DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
1918-1945
Series D (1937-1945)
Volume XIII
THE WAR YEARS
June 23-December 11, 1941
DOCUMENTS ON
GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
1918-1945
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1954
TX
/-. „ i Thlt itrtto U also published in (treat Britain by
^5 3 J Her Majetty'i Stationery Office, London
MS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Publication 7682
For sale by the
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Washington, D.C., 20402
Price £4.00 (Buckram)
BOARD OF EDITORS 1
United States: Howard M. Smyth, Editor-in-Chief; Arthur G.
Kogan ; George O. Kent.
Great Britain: The Hon. Margaret Lambert, Editor-in-Chief;
K.H.M. Duke; F. G. Stambrook; D. C. Watt; E. C. M. Breuning.
France: Maurice Baumont, Editor-in-Chief; Georges Bounin;
Andre Scherer; Jacques Bariety.
1 This list shows the members of the Board of Editors in Washington at the
time of the final editorial work on the volume. For Great Britain and France
it lists the members in the closing phase of the work of the Project at Whaddon
Hall, Buckinghamshire. Former editors, with their terms of service, were:
United States: Raymond James Sontag, Editor-in-Chief, September 1946-
July 1849; Bernadotte E. Schmltt, Editor-in-Chief, July 1949-July 1952;
Paul R. Sweet, Editor-in-Chief, July 1952-March 1959; Fredrick Aandahl,
January 1951-September 1953; B. Malcolm Carroll, October 1946-August
1949; Jean Brownell Dulaney. December 1946-April 1951; Fritz Epstein,
October 1946-July 1948; Anna Maria Herbert, April 1951-August 1952;
John Huizenga, January 1947-September 1952; Otto Pfianze, January
1948-August 1949; Joachim Remak, December 1947-July 1951; Norman
Rich, August 1949-August 1954; James Stuart Beddie, September 1946-
August 1959.
Great Bhitain : Sir John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Editor-in-Chief, September
1946-May 1948, thereafter Historical Adviser until 1956 ; James Joll, Editor-
in-Chief, June-December 1948; General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall,
Editor-in-Chief, June 1948-January 1951 ; B. K. Bramsted, January 1948-
February 1952 ; L. Branney, September 1946-July 1948 ; P. Ericsson, January
1948-May 1952; M. H. Fisher, May 1949-May 1356; W. H. C. Frend,
March 1947-October 1951; K. Ronau, April 1952-June 1956; D. C. Watt,
October 1951-October 1954; T. F. D. Williams, September 1947-September
1949 ; Z. A. B. Zeman, January 1956-October 1957.
France : Jeau Bstienne, July 1947-April 1950; Won de Groer, July 1947-October
1950; Jacques Grunewald, October 1950-October 1955.
-"\
CONTENTS
Page
Pbepace IX
Analytical List op Documents . xm
Documents 1
Appendices:
I. Organization of the German Foreign Ministry . . . . . 1011
II. List of German Files Used 1017
III. List of Principal Persons 1023
IV. Glossary of German Terms and Abbreviations 1033
VII
PREFACE 1
This volume concludes the work of the Tripartite Project which
originated with the agreement of June 1946 between the United States
Department of State and the British Foreign Office and to which the
French Government adhered in 1947. The agreement provided for the
publication of selected documents from the archives of the former
German Foreign Ministry in order "to establish the record of German
diplomacy preceding and during World War II," and it stipulated
that the editorial work was to be performed "on the basis of highest
scholarly objectivity." The editors have made their selections of docu-
ments for publication on this basis alone. They have exercised com-
plete freedom in the selection of documents and in their editing of
this volume and of all volumes published under the terms of the
Project. The editors, therefore, accept full responsibility for the
volumes as published.
Microfilming- of the files of the German Foreign Ministry archives
was begun in Marburg in 1945 by American and British experts for
intelligence purposes and was continued in Berlin by teams of his-
torians representing the three Governments in the Project. In 1948
the collection was moved to Whaddon Hall, Buckinghamshire, Eng-
land where it remained for ten years in the custody of the British
, and United States Governments. Before the archives were moved
from Berlin over 800,000 pages of documents for the period since 1914
had been recorded on film. By the end of 1958, when the last of the
archives were made ready for restoration to the German Federal Ke-
public, almost three million microfilm frames had been made. Each
document printed in this publication bears a microfilm serial and frame
number in the upper left-hand corner. The microfilm copy of the
original German text can be located by reference to Appendix II,
"List of German Files Used."
It was originally intended to complete the entire publication for the
period 1918-1945 in some twenty volumes. When, however, the pre-
liminary work on the selections for the years from 1933 to 1945 was
completed in 1954 it became apparent that an adequate selection of
the documents for this period would require a publication on a scale
approximately double the size which had been anticipated at the out-
' In each of the first four volumes published in the series there appears a
"General Introduction" which describes some of the principles which have guided
the editors in their work.
PREFACE
set.
After considering the length of time it would take to carry out
a program on this enlarged scale, the participating Governments de-
cided to limit the publication in English to the years 1933 to 1941—
beginning January 30, 1933, when Hitler became Reich Chancellor
and ending in December 1941 with the German declaration of war on
the United States. Series D comprises 13 volumes. Series C, in six
volumes, covers the period 1933 to 1937.
In the exchange of notes with the custodial Governments which
provided for the restitution of the political archives of the former
German Foreign Ministry, the Federal Republic gave assurance that
it would "keep the returned files in an orderly manner and grant
German and foreign scholars access to the files at all times."
In 1952 the custodial Governments decided to permit universities,
private foundations, and even individuals to sponsor filming programs
m the pre-1920 files. Thus it came about that a very large portion of
the files of the Political Department for the period before 1920 were
a ™ T?,' Aft6r th6Se Vari0US P r °i e<!ts wei- e completed a grant by
the *ord Foundation enabled the Committee for the Study of War
Documents of the American Historical Association to publish A Cata-
logue of Fzles and Microfilms of the German Foreign Ministry Ar-
chives 1867-1920 (Oxford University Press, 1959) .
All of the microfilms made by the Project are now freely available
to public research at the National Archives in Washington and at the
Public Record Office in London. Scholars who wish to check the
translation of any printed document, or to consult the full language
of a document which is summarized or referred to by footnote, can
identify the desired German text by serial and frame number. Those
who might wish to test the selection of documents printed can consult
the films of the files listed in the appendix according to serial number.
After the completion of the microfilming program at Whaddon Hall
the Historical Office of the Department of State undertook the prepara-
tion of a comprehensive guide of the official filming: A Catalog of
Files and Microfilms of the German Foreign Ministry Archives 1920-
im Compiled and edited by George O. Kent, and published as a
joint project of the Department of State and the Hoover Institution
on War, Revolution, and Peace, volume I was issued by the Hoover
Institution in the summer of 1962.
Volume XIII of the Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series
D, covers German foreign policy for the second half of the year 1941
It opens on June 23, the day following announcement of the attack
on the Soviet Union, and it ends on December 11 with the German
declaration of war following Pearl Harbor. The relations of Germany
PREFACE XI
with the United States and with the Imperial Japanese Government
constitute the principal topics of this period. The editors have en-
deavored to present all of the German diplomatic evidence of how
Hitler came to his decision to declare war on the United States. Cer-
tain of the crucial documents in this story are classified in the Ana-
lytical List under the subject, Tripartite Pact.
There is a decided shift of emphasis between the previous volume
and this one. Until June 22 negotiations with the Soviet Union con-
stitute a large fraction of the work of the German Foreign Ministry.
As German policy toward Russia after that date is continued by other
means, the diplomatic relations sink to the level of those of belligerent
powers without direct connection. Moreover, in the period of volume
XII the Balkans constitute an area of intense diplomatic activity.
For volume XIII the area becomes predominantly one of occupation,
veiled or overt. Although the line beween foreign policy and occupa-
tion policy is not always obvious, the editors have tried to restrict their
selections of documents to the field of diplomacy. Where the policies
of Germany as an occupying power affect her relations with other
states the occupation policy needs to be illustrated. Under the head-
ing, Yugoslavia, are comprised documents relating both to the govern-
ment established by the Axis in Croatia and to the occupational regime
in Serbia.
A generous selection of documents illustrates the Rome-Berlin Axis
relationship. Here the editors have continued to present tlie texts of
all known letters of Hitler and Mussolini. The Axis in the period of
this volume begins to show considerable strain : because of the in-
adequate deliveries of raw materials to Italy ; because of the treatment
of Italian laborers in Germany; because of friction in the Balkans;
and because of the German failure to achieve quick victory, an Axis
article of faith in which the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano,
ceases to believe. German relations with France, with the govern-
ment at Vichy and through the office at Paris, are also fully portrayed
in this period of collaboration under handicap.
With the cutting off of the flow of raw materials and other supplies
from Russia, the economic relations of Germany with Rumania,
Sweden, Turkey, and the Iberian Peninsula loom larger. It has not
been possible to cover these topics with complete satisfaction or to
illustrate fully the economic negotiations of Germany with Italy and
with Japan because of gaps in the record arising from the absence
of the files of the Economic Policy Department.
In accordance with past practice in this series all of the numbered
Fiihrer Directives issued in this period have been printed although
some are almost completely tactical and have little foreign policy
COIlltJI 1 L r
XII PREFACE
The documents are printed in chronological order, but the Analytical
List at the beginning of the volume presents them by subject for the
convenience of the reader. Here will be found in alphabetical order
additional important topics of German policy covered by this volume.
The documents have been selected jointly by United States, British,
and French editors, but the United States editors have had full edi-
torial responsibility for this volume. The editors wish to express their
appreciation to various officials of the Department of State for co-
operation and assistance, and particularly to G. Bernard Noble, former
Director of the Historical Office, to his successor William M. Franklin,
and to members of the American Advisory Committee : Sidney B. Fay,
Hans W. Gatzke, Oron J. Hale, Hajo Holborn, William L. Langer,
and Raymond J. Sontag. Bernadotte E. Schmitt, a former editor-in-
chief, has most generously rendered guidance on an informal basis.
The translations were drafted by the Division of Language Services
of the Department of State, but the editors have final responsibility
for the translations as well as full responsibility for the footnotes and
other editorial matter.
The American editors are particularly grateful to Dr. Vincent Kroll
and other members of the German Editorial Group within the
Quadripartite Project for the publication of the documents on the
foreign policy of the Weimar Eepublic; they undertook the onerous
task of comparing the completed typescript text with the original
documents and thereby prevented many an error.
Valuable aid in preparing the typescript was rendered by Barbara
A. Griffith and by Elizabeth Baird, Linda Swauger, and Willa Mae
Kuhn. The technical preparation of edited copy for the printer was
done in the Division of Publishing Services of the Department of
State under the direction of Jerome H. Perlmutter; the editors ac-
knowledge gratefully the assistance of Elizabeth Vary, Collie E.
Halbert, and other members of the staff of that Division.
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS *
Afghanistan
Date
Subject
1941
June 29
July 14
July 31
Aug. 9
Aug. 16
Sept. S
107
169
190 301
Unsigned Memorandum
Th Jit^i° n '" ^fBhanistan to the Foreign. Ministvn
abandoned because th^^j SUch "Potions be
Save the B^ft E^^^
there is increasing ; we Jure or ^tS» -* 81 ? Iran £ Ut that
fomented by the BriKSSV^™^ ™*
^ ReSthat i& k T?- a Z i0 J^ e Forei ^ Minify
man and Italian commu"^ but th^^Af"^ th ? Ger '
request their free departure across J£>M.^ fgl ? , ™ tan ' s
neutral country w aS pSeT Sh * emt0ry to a
(See also under ' India" and "Middle East.")
SI
206
289
318
463
Oct. 12
308
640
XIV
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Anti-Comintern Pact
Date
1941
Aug. 12
Oct. 17
Nov. 2
Nov. 3
Nov. 15
Nov. 15
Subject
Doe. No.
Nov. 15
Nov. 17
Nov. 20
Memorandum by the Stale Secretary
Records a conversation with the Finnish Minister,
Kivimaki, who expressed the view that Finland's acces-
sion to the Anti-Comintern Pact was not necessary and
that her accession to the Tripartite Pact would not be
useful.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy
Explains that Ambassador O'tt has been instructed to
propose to Japan that a protocol for the extension of the
Anti-Comintern Pact be signed in Berlin. Directs
that the Italian Government be asked to agree.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy
Suggests that Rumania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and
Croatia might wish to join the Anti-Comintern Pact and
that Finland and Denmark should also be considered.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy
Suggests that the representatives for the German,
Italian, and Japanese Governments approach the
Governments of Hungary, Manchukuo, and Spain and
invite them to sign the document for the extension of
the Anti-Comintern Pact.
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland
Explains that other governments, in addition to the
original signatories, have agreed to join the Anti-Comin-
tern Pact and directs that the Finnish Government be
urged to join in the accession and extension.
The Slate Secretary to the Foreign Minister
Transmits a report by Grundherr on his conversation
with the Finnish Minister about Finnish accession to
the Anti- Comintern Pact. Kivimaki stated, as his
personal opinion, that while he was in favor of Finland's
joining the Pact he considered the present moment
unsuited.
Memorandum by the Minister to Portugal
Explains the position of Portugal on the Anti- Comin-
tern Pact: her opposition to Bolshevism is well known
but adherence to the Pact would involve great risk be-
cause of her economic dependence on Britain.
The Minister in Finland to Ike Foreign Ministry
Refers to telegram No. 1469 (document No. 472)
and reports on his conversation with President Ryti
regarding Finland's accession to the Anti-Comintern
Pact. Ryti stressed the great difficulties Finland was
having at the time and said that the moment did not
seem propitious for Finland to join the Pact. Bliicher
pointed out that Finland's accession would only for-
malize existing policies.
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the President has decided to empower
the Foreign Minister to adhere to the Anti-Comintern
Pact.
Pags
197
405
442
443
472
474
310
650
727
728
783
785
476
787
477 788
485
804
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Anti-Comintern Pact — Continued
XV
Subject
Doc. NO.
Page
1941
Nov. 24
Nov. 25
Nov. 25
Memoranchim by the director of the Legal Department 496 818
Records meeting with Kase for the exchange of notes
concerning the Secret Additional Agreement to the
Anti-Comintern Pact (document No, 498) and with
whom it was agreed that secrecy of the pertinent doc-
ument would be maintained.
Protocol on the Extension of the Period of Validity of 498 820
the Agreement Against the Communist Inter-
national
Text.
The Japanese Ambassador in Germany to the Foreign 502 834
Minister
States that Japanese and German Governments are
in agreement in considering the Secret Additional
Agreement to the Anti-Comintern Agreement of 1936
to be no longer in force with the signing of the new
Protocol (document No. 498).
(See also under "Bulgaria," "Italy," and "Ru-
mania.")
Baltic States
Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI
Records having been told by the former Lithuanian
Minister Skirpa that the Kaunas radio station an-
nounced the formation of a Lithuanian government
headed by him. He admitted having been in contact
with the Abwehr.
Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI
Records receiving unofficially M. Kreewinsch, the
former Latvian Minister, No hope was offered regard-
ing fulfillment of his wish to be recognized again as
Latvian Minister in Berlin,
Kazys Skirpa to the FHhrer and Chancellor
States that he is willing to head the national Lithu-
anian government which has been proclaimed by the
Lithuanian activist movement following the advance of
the German troops into Lithuania.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 18 22
Secretariat
Refers to Grundherr's memorandum of June 23
(document No. 3) and records the Foreign Minister's
decision that no contact whatever is to be established
with Skirpa.
The State Secretary to the Embassy to the Holy See 37 42
Directs that no contact be established with the Mis-
sions of the former Baltic States; that any discussion of
the political future of the Baltic area is undesirable.
Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI 39 43
Records that the Foreign Ministry in a communica-
tion sent to the OK W welcomed the cooperation of local
elements in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia with the
German troops, requesting, however, that political
promises to these elements be avoided.
1941
June 23
June 23
June 23
June 25
June 28
June 28
XVI
Date
1941
Aug. 21
Oct.
1941
Oct. 13
Oct. 21
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Baltic States — Continued
Subject
Memorandum by an Official of the Department for Ger-
man Internal Affairs
Requests that the Foreign Minister be informed of
a proposal by the former Estonian Minister President
regarding the formation of an Estonian government
and army.
The Acting Deputy Director in the Political Department
to the Legation in Finland
Directs that the political reorganization of the
Baltic states not be discussed with foreigners. Ex-
plains that it is intended to bring these states into very
close association with the Reich, but that the details
have not as yet been worked out.
(See also under "U.S.S.R.")
Page
348
620
Belgium
The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmachl to the
Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Lists the military, political, economic, and adminis-
trative reasons why the current military administration
in Belgium should not be replaced by a civil adminis-
tration.
Memorandum by the Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Records that Hitler, who intended to set up a civilian
administration in Belgium, dismissed Keitel's reasons
against this procedure as stated in his report of October
13 (document No. 401).
Bulgaria
1941
July 9
July 11
July 14
July 31
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Records a visit of the Bulgarian Minister who ex-
plained the changes desired by the Italians in the
Albanian-Bulgarian frontier as drawn in Vienna.
Recommends encouraging the Bulgarians to resist the
Italian claims.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Records giving the Bulgarian Minister a map of the
Vienna boundary line between Albania and Bulgaria
and suggesting the argument be used with the Italians
that a change in the line would need German consent.
The Legation in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Confirms that the Vienna boundary line of Albania
and Bulgaria was deliberately drawn so that the Jesse-
rina mine would fall to Bulgaria; King Boris was
informed of this; the Italians were aware of it.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Records having been informed by the Bulgarian
Minister regarding the visit of the Bulgarian Foreign
Minister to Rome.
643
672
87
94
106
170
107
120
135
271
Date
1941
Sept. 20
Oct. 31
Nov. 22
Nov. 27
Nov. 29
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Bulgaria — Continued
Subject
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria
Directs that a noncommittal attitude be taken in the
question whether or not Bulgaria should break off rela-
tions with the Soviet Union,
Memorandum by the Slate Secretary
Records mentioning to Draganov the Bulgarian mal-
treatment of the Greek population in Thrace.
German-Bulgarian Secret Additional Protocol to the
Tripartite Pact Regarding the Press, News, and
Propaganda
Provision for German-Bulgarian cooperation in the
sphere of press, news, and propaganda support of the
Tripartite Pact; specialists from each country will be
attached to its Legation in the other country to consult
on appropriate steps to be taken.
Memorandum by the Dirigetd of the Political Depart-,
ment
Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and
Bulgarian Foreign Minister Popov on November 26;
discussion of the possibility for increased Bulgarian
grain deliveries to Germany, Bulgarian methods in
putting down an uprising in Thrace, Bulgarian demands
for more protection by the German military against the
Greeks in Macedonia, and the difficulties in carrying out
anti-Jewish laws in Bulgaria.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Personal Staff
Record of Hitler's reception on November 27 of the
Bulgarian Foreign Minister Popov. Hitler contrasted
Germany's policy with England's; described his plans for
European reconstruction; and denounced Russian
Communism.
(See also under "Anti-Comintern Pact.")
Doc. No.
XVII
Page
341
435
490
537
718
811
504
840
509
858
1941
June 25
June 27
June 27
China
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 13 17
Reports that Matsuoka, in compliance with a request
by Wang Ching-wei, has instructed the Japanese
Ambassadors in Berlin and Rome to obtain German
and Italian recognition of the Nanking government.
The Charge 1 d' Affaires in China to the Foreign Ministry 27 29
States that the reasons heretofore arguing against
German recognition of the Wang Ching-wei govern-
ment still exist and urges that no decisive steps
regarding recognition be taken before the conclusion
of the German-Russian conflict.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Japan 32 35
Informs Ott that Ribbentrop told Oshima that
Hitler had decided to recognize the Wang Ching-wei
regime on July 1. States that he himself has discussed
with Oshima the details regarding recognition.
682-905—64-
xvin
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
China — Continued
Date
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
1941
June 28
The State Secretary to the Embassy in China
Sends instructions to hand Wang Ching-wei the
Foreign Minister's telegram recognizing his govern-
ment.
38
42
June 30
Circular of the State Secretary
States that Germany does not intend to break off
automatically relations with Chungking following rec-
ognition of the Wang Ching-wei government.
47
53
June 30
The State Secretary to the Field Office in Chungking
Tells of his conversation with the Chinese Ambassa-
dor regarding the effects of a German recognition of the
Wang Ching-wei government. Gives instructions not
to notify the Government in Chungking of Germany's
impending recognition of Wang Ching-wei,
48
53
July 3
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Records his conversation with the Chinese Ambassa-
dor who stated orally that the Government of Chiang
Kai-shek was breaking off relations with Germany
following German recognition of Wang Ching-wei.
(See also under "Anti-Comintern Pact.")
68
79
Denmark
1941
July 23
Aug. 12
Nov. 4
Nov. 10
Nov. 17
Memorandum by Ambassador Hitter
Recommends compliance with a Danish request for
an increase of their Army which has the approval of
General Fromm on condition that a regiment of the
Danish Army participates in the war against Soviet
Russia.
The Commander of German Troops in Denmark to the
High Command of the Army
Transmits the reply of the Danish General Staff re-
garding an increase of effectives of the Danish Army
and a memorandum giving some reasons for the Dan-
ish reply. From this reply it appears that the Danish
Ministry of War in agreement with the Government
disapproved the request of the General Staff.
Memorandum by ike Head of Political Division VI
Examines the attitude of the Danish Government
and people toward Germany and concludes that while
there is much cooperation with German policy many
Danes would prefer to have the war between Germany
and Great Britain end in a draw.
The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
Foreign Minister
Informs Ribbentrop of the renewed Danish request
for a revaluation of the Danish currency and asks au-
thorization for its approval.
Memorandum by the Dirigent of the Political Department
Informs Weizsacker that Hitler approved a continua-
tion of German policy toward Denmark as set forth in
an enclosed memorandum by the Foreign Minister.
142
198
447
459
479
204
311
737
762
795
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Den mark — Continued
XIX
Date
1941
Nov. 27
Nov. 30
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 510 861
Personal Staff
Records Hitler s remarks on the economic future of
Europe, and on American and British economic policy
on the occasion of the visit of Danish Foreign Min-
ister Scavenius at Hitler's headquarters;
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 518 887
Secretariat
Records a conversation between Ribbentrop and
Scavenius in Berlin on November 28. Ribbentrop talks
about German-Danish relations and about the progress
of the war in general.
fSee also under "Anti-Comintern Pact" and "Ice-
land.")
Directives fob the Conduct of the War
1941
July 19
July 30
Sept. 1
Sept. 6
Sept. 13
Sept. 16
Sept. 20
Fuhrer's Directive Mo. 38: Continuation of the War in 128 181
the Bast
Outlines the aims and operations for the next phase
of the campaign against Soviet Russia.
Fuhrer's Directive No. 34 164 235
Modifies directive No. 33 (document No. 128) in
view of changes in the situation.
The Chief of the High Command of the Wekrmacht to 265 422
the Reichsmarschall and Commander in Chief of the
Luftwaffe, to the Commander in Chief of the Navy,
to the Commander in Chief of the Army, and to the
Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs
Forwards a memorandum of August 27 entitled "The
Strategic Situation in Late Summer 1941 as Basis for
Further Political and Military Plans."
Fuhrer's Directive No. 85 283 456
Outlines the next operations on the various sectors of
the front.
Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht 312 496
Directs that in view of the situation in Norway far
stricter punishments, including the death penalty, be
administered for offenses committed directly or in-
directly against Germany.
Fuhrer's Directive 326 517
Assigns to Field Marshal List the tasks of crushing
insurrections in southeastern Europe and outlines the
necessary measures; all army units in the area of insur-
rection are to be concentrated under the command of
General Boehme.
Circular of the Foreign Ministry 344 541
Forwards text of a directive of September 16 by
Keitel regarding the suppression of insurrectionary
movements in the areas under German occupation.
XX
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Directives for the Conduct of the War— Continued
Date
1941
Sept, 22
Oct. 7
Oct. 10
Dec. 2
Dec. 8
Subject
FHhrer's Directive No. 36
Outlines operations to be conducted by the forces
operating on the Finnish front against Soviet Russia.
Directive of Che High Command of Die Wekrmacht
Hitler's decision that no capitulation be accepted
from Leningrad or Moscow.
Fiihrer's Directive No. 37
Directs a shift from the offensive by the forces operat-
ing in Finland.
Fiihrer's Directive No. 38
Provides for the transfer of a Luftwaffe Corps to the
Mediterranean theater under Command of Field
Marshal Kesselring as Commander in Chief, South.
Fukrer's Directive No, 39
Directs a shift to the defensive on the eastern front
because of early winter weather.
Doe. No.
Pago
349
388
395
535
564
549
623
634
938
984
Egypt
1941
June 30
July 3
Oct. 6
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Iran
Instructs Ettel to continue with the Egyptian Am-
bassador in Iran the discussions which had been begun
in April 1941.
The Minister in Iran to Vie Foreign Ministry
Reports a conference with the Egyptian Ambassa-
dor who stated that on instruction he had informed
the Shah that King Farouk had definite information of
a plan by the British General Staff to occupy the Iran-
ian oil region.
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Reports on a conversation with an emissary of King
Farouk who also represents three Egyptian politicai
parties. He wished to clarify Germany's plans with
regard to Egypt in case of a German victory in Africa
and also sought to induce the Axis to treat Cairo as an
open city.
(See also under "Middle East.")
49
66
54
77
385
618
Finland
1941
June 25
June 27
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that Russian air attacks had created a new
situation for Finland, and that he had pointed out to the
Finnish Foreign Minister that there how existed a state
of war between Finland and Russia. The Finnish
Cabinet will issue a new governmental declaration.
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with Foreign Minister
Witting who mentioned the possibility of a break with
England or America but stated that Finland would
prefer the initiative for such to come from the other side.
15
29
19
32
ANALYTICAL LIST OP DOCUMENTS
Finla Nr> — Continued
XXI
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
1941
July 1
July 9
July 22
July 28
Aug. 22
Aug. 26
Sept. 1
Sept.
1
Sept.
11
Sept.
18
The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister
Transmits a letter from the Finnish President to
Hitler in which Ryti expressed his appreciation for
Germany's military assistance and the hope that it
would lead to a successful conclusion of Finland's fight
for independence.
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland
Directs that the Finnish Government be urged to
break off diplomatic relations with Great Britain in view
of her close cooperation with the Soviet Union.
Editors' Note
Reference to a letter of Hitler to Ryti urging that
Finland break relations with Great Britain.
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the Finnish Cabinet has authorized the
Foreign Minister in dealing with England to go as far
as breaking off diplomatic relations.
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the Finnish Foreign Minister informed
the British Minister that Finland, because of British-
Soviet cooperation, would close her Legation in London.
Bliicher requests that the German press minimize the
matter.
Field Marshal Keitel to Field Marshal Manntrheim
Explains his views on the military situation regarding
the northern part of the Russian front and suggests
where Finnish and German troops could cooperate
most profitably in their struggle to defeat the Soviet
Union.
Field Marshal Mannerheim to Field Marshal Keitel
Replies to Keitel's letter of August 22 (document
No. 228) and gives his views on the current military
operations and the conditions of the Finnish armed forces.
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Explains that the official version is that Finland is
fighting a defensive war which is connected with the
German-Russian war only operationally, and that
although no official aims have been announced by the
Government, some circles would like to acquire Eastern
Karelia.
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports differences within the Finnish Government
about the future conduct of the war, especially on the
question of advancing beyond the former boundary.
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with President Ryti who
denied rumors of a separate peace, mentioned the need
for a reduction of the army in order to alleviate the
economy, and outlined Finland's territorial aims.
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland
Refers to Bhjcher's telegram of September 11 (docu-
ment No. 301) and informs him that the German atti-
tude toward Finland's territorial wishes was positive
but that Germany herself was interested in the Kola
Peninsula.
52
85
140
160
228
248
262
60
105
185
202
227
355
395
417
264
301
331
421
477
527
xxn
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Finland — Continued
Date
Subject
Doc, No.
1941
Sept. 24
Oct. 25
Oct. 28
Oct. 31
Nov. 4
Nov. 10
Nov. 14
Nov. 23
Nov. 28
Dec. 2
Dec. 2
Page
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the former Norwegian Minister de-
livered to Witting a communication of the British
Government stating that Finland waged aggressive war
against England's ally, Russia, and that if Finland con-
tinued to invade purely Russian territory England
could be compelled to treat her as an open foe.
The Legation in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports the main economic preoccupation of the
Finnish Government to be the food situation which
shows a deficit of 175,000 tons of bread grains.
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports on a proposal made to the Finnish Govern-
ment regarding reorganization of the nickel concession
The plan for a German-Finnish company was approved
in principle by the President.
Memorandum by the Head of Division W IV in the
Economic Policy Department _
Records a conversation with President Ryti who
talked about Finnish territorial aims, the forthcoming
winter campaign, and Finnish attitude toward Great
Britain and Sweden.
Memorandum by Minister Leitner _
Records the statements of Ramsay, Finnish Minister
of Supply, regarding Finland's overseas ships and the
Finnish wish to sell a portion of these to Sweden,
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Records a brief discussion with the Finnish Minister
regarding the new American memorandum in regard to
the Finnish campaign against Russia.
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with the Foreign Minister
who is opposed to a change in the existing arrangements
for the Petsamo niekel mines.
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the German promise of 75,000 tons of
grain has brought great joy although the grain deficit
is now estimated to be much larger than was thought
earlier.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Personal Staff
Records the conversation at a reception of the
Finnish Foreign Minister by Hitler on November 27.
Hitler explained the strategic and political situation.
his future plans in the east, and his determination to
support Finland in all circumstances:
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the Finnish Cabinet continues to discuss
the British ultimatum but that the reply is certain to be
negative.
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with the Foreign Minister
who complained about the treatment of Finnish
volunteers in German military units.
353
558
423
429
436
448
461
469
493
507
685
705
719
740
768
780
814
849
533
534
936
937
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Finland — Continued
XXIII
Date
Subject
Doe. No.
Pago
1941
Dec. 4
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the Finnish reply to the British ulti-
matum is expected to be handed to the American
Minister this evening. The wording is polite and is
designed to place the blame for a declaration of war
on England.
(See also under "Anti-Comintern Pact," "Directives
for the Conduct of the War," and "Sweden.")
540
949
France
1941
June 26
June 26
June 26
June 27
July 2
July 5
July 6
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that Darlan wished to break off relations
with the Russian Government but needed a suitable
pretext for reasons of domestic policy.
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry
Transmits Plain's letter of June 25 to Hitler re-
questing that members of the Gardes Territoriaux
not be treated by the German military authorities as
snipers.
Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter
Presents his views regarding French occupation
costs, advocating: (1) the reduction to the figure of
10 million reichsmarks effective with fulfillment of
German demands regarding Bizerte and Dakar; and
(2) renunciation of the transfer of securities, foreign
exchange and gold.
The Foreign Minister to the Chief of the High Command
of the Wekrmacht
In reply to Keitel's letter of June 15 (Volume XII,
document No. 633) explains the need to secure Ger-
many's military interests by negotiation with France
and discusses the need for Bizerte and Dakar.
The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmachi to
the Foreign Minister
Replies to Ribbentrop's letter of June 27 (document
No. 31) agreeing with Ribbentrop's conceptions; ex-
plaining the intended routing of transports to Bizerte;
and indicating that the exploitation of Dakar by the
German Navy should precede its use as a German air
base.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris
Replies to telegram No. 1909 of June 26 (document
No. 23) directing Abetz to inform Darlan that Ger-
many would be willing to consider a pardon for the
French territorial guards provided that Reynaud and
Mandel be imprisoned for life by the French Govern-
ment.
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having convoked the leaders of certain French
groups to facilitate the organization of French volunteers
in the struggle against Russia.
20
23
24
31
61
74
78
24
25
27
33
70
88
94
XXIV
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
France — Continued
Date
1041
July 8
July 12
July 15
July 16
Subject
July 30
Aug. 7
Aug. 8
Aug. 13
Aug. 18
Doc. No.
Page
Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Minister
Reports a conversation with Darlan on problems
concerning the Mediterranean area, particularly those
relating to supply transports through Bizerte and the
possibility of British attacks on Dakar.
The Embassy in Parts to the Foreign Ministry
Reports receiving a communication from the French
Cabinet stating that it is unable to carry out further
military cooperation because the political negotiations
which constitute the framework have not been con-
cluded.
The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Instructs Abetz to expedite the shipments via Bizerte
but to treat other questions with France in a dilatory
manner. Explains that a meeting of the Foreign Min-
ister with Darlan would not be opportune.
Memorandum for the Ftihrer
Ribbentrop submits to Hitler the French note verb ale
of July 14 with the notation that with Hitler's approval
it was to be returned to Abetz as not received. The
note verbale urges that recent developments have
changed the conditions under which the Paris Protocols
of May 27 and 28 (Volume XII, document No. 559)
were concluded ; proposes a meeting of Darlan and Rib-
bentrop; and outlines a new Franco-German policy to
take account of the changed situation.
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with Benoist-Mechin in
which Abetz informs him of Germany's rejection of
the French note of July 14 (see document No. 113) and
reproves him for the uncooperative attitude of the
French Government.
An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the
Embassy in Paris
Transmits a communication from the Military
Commander in France with a report of de Brinon about
his recent conversations with Petain, Darlan, and
Huntziger, on the current French political crisis.
Ribbentrop asks that Abetz check the report.
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry
Corroborates General Stulpnagel's report (docu-
ment No. 186) . Cites additional reasons for the delay
in French cooperation regarding Bizerte and explains
the difficult position of Darlan.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris
Instructs Abetz to tell Darlan that because of ;the
eastern campaign a personal meeting could not be
arranged at the moment but that the German Govern-
ment was anxious to reach a sincere understanding with
the French as soon as possible.
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with Darlan on French-
American relations and British and Free French in-
trigues. Darlan reasserted his intention to proceed
forcefully against these elements.
82
100
110
113
99
127
139
142
162
186
231
293
189
199
211
300
312
326
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
France — Continued
XXV
Date
1941
Aug. 21
Sept.
16
Sept.
19
Oct.
21
Oct.
22
Oct.
24
Oct.
25
Nov.
4
Nov
10
Subject
Doe. No.
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy 222 345
Department
Reviews the course of negotiations with the French
Government over occupation costs explaining the
French unilateral action in reducing the daily rate of
payment to 15 million reichsmarks. Discusses various
courses and suggests a note which would reserve Ger-
many's rights to full payment.
Unsigned Memorandum 327 518
Resume 1 of Hitler's remarks to Ambassador Abetz:
The French a decent people but no change in their
tactical treatment while the eastern campaign lasts;
occupation troops to be increased; territorial claims;
Italian claims excessive; the question of occupation
costs and of uniforms for the militia; the Filhrer's plans
for the east.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris 338 534
Instructs Abetz to support in every way the strong
military measures against Communist intrigues which
have been ordered by the OKW.
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry 415 671
Reports Weygand's unwillingness voluntarily to re-
sign and requests instructions as to what to reply to
Darlan who will formally ask about the German attitude
toward Weygand.
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry 417 673
Transmits text of a letter from Pe'tain to Hitler, ex-
pressing hopes for a fruitful German-French collabora-
tion in the future.
The Dirigent of the Political Department to the Embassy 419 676
in Paris
Directs Abetz to tell Darlan that Weygand does not
in any way enjoy the confidence of the Reich Govern-
ment.
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry 422 682
Abetz reports having maintained complete re-
serve regarding the reprisals for the recent assassina-
tions of members of the Wehrmacht. He discusses the
possible political consequences of the reprisals ; relates
Pfitain's plan to turn himself over to German authori-
ties; and recommends that further shootings of
hostages be suspended.
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry 445 730
Reports on the French Government's problem re-
garding Weygand and of the maneuvers of Weygand's
supporters in the Ministerial Council. Explains that
Petain would be willing to dismiss Weygand but wishes
concessions to compensate for the loss of prestige such
as a trip to the occupied area and the opportunity to
meet Goring.
Chancellor Hitler to Marshal Pilain 460 764
Replies to Plain's letter (see document No. 417)
and states his views regarding Franco-German coopera-
tion, the shooting of French hostages, and Germany's
war against the Soviet Union.
XXVI
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
France — Continued
1941
Nov. 12
Nov. 17
Nov. IS
Dee. 3
[Dec. 1]
Deo. 10
Subject
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris
Directs that the French Government be informed
that the Reich Government has already stated its lack
of confidence in Weygand.
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry
Reports on a trip to Vichy on the occasion of the
funeral of General Huntziger and on conversations with
Pe"tain and Darlan regarding Hitler's letter to Pfitain
(document No. 460) and the dismissal of Weygand.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris
Instructs Abetz to inform P6tain that Goring would
be willing to meet him secretly in the course of the
coming week.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Secretariat
Record of the conversation between Reichsmarschali
Goring and Marshal Petain on December 1, 1941, in
Florentin-Vergigny. Pfitain presented a note verbale of
the French Government (document No. 531) which
was read in translation. Darlan was drawn into the
discussion. Goring rejected the note but suggested it
be modified before being presented to Hitler.
Note Verbale From the French Government
Explains the desire of the French Government to
collaborate with Germany but that the policy needs the
support of the French people which cannot be expected
unless they can see positive advantages from the policy.
France needs to defend her empire and requires the
means for this. Other necessary concessions are listed.
Memorandum by an Official of Political Division IM
Records the decision of Hitler to have a meeting
arranged among Goring, General Juin, and Admiral
Platon for the discussion of defense plans for the
French colonial possessions in Africa.
(See also under "Indochina," "Italy," and "Middle
East.")
463
478
481
529
Pago
770
791
800
914
531
930
573
1000
Greece
1941
July 25
Aug. 14
Aug. 18
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy
Department
Delineates the critical food situation in Greece and
discusses possible solutions.
Ambassador Riiter to the Foreign Ministry and to the
Reich Plenipotentiary in Greece
Explains that in deference to Italian wishes no Greek
volunteers will be permitted on the Russian front. Di-
rects that the decision be tactfully explained to the
Greeks,
The Foreign Minister to the Reich Plenipotentiary in
Greece
Directs that policy in the Mediterranean area must
be subordinate to the basic principle of the alliance with
Italy.
155
201
212
218
313
328
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Gbeece — Continued
xxvn
Date
1941
Aug. 26
Sept. 15
Oct. 24
Subject
Doe. No.
Page
The Foreign Minister lo the Reich Plenipotentiary in 246 394
Greece
Directs Aitenburg to maintain complete reserve re-
garding reorganization of the Greek Government leav-
ing every initiative in the matter to his Italian col-
league.-
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy 323 512
Department
Discusses the situation of Greece with regard to the
food supply in view of recent unfavorable developments.
Memorandum by Minister Eisenlohr 420 676
Records the breakdown of German-Italian plans to
supply Greece with grain from Turkey and Bulgaria.
lhe German military provide supplementary allow-
ances to Greeks who work for them.
Hungary
1941
June 24
June 24
June 26
June 26
June 26
JuneI28
July 1
The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the Hungarian Minister President
requested clarification as to whether Germany desired
Hungarian participation in the advance against the
bo viet Union in view of statements to that effect made
by the German General with the Hungarian Hieh
Command.
The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a discussion with General Himer who de-
clared that the statements attributed to him by
Minister President Bardossy (see document No. 10)
were not in accordance with the facta. Forwards text
of General Himer's note to Colonel Laszlo.
The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that Bardossy inquired whether the Gov-
ernment had sent a reply to his inquiry (documents
Nos. 10 and 11) regarding Hungarian participation in
the German operation against the Soviet Union.
The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Reports the statement of Bardossy that Russian
planes had bombed a train and town in Hungary in
consequence of which Hungary considered herself at
war with the Soviet Union.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Records receiving from the Hungarian Minister a
memorandum regarding efforts to incorporate the
former 1 ugoslav Banat into the German Reich.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Records a statement by the Hungarian Minister that
he was not misled by the Foreign Ministry regarding
developments leading to the German-Russian conflict
but that there was a certain confusion in the military
field.
Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I
Records text of General Himer's report of June 23
to the OKW regarding Hungarian participation in the
campaign against Soviet Russia.
10
13
11
21
22
25
40
54
15
24
25
28
43
63
xxvm
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Hun oart — Continued
Data
1941
July 1
July 1
Aug. 16
Sept. 6
Sept. 16
Sept. 18
Nov. 27
Nov. 28
Dec. 7
1941
July 13
Subject
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Records a complaint by the Hungarian Minister re-
garding the treatment of the Hungarian population in
Banat.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Records having received from the Hungarian Minister
a letter from Horthy to Hitler.
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic
Policy Department
Records his negotiations with Hungarian Minister
President Bardossy leading to German controlling in-
terest in the Maort oil company.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Records that the Foreign Minister would postpone
conclusion of a frontier treaty with Hungary.
Editors' Note
Reference to the visit of Minister President Bardossy
and Field Marshal Szombathelyi at Hitler's field head-
quarters in East Prussia on September 8 and 9.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Records a request by the Hungarian Minister that
Hungary occupy points in the former Yugoslav Banat
inasmuch as Rumanian troops are said to have occupied
the right bank of the Danube opposite the Iron Gate.
Memorandum by Ike Stale Secretary
Records a discussion with Sztojay in regard to his
demarche of September 16 (document No. 328). The
Hungarian Government was asked to drop the idea of
occupying points in the former Yugoslav Banat.
Memorandum by the Dirigent of the Political Department
Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and
B&rdossv on November 26. Ribbentrop urged in-
creased Hungarian grain and oil deliveries to Germany;
advised the greatest possible calm in Hungary's rela-
tions with Rumania; and inquired about Bardossy's
ideas regarding a ban on listening to foreign broadcasts.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Personal Staff
Record of Hitler's reception of Bardossy on Novem-
ber 27; Hitler expressed optimism about the prospects
of the war in the east and in North Africa.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Records that Sztojay inquired about the possibility
of issuing an officially inspired press report concerning
the cancellation of Rjbbentrop's visit with Horthy.
(See also under "Rumania" and "Slovakia.")
Doc. No. Page
Iceland
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Denmark
Directs the Legation to induce the Danish Govern-
ment to protest against the occupation of Iceland by
American troops.
55
56
208
284
328
333
503
65
508
556
319
459
466
520
528
835
856
973
102
129
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Iceland — Continued
XXIX
Date
1941
July 17
Subject
Doc. No.
Pago
The Chargi d' Affaires in Denmark to the Foreign Minis-
try
Reports his conversation with Seavenius on the
landing of American forces in Iceland and his attempt
to persuade the Minister President to issue a strong
declaration of protest against this undertaking.
(See also under "United States.")
118
161
India
1641
July 17
Aug. 18
Sept. 6
Sept. 10
Oct. 4
Oct. 16
Nov. 29
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Records a conversation with Subhas Chandra Bose
who stated with respect to the German-Russian war
that Indian sympathies were on the side of Russia as an
anti-imperialist power. He urged that the proclama-
tion regarding a free India be issued at once.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Records a conversation with Bose who presented a
letter for the Foreign Minister and urged that the
declaration regarding free India be issued soon. Bose
argued that the declaration was necessary as a weapon
of the nationalists against Gandhi's willingness to com-
promise under Anglo-American influence. Recom-
mends that the Foreign Minister write to Bose.
Minute by the Director of the Political Department
Records a decision by Hitler that a declaration
regarding India is to be postponed for the time being
lest the British have a pretext for invading Afghanis-
tan.
The Dtrigent of the Political Department to the Director
of the Political Department
Refers to Woermann's memorandum of August 18
(document No, 213) and forwards the instruction of the
Foreign Minister that Bose be told that a declaration
regarding free India should be postponed until German
operations in the east have made a greater impact.
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Reports the establishment of a special office in
Rome where all activities connected with the Indian
liberation movement are to be coordinated.
Memorandum by the Dirigent of the Political Department
Transmits Ribbentrop's request for examination of
propaganda possibilities regarding Indian prisoners
of war, the Pan-Turanian movement and South African
opposition to the Smuts Government. Keppler is to
deal with India, Hentig with Pan-Turanian matters,
and Karlowa with South Africa.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Secretariat
Record of the conversation of Ribbentrop with Bose
in Berlin. Ribbentrop stated that Germany did not
want to issue a declaration regarding India until Ger-
man power had a firm basis in the Near East. Bose
pointed to the effectiveness of British propaganda
and to the importance of letting the Indian people know
Hitler's views regarding their country.
120
213
165
328
286
296
461
472
379
404
611
649
521
896
XXX
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
India — Continued
Date
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
1941
Dec. 1
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the Japanese Counselor of Embassy
stated that his Government was willing to issue a dec-
laration on Indian independence upon the outbreak
of war between Japan and Great Britain which he said
was imminent.
(See also under "Afghanistan.")
526
909
Indochina
1941
July 19
July 24
Oct. 6
The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Embassy
in Japan and to the Embassy in Paris
Transmits the text of a memorandum and appendix,
handed to Ribbentrop by Oshima, setting forth the
Japanese demands regarding Indochina which had been
presented to the French Government. Directs the
Embassies to observe restraint in the matter.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having been told by the Japanese Foreign
Minister of the conclusion of a Japanese- French agree-
ment on the occupation of bases in Indochina.
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having been told by Benoist-Mechin that
Japan's aggressive actions against French sovereignty
in Indochina have caused doubts within the French
Government regarding the correctness of Darlan's
poliey.
178
208
616
Ireland
1941
Aug. 24
Memorandum by SS-Standartenfuhrer Veesenmayer
Outlines the details of an intelligence operation
in Ireland with the aim of establishing liaison with the
Irish Republican Army, transmitting military in-
formation, and preparing underground resistance in
case of an Anglo-American occupation of Ireland.
363
Italy
1941
June 23
June 30
Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler
Supports Hitler's decision in declaring war on the
Soviet Union and states his views on common policy
toward Turkey, France, Spain, Great Britain, and the
United States.
Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini
Replies to Mussolini's letter of June 23 (document
No. 7); describes the military action on the eastern
front, suggests arrangements for the Italian army corps,
and proposes a new meeting.
50
55
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Italy — Continued
XXXI
Date
Subject
1941
July 2
Aug. 25
Aug. 26
Sept. 2
Sept. 2
Sept. 5
Doc. No.
62
134
156
175
Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler
Replies to Hitler's letter of June 30 (document No
50), reaffirms his belief in an Axis victory, and accepts
the proposal for a meeting at Hitler's headquarters?
July 20 Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini
Refers to Mussolini's letter of July 2 (document No
b2), and discusses France, North Africa, Spain. Turkey
Japan, and the war in the east.
July 26 The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
lransmits the text of a letter dated July 24 from
Mussolini to Hitler in reply to Hitler's letter of July
l£ a ^ C e me - nt S°-, 134 \ Mussolini gives his views on
.France, Spam, Turkey, Japan, and Russia.
Aug. 2 The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Keports discussion with Greifelt and Bene regarding
the South Tu-ol Because Buffarini's deputy, who it
also Prefect of Bolzano, combines tasks which tend to
impede a radical, ethnic solution, the proposal was
made for the appointment of a special Commissioner
on the Italian side.
Record of the Duce's Conversation With the Fiihrer 242
Hitler discussed the campaign against Soviet Russia
indicating surprise at the Russian equipment but ex-
pressing confidence in defeating the Red Army bv
October. He briefly mentioned England and France
in a second conversation there was a discussion of
Jni $1 t? T ? B J £?? m > J T&Rce > the neutrals, Japan,
and the United States; the war in the Mediterranean 1
and Italian participation in the Russian campaign. '.
The Chargi d' 'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 245
Transmits text of a letter from Riccardi to Clodius
complaining of the German failure to maintain the
agreed schedule of deliveries of critical materials to
The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 268
Keports a conversation with Giannini about Italian
complaints concerning arrearages of German imports of
certain critical materials. Clodius belittled these
complaints m the meeting with the Italians but in the
report admits the seriousness of the situation.
The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 269
Reports that with reference to Riccardi 's recent letter
(see document No. 245) it was explained to the Italians
that the apparent passive trade balance with Italy was
a matter of bookkeeping since war materials were a
separate account.
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 281
Keports that Mussolini was painfully affected over a
report by an Italian official in Germany according to
which Kreisleiter Goldbeek of Recklinghausen had
signed a circular expressing preference for interbreeding
of German women with Norwegians, Danes, and even
Englishmen over that with Italians,
72
190
220
279
383
392
435
436
453
XXXII
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Italy — Continued
Date
Subject
Doc. No.
1941
Sept. 13
Sept. 24
Sept. 25
Sept. 25
Sept. 27
Oct. 2
Oct. 11
Oct. 18
Oct. 18
Page
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Secretariat tj„;„i,
Beeord of the conversation between the Keicii
Foreign Minister and Ambassador Alneri at General
Headquarters on September 12. Subject: The war in
the east, the Greer incident and German-US relations,
Japanese policy, Italian workers in Germany, and short-
ages of strategic raw materials in Italy.
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Forwards a memorandum by an informant regarding
Ciano's -views on the war: Neither the Axis nor ling-
land can win, and a compromise peace is necessary.
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with Oiano who showed him
a copv of an Italian report (document No. 356) describ-
ing maltreatment of Italian laborers in Germany.
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Transmits the text of the Italian report referred to
in telegram No. 2315 (document No. 655).
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Reports in detail on the situation in the South lirol,
the problem of the resettlement of the German popula-
tion; the attitude of the Italian authorities, and the
future tasks of the German High Commissioner.
Memorandum by the State Secretary ,. d
Records a conversation with Alfieri who mentioned
the complaints of the Italian laborers in Germany and
suggested the possibility of returning all Italian la-
borers in Germany to Italy.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Hecords a conversation with Allien about the treat-
ment of Italian laborers in Germany. While many of
the Italian complaints appeared to be unfounded there
were enough discrepancies to deserve investigation by
everts from both sides. Alfieri was ^^ ™?^
the circular attributed to Kreisleiter Goldbeck of Reck-
linghausen (see document No. 281).
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister 1 *
Record of the conversation between the foreign Min-
ister and Ambassador Alfieri at Headquarters on Octo-
ber 17 Ribbentrop discussed the Russian campaign,
the prospects for England and America, the case of
KreiSr Goldbeck, g the problem of Italian workers
in Germany, Alfieri's report on Hitler's latest speech.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy *»/*".ty.. _ . .
Explains that the alleged circular of Kreisleiter Gold-
beck has been investigated and the document proved
to be the work of two delegates of the Italian Govern-
m Directs the Ambassador to request a copy of the
document; to submit the German report on the matter
to Ciano or Anfuso; and to insist that Mussolini be
fully informed.
308
483
354
355
356
362
375
397
560
562
563
575
605
639
409
653
410
662
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
xxxin
Italy — Continued
Date
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
1941
Oct. 19 Ambassador Alfieri to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop
Refers to his recent meeting with Eibbentrop (see
document No. 409) and defends his reports about
complaints of Italian workers in Germany. Alfieri
also stated that the sentiment of the German people,
in general, was not favorable to Italy.
Oct. 25 The Legation in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Glodius reports about his recent conversations in
Rome regarding the dwindling Italian supplies of oil
and grain. According to Admiral Riccardi 54,000 tons
of oil were needed immediately; otherwise transport
operations to Libya would have to be suspended during
November.
Oct. 26 Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Secretariat
Records the conversation at Headquarters on October
25 between Hitler and Ciano. Hitler reviewed the
campaign in Russia, and his pla ns f or the future . Ciano
mentioned the food situation in Italy, Italian workers
in Germany, and increased Italian military participa-
tion in the war in the East.
Oct. 29 Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini
Explains the latest military developments on the
eastern front; lists all possible moves by Britain
against Germany and his own countermeasures; and
suggests to Mussolini more effective methods of opera-
tions in North Africa.
Kov. 1 Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic
Policy Department
Reports having refused the request of Riccardi for
German consent to his purchase of 100,000 tons of
Rumanian grain for Italy.
Nov. 3 Memorandum by the Director of the Department for Ger-
man Internal Affairs
Records a discussion with Brigadefuhrer Muller
regarding the treatment of Italian laborers in Ger-
many. Those guilty of infractions are no longer to
be sent to labor training camps but sent back to Italy.
Nov. 4 Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Ambassador Alfieri
Replies to Alfieri' s letter of October 19 (docu-
ment No. 411), minimizes the seriousness of the com-
plaints of Italian workers in Germany and asserts
that, contrary to Alfieri 's information, the attitude of
the German people toward Italy is friendly.
Nov. 6 Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler
Replies to Hitler's letter of October 29 (document
No. 433) and reaffirms his belief in victory over
Bolshevism. He is convinced that America will
actively intervene and land an expeditionary force
in Egypt; he examines the various possibilities of
enemy action and declares that Italy is well pre-
pared for all eventualities. He gratefully accepts
Hitler's offers of raw materials, weapons, and of the
X German Air Corps.
411
421
664
679
424
687
433
440
444
446
454
709
725
730
733
749
682-903—64-
XXXIV
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Italy — Continued
Date
1941
Nov. 7
Subject
Doc. No.
Nov. 24
Nov. 25
Nov. 28
Nov. 30
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with Ciano who drew at-
tention to certain anti-Italian activities in the Mitro-
vica area which allegedly enjoyed German support.
The Director of the Political Department to the Pleni-
potentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Mili-
tary Commander in Serbia
States that incoming reports indicate a tendency of
the military administration in the Mitrovica area to
sympathize with anti-Italian Albanian elements. Di-
rects that the problem be taken up with the Military
Commander to prevent the area from becoming a
Bource of Italo-German friction.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy
In response to telegram No. 2828 (document No.
456) directs Mackensen to assure Ciano that there is no
support of anti-Italian elements by the German mili-
tary in the Mitrovica area. There should be no re-
sponse to the earlier suggestion of Italian incorporation
of Mitrovica.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Secretariat
Eecords a conversation held on November 25 be-
tween Ribbentrop and Ciano which Serrano Buner
joined at a later stage. They discussed relations with
France, Croatia, Greece, the campaign in Russia and its
significance for England and for Turkey.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Secretariat
Records a conversation of November 29 between
Hitler and Ciano in which Hitler explained the military
operations and problems in the east. Ciano transmitted
a request of Mussolini to contribute additional
Italian divisions to the eastern front. Both agreed on
the stability of the domestic situation in Germany and
Italy.
The Military Attache in Italy to the General Staff of the
Army, Attache Department _
Reports a conversation on December 1 with Musso-
lini who insisted that the only possibility of radically
improving the supply traffic with Libya lay in the use
of the harbor of Bizerte.
The High Commissioner of the Reick Government for the
South Tirolese Resettlement to the Ambassador zn
Writes that a discussion with the Italian High Com-
missioner, Signor Podesta, brought out that the resettle-
ment had reached a dead point. PodesU urged that
the Reich designate a resettlement area but it appears
that he wishes to push the German side into applying
for a moratorium on the resettlement.
Dec 7 The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy
Explains the intention of Mussolini, as expounded to
Rintelen (see document No. 532), to gain use of Bizerte
as the only means to relieve the supply situation of
North Africa. Directs Mackensen to tell Ciano that
the French should not be approached on the matter
until the Axis had reestablished command of the sea and
air in the Central Mediterranean.
Dec. 2
Dec. 4
456
495
Fags
758
817
497
S19
501
826
522
900
532
544
934
954
552
967
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Italy — Continued
XXXV
Date
1941
Dec. 7
Dec. 10
Subject
Pege
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having spoken about Bizerte to Ciano who
had not yet received instructions for the Turin meeting.
Ciano stated that he would not enter into concrete
discussion of a matter like Bizerte without first reaching
full agreement with Germany.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Secretariat
Records a conversation between Ribbentrop and
Alfieri on December 9. Alfieri asked about Germany's
position regarding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
and about the contents of the G6ring-P6tain conver-
sation at Florentin-Vergigny (see document No. 529).
Ribbentrop expressed his great satisfaction over Japan's
entrance into the war and stated that information about
the Florentin meeting had already been sent to Rome,
(See also under "Anti-Comintern Pact," "Bulgaria,"
"Directives for the Conduct of the War," "Prance,"
"Greece," "Tripartite Pact," and "Yugoslavia.")
557
569
974
994
Japan
1941
June 23
June 25
June 28
June 28
June 28
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with Matsuoka in order to
explain the German attack on Soviet Russia. Mat-
suoka asked if Germany reckoned on a quick collapse
of the Stalin regime and mentioned that Oshima's
reports indicated that Hitler and Ribbentrop did not
expect the active participation of Japan against Russia.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a visit by Matsuoka who stated that the
Russian Ambassador had asked if Japan would remain
neutral in the Russo-German war. Matsuoka had
intentionally left Smetanin in the dark in order to
prevent Russian troop withdrawals from the Far
East.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Reports on the discussion in Japanese Government
and Army circles as to whether Japan should attack
the Soviet Union or take vigorous military action in
the South.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Explains that he has arranged with Oshima to in-
fluence his Government in favor of speedy military
action against the Soviet Union. Instructs Ott to use
all his influence toward the same end and suggests
seven arguments to be used.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
States that Russian military resistance may collapse
sooner than previously expected and that his earlier
advice that Japan should intervene actively against
the Soviet Union therefore assumes special impor-
tance.
14
18
33
35
36
36
40
41
XXXVI
Date
1941
July 1
July 3
July 3
July 3
July 5
July 10
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Japan — Continued
Subject
Doc. No.
July 10
Pflge
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Directs Ott to deliver to Matsuoka a personal tele-
gram in which Ribbentrop states that Russia is on the
verge of collapse and urges that Japan take the oppor-
tunity to seize Vladivostok and advance westward so
that the defeat of Russia would free both Europe and
the Far East, prepare the final defeat of England, and
paralyze any tendency of the United States to inter-
vene.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to the instructions from Ribbentrop (docu-
ments Nos. 35 and 36) and reports that he has brought
influences to bear on the Japanese leaders in favor of a
rapid action against the Soviet Union. Reports that
Matsuoka gave him a statement for Ribbentrop and
that he explained that Japan was not at present in a
position to enter the war against the Soviet Union.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to his telegram of July 2 (document No. 63)
and transmits a statement from Matsuoka informing
Ribbentrop that Japan, while preparing for all possible
eventualities regarding the U.S.S.R., has also decided
to secure points d'appui in French Indochina in order
to increase her pressure on Britain and the United
States which will constitute a contribution to the com-
mon cause no less vital than Japanese intervention in
the German-Soviet war.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having carried out the instructions conveyed
in telegram No. 942 (document No. 53) whereupon
Matsuoka expressed full agreement with Ribbentrop
and regretted that his opinions could not prevail in the
Cabinet.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Offers a correction of the account which Matsuoka
gave Ott in May 1941 regarding his discussions with
Ribbentrop in Berlin prior to the conclusion of the
Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact of April 1941.
Explains that conclusion of the Pact was not appro-
priate and came as a surprise.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Minister
Reports having been told by Matsuoka that no
American replv to Japan's latest proposals had been
received but that he had learned from an informant
that an American reply was verbally received. Re-
quests information on this new American move to
counteract the pro-American clique in the Japanese
Government.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Requests more detailed information on Japanese-
American relations, on the Japanese attitude toward
the landing of American forces in Iceland, and on
Japanese reactions to his message of July 1 to Matsuoka
(see document No. 53). Expresses confidence that the
Japanese Government will seize this unique oppor-
tunity for settling the Russian and the Chinese prob-
lems and securing Japan's southward expansion.
53
61
63
73
64
75
65
72
76
84
88
108
89
110
.ANALYTICAL LIST OP DOCUMENTS
xxxvn
Japan — Continued
Bate
1)941
July 12
July 14
July 17
July 18
July 18
July 19
Subject
Doc. No.
July 20
July 20
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
States that his report of July 10 based on confidential
information regarding the receipt of an American
reply to the latest Japanese proposals (document No.
88) was confirmed by Deputy Foreign Minister Ohashi
who supplied additional details on the subject.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Replies to the instructions of July 10 (document No.
80) and refers to his previous reports on Japanese-
American relations. States that the Japanese Gov-
ernment, including Matsuoka, views the possibility of
an American entry into the war with concern. Em-
phasizes that he is using all his influence to bring about
an early participation of Japan in the war.
Editors' Note
Reference to Hitler's conversation with Ambassador
Oshima on July 15.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Reports regarding discussions with influential leaders
of the Japanese Army military who emphasized the
need for making extensive preparations for any cam-
paign against Soviet Russia, in view of the strength
of the Soviet forces facing Japan.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Secretariat
Summarizes the main points of the American reply
to the Japanese proposals of May 1941 (see volume
XII, of this series, document No. 512) and of the
Japanese counterproposals about to be sent to Am-
bassador Nomura, both of which had been communi-
cated to Ambassador Ott by an official of the Japanese
Foreign Ministry.
Memorandum by Ambassador Stahmer
Comments in a brief for Ribbentrop and Hitler on the
resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and considers it
likely that the next Cabinet will have a Foreign
Minister who will promote developments in accordance
with the Tripartite Pact.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Refers to the negotiations between Japan and the
United States and directs Ott to express as his own
the view that the toning down in the Japanese counter-
proposals of passages of importance to the powers of the
Tripartite Pact would only encourage further demands
by the United States.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Forwards the text of a statement by the new Japa-
nese Foreign Minister Toyoda addressed to the Ambas-
sadors of Germany and Italy assuring them that Japan's
attitude will not change and that Toyoda will continue
Matsuoka's foreign policy.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Discusses the composition and policies of the new
Japanese Cabinet and states that the elimination of
Matsuoka was the aim of the resignation of the previous
Cabinet. Does not expect the new Cabinet to pursue a
vigorous poliey with respect to the United States or to
the Soviet Union or China.
Page
95
105
121
131
117
123
141
158
169
124
127
173
179
130
131
185
186
xxxvin
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS.
Ja pan — Continued
Dat«
Subject
Doc. No,
Page
1941
July 21
July 21
Aug. 5
Aug. 20
Aug, 22
Aug. 24
Aug. 25
Aug. 29
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Refers to Ott's telegram of July 19 (document
No. 131) and asks for clarification regarding the part
played in Matsuoka's dismissal by his negotiation of
the Neutrality Pact with Russia.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to the instruction of July 19 f document
No. 127) and reports having told the Deputy Foreign
Minister of his personal objections to the toning down
of passages in the Japanese counterproposals to the
United States. Reports that the counterproposals
had already been sent before Matsuoka's resignation.
Memorandum by an Officer in the Intelligence Depart-
ment of the Army General Staff
Records the visit on August 4 at the Intelligence
Department of Japanese Military Attach^ General
Banzai who, on instructions from the Japanese General
Staff, stated that the Japanese Army and Government
were determined to enter the war against Soviet Russia
as soon as the strategic concentration of the forces
would permit.
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy
Department
Reviews the course of the negotiations with Japan
regarding rubber and general economic matters and
emphasizes the difficulties raised by the Japanese with
regard to Germany's imports of rubber. Suggests that
the Foreign Minister discuss these issues with Oshima.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the announcement of American ship-
ments of aviation gasoline has placed the Japanese
Government in a dilemma in the face of which no de-
cision has been reached, for the Navy tends to exag-
gerate the dangers of an operation in the North and the
Army feels greater misgivings about an early war with
the Soviet Union,
Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter
Forwards a report of August 22 from the Naval
Attache" in Tokyo based on conversations with leading
Japanese Naval officers. The Japanese Navy believes
that there will be no Japanese attack on Russia but
that Japan, after consolidation of her bases in
Indochina, will occupy Thailand and the Dutch oil-
fields, attack Manila, and blockade Singapore.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Refers to Ott's report of August 22 (document No.
225) and outlines several arguments with which Ott
is directed to counter the irresolution of the Japanese
Government: the Red Army is practically destroyed;
the United States has reacted with economic sanctions
and words only to Japan's occupation of Indochina;
Japan now has a freedom of choice; and can end the
threat of encirclement by an active policy.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having learned from Japanese Deputy For-
, eign Minister Amau that Prime Minister Konoye had
1 sent a message to President Roosevelt. Ott expressed
, serious doubts about the advisability of a conciliatory
gesture by Japan.
136
137
197
198
177
282
216
338
225
351
235
367
239
375
256
410
Date
1941
Aug. 30
Sept. 4
Sept. 4
Sept. 8
Sept. 13
Sept. 14
Sept. 16
Sept. 16
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Japan — Continued
XXXIX
Subject
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to the instruction of August 25 (document
No. 239) and reports having given the Japanese For-
eign Minister a picture of the situation. Toyoda de-
clined to give particulars about Konoye's message to
President Roosevelt and acted with reserve.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Reports on the Japanese domestic situation which
led to Konoye's message to President Roosevelt. Ex-
presses the opinion that the attempt of the circles
around Konoye to seek a modus vivendi with the
United States cannot succeed in view of the deep-seated
conflicts of Interest between the two countries.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Records a discussion with Oshima regarding the
German-Japanese negotiations relating to rubber and
raw materials and having urged that the important
economic questions not be decided by departmental
particularism detached from joint policy.
Extract From the Notes of the Representative of the For-
eign Ministry With the High Command of the Army
Record of Weizsacker's view that Japan should be
pressed to attack Vladivostok and of Hitler's view
opposing such pressure lest it be interpreted as a sign
of weakness.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having been assured by Foreign Minister
Toyoda that the recent messages exchanged between
Roosevelt and Konoye merely meant a resumption of
Japanese-American talks that had broken off and that
.Japan would not assume any commitment contrary to
the Tripartite Pact. Toyoda, however, refused to
reveal the texts of these messages.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Refers to President Roosevelt's speech of September
11 and directs Ott to criticize it and to explain that
Germany will not be deflected from the policy followed
so far. Refers to the negotiations of Japan with the
United States and directs Ott to urge Japan to state
clearly in Washington that further acts of aggression by
the United States will evoke the case of the alliance
under the Tripartite Pact.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
With reference to the instruction of September 13
(document No. 316) reports that Toyoda gave assur-
ances that Japan would come to the aid of the Axis
Powers in case of an American attack and that he
would submit the German suggestions to the Cabinet.
The Slate Secretary to the Embassy in Japan
Explains that Oshima was received by Ribbentrop at
Headquarters on August 23, and that he was informed
of the Japanese-American conversations by Weizsacker
on September 4. Oshima was grateful because he had
been kept in the dark by his own Government.
Doc. No.
Page
259
276
414
446
278
291
310
450
466
490
316
503
324
325
515
516
XL
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Ja pa n — Continued
Date
Subject
Doc. No. Page
1941
Sept. 20
Sept. 21
Sept. 26
Oct. 4
Oct. 6
Oct. 20
Oct. 31
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Reports the text of the Japanese Government's reply
to the German suggestion for a Japanese statement to
be addressed to the United States. It assures Germany
that in the negotiations thus far, Japan, in accordance
with the Tripartite Pact, has fulfilled her task of re-
straining America from entering the war. Ott con-
sidered the statement as far from precise.
The Embassy in Ike United States to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a discussion with the Japanese Military At-
tache, General Isoda, who on instruction discussed the
possibility of British or American intervention if Japan
should attack Russia or occupy Thailand or the Neth-
erlands Indies. Botticher presented the views given
in his own reports, pointing to weaknesses in the British
position and in America.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Forwards the text of the Japanese statement intended
for the United States which points out that the threat of
a German-American war would cause grave concern
to Japan as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact. Reports
having told Amau that it seemed doubtful that the
statement would deter the United States from further
aggressive action.
The Ambassador in, Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Presents a picture of Japan's position as sketched
by leaders of the Army : a disinclination to consider an
attack against Soviet Russia before next spring; a pref-
erence for an attack against the Anglo-Saxon position
in the south which would not be dependent on the time
of year; a tendency to regard the British Empire as the
enemy and to ignore the possibility of intervention by
the united States, yet with a growing feeling that con-
flict with the United States is unavoidable.
The Embassy in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Recommends that for economic as well as political
reasons consideration be shown for Japan's wishes.
Argues that a halt in the production or a confiscation of
goods ordered by Japan would result in the cessation
of Japanese deliveries of strategic materials, would
frustrate hopes in the Tripartite Pact and increase the
danger of a Japanese-American detente.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Comments upon the members of the new Tojo
Cabinet and emphasizes that certain Ministers who
represented conservative and business elements are
no longer in the government.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with Foreign Minister Togo
who stated that no decision had yet been taken regard-
ing an intensified warning to the United States and
who asked how the German Government visualized
the further conduct of the war. Ott explains his im-
pression that the Japanese Government is still uncertain
about the policy to be adopted.
342
537
345
543
359
569
378
608
381
613
413
434
667
717
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Japan — -Continued
XM
Data
Subject
Doo. No.
Page
1941
Nov. 6
Nov. 9
Nov. 18
Nov. 21
Nov. 21
Nov. 22
Nov. 23
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 451 744
Reports a conversation with Foreign Minister Togo
regarding the dispatch of Ambassador Kurusu to
Washington. Togo stated that instructions for a
warning to Roosevelt which Japan had promised had
not been issued, but explained that definite limits had
been set for Kurusu's negotiations which he might not
exceed.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan 458 760
Directs Ott to make use in his conversations of an
appraisal of American-Japanese relations based on the
reports from the Military Attache 1 in Washington.
This appraisal emphasizes that America is unable to
support a war in the Pacific and Atlantic and that
Japan, therefore, should not fail to act at such a
favorable moment.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 480 798
Reports that the Military Attache was told that the
Japanese General Staff is not reckoning on a peaceful
settlement with the United States; that the Japanese
thrust to the south will come before Germany shifts
her main effort from Russia to the Near East; and that
the Japanese General Staff wishes a mutual obligation
by Germany and Japan not to conclude any separate
peace or armistice.
The Embassy in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 486 805
The Military Attache 1 reports that the objectives of
any Japanese operations in the south are possibly the
'occupation of Thailand and the oil fields of British and
Dutch Borneo and a surprise attack on the Philippines
"in the event of a threatening American attitude about
which there can hardly be any doubt."
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan 487 806
Directs Ott to inform the Head of the Department
of Foreign Armies of the Japanese General Staff that
Germany considered it a matter of course that in case
Germany or Japan became involved in a war with the
United States they would only conclude a peace or
armistice jointly.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 488 807
Reports having been assured by Foreign Minister
Togo that Japan was taking a firm attitude in the nego-
tiations . with the United States and having received
confidential information regarding these discussions.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 492 813
Reports having carried out the instruction of Novem-
ber 21 (document No. 487) and that General Okamoto
asked whether Germany would consider herself at war
with the United States if Japan opened hostilities
against that country.
Unsigned Memorandum 512 868
Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and
Oshima on November 28. Ribbentrop inquired about
the state of the Japanese-American conversations, and
about Japanese intentions regarding Thailand and
Indochina. He expressed the view thnt it might be best
for Japan to have a showdown with the United States
at this most favorable moment.
xlh
ANALYTICAL LIST OP DOCUMENTS
Japan — Continued
Data
1941
Nov. 30
Deo. 5
Dec. 6
Dee. 6
Dec. 9
Subject
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having been informed by the Japanese
Foreign Minister that the American note of November
26 indicated a wide divergence of the respective posi-
tions in the Japanese-American negotiations. States
that Foreign Minister Togo emphasized that American
efforts to make the Tripartite Pact inoperative were a
principal obstacle to success in the negotiations.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Reports Japanese determination following the receipt
of the American note of November 26. States that he
has so far advised against an attack on the United
States and requests instructions.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having been informed by the Japanese
Foreign Minister of the Japanese reply to a recent
American inquiry regarding concentration of Japanese
forces in Indochina. States that the Foreign Minister's
line of conversation indicated the resistance which
Japan has to overcome while she is reaching a decision.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy, in Japan
Refers to Ott's telegram of December 5 (document
No. 545) and states that it would be inappropriate to
suggest to the Japanese Government a particular course
of action with regard to the United States. Directs
Ott to tell the Japanese that the Axis Powers and Japan
must fight this struggle together regardless of the
tactical moves of one or the other partner in the indi-
vidual case.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that Foreign Minister Togo personally
informed him about Japan's decision to enter the war
and of his expectation that Germany would promptly
declare war on the United States. Says that he made
the statement as directed in Ribbentrop's telegram of
December 6 (document No. 551).
(See also under
"Indochina,"
States.")
"Anti-Comintern
"Tripartite Pact,
Pact,"
" and
"China,"
"United
Latin America
Doc. No.
524
906
545
550
956
964
551
966
567
990
1941
July 5
July 11
The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry 73 86
Reports a conversation with the Argentine Foreign
Minister who explained that after Russia's impending
defeat neither Germany nor England would be able to
defeat the other and who urged a mediation by Presi-
dent Roosevelt. Reports that he objected that
Roosevelt was unsuitable.
The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the 93 119
Embassy in Brazil
Directs that the Brazilian Government be informed
that the execution of the Krupp contract regarding
deliveries of war material would be upheld and a new
production plan would be worked out.
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Latin America — Continued
XLIII
Date
Subject
Doe. No.
1941
July 16
July 20
July 25
July 27
Aug. 14
Aug. 27
Sept. 3
Sept. 4
Sept. 9
Sept. 23
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Argentina
Refers to the report of July 5 (document No. 73) and
expresses agreement with the Ambassador's view
toward the suggestion of mediation by Roosevelt.
Directs Thermann not to touch on the idea of good
offices of the Argentine Government.
The Minister in Bolivia to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that a state of siege has been proclaimed
by the Bolivian Government which has declared him
to be persona non grata.
The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
Embassy in Argentina
Transmits the text of a memorandum about Ger-
many's attitude toward the proposed Argentine-
Brazilian customs union. Germany favored it because
it would increase South American resistance to United
States political and economic encroachments and be-
cause it would provide a greater market for a future
greater German economic area,
The Director of the News Service and Press Department
to Various Missions
Explains that Major Belmonte, Bolivian Military
Attach^, will brand the letter allegedly written by him
to Minister Wendler as a falsification. Directs that the
"Belmonte Case" be prominently publicized.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Records Ribbentrop's view that the arrest of five
Party members in Chile automatically justified official
reprisals and notes that preparations for these were
being made.
Memorandum by the Stale Secretary
Records a conversation with the Argentine Ambassa-
dor in which he protested about various incidents in
Argentina which had worsened the relations between
the two countries.
The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry
Reports an interpellation in the Chamber of Deputies
suggesting that the German Ambassador be declared
persona non grata.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Records a conversation with the Argentine Am-
bassador who inquired about the arrest of 11 Argen-
tineans in Paris and whether these were reprisals for
the arrest of Germans in Argentina. Woermann
denied any relationship between the two actions.
The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with the Argentine Foreign
Minister who suggested the possibility that the German
Government itself bring about the recall of Ambassador
Thermann.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Records that the arrest of Chileans in Germany has
had an effect on the Chilean Government, especially
in connection with the arrest of Germans in Chile. To
prevent a further deterioration of the relationship
between the two countries, Woermann suggests an
elastic use of reprisals and at least a temporary release
of the arrested Chilean citizens.
112
135
154
Page
142
195
217
158
202
251
274
279
293
351
224
314
401
443
451
469
555
XLIV
Date
1941
Nov. 6
Nov. 29
Deo. 1
Dec. 10
Dec. 11
1941
June 25
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Latin America — Continued
Subject
Doc. No.
The Embassy in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that General Miller, Chief of the U.S. Mili-
tary Mission, demanded cooperation of the Brazilian
Minister of War for the establishment of U.S. bases
in Brazil, but that the Minister of War refused and
the American Ambassador disavowed General Miller.
The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with Colonel Benjamin
Vargas, the brother of the President, who conveyed
the President's desire to remain on good terms with
Germany and explained that concessions made to the
United States did not mean any fundamental change
in Brazil's foreign policy.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Argentina
Directs Ambassador Thermann to explain that now
that the agitation against his person has subsided, the
German Government would be willing to consider a
simultaneous replacement of its Ambassador in
Buenos Aires and of the Argentine Ambassador in
Berlin.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassies in Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile, and to the Legation in Peru
Instructs the German representative to inform the
Foreign Minister of the state of war between the United
States and Germany, Japan, and Italy; to explain that
this was entirely due to the policy of the United States;
and was the exclusive responsibility of President
Roosevelt.
The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to the Foreign Minister's instruction of De-
cember 10 (document No. 570) and reports his con-
versation with the Argentine Foreign Minister who
explained that future German-Argentine relations
would have to take account of Argentina's adherence
to the principles of Pan-American solidarity, assistance
and defense.
(See also under "Portugal," and "United States.")
Page
Middle East
July 4
450
520
743
895
528
912
570
996
575
1002
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 19
Notes the suggestion from the French Government
that in case of a French request for military aid in
Syria, Germany issue a declaration recognizing French
rights there. Advises against an unqualified declara-
tion which would run counter to German policy toward
the Arabs.
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 71
Reports a conversation with French State Secretary
Benoist-Mechin dealing with Turkish wishes with
regard to occupation of Syria, German-French rela-
tions, and German intentions with regard to the occu-
pied countries.
22
82
DiitO
1941
July 9
July 12
July 20
July 30
Aug. 1
Aug. 5
Aug. 6
Aug. 19
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Middle East — Continued
XLV
Subject
Doe. No.
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that Iran is taking military measures to
defend herself against any English attack and that
she would appeal to Germany for help if such an attack
should be made.
The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy
in Italy and to the Embassy in Paris
Explains that Minister Cosmelli has been informed
that the English have proposed to General Dentz a sus-
pension of hostilities, and that the German Govern-
ment, while warning the French of English insincerity,
left the decision to them.
The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Minister's Secre-
tariat
Directs all Foreign Ministry personnel concerned
with Arab propaganda to support henceforth Arab
wishes for unlimited political freedom; the collapse of
French resistance in Syria has eliminated the hitherto
existing reasons for German reserve in this matter.
Memorandum, by Minister Rahn
Report on the German mission in Syria from May 9
to July 11, 1941 : I Mission (p. 237) ; II Journey (p. 238) ;
III First Meeting with High Commissioner General
Dentz (p. 239); IV Damascus (p. 242); V First Arms
Transports (p. 243) ; VI Additional Arms Transports
(p. 244); VII War Preparations in Syria (p. 245); VIII
Representatives of the Wehrmacht in Syria (p. 248) ;
IX The "Arab Movement" (p. 250); X German Inter-
vention in Syria (p. 251) ; XI The English Attack (p. 253) ;
XII Economic Matters (p. 256) ; XIII Supplies (p. 258) ;
XIV "Desert War" (p. 260) ; XV The Armistice (p. 264) ;
XVI Conclusion (p. 265).
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the British Minister presented a note
to the Iranian Foreign Ministry recommending the
removal of Germans from the country.
Memorandum by Minister Grobba
Reviews Gaylani's proposal for German-Iraq coop-
eration. Recommends that Germany aim for his rein-
statement aS Iraq Minister President. Proposes that
Germany negotiate agreements with Iraq which would
become effective when German occupation of Iraq is
imminent.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Refers to Grobba's memorandum of August 5 (docu-
ment No. 180) and explains that some degree of Italian
participation will be necessary. Recommends careful
internal preparation prior to discussions with Gaylani.
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with the Iranian Minister Presi-
dent regarding the British demand for the removal of
Germans from Iraq. Agrees with the Minister Presi-
dent that an organized, official departure of German
residents would have a devastating effect on Iranian
morale.
Page
84
101
103
128
132
188
165
237
171
180
272
285
183
215
288
335
XLVI
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Middle East — Continued
Date
Subject
Doc. No.
1941
Aug. 21
Aug. 23
Aug. 25
Aug. 25
Aug. 25
Aug. 28
Sept. 1
Sept. 4
Sept. 7
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having been told by the secretary of the
Grand Mufti of Italian attempts to induce the Grand
Mufti and Gaylani to conclude political and economic
agreements with Italy at this time.
The Foreign Minister to Ike Legation in Iran
Instructs Ettel to convey to the Shah a message
expressing hope that he will continue to resist
encroachment on Iran's sovereignty for a short while
longer and explaining that Germany meanwhile was
advancing farther into the Ukraine and that Russia's
power to resist was plainly ebbing.
Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy
Department
Record of interministerial conference of August 23.
Agreement was readied on the basic principles for the
economic provisions of a German-Iraq draft treaty to
be discussed with Gaylani on his forthcoming visit to
Germany.
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having conveyed Hitler's message to the
Shah (see document No. 230) who stated that the Soviet
Ambassador and British Ambassador had presented a
note explaining that their troops were entering Iran
because of failure of her Government to expel the Reich
Germans. The Shah asks that Turkey be approached
to bring about a cessation of hostilities.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Notes foreign reports of an Anglo- Russian invasion
of Iran. Proposes a seven-point program for immedi-
ate action.
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the Shah has ordered the Iranian troops
to make no further use of arms.
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with the Foreign Minister and
Minister President regarding the fate of the German
colony in Iran and that he warned against expulsion of
the Reich Germans without assurances of safe conduct
to Turkey.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Personal Staff
Records having discussed with Hitler the situation
of the German colony in Iran. Hitler approved the
proposal by the Foreign Minister that the German
Legation not be withdrawn until the fate of the Ger-
mans in Iran had been decided.
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Iran
Advises Ettel that internment of the members of the
German colony in Iran by the British is to be preferred
over their surrender to the Bolshevists. Informs Ettel
of a communication for the British Government by
way of Switzerland threatening reprisals against Eng-
lish residents of the Channel Islands in case of refusal to
grant safe conduct to the German colony in Iran.
221
230
344
358
233
361
240
379
243
252
263
280
388
402
419
452
287
461
ANALYTICAL LIST OP DOCUMENTS
Middle East — Continued
XLvn
Date
1941
Sept. 9
Sept. 12
Sept. 12
Sept. 13
Sept. 14
Sept. 15
Oct. 13
Oct. 28
Nov. 5
Subject
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the Iranian Foreign Minister made
public an exchange of notes indicating that the Allies
were demanding the surrender of the German colony
to the British or Russians.
Memorandum by the Foreign Minister
States with respect to a Soviet demand for the sur-
render of a number of Germans in Iran that reprisals
will be taken against Soviet citizens in areas under
German control.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Personal Staff
Records Hitler's wish that 10 Englishmen be de-
ported from the Channel Islands to the Pripet Marshes
for every German deported from Iran.
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Reports on his negotiations with Iranian Foreign
Ministry officials requesting an extension of the time
limit for the deportation of the German colony. States
that he informed the men of the colony that their de-
parture could be no longer delayed lest the Bafe con-
duct promised for the women and children be jeop-
ardized.
The Dirigent of the Political Department to the Foreign
Ministry
Reiterates that for every German from Iran interned
by the British, 10 British subjects from the Channel
Islands are to be interned in the Pripet Marshes.
Directs that such measures be prepared for execution
at a moment's notice but that the effective date will
be given later.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Records that Ribbentrop rejected a proposal by
Bohle that Stalin's son and high-ranking Russian
officers who had been taken prisoner be used as bar-
gaining points in negotiations with the Soviet Union
regarding the Germans in Iran.
The Charge d' Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having been told by Anfuso in strictest
secrecy that the Grand Mufti had arrived in Italy a
short while ago.
The Charge d' Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having been told by Anfuso that the Grand
Mufti had made a favorable impression on Mussolini
and had told him that his aim was political independ-
ence for Palestine, Syria, and Iraq.
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that Anfuso handed Bismarck the text of
a declaration agreed upon by Mussolini, Ciano, and
the Grand Mufti which was to be issued by the Grand
Mufti after German consent had been obtained.
Doe. No. Pags
295
305
306
311
317
322
399
428
449
471
482
482
494
508
512
641
704
742
xlvhi
Date
1941
Nov. 6
Nov. 13
Nov. 15
Nov. 19
Nov. 23
Nov. 28
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Middle East — Continued
Subject
Nov. 30
Nov. 28
Doc. No.
Memorandum by Minister Grobba
Records the arrival of the Grand Mufti m Berlin
and the discussions held with him and Alberto Mellini
of the Italian Foreign Ministry with regard to the text
of the proposed declaration transmitted in Mackensen'a
telegram of November 5 (document No. 449).
Memorandum by the Foreign Minister
Submits to Hitler a summary of developments in
the Arab, Indian, and Pan-Turanian questions together
with proposals for German activities in these matters.
Recommends that the Grand Mufti be received by
Hitler.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Personal Staff
Records Hitler's comments on Ribbentrop s memo-
randum of November 13 (document No. 468). Notes
that Hitler will receive the Grand Mufti but regards
the Pan-Arab question as pertaining to the Italian
sphere of influence and that he considers it contrary
to German interests to promote a Pan-Turanian feel-
ing.
The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy
in Italy
Asks Mackensen to ascertain the views of the Italian
Government concerning the idea under consideration
in Berlin that a council of Arab leaders with head-
quarters in Rome should be set up.
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry
States that the projected German-Italian declaration
on the independence of Uie Arab states in the Near
East would adversely affect German-French collabora-
tion and weaken the will to resist in French North
and West Africa. Urges that the French be informed
beforehand of the declaration and that its issuance be
postponed until a later date.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Secretariat
Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and
the Grand Mufti. The Foreign Minister promised
support for the Arab cause but expressed doubt, in
spite of the Grand Mufti's insistence, whether an Axis
declaration in favor of Arab independence should be
issued right away.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Secretarial
Record of the conversation between Hitler and the
Grand Mufti on November 28. Hitler promised to
announce the hour of Arab liberation once the German
armies stood south of the Caucasus but suggested that
the declaration requested by the Mufti be put off for
a few months.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Records that following the Grand Mufti's reception
by Hitler the decision was made to postpone the dec-
laration on Arab Freedom; also a suggestion was to
be made to the Italians that a communique" be issued
concerning the Grand Mufti's reception by Mussolini
which would be followed by a similar communique on
his reception by Hitler.
Page
452
468
475
746
774
786
483
494
803
815
514
876
515
881
516
885
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Middle East — Continued
Date
1941
Dec. 2
Subject
Doc. No.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
,* Jr?? rd ? tJ ? e I lslt of the former Ira 1 Minister Presi-
dent Wlani who expressed the wish to be recognized
immediately as Iraq Minister President and to con-
clude with Germany a comprehensive treaty proceed-
ing for various forms of cooperation.
(See also under "Egypt," "India," and "Turkey.")
536
XLDC
Page
940
Nethehlands
1941
June 30
July . 3
July
Oct.
Oct. 13
Oct. 20
The Foreign Minister to the Representative of the Foreign
NeZ'rlanJs Commissar for the Occupied
Instructs Bene to inquire if the Dutch have expressed
Soviet &ET ^ VOlUnteer Units t0 fi S ht «***
Eeichsleiier Bormann to Reich Minister hammers
Informs Lammers that, as a result of the radio speech
of Queen Wilhelmma in support of Russia, Hitler had
2S? SSJShSSS "*™ ° f thG ^^ ° f thG Nether "
The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the
Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to
the foreign Ministry
Reports on the political situation and the attitude of
the population following the outbreak of the war against
the Soviet Union, and discusses the measures under-
taken and planned by the Reich Commissar.
The Representative of ike Foreign Ministry With the
Ketch Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to the
toreign Ministry
Reports Seyss-Inquart's account of his meeting with
Hitler on September 26. Hitler expressed satisfaction
oyer the current German policies and requested that
Mussert and his NSB should become thinly political
party in the occupied Netherlands. v
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal Depart-
Records a conversation with the Swedish Minister
who requested permission to visit the Mauthausen
concentration camp where 400 Dutch Jews had died
since February 1941. a
The Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to
the Chief of the Retch Chancellery
Request a decision about the transfer of Dutch
hostages from concentration camps in Germany to
camps in the Netherlands to prevent an investigation
by the Swedish Legation.
45
69
75
51
80
373
598
400
412
642
666
682-905—64-
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Portugal
Date
1941
July 2
July 13
July 20
July 22
July 31
Aug. 21
Sept. 2
Sept. 21
Sept. 30
Subject
Doe. No.
rasa
The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Mtntstry
Reports a conversation with Salazar on the possi-
Wlftv of sending Portuguese volunteers to the eastern
Sent- °ktazar "did not g conaider this feasible but ^ndi-
cated his intention publicly to express his sympathy
wit! Germany in the fight against Bolshevism.
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Portugal
Directs the Minister to call the attention of the
Portuguese Government to statements by American
nolSns urging American occupation of the Azores
ffio report the Portuguese evaluation of this matter.
The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Reports that President Roosevelt Has for the present
postponed plans for the occupation of the Cape yerde
Islands, Azores, and Dakar and provides details about
the President's policy and attitude.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Records a conversation with the Portuguese Minister
about the United States' attitude toward the Azores;
Portuguese-Spanish relations; and economic conditions
in Spain.
The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Reports having learned of American plans for the
occupation of the Azores.
The Minister in Portugal to ^f ^.^^^ and
Renorts on the tungsten situation in Portugal and
the aKies of German firms in acquiring interests ,n
tungsten mines.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Records a conversation with the Portuguese Minister
regarding attempts by the United States to interest
BrSl^the occupation of the Azores; Portuguese^
Brazilian relations; and the general attitude of bpain
and Portugal to Latin America.
The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having been assured that no of^ c ° m ;
munication has been transmitted to the P °rtuguese
Government by Brazil regarding the Azores, but that
the United States would inform Brazil prior to any
American action in the Azores.
Memorandum by an Official of Political Division IM
Records statements by State Secretary Santos Costa
as reported by the Air Attaclie: Portugal intended to
maiaS strict neutrality ; she would call on ; Germany
for help in case of an Eng ish or American landing,
but would call on England in case of a German inva-
sion.
60
103
133
141
168
224
271
346
370
69
130
189
202
267
349
439
545
594
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
LI
Portugal — Continued
Data
1941
Nov. 22
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
The Head of Division W II in the Economic Policy
Department to the Legation in Portugal
Informs the Legation of discussions with representa-
tives of the Ministry of Economies and of the OKW
leading to a plan for a guaranteed monthly supply of
tungsten from Portugal in return for certain manu-
factured products from Germany.
(See also under "Spain.")
489
808
Rumania
1941
July 1
July 2
July 27
July 30
Aug. 6
Aug. 10
Aug. 14
Aug. 14
General Antonescu to Adolf Hitler 57 (j(j
Discusses the joint military operations against the
Soviet Union.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 58 68
Reports that General Antonescu wants a common
German-Rumanian frontier and that he opposes the
employment of Rumanians and Hungarian troops side
by side.
Adolf Hitler to General Antonescu 159 225
Expresses praise for the performance of the Ruma-
nian troops and satisfaction over the course of the
operations in Russia; urges Antonescu to advance with
his forces into the area southwest of the Bug river
and places under his command the LIV Army Corps.
General Antonescu to Adolf Hitler 167 266
Expresses thanks for Hitler's appreciation of the
Rumanian military achievement in the war against
Soviet Russia and promises to carry out the military
tasks requested by Hitler in his letter of July 27 (docu-
ment No. 159).
The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 182 287
Reports that a roundup of 60,000 Jews for road-
building in Bessarabia severely damaged the Ruma-
nian economy. Mihai Antonescu was advised to
proeeed slowly with elimination of the Jews.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 188 296
Secretariat
Record of Hitler's remarks on August 7 on bestowing
the Knight's Cross on General Antonescu. Antonescu's
reply.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 200 312
Reports that the Rumanian Government has reports
of the intention of Hungary to occupy the Banat on
August 16. Rumania refers to an intention of Hitler
to settle that question only after the war.
Adolf Hitler to General Antonescu 204 316
Expresses his views on the future conduct of opera-
tions. Suggests that Rumanian forces occupy the area
between the Dneister and the Dnieper and that Ru-
manian mobile units participate in operations east of
the Dnieper.
LII
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Rumania — Continued
Date
1941
Aug. 16
Aug. 17
Aug. 21
Sept. 18
Sept. 30
Oct. 17
Oct. 21
Subject
Oct. 27
Nov. S
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a request by General Antonescu that Ger-
man military authorities be prevented from moving
Jews back from the Ukraine into Bessarabia.
General Antonescu to Adolf Hitler
In reply to Hitler's letter of August 14 (document No.
204) states that Rumanian forces will occupy the area
between the Dniester and the Dnieper but that Ru-
mania can assume responsibility for the administration
and economic exploitation of the area between the
Dniester and the Bug only.
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania
In response to telegram No. 2588 (document No.
200), directs Killinger to remain entirely noncommital
regarding the Banat.
The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Rumania
Informs the Legation of the order by the OKW for-
bidding any intervention by the German military for
moving Jews from Rumanian territory to the occupied
territory or vice versa.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign, Ministry
Reports strong complaints by Mihai Antonescu of
the economic and military sacrifices made by Rumania
and his urging of radical change in Germany's economic
policy.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a discussion regarding Rumania's economic
difficulties with Marshal Antonescu who complained
especially about purchases by the German troops
contrary to existing agreements.
Ambassador Hitter to the Legation in Rumania
In response to telegram No. 3346 (document No.
406), explains that the whole problem of German
expenditures in Rumania is under review; that some
Rumanian complaints appear to be unfounded; that
a long-term financial plan will be sought which will
protect Rumanian interests.
The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a discussion with Mihai Antonescu regard-
ing the relationship of the Rumanian Government
and the Legion; increased tension between Marshal
Antonescu and the Legion; unwillingness of Mihai
Antonescu to continue the role of conciliation.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy
Mentions the mutual Hungarian and Rumanian
accusations. Directs Mackensen to inquire if these
come to the Italian Government also and if it has any
idea of how to deal with them.
Doc. No.
Page
207
210
318
324
218
332
369
406
414
342
528
592
651
669
426
457
700
759
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Lni
Rumania — Continued
Date
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
1941
Nov. 13
Nov. 30
[Nov. 28]
Deo. 3
Dec. 5
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 466 773
Reports that the Rumanian Government would leave
it up to Germany to deport the Rumanian Jews to the
Ghettos in the east.
Unsigned Memorandum 505 844
Record of a conversation between Goring and Mihai
Antonescu, apparently held on November 26, regarding
German-Rumanian economic relations. Goring urged
the greatest possible increase of Rumanian petroleum
production even at the risk of exhausting the oil wells.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 513 870
Secretariat
Record of conversation between Ribbentrop and
Mihai Antonescu on November 28. Ribbentrop dis-
cussed the course of the war, urged Rumania to
increase her deliveries of oil and food to Germany, and
asked that the peace be kept between Rumania and
Hungary,
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 519 891
Secretariat
Record of the conversation between Hitler and
Mihai Antonescu on November 28; Antonescu promised
increased Rumanian deliveries of petroleum and grain
to Germany; Hitler promised a reduction of German
troops and support for Rumania's currency.
Marshal Antonescu to Adolf Hitler 549 963
Suggests several ways for increasing the export of
Rumanian oil to Germany and Italy. Asks that a
German expert be sent to examine the situation on the
spot.
(See also under "Hungary" and "U.S.S.R.")
Slovakia
1941
Nov. 1
Nov. 26
Editors' Note
Reference to conversations of President Tiso and
Minister President Tuka with Hitler on October 20.
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Slovakia
Directs that Tuka be advised against an official visit
to Rumania in view of recent Rumanian efforts toward
establishing closer ties between Rumania, Slovakia,
and Croatia which aroused concern in Hungary.
Memorandum by the Dirigent of the Political Department
Record of the reception on November 25 of the
Slovak Minister President Tuka by the Foreign Min-
ister in Berlin. They discussed Slovakia's attitude
toward Germany, the war against Soviet Russia,
Slovak-Hungarian relations, the activities of the former
Minister Durcansky, and Tuka's relations with Presi-
dent Tiso.
669
723
823
LIV
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Spain
Date
1941
June 25
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
The Ambassador in Spam to the Foreign ^rmlry
Reports that Serrano Sufier was pleased that Oer-
many agreed to the expedition of Spanish volunteers
™a°n S t Hussia, but that as regards a declaration of
war against Russia, he feared an economic blockade by
England and possibly by America.
June 28 The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
June Sports that a series of recent moves by Serrano
Sufler, such as winning over Franco for sending volun-
teers against Russia, indicate clearly the intention of
preparing Spain's entrance into the war.
Tulv 4 The Charge d' Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
July Reports that 40 times the number needed .volun-
teered for the Blue Division which is soon to be moved
to Germany. The division is to comprise 641 officers,
2,272 noncommissioned officers, and 15.7KU men.
Tulv 18 Memorandum, by an Official of Political Division I M
July 18 Memo ^ ^ ^fJLVder
supplying of a German submarine by a German tender
?n the Canary Islands; although the Spaniards would
probably not be deterred by the English protest, the
German Naval Attache has discontinued these supply
operations for the next months.
Julv 27 The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
July a ™ ~^ t long con Cersation with Serrano Suner on
the ?pan?sh attftude toward the .Allies and his fears
of English or American landings m the Azores, North
Africa, or Portugal.
Auk 22 The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
S ' Reports a conversation with the Spanish Foreign
Mmister who was distressed that the new Spanish
Ambassador, Count Mayalde, had not yet been
received by Hitler.
Auk 22 The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
g ' Adds to his earlier telegram (document No. 228)
that Serrano Sutler was hurt that his confidant,
Mayalde, had not been received after 4 weeks whereas
the former Ambassador, Espinosahadtw.ee been re-
ceived in farewell visits at Hitler's headquarters.
Aug. 23 An Official of the Embassy in Spain to the Foreign
Reforts'the signing of the agreement concerning
employment of Spanish workers in Germany.
Sent 2 The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreiw Ministry
bept. " Transmits a r eport of the Military Attache regarding
a discussion with General Asensio, Chief of Staff, who
advocated an operation against Gibraltar by Spam
afone Comments that this ^ea is probaby inspired
bv Minister of War, Varela, who is Anglophile. Urges
?hat a new approach to Spain for mlitary. cooperation
would probably be successful and asks for instructions.
12
34
70
122
16
38
81
168
157
226
229
231
273
222
353
357
360
441
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
LV
Spain — Continued
Date
1941
Sept. 3
Sept. 6
Sept. 11
Sept. 13
Oct. 4
Oct.
Oct.
10
Oct.
10
Oct.
10
Subject
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy
Department
Records a conversation with Carceller who argued
that a more moderate tone of the Spanish press toward
Britain and the United States would result in Increased
imports of raw materials from overseas. He urged
that this would not mean an abandonment of Spain's
pro-German policy.
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy
Department
Refers to his earlier memorandum of September 3
(document No. 275) and records a c6nversation between
Carceller and Brandau, of the Protocol Division, ac-
cording to which the Spanish Minister of Commerce had
emphasized that it was up to Germany to decide if she
wanted Spain to participate in her European policy
as an equal partner.
Minister Eisenlokr to the Embassy in Spain
Directs Stohrer to make preparations and get per-
mission to increase the loading capacity of the railroad
station at Irun.
The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the
Foreign Ministry
States the view of the OKW, which was approved by
Hitler, that political and military relations with Spain
are to be expanded, yet military action on the Iberian
Peninsula is considered undesirable until conclusion of
the Russian campaign. A reserved attitude is recom-
mended in economic discussions.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Records a visit by the Spanish Ambassador who
stated that his Government was for some time without
news of the Blue Division and who requested permis-
sion to make a personal visit to the Division.
State Secretary Weizs&cker to Ambassador Stohrer
Explains the situation in regard to Mayalde. With
both Hitler and Ribbentrop away from Berlin it is
exceptional if Chiefs of Mission are able to see either of
them.
Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Spain
Expresses resentment over Spanish compliance with
a British protest over two German ships supplying
German submarines in Las Palmas. Asks Stohrer to
arrange with Spanish authorities to have this operation
continued as had been agreed upon with the Spanish
Government in 1939.
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Reports on the internal political crisis and especially
the opposition to Serrano Suner and to his pro- German
foreign policy.
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Reports the gist of the conversation between Franco,
Serrano Suner, and Weddell as told to him by the
Foreign Minister. Weddell suggested far-reaching
economic concessions in return for a friendlier policy
on the part of Spain regarding Britain and America.
Doc. No.
275
Page
444
285
302
314
459
380
383
391
478
498
392
394
612
617
628
630
633
LVI
Date
1941
Oct. 14
Nov. 6
Nov. 13
Nov. 15
Nov. 30
Dec. 9
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Sp ai n — Continued
Subject
1941
Aug. 23
Nov. 7
Nov. 25
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to the instruction of October 9 (document No.
391) and explains the action of the Spanish Minister of
the Navy in regard to the two German supply ships
at Las Palmas.
Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in Spain
Records that recruitment of Spanish workers for
Germany has come to a standstill; that not a single
worker has left for Germany.
The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy
in Spain
Directs that no discussions about joint military
action or the entry of Spain into the war be undertaken
with members of the Spanish Government.
The Embassy in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Transmits a report according to which Franco stated
in a letter to Don Juan that he considered the restora-
tion of the monarchy in Spain the coronation of the
revolution.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Secretariat
Records the conversation of Hitler, Ciano, Suiier,
Ribbentrop, and Stohrer on November 29 in which
Hitler discussed American and Turkish attitudes
toward the war, and Serrano Suiter talked about the
problems of Spanish policy.
Memorandum by an Official of the Protocol Department
Records a conversation between Hitler and General
Moscardo on December 7 about Spanish-Portuguese
relations, and Spanish economic difficulties. Hitler
expressed his regrets that he was unable to do any-
thing regarding the capture of Gibraltar at that time.
(See also under "Anti-Comintern Pact" and "Por-
tugal.")
Doc. No. Page
403
453
467
471
523
555
647
748
774
782
904
971
Spanish Morocco
An Official of Political Division II to the Consulate at
Tetuan n , „.
Directs that in view of the needs of Germany s allies
there should be no discussion in Morocco of Germany's
policy regarding the Arabs.
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with the Spanish Foreign
Minister and Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco
regarding German propaganda in Spanish Morocco.
Asks for more personnel and funds to counteract ex-
tensive American and British activities.
Memorandum by the Director of the Information Depart-
ment
Records a meeting of November 14 in the German
Embassy, Madrid, in which details of future propa-
ganda activities for Spanish Morocco were discussed.
361
756
822
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Sweden
LVII
Date
1941
June 24
June 24
June 25
June 25
June 27
June 27
June 29
June 29
June 29
July 2
Subject
Doc. No.
The Legation in Sweden to Ike Foreign Ministry
Reports that although no definite reply has been
received, the Swedish Government will most likely
agree to the German military requests, particularly
for the transit of one division from Norway over
Sweden to Finland.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that Finland's emphasis on her neutrality
respecting the German-Russian war is having a re-
tarding effect on conversations with Sweden on political
and military questions.
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with the King who expressed
his satisfaction that the principal German request for
the transit of one division had been accepted by the
State Council and who indicated his personal support
in this matter.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the Swedish Foreign Minister has
stated that the Swedish Government granted the
request for the transit of one division from Norway
to Finland.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the wishes of the OKW regarding Swed-
ish cooperation in the campaign against Soviet Russia,
as listed in the OKW letter of June 17 (volume
XII, document No. 038), have in large measure been
granted.
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden
Directs that the Government's thanks and satis-
faction be conveyed to the Swedish Foreign Minister
for Sweden's understanding attitude toward Ger-
many's wishes in connection with the war in the East.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the Swedish Foreign Minister assured
the Minister of Finland that Sweden would supply
arms and ammunition to Finland.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports on the agreement made with the Swedish
Air Force for its cooperation with the Luftwaffe as
regards: forced landings; courier flights; withholding
of fire against German or Finnish aircraft; possible
intermediate landings in the transfers of Luftwaffe
units; and weather reports.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports on the agreement negotiated with the Swed-
ish Government for cooperation of the Swedish Navy
with the German Navy.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Forwards the list of war materials and equipment
requested by the Swedish Government.
16
17
28
30
41
42
Page
11
12
20
21
30
33
44
45
43
59
48
68
lviii
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Sweden — Continued
Date
1941
July 6
July 7
July 10
July 10
July 12
July 15
July 25
Aug. 1
Subject
Doc. No. Page
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Discusses a possible request to Sweden to accede
to the Tripartite Pact. Points out that the concessions
already made to Germany have strained the coalition
government and that only a minority government
could support Sweden's accession. Suggests that
Sweden's relationship to Germany could best be de-
fined by a special treaty.
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden
Acknowledges the argument in the Legation's tele-
gram of July 5 (document No. 77), but reserves a final
instruction regarding Swedish accession to the Tri-
partite Pact. Points out that a bilateral pact with
Sweden is out of the question.
The Head of Division W VI of the Economic Policy
Department to the High Command of the Wekrmacht
and other Offices and Ministries
Forwards an Official Minute of July 9 which records
the agreed conditions for Swedish overseas trade
through the harbor of Goteborg.
Memorandum by the Head of Division W V of the Eco~
nomic Policy Department
Reeords a telephone message from Major Radtke
(of the OKW, Wi Rti) that he will go to Stockholm.
Lists the general answers he will bring in regard to
Sweden's wishes for war materials, as forwarded in
the Legation's telegram of July 2 (document No. 59).
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to his telegram of July 2 (document No. 59)
and complains that instead of the negotiator with full
powers which he had requested, Major Radtke appeared
with a negative answer and not even the power to grant
the few concessions considered in Berlin. Reports
having called off the negotiations of today, and having
decided to handle aerial questions separately.
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden
Directs the Legation to decline the offer of the
Swedish Government to detail a select group of officers
to the Wehrmacht because such officers would com-
mand no cadres of volunteers.
The Charge d' Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a discussion with the Swedish State Secre-
tary regarding the Norwegian ships in Swedish harbors.
Boheman stated that the ships were being sharply
watched; that they would need at least 2 weeks for
preparations to run out; but that Swedish law could
not prevent their departure if their papers were in
order.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the Swedish Government refused per-
mission for the overland transit of an additional German
division to Finland and suggested that the sea route be
used instead.
77
79
91
92
98
109
151
93
95
115
118
124
138
214
172
272
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
LIX
S weden— Continued
Date
1941
Aug. 2
Aug. 4
Aug. 5
Aug. 6
Aug. 28
Sept. 2
Sept. 8
Sept. 11
Subject
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a discussion with Hagglof regarding the
Norwegian ships in Swedish harbors. As a means of
preventing the ships from running out to England
Hagglof proposed that the Oslo shipping firms send
captains to bring the ships to Norway. Objection by
the Norwegian Legation would put the matter into the
courts which in any case would involve long delays and
provide that the ships remain in Goteborg.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having expressed the reerets of the German
Government over Sweden's refusal to permit the pas-
sage of another German division across Swedish terri-
tory, and having emphasized the need for secrecy.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports the Swedish Government's assent to anal-
ogous application of the agreement of July 1940 which
would permit unrestricted transport of war materials
over Swedish railroads to Haparanda, Narvik, and
Trondheim and the shipment of a few thousand men to
Narvik and Trondheim.
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a communication from Soderblom that the
Swedes had discovered a captured British officer on a
German furlough train.
MintUe by the Head of Division W V of the Economic
Policy Department
Records the discussion at Ministerialdirektor Wiehl's
office on August 28 concerning economic negotiations
with Sweden: the need for a clearing credit from
Sweden; the need to maintain civilian exports to
Sweden, to centralize Wehrmacht purchases in Sweden,
and for relaxation in the matter of exports of war ma-
terials to Sweden.
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports the announcement in Sweden of the official
ban on the recruitment of Swedish volunteers for
foreign armies.
The Minister in Sweden to Ike Foreign Ministry
Reports a discussion with Gunther regarding the
Norwegian ships in Swedish harbors, Gunther stated
that it was impossible for the Swedish police to change
the crews without a court order; he insisted that the
validity of the Norwegian decree of May 1940 had to
be decided judicially before any action took place; and
maintained that Sweden had to operate according to
law. He promised finally to re-examine the complex of
questions.
The Minister in Sweden to Ike Foreign Ministry-
Reports receiving the final answer of the Swedish
Government regarding the Norwegian ships: the
recommendation that the Norwegian shipowners insti-
tute legal action in order to place their own captains and
crews aboard the ships. The Legation recommends
either following that course or letting the ships escape
and be brought in by German naval vessels.
Doc. No.
174
Page
277
176
178
281
283
181
254
287
405
270
290
438
465
300
475
LX
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
S wed en — Continued
1941
Sept. 15
Sept. 17
Subject
Doc. No,
Page
Sept. 19
Sept. 19
Sept. 19
Sept. 20
Sept. 22
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports regarding conclusion of a new agreement
with the Swedish Air Force permitting an increase
AenuSof flights over Swedish territory by
German courier planes.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that today's conversation revealed the
surprising fact that the Norwegian ships have been
ffiered to England and are at England's disposal.
Reports having insisted that the ahipfi.be turned over
to their rightful owners, the Norwegian shipowners,
and without recourse to judicial proceedings and that
pendTng such restoration no ships be allowed to escape.
Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Sw f ed «" n , pmh „. l7
Refers to the Legation's ^Segram of Septembei 17
fdocument No. 329) and directs that the > Sw«hsh
■Foreign Minister be informed that the facts indicate
that the Swedish Government has not dealt openly
witn Germany; that Sweden has taken an unneutral
Ittitude Toward the legal claims of the Norwegian
^ners for Their ships; that the licensing for oadi ng
war materials for England throws a peculiar hght on
the attitude of the Swedish Government.
The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
Legation in Sweden < « m f om hpr 17
Refers to the Legation's telegram of September 1/
fdocument No. 329) and states that the Foreign Min-
ister wfshes a memorandum on eeonomio relations
with Sweden, with special regard to possibilities of
putting the thumbscrews on the bwedes.
The Leoaiion in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
™In response 'to the Reich Foreign Minister's request
(document No. 335) submits a m « m t ?^ d "XswS
the Bresent status of economic relations with »weaen
Argues that to put pressure on the Swedes .by -cutting
nff coal and other deliveries would disrupt the Swedish-
German trade on which Germany .is more dependent
tharXeden. Urges that Sweden is most sensitive in
her overseas trade, the Goteborg traffic.
The Legation in Sweden to tht Foreign ^*»»^__ edan
Reports a new discussion regarding the Norwegian
ships w'tn Giinther who insisted there had been no
changed in the position of the Swedish Government
nrntptted aeainit the imputation of acting behind
F^p™v' s back and denied that war materials were
bein3pped to'Bngland. He explained his policy a,
one If S to Germany and neutrality ^^gland
and recounted all that ae had d one for Germany .1 he
Legation suggests the Goteborg traffic as a possible
point for sanctions against bweden.
The Legation in Sweden to the ^f^f™^
Reports on the significance of the results oi ™
neKtions concluded this day by the governmental
5SR. tt&t&ss&A
part would cover existing and anticipated clearing
deficits.
319
329
508
522
334
529
335
531
336
532
343
539
347
546
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Sweden — Continued
LXI
Subject
Doe. No. Page
1941
Sept. 25
Sept. 28
Oct. 1
Oct. 23
Oct. 28
Nov. 1
Nov. 20
Dec. 1
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with Hagglof who explained
certain factors regarding the Swedish truck market.
The British had cut off the importation of parts from
the U.S.A. on learning that Sweden delivered 500
trucks to Finland just as they had eut off the importa-
tion of chocolate through Goteborg. Hflgglof also
urged the importance of the Goteborg traffic not only
for Sweden but also for Germany.
Memorandum by the Foreign Minister
Records a conversation of September 26 with the
Swedish Charge" d' Affaires regarding German-Swedish
relations: criticism of Germany and of Hitler in
the Swedish press; refusal to permit Swedish volunteers
to serve with the German colors; the pro-English
attitude of the Swedish Government regarding Nor-
wegian ships in Swedish ports.
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the Chief of the Legal Department
explained the current status of the litigation regarding
the Norwegian ships: that the Rigmor was under arrest
by order of the Court of Appeal; that the other cases
would probably be settled in accordance with the
precedent of the Rigmor case.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that two important problems regarding the
supply of the German troops in Finland have been
resolved by Sweden's agreement to sell 2,000 tents and
to lease 300 trucks equipped with tires.
The Chargk d' Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with the King who expressed
his fears of Bolshevism, his admiration for Hitler in
the fight against Soviet Russia, and who spoke of his
desire to maintain good relations with Germany.
The Foreign Minister to the Reich Commissar for Oc-
cupied Norway
Explains German policy on Nordic congresses in
Sweden: Norwegian participation is out of the ques-
tion; but as regards Finland and Denmark a distinc-
tion must be drawn between political and nonpolitical
congresses.
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a discussion with Guntner regarding Swe-
den's refusal to supply woolen goods to the German
Army in Finland. Giinther explained that the raw
materials for such goods came from overseas and that
the British Government would cut off the Goteborg
traffic if Sweden provided such goods to Germany.
Memorandum by the Head of Division W IV of the
Economic Policy Department
Draws the attention of Ribbentrop to a memo-
randum prepared by the Swedish Government which
lists in detail Swedish services on behalf of Germany
since July 1940.
357
565
364
583
371
594
418
430
437
674
706
722
484
803
530
927
LXII
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Sweden — Continued
Subject
Doc, No,
Fags
1941
Dec. 7
Dec. 7
Dec. 8
Dec. 8
Dee. 11
Adolf Hitler to King Gustav V of Sweden
Refers to the King's message (document No. 430)
and expresses his appreciation for the King's sympathy
with Germany's anti-Bolshevist struggle. He points
out that Germany is fighting for all of Europe and that
the Swedish public should realize this more fully than
it apparently does.
Minister Wied to State Secretary Weizsacker
Mentions that in November Sweden rejected the
German requests brought by Schnurre. Predicts that
in the new situation resulting from the English declara-
tion of war on Finland it will be necessary to make new
demands of Sweden. Suggests that these would best
be made through Finland or through the regular route
of the Legation rather than by Schnurre as a special
envoy.
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports in regard to the consequences of the English
declaration of war on Finland which is not expected
to change Sweden's attitude toward Finland. Suggests
that if special demands have to be made on Sweden they
be made through Finland.
German-Swedish Agreement Regarding the Delivery of
War Materials
Secret protocol listing a number of items of arms,
ammunition, and military equipment to be delivered by
German firms to Sweden, providing for methods of
payment and specifying periods for delivery.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having delivered Hitler's letter (docu-
ment No. 554) to the King who was rather negative
toward Germany's present wishes in regard to the
transportation of men on leave and exchange of troops
from northern Finland.
(See also under "Finland.")
554
969
558
975
561
565
574
981
988
1001
Switzerland
1941
Aug. 19
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Personal Staff
Submits a report by an agent on the Swiss domestic
situation; the report deals with effects of the war in
the east, German-Swiss economic relations, opinions
in Swiss military circles, and British propaganda in
Switzerland.
331
Date
1941
Deo. 3
Dec. 4
Dec. 5
Dee. 5
Dec. 8
Dec. 8
Dec. 9
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Tki partite Pact
LXin
Subject
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having been informed by Ciano that the
Japanese Ambassador had handed Mussoiini a com-
munication regarding the breakdown of the Japanese-
American conversations, stating that a war of Japan
against the United States and Great Britain is regarded
"as possible and imminent." Japan requested an Italian
declaration of war in such an event as well as a mutual
agreement committing the two countries not to con-
clude an armistice or separate peace with the United
States and the British Empire.
Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Italy
Records a discussion with Marchese d'Ajeta regard-
ing the Japanese d-marche of December 3 (document
No. 537). D'Ajeta remarked that Berlin was appar-
ently examining very carefully the reply to be made to
Japan, and mentioned that opinions in the Palazzo
Chigi were divided on whether the outbreak of a Japa-
nese-American conflict at this time would be advan-
tageous to the Axis.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy
Forwards the draft text of an agreement of the Tri-
partite Powers providing for a joint entry into a state
of war with America and excluding any separate peace.
Directs Mackensen to secure the approval of the
Italian Government so that the text may be handed
to Oshima.
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy
Records a series of conversations in connection with
carrying out Ribbentrop's instructions of December 5
(document No. 546). Ciano and Mussolini approved
the German draft of an agreement to be concluded
with Japan and the proposal that a similar statement
be handed to the Japanese Ambassador in Rome.
Editors' Note
Reference to the conversations of Oshima and Rib-
bentrop on December 7.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Forwards the draft of a German-Italian-Japanese
agreement which had been discussed with Oshima.
Requests that the assent of the Japanese Government
be obtained in time for the signing to take place on
December 10.
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy
Records that Ciano and Mussolini agreed to the draft
of the German-Italian-Japanese agreement (document
No. 562).
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the text of the draft agreement for-
warded in the instruction of December 8 (document No.
562) was submitted to Foreign Minister Togo who re-
quested changes in articles 3 and 4 for the sake of the
Privy Council. Togo also asked when Germany would
declare war on the United States.
Doc. No.
537
Page
941
543
953
546
958
548
960
562
563
568
977
982
983
992
XLIV
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Latin America — Continued
1941
Nov. 6
Nov. 29
Dec. 1
Subject
Doc. No.
Dec. 10
Deo. 11
1941
June 25
July 4
The Embassy in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that General Miller, Chief of the U.S. Mili-
tary Mission, demanded cooperation of the Brazilian
Minister of War for the establishment of U.S. bases
in Brazil, but that the Minister of War refused and
the American Ambassador disavowed General Miller.
The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with Colonel Benjamin
Vargas, the brother of the President, who conveyed
the President's desire to remain on good terras with
Germany and explained that concessions made to the
United States did not mean any fundamental change
in Brazil's foreign policy.
Tlie Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Argentina
Directs Ambassador Thermann to explain that now
that the agitation against his person has subsided, the
German Government would be willing to consider a
simultaneous replacement of its Ambassador in
Buenos Aires and of the Argentine Ambassador in
Berlin.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassies in Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile, and to the Legation in Peru
Instructs the German representative to inform the
Foreign Minister of the state of war between the United
States and Germany, Japan, and Italy ; to explain that
this was entirely due to the policy of the United btates;
and was the exclusive responsibility of President
Koosevelt.
The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to the Foreign Minister's instruction of De-
cember 10 (document No. 570) and reports his con-
versation with the Argentine Foreign Minister who
explained that future German- Argentine relations
would have to take account of Argentina's adherence
to the principles of Pan-American solidarity, assistance
and defense.
(See also under "Portugal," and "United States.")
450
520
Page
743
895
528
912
570
996
575
1002
Middle East
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Notes the suggestion from the French Government
that in case of a French request for military aid in
Syria, Germany issue a declaration recognizing French
rights there. Advises against an unqualified declara-
tion which would run counter to German policy toward
the Arabs.
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with French State Secretary
Benoist-MSchin dealing with Turkish wishes with
regard to occupation of Syria, German-French rela-
tions, and German intentions with regard to the occu-
pied countries.
19
22
71
82
Data
1941
July 9
July 12
July 20
July 30
Aug. 1
Aug, 5
Aug. 6
Aug. 19
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Middle East — Continued
XLV
Subject
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that Iran is taking military measures to
defend herself against any English attack and that
she would appeal to Germany for help if sueh an attack
should be made.
The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy
in Italy and to the Embassy in, Paris
Explains that Minister Cosmelli has been informed
that the English have proposed to General Dentz a sus-
pension of hostilities, and that the German Govern-
ment, while warning the French of English insincerity,
left the decision to them.
The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Minister's Secre-
tariat
Directs all Foreign Ministry personnel concerned
with Arab propaganda to support henceforth Arab
wishes for unlimited political freedom; the collapse of
French resistance in Syria has eliminated the hitherto
existing reasons for German reserve in this matter.
Memorandum by Minister Rahn
Report on the German mission in Syria from May 9
to Jufy 11, 1941 : I Mission (p. 237) ; II Journey (p. 238) ;
III First Meeting with High Commissioner General
Dentz (p. 239); IV Damascus (p. 242); V First Arms
Transports (p. 243); VI Additional Arms Transports
(p. 244); VII War Preparations in Syria (p. 245); VIII
Representatives of the Wehrmacht in Syria (p. 248) ;
IX The "Arab Movement" (p. 250) ; X German Inter-
vention in Syria (p. 251) ; XI The English Attack (p. 253) ;
XII Economic Matters (p. 256) ; XIII Supplies (p. 258) ;
XIV "Desert War" (p. 260) ; XV The Armistice (p. 264)
XVI Conclusion (p. 265).
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the British Minister presented a note
to the Iranian Foreign Ministry recommending the
removal of Germans from the country.
Memorandum by Minister Grobba
Reviews Gaylani's proposal for German-Iraq coop-
eration. Recommends that Germany aim for his rein-
statement as Iraq Minister President. Proposes that
Germany negotiate agreements with Iraq which would
become effective when German occupation of Iraq is
imminent.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Refers to Grobba's memorandum of August 5 (docu-
ment No, ISO) and explains that some degree of Italian
participation will be necessary. Recommends careful
internal preparation prior to discussions with Gaylani.
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with t he Iranian Minister Presi-
dent regarding the British demand for the removal of
Germans from Iraq. Agrees with the Minister Presi-
dent that an organized, official departure of German
residents would have a devastating effect on Iranian
morale.
Doc. No.
84
101
Page
103
128
132
1SS
165
237
171
180
272
285
1S3
215
288
335
XLVI
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Middle East — Continued
Date
1941
Aug. 21
Aug. 23
Aug. 25
Aug. 25
Subject
Doc. No.
Aug. 25
Aug. 28
Sept. 1
Sept. 4
Sept. 7
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having been told by the secretary of the
Grand Mufti of Italian attempts to induce the Grand
Mufti and Gaylani to conclude political and economic
agreements with Italy at this time.
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Iran
Instructs Ettel to convey to the Shah a message
expressing hope that he will continue to resist
encroachment on Iran's sovereignty for a short while
longer and explaining that Germany meanwhile was
advancing farther into the Ukraine and that Russia s
power to resist was plainly ebbing.
Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy
Department
Record of interministerial conference of August IA.
Agreement was reached on the basic principles for the
economic provisions of a German-Iraq draft treaty to
be discussed with Gaylani on his forthcoming visit to
Germany.
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having conveyed Hitler's message to the
Shah (see document No. 230) who stated that the Soviet
Ambassador and British Ambassador had presented a
note explaining that their troops were entering Iran
because of failure of her Government to expel the Reich
Germans. The Shah asks that Turkey be approached
to bring about a cessation of hostilities.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Notes foreign reports of an Anglo-Russian invasion
of Iran. Proposes a seven-point program for immedi-
ate action.
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the Shah has ordered the Iranian troops
to make no further use of arms.
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with the Foreign Minister and
Minister President regarding the fate of the German
colony in Iran and that he warned against expulsion of
the Reich Germans without assurances of safe conduct
to Turkey.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Personal Staff
Records having discussed with Hitler the situation
of- the German colony in Iran. Hitler approved the
proposal by the Foreign Minister that the German
Legation not be withdrawn until the fate of the Ger-
mans in Iran had been decided.
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Iran
Advises Ettel that internment of the members of the
German colony in Iran by the British is to be preferred
over their surrender to the Bolshevists. Informs Ettel
of a communication for the British Government by
way of Switzerland threatening reprisals against Eng-
lish residents of the Channel Islands in case of refusal to
grant safe conduct to the German colony in Iran.
221
230
344
358
233
361
240
379
243
252
263
280
388
402
419
452
287
461
ANALTTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Middle Bast — Continued
xlvh
Date
1941
Sept. 9
Sept. 12
Sept. 12
Sept. 13
Sept. 14
Subject
Sept. 15
Oct. 13
Oct. 28
Nov. 5
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the Iranian Foreign Minister made
public an exchange of notes indicating that the Allies
were demanding the surrender of the German colony
to the British or Russians.
Memorandum by the Foreign Minister
States with respect to a Soviet demand for the sur-
render of a number of Germans in Iran that reprisals
will be taken against Soviet citizens in areas under
German control.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Personal Staff
Records Hitler's wish that 10 Englishmen be de-
ported from the Channel Islands to the Pripet Marshes
for every German deported from Iran.
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Reports on his negotiations with Iranian Foreign
Ministry officials requesting an extension of the time
limit for the deportation of the German colony. States
that he informed the men of the colony that their de-
parture could be no longer delayed lest the safe con-
duct promised for the women and children be jeop-
ardized.
The Dirigent of the Political Department to the Foreign
Ministry
Reiterates that for every German from Iran interned
by the British, 10 British subjects from the Channel
Islands are to be interned in the Pripet Marshes.
Directs that such measures be prepared for execution
at a moment's notice but that the effective date will
be given later.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Records that Ribbentrop rejected a proposal by
Bohle that Stalin's son and high-ranking Russian
officers who had been taken prisoner be used as bar-
gaining points in negotiations with the Soviet Union
regarding the Germans in Iran.
The Chargl d' Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having been told by Anfuso in strictest
secrecy that the Grand Mufti had arrived in Italy a
short whale ago.
The Charg6 a" Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having been told by Anfuso that the Grand
Mufti had made a favorable impression on Mussolini
and had told him that his aim was political independ-
ence for Palestine, Syria, and Iraq.
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that Anfuso handed Bismarck the text of
a declaration agreed upon by Mussolini, Ciano, and
the Grand Mufti which was to be issued by the Grand
Mufti after German consent had been obtained.
Doc. No.
295
305
306
311
Page
471
482
482
494
317
506
322
399
428
449
512
641
704
742
XLvm
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Middle East — Continued
Date
1941
Nov. 6
Nov. 13
Nov. 15
Nov. 19
Nov. 23
Nov. 28
Nov. 30
Subject
Nov. 28
Doc. No.
Memorandum by Minister Orobba
Records the arrival of the Grand Mufti in Berlin
and the discussions held with him and Alberto Mellini
of the Italian Foreign Ministry with regard to the text
of the proposed declaration transmitted in Mackensen's
telegram of November 5 (document No, 449).
Memorandum by the Foreign Minister
Submits to Hitler a summary of developments in
the Arab, Indian, and Pan-Turanian questions together
with proposals for German activities in these matters.
Recommends that the Grand Mufti be received by
Hitler.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Personal Staff
Records Hitler s comments on Ribbentrop's memo-
randum of November 13 (document No. 468). Notes
that Hitler will receive the Grand Mufti but regards
the Pan-Arab question as pertaining to the Italian
sphere of influence and that he considers it contrary
to German interests to promote a Pan-Turanian feel-
ing.
The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy
in Italy
Asks Mackensen to ascertain the views of the Italian
Government concerning the idea under consideration
in Berlin that a council of Arab leaders with head-
quarters in Rome should be set up.
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry
States that the projected German-Italian declaration
on the independence of the Arab states in the Near
East would adversely affect German-French collabora-
tion and weaken the will to resist in French North
and West Africa. Urges that the French be informed
beforehand of the declaration and that its issuance be
postponed until a later date.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Secretariat
Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and
the Grand Mufti. The Foreign Minister promised
support for the Arab cause but expressed doubt, in
spite of the Grand Mufti's insistence, whether an Axis
declaration in favor of Arab independence should be
issued right away.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Secretariat
Record of the conversation between Hitler and the
Grand Mufti on November 28. Hitler promised to
announce the hour of Arab liberation once the German
armies stood south of the Caucasus but suggested that
the declaration requested by the Mufti be put off for
a few months.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Records that following the Grand Mufti's reception
by Hitler the decision was made to postpone the dec-
laration on Arab Freedom; also a suggestion was to
be made to the Italians that a communique" be issued
concerning the Grand Mufti's reception by Mussolini
which would be followed by a similar communique" on
his reception by Hitler.
452
468
475
Page
746
774
786
483
494
803
815
514
876
515
881
516
885
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Middle East — Continued
XLES
Date
1941
Dec. -2
Subject
Doc. No.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Records the visit of the former Iraq Minister Presi-
dent Gaylani who expressed the wish to be recognized
immediately as Iraq Minister President and to con-
clude with Germany a comprehensive treaty proceed-
ing for various forms of cooperation.
(See also under "Egypt," "India," and "Turkey.")
1941
June 30
July 3
July 5
Oct.
Oct. 13
Oct. 20
Netherlands
The Foreign Minister to the Representative of the Foreign
Ministry With the Reich Commissar for the Occupied
Netherlands
Instructs Bene to inquire if the Dutch have expressed
any desire to organize volunteer units to fight against
the Soviet Union.
Reichsteiter Bormann to Reich Minister Lammers
Informs Lammers that, as a result of the radio speech
of Queen Wilhelmina in support of Russia, Hitler had
approved the confiscation of the property of the Nether-
lands Royal House.
The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the
Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to
the Foreign Ministry
Reports on the political situation and the attitude of
the population following the outbreak of the war against
the Soviet Union, and discusses the measures under-
taken and planned by the Reich Commissar.
The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the
Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to the
Foreign Ministry
Reports Seyss-Inquart's account of his meeting with
Hitler on September 26. Hitler expressed satisfaction
over the current German policies and requested that
Mussert and his NSB should become the only political
party in the occupied Netherlands.
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal Depart-
ment
Records a conversation with the Swedish Minister
who requested permission to visit the Mauthausen
concentration camp where 400 Dutch Jews had died
since February 1941.
The Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to
the Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Request a decision about the transfer of Dutch
hostages from concentration camps in Germany to
camps in the Netherlands to prevent an investigation
by the Swedish Legation.
Page
536
940
45
75
51
80
89
373
598
400
412
642
666
682-905—64-
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
PORTUGAL
Date
1941
July 2
July 13
July 20
July 22
July 31
Aug. 21
Sept. 2
Sept. 21
Sept. 30
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with Salazar on the possi-
bility of sending Portuguese volunteers to the eastern
front Salazar did not consider this feasible but indi-
cated his intention publicly to express his sympathy
with Germany in the fight against Bolshevism.
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Portugal
Directs the Minister to call the attention of the
Portuguese Government to statements by American
politicians urging American occupation of the Azores
and to report the Portuguese evaluation of this matter.
The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry
Keports that President Roosevelt has for the present
postponed plans for the occupation of the Cape Verde
Islands, Azores, and Dakar and provides details about
the President's policy and attitude.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Records a conversation with the Portuguese Minister
about the United States' attitude toward the Azores;
Portuguese-Spanish relations; and economic conditions
in Spain.
The Charge d' Affaires in the Untied States to ike Foreign
Ministry , ,
Reports having learned of American plans lor tne
occupation of the Azores.
The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry
Reports on the tungsten situation in Portugal and
the activities of German firms in acquiring interests in
tungsten mines.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Records a conversation with the Portuguese Minister
regarding attempts by the United States to interest
Brazil in the occupation of the Azores; Portuguese-
Brazilian relations; and the general attitude of Spam
and Portugal to Latin America.
The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having been assured that no official com-
munication has been transmitted to the Portuguese
Government by Brazil regarding the Aaores, but that
the United States would inform Brazil prior to any
American action in the Azores.
Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M
Records statements by State Secretary Santos Costa
as reported by the Air Attache: Portugal intended to
maintain strict neutrality; she would call on Germany
for help in case of an English or American landing,
but would call on England in case of a German inva-
sion.
60
103
133
141
168
224
271
346
370
69
130
189
202
267
349
439
545
594
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Pobtugal — Continued
LI
Date
Subject
Doc. No.
Pag8
1941
Nov. 22
The Head of Division W II in the Economic Policy
Department to the Legation in Portugal
Informs the Legation of discussions with representa-
tives of the Ministry of Economics and of the OKW
leading to a plan for a guaranteed monthly supply of
tungsten from Portugal in return for certain manu-
factured products from Germany.
(See also under "Spain.")
489
808
Romania
1941
July 1
July 2
July 27
July 30
Aug. 6
Aug. 10
Aug. 14
Aug. 14
General Antonescu to Adolf Hitler
Discusses the joint military operations against the
Soviet Union.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that General Antonescu wants a common
German-Rumanian frontier and that he opposes the
employment of Rumanians and Hungarian troops side
by Bide.
Adolf Hitler to General Antonescu
Expresses praise for the performance of the Ruma-
nian troops and satisfaction over the course of the
operations in Russia; urges Antonescu to advance with
bis forces into the area southwest of the Bug river
and places under his command the LIV Army Corps.
General Antonescu to Adolf Hitler
Expresses thanks for Hitler's appreciation of the
Rumanian military achievement in the war against
Soviet Russia and promises to carry out the military
tasks requested by Hitler in his letter of July 27 (docu-
ment No. 159).
The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that a roundup of 60,000 Jews for road-
building in Bessarabia severely damaged the Ruma-
nian economy. Mihai Antonescu was advised to
proceed slowly with elimination of the Jews.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Secretariat
Record of Hitler's remarks on August 7 on bestowing
the Knight's Cross on General Antonescu. Antoneseu's
reply.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the Rumanian Government has reports
of the intention of Hungary to occupy the Banat on
August 16. Rumania refers to an intention of Hitler
to settle that question only after the war.
Adolf Hitler to General Antonescu
Expresses his views on the future conduct of opera-
tions. Suggests that Rumanian forces occupy the area
between the Dneister and the Dnieper and that Ru-
manian mobile units participate in operations east of
the Dnieper.
57
58
159
167
182
188
200
204
66
68
225
266
287
296
312
316
Ul
Sate
1941
Aug. 16
Aug. 17
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Rumania — Continued
Aug. 21
Sept. 18
Sept. 30
Oct. 17
Oct. 21
Subject
Doc. No.
Oct. 27
Nov. S
Page
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a request by General Antonescu that Ger-
man military authorities be prevented from moving
Jews back from the Ukraine into Bessarabia.
General Antonescu to Adolf Hitler
In reply to Hitler's letter of August 14 (document No.
204) states that Rumanian forces will occupy the area
between the Dniester and the Dnieper but that Ku-
mania can assume responsibility for the administration
and economic exploitation of the area between the
Dniester and the Bug only.
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania
In response to telegram No. 2588 (document No.
200), directs Killinger to remain entirely noncommital
regarding the Banat.
The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Rumania
Informs the Legation of the order by the UK W for-
bidding any intervention by the German military for
moving Jews from Rumanian territory to the occupied
territory or vice versa.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Reports strong complaints by Mihai Antonescu of
the economic and military sacrifices made by Rumania
and his urging of radical change in Germany's economic
policy.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a discussion regarding Rumania's economic
difficulties with Marshal Antonescu who complained
especially about purchases by the German troops
contrary to existing agreements.
Ambassador Rilter to the Legation in Rumania
In response to telegram No. 3346 (document No.
406), explains that the whole problem of German
expenditures in Rumania is under review; that some
Rumanian complaints appear to be unfounded; that
a long-term financial plan will be sought which will
protect Rumanian interests.
The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a discussion with Mihai Antonescu regard-
ing the relationship of the Rumanian Government
and the Legion; increased tension between Marshal
Antonescu and the Legion; unwillingness of Mihai
Antonescu to continue the role of conciliation.
The State Secretary to the Einbassy in Italy
Mentions the mutual Hungarian and Rumanian
accusations. Directs Mackensen to inquire if these
come to the Italian Government also and if it has any
idea of how to deal with them.
207
210
318
324
218
332
369
406
414
342
528
592
651
426
457
700
759
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Rumania — Continued
Lin
Date
Subject
Do«. No.
Pago
1941
Nov. 13
Nov. 30
[Nov. 28]
Deo.
Dec. 5
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 466 773
Reports that the Rumanian Government would leave
it up to Germany to deport the Rumanian Jews to the
Ghettos in the east.
Unsigned Memorandum 505 844
Record of a conversation between Goring and Mihai
Antonescu, apparently held on November 26, regarding
German-Rumanian economic relations. Goring urged
the greatest possible increase of Rumanian petroleum
production even at the risk of exhausting the oil wells.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 513 870
Secretariat
Record of conversation between Ribbentrop and
Mihai Antonescu on November 28. Ribbentrop dis-
cussed the course of the war, urged Rumania to
increase her deliveries of oil and food to Germany, and
asked that the peace be kept between Rumania and
Hungary.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 519 891
Secretariat
Record of the conversation between Hitler and
Mihai Antonescu on November 28; Antonescu promised
increased Rumanian deliveries of petroleum and grain
to Germany; Hitler promised a reduction of German
troops and support for Rumania's currency.
Marshal Antonescu to Adolf Hitler 549 963
Suggests several ways for increasing the export of
Rumanian oil to Germany and Italy. Asks that a
German expert be sent to examine the situation on the
spot.
(See also under "Hungary" and "U.S.S.R.")
Slovakia
1941
Nov. 1
Nov. 26
Editors' Note
Reference to conversations of President Tiso and
Minister President Tuka with Hitler on October 20.
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Slovakia
Directs that Tuka be advised against an official visit
to Rumania in view of recent Rumanian efforts toward
establishing closer ties between Rumania, Slovakia,
and Croatia which aroused concern in Hungary.
M emorandum by the Dirigent of the Political Department
Record of the reception on November 25 of the
Slovak Minister President Tuka by the Foreign Min-
ister in Berlin, They discussed Slovakia's attitude
toward Germany, the war against Soviet Russia,
Slovak-Hungarian relations, the activities of the former
Minister Durcansky, and Tuka's relations with Presi-
dent Tiso.
669
723
823
LIV
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Spain
1941
June 25
June 28
July 4
July 18
Subject
Dm. No.
Pags
July 27
Aug. 22
Aug. 22
Aug. 23
Sept. 2
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign^ ^"^
Renorts that Serrano Sufier was pleased that L.er
manned to the expedition of Spanish volunteers
aeainst Russia, but that as regards a declaration of
w against Russia, he feared an economic blockade by
England and possibly by America.
The Ambassador in Spain to the F °/ ei W™™ StT l tTaT1 o
ReDorts that a series of recent moves by berrano
Sufter such as winning over Franco for sending volun-
teers agafnst Russia, indicate clearly the intention of
preparing Spain's entrance into the war.
The Chargt d' Affaires in Spain to the ^reign Ministry
Reports that 40 times the number needed .volun-
teered for the Blue Division which is soon to be moved
£ GermLy The division is to emprise 641 officers,
2,272 noncommissioned officers, and 15,780 men.
Memorandum^ an Official of Politic -al Div^on^ M
' Records that the English have closely observed the
sunrjlving of a German submarine by a German tender
n P the y Slnary Islands; although the Spaniards rjrouW
probably not be deterred by the English Potest, the
German Naval Attache has discontinued these supply
operations for the next months.
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a long conversation with Serrano toaon
the Spanish attitude toward the Allies and his fears
of English or American landings in the Azores, North
Africa, or Portugal.
The Ambassador in Spain to the F 'oreign Mv^V
Reports a conversation with the Spanish foreign
MKfwho was distressed that the : new ^Spanish
Ambassador, Count Mayalde, had not yet been
received by Hitler.
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Adds to his earlier telegram (document No l 226)
that Serrano Sufier was hurt that his confidant,
Mayalde, h a d not been received after 4 weeks whereas
the former Ambassador, Espinosa had twice been re-
ceived in farewell visits at Hitler's headquarters.
An Official of the Embassy in Spain to the Foreign
Reports the signing of the agreement concerning
employment of Spanish workers in Germany.
The Ambassador in Spain ^^J 0Tei f>. M iT^ arA , ns
Transmits a report of the MiUtary Attache regarding
a discussion with General Asensio Chief of Sta ff who
advocated an operation aga nst Gibraltar by Spain
alone. Comments that this idea is probably inspired
by Minister of War, Varela, who is Anglophile. Urges
that a new approach to Spain for military, cooperation
would probably be successful and asks for instructor.
12
34
70
122
16
38
81
168
157
226
229
231
273
222
353
357
360
441
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Spain — Continued
LV
Date
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
1941
Sept. 3
Sept. 6
Sept. 11
Sept. 13
Oct. 4
Oct. 6
Oct. 10
Oct. 10
Oct. 10
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy 275 444
Department
Records a conversation with Carceller who argued
that a more moderate tone of the Spanish press toward
Britain and the United States would result in increased
imports of raw materials from overseas. He urged
that this would not mean an abandonment of Spain's
pro-German policy.
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy 285 459
Department
Refers to his earlier memorandum of September 3
(document No. 275) and records a conversation between
Carceller and Brandau, of the Protocol Division, ac-
cording to which the Spanish Minister of Commerce had
emphasized that it was up to Germany to decide if she
wanted Spain to participate in her European policy
as an equal partner.
Minister Eisenlohr to the Embassy in Spain 302 478
Directs Stohrer to make preparations and get per-
mission to increase the loading capacity of the railroad
station at Irun,
The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the 314 498
Foreign Ministry
States the view of the OKW, which was approved by
Hitler, that political and military relations with Spain
are to be expanded, yet military action on the Iberian
Peninsula is considered undesirable until conclusion of
the Russian campaign. A reserved attitude is recom-
mended in economic discussions.
Memorandum by the State Secretary 380 612
Records a visit by the Spanish Ambassador who
stated that his Government was for some time without
news of the Blue Division and who requested permis-
sion to make a personal visit to the Division.
State Secretary Weizsacher to Ambassador Stohrer _ 383 617
Explains the situation in regard to Mayalde. With
both Hitler and Ribbentrop away from Berlin it is
exceptional if Chiefs of Mission are able to see either of
them.
Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Spain _ _ 391 628
Expresses resentment over Spanish compliance with
a British protest over two German ships supplying
German submarines in Las Palmas. Asks Stohrer to
arrange with Spanish authorities to have this operation
continued as had been agreed upon with the Spanish
Government in 1939.
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry _ 392 630
Reports on the internal political crisis and especially
the opposition to Serrano Suner and to his pro-German
foreign policy.
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry 394 633
Reports the gist of the conversation between Franco,
Serrano Suner, and Weddell as told to him by the
Foreign Minister. Weddell suggested far-reaching
economic concessions in return for a friendlier policy
on the part of Spain regarding Britain and America.
LVI
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Sp ai n — Continued
Data
1941
Oct. 14
Nov. 6
Nov. 13
Nov. 15
Nov. 30
Subject
Doc. No,
Dec. 9
The Ambassador in Spain to Ike Foreign Mtmstry
Refers to the instruction of October 9 (document No.
391) and explains the action of the Spanish Minister of
the Navy in regard to the two German supply ships
at Las Palmas,
Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in Spain
Records that recruitment of Spanish workers tor
Germany has come to a standstill; that not a single
worker has left for Germany.
The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy
in Spain . .
Directs that no discussions about joint military
action or the entry of Spain into the war be undertaken
with members of the Spanish Government.
The Embassy in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Transmits a report according to which Franco stated
in a letter to Don Juan that he considered the restora-
tion of the monarchy in Spain the coronation of the
revolution.
Memorandum, by an Official of the Foreign Ministers
Be cords the conversation of Hitler, Ciano, Sutler,
Ribbentrop, and Stohrer on November 29 in which
Hitler discussed American and Turkish attitudes
toward the war, and Serrano Sufler talked about the
problems of Spanish policy.
Memorandum by an Official of the Protocol Department
Records a conversation between Hitler and General
Moscardo on December 7 about Spanish-Portuguese
relations, and Spanish economic difficulties. Hitler
expressed his regrets that he was unable to do any-
thing regarding the capture of Gibraltar at that time.
(See also under "Anti-Comintern Pact" and "Por-
tugal.")
Spanish Morocco
1941
Aug. 23
Nov. 7
Nov. 25
An Official of Political Division II to the Consulate at
Tetu&n „ _ , „.
Directs that in view of the needs of Germany s allies
there should be no discussion in Morocco of Germany s
policy regarding the Arabs.
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with the Spanish Foreign
Minister and Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco
regarding German propaganda in Spanish Moroceo.
Asks for more personnel and funds to counteract ex-
tensive American and British activities.
Memorandum by the Director of the Information Depart-
Records a meeting of November 14 in the German
Embassy, Madrid, in which details of future propa-
ganda activities for Spanish Morocco were discussed.
403
453
467
471
523
Page
555
647
748
774
782
904
971
232
361
455
756
499
822
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Sweden
lvh
Date
Subject
Doc. No.
Pago
1941
June 24
June 24
June 25
June 25
June 27
June 27
June 29
June 29
June 29
July 2
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that although no definite reply has been
received, the Swedish Government will most likely
agree to the German military requests, particularly
for the transit of one division from Norway over
Sweden to Finland.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that Finland's emphasis on her neutrality
respecting the German-Russian war is having a re-
tarding effect on conversations with Sweden on political
and military questions.
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with the King who expressed
his satisfaction that the principal German request for
the transit of one division had been accepted by the
State Council and who indicated his personal support
in this matter.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the Swedish Foreign Minister has
stated that the Swedish Government granted the
request for the transit of one division from Norway
to Finland.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
. Reports that the wishes of the OKW regarding Swed-
ish cooperation in the campaign against Soviet Russia,
as listed in the OKW letter of June 17 (volume
XII, document No. 638), have in large measure been
granted.
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden
Directs that the Government's thanks and satis-
faction be conveyed to the Swedish Foreign Minister
for Sweden's understanding attitude toward Ger-
many's wishes in connection with the war in the East.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the Swedish Foreign Minister assured
the Minister of Finland that Sweden would supply
arms and ammunition to Finland.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports on the agreement made with the Swedish
Air Force for its cooperation with the Luftwaffe as
regards: forced landings; courier flights; withholding
of fire against German or Finnish aircraft; possible
intermediate landings in the transfers of Luftwaffe
units; and weather reports.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports on the agreement negotiated with the Swed-
ish Government for cooperation of the Swedish Navy
with the German Navy.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Forwards the list of war materials and equipment
requested by the Swedish Government.
16
17
28
30
41
42
11
12
20
21
30
33
44
45
43
59
48
68
Lviir
Date
1941
July 6
July 7
July 10
July 10
July 12
July 15
July 25
Aug. 1
ANALYTICAL. LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Swede n — Continued
Subject
Doc. No. Page
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Discusses a possible request to Sweden to accede
to the Tripartite Pact. Points out that the concessions
already made to Germany have strained the coalition
government and that only a minority government
could support Sweden's accession. Suggests that
Sweden's relationship to Germany could best be de-
fined by a special treaty.
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden
Acknowledges the argument in the Legation s tele-
gram of July 5 (document No. 77), but reserves a final
instruction regarding Swedish accession to the iri-
partite Pact. Points out that a bilateral pact with
Sweden is out of the question.
The Head of Division W VI of the Economic Policy
Department to the High Command of the WenrmacM
and other Offices and Ministries
Forwards an Official Minute of July 9 which records
the agreed conditions for Swedish overseas trade
through the harbor of Goteborg.
Memorandum by the Head of Division W V of the Eco-
nomic Policy Department
Records a telephone message from Major Kadtite
(of the OKW, Wi Rii) that he will go to Stockholm.
Lists the general answers he will bring in regard to
Sweden's wishes for war materials, as forwarded in
the Legation's telegram of July 2 (document No. 59).
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to his telegram of July 2 (document No. 59)
and complains that instead of the negotiator with full
powers which he had requested, Major Radtke appeared
with a negative answer and not even the power to grant
the few concessions considered in Berlin. Reports
having called off the negotiations of today, and having
decided to handle aerial questions separately.
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden
Directs the Legation to decline the offer of the
Swedish Government to detail a select group of officers
to the Wehrmacht because such officers would com-
mand no cadres of volunteers.
The Charge 1 d' Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a discussion with the Swedish State becre-
tarv regarding the Norwegian ships in Swedish harbors.
Boheman stated that the ships were being sharply
watched; that they would need at least 2 weeks for
preparations to run out; but that Swedish law could
not prevent their departure if their papers were in
order.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the Swedish Government refused per-
mission for the overland transit of an additional German
division to Finland and suggested that the sea route be
used instead.
77
79
91
92
93
95
115
118
98
124
109
151
138
214
172
272
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
S wede n — Continued
LIX
1941
Aug, 2
Aug. 4
Aug. 5
Aug. 6
Aug. 28
Sept. 2
Sept. 8
Sept. 11
Subject
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a discussion with Hagglof regarding the
Norwegian ships in Swedish harbors. As a means of
preventing the ships from running out to England
Hagglof proposed that the Oslo shipping firms send
eaptams to bring the ships to Norway. Objection by
the Norwegian Legation would put the matter into the
courts which in any case would involve long delays and
provide that the ships remain in Goteborg.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having expressed the reerets of the German
Government over Sweden's refusal to permit the pas-
sage of another German division across Swedish terri-
tory, and having emphasized the need for secrecy.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports the Swedish Government's assent to anal-
ogous application of the agreement of July 1940 which
would permit unrestricted transport of war materials
over Swedish railroads to Haparanda, Narvik, and
Trondheim and the shipment of a few thousand men to
Narvik and Trondheim,
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a communication from Sbderblom that the
Swedes had discovered a captured British officer on a
German furlough train.
Minute by the Head of Division W V of the Economic
Policy Department
Records the discussion at Ministerialdirektor Wiehl's
office on August 28 concerning economic negotiations
with Sweden: the need for a clearing credit from
Sweden; the need to maintain civilian exports to
Sweden, to centralize Wehrmacht purchases in Sweden,
and for relaxation in the matter of exports of war ma-
terials to Sweden.
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports the announcement in Sweden of the official
ban on the recruitment of Swedish volunteers for
foreign armies.
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a discussion with Gilnther regarding the
Norwegian ships in Swedish harbors. Giinther stated
that it was impossible for the Swedish police to change
the crews without a court order; he insisted that the
validity of the Norwegian decree of May 1940 had to
be decided judicially before any action took place; and
maintained that Sweden had to operate according to
law. He promised finally to re-examine the complex of
questions.
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports receiving the final answer of the Swedish
Government regarding the Norwegian ships: the
recommendation that the Norwegian shipowners insti-
tute legal action in order to place their own captains and
crews aboard the ships. The Legation recommends
either following that course or letting the ships escape
and be brought in by German naval vessels.
Doe. No.
174
176
178
Page
277
181
254
281
283
287
405
270
290
300
438
465
475
LX
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Sweden — Continued
Date
Subject
Doc. No.
1941
Sept. 15
Sept. 17
Page
Sept. 19
Sept. 19
Sept. 19
Sept. 20
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign M *'" is ^ rppmellt
Reoorts regarding conclusion of a new agreement
wifh the Swedish lir Force permitting an ' J^re^e
in the number of flights over Swedish territory by
German courier planes.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that today's conversation revealed the
suSng fact that the Norwegian ^ips have been
Sed to England and are at England's disposal.
Srtehaving insisted that the ships be turned over
to their rfghtful owners, the Norwegian shipowners
tnd w£hout recourse to judicial P£^<?^S£
pending such restoration no ships be allowed to escape.
Ambassador Bitter to the Legation in S ™ d ™. heY 17
Refers to the Legation's telegram l of .Septemba ^
Mnrument No. 329) and directs that the bweaisn
StiiSte be informed that the facte mfccate
fh-it the Swedish Government has not dealt openly
SuS Glrmlnv that Sweden has taken an unneutral
war materials for England throws a peculiar light on
the attitude of the Swedish Government.
The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
BiartTA LSSm'- telegram of September 17
fdocument No 329) and states that the Foreign Min-
ister wfshes a memorandum on economic relations
wltn Sweden, with special regard to pos^bihUes of
putting the thumbscrews on the Swedes.
SgSfth.t to pot Pte»»r. on **« /«*» *y o^tms
8SKJS? '&lA a l^«p ■^3B«
her overseas trade, the Gbteborg traffic.
The Legation in Sweden to the Fore f?* ^Norwegian
Reports a new discussion regarding the «°™egiaii
wmmm
point for sanctions against bweden.
319
329
Sept. 22
508
522
334
SFSwHMSSSs
deficits.
529
335
531
336
532
343
539
347
546
Date
1941
Sept. 25
Sept. 28
Oct. 1
Oct. 23
Oct. 28
Nov. 1
Nov. 20
Dec. 1
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Sweden — Continued
Subject
Doc. No.
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with Hagglof who explained
certain factors regarding the Swedish truck market.
The British had cut off the importation of parts from
the U.S.A. on learning that Sweden delivered 500
trucks to Finland just as they had cut off the importa-
tion of chocolate through Goteborg. Hagglof also
urged the importance of the Goteborg traffic not only
for Sweden but also for Germany.
Memorandum by the Foreign Minister
Records a conversation of September 26 with the
Swedish Charge d' Affaires regarding German-Swedish
relations: criticism of Germany and of Hitler in
the Swedish press; refusal to permit Swedish volunteers
to serve with the German colors; the pro-English
attitude of the Swedish Government regarding Nor-
wegian ships in Swedish ports.
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the Chief of the Legal Department
explained the current status of the litigation regarding
the Norwegian ships: that the Rigmor was under arrest
by order of the Court of Appeal; that the other cases
would probably be settled in accordance with the
precedent of the Rigmor case.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that two important problems regarding the
supply of the German troops in Finland have been
resolved by Sweden's agreement to sell 2,000 tents and
to lease 300 trucks equipped with tires.
The Charge" a" Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with the King who expressed
his fears of Bolshevism, his admiration for Hitler in
the fight against Soviet Russia, and who spoke of his
desire to maintain good relations with Germany.
The Foreign Minister to the Reich Commissar for Oc-
cupied Norway
Explains German policy on Nordic congresses in
Sweden: Norwegian participation is out of the ques-
tion; but as regards Finland and Denmark a distinc-
tion must be drawn between political and nonpolitical
congresses.
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a discussion with Giinther regarding Swe-
den's refusal to supply woolen goods to the German
Army in Finland. Giinther explained that the raw
materials for such goods came from overseas and that
the British Government would cut off the Goteborg
traffic if Sweden provided such goods to Germany.
Memorandum by the Head of Division W IV of the
Economic Policy Department
Draws the attention of Ribbentrop to a memo-
randum prepared by the Swedish Government which
lists in detail Swedish services on behalf of Germany
since July 1940.
LXI
Page
357
565
364
583
371
594
418
430
437
674
706
722
484
803
530
927
LXII
Data
1941
Deo. 7
Dec. 7
Dec. 8
Dec. 8
Dec. 11
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Sweden — Continued
Subject
Doc. No.
Adolf Hitler to King Oustav V of Sweden
Refers to the King's message (document No. 430)
and expresses his appreciation for the King's sympathy
with Germany's anti-Bolshevist struggle. He points
out that Germany is fighting for ail of Europe and that
the Swedish public should realize this more fully than
it apparently does.
Minister Wied to State Secretary Weizsacker
Mentions that in November Sweden rejected the
German requests brought by Sehnurre. Predicts that
in the new situation resulting from the English declara-
tion of war on Finland it will be necessary to make new
demands of Sweden. Suggests that these would best
be made through Finland or through the regular route
of the Legation rather than by Sehnurre as a special
envoy.
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports in regard to the consequences of the English
declaration of war on Finland which is not expected
to change Sweden's attitude toward Finland. Suggests
that if special demands have to be made on Sweden they
be made through Finland.
German-Swedish Agreement Regarding the Delivery of
War Materials
Secret protocol listing a number of items of arms,
ammunition, and military equipment to be delivered by
German firms to Sweden, providing for methods of
payment and specifying periods for delivery.
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having delivered Hitler's letter (docu-
ment No. 554) to the King who was rather negative
toward Germany's present wishes in regard to the
transportation of men on leave and exchange of troops
from northern Finland.
(See also under "Finland.")
Page
554
969
558
975
561
565
574
981
9SS
1001
Switzerland
1941
Aug. 19
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Personal Staff
Submits a report by an agent on the Swiss domestic
situation; the report deals with effects of the war m
the east, German-Swiss economic relations, opinions
in Swiss military circles, and British propaganda in
Switzerland.
331
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Tripartite Pact
LXIII
Date
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
1941
Deo. 3
Dec. 4
Dec. 5
Dec. 5
Dec. 8
Dec. 8
Dec. 9
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry 537 941
Reports having been informed by Ciano that the
Japanese Ambassador had handed Mussolini a com-
munication regarding the breakdown of the Japanese-
American conversations, stating that a war of Japan
against the United States and Great Britain is regarded
"as possible and imminent." Japan requested an Italian
declaration of war in such an event as well as a mutual
agreement committing the two countries not to con-
clude an armistice or separate peace with the United
States and the British Empire.
Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Italy 543 953
Records a discussion with Marchese d'Ajeta regard-
ing the Japanese d-marche of December 3 (document
No. 537), D'Ajeta remarked that Berlin was appar-
ently examining very carefully the reply to be made to
Japan, and mentioned that opinions in the Palazzo
Chigi were divided on whether the outbreak of a Japa-
nese-American conflict at this time would be advan-
tageous to the Axis.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy 546 958
Forwards the draft text of an agreement of the Tri-
partite Powers providing for a joint entry into a state
of war with America and excluding any separate peace.
Directs Mackensen to secure the approval of the
Italian Government so that the text may be handed
to Oshima.
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy 548 960
Records a series of conversations in connection with
carrying out Ribbentrop's instructions of December 5
(document No, 546). Ciano and Mussolini approved
the German draft of an agreement to be concluded
with Japan and the proposal that a similar statement
be handed to the Japanese Ambassador in Rome,
Editors' Note 977
Reference to the conversations of Oshima and Rib-
bentrop on December 7.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan 562 982
Forwards the draft of a German-Italian-Japanese
agreement which had been discussed with Oshima.
Requests that the assent of the Japanese Government
be obtained in time for the signing to take place on
December 10.
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy 563 983
Records that Ciano and Mussolini agreed to the draft
of the German-Italian-Japanese agreement (document
No. 562).
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry 568 992
Reports that the text of the draft agreement for-
warded in the instruction of December 8 (document No.
562) was submitted to Foreign Minister Togo who re-
quested changes in articles 3 and 4 for the sake of the
Privy Council. Togo also asked when Germany would
declare war on the United States.
LXIV
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Tripartite Pact — Continued
Date
1941
Dec. 10
Dec. 11
Dec. 11
Subject
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Agrees to the Japanese proposals for changes in the
draft agreement as reported in Tokyo telegram of
December 9 (document No. 568) and directs Ott to urge
that full powers to sign be issued to Oshima without
delay.
The Foreign Minister to the Legations in _ Hungary,
Rumania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Slovakia
Directs the Minister to inform the Government to
which he is accredited of the view of Germany and
Italy that article 3 of the Tripartite Pact now applies
and that the Government should therefore declare war
on the United States. Croatia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia
are asked also to declare war on Great Britain.
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy
Records a series of telephone calls with Berlin and
conversations with Mussolini and officials of the Italian
Foreign Ministry so that the diplomatic steps and
public statements by Germany and Italy would be
synchronized in the matter of declaring war on the
United States.
(See also under "Japan" and "Sweden,")
Doc. No,
Page
571
576
998
1003
578
1005
Turkey
1941
June 23
June 30
July 9
July 12
July 18
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry _
Reports that Saracoglu is willing to cooperate with
Germany with regard to the passage of Soviet ships
through the Straits.
Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy
Department
Records a conversation with the Turkish Counselor
of Embassy who offered his Ambassador's cooperation
in the preparation of a new German-Turkish trade
agreement.
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Requests instructions regarding a suggestion by
Saracoglu that Germany should consent to Turkish
occupation of Northern Syria.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey
Replies to the telegram of July 9 (document No.
86) and states that in view of the loyal attitude of the
French it is not possible for Germany to support a
Turkish occupation of Northern Syria.
Editors' Note
Reference to conversation between Ribbentfop and
Turkish Foreign Ministry official M. C. Acikalin on
July 12.
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Explains the sympathy of the Turks for Germany
in the struggle against Bolshevism and their hope that
a prompt defeat of Russia will permit a German com-
promise peace with the West. Indicates Turkey s
antipathy toward Arab liberation movements. Sug-
gests psychological exploitation of the situation to bring
Turkey to Germany's side.
51
86
97
125
69
106
123
129
174
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Tueket — Continued
LXV
1941
July 24
July 28
Aug. 5
Aug. 11
Aug. 11
Subject
Doc. No,
Aug. 22
Aug. 24
Aug. 25
Aug. 28
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey
Refers to American and British press reports of a
peace offensive by von Papen. Points out the simi-
larity of such reports with some of the ideas of Papen s
dispatch of July 14 (document No. 125). Directs the
Ambassador to refrain from any talk regarding Turkey
as a mediator except on authorization from the Foreign
Ministry.
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Replies to Ribbentrop's telegram of July 24, (docu-
ment No. 145); denies having discussed peace offers by
Germany with foreign diplomats; and defends his
policy of influencing Turkey by diplomatic means.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Records a conversation with the Turkish Ambassador
who brought up the question of the nationalities of
Turkic ethnic origin in Soviet Russia and suggested
the possibility of a Caucasian buffer state.
The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister
Suggests letting the Turks have the text of Molotov s
proposal of November 1940 regarding Soviet bases on
the Straits.
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Ambassador Papen
Replies to Papen's report of July 28 (document No.
161) and denies any lack of confidence in Papen.
States that he had mainly wished to point out the
danger of giving the impression that Germany was
making peace offers through Turkey and outlines the
goals of German diplomacy with regard to Turkey.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey
States that Germany expects Turkey to intern
Russian military personnel escaping to Turkish terri-
tory and to obstruct and delay the passage of Russian
merchant vessels through the Dardanelles.
Memorandum by an Official of the Political Department
Records an account by Minister Kroll of the Em-
bassy in Turkey of his visit in the Special Train where
he had conversations with Ribbentrop, Ritter, and
Jodl regarding the problem of Turkey. Kroll outlined
a program toward Turkey which was approved by
those present.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey
Informs Papen of his conversation with the Turkish
Ambassador at Headquarters on August 19 in which
they discussed Roosevelt's policy, the Anglo-Russian
guarantee to Turkey, and Russia's aims as revealed
in Molotov's statement of November 1940, the text
of which was shown to Gerede. Ribbentrop asked
about Turkey's attitude toward the border peoples in
the Caucasus and eastward.
Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Turkey
Transmits the Foreign Minister's instruction that
every effort be made to bring about a change in Tur-
key's position toward the passage of Russian merchant
vessels through Turkish waters.
145
Page
207
161
179
193
194
22S
284
304
305
227
236
354
368
238
373
253
403
683-905—84-
LXVI
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Tuhkby — -Continued
Date
Subject
1941
Aug. 29
Sept. 9
Sept. 10
Sept. 24
Sept. 26
Sept. 26
Sept. 28
Sept. 29
The Stale Secretary to the Foreign Minister
Explains with regard to the forthcoming German-
Turkish economic negotiations that Turkey will agree
to deliver chromium and copper only in return for war
materials and asks that ClodiuB be authorized to ar-
range for such German deliveries.
The Embassy in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that in negotiations for a new trade and
clearing agreement the Turks do not want to make
deliveries in advance and are resolved to obtain at
least a part of the war materials immediately.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Reeords a conversation with Nuri Pasha, a leader
of the Pan-Turanian movement in Turkey, who offered
to advise Germany in matters relating to the Caucasus.
The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department
to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with Menemencioglu who
said that the English Ambassador insisted on the main-
tenance of Turkey's agreement which required the de-
livery to England of the total annual production of
chromium ore, limited to 250,000 tons. States that
he rejected the suggestion of a treaty excluding de-
liveries of chrome ore and war materials.
The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department
to the Foreign Ministry
Reports regarding the economic negotiations that
Menemencioglu insisted that it was impossible for
Turkey to make deliveries of chrome ore prior to
January 8, 1943. Explains that the alternatives are:
to break off negotiations, or to conclude a treaty with
the promise of future chrome ore deliveries.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Records the results of three discussions with the
Turkish champion of the Pan-Turanian movement, Nuri
Pasha, who advocated the creation of certain inde-
pendent states, based on the Turkic ethnic element,
which would be carved out of the Soviet Union.
Recommends that, in accordance with Nuri Pasha's
suggestion, the Mohammedan elements be separated
out from the other Russian prisoners.
Memorandum by Minister Eisenlohr
Comments on Clodius' report of September 26
(document No. 358) and argues in favor of acceptance
of the Turkish suggestion for future deliveries of
chromium ore. Requests permission to take steps to
secure the consent of the Chief of OKW to that pro-
gram.
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a discussion with Menemencioglu and
Clodius on the economic and political situation; how
Menemencioglu felt about Turkey s interest in the defeat of
Bolshevism but that Turkey had to maintain her
agreement with England regarding chromium. Urges
a decision on the Turkish proposal for a comprehensive
agreement with chromium deliveries beginning in 1943.
Doc. No.
258
294
298
352
413
470
473
55&
358
566
361
571
366
587
367
589
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Turkey — Continued
Lxvn
Date
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
1941
Oct. 2
Oct. 9
Oct. 10
Oct. 13
Oct. 28
Nov. 12
Nov, 12
Nov. 18
Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Turkey 374 602
Lists three groups of armament deliveries which can
be stipulated in the economic negotiations. Explains
that the third group consisting of howitzers and
cannons can be promised, item by item, in return for
chromium after January 8, 1943. Points out the need
for chromium deliveries from Turkey even after the
proposed terminal date of the treaty, March 31, 1943.
German-Turkish Exchanges of Letters 390 626
Regarding Turkish exports of raw materials in ex-
change for German war material and manufactured
goods. It is stipulated that before March 31, 1943,
a German- Turkish agreement is to be concluded pro-
viding for the delivery of 180,000 tons of chromium
from January IS, 1943, to December 1944,
The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department
to the Foreign Ministry 393 632
Reports, on the basis of discussions of Turkish
foreign policy with Saracoglu and Menemencioglu,
that Turkey desires the total defeat of Russia in the
east and a compromise peace between Germany and
England in the west.
Minister Kroll to Ministerial Director Wiehl 402 645
Comments on the German-Turkish Commercial
Agreement (document No. 390) and explains that he
was surprised at Turkey's negative attitude in the
matter of chromuim which was in contrast with Mene-
mencioglu's initial promises. Criticizes Clodius for
failing to make use of Kroll's experience in the negotia-
tions with the Turks.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department 431 707
Records the action taken in the Pan-Turanian
question: Hentig has been called to the Foreign Minis-
try to deal with the matter; the OKW has been asked
to separate the Turkic and Mohammedan prisoners
of war; Papen has been asked to report on the attitude
of the Turkish Government.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey 462 769
Requests Papen's opinion whether Turkey should
accede to the Anti-Comintern Pact.
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 464 771
Replies to Ribbentrop's instruction of November
12 (document No. 462) and explains that Turkey's
accession at this time to the Anti-Comintern Pact
would be interpreted as an option in favor of the Axis
which Turkey is not yet prepared to make.
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 482 801
Reports having been informed by Saracoglu and
Menemencioglu that Turkey would receive materials
directly from the United States under the Lend- Lease
Law. Suggests an appropriate propagandistie treat-
ment of the matter.
(See also under "Middle East. 1 ')
LXVIU
Date
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Subject
Doc. No.
1941
June 23
June 26
July 3
July 6
July 12
July 15
July 16
July 16
July 17
July 21
July 24
July 30
Paga
Wolodymyr Stachiw to the FHhrer and Chancellor
On behalf of Stepan Bandera requests Hitler s support
in the establishment of an independent Ukrainian State.
Reichsleiter Rosenberg to the Foreign Ministry _
Refers to Hitler's decree entrusting him with the
"central handling of the questions of the eastern
European area" and requests that all material con-
cerning this area be submitted to him.
The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania
Directs that Russian emigres who volunteer for the
fight against the Soviet Union are not to be accepted.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris
Directs that Grand Duke Vladimir be told not to
disseminate his proclamation to the Russian people and
to refrain from all political activity lest he be interned.
Circular by Ambassador Ritler
Sets forth the essentials of the guidelines drawn up
in consultation with the OKW and SS for the employ-
ment of foreign volunteers in the struggle against the
Soviet Union.
State Secretary Weizsacker to Reichsleiter Rosenberg _
Communicates the Foreign Minister's standpoint
regarding the functions of the Foreign Ministry repre-
sentatives in the eastern European areas under German
occupation.
Unsigned Memorandum
Record of Hitler's conference with Rosenberg,
Lammers, Keitel, Goring, and Bormann regarding
policies, administration and personnel in the occupied
areas of the Soviet Union.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Secretariat
Submits a letter from Wolodymyr Stachiw addressed
to the Foreign Minister and stating that a Ukrainian
government was established in Lw6w on June 30.
Fukrer's Decree of July 17 4 .
Provides for the civil administration under Keicns-
leiter Rosenberg of the occupied eastern territories
which are to be divided into Reich Commissariats
and subdivided into general regions and districts.
Memorandum by an Official of the Department for Ger-
man Internal Affairs
Refers to Bruns's memorandum of July 10 (.docu-
ment No. 115) and explains that no reply should be
given to the letter of Wolodymyr Stachiw. Encloses
a memorandum describing the action of the Bandera
group of Ukrainian nationalists in Lwow on June M.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Records a discussion with the Rumanian Minister
who expressed the wish that the future Ukrainian
state be not too large.
Memorandum by the Head of Political Division I M
Records a decision bv the Department of National
Defense excluding establishment of a Ukrainian na-
tional militia within the framework of the Wenrmacht.
26
76
96
111
114
115
119
138
28
79
92
122
140
149
156
163
198
147
166
209
265
Date
1941
Aug. 1
Aug. 6
Aug. 14
Aug. 24
Aug. 26
Aug. 26
Sept. 4
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS L303C
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — Continued
Oct. 1
Subject
Doc. No.
Oct. 2
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal De-
partment
Encloses a Swedish note indicating the willingness
of the Soviet Government to apply The Hague Rules
of Land Warfare on condition of reciprocity. Explains
the standpoint of the OKW on the matter and the
considerations of foreign policy which are involved.
Memorandum by an Official of the Department for Ger-
man Internal Affairs
Records expressions of discontent on the part of
Ukrainian individuals and organizations as a result of
the transfer of eastern Galicia to the administration
of Governor General Frank.
Stepan Bandera to Reich Minister Rosenberg
States on behalf of the Organization of Ukrainian
Nationalists that he will aceept Germany's conditions
for cooperation by the OUN, but not the demand for
dissolution of the Ukrainian Government proclaimed
in Lw6w on June 30.
Memorandum by Counselor of Embassy Hilger
Records proposing to the Foreign Minister a com-
promise solution for the propaganda against Soviet
Russia. Although the Russia Committee favored
assurances of abolition of the kolkhoz system it rec-
ommended the compromise in view of the opposition
from other ministries.
Circular of the Foreign Minister
Issues guidelines for conversations emphasizing
Germany's victory over the Soviet Union which will
soon permit Germany to turn her entire strength
against England while Roosevelt will be unable to wage
a war on two fronts.
Circular of the Foreign Ministry
Explains that Germany is not interested in the
services of £migrls from eastern Europe who may
offer to aid in the establishment of a new order in
Russia.
The Slate Secretary to the Permanent Deputy of the
Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories
Refers to earlier correspondence of the two ministries
(see document No. Ill) regarding the representatives
of the Foreign Ministry with the Reich Commissars
and forwards a memorandum regarding their appoint-
ment and their functions.
Memorandum by the Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Records a conference on September 29 in which
Rosenberg reported to Hitler about the political situa-
tion in the occupied eastern territories. Hitler favored
a gradual return of the kolkhozes to private property ;
envisaged a 25-year German protectorate oyer the
Ukraine; and opposed a return of Russian Emigres.
The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the
Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to
the Foreign Ministry
Forwards an account of a visit of Seyss-Inquart with
Hitler on September 26 in the course of which Hitler
expressed his views regarding the exploitation of Soviet
Russia's economic resources for the benefit of Germany.
173
184
203
237
244
247
277
372
377
Page
274
289
315
370
389
395
449
596
606
LXK ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Union op Soviet Socialist Republics — Continued
Date
1041
Oct. 8
Nov. 30
Subject
Doc. No.
Deo. 1
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal
Department
Records receiving from the Swedish Legation a pro
memoria of the views of the Soviet Government which
denied any departure from The Hague Rules of Land
Warfare in its treatment of German prisoners of war
and demanded of Germany merely the reciprocal appli-
cation of those rules.
Memorandum by the Director of the News Service and
Press Department
Records that Hitler ordered the greatest possible
propaganda use of the "Testament of Peter the Great
in spite of the objection that German scholars had
characterized it as a forgery even at the time of the
last war.
Circular of the Foreign Ministry
Refers to the circular of August 26 (document No. 247)
and reiterates that emigres from former Russian terri-
tory are not to be used in the newly occupied areas.
Forwards a memorandum to be used in replying to
emigres.
(See also under "Baltic States," "Directives for the
Conduct of the War" "Finland," "Hungary,
"Rumania," "Spain," "Turkey," and "Vatican. )
Pago
389
624
525
908
527
910
United States
1941
July 7
July 7
July 9
July 12
July 13
The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Submits an appraisal by the Military Attache of
American strategic thinking following the outbreak of
the German-Russian war.
The Chargi d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry
Reports on the arrests of a number of Germans for
espionage and sharply criticizes the employment of such
people by German counterintelligence agencies.
The Chargi d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Comments upon the landing of American forces in
Iceland and upon the effect of President Roosevelt s
foreign policy on public opinion. States that Roose-
velt's policy aims at strengthening Britain and her
allies and at prolonging the war until America can
intervene decisively.
The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Submits an appraisal of American rearmament by
the Military Attach^; he warns against underestimating
American efficiency and states that the American
Officers' Corps in general meets high requirements.
The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
J^zTiistTy
Submits an appraisal of American foreign policy
after the occupation of Iceland, explaining that the
President does not want a formal declaration of war on
Germany which would commit him to a total war effort
but that he is determined to wage undeclared war.
80
81
83
96
98
101
99
104
125
130
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
United States — Continued
LXXI
Bate
Subject
Doc. No,
Fagfl
1941
July 14
JulyJlS
JulyI22
July 24
July 25
Julyl25
July 30
Aug. 7
Aug, 10
Memorandum, by Dr. Karl Megerle
Proposes a program to Ribbentrop for propaganda
themes emphasizing the defense of Europe against
Anglo-American aggression and the concept of a
European Monroe Doctrine.
The Chargi d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry
Comments on Roosevelt's explanation of the neces-
sity for occupying Iceland for the defense of the United
States and the Western Hemisphere and on the views
of the noninterventionist opposition.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United
States
Directs the Chargi d' Affaires to circulate the idea
in the United States that America's entry into the
war would be most disadvantageous to the American
Jews.
The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Minister's Sec-
retariat
Expresses the wish that mendacious reports about
Roosevelt and Churchill be circulated as a counter-
move against British and American falsifications.
The Charge" d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry
Refers to Ribbentrop's instruction of July 22 (docu-
ment No. 139) and reports having discussed its ideas
with leaders of the opposition. States that some in-
telligent Jews fear that they may be the scapegoats in
case of America's entry into the war.
The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Submits an evaluation of the military situation
indicating that the American fleet ia dispersed, leaving
Japan free in the Western Pacific. The United States
must therefore seek an accommodation with Japan.
Entry into the war against Germany is unlikely.
The Chargi d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry
Reports on a "particularly effective" propaganda
action organized and financed by the Embassy; post-
cards containing attacks on Roosevelt and his Cabinet
have been sent out in great numbers under the letter-
heads of members of the Congress.
The Chargi d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry
Reports that in spite of propaganda efforts by
"warmongers" Roosevelt will maintain the course of
"nonbelligerent means," the median course between
war and isolation.
The Chargi d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry
Reports that American foreign policy is faced with a
dilemma resulting from various foreign and domestic
pressures; considers it likely that an Anglo-American
peace program will be formulated to anticipate any
possible German peace offer after victory in Russia.
108
121
139
144
150
137
167
201
206
213
153
163
216
234
185
192
291
302
LXXII
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
United States — Continued
Date
1941
Aug. 12
Subject
Doe. No.
The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry .
Reports that American policy aims at appeasement
of Japan because America cannot risk a two-front war
in view of her needs of strategic materials from over-
seas Reports also that isolationist leaders have
approached the German Embassy asking that it exert
its influence on Japan lest an incident in the Pacific
precipitate war.
Aus 17 Memorandum by the Foreign Minister t, „„„„„>,♦
AUg - Submits to Hitler an appraisal of * h ° *?^™"
Churchill meeting; states that the eight Wilson
points of the Atlantic Charter will not impress anybody
and expresses the opinion that there will be no active
American intervention in the war once Germany has
attained her goals in the east.
Aug. 27 The Chargi d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
frT7 1M-S £?"U *
States that a Japanese attack on Manila would bring
about an American declaration of war on Japan which
would not be in Germany's interest.
Sept. 1 Memorandum, by Minister Eisenlohr roMT M na
P Refers to the Washington report of July 5 regard ing
espionage (document No. 81) and records that a delay
*n P the investigation ensued because the OKW objected
to the Embassy's harsh criticism of the Abwehr activi-
ties. Of those 17 who were arrested, four were from the
Abwehr and one from the SD.
Sept. 6 The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United
Transmits the text of the German press announce-
ment regarding the encounter of the AmencM deateosw
Greer with a German submarine, and instructs Thorn-
sen to make it clear to "leading isolationist members
of Congress" that the incident provides a unique op-
portunity to expose Roosevelt's war-mongenng policy.
Sept. 9 The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Refers^ the Foreign Minister's instruction regard-
ing [the Greer incident (document No. 282) and report*
that Germany's handling of the matter has >d effect,
and that contact has been made with eertain Senators
and Congressmen who expect to press for a Congres-
sional investigation.
Sept. 11 The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Reports' that Senator Nye introduced a resolution in
the Senate calling for an investigation of the Greer
incident.
Sept. 12 The Chargi d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Comments on President Roosevelt's speech of
September 11 and states that it will affl™vate the
situation in the Atlantic, the more so as the United
States Atlantic fleet, in interpreting the new orders
will not merely wait for Axis naval units to appear
but will hunt them down.
196
Page
309
209
321
249
266
399
433
282
454
292
467
299
304
474
480
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
LXXIII
United States — Continued
Date
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
1941
Sept. 15
Sept. 19
Sept. 22
Sept. 28
Oct. 6
Oct. 7
Oct. 10
Oct. 17
Oct. 27
Nov. 1
The Charge d'Affaires in the United Stales to the For- 321 511
eign Ministry
Reports that Secretary of the Navy Knox stated
in a speech that the American Navy after September
16 would protect ships of all flags carrying lend-lease
war material between the American Continent and
Iceland.
The ChargS d'Affaires in the United Stales to the Foreign 337 533
Ministry
Reports the receipt of an American note demanding
$2,967,092 in reparation for the sinking of the Robin
Moor by a German submarine in May 1941.
The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister 348 548
Submits a draft instruction for Washington in reply
to Thomsen's telegram of September 19 regarding the
American note on the Robin Moor (document No. 337) ,
Thomsen is rebuked for having acknowledged receipt
of the note.
Minute by the Director of the Political Department 365 586
States that reprisals against Jews and Freemasons
in Germany, as suggested in a memorandum forwarded
by Bohle, would not improve the situation of German
citizens in North and South America.
Minute by the Stale Secretary 384 617
Asks the Press Department for information on the
way in which the use of uranium for blasting has
recently been dealt with in the foreign press, especially
the American press.
The Chargi d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign 387 621
Ministry
Reports his view that President Roosevelt will pro-
ceed with caution in his endeavor to achieve repeal of
the Neutrality Act.
Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff 396 638
Comments upon President Roosevelt's message to
Congress of October 9 urging repeal of article 6 of the
Neutrality Act which prohibits the arming of merchant
vessels.
The Charge" d'Affaires in the United Stales to the Foreign 407 652
Ministry
Comments on the likely reaction of the American
Government and of the opposition as well to the tor-
pedoing of the United States destroyer Kearney near
Iceland.
Minute by Ambassador Dieckhoff 427 702
Records that on request from the Foreign Minister's
Secretariat he submitted a memorandum on the situa-
tion in the United States Senate with regard to the
pending bill providing for changes in the Neutrality
Act.
Circular of the Foreign, Minister 439 724
Directs each Mission to notify the given Govern-
ment by note verbale that the Reich Government
absolutely denies the assertions made in a speech by
President Roosevelt regarding a map showing German
plans for the control of Latin America and regarding
plans for the abolition of all existing religions.
lxxiv
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
United States — Continued
Bate
1941
Nov. 2
Nov. 13
Nov. 14
Nov. 15
Nov. 27
Dec. 4
Dec. 4
Dec. 7
Subject
Doc. No.
Fago
Circular of the Foreign Minister
Refers to a second statement prepared in Berlin in
addition to that issued in Multex No. 887 (document
No. 439) and directs each Mission to make appropriate
use of the statement in refuting Roosevelt's charge in
his speech of October 27 regarding Germany as the
aggressor.
The Charge d' Affaires in the United Stales to the Foreign
Ministry
States that as a result of Roosevelt's continued drive
against the opposition leading members of the America
First Committee may be intimidated into resigning.
Editors' Note
Reference to a conference on November 13 at Hitler s
headquarters where new directives were approved for
the conduct of German surface forces on encountering
American forces.
Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff
Comments on the changes in the Neutrality Act
voted by the House of Representatives and emphasizes
the small size of the vote in favor of the changes.
The Embassy in Ike United Stales to the Foreign Min-
istry
The Military Attache" expresses the opinion that the
arrival of the Japanese negotiator Kurusu poses for
the United States the question of how to extricate
itself from the dilemma between its "megalomania
and the actual power situation in the Far East.
The Chargi d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry
Reports that the American note handed to the
Japanese negotiators amounts to an ultimatum but
that it is impossible to say whether the Americans
intend to make good this threat.
The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry
Suggests certain considerations which argue against
an American-Japanese war in spite of alarmist articles
to the contrary in the American press.
The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ivt 1S¥L % S t T 1/
Comments on the publication in the Chicago Tribune
and Washington Times Herald of a secret report of the
American High Command which confirms that
American combat power will not be ready before July
1943, and which indicates that Germany and her allies
can be conquered only by an American expeditionary
force which would require enormous sums of money.
The Charge a" Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry ..
Reports that the Japanese attack on Hawaii and the
Philippines came as a complete surprise to the American
Government and people and caused all American war
plans based on the expectation of gaining time for one
or two years to be abandoned.
441
726.
465
470
473
772
779-
781
784-
506
539
541
848-
948
950
553
968
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
United States — Continued
LXXV
Date
Subject
Page
1941
Dec. 8
Dec, 8
Deo. 10
Dec. 11
The Chargt d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry
Reports that Roosevelt will have the support of the
whole nation in the war against Japan and will be able
to obtain full war powers from Congress. Considers it
uncertain whether the President will also ask that a
state of war with Germany and Italy be declared.
The Chargi d' Affaires in the Untied Slates to the Foreign
Ministry
Reports that Congress declared war on Japan fol-
lowing Roosevelt's short speech which did not mention
Germany or Italy; that all segments of American
political life are united; and that American losses in the
Pacific pose most difficult problems for the conduct of
American military operations.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United States
Directs the Charge' d' Affaires to deliver to the Amer-
ican Government on December 11a note which declares
a state of war to exist between Germany and the United
States.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Secretariat
Records the delivery by the Foreign Minister to the
American Charge 1 d' Affaires of the German declaration
of war.
(See also under "Finland, 1
"Latin America.")
"Iceland," "Japan," and
559
978
560
980
572
577
999
1004
1941
July 19
July 23
July 24
Aug. 25
Vatican
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Formulates certain guidelines in regard to the treat-
ment of German church matters abroad.
An Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs
to the Foreign Minister
Notes the impending announcement of the appoint-
ment of Rosenberg as Reich Minister and advises
that the Dienststelte Rosenberg claims the right to
regulate church questions. Indicates some impend-
ing problems.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Urges that the right of State control in the appoint-
ment to offices in the Catholic Church be extended
within the territory of the old Reich and expanded in
the new areas under German sovereignty. Proposes
a note to the Vatican explaining the Government's
position.
The Stale Secretary to the Embassy to the Holy See
Explains the view of the Reich Government regarding
appointments to high Church offices in the so-called new
Reich area and regarding other appointments within
the Old Reich. Forwards the text of a note verbale
setting forth the position of the Reich Government
regarding such appointments and directs that it be
delivered to the Cardinal Secretary of State.
129
143
183
205
148
210
241
381
LXXVI
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Vatican — Continued
Date
1941
Aug. 28
Aug. 30
Sept. 2
Sept. 12
Sept. 12
Subject
Sept. 13
Sept. 17
Sept. 19
Sept. 29
Dec. 4
Dec. 5
Note Verbale From the Apostolic Nunciature
Refers to the note verbale of May 19 of the For-
eign Ministry (Volume XII, document No. 567) and
explains the right of the Church to church property.
Protests that the confiscations of church properties in
the occupied eastern territories are contrary to inter-
national law.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Records a visit of the Nuncio during which he was
told that the legal theory of the latest note verbale
of the Nunciature was not accepted.
The Apostolic Nuncio to the Foreign Minister
Complains about the closing of churches in the
Warthegau and asks that the Foreign Minister inter-
cede in the matter with the competent authorities.
Memorandum by ike State Secretary
Records a conversation with the Nuncio who in-
quired about the confiscation of monasteries in Ger-
many and about a directive that was said to restrict
further confiscations.
Counselor of Embassy Menshausen to State Secretary
Weizsacker
Discusses the attitude of the Holy See toward the
war against Russia: The Pope would have expressed
his sympathies with Germany to a much greater ex-
tent had it not been for the reported anti-Christian
tendencies in Germany.
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Transmits a report by Attolico, the Italian Ambas-
sador to the Holy See, concerning the conversation of
Myron C. Taylor with the Pope.
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Transmits a further report of Attolico regarding his
conversation with the Pope in connection with Myron
Taylor's visit to the Vatican.
An Official of the Reich Ministry for Ecclesiastical
A fairs to the Stale Secretary
Transmits a copy of Hitler's order of August 6
concerning the conduct of the Wehrmacht in religious
questions in the eastern areas and a copy of Hitler's
directive of July 30 concerning the suspension of the
confiscations of church and monastic property.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Records the receipt from the Apostolic Nuncio of a
note verbale protesting against a decree of the Reichs-
statthalter of the Warthegau which ignores the exist-
ing hierarchy of the Church in that area and sets up new
religious communities.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry
Explains why Orthodox priests had been allowed to
enter the formerly Russian areas and Catholic priests
had been denied such permission.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Records a conversation with the Nuncio who com-
plained once more about conditions in the Warthegau.
Doe. No. Page
255
260
272
307
309
408
315
330
340
368
542
547
415
440
483
489
499
523
535
590
952
959
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Yugoslavia
LXXVII
1941
June 30
July 10
July 17
July 24
July 25
Aug. 7
Aug. 10
Aug. 12
Aug. 15
Aug. 20
Subject
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Croatia
Directs that Pavelic" be told that Hitler accepts
his offer of a contingent of Croatian volunteers in the
struggle against Soviet Russia.
The Charge 1 d' Affaires in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that General Glaise von Horstenau ex-
pressed to Pavelie - Germany's concern over the excesses
against the Serbs in Croatia committed by the Ustaie.
The Director of the Department for German Internal
Affairs to the Legation in Croatia
States that the resettlement of Slovenes and Serbs
in the territory of the former Yugoslav state is to be
arranged by an exchange of notes between the Ger-
man and Croatian Governments rather than by a
formal treaty.
Editors' Note
Refers to the visit of Marshal Kvaternik to Hitler's
headquarters on July 22.
Memorandum by the Director of the Department for Ger-
man Internal Affairs
Requests the Foreign Minister to determine whether
or not Hitler decided that the Volksdeutsche in south-
eastern Europe were to be resettled in Germany.
An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the
Foreign Ministry
States that a report from Belgrade regarding in-
creased communist activity was passed on to Ribben-
trop and Hitler. Ribbentrop ordered Veesenmayer to
Belgrade.
Memorandum by an Official of the Department for Ger-
man Internal Affairs .
Records information from Himmler of Hitler's de-
cision postponing the resettlement of Volksdeutsche
from southeastern Europe until after the war. Kofievje
in Italian-occupied territory is not affected.
The Charge d' Affaires in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the insurrectionary movement in
Bosnia, now on the wane, is partly to be attributed to
the ruthless methods of the Ustaae.
The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the
Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Minis-
try
Reports deterioration of the situation with regard
to the insurrectionary movement in Serbia.
The Deputy Director of the Legal Department to the
Legations in Croatia and Hungary
Forwards Red Cross reports of executions of Serbs
on Croatian and Hungarian territory. Suggests that
measures be taken to counteract propagandists
exploitation of such incidents.
Memorandum by the Foreign Minister
Records the Italian demand of Croatia that she hand
over to the Italian military all executive authority in
the Adriatic littoral.
Page
46
90
116
52
113
157
149
152
187
191
195
205
217
203
212
215
295
301
308
317
341
L3DCVIII
Date
1941
Aug. 21
Aug. 21
Aug. 27
Aug. 29
Aug. 30
Sept. 2
Sept. 8
Sept. 10
Sept. 12
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Yugoslavia — Continued
Subject
Doc. No.
Paga
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Croatia
Directs that in regard to the Italian demand on
Croatia (see document No. 217) the Croatian Govern-
ment be advised to reach a friendly agreement with
Italy. The alliance with Italy is of paramount interest
to Germany in the Mediterranean.
The Minister in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that Mussolini has accepted a Croatian
proposal regarding the dispute over administration of
the Croatian littoral.
The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the
Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign
Ministry
Reports on the spread of insurrection in Serbia and
the disintegration of the provisionally appointed
government; installation of a new Serbian government
willing to fight Communism is being attempted.
The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the
Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign
IvfiTustviJ
Reports the attempt to have the Communist insur-
rection crushed by the Serbs themselves. General
Milan Nedie, a former Yugoslav War Minister, has
been charged with forming a government.
The Director of the Department for German Internal
Affairs to the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Min-
istry With the Military Commander in Serbia
Inquires about the number of Serbs thus far de-
ported from Croatia.
The Foreign Minister to the Plenipotentiary of the
Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander
in Serbia
States that he has no objections to the formation of
the Nedid government but that he should have been
informed beforehand. The Nedie" government must
be prevented from turning against Germany.
The Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry
With the Military Commander in Serbia to the
Foreign Ministry
Proposes that 8,000 male Jews be moved from berbia
and put on an island in the Danube delta.
The Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry
With the Military Commander in Serbia to the
Foreign Ministry
Requests instructions so that the question of a quick
and Draconian settlement of the Jewish question in
Serbia can be taken up with the Military Commander,
Serbia.
The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the
Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign
Ministry
Reports that the Nedie government is unable to put
down the insurrectionary movement and that Germany
will have to crush it solely with her own forces.
219
220
250
342
344
400
257
411
261
267
416
434
288
297
463
472
303
479
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Lxxrx
Yugoslavia — Continued
Date
Subject
Doe. NO.
PagB
1941
Sept. 13
Sept. 14
Sept. 15
Sept. 19
Sept. 22
Sept. 26
Sept. 28
Oct. 2
Oct. 17
Oct. 25
Memorandum by an Official of the Department for
German Internal Affairs
Opposes the deportation of Serbian Jews to Poland or
Russia and considers it possible to keep them in camps
in Serbia if the necessary harshness and determina-
tion are applied.
Ambassador Ritter to the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign
Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia
Gives notice of the decision of the OKW to transfer
one division from France to Serbia.
Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Bulgaria
Directs that the agreement in principle of the
Bulgarian Government be requested for cooperation in
blocking off outside aid to the insurgents in Serbia.
The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy
Forwards text of Hitler's Directive of September 16
(document No. 326) and requests that the Italian
Government be informed of Field Marshal List's im-
pending journey to Zagreb for discussing joint German-
Croatian action against the Communist uprisings in
Serbia.
The Minister in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry
Forwards the minutes of a conference concerning prob-
lems of resettlement from and to the areas of former
Yugoslavia. Requests instructions in view of the
Croatian reluctance to accept more Slovenes.
SS-Obergruppenfiihrer Heydrich to Foreign Minister
Rihbentrop
Asks that influence be brought to bear on Croatia to
accept the Slovenes who are to be removed from Ger-
many in order to make room for the Volksdeutsche
from Kocevje.
The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the
Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign
Minister
Requests the Foreign Minister's support in bringing
about the removal of 8,000 Jews from Serbia as the
prerequisite for eliminating Freemasonry and a hostile
intelligentsia.
Memorandum by the Director of the Department for Ger-
man Internal Affairs
Comments on Behzler's telegram No. 701 (document
No. 363) and opposes the removal of Serbian Jews to
the Rumanian Danube delta. Requests authorization
to discuss the matter with Heydrich.
The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy
Requests comments on an enclosed letter of Sep-
tember 24 from the OKW which urges that the Foreign
Ministry not get involved in cases where death sen-
tences are passed against nationals of occupied coun-
tries.
Memorandum by an Official of the Department for Ger-
man Internal Affairs
Record by Counselor Rademacher of his trip to Bel-
grade to study the problem of the disposition to be
made of the Serbian Jews.
313
318
320
339
497
507
509
535
350
360
363
552
570
582
376
408
425
605
653
697
liXXX
Date
1941
Oct. 29
Nov. 22
Nov. 28
Nov. 30
Dec. 3
Dec. 8
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Yugoslavia — Continued
Subject
The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the
Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign
Ministry
Reports that the wholesale execution of Serbs as
reprisals for killings of members of the Wehrmacht have
effects which are contrary to Germany's political objec-
tive.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Explains that while Benzler's appointment as Plen-
ipotentiary authorizes him to deal with the deportation
of Jews from Serbia, the handling of this problem by the
military authorities within Serbia is outside the sphere
of his responsibility.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Personal Staff
Record of a conversation between Hitler and
Croatian Foreign Minister Lorkovid on November 27;
Hitler expressed satisfaction at developments in Croatia.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's
Secretariat
Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and
Croatian Foreign Minister Lorkovic' on November 28.
Ribbentrop advised Croatia to conduct a wise policy
with respect to Italy because Italy and Germany were
allies.
The Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry
With the Military Commander in Serbia to the
Foreign Ministry
Reviews the situation in Serbia after the insurrection
had largely been suppressed. Recommends that future
police action be chiefly entrusted to such Serbs as
General Nedid whose actions have earned a degree of
German trust.
Minute by an Official of the Department for German
Internal Affairs
Records having told Benzler that compliance with
his request for an early removal of the Serbian Jews
to the east was impossible because deportation of the
Jews from Germany had priority.
(See also under "Directives for the Conduct of the
War" and "Italy.")
Doe. No. Pags
432
491
511
517
538
566
708
812
865
8S6
944
990
No. 1
177/85202-03
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
mosttjkgent Tokyo, June 23, 1941—12:35 a.m.
No. 1012 of June 22 Received June 22—10 : 15 p. m.
With reference to your telegram Multex No. 401 of June 21. 1
For the Foreign Minister.
Today at 7:00 p. m,, Japanese time, after receiving the telegram
mentioned above, I called on Foreign Minister Matsuoka. I explained
to him in detail the memorandum of the German Government and
moreover handed to him the proclamation of the Fiihrer. 2
The Foreign Minister accepted my explanation with understand-
ing and told me that Ambassador Oshima had been informed by
the Reich Foreign Minister, after i : 00 a. m., German time, corre-
sponding to 11 : 00 a. m., Japanese time, that war with the Soviet
Union had begun. He thereupon asked me for information whether
there had been a formal declaration of war. I answered in the
negative and referred him to the text of the memorandum, where
mention is made of the removal of a threat made against the German
Reich. Matsuoka described my explanation as valuable, but requested
me to ask Berlin for information on this point. Precise wording
of the question is without decisive significance for the attitude of the
Japanese Government. However, he requested precise information
on the German point of view.
Matsuoka remarked further :
1. A meeting of the leadership committee of the Cabinet, consist-
ing of the Prime Minister, 3 Foreign Minister, the Army Chief
[Wehrmachtschef] 4 and the Finance Minister 5 will take place to-
morrow afternoon. He would report on the situation and hoped to
be able to inform the German Government expeditiously of the opinion
of the Japanese Government.
1 Vol. m of this series, document No. 663.
See vol. xu of this series, Editors' Note, p. 1073.
JTumimaro Konoye.
* Gen. Ha jlme Sugiyama, Chief of the Array General Staff.
Isao Kawada.
1
682-805 — 64— -^6
2 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
2. The Japanese Government would adopt no measures without
detailed consultation with the Government of the Reich.
3. For himself he could once again assert that the United States
would not be in a position to deliver military supplies to the Soviet
Union by the Pacific route. The Japanese Cabinet would certainly
be of the same opinion.
4. He had requested all departments to refrain from giving their
own views on the situation to the press through spokesmen; the
Bureau of Information had recommended to the Japanese press that
it observe restraint. Matsuoka then asked me for information
whether Germany reckoned on a quick collapse of the Stalin regime.
He had always seen a threat to it only in foreign war. When I
answered that the German considerations were not known by me in
detail, he asked me to inquire in Berlin.
Matsuoka further stated that he had gained the impression from
the report of Ambassador Oshima, that the Fiihrer and the Foreign
Minister did not expect active Japanese participation against the
Soviet Union on the basis of the Tripartite Pact. He personally
was of the same opinion as before, that in the long run Japan could
not remain neutral in this conflict. In the event of the entry of the
United States of America into the war, as a result of the Russo-
German war, he personally considered that the alliance would be-
come operative for Japan under the Tripartite Pact.
Toward the end of the interview Matsuoka received another tele-
gram from Oshima wherein the Reich Foreign Minister called
attention to an alleged Russian withdrawal of troops from the Far
East. Matsuoka stated spontaneously that he would immediately
propose appropriate countermeasures. Matsuoka was thoroughly
positive and cordial throughout the whole interview. He denied
emphatically that the existence of the Cabinet was in danger, and
he repeatedly expressed his confidence that the German operations
would meet with quick success. "With regard to the current economic
negotiations, he advocated that they should be carried on steadily.*
Request telegraphic instructions to the question raised by Matsuoka.'
Ott
" See document No. 216.
'In telegram No. 886, dispatched June 26 (177/85205), Ribbentrop replied to
this request for Instructions as follows : "Please tell Mr. Matsuoka in reply to his
question whether Germany Is counting on an early collapse of the Stalin regime
that we expect the Stalin regime to collapse in the not-too-distant future."
JUNE 1941 d
No. 2
265/173013
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Ankara, June 23, 1941 — 9 : 55 p. m.
secret Received June 24 — 6 : 00 a. m.
No. 790 of June 23
With reference to telegram No. 726 of June 22. 1
Today I discussed with Saracoglu the question of Russian shipping.
Passage of Russian naval vessels is completely out of the question.
The Bosporus and the Dardanelles are closed by net defenses and
sown with mines. Passage of Soviet merchant vessels appears to
the Foreign Minister not very likely at this time because in the
initial phase of the war Russia undoubtedly would not want to divest
herself of her merchant tonnage for the benefit of England. In any
event, he is apparently willing to cooperate with us in this matter
also, and he promised that he would promptly inform me of any
Russian demarche in that regard.
Pafen
'This telegram (1099/318819-21) contained instructions by Bitter that Papen
take up with Saracoglu the question of the passage of Soviet ships through the
Straits. According to this instruction Turkey could refuse to let Soviet war-
ships pass through the Straits under the Montreux Convention of 1936 although
there would be freedom of passage for merchant vessels under this Convention,
"We are very anxious, however," he stated, "to have Turkey cooperate with us
to prevent the passage of Soviet merchant vessels, too. The reason is, first
of all, that we do not want the considerable Soviet merchant tonnage of about
400,000 tons in the Black Sea to get away, and, secondly, that we want to
prevent any cooperation between the Soviet Union and England in the field
of merchant shipping in the Mediterranean. In view of the well-known English
shortage of shipping space in the Mediterranean the Soviet Union could perhaps
render England substantial aid,"
The instruction then suggested that the Turks might lay minefields to pro-
tect themselves against the passage of warships through the Straits in accordance
with the Montreux Convention, a measure which would at the same time hamper
and delay the passage of merchant vessels which could not be denied passage.
No. 3
616/249802-04
Memorandum by tlie Read of Political Division VI x
secret Berlin, June 23, 1941.
Pol. VI 3369 g.
At 1 :00 p. m. today former Lithuanian Minister Skirpa called on
me and informed me that at 11 :30 a. m. today the Kaunas radio —
which accordingly must be in the hands of the Lithuanian activists —
had proclaimed a general uprising against the Red Russian occupa-
1 Marginal note at the head of the document : "Fiihrer portfolio" (Fiihrer
Mappe).
4 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
tion and called on the Lithuanian people to fight for their freedom
and political independence. At the same time the radio had announced
the composition of a new activist Lithuanian government with Skirpa
as Minister President at the head and General Rastikis, who is like-
wise living here in Germany as an emigre, as Minister of National
Defense.
While M. Skirpa was still with me the Gestapo (Herr Grafe) also
informed me that this announcement by the Kaunas radio had been
picked up.
M. Skirpa tried to describe to me the advantages for Germany if
we would immediately recognize this new Lithuanian activist gov-
ernment and thereby the right to existence of little countries, too;
this would perforce make a particularly favorable impression on
world opinion.
I asked M. Skirpa how it happened that the new government had
been proclaimed under him— and thus doubtless at his instigation—
without his having informed the Foreign Ministry in advance about
such an intention in a straightforward manner. During his private
visits with me I had pointed out to him every time very emphatically
that we could not tolerate political activity from him, who was en-
joying our hospitality here. M. Skirpa replied in some embarrass-
ment that after all he had submitted a memorandum here on June 19 *
and he had tried yesterday to reach the Ministry by telephone but
had not been able to get anyone ! When I objected that I could have
been reached very easily by telephone at home all day he admitted
that he had not made this attempt. He then asserted that he was of
course ready to bear the responsibility for everything.
When I asked whether he had dealt in this matter with a German
authority, and if so with which one, he replied as follows :
For some time he kept in connection with the High Command of
the Wehrmacht Abwehr (Lt. Col. Graebe), who, like the Abwehr
office in Konigsberg, was accurately informed of his activity. With the
consent of the High Command of the Wehrmacht he had kept close
contact with the activists in Lithuania with the aid of agents, and
prepared everything for an uprising against the Soviet forces in the
country for the occasion which had now arrived.
Skirpa then evidently promoted also the plan of forming a Lithua-
nian government under him. I cannot judge to what extent the Ab-
wehr Department itself (Lt. Col. Graebe) knew about this plan. It
is significant, however, that there was a communication from Hen-
Graf e stating that he had repeatedly warned the military authorities
' See vol. xii of this series, document No. 650 and footnote 2.
JUNE 1941 5
against getting involved with the all too active and somewhat fanatical
Skirpa in matters of a political nature.
M. Skirpa gave me a copy of the Kaunas radio announcement, 3 here
enclosed, as well as the statement of the commitment of the agents
employed by him,*
Gkundheer
•Not printed (616/249805-08).
* Not printed (616/249807).
No. 4
323/193896-97
Memorandum hy the Head of Political Division VI
Berlin, June 23, 1941.
Pol. VI 3382 g.
This afternoon the former Latvian Minister, M. Kreewinsch, called
on me. I told him immediately at the start of the conversation that
I could receive him only as a private person.
M. Kreewinsch stated the following :
He had never recognized the new situation created by the actions of
the Soviet Union in Latvia. As indicated by the note of the Reich
Government of day before yesterday, 1 the Russian actions in Latvia
had occurred also without the consent and knowledge of the German
Government. He assumed that in Riga the same thing would soon
occur that had happened in Kaunas, namely the proclamation of a
Latvian government. 2 He was making the request that he again be
recognized as the Latvian Minister in Berlin, that his former officials
be able to operate once more as officials of the Legation, and that he be
given back the two buildings of the former Latvian Legation at
Burggrafenstrasse 13 and Einemstrasse 5. This was particularly
important because numerous Latvian refugees, some of whom had now
been released from German internment camps, still had no living
quarters in Berlin.
I replied to M. Kreewinsch that I could only take cognizance of his
statements privately, and that moreover I could not give him any
hope that his wishes would be granted.
From what followed it became evident that particularly the former
Latvian Military Attache, Colonel Plensners, who is in Konigsberg
at the moment, has kept close contact with the High Command of the
Wehrmacht Abwehr. Moreover about 200 Latvian refugees have been
called up by the High Command of the Wehrmacht as interpreters,
etc., and some of them have already been dispatched to East Prussia.
The connection with Latvia was probably organized through these
'For text see Monatshefte fur Aimcartige Politik, July 1941 (Essen, 1941),
pp. 551-563 ; cf . vol. xii of this series, Editors' Note, p. 1073.
' See document No. 3.
6 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
agents by M. Plensners in cooperation with the High Command of
the Wehrmacht Abwehr.
After consultation with Under State Secretary Woermann, Pol.
I M took up contact with the Abwehr in Konigsberg in order to make
sure that in connection with the welcome military activity of the agents
of the High Command of the Wehrmacht Abwehr there will not be
any political accomplished facts brought about in the Baltic region
that could be inconvenient to us.
Incidentally M. Kreewinsch seems to have been much less active
than the Lithuanian Minister Skirpa. 3 On the other hand Colonel
Plensners probably played a more active role in these matters.
Geundheer
3 See documents Nos. 3 and 6.
No. 5
1531/374226
Wolodymyr StacMw to the Fuhrer and Chancellor 1
Berlin- Wilmersdoiuf, June 23, 1941.
Rk. 9380A.
Your Excellency, highly honored German Reich Chancellor:
The leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists — OUN,
Stepan Bandera, has honored me with the mission to submit to Your
Excellency, as the leader of the German nation now fighting vic-
toriously for the new order of Europe, a memorandum by the
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists for the solution of the
Ukrainian question.*
1 Marginal note : "Staehiw, who brought this, states that the Foreign Ministry,
the OKW, the Reichsftihrer SS, and Reichsleiter Rosenberg will Teceive copies
of this letter and the enclosures. M[eerwald?], June 23."
"The memorandum has not been found. A Reich Chancellery minute of
June 26 (1531/374227), presumably by Iiammers, describes this memorandum of
the Ukrainian organization in the following terms :
"The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) has submitted along
with the letter of June 23, 1941, addressed to the Fiihrer, a memorandum on
the Ukrainian question. The memorandum advocates the restoration of an
independent Ukrainian national state in the sense of the peace treaty of Brest-
Litovsk. Considering the urge of the Ukrainians for independence, peaceful
conditions, politically speaking, could be brought about in Eastern Europe in
the long run, only if the Ukrainian state were politically independent. Likewise
the Ukraine would in the long run become an organic component and a valuable
supplement to the European economy only if the Ukrainian state were econom-
ically independent. Finally, the best guarantee of a German-Ukrainian alliance
and the best protection against Russian pressure on Europe would be an inde-
pendent Ukrainian armed force. A solution of the Ukrainian question corre-
sponding to the solution of the Slovakian and Croatian questions did not appear
advisable. Appended to the memorandum are programmatic, political and mili-
tary decisions of the second congress of the OUN, which took place at the
beginning of 1941."
JUNE 1941 7
The OUN, which leads the Ukrainian masses in their revolutionary
struggle to establish the Ukrainian state, is deeply convinced that the
present passage at arms against Moscow will destroy the subversive
Jewish-Bolshevist influence in Europe and permanently break Rus-
sian imperialism.
The reestablishment of the independent Ukrainian national state in
the sense of the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk will consolidate the
new ethnic order in Eastern Europe and contribute to the peaceful
and beneficial development of this area.
Confident that Your Excellency, as the champion of the ethnic
principle, will support our ethnic struggle, I remain,
Yours, etc. Wolodtmtb Stachiw
Department Head in
the Political Office of the OUN
No. 6
616/249799-800
v
Eazys Skirpa to the Fiihrer and Chancellor 1
Berlin, June 23, 1941.
Yotm Excellency: In this historic hour in which the Lithuanian
people are regaining their freedom I take the liberty as Minister of
the former constitutional Lithuanian Government in the German
Reich to express to you and the victorious German Army my most
profound thanks for saving Lithuania from the Bolshevist occupation.
At the same time I have the great honor very humbly to lay before
you the following:
After Lithuania was last year incorporated into the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics through the act of force of the Moscow Govern-
ment, the Lithuanian activist movement was formed in the face of the
Bolshevist terror from the most active and energetic elements in the
country under my leadership, with the objective of shaking off the
Bolshevist rule and fighting to regain the political independence of
Lithuania.
After attainment of this objective the Lithuanian activist movement
is striving to gain the new internal organization of the Lithuanian
state on an ethnic basis and its incorporation into the community of
destiny and solidarity of the new Europe, A more detailed presenta-
tion of Lithuania's attitude and wishes is set down in a memorandum
which I submitted to Minister von Grundherr in the Foreign Ministry
on June 19, 1941.* It stresses the fundamental realization, proved by
past experience, that a close political, economic, and cultural coopera-
tion of Lithuania with the German Reich is in the vital interest of the
Lithuanian people.
a This letter was accompanied by a cover note of June 23 (616/249801) in
which Skirpa asked Ribbentrop to transmit the letter to Hitler.
' See vol. xii of this series, document No. C50 and footnote 2,
8 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Now the Lithuanian activist movement has eliminated the Soviet
regime through the revolution on June 22, 1941, made possible by the
heroic advance of the German troops. It has proclaimed the restora-
tion of Lithuania's national independence, and formed a national
government which I have been called upon to head.
Hoping for your kind benevolence I am willing, from a feeling of
patriotic responsibility, and I feel duty-bound as leader of the Lith-
uanian activist movement, to comply with the summons of my father-
land and to place myself at its service.
I therefore consider it my first task at tlie moment — assuming the
consent of the German Reich Government — to go to my homeland at
once in order to proclaim before all the world, on the occasion of taking
over the business of the government, on behalf of the entire Lithuanian
people their thanks to you and the German people for making it pos-
sible to restore the Lithuanian state, and to proclaim Lithuania's alli-
ance with the German people.
I should be exceedingly grateful to you if you would do me the
honor [of permitting me] to demonstrate in a personal discussion my
full devotion to you and the German Eeich.
Kazys Skdupa
F19/404-05 ;
F20/051-44
No. 7
Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler '
Rome, June 23, 1941/XIX.
Fuhree : On the occasion of our talk on the Brenner on June 2 I
gave you my views regarding Russia and told you that the Russian
question now called for a radical solution : either a military alliance
or war. You explained to me that the former solution was out of the
question because Stalin could never forget the failure of his policy in
the Danube-Balkan area, and because the agreement with Belgrade,
which he concluded in the eleventh hour, 3 had revealed his true
intentions. Consequently there remained only the second solution and
with respect to it there was only one problem, that of timing. From
what you have said in your proclamation to the German people * I am
x The letter here printed is translated from the German text.
The Italian original with Mussolini's signature is filmed on ^20/043-309. This
Italian test is the same as that which is printed in Hitler e Mussolini: lettere e
document} {Rome-Milan, 1946), pp. 104-108 except for two differences in para-
graphing. The sentence on p. 107 which is enclosed within brackets does not
appear on the original received in Berlin.
Weizsacker's memorandum, St.S. 417 of June 25 (B12/B001010), records that
AJfieri handed him the letter that day in a sealed envelope.
1 See vol. xn of this series, document No. 584.
* See vol, xir of this series, document No. 265.
' For text see Monatsliefte fur Au&wtirtige Politih, July-Bee, 1941, pp. £15-551.
JUNE 1941 y
convinced that any further postponement of the solution by the use of
arms, for which there is now no alternative, would have imperiled our
cause. Here, too, the knot had to be cut.
I fully appreciate that your decision must have been preceded by
long reflection, because the war against Russia is primarily a struggle
against the breadth of space. But all those who would point to his-
torical precedents should be reminded that today the motors of tanks
and airplanes, and the extraordinary maneuvering skill of both your
generals and your soldiers, have overcome space.
. The solution of the Russian problem results, I believe, in the
following advantages :
a. It deprives Great Britain of her last hope on the European
Continent j
&. It relieves us of any concern for the immediate future ;
e. It brings us back to our political doctrine, which for tactical
considerations we temporarily abandoned ;
d. All anti-Bolshevist tendencies throughout the world, including
the Anglo-Saxon countries, will again turn toward the Axis;
e. The new Russia, diminished in territory and liberated from Bol-
shevism, may be returned to the practice of sincere economic collabora-
tion with the rest of Europe, and make raw materials which we need
available to us, especially if the Anglo-Saxons should impose upon
us a war of unforeseeable duration.
Everything I have said will show you, Fiihrer, what enthusiastic
approval your decision to take Russia by the throat has met with in
Italy and especially among the old guard of the party, which would
have accepted only with a heavy heart any other solution of the prob-
lem. In a war of this nature Italy cannot remain on the sideline.
I therefore thank you, Fiihrer, for having accepted the participation
of Italian ground and air forces, in numbers and for a sector yet to
be determined by the General Staff. At the same time every effort
will be made to consolidate our position in North Africa, both in the
west, to watch Weygand, and in the east, in order to forestall any
British attempt at a counter thrust — an attempt, moreover, which is
unlikely after the latest severe defeat of the English Army. Concur-
rently we shall do everything in our power — notwithstanding the
enormous transport difficulties — in order to prepare the 10 to 12 divi-
sions necessary for an offensive against Egypt. This attack cannot
be undertaken until late autumn after Tobruk has been captured.
As regards the various states, Fiihrer, Turkey is an extremely
important card in our game. If Turkey should permit the passage
of our troops so that they could attack Egypt from the east as well,
Egypt's fate would be sealed and the backbone of the British Empire
broken. The resulting consequences for the British East, as far as
* See vol. xii of this series, document No. 660 and Editors' Note, p. 924.
10 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
India, would be incalculable. In this estimate of Turkey's signifi-
cance it gave me deep satisfaction to take note of the recent conclu-
sion of the German-Turkish accord, 8 and I have formally proposed
to the Turkish Government the conclusion of an analogous or even
stronger accord, if acceptable to Ankara.
France-Spain. You know, Fuhrer, my views on France and the
French, views which are based on an accurate knowledge of that
nation and its psychology. Without indulging in any illusions, it
will be useful to pay with appropriate concessions for any advantages
that Darlan's policy can offer us, especially in the fundamental ques-
tion of our transports to North Africa. 7 If we. were to play our
French card for all it is worth we would lose Spain ; conversely, if
we played the Spanish card, that is, yielded to the demands of Spain,
the situation in North Africa would immediately be endangered.
France is playing with the idea of regaining North Africa, but
France also knows that her doing this would entail the complete
occupation of the mother country, and consequently she will be care-
ful. I believe, Fuhrer, that the best policy toward France or Spain is
the one we have pursued up till now, namely, to prevent both the one
and the other from creating difficult and perhaps irremediable situa-
tions for us.
Or eat Britain-United States. Mr. Roosevelt cannot do us more
damage than he has done already, even if he formally declares war
on us. The declaration of war would therefore have the purpose of
giving a lift to morale in England, which is at present very de-
pressed. However, the effect of such a stimulant would be of short
duration.
Before closing this letter, Fiihrer, I should like to say the following
to you:
a. With respect to the unfolding of the operations, I wish to ask
you, Fuhrer, to keep me informed to the extent that appears desirable
to you, just as you did in the recent campaign in the Balkans. I know
that our General Staffs are collaborating in the most comradely
solidarity and harmony.
i. I should like to thank you for the recently concluded economic
agreement, 8 which was signed by Clodius and Giannini. This agree-
ment enables me to overcome a number of difficulties and to intensify
our armament production.
c. The harvest of 1941 is richer than that of last year. I shall not
announce the figures to the nation, so as not to arouse any false hopes
and cause a relaxation of consumer discipline.
d. The "morale" 9 of the Italian people is excellent, as you, Fuhrer,
probably have heard from other sources as well. Above all, the Italian
* See vol, xri of this series, document No. 648.
* See vol, xn of this series, document No. 633.
* See vol. xrr of this series, document No. 652.
* "Stimmung" in the Italian original.
JUNE 1941 11
people are consciously determined to march with the German people
to the end and to bear all sacrifices necessary to achieve victory.
I am certain that the campaign against Bolshevist Russia will cul-
minate in a dazzling victory, and that this victory will be the prologue
to the total victory over the Anglo-Saxon world.
In this conviction, which is for me a certainty, I ask you, Fiihrer,
to accept my always sincere and comradely salutations.
Mussolini
No. 8
205/142T35-SG
The Legation in Sweden to tJie Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 723 of June 24 Stockholm, June 24, 1941—12 : 30 a. m.
Received June 24 — 2 : 25 a. m.
With reference to our telegram No. 705 of June 22. 1
No definite decision by the Swedish Government has as yet been
received on the list of military wishes presented by me. The Swedish
Government is aware that compliance with the German military
wishes marks the abandonment of its former policy of neutrality and
for that reason, and in order to preserve unity in Sweden's domestio
politics, it is anxious not to bypass the Foreign Relations Committee
and the Parliament. The questions will be considered in the Foreign
Relations Committee today, and a secret session of the Riksdag is
set for Wednesday morning. 2 As to the Swedish Government's deci-
sion toward the over-all German program, particularly the German
demand for transit of the German Oslo division, 3 there seems to be
hardly any ground for doubt according to what Giinther has told me
in further talks. I hope to have the definite decision as early as to-
morrow afternoon or evening, so that the Swedish Riksdag would
only have to give retroactive sanction to the Government's decision. 4
1 Vol. xn of this series, document No. 668.
"June 25.
* The German 163d Infantry Division.
* The clock time of the dispatch of this telegram indicates that it was drafted
on June 23.
A memorandum by Kiamara dated Juno 25, Pol. I M 1858 g. Its (205/142739)
records that the Military Attache 1 in Stockholm on June 23 reported directly
to the Attach^ Department, OKW, that final Swedish approval of Germany's
wishes in regard to transportation was expected the next day, June 24 ; that
the attitude of the King and of the Government was positive.
In telegram No. 725 of June 23, sent 1 : 10 a. m. June 24 (205/142737) Sehnurre
and Wied further reported that the Swedish Government had agreed in principle
to the laying of mine fields by the Swedish Navy in cooperation with the
German Navy, and that the attitude of Sweden toward the other wishes ex-
pressed by the German Naval War Staff in its communication of June 18 was
positive. -j
12 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Minister President Hansson, whose attitude has decisive importance,
has already declared himself in favor of acceptance, as I was informed
confidentially. The Minister President and the Foreign Minister are
making it their business to win over for acceptance several members
of the Cabinet and of the Foreign Relations Committee, who are
still in the opposition, in order to make Sweden's decision a unanimous
one.
Thus, subject to Sweden's political decision, which is still out-
standing, I have tentatively informed the Swedish Government that
departure of the Oslo division will start as early as Wednesday
evening. The transport experts on both sides started tonight with
the preparatory technical planning.
The positive impression gotten from the attitude of the Swedish
Government and the Swedish authorities, reported in the preceding
telegram, 5 has been substantiated in my subsequent discussions. 6 Eur-
thermore, the effort to reorient the Swedish press in our favor has
apparently been successful.
Schnubre
WlED
" No. 705 of June 22. See footnote 1.
•In a memorandum of June 25 (205/142740) Ritter recorded a telephone
message from Schnnrre in Stockholm according to which the Swedish Govern-
ment had that afternoon given its consent to the transit of one German
division which started to move out from Norway.
See also documents Nos. 16 and 17.
No. 9
205/142738
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most TJRGENT Stockholm, June 24, 1941 — 1 : 45 p. m.
No. 728 of June 24 Received June 24 — 3 : 45 p. m.
For Ambassador Ritter.
In reply to your telephone message of this morning 1 and with ref-
erence to our telegram No. 709 of June 22. 2
The fact that Finland at every opportunity is emphasizing her neu-
trality and even, with respect to the Swedish Government is not mak-
ing it clear enough that she will of her own free will join the German
campaign against Russia is having a retarding effect on our conver-
sations with regard to political and military questions. The Finnish
Minister here, 3 it is true, at my urging finally secured by telephone the
1 No record of this telephone message has been found.
* In this telegram (260/170036) Schnurre and Wled reported that the Finnish
Minister in Stockholm had received no Instructions from Helsingfors.
* Dr. Jarl de Vasastjerna.
JUNE 1941 13
agreement of his Government to the most urgent measures, but up to
this moment he has not received telegraphic instructions along the
lines proposed by us. As a result his manner of expression in dealing
with the Swedish Foreign Minister is even now not emphatic enough,
which, in view of the meetings of the Riksdag committees which are
now taking place, and in view of tomorrow's meeting of the Eiksdag,
is very regrettable. It would work in support of us if the Finnish
Minister at Stockholm were immediately instructed to inform the
Swedish Government confidentially that the entry of Finland into the
war against Soviet Russia on our side was imminent. The defensive
character of any Finnish move, which was emphasized yesterday and
today in the Swedish press, need not be affected by such a step. 4
ScHNUBBE
WlED
* See document No. 15.
In telegram No. 513 of June 26 (260/170054) Blueher reported from Helsinki
that the situation of the Swedish negotiators in Stockholm was quite changed as
a result of the outbreak of the Finnish-Russian war, and that new instructions
had been sent to them the previous night to put pressure on the Swedes for
compliance with Finland's requests.
No. 10
93/103746-48
The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 695 of June 24 Budapest, June 24, 1941—3 : 45 p. m.
Received June 24 — 5 : 35 p. m.
The Minister President 1 summoned me in order to clarify the ques-
tion of the participation of Hungarian troops in the advance against
the Soviet Army. He gave a historical account of how the Hungarian
Government in recent weeks had time and again tried to find out our
position in this regard in order at this opportunity also to make known
the Hungarian position. At the Foreign Ministry, however, the
Hungarian Minister had been told even until recently that there was
no Russian problem. I, too, in my demarche of June 16 had stated
only that the German Government considered it necessary for Hun-
gary, too, to undertake steps for securing her borders with respect to
the Soviet Union. 2 On June 19 General Haider had told the Chief
of the Hungarian General Staff 3 in Budapest that it would perhaps
have been better if Hungarian troops had been reinforced to a greater
1 Laszld de Bardossy.
1 See vol. xii of this series, document No. 631 and footnote 1.
* Gen. Henrlk Werth.
14 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
degree along the Russian border; he advised, however, that now noth-
ing more be done so as not to alarm the Russians.* Nor was there any
mention in the Ftihrer's letter which I gave the Regent on June 22 B
that Germany considered an active Hungarian participation in the
action against the Soviet Union to be desirable.
Yesterday the German General with the High Command of the
Hungarian Armed Forces e had informed the Chief of the Hun-
garian General Staff that the participation of Hungarian troops in
the advance into the Soviet Union was desired. He, the Minister
President, considered this to be primarily a political question, and
therefore asked for clarification whether there was actually a Ger-
man wish to this effect and if so to what extent Hungarian partici-
pation was desired.
The position of the Hungarian Government was determined by
the following political and economic factors: The Hungarian Gov-
ernment had submitted in advance to the recent Vienna Award r in
the hope of thereby bringing the Transylvanian question to a resting
point. It had indeed done everything to achieve this, and had shown
self-control and patience in the face of the continuing Rumanian
provocations. It had likewise not replied to the Rumanian press
campaign. It was impossible, however, to overlook the strong Irre-
dentist movement in Rumania. The situation was so tense that the
portions of Transylvania awarded to Hungary had to expect later
to become the object of Rumanian aggression. The Hungarian
Government knew that the Reich Government would not approve
such a Rumanian action, but nevertheless it had to reckon with such
independent actions, which possibly might not originate with the
leadership of the Rumanian state. The new line of the frontier was
not only unfavorable economically but was also difficult to defend mili-"
tarily, particularly the connection with the Szekler region, so that
initial successes of the Rumanian Army, which was well equipped
with German war material, were not impossible; but they would be
absolutely intolerable for any Hungarian Government, especially since
the Szekler region had a purely Hungarian population. Further-
more the Hungarian Government believed that it was fulfilling an
obligation toward the Axis Powers by providing for the use of mili-
tary defense measures in order to prevent such a situation from arising
as would be contrary to the interests and prestige of the Axis Powers.
The Hungarian Government also could not disperse its military
forces too much for the reason that the Slovak Government still cher-
*Cf. C. A. Macartney, A History of Hungary, 19&9-1945 (New York, 1957),
vol. ii, pp. 20-21.
° Vol. xii of this series, document No. 661.
"Gen. Kurt Himer.
* See vol. x of this series, document No. 413.
JUNE 1941 15.
ished revisionist ambitions. Thus the Slovak Minister President*
had officially informed the Hungarian Minister, who had suggested
to him the convening of a commission for the final settlement of the
Hungarian-Slovak border, that the Slovak Government intended to
make revisionist claims on Hungary at a final settlement of the fron-
tiers in Southeast Europe. He [the Hungarian Minister President]
had let him be answered that the Slovak Government should not in-
dulge in any sort of empty hopes and illusions in this regard.
Furthermore the Hungarian Government had to take into account
the impending start of the harvest in view of the very serious food
situation, as well as the fact that it had made the Hungarian railroad
network available to the needs of the Wehrmacht to the greatest pos-
sible extent— and this willingly. He also wanted to point out that
Germany had not expected the Rumanians either to proceed actively
against the Yugoslav Army. The Bulgarians, too, had only later
moved in to occupy without fighting the areas awarded to them.
All of these considerations changed nothing in the fact that the
Hungarian Government felt united with the Axis Powers in loyalty
and full solidarity. He therefore wished to emphasize that the
Hungarian Government would be willing to review the question of
participation by parts of the Hungarian Army in the advance against
the Soviet armies, and to submit this to the Regent, in case this were
desired by Germany and he were informed of this wish through me.
The Minister President concluded his remarks by again requesting
that he be informed through diplomatic channels whether and in
what strength a participation by the Hungarian Army was desired.
Erdmannsdokit
"Vojtech Tuka.
No. 11
93/103750
The Minister in Hungary to tlie Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 698 of June 24 Botapest, June 24, 1940—10 : 45 p. m.
Received June 25—12 : 25 a. m.
With reference to my telegram No. 695 of June 24. 1
General Himer told me that the Minister President's assertion
mentioned in the telegram cited above, that he had informed the
Chief of the Hungarian General Staff that participation by Hungarian
troops in the advance into the Soviet Union was desired, was not in
1 Document No. 10.
1Q DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
this form in accordance with the facts. Rather, he had left with the
Chief of the Operations Group of the Hungarian General Staff 2 a
note on June 22 with the following text :
"Every Hungarian assistance will he accepted at any time. We do
not wish to demand anything, but everything that is offered volun-
tarily will be gratefully accepted. There is no question of our not
wanting participation by Hungary."
He had spoken in the same sense yesterday with the Chief of the
Hungarian General Staff; 3 it was possible that the gentlemen had
passed on his statements in a stronger form to the Minister Presi-
dent in order to exert pressure on him, as the department chiefs in the
General Staff were urging participation by Hungary in the campaign
against the Soviet Union.
Erdmannsdokff
* Col. H. Lfiszlo.
3 See, further, document No. 54.
No. 12
136/75001
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 2179 of June 24 Madrid, June 25, 1941.
Received June 25 — 4:30 a. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 1422 of June 24. 1
The Foreign Minister was very pleased that we had agreed to the
expedition of Spanish volunteers against Russia. He promised at
once to bring up the matter at today's meeting of the Council of
Ministers and afterwards to arrange everything with the Chief of the
Falange Militia, General Moscardo, for the immediate issuance of a
call for enlistments. I would then receive further communications
to enable the military agencies of both Governments to discuss the
necessary arrangements.
Because of jealousies between the Falange and the Army, volun-
teers would be accepted not only from the Falange but also from the
Legion associated with the Army. The Minister assured me that the
response would surely be extraordinarily large.
When I remarked that for the reasons stated in the telegraphic in-
structions, a public declaration that Spain was in a state of war with
the Soviet Union would be appropriate and desirable, the Minister
replied that he would have to discuss this question with the Generalis-
1 Vol. xn of thin series, document No. 671, footnote 2,
JTJNE 1941 17
simo. Personally he was inclined to believe that England and pos-
sibly America would react to such an announcement if not by a
declaration of war on Spain, then undoubtedly by the imposition of a
blockade, which would entail cutting off of all supplies now in transit
as well as seizure of the Spanish ships now held in the United States
under the order blocking Spanish assets (cf. my telegram No. 2178
of June 24 ") . Complications for Spain would also be detrimental to
Germany during the Russian campaign. It was not impossible that
the sending of Spanish volunteers alone might have similar con-
sequences, but, if so, the course of events could no longer be
changed. 3
Stohrer
'Not found.
* In telegram No, 2218 of June 26 (136/75010) Stohrer reported that a decision
had not yet been taken regarding a Spanish declaration of war on Russia ; that
it would in great measure depend on the reaction to the expedition of Spanish
volunteers. The British Government had already reacted by prohibiting all
imports of gasoline into Spain.
No. 13
191/138736
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Tokyo, June 25, 1941 — 8 : 15 a. m., summer time.
secret Eeceived June 25 — 5 : 10 p. m.
No. 1033 of June 25
The Foreign Minister 1 just called on me and informed me that Wang
Ching-wei had asked the Japanese Government to obtain recognition
of the Nanking Government by the Governments of Germany and
. Italy. Matsuoka had passed on this request to the Japanese Ambas-
sadors in Berlin and Rome with the instruction to advocate recognition
with the German and Italian Governments and to ask that recognition
be accorded by July 1. The Foreign Minister also stated that on the
same day the Japanese Government (clear text evidently missing)
the grant of a loan of 300,000,000 yen to Wang Ching-wei. I suggest
on the basis of our experience in Manchukuo that we link recognition
of the Wang Ching-wei Government with prior settlement of our
economic position in China. 2
The same text is being sent to Peiping,"
Ott
1 Yosulce Matsuoka,
8 See vol. r of this series, documents Nos. 571 . 575, and 606.
" See document No. 27.
682-905—64 7
18 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 14
177/8B22S-29
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Tokyo, June 25, 1941 — 8 : 15 a. m. summer time.
secret Received June 25 — 5 : 50 p. m.
No. 1034 of June 25
Foreign Minister Matsuoka called on me today and informed me
as follows:
As he had already telegraphed Ambassador Oshima, Russian Am-
bassador Smetanin called at the Japanese Foreign Ministry yesterday
on instructions from his Government and asked whether Japan, in
accordance with the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Agreement of April
13, 1941 , x would remain neutral in the present conflict. He, Matsuoka,
had first called the Russian Ambassador's attention to_ the statement
he made in Tokyo after his return from his European trip. According
to that, the Neutrality Pact would be without effect in the event that
Japan should have to fulfill her obligations under the Tripartite
Pact. 2 He had also made it clear to Stalin and Molotov that the
Tripartite Pact was still the basis of Japanese policy. Smetanin
had then asked whether Japan considered the Tripartite Pact appli-
cable to the present conflict. He had not given Smetanin any clear
reply to that, but had stated that the Neutrality Pact was limited
in force and scope 3 by the Tripartite alliance. The Japanese Cabinet
would soon decide on the position to be taken and also enter into con-
sultations with Japan's allies.
He had intentionally left Smetanin completely in the dark. He
believed he had thereby done what was best to prevent troop with-
drawals from the Far East.*
Matsuoka stated further that a strong current against [in favor off]
Japan's entry into the war against the Soviet Union is making itself
felt in the Cabinet, in branches of the armed forces, and among the
people. It was also being advocated by Minister of the Interior
Hiranuma. He was well aware that part of this group wants a
conflict -with Russia in order to prevent Japan from striking in the
south. Although he realized this clearly, he intended to advocate
the policy of war against Russia before the Cabinet, being convinced
that the need for a Japanese operation in the south would become
1 For text see Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, selected and edited by Jane
Degras (London, 1953) , vol. in, pp. 486-487.
'According to the New York Times of Apr. 23, 1941 (p. 7, col. 1), Matsuoka
Upon his return made various statements, reported by the Japanese press and
radio, saying that the Tripartite Pact remained the immutable basis of Japanese
foreign policy.
* The italicized words are in English in the original.
* According to a memorandum by Kramarz of June 28 (177/85213) the Military
Attach^ in Tokyo had briefed Matsuoka on June 23 about military developments.
On that occasion Matsuoka remarked that "Japan would make difficult the trans-
fer of further Russian forces from the Far East to Europe and could not tolerate
assistance by America through Vladivostok."
JUNE 1941 19
increasingly strong once Japan had entered the war. He hoped that
the Cabinet would now decide to propose to the Emperor that Japan
enter the war at the appropriate time. As soon as such a decision
had been taken he would get in touch with Germany and Italy.
In his opinion Japan's entry into the war would have to come at a
time when the outcome of the war was still uncertain, for a participa-
tion that involved no risk would be morally objectionable and
intolerable.
In his opinion the United States would not at the present time
move any closer toward participation in the war. A strong stand
by Japan appeared to him to be the means of confirming America
in that attitude.
Ott
No. 15
260/170047-48
The Minister in Finland to ths Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Helsinki, June 25, 1941—6 : 10 p. m.
top secret Received June 25 — 9 : 20 p. m.
No. 503 of June 25
1)1 had a talk with the Foreign Minister 1 as soon as the air raid
alarm was over. 2
2) The Bussian air attacks have completely changed the situation
since this morning. The declaration prepared for today's session of
the Parliament is no longer relevant. 3
3) I explained to the Foreign Minister that air attacks were Rus-
sia's answer to the Finnish protests. 4 Now war had been started by
the Russian side through a plain act of aggression. A de facto state
of war now existed between Finland and Russia. Finland now had
to act accordingly.
4) The Foreign Minister did not deny this. He stressed that the
Russian attack was especially brutal, considering that only yesterday
Moloftov] (1 group missing) had sent for the Finnish Charge
d'Affaires s and had told him the following : Finland should not begin
1 Professor Rolf Witting.
' The American Minister reported on June 25 that he had been informed at
4 : 35 p. m. that up to 3 : 00 p. m. that day "some 16 Soviet aircraft had been
shot down in various parts of the country and one seaplane captured by a
coast guard vessel after a forced landing. Bombing had been widespread in
nearly all parts of the country with civilian casualties considerable, Soviet
forces having been used in some places including groups of as many as 50
planes." Cf. Foreign Relations of the United States, 19%1, vol. i ("Washington,
Government Printing Office, 1958) , p. 42.
* See vol. in of this series, document No. 675 ; The Memoirs of Marshal Man-
nerheim, translated by Brie Lewenhaupt (London, 1953), p. 413.
* See vol. in of this series, document No. 675.
6 P. J. Hynninen.
20 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
any "war with Russia. Otherwise 200 million Russians would become
the enemies of Finland and that would lead to the extinction of
Finland.
5) The Foreign Minister, together with the other Cabinet Minis-
ters, will now draft a new governmental declaration. 8
6) I suggested to the Foreign Minister to present Finland in all
foreign countries as the victim of an unprovoked Russian aggression.
7) I asked the Foreign Minister that, on the basis of the Russian
attack, he instruct his two negotiators in Stockholm not to mince
words and to take a strong line. 7 The Foreign Minister agreed.
Bluchek
°In telegram No. 508 of June 25 (260/170049) Bliicher reported that in a
secret session of the Parliament that evening the Minister President issued
the new governmental declaration which "culminated in the confirmation of
the fact that 'now it is war' and concluded with the hope that Finland by
her participation could make a significant contribution for Europe and for
the world." ,„„„ ,
In telegram No. 509, dated June 25 but sent shortly after midnight (260/-
170050) Bliicher reported that in a second secret session Parliament gave the
Government a unanimous vote of confidence which signified its adherence to
the concept of war with Russia.
In telegram No. 510 of June 26 (260/170055), as a result of the discussion
in the morning newspapers Bliicher forwarded the exact words of M. Rangell :
"Finland on Wednesday morning [June 25] was subjected to an attack on the
part of the Soviet Union which initiated operations of war against Finland.
On the basis of this Finland has began to defend herself with all the military
means available to her."
7 See documents Nos. 9 and 41.
No. 16
205/142742
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Stockholm, June 25, 1941 — 7 : 20 p. ra.
top secret Received June 25 — 9 : SO p. m.
No. 736 of June 25
For the Foreign Minister.
The King of Sweden summoned me this afternoon in order to
inform me that Germany's principal request, for transit of one
division, had just been accepted in the State Council. 1 The King's
words conveyed the joyful emotion he felt. He had lived through
anxious days and had gone far in giving lus personal support to
the matter. He added confidentially that in so doing he had found
it necessary to go even so far as to mention his abdication. The
King then expressed the hope that Germany would make no demands
on Sweden going beyond these limits. If the issue had been for
1 See vol. s.n of this series, document No. 668 and footnote 1.
JUNE 1941
21
instance the occupation of Gotland, as he was afraid for a time,
he would have been compelled to refuse such a demand.
Form and substance of this statement by the Head of the Swedish
State indicated to me once more how much affection the King felt
for Germany and, on the other hand, the distinct limitations of his
personal influence on decisions.
Wied
No. 17
205/142743-44
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Stockholm, June 25, 1941 — 10 : 10 p. m.
No. 737 of June 25 Received June 25—11 : 15 p. m.
The Swedish Foreign Minister has just asked me to see him in
order to tell me that the Swedish Government has granted our request
for the transit of a division from Norway through Sweden to Fin-
land. 1 The Foreign Minister emphasized the significance for the
domestic policy as well as for the foreign policy of this decision
for Sweden and expressed his joy that in spite of the great difficul-
ties it had been possible to bring about a unified decision of the
King, the Cabinet, and the Riksdag. Regarding the other wishes
in the military field which I had brought up he could at the same
time inform me of Swedish agreement in principle subject to fur-
ther discussion regarding the individual points. 2 The Swedish Gov-
ernment intends to inform the Swedish public of the decision of
the Government by means of an official communique. He intends
to inform the Soviet Minister, Mme. Kollontay, this afternoon. 3
The decision of the Swedish Government encountered extraordinary
internal political difficulties. The negative views within the Cabinet
itself and in the parties of the Riksdag almost led yesterday evening
to a Cabinet crisis. The joint intervention of the King, of Min-
ister President Hansson, and of Foreign Minister von Giinther finally
succeeded in bringing about the unity in reaching the decision. The
differences of view had their origin in this that the Government
on the one hand wishes to maintain the earlier policy of keeping
out of the war of the Great Powers and on the other hand it would
like to do what is possible in the way of rendering aid in the struggle
against Bolshevism within the framework of this policy.
1 See documents Nos. 8 and 16.
s See vol. xn of this series, document No. 638, and document No. 28 in this
volume.
3 See document No. 42 and footnote 5.
22 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
After this final decision the first train leaves Oslo this afternoon,
with the Division Commander.*
ScHNTJRHB
WlED
4 In telegram No. 764 of June 27 (205/142754-55) the Legation reported that
the first train, bearing the divisional staff, regimental staffs, and the recon-
naissance staff of the 163d Division, had crossed the Norwegian-Swedish border
early in the morning of June 26. At the noon pause at Krylbo the train was
greeted by Wied, Schnurre, and Major General von Uthmann.
No. 18
616/249808
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Berlin, June 25, 1941.
With respect to memorandum D IX 9 g. from Senior Counselor
Grosskopf l concerning the attempt of former Lithuanian Minister
Skirpa in Berlin to establish contact -with the Eeich Government,
the Foreign Minister has decided that no contact whatever is to be
established with Skirpa. 8
Submitted herewith through the State Secretary to the Depart-
ment for German Internal Affairs (Senior Counselor Grosskopf).
Lohmann
'This memorandum of June 24 (616/249814) forwarded to Ribbentrop the
memorandum printed as document No. 3.
'Unsigned marginal note: "Was made known in the meeting of the Russia
Committee on July 3, 1941."
No. 19
587/243586-88
Memorandum by the Director of ths Political Department
U. St.S. Pol. 584 Berlin, June 25, 1941.
According to an unnumbered telegram of June 21 from Paris, 1
the French Government has requested information on whether, in the
event of a French call for help through German military action in
Syria, the German reply "might be combined with a declaration
cleared for publication that, in contrast to England, Germany does
not call in question French rights in Syria".
In view of our Arab policy any declaration would be undesirable
that would create the impression that the Arabs in Syria should remain
under French rule for an unlimited period.
The French mandate over Syria was based, as is well known, on
the principle that Syria and Lebanon were to obtain independence at
"Not printed (70/50488).
JUNE 1941 23
a certain time. French policy has really taken this circumstance
continuously into account, to a certain extent. Thus General Dentz
stated in a broadcast on April 2 : *
"The independence of Syria remains the goal to which the Syrians
aspire. France has never ceased to be in favor of it, but this goal
can be attained only in a definitive world situation that settles the
status of Syria;
"Public opinion desires a Government that has more extensive
• powers ;
"It is necessary to put an economic and social program to work."
General Dentz stated further that he had taken the following
decisions :
1. . . . (There follow specific provisions.) 3
If a German declaration regarding French rights in Syria should
become unavoidable in the circumstances, it would be necessary to
include in it somehow a statement that Syria's later independence is
itself one of the aims of French policy.
The declaration which the French Government would publish at
a proper time should therefore be worded approximately as follows :
"The French Government has been authorized to declare that the
German Reich, as well as France, recognizes the right of the Syrian
population to independence, but that like France it is convinced that
that goal cannot be realized at this moment and that Germany, there-
fore, in contrast to England, does not call in question the French rights
in Syria."
Herewith sent to Ambassador Abetz in accordance with our
conversation.*
I did not submit this specially to the Foreign Minister, but would
be grateful to you for mentioning these points in your conference
with him. a
I am attaching a memorandum on various French declarations
concerning Syria 6 but would like to have it back.
WOERMANN
' The following citations from this broadcast are in French in the original.
* Thus in the original.
' No record found.
"According to a memorandum of June 20 by Sehwarzmann (38o/211099)
Abetz had requested by telephone that he be permitted to make an oral report
to the Foreign Minister about matters concerning France "especially on Syria,
the question of occupation costs and the implementation of the Paris Protocols."
"Marginal note: "Pol. VII 573/41 g. — End. 1: Temps of January 1, 1941
(Radio address of General Dentz). Encl. 2: France de Bordeaux of April 3,
1941 (Radio address of General Dentz to Syrian population)."
Pol. VII 573/41 g. was an unsigned memorandum submitted to Woermann on
June 12 (587/243579-82) which dealt with French-Syrian relations and recent
French statements on that subject. The two enclosures to that memorandum
which are cited above have not been found.
24 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 20
386/211130
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
Paris, June 26, 1941.
No. 1910 Received June 27—1 : 00 a. m.
For Ambassador Abetz,
Admiral Darlan told me today that he would like to sever relations
with the Russian Government and get rid of the Russian Ambassador. 1
But he could [undertake] such a measure only with a suitable pretext
and he asked for our support. 3
Darlan is especially anxious not to wait until the country is almost
conquered to break off relations with Russia, in order not to incur the
suspicion that he was profiting by a military defeat. 3
Schleier
1 Alexander Ef removich Bogomolov.
1 In telegram No. 1925 of June 28 (386/211147-48) Schleier reported that he
had secretly supplied Darlan with Information of materials discovered in the
Soviet Russian Embassy and consular department. This information was to be
used by Darlan in the ministerial council but without revealing its origin.
A memorandum attached to telegram No. 1925 (386/211149) indicates that it
was to be withdrawn.
s In telegram No. 1939 of June 28 (386/211159) Schleier reported that a council
of ministers held on that day had decided In principle to break off relations with
the Soviet Union and that this should take effect within 48 hours.
No. 21
93/103751
The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent BunAPEST, June 26, 1941 — 5 : 35 p. m.
No. 710 of June 26 Received June 26 — 6 :10 p.m.
With reference to my telegrams Nos. 695 1 and 698 2 of June 24.
The Minister President asked me whether a reply by the Reich Gov-
ernment had arrived to the question which he had asked me regarding
a possible participation of Hungarian troops in the German advance
against the Soviet Union. I replied negatively.
Bardossy asked me to report that he would be grateful for an im-
mediate reply because the Hungarian Government attached the great-
est importance to being guided by our wishes in this question. 3
Ehdmannsdorff
1 Document No. 10.
' Document No. 11.
' No reply has been found in the flies of the German Foreign Ministry. The
Haider Diary has the following entry for June 25, 1941 : ". . . Hungary's par-
ticipation would be desirable. Hungary, however, wants to be asked officially.
For political reasons the Fiihrer does not want this."
JUNE 1941 25
No. 22
93/103758
The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Budapest, June 26, 1941 — 6 : 50 p. m.
No. 713 of June 26 Received June 26—10 :40 p. m. l
The Minister President has just summoned me and informed me that
this afternoon Russian airplanes had bombed an express train running
on the line from Korosmezo to Budapest and the town of Kosice, and
there had been some killed and some -wounded.
The Hungarian Government therefore considered itself to be in a
state of war with Soviet Russia. 3 The Hungarian Air Force would
react appropriately to the attack this very day. Hungary intended
to publish a communique" regarding the state of war with Russia only
after the Hungarian air attack had been carried out. He therefore
urgently requested that the German press not publish reports on the
affair before the Hungarian communique had been issued.
The Minister President stated further that his statements trans-
mitted in telegram No. 695 of June 24 8 had become pointless owing
to the new situation.
Erdman nsdokff
1 Marginal note : "Received by telephone."
* For the background of this Hungarian decision, ef. Nikolaus von Horthy, Ein
Leben Jiir Ungarn (Bonn, 1953), pp. 235-237; Antal Ullein-Reviczky, Guerre
AUemande, Paix Busse (Neuchatel, 1947), pp. 106-109; C. A. Macartney, A His-
tory of Hungary, 1929-1945, vol. n, pp. 25-32.
3 Document No. 10.
No. 23
4661/E211348-50
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 1909 of June 26 Paris, June 26, 1941.
Received June 26—10:40 p. m.
Foreign Ministry through Dr. Schwarzmann for Ambassador
Abetz.
When Admiral Darlan visited me today, he gave me a letter signed
by Marshal Petain personally, and addressed to the Fiihrer.
26 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The text, in translation, follows i 1
Marshal Petain, Chief of State .
Vichy, June 25, 1941.
TRANSLATION
Herr Reich Chancellor, I have just learned that the high German
military authorities have apparently decided to place the Gardes
Temtoriaux (the detachments of the Home Guard), which during
hostilities had occasion to proceed against German parachutists he-
hind the French lines, on a par with the snipers. Some of my com-
patriots come under this general ruling and are in danger of incurring
the death penalty. Two of them, the MM. Pellerin and Andrieux,
have already been sentenced on these grounds and shot.
I have the honor to draw the attention of Your Excellency to the
fact that the Gardes TerHtoriaux, in contrast to the snipers, carried
out express orders of French official agencies.
Inasmuch as the French Government confirmed these orders and
set up the formations of the Gardes Territoriaum by legal decrees of
June 18, 1940, 2 it was of the opinion that such an organization was
absolutely admissible with reference to articles 1 and 2 of the Regula-
tions annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of October 18, 1907. 3
If this legal opinion were contestable, and I believe it is not, even
if mistakes on the part of certain local authorities could be determined,
it is nonetheless inhuman to turn against those who carried out the
orders and whose patriotic duty it was to obey without contradiction.
If, on the other hand, some of them can be reproached for some-
times having lost their heads and committed unfortunate acts, they
could be called to account for this reason and sentenced only for this
reason.
I therefore consider it my duty as Chief of the French State, to
appeal to Your Excellency in the last resort in order that you may
decide that in no event should the Gardes Territoriaztx be placed on
a par with snipers.
At a time when I am trying to obtain from the French people the
faithful execution of the directives which I give them, I should con-
sider it very important to obtain from your Excellency a pardon for
those men who, in carrying out their operations, only rendered obedi-
ence to the government of their country and their superiors.
Please accept, dear Herr Reich Chancellor, the assurances of my
highest esteem. Ph. Petain.
Close of the text.
Darlan declared himself, with reference to the proposal discussed
previously,* in agreement with the surrender of former Ministers
1 A copy of the French original has been filmed on 4661/E211352-53.
' The decree for the establishment of the Gardes Territoriauw bears the date
May 17, 1940. For the text see Journal Ofliciel de la Ripuhlique Francaise: Lois
et D&erets, mai 1940, p. 3692.
* For test see The American. Journal of International Law, supp., vol. 2, 1908,
pp. 1-215.
4 See vol. xii of this series, document No. 135. For Ribbentrop's reply to
Darlan's proposal see document No. 74.
JUNE 1941 27
Reynaud and Mandel, -who were responsible for this order of the
French Government. He would surrender them at any time if such
a demand were made by the German Government for criminal prose-
cution by German authorities in exchange for the holding of separate
trials of members of the Gardes Territoriaux,
SOHLEEER
No. 24
386/211122-23
Memorandum, by Ambassador Ritter
Berlin, June 26, 1941.
Subject: The Present State of Negotiations Concerning the Reduction
of French Occupation Costs. 1
I have been informed only belatedly of Ministerialdirektor Wiehl's
memorandum — Dir. Ha Pol No. 158— of June 24. s
From the military point of view, I have to differ on two points with
the conception of Wiehl.
The first point is that I advocate granting to the French the reduc-
tion of occupation costs to 10 million reichsmarks right now, effective
at the time when the French will have fulfilled the German demands
in regard to Dakar and Bizerte. 3 I share the point of view of the
OKW and of the three armed services that Bizerte is more important
for the supply of the Africa Corps and Dakar for the employment of
German naval and air forces than the highest possible monetary
contributions.
The second point is that I advocate the renunciation of the transfer
of securities, foreign exchange, and gold at the present time. 4 This
demand has not been fully justified from the beginning. Such a
demand could perhaps have been justified toward a France that was to
be treated only as a vanquished foe. But France is now to be treated
as an incipient ally. Such demands should not be maintained toward
a prospective ally. In this connection I point out that the French
1 For previous developments see vol. xn of this series, document No. 475,
footnote 3.
"In this memorandum (378/209741^13) Wiehl outlined the German position,
French objections, and his own recommendations. For further details, especially
on the French view, see La D4tegation francaise auprda de la Commission alle-
mande d' Armistice (Paris, 1957), vol. iv, pp. 590-596.
3 See vol. xn of this series, document No. 559.
* In telegram No. 569 of June 30 from Olymp (386/211169) Abetz reported that
Hitler had agreed "to a revision of the occupation costs to the figure of a daily
sum of 10 million marks under the condition that 3 million marks of the 60
billion deposited with the Bank of France would be transferred daily in gold,
foreign exchange, and securities."
28 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Government is about to employ very strong French naval units off
Syria, that is, against the English fleet. 8
To be submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary
for the prospective presentation by Ambassador Abetz and Minister
Hemmen.
Eitter
° See document No. 31 and footnote 3.
No. 25
93/103754
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. 425 Berlin, June 26, 1941.
The Hungarian Minister 1 gave me today the appended memo-
randum concerning efforts in the Banat to bring this area into the
Reich in some form or other. 2 The Minister remarked in this regard
that he and his Government had no doubts for a single moment con-
cerning the future fate of the Banat as a part of Hungary. 3 They
would be grateful, however, if the data contained in the memorandum
were investigated.
Wbizsacker
1 Dome Sztfijay. . , „ „ *. ....
a Not printed (93/103755-56). The memorandum dealt with alleged activities
in this matter by the leaders of the German minority in the Banat.
3 For the background of German-Hungarian discussions regarding the former
Yugoslav Banat see vol. xn of this series, documents Nos. 340, 353, 366, 371, and
564.
No. 26
2800/548214-16
Reichsleiter Rosenberg to the Foreign Ministry l
Institute for Continental European Research
Abt. II No. 074 Berlin, June 26, 1941.
DIX18g.Rs.
On the basis of the special assignment given me by the decree of
the Fiihrer of April 20, 1941, in regard to the central handling of the
questions of the eastern European area? I request the following :
* This letter was also sent to a number of other Ministries and departments
eonrerned which are listed on the first two pages of this document. The copy sent
to the Foreign Ministry was for the attention of Senior Counselor Grosskopf of
the Department for German Internal Affairs.
"For text see Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International
Military Tribunal (Nuremberg, 1948), vol. xxvi, document No. S65-PS (U.S.
Exhibit 143) , pp. 383-384.
JUNE 1941 29
1. All publications planned in matters of the eastern area, 3 also all
directives and orders -which concern the political or propaganda ac-
tivities -with respect to the eastern area, as well as all orders and
decisions which concern the political organization of this area, are to
be submitted to me for my opinion.
2. Special caution is in order in the employment of members of the
nations of the Soviet Union in the eastern territories. In case an
office intends to utilize such persons in the eastern areas for purposes
touching on policy, my consent must be procured in advance.
A. Rosenberg
8 Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting : "?".
The following notes in Ribbentrop's handwriting are appended to the docu-
ment printed on a separate page (2800/548217) :
"P[iihrer], 'Eastern European area'."
"Area outside German troops is responsibility of Foreign Ministry."
No. 27
191/188752-53
The Charge d'Aff aires in China to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Peiping, June 27, 1941 — 8 : 50 a. m.
No. 299 of June 26 Received June 27—10 : 50 a. m.
"With reference to telegram No. 1033 of June 25 of the Embassy
Tokyo 1 and my telegram No. 262 of June 13. 2
1. All the reasons which have heretofore argued against the recogni-
tion of the Wang Ching-wei Government still exist unaltered. I refer
to my earlier reports.
2. Negotiations on the occasion of Wang Ching-wei's recent Tokyo
visit 3 are considered in political circles here mainly as representing an
internal Chinese- Japanese conflict about an extension of the powers to
be accorded to Nanking, and this is correctly termed by the press a
"domestic quarrel." There are as yet no concrete results of the
negotiations. Evidently, however, neither party has made any impor-
tant concessions and the total absence of practical results can now
only be compensated by increasing the prestige of Wang Ching-wei
at the expense of third countries. This is here considered a helpless
attempt at getting out of the big muddle into which they have gotten
1 Document No. 13.
"This telegram (191/138734) reported a conversation with a "leading member
of the North China government" about Wang Ching-wei's negotiations with
Japan concerning recognition by the Axis Powers. Altenburg quoted the in-
formant as saying that the Chinese people would be able to understand a
recognition of the Nanking regime by Germany only "in the event that Chiang
Kai-shek would have put himself unconditionally into the hands of the Americans
and English, which so far was by no means certain ..."
8 June 16-25.
30 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
themselves by their own lack of discipline. A final success can hardly
be counted on.
3. I wish to warn urgently against fulfilling the ultimatum-like
Japanese wishes in favor of Wang Ching-wei. In view of the advance
of Soviet-Russian influence in western China, bitterly resented for a
long time, and of the continued tense relationship with their own
Communist party, the military success in the German-Russian war
(evidently one group missing) change at one stroke the relationship
of Chungking to Germany as well as the Chungking inclination
toward a compromise in the direction of a direct Chinese-Japanese
total solution of the China conflict. I therefore suggest that before
conclusion of the German conflict with Russia no decisive steps be
taken in the matter of recognition.
Altenbtjrg
No. 28
208/142757-58
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 769 of June 27 Stockholm, June 27, 1941—9 : 02 p. m.
Received June 27—11 : 05 p. m.
With reference to my telephone conversation with Ambassador
Ritter of this afternoon. 1
The following is the report on the status of the specific questions
raised in the OKW letter of June 17 : z
II, 1 : Transit of the Engelbrecht Division is now in progress. The
volume of traffic totals 100 trains. The question of using the railroad
lines leading to Trondheim and Narvik has been deferred since
the German interests are for the present assured by last year's trans-
port agreement. Once this transport route is utilized to maximum
capacity, there is nothing to bar a suitable interpretation of last year's
transport agreement. 3
II, 2 : The movement of supplies to Finland on every technically
practical scale has been approved by the Swedish Government. Tech-
nical discussions are now in progress. In addition to the route used
at present via Denmark, southern Sweden, to Haparanda and Tornio,
preparations are now being hastened to organize a route to Finland
over Swedish railroads to the Swedish ports of Gavle and Sundsvall
on the Gulf of Bothnia. From Gavle or Sundsvall by ship across the
Gulf of Bothnia to the corresponding Finnish ports. The new route
1 No record of this telephone conversation has been found.
' Vol. sii of this series, document No. 638.
* Vol. x of this series, document No. 132.
JUNE 1941
31
is contingent on the early closure of the Aland passage by mines,
which the Naval Operations Staff has put off for the present for rea-
sons unknown to us here. I would appreciate it if the second route
mentioned above were taken into account for transport planning and
developed as quickly as possible.
II, 3 : No objections on the Swedish side. The case is of no practical
importance at this time.
II, 4: Sweden has agreed. The question of the Norwegian ships
has not been raised by me for the time being. I have asked the Fin-
nish Minister, Ramsay, to see what he can do about Finnish charter-
ing of the Norwegian ships. The question is not urgent because the
vessels are only motor ships. 4
II, 5 : The transport questions will be handled on a continuing basis
by the transport experts already or still to be assigned to the Military
and Naval Attaches.
II, 6: Sweden has agreed to all wishes expressed so far. Ober-
postrat Harder has been designated by me as the expert of the Mili-
tary Attache for signal communications.
II, 7 and IV, 5 : Sweden has agreed to assign airfields suitable for
forced landings and will disclose instructions insuring flight safety.
Details will be furnished to the Air Attache tomorrow morning. 8
Compliance with the German wishes regarding aircraft and crews in-
volved in forced landings. Discussion concerning flight of individual
aircraft across Swedish territory is still going on at present. Sweden
requests timely advance notice for flights across Swedish territory.
' A memorandum of Feb. 9 by Ruter, zu Ha. Pol. II b 374 (205/142869-73) lists
and describes the Norwegian ships lying in Swedish harbors as follows :
"name ofthip
SS Gudvang
" Charente
" Rapid II
" Solgry
" Skytteren
(whale reducer)
" Vesta
" Carma
" Bygdoy
MS Fjeldberg
MT Rigrnor
" Buccaneer
" Storsten
" hind
MS Karin
" Lionel
" Dido
" ReaHII
" B. P. Newton
All ships lie without cargo (except for the BygdOy, Vesta, and Carma)."
See, further, document No. lfil.
5 See document No. 42.
jrosj
deadweight
spied
ton-nave
tonnage
initnot-t
harbor
1,470
2,550
9. 5-10
Goteborg
1,282
1,815
9-10
a
714
1,000
9
Stromstad
559
750
8.5
Trelleborg
12, 358
15, 650
12
Goteborg
1,310
unknown
10
tt
1,234
it
unknown
a
1,252
1,800
8
Halmstad
332
380
9
Malmo
6,305
9,610
11
Goteborg
6,222
9,525
unknown
a
5,343
8,000
10.5
a
461
600
9
tt
30
unknown
unknown
tt
5,653
8,825
10.25
Gullmarsjord
5,263
unknown
13.75
it
6,069
unknown
unknown
Goteborg
10, 324
unknown
13.75
Malmo
32 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The question of a permanent regular courier service from Rovaniemi
to Norway still requires clarification with. Army Headquarters in
Rovaniemi.
Ill : Regarding the status of Swedish assistance to Finland and of
the German-Swedish negotiations on nonmilitary supplies, I refer to
detailed telegraphic reports Nos. 734 6 and 740 T of June 25. With
Sweden herself being short in most of the supplies requested, the
negotiations must be expected to be difficult. The questions are being
pursued by me in consultation with the Finnish negotiators. 8
IV, 1-5 : Sweden has agreed. A separate report will follow tomor-
row on the special questions contained in OKM's supplementary letter
of June 18.* The German wishes have been complied with on all
substantial points. Military administrative questions are not imme-
diately pertinent at this time since there are no German troops on
Swedish territory except the Engelbrecht Division in transit, for
which quite satisfactory special arrangements have been made. The
Swedish Government has today, in a separate memorandum, served
notice of its counterrequests in the domain of civilian and military
supplies, which will be separately reported. 10
SCHNUBRE
WlED
' Not found.
' Not printed (205/142748-49).
* See document No. 41.
' See document No, 43.
10 See document No. 59.
No. 29
260/170058
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
urgent Helsinki, June 27, 1941 — 10 : 40 p. m.
top secret Received June 28 — 1 : 30 a. m.
No. 524 of June 27
1. The Foreign Minister told me that Finland had entered a new
phase of her policy. If a break with England or America should
result from it, the Finnish Government would prefer that the other
side should initiate the break. 1
1 On June 28 the Finnish Minister In the United States, Hjalmar J. Frocop£,
handed Sumner Welles a statement containing the following declaration:
"The Government of Finland desires to maintain unaltered its relations with
Great Britain. The Government of Finland Is a co-belligerent with Germany
solely against RussEa." Cf. Foreign Relations of the United. States, 19&1, vol. I,
p. 44.
JUNE 1941 33
2. In regard to England I followed the guidance of conversation
of telegram No. 511. 2
3. The Foreign Minister does not yet see' his way clear, but has
by way of precaution instructed Gripenberg 3 to proceed to Dublin in
the event of a break with England.
4. The British Legation here has evacuated the women and chil-
dren, and has reduced the staff. The Foreign Minister has grounds
for believing that the British Minister i has been authorized to de-
cide for himself whether or not he would stay.
Blucher
a In this telegram of June 19 (260/170023) Ribbentrop agreed with Bliicher's
point of view and instructed him to work for a break of relations between
Finland and Great Britain,
1 Finnish Minister in Great Britain.
* George Gordon Medlicott Vereker.
No. 30
205/142751
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden
No. 896 of June 27 Berlin, June 26, 1941 1
Sent June 27.
For Minister Schnurre.
Please call on the Swedish Foreign Minister and inform him that
you have been instructed by me to convey to the Swedish Government
the thanks of the Eeich Government together with its satisfaction
over the understanding attitude Sweden has shown toward Germany's
wishes 2 occasioned by the conflict with Russia. Also, that it was my
conviction that this attitude conforms to the essential interests of the
Swedish people.
Ribbentrop
'This telegram also bears the number 558 and the notation, "received June
26, 10 : 40 p. m." It was presumably sent to Berlin from Bibbentrop's temporary
headquarters.
2 See documents Nos. 8, 16, and 17.
No. 31
Fl/0582-85
The Foreign Minister to the Chief of the High Command of the
Wehrmaoht
top secret Berlin, June 27, 1941.
Dear Herr Field Marshal: I have noted the contents of your
letter of June 15, 1941 (WFSt/Div. L IV/K No. 00113741 Top
682-905 — 64 -8
34 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Secret) 1 on the implementation of France's military obligations as
laid down in the "Paris Protocols", 2 and reply as follows:
The premise from which we proceed in our attitude toward the
French Government is that we can only secure to ourselves our mili-
tary interests in this sphere by negotiating with France, and this
premise underlies a policy which, as you well know, I have advocated
from the beginning and which has since been consistently followed.
For it is obvious that any coercive action against France would have
led to the defection of the French colonies and their joining forces
with de Gaulle.
On the other hand it is important to handle matters in such a way
that no open war between France and England should break out at
a time when this did not suit us. If open warfare should break out
between these two countries now that we are committed in Russia it
could lead to an English attempt to take possession of French bases
on the west coast of Africa without our being able to help France
effectively in warding off such attempts at these not easily accessible
points.
In the meantime the Fiihrer's decision about having the French
fleet put out to sea with troop transports for Syria s has in this con-
nection produced a new situation; this decision is no doubt based on
considerations of a military nature in the Mediterranean region which
could, however, advance the likelihood of a general state of war arising
between France and England and of an English attack against specific
French bases. Since, as you emphasize, it is becoming increasingly
urgent to utilize Dakar as a base for our navy while it would be
impossible for us to seize this base by force once the English had
gained a firm footing there, it seems to me to be of primary importance
that we deploy, as soon as practicable from the military standpoint,
units of the German Air Force there which would be capable, in
concert with local French forces, to repulse any English attack. In
this connection it should be borne in mind that under the Paris
agreements the obligations of the French with respect to Dakar
do not become effective until July 15 at the earliest. I would appreciate
learning if it would be possible to send German squadrons to Dakar
by this date.
As far as the use of the port of Bizerte is concerned I am of
course fully aware of its importance for supplying the German Africa
Corps as well as of the urgency of this question. In this regard
the arrangements entered into by Ambassador Abetz with the French
1 See vol. mi of this series, document No. 633.
' See vol, in of this series, document No. 559.
"In memorandum Fol. I M 19.72 of June 26 (70/50516-17) Grote recorded
Hitler's decision to permit the transport of four French battalions from France
to Syria under the protection of the French naval task force "Strassbourg."
JUNE 1941 35
Government in the supplementary Protocol of May 28, 1941, 4 are
so worded that the obligations which France assumes on this score
are not contingent upon any political or economic concessions to
France. We can therefore demand of the French Government — and
the latter is in principle agreeable to this — that it meet these obliga-
tions at once. As a result of the events in Syria there is, however, a
greater danger than there was last May of an English attack as a
reaction to our use of Bizerte for our supply line. The French
Government is understandably anxious- to be able, in such event,
to show its people some tangible German counterconcessions. I will
therefore propose to the Fiihrer to make some political and financial
concessions to the French at this time."
Heil Hitler I
Yours, etc. 6
* See vol. in of this series, document No. 559.
" For Keitel's reply see document No. 61.
* The file copy of this letter is not signed.
No. 32
191/138737-39
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Japan
Telegram
secret Berlin, June 27, 1941.
No. 907
With reference to your telegram No. 1033 of June 25. 1
For the Ambassador personally.
For the time being for your confidential information.
The Foreign Minister informed Ambassador Oshima, after the
Fiihrer had consented, and in agreement with the Italian Government,
that we had decided to recognize the Wang Ching-wei Government
on July 1.
I have discussed with Ambassador Oshima the details of recogni-
tion in the following way : 2
1. I told Oshima that on July 1 we would send Wang Ching-wei
a telegram recognizing his government. 3 It would also state that
we were establishing diplomatic relations. We would get in contact
with Wang regarding the special questions arising from the
recognition.
2. I have arranged with Oshima that we would instruct our Mis-
sions with the Governments of the Tripartite Pact in Rumania, Bul-
garia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Croatia in the course of this day to
1 Document No. 13.
' Weizs&cker's memorandum of June 27 (191/138745-47) is a record of this con-
versation and of some of the steps subsequently taken in this matter.
3 See document No. 38 and footnote 2.
36 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
support the impending Japanese step regarding the recognition of
Wang Ching-wei, in accord with the Italian Mission.*
3. Oshima asked that nothing be done for the time being in the
way of approaching the Spanish Government. 5 He was expecting
further instructions in this regard from Tokyo.
4. Regarding our economic wishes I said the following in the course
of the conversation :
Following recognition of the Wang Chang-wei government we
intended to instruct the Wohlthat delegation e to negotiate and con-
clude within the framework of its negotiations in Tokyo a special
agreement with the Wang Ching-wei government regarding German-
Chinese trade. In this we proceeded from the assumption, in accord-
ance with the Fuschl conversation of February 23, 1941, 7 that Ger-
many in her trade with China would enjoy a preferential treatment
over third countries.
Oshima received this remark willingly and with understanding.
He said he intended to inform Tokyo accordingly on his own initia-
tive, too, and obtain confirmation of the reception given my
observation.
5. Oshima asked whether our relations with Wang Ching-wei should
be considered as having been established de jure with our telegram
of recognition of the first of next month. I confirmed this and added
that we would then appoint very soon a Charge d'Affaires to Wang
and would later presumably also send an Ambassador.
Weizsacker
'An unnumbered draft of this instruction elated June 29 (191/138771) is in
the files. According to the reply telegrams, Nos. 1932 of June 30 from Bucharest
(191/138791), 670 of June 30 from Sofia (191/138790), 730 of June 30 from
Budapest (191/138787), 675 of July 1 from Bratislava (191/138805) and 631 of
July 1 from Zagreb (191/138795) the instruction had been carried out and
letters of recognition had been or were being sent to Wang Ching-wei.
6 An unnumbered draft instruction of June 29 (191/138769-70) informing
Stohrer of the forthcoming recognition of the Wang Ching-wei regime and asking
him to support the Japanese demand for recognition by Spain is also in the files.
Stohrer's telegram No, 2274 of June 30 (191/138788), apparently the reply to
this instruction, indicated that Spain would recognize the government of Wang
Ching-wei the following day.
•For the Wohlthat mission see vol. xi of this series, documents Nos. 341 and
424, and vol. sn of this series, document No. 429.
* Between Ribbentrop and Oshima ; see vol. xn of this series, document No. 78.
No. 33
177/85220-21
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
secret Tokyo, June 28, 1941 — 11 : 45 a. m.
No. 1069 of June 28 Keceived June 28—10 : 10 p, m.
With reference to my telegram No. 1034 of June 25. 1
Within the last few days the leadership committee of the Cabinet
has repeatedly met in the presence of the Chief of Staff, the entire
1 Document No. 14.
JUNE 1941
37
Cabinet, and advisory committees without reaching a clear-cut
decision as to Japan's future attitude regarding the German-Russian
war. As far as could be found out, only preparatory measures for
the various possible actions on the part of Japan have been ordered
thus far. As the Wehrmacht memorandum * confirms, preparatory
measures have indeed begun with zest. In the circumstances the prep-
arations for intervention against Russia will take at least 6 weeks,
unless Russia is weakened materially and morally in a decisive manner
in the Far East beforehand. According to reliable, confidential in-
formation, Prime Minister Konoye and the majority of Cabinet Minis-
ters, to be sure, seem to adhere to the view that nothing must be
undertaken that would injure Japan's military position in China.
Hence, the Cabinet seems thus far merely to have resolved on tighten-
ing their grip on French Indochina for which purpose three divisions
are allegedly being prepared.
In public and behind the scenes discussions concerning the attitude
to be taken are in full swing. Noted nationalists, who always work
closely together with the Embassy, have held various confidential
discussions— cf. DNB No. 244 of 26 June— in which caution toward
the Soviet Union and vigorous action in the south was advocated.
The danger exists that the southern expansion desired by this group
will at first be limited to French Indochina, while their efforts (clear
text evidently missing) could hinder Japan's activity in the north.
In these circumstances, the question arises whether the general direc-
tive, given to me in Berlin, 3 to see to it in the first place that Japan
takes action in the south while neglecting the Soviet Union, is still
valid if a successful move to the south beyond Indochina cannot be
counted on at present. According to confidential reports coming to
me from the Japanese Foreign Office, Ambassador Oshima is said
urgently to have advised the Japanese Government to attack Russia
soon.
I request telegraphic instructions.*
Ott
! Not found. .
' Ott was in Berlin during Matsuoka's visit in March and April 1941 as is indi-
cated in vol. xir, documents Nos. 218 and 222 but no record has been found of
such a directive given to him at that time. See, however, vol. xir, document No.
100.
* Not found. See, however, document No. 53.
38 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 34
136/75022-24
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
top secret Madrid, June 28, 1941—2 : 35 p. m., special summer time.
No. 2251 of June 28 Received June 28—6 : 10 p. m.
The moves of Serrano Suner in the last few days show even more
clearly than hitherto that he is with clear aim preparing Spain's en-
trance into the war.
The sending of Spanish volunteers against Russia, which must bring
Spain into sharper opposition to our foes, is to be attributed to his
initiative. Only a few hours after the outbreak of the war with Rus-
sia he won Franco over for this plan which was immediately explained
to us in order to bind the easily influenced Chief of State. 1 The re-
ported jealousy and protest by the Army which vetoed the dispatch
of Falange formation had a more serious background in so far as the
military attempted to oppose the whole project because it would bring
Spain to the brink of war.
The incident at Algeciras, which according to the representations of
the Foreign Minister involved a heavy encroachment of English flak,
and which was made the subject of a very energetic note of protest to
the British Embassy (telegram No. 2220 of June 26 2 ), takes on a
different light in the description by the responsible General Munoz
Grandes (telegram No. 2242 of June 27 e ) and far less significance.
The same thing is evident in the affair of the gasoline blockade by
England, which the Foreign Minister caused to be published and
commented upon in aggressive form (Arriba article, telegram No.
2218 of June 26 4 and No. 2236 of June 27 ") . Again the account of
the facts of the case given by the relevant office presents a different
picture (telegram No. 2241 of June 27) . B
In both cases it is clear that Serrano Sufier consciously exaggerated
matters in order to sharpen antagonism toward England and to stir
up public opinion against England.
"In telegram No. 2206 of June 25 (136/75003) Stohrer reported that some 40
to 50 trained pilots of the Spanish Air Force were to be sent as volunteers in
addition to the infantry.
In telegram No, 2217 of June 26 (136/75009) Stohrer reported that Serrano
Suffer had informed him of the various points regarding the volunteers which
had been decided by the Spanish Government.
*In this telegram (136/75011) Stohrer reported having heard that an English
plane from Gibraltar had flown over Spanish territory near Algeciras evoking
Spanish flak and that thereupon the English flak positions had fired upon the
Spanish guns.
' Not printed (136/75018) .
•Not printed (139/75010).
1 Not found.
JUNE 1941
39
The sharp oral and written arguments with the English and with
the American Ambassador (telegram No. 2184 of June 24 a and No.
2213 of June 26 7 and No. 2129 of June 19 s ) tend in the same direction.
The dilatory answers of the Foreign Minister to the Italian Foreign
Minister in regard to adherence to the Tripartite Pact and his initial
negative view toward the question of an official declaration of war
against Russia should not deceive us regarding the intention of the
Foreign Minister within a short time to make Spain's entry into the
war unavoidable. Serrano Suner wishes war, but he wants it at a
moment most favorable for Spain, that is to say after making sure
of a series of important imports which are already on the way and
after appropriate preparation of public opinion. In the pursuit of
his aim he has to reckon with strong opponents— above all, with the
military who have an influence with Franco. That this party is itself
more and more convinced of the necessity of entrance into the war I
have reported at various times; but they seek to postpone for the
longest time possible the entry into the war because of lack of economic
and military preparation. For this reason they would oppose any
step taken now which might be decisive, of which they might hear
from Franco (the Tripartite Pact, declaration of war on Russia)
and in view of Franco's indecisiveness they would probably win out
as they did this past winter. For these reasons Serrano Suner makes
his preparations for war in areas where an interference is not easily
possible and where at the most Franco's assent is necessary, which
will be possible for the more significant of the two brothers-in-law to
achieve after the restoration of harmony between them.
How nervously the military party observes the operations of the
Foreign Minister within his sphere are clear from the fact that the
lively exchange with England in Arriba because of the gasoline block-
ade stirred up strong discontent with certain of the military so that
the especially anxious Minister of Air, Vigon, suggested to me that
I exercise a moderating influence because otherwise Spain would be
involved in the war within a very short time.
Serrano Suner apparently operates in accordance with the words
which he once uttered according to which a provocation on the part
of the English was necessary for bringing about Spanish unity and
that if necessary such a provocation had itself to be provoked. 9
Stohrbr
" Not found.
'Not printed (136/750O8).
8 Not printed (136/74983).
'This telegraphic report crossed the instruction from Berlin of June 28
(136/75029) which is cited In vol. xn of this series, document No. 574, footnote
15. The instruction warned Stohrer to make no moves on his own part regard-
ing Spanish entry into the war because the repeated suggestions of Suner's de-
sire to enter the war were not to be taken seriously.
40 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 35
177/85214-15
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Telegram
MOST URGENT
No. 560 of June 28 Special Train, June 28, 1941—8 : 10 p. m.
from the Special Train Received Berlin, June 28—8 : 30 p. m.
No. 916 of June 28
from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 28—9:30 p. m.
No. 267/R RAM
Secret for the Chief of Mission.
I have arranged agreement with Ambassador Oshima that he -will
influence his Government, in the direction of a speedy military action
against Soviet Russia, and I ask you now to utilise on your part all
the possibilities that present themselves to influence the government
at your post and the other influential circles in such a direction. In
this connection I ask you to make use of the following points :
1) War between Germany and Soviet Russia will not only bring
with it the solution of more or less limited individual problems, but
will bring as a consequence a solution of the Russian question in its
entirety through a final battle.
2) The destruction of Russian power by our military action, which
is to he expected within a comparatively short time, will also make
Germany's victory over England an irrevocable fact. If Germany
is in possession of the Russian oil wells and grain fields, a sufficient
supply for the whole of Europe will thereby be ensured so that the
English blockade will on the whole be of absolutely no avail. The
direct land connection with East Asia will likewise be established on
this occasion.
3) In this way all the preconditions are given which will render
possible the new organization of the European sphere as intended by
the Axis Powers.
4) The present situation also presents a unique chance for Japan.
As Germany does this with respect to Europe, so can Japan now
through a military action against Soviet Russia create the prerequi-
sites for the new order in East Asia planned by her. After the re-
moval of the Soviet power in the Far East also, the solution of the
Chinese question will be achieved in the way desired by Japan without
encountering any more difficulties.
5) From the standpoint of Japanese interests, the idea of a drive
toward the south in the direction of Singapore, to be sure, is and re-
mains also of great importance. As Japan is not yet prepared for this
and as a possibility for such a drive has not yet been presented in the
JUNE 1941 41
present phase of the war, it is in the urgent interest of Japan not to
leave unused this chance now offered to her for solving the Russian
question in the Far East too. By doing this she would also free her
rear for a drive toward the south.
6) In view of the speedy course of events to be expected, Japan
should come to a decision in favor of a military action against Soviet
Russia without hesitation. A Japanese action against a Soviet Russia
already beaten to the ground would be quite prejudicial to the moral
and political position of Japan.
7) It can be expected that the swift defeat of Soviet Russia, es-
pecially if Japan participates in it from the East, will be the best
means for convincing the United States of the absolute senselessness
of entering the war oh the side of England, who will then be com-
pletely isolated and confronted by the mightiest combination in the
world.
Ribbenthop
No. 36
177/85216
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Telegram
top secret Special train, June 28, 1941 — 8 : 45 p. m.
No. 623 from the Special Train Received Berlin, June 28 — 9 : 10 p. m.
No. 917 from the Foreign Ministry Sent June 28—10 : 20 p. m.
For the Ambassador personally.
Although there have been some hard battles, military operations are
developing so favorably and rapidly that Russian resistance as a whole
may perhaps be expected to collapse much sooner than we had thought
up to now. The advice given in my previous telegram of June 28 1
that the Japanese Government should decide as soon as possible in
favor of intervening actively against the Soviet Union assumes special
importance in this connection. In the last few days I have kept
Ambassador Oshima continuously informed about the favorable devel-
opment of the military situation and have just spoken to him again on
the telephone, with particular emphasis on the foregoing. I hope that
Mr. Matsuoka's recently expressed conviction, that in the event of a
German conflict with Russia Japan of necessity will have to attack
Russia on Germany's side, 5 will now very soon become a reality.
RlBBENTKOF
1 Document No. 35.
* See vol. xii of this series, documents Nos. 512 and 596.
42 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 37
5146/B30351T
The State Secretary to the Embassy to the Holy See
Telegram
Multex No. 424 of June 27 x Berlin, June 28, 1941—12 : 25 p. m.
Received June 28—2 : 00 p. m.
Please do not establish any contact — or as the case may be cease any
contact— with the former diplomatic and consular missions of the
former Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Every dis-
cussion of the question of the future political organization of the
Baltic area is undesirable at the present time.
Please confirm receipt. 2
Weizsacker
1 The Multex number indicates that this instruction was a circular sent also to
various other Missions; however, no other copies of this telegram or lists of
addresses have been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.
'Not found.
No. 38
191/138758-59
The State Secretary to the Embassy in China
Telegram
secret Berlin, June 28, 1941.
No. 281
Drafting Officer : Minister Boltze.
With reference to your telegram No. 299 of June 26. 1
For the Charge d' Affaires personally.
The Reich Government has decided to recognize the Wang Ching-
wei government on July 1. It has been arranged with the Italian
Government that on July 1 the Reich Foreign Minister and the Italian
Foreign Minister will send Wang Ching-wei telegrams recognizing
his government and informing him that we will soon establish diplo-
matic relations with him.
The text of the Reich Foreign Minister's telegram will be forwarded
to you as soon as the wording is definitively settled. 2 Please see to it
that Consul General Gipperich hands Wang Ching-wei the Reich For-
eign Minister's telegram on July l. a
1 Document No. 27. „«.„_ „„,.
1 Sent in Weizsacker's telegram No. 282 of June 29 (191/138767-68).
* In telegram No. 314 of July 2 from Peiplng (191/138811) Altenburg reported
that Gipperich, the Consul General at Nanking, had carried out these instructions
in the afternoon of July 1.
JUNE 1941 43
The matter must be kept completely secret until July 1. Please
inform Gipperich also accordingly. Furthermore, please inform the
Mission in Chungking confidentially from your post (Peiping) only
on June 30.
Further directives for the guidance of your conversation will
follow. 4
Weizsacker
* See footnote 2.
No. 39
616/249809
Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI
Berlin, June 28, 1941.
zu Pol. VI 3405 g. 1
Submitted through U.St.S. Pol. to Pol. I M with the request that
the following communication be forwarded to the OKW:
"The Foreign Ministry welcomes the cooperation of activist ele-
ments and groups of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian popu-
lations with the German troops in the struggle against Soviet Russia.
"Strictly confidential and only for your information and attention:
"The Foreign Ministry requests, however, that political promises
of any kind to these elements and groups, and in general all con-
versations of a political kind with those mentioned, be avoided in
all circumstances."
Grundherr
1 Pol. VI 3405 g. : Not found.
No. 40
105/113623
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. 441 Berlin, June 28, 1941.
The Hungarian Minister once more stressed to me today that he
personally had not been misled by the Foreign Ministry in regard
to the developments leading to the German-Russian conflict. On
the other hand, a certain confusion in the military field had arisen
because of the fact that Colonel General Haider had asked the
Hungarian military on June 18 during his short sojourn in Budapest
not to sound an alarm in order not to arouse the attention of the
Russians, nor to take an offensive position. 1 General Himer had
spoken somewhat differently.
1 See document No. 10.
44 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
For the rest we agreed that these things all belong to the past,
now that the state of war between Hungary and Russia has been
provoked and brought about by the Russian attack.
I told the Minister that for my part I would only try to find out
also whether any kind of steps through diplomatic channels were
still necessary with regard to Hungary's military action.
So far as I knew this was not the case.
Weizsacker
No. 41
205/142761
The Legation in Sioeden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 784 of June 29 Stockholm, June 29, 1941—3 : 00 a. m.
Received June 29 — 6 : 00 a, m.
With reference to your telegrams No. 734 of June 25 * and No. 769
of June 27 2 and with reference to the telegram from Helsinki of
June 27 in your file. 3
The Swedish Foreign Minister informed the Finnish Minister
yesterday that the Swedish Government is prepared in principle to
supply arms and ammunition to Finland and to discuss Finland's
various supply requests. 4 Concrete Swedish-Finnish negotiations
will accordingly be initiated today, the prospects of which are viewed
by the Finnish negotiators much more favorably than they were in
the past. 6
Repeated to Helsinki.
SCIINURRB
WlED
1 Not found.
a Document No. 28.
3 Not identified.
1 In telegram No. 897 of July 10 (319/192472) the Legation reported that in
response to Finland's request for 1,000 trucks, Sweden would offer only 500
and these without tires. According to the Finns the British Government had
threatened Sweden with cutting; off her overseas imports, the Goteborg traffic,
if Sweden were to export rubber or tires to Finland. The British control
over the imports from overseas was so strict that Sweden saw no possibility
of an evasion (elne Ausnahme zu konstruieren).
In a further report on the Swedish-Finnish economic negotiations (No. 961
of July 16: 319/192450-51), Schnurre emphasized that the Swedes feared, in
case they delivered rubber to Finland, that Sweden's overseas trade would be
completely cut off.
See document No. 357.
"In telegram No. 1883 of Nov. 5 (205/143080) Dankwort reported that the
negotiations had been concluded in Helsinki. The Swedes declined to make
the loan which the Finns wished as the Swedish delegation had no such
authorization. The Swedes further were dubious that Finland would be able
to make the stipulated counterdeliveries.
JUNE 1941 45
No. 42
205/142762-65
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Stockholm, June 29, 1941 — 3 : 30 a. m.
No. 785 of June 29 Received June 29—6 : 00 a. m.
For the Air Ministry, Attache Group. 1
Following earlier general clarification of the German wishes by
Minister Schnurre with the Swedish Government, 2 the following ar-
rangements have been agreed with the Swedish Air Force.
1. Forced landings.
A. For forced landings by German aircraft, the following airfields
have been designated, to be used preferably whenever possible : Tors-
landa, Bulltofta, Varberg, Ljungbyhed, Skavsta near Nykoping,
Roma and Farosund on Gotland, civilian airfield Visby, 2 km north
of the city, Norrtalje, Frosb'n near Ostersund, Eomehed northwest of
Sater, Vannas, Kalaxheden, 5 km south of Lulea, Kalix. No field
available on Oland.
B. Size of the fields. Skavsta, runways 1000 & 1000; Roma and
Farosund approximately 1000 & 1000, in Farosund in one direction
only 850; Vannas 900 & 600; Kalaxheden 1200 & 1200; Kalix 900
&900.
G. The designated fields can be directly approached by aircraft in
distress. Red distress flares must be fired if possible. The Swedish
authorities will afford every aid and assistance, including fueling and
repairs, to aircraft making forced landings on these fields or else-
where. Attention is called to use of international emergency
frequencies.
D. No internment. No general agreement has been concluded on
this point; disposition will be from case to case in our favor.
E. Maps on which the airfields are marked will be forwarded at the
earliest opportunity to the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, Fifth Air
Force, Headquarters Army in Norway, and to Major General Lorenz.
2. Courier routes and courier aircraft.
A. For the time being, the following routes have been agreed on
with the Swedish Air Force: Oslo-Hamar-Skelleftea-Kemi-Rova-
niemi, and Trondheim-Skelleftea-Kemi-Rovaniemi, Courier planes
must fly a pennant — color immaterial — on each air foil and are then
considered civilian aircraft regardless of type. They will not be fired
at, not even by way of warning. No restrictions as to cruising altitude.
1 Typed marginal note at the end of the document : "Forwarded by the tele-
graph office by means of closed circuit coded teletype to the Reich Ministry
of Air, June 29."
1 See document No. 28.
46 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Maximum altitude desired by the Swedish side. The prescribed course
must be followed. The fortress areas of Hemsjo and Boden, as well
as other restricted areas, must not be flown over. As far as possible, a
regular flight schedule must be established and will be communicated
to the Swedish Air Force by this office. The schedule arranged at the
present calls for one plane over each route and in each direction, or
two planes on one route in each direction, daily. The flight schedule
will be established by this office in consultation with Fifth Air Force
and Headquarters of the Army in Norway. The Luftwaffe Operations
Staff will be informed. 8
B. An alternate courier route, Oslo-Pori, has been discussed to al-
low for contingencies. This office can make definite arrangements if
need arises for this route.
0. Courier flights and special flights operated outside the flight
schedule must be announced in advance — if possible 2 hours before
starting time — to this office, which will arrange for notification of the
Swedish Air Defense Command. Such flights must also follow the
designated routes.
3. Firing on aircraft.
A. Aircraft in distress will not be fired at. Fire international red
flare.
B. Scheduled courier planes or previously announced courier or
special purpose planes will not be fired at.
6. Beginning June 29, other aircraft will receive warning shots
and, if they fail to change course, fire for effect; this is the same pro-
cedure followed in the past pursuant to Annex 3ZL, Dispatch 8/41
Stockholm-Berlin. 4 The Swedish Air Defense Command considers
this provision essential for effective action against Eussian aircraft
flying over Swedish territory or attacking German rail transports to
Finland. Sweden anticipates the possibility of Russian air attacks, 5
particularly since the German side has demanded that German anti-
aircraft machine guns be emplaced on top of transport trains.
*In telegram No. 863 of July 6 (205/142797-98) the Legation reported the
definitive agreement on two routes for couriers and transport purposes: Ro-
vaniemi-Pori-Bromma-Oslo and return ; Germany-Bromma-Finland and return.
Furthermore arrangements were made for fueling of the planes at Bromrna;
the flying into Swedish air space on other routes was to be restricted to a min-
imum ; every flight was to be proceeded by a 2-hour warning with the office of
the Air Attache, Stockholm ; and each plane was to signal the field at Bromma
before flying over Swedish territory but the indication of courier planes by
means of pennants was no longer an absolute requirement.
* Not found.
' In telegram No. 751 of June 26 (205/142753) Wied reported having learned
from a private Swedish source that Mme. Kollontay had said that the conse-
quences of the Swedish concession to transport German troops would be that
Russian planes would try to attack not only the German troops on Swedish trains
but Swedish territory as well.
JUNE 1941 47
D. The Swedish Air Defense Command will not fire at German
and Finnish aircraft, but would prefer not to issue a general order to
this effect. Since the arrangement arrived at, despite the good will
in evidence, is not entirely satisfactory and fails to rule out the possi-
bility of aircraft being fired at by mistake, Minister Schnurre will ask
of the Swedish Government an explicit order that German aircraft be
not fired at by antiaircraft artillery and fighters. 6 For the time being
I recommend that all aircraft flying across Swedish territory be
equipped with red distress flares for use in case they are fired at.
E. In the conference this evening with the Chief of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces T and the Chief of the Air Force Staff, 8 1
repeatedly and emphatically called attention to the incalculable conse-
quences that in my opinion would ensue from the loss of German air-
craft from gunfire from Swedish flak or fighters. On the Swedish side
it was pointed out that no untoward incident had occurred since the
coming into effect of the agreement under Annex 3 ( Section 3 O) . B It
was further stated by the Swedish side that such incidents are believed
impossible even now.
4. The Swedish Air Defense Command has proposed to Finland
the sending to Turku, the Aland Islands, and to Aulu of liaison officers
in order to report as promptly as possible to the Swedish Air Defense
on German or Finnish planes coming from the east.
5. Attention is called to Swedish restricted areas indicated in the
maps that will follow.
6. Intermediate landings.
In the event that contrary to past instructions the military situation
should require transfer of a unit, e.g., fighters, to Finland, it will be
necessary to notify this office of the number of aircraft, of the type,
of the course, as well as of any intermediate landing places envisaged,
in order to enable Minister Schnurre or the Legation to obtain the con-
sent of the Swedish Government. 10
7. Weather reports.
A. Weather reports are now being broadcast only in a form suffi-
cient for the needs of agriculture. Russia receives no weather reports.
If there is interest on the German side for detailed Swedish weather
reports, I would request instructions to this effect, together with a list
of the desired stations and specification of the channels and codes by
" In unnumbered telegram of July 1 (205/142790) Schnurre reported that his
request had been granted : the Swedish Government gave assurances that in no
case would German or Finnish planes be fired upon but at the most warning
shots would be fired.
* Gen. O. G. ThOrnell.
* Col. B. G. Nordenskibld.
" Not identified.
10 A new arrangement regarding German transit flights over Swedish territory
was concluded on Sept. 12, 1941. See document No. 319.
48 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
which transmission is to be effected. The closed circuit coded tele-
type of this Legation seems to be the best method of transmission;
reciprocal exchange of weather information might be a matter for
consideration.
B. Bequest study of question and decision whether weather reports
from this office are actually still necessary. 11
Air Attache 18
Wied
11 No reply to this request has been found in the flies of the Foreign Ministry.
12 Col. J. P. Petersen.
No. 43
205/142767-70
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry u
Telegram
most urgent Stookholm, June 29, 1941 — 2:56 p. m.
No. 791 of June 29 Received June 29 — 4:45 p. m.
For OKM.
Subject : Wishes of the Navy respecting Sweden.
After Minister Schnurre created the political prerequisite, the nego-
tiations on the wishes of the German Navy 2 have been brought
to a close. For these negotiations the Swedish Government had des-
ignated the Staff of the Commander in Chief of the Swedish Armed
Forces. As has already been reported, 3 the positive attitude of the
Swedish Government and Navy, also in military matters, found ex-
pression during the conferences, which were characterized by full
understanding for the situation by the Swedish side.
It is obvious that the Swedish public is daily becoming more aware
of the importance of the decisive decision by the Eiksdag and that
these ideas are popular not only in the armed forces but also in other
circles of the population. There must also be no doubt, however,
that this change of Swedish public opinion is being facilitated by the
Scandinavian idea and in good part can be attributed to the announce-
ment of Finland's entry into the war against Russia. 4
Swedish desire to cooperate as a matter of fact with Germany in
the military field found expression in the instruction issued with the
1 Typed marginal note at the end of the document : "Forwarded by the Tele-
graph Office to OKM by closed circuit coded teletype. June 29."
* The letter of the OKM of J une 18 to the Foreign Ministry which formulated
the specific requests of the German Navy has not been found in the files of the
German Foreign Ministry.
See vol. xn of this series, document No. 668, footnote 1.
' See document No. 8. footnote 4.
* See document No. 15.
JUNE 1941 49
aid of the Government to the effect that with the elimination of the
Defense Ministry which is under parliamentary control [parlamen-
tarischen Verteidigungs ministeriums] which is competent for the
armed forces Attaches accredited to Sweden, all military questions
for the duration of the hostilities in the east are to be settled directly
through the armed forces Attaches with the Staff of the Commander
in Chief of the Swedish Armed Forces and the three branches of
the service.
In particular the following is to be reported concerning the Ger-
man naval wishes, on the basis of the letter B.No.l.Skl. ( JC) 001103/-
41 Op.Chefs. of June 18, 1941, from the High Command of the
Navy to the Foreign Ministry: 8 1. Swedish mine field, a.) Block-
ing of passage west of the Aland Islands; the Swedish Navy is will-
ing at any time to close the passage with an effective mine field as
soon as a time is given for this by the German side. The wish was
expressed that this mining be undertaken as soon as possible. Kef-
erence is made to telegraphic report No. 723 of June 23 from Minister
Schnurre to the Foreign Ministry 8 as well as telegram No. 1420 g.
of June 24 from the Naval Attache 7 to the OKM. 8 b.) Mine field
connected on the west with the German mine field at Oland. The
Swedish mine field was laid on June 28 in accordance with the
wishes of the German Naval War Staff. The announcement of warn-
ing to shipping was issued on June 29. The High Command of the
Navy received the text of the announcement by telephone from the
Naval Attache, No. 1454 of June 28, 1941. The gap in the Swedish
Oland field is being guarded. Details regarding emphasis [zoning] s
and pilot service are contained in the announcement of warning to
shipping.
According to a decision of the Crown Council on June 28, 1941,
passage through the gap in the mine field has been closed to warships
of all nations, so that the German request for refusal of passage to
warships of the U.S.S.R. has therewith been complied with. The
Crown Council decision amending the Constitution will probably be
published on June 30, 1941. For German warships see below under
"Treatment of German naval forces".
2. Protection of territorial waters. The maintenance of shipping
traffic in Swedish territorial waters under the protection of Swedish
warships was recognized as the main task of the Swedish Navy as a
matter of c ourse. The Swedish Navy, whose floating forces have so
* See footnote 2.
6 Document No. 8.
*l.t. Comdr. P. von Wahlert.
and T footaote a f 6 to the ° KM iaS n0t be6Q f ° nnd ' See ' h0wever ' lament No. 8
err^for G 'SnuS» ^^ " Betonune " whIch a PPa«*tly is a typographical
682-905 — 64 9
50 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
far mainly been employed in the patrol service to protect the Swedish
territorial waters, has announced the first regular convoy service
for June 30, for the time being in the region of the Gulf of Bothnia,
At the proper time the German ships still detained or only sailing
in the inter-island waters can join these convoys depending on the
safety from enemy action to be decided upon by the Naval War Staff.
The German request to prevent the possibility that enemy subma-
rines utilize the Swedish inter-island waters as a base or refuge is
taken care of by the stipulation in the Swedish Constitution according
to which both the inner and the outer territorial waters are blocked
to submarines of other nations. Exceptions can be brought about
only through diplomatic channels (Swedish constitutional compila-
tion of 1938, No. 187, par. 2) . German naval forces see below.
For other non-German and non-Finnish surface naval forces the
inner territorial waters are blocked in the same way as for submarines.
For the outer territorial waters there will be, in accordance with the
neutrality policy of Sweden as stressed in her foreign relations, no
publication of a blockade, which would be contrary to the stipulations
of international law. Assurance was given, however, that if Russian
naval forces should cross the borderline of the territorial waters they
would be forced away and prevented from remaining there. The
Naval Attache is of the opinion that owing to the particularly out-
spoken dislike of Russia in the Swedish Navy this measure will be
carried out emphatically and the German request will thus also be
complied with. .
3. Treatment of German naval forces. The wish expressed in the
letter of the Naval War Staff, that German naval forces not be in-
terned when they exceed the period of stay in Swedish territorial
waters permitted by international law, will be complied with. As-
sistance too was promised in case of need. The Swedish side desires
that German naval forces entering Swedish territorial waters (even
if the time period is not exceeded) be unmistakably recognizable as
German warships with the aid of special agreements to be arranged
between the two navies. A special telegram on this subject with the
Swedish proposal will follow." Questions arising in connection with
entrance into Swedish territorial waters and in connection with ex-
ceeding the period of stay are not to be settled through diplomatic or
political channels, but on the spot in each case by the commanders or
commandants on the two sides. The wish was likewise expressed that
all matters belonging to this area be handled between the two navies.
This report has been checked with Minister Schnurre.
Naval Attache 81 g. Kdos
Wied
10 Not found.
JUNE 1941 51
No. 44
329/105547 — 48
Unsigned Memorandum
Special Train, June 29, 1941.
Instructions of the Foreign Minister for the newly appointed Minister
Dr. von Hentig to Kabul, Afghanistan. 1
1. Ascertainment of the English strength and positions
a. in Afghanistan itself,
b. in India.
2. Consolidation of the German position
a. with respect to the Afghan Government,
b. with respect to the English Government,
c. with respect to the Russian Government,
by coordinating, among other things, all instruction and Abwehr
officers on the spot, doctors and teachers in our schools, engineers of
the Todt Organization, and organizations of the nationalist circles in
Afghanistan in order to employ them within the country or, if neces-
sary, against the government. Coordination of the local intelligence
services of all agencies operating abroad.
3. Contact with the frontier tribes and their nationalist leaders.
Establishment of communications with India in order to obtain news
and exert influence politically and by means of propaganda.
4. Observation of the military measures taken by the English in
Baluchistan and along the Iranian border.
5. Observation of and support for the national independence move-
ments in Iran and Afghanistan, particularly in so far as these are
connected and cooperate with one another.
1 Hentig actually did not assume this post The reason may have been opposi-
tion to his appointment on the part of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP.
See vol. vm of this series, document No. 470, footnote 7.
No. 45
173/84437
The Foreign Minister to the Representative of the Foreign Ministry
With the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands
Telegram
No. 563 of June 30 Special Train, June 30, 1941—12 : 15 a. m.
from the Special Train Received Berlin, June 30 — 12 : 45 a. m.
No. 229 of June 30 from the Foreign Ministry Sent June 30.
RAM 271/R
From almost all the countries of Europe the wish to participate
in the fight against the Soviet Union by providing volunteer contin-
52 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
gents has been communicated to us. This wish will be granted by
Germany.
After consultation with Reich Commissar Seyss-Inquart please
send me a telegraphic report on whether the desire to provide such
volunteer contingents has also been expressed by the Dutch, particu-
larly by Dutch organizations such as, for example, the Mussert
movement. I ask you, however, not to undertake anything yourself
with the Dutch in this matter for the time being. 1
RlBBENTROP
'In his reply telegram No. 206 of June 30 (173/^438), Bene .reported that
from the 8,000 men who had lately come from the NSB (Mussert) and NSNAP
(Cppard) movements, 4,000 were in the SS division Wiklng and an equal
number of members of the NSKK were in other units at the eastern front
He also reported that some Netherlander had expressed a desire to organize
a Netherlands Legion.
No. 46
118/66852-03
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Croatia
Telegram
No. 624 from Special On the Train, June 29, 1941.
Train Heinrich R Received Berlin, June 30—12 : 15 a. m.
No. 549 from the Foreign Ministry Sent June 30.
Biiro RAM 272/R
For the Minister.
1. In a letter to the Fuhrer * the Poglavnik has requested that
Croatia be also permitted to participate in the struggle against Soviet
Russia by supplying a contingent of volunteers.
Please tell the Poglavnik that the Fuhrer gladly accepts the offer
and will also inform him of this in a personal letter of reply. 2 The
execution of the plan would then have to be settled through the usual
official channels.
2. As regards the invitation to Field Marshal Kvaternik, 3 please
tell him that I would be particularly happy to see him soon, but that
I could not receive him as yet at Headquarters, in view of the war
situation at the moment; and as soon as this was possible I would
have a communication sent him through you concerning the time
of the visit.
RlBBENTROP
•Senf on UI S l?^5/KU). In this letter Hitler Informed Pavelic
that Croatian volunteers would be organized within each of the three branches
° f tSSft 512 of June 23 (116/66919) Kintelen informed the Legation
in Zagreb that on the occasion of Croatia's accession to the Tripartite Pact
in vlnice on June 15, Ribbentrop had invited Kvatemik to a visit in Germany.
JUNE 1941 53
No. 47
191/138777
Circular of the State Secretary 1
Telegram
most tjbgent Berlin, June 30, 1941.
MultexNo.434
"With the recognition of Wang Ching-wei we do not intend to break
off automatically our relations with the Chungking Government, but
want to wait for the time being to see how Chiang Kai-shek reacts to
such a recognition. Please inform the government at your post
accordingly.
Confirm receipt.
Weizsackek
1 Sent to the Embassies in Italy and Spain, and to the Legations in Hungary,
Rumania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Slovakia.
No. 48
191/138784-85
The State Secretary to the Field Office in Chungking
Telegram
host urgent Berlin, June 30, 1941.
TOP SECRET Pol. Vni 951.
No. 47
For the Chief of the Office personally.
I. The Chinese Ambassador 1 called on me on June 28 and told me
it was believed in Chungking that the Japanese Government was
trying to put through recognition of Wang Ching-wei in Berlin and
Home. The Ambassador recalled that he had always had instructions
in case the question of recognition of Wang Ching-wei should come up
here to point to the statement by his Foreign Minister on November 30,
1940.* The Foreign Minister had stated at that time that the Chinese
Government would consider recognition to be a very unfriendly
act and would be forced to break off relations. The Ambassador
pointed to the efforts made by him and his Government to main-
tain the German-Chinese relations so far as possible in consid-
eration of the time after the war, when the natural, 100-year-old,
excellent relationship between Germany and China would have to be
restored automatically. The Ambassador described with emotion the
material and ideal values which were at stake on both sides. He
1 Chen CMeh.
* For test of this statement of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Chung-hui, see
Foreign Relations of the United, States, Japan, 19S1-1941, vol II, pp. 122-123.
54 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
spoke of the patient Chinese character that clung closely to friendships
but also remembered for a long time if its feelings were injured.
I replied to Mr. Chen that the Japanese Government had repeatedly
brought up the question of recognition of Wang Ching-wei with us,
but that at the moment I was not in a position to say more on the
subject. If in case of recognition the Chinese Government should
resort to the measures mentioned in the statement by the Chinese
Foreign Minister, it would have to make the decision itself. Inci-
dentally, the 100-year German-Chinese friendship had experienced
a breach in 1917 quite without our doing. Referring to the tremendous
German successes I finally stressed that those who intended to commit
themselves definitely to the Anglo-Saxon cause were at any rate badly
advised.
Mr. Chen received my statements with understanding; indeed,
the whole discussion was calm, although the conversation affected him
very much. 3
II. Please do not of your own accord notify the Government at your
post of the recognition of Wang Ching-wei which will take place
tomorrow. However, if you should be approached regarding the
recognition, please conduct the conversation by making use of the
foregoing ideas.*
III. The same text is being sent to Tokyo and Peking.
Weizsacker
a The foregoing portion of this instruction la a somewhat abbreviated version
of Weizsftcker's memorandum of June 28 (191/138760-62) recording his con-
versation with the Chinese Ambassador. ,
•In telegram No. 51 of July 1 (191/138806) Weizsacker Instructed the Mission
in Chungking "to observe the greatest possible reserve toward Chungking
government circles" and for the time being "not to ask for talks with leading
people in the Government."
No. 49
1000/305670-71
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Iran
Telegram *
No [351] Berlin, June [30,] 1941.
[Pol VII 3532 g.]
With reference to your telegram No. 331 of May 4. a
It had been intended to send a special deputy to Tehran to carry
on the discussions with the Egyptian Ambassador there. 3 In con-
"The file copy of this telegram is a draft; the date, telegram number, and
file number have been supplied from the reply telegram, document No. 66.
2 Vol. xn of this series, document No. 448.
■According to Woermann's memorandum, TJ.St.S.Pol. 589 of June 26 (1000/-
305068-69) , the original Intention had been to send Hentlg to Tehran ostensibly
for the purpose of economic negotiations with the Iranian Government but
actually in order to continue there the discussions with the Egyptian Ambassador,
Zoulflkar Pasha.
JUNE 1841 55
sideration of the situation that has developed in Iraq in the meantime
we do not consider the time to be appropriate for more detailed dis-
cussions. I therefore request you to carry on the discussions with the
Egyptian Ambassador yourself and to ask him in the first place how
the King had received the Fiihrer's message * and whether there were
any further details concerning a continuation of the discussions, in
particular whether there were any specific wishes for cooperation.
Furthermore please point out in the talks that the group of Ali
Maher, Azzam, and Azis Al Masri has evidently been recognized and
treated there by the English as opponents, 5 and ask in what man-
ner the aspirations represented by them can be carried on. Also
please ask for information about the fate of the two.
Report by wire. 9
RlBBENTROP
* Vol, xii of this series, document No. 427.
"These references probably are to All Maher, Egyptian Minister President,
August 1939-June 1940, and to Abdur-Rahman Azzam, and Aziz Ali al-Misri,
who had served under Ali Maher as Minister of Social Affairs and Chief of
Staff, respectively. AI-Misrl tried to leave Egypt at the time of the fighting in
Iraq In May 1941 and waa courtmartialed and interned.
* Document No. 66.
No. 50
F19/396-403
Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini 1
Fuhrer's Headquarters, June 30, 1941.
Duoe : First of all, please let me thank you cordially for your last
letter. 8 I am overjoyed that our views in the great questions affecting
the destinies of our people coincide so completely. I believe that the
past week — from a political point of view — has given striking con-
firmation to our opinions. What I myself at the first moment did not
even dare to hope for has happened. Large parts of Europe have
been roused from a truly lethargic disinterestedness. Many countries
now find themselves obliged in this, our battle against Bolshevism,
to take an attitude that will be the beginning of a better understand-
ing of our common policy which, in the last analysis, is a truly
European one.
'In telegram No. 1481 of July 2 (100/65276) Mackensen reported that the
letter, which came by special plane, had been delivered to Mussolini at 11 : 15
a. m.
In telegram No. 1483 of the same date (B12/B001033-34) Mackensen re-
ported that Mussolini read the letter aloud in his presence, expressing his gen-
eral satisfaction. He made the remark that he could send three more divisions
to the eastern front if they were desired, and he promised a reply at once. See
document No. 62.
1 Of June 23, document No. 7.
56
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The struggle which has now been raging for a week, Duce, already
makes it possible for me to give you a general picture in a few strokes
and to tell you of our experiences.
The most important realization that I and my generals have gained
is, despite all our suspicions, the positively alarming one, Duce, that
if this battle had not come now, but only a few months, not to speak
of a year later, we would— however horrible the thought may be-
have lost the war!
The Russian Army was about to complete a troop concentration
with resources far in excess of what we knew or had even considered
possible. For 8 days now one armored brigade after another has been
attacked, beaten or annihilated— and despite this there seems to be
almost no decrease either in their numbers or in the ferocity of their
attack. Only since June 27 have we had the feeling that things are
easing up, that the foe is slowly tiring, and that in spots there are
signs of disintegration. Like the English with their Mark II infantry
tank the Russians came here with a surprise of which we unfortunately
had no idea at all. A monster tank, weighing some 52 tons, with
the best of armor, 75 mm. thick, a 7.6 cm. gun, and three machine
guns. Without our new 5 cm. antitank gun, the 8.8 antiaircraft gun,
as well as the new armor-piercing grenades of our field artillery,
even we would be powerless against this tank which is surely the
strongest at present in existence.
The Russians had stationed two huge offensive armies in the large
pocket of Bialystok as well as in that of Lwow. Numerous motorized
and armored units were assigned to the infantry divisions, almost all
of which, however, had their own armored units. We executed a
flank attack on these two armies after breaking through extremely
deep fortifications, which in some places are hardly inferior to those of
the West Wall. The battles that have been taking place here for the
past 8 days are among the most difficult that German troops have
thus far had to experience. The Russians fight with a truly stupid
fanaticism. On the first day there were hardly any prisoners at all.
It was a struggle to the death in which numerous Russian officers and
especially commissars in the end escaped threatened capture by suicide.
Pillbox crews whose position was hopeless chose to blow themselves
up rather than surrender. The Russian counterattacks did not take
place in accordance with any general plan, but rather with the primi-
tive brutality of an animal that sees itself trapped and then in wild
rage beats against the walls of its cage. These soldiers, who are very
stolid to begin with, have, in addition, been insanely incited. Their
commissars tell them that if they are captured, they will be tortured
and then killed anyway. They therefore fight to the last ditch, and if
the worst comes, prefer their own death to the torments they have been
JUNE 1941
57
made to believe in. Only in the last few days of battle has this morale
begun to waver and the number of prisoners and deserters is now, to be
sure, increasing by the hour.
Almost all Russian counterattacks are made with tanks only. After
being attacked by 100 to 200 tanks, which individual divisions have
often shot up in one day, the latter are again attacked by new tanks
the next morning. I believe, Duce, that Europe was threatened with
a danger here, of the gravity of which no one, unfortunately, had any
proper conception.
The Russian Air Force is bad. Fanatically as the Russian fights
as a land soldier, he has always been inept as a seaman, and apparently
now also as a flier. As far as the Russian Air Force is concerned, the
German fliers have wrought terrific havoc even in the first 7 days.
Here the superiority is now not only unmistakable but absolute. Rus-
sian planes still try only occasionally to reach the front. In general,
every such flight is also the last.
The Russian infantry are thrown into the battle in tremendous
numbers, regardless of the sacrifice involved. Machine guns, mortars,
infantry guns, and hand grenades cause terrible losses. Despite this
the attacks are repeated again and again at very short intervals.
Russian leadership is, on the whole, bad. One exception to this, at
least in the first few days, was the Russian Southern Army. The
leadership of the individual divisions or regiments is not in accordance
with any military standards. The training of the so-called officers is
in no way comparable to the requirements in European nations.
Nevertheless it is impossible to tell whether in the course of years an
improvement might not perhaps have taken place in this respect also.
But in view of the brutality of this type of warfare, the value of the
individual is not so important from the very outset as the danger of
the instrument in itself. This danger lies in the tremendous number
of units, the enormous development of the tank arm, the stolid fanati-
cism of the individual soldier, as well as the complete indifference with
which the leaders themselves sacrifice men and materials.
When I now report quite briefly on the outcome of the struggles,
Duce, naturally only the external gains are to be seen at the moment,
while the internal state of the now battered Russian units still remains
concealed from us for the present. After an 8-day campaign we have
the following situation :
North of the Pripet Marshes— these divide the zone of operations
for the time being into the northern half, the Baltic States, and White
Russia, and the southern half, Galicia and Bessarabia — the enemy's
armies massed near the border are already completely beaten. In the
pockets formed along the front of the Central Army Group two armies
are enclosed by the rapid advance of armored wedges between Bialy-
58 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
stok and Minsk, "while other mobile forces are already pushing to the
east over the Berezina.
In front of the Northern Army Group the enemy, after having
suffered heavy losses between the border and the Drina, is trying to
save the remnants of his northern armies through a retreat to the
northeast. Daugavpils and Eiga are in the hands of the German
armored forces.
In southern Finland Field Marshal Mannerheim, to whom I am also
sending a German division via Sweden, 3 is deployed on both sides of
Lake Ladoga, ready to attack starting July 2. In central and north-
ern Finland German-Finnish forces have the mission to attack east-
ward and block off Murmansk, which is of importance as a launching
point for possible English or American assistance.
South of the Pripet Marshes the armored group of the Southern
Army Group is advancing hi the general direction of Zhitomir, while
the enemy on both sides of Lwow is trying to escape the threat^ of
encirclement by withdrawing to the east. It may well be the intention
of the Soviet Eussians to reach their old line of fortifications and
there to put up resistance. I therefore plan— in order to facilitate
the frontal drive from the west— to have the Eleventh Army, which
is concentrated in Eumania, together with the attached Rumanian
forces, attack the line of Eed fortifications from the rear, over the
Pruth, early in July.
On the Carpathian front, Hungary is preparing to advance with
a mobile corps against Kolomyya and Stanislawow. Advance units
have already crossed the border.
The enemy's air force units have already sustained such losses that
our supremacy in the air is complete. TJie Luftwaffe can therefore
be withdrawn in increasing measure from fighting the enemy's air
force and utilized for direct support of the Army.
The Eed Navy has so far remained passive both in the Baltic and
in the Black Sea.
I accept with thanks your generous offer, Duce, to dispatch an
Italian corps and Italian fighter pilots to the eastern war theater.
The fact that our allied armies are marching side by side precisely
against the Bolshevist world enemy seems to me a symbol of the war
of liberation that you and I have waged.
As I understand the arrangements between our two transport de-
partments, the transports are to be carried out via the Brenner-
Innsbruck-Salzburg-Linz-Vienna-Bratislava-Budapest line and are
to discharge in eastern Hungary. Notification of the beginning of the
transport movement should be made at least 3 days in advance because
of the preparations necessary in Germany. The place of commit-
1 See document No. 16.
JUNE 1941
59
ment— probably within the framework of the German Eleventh
Army — must be decided in accordance with the development of the
situation. I shall take the liberty, Duce, of communicating to you
more detailed suggestions on this point at the proper time.
The following seems to me to be of special significance : The trans-
portation routes out of Kumania are very much congested at present
because of the Rumanian and Hungarian troop concentrations. I
have notified both countries that the deliveries of Rumanian oil, which
are of vital importance to the Axis Powers, must nevertheless continue
to be made according to schedule. Our transport chiefs have already
taken this point of view into account in their joint handling of the
Italian troop transports.
During the eastern campaign too, the war against England will be
waged with adequate commitment of forces. The German Navy is
hardly being used against Soviet Russia in the Baltic Sea, which we
have sealed off. Above all, however, the siege of England is to be
intensified by an appropriate commitment of the Luftwaffe even
during the eastern operations.
And now, Duce, permit me to express one more thought in con-
clusion. I have considered whether it would not perhaps be psy-
chologically right if, in the course of this struggle, the two of us
could meet sometime, somewhere at the front. The most suitable place
would, of course, be my own quarters or one of the places provided for
it, for the conditions exist there for the apparatus from which it is
very hard for me to absent myself — for any length of time, at any
rate. In matters of transportation and communication I am, unfor-
tunately, a slave of technology. But I believe that — if it could be done
sometime — quite apart from the personal exchange of ideas, the psy-
chological effects for both our peoples would also be only beneficial.
I believe furthermore that this would also be properly appreciated
by the rest of the world.
I close this long letter by greeting you most cordially, Duce, as an
old comrade.*
" No typed signature appears on this version of the letter which is the film of
a carbon copy of the original.
No, 51
265/173046
Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department
Berlin, June 30, 1941.
Ha. Pol. VII 2419.
At a luncheon on June 28, to which the Turkish Counselor of Em-
bassy Alkend had invited me, I was told by him that he had instruc-
tions from Ambassador Gerede to ask me whether the Turkish
60 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOHEIGN POLICY
Embassy could be of any help to us in the preparations for the planned
German-Turkish trade agreement. 1 I replied to M. Alkend that our
preparations for that agreement were only being started now and that
for that reason it seemed to me premature to consider the substantive
aspects of that obliging offer of cooperation.
Alkend requested that I inform the Foreign Minister regarding the
offer of cooperation of his Ambassador and let them know through
him (Alkend) what our position was.
In that connection, M. Alkend told me of the deep impression which
Ambassador Gerede had received at a recent interview with the
Fiihrer, when he presented to the Fiihrer in accordance with his in-
structions a personal letter from the Turkish State President. 2 On
that occasion the Fiihrer had very strongly stressed the fact, without
any reference to political considerations, that close economic coopera-
tion between Germany and Turkey was both necessary and possible.
At the same time he had expressed the readiness of the Reich Govern-
ment to conclude at the earliest possible date a new trade agreement
with Turkey covering the widest possible range.
In view of this attitude on the Fiihrer's part, the Turkish Ambas-
sador Gerede in turn was anxious to do everything possible to pave
the way for a genuinely satisfactory solution concerning German-
Turkish economic cooperation. He was prepared to adopt as his
own the German wishes regarding the development to be given to the
German-Turkish trade. He would appreciate it if he could receive a
German formula to this effect.
I assured M. Alkend that I would present the Ambassador's pro-
posal and would come back to the inquiry.
Ripken
'According to a WeizsScker memorandum of June 30 (2153/469462-64) the
provisional economic agreements with Turkey were due to expire soon. For
this reason as well as for political reasons the opening of new economic nego-
tiations around July 20 was advisable. See further, document No. 294.
1 See vol. xir of thts series, Editors' Note, p. 1052.
No. 52
260/170063-64
The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister
Teletype Message
Berlin, July 1, 1941.
Sent July 1—1 : 40 p. m. 1
The Finnish Minister just transmitted to me a letter in a sealed en-
velope personally addressed to the Fiihrer from the Finnish President.
The letter will be transmitted by the Minister's Secretariat in the
quickest possible manner.
1 The date and time of the dispatch are supplied from a marginal note.
JULY 1041 61
The Minister delivered to me at the same time a copy of the letter's
content which reads as follows :
"Your Excellency: While I thank you for the cordial letter ad-
dressed to me, 2 in which you recall tne memory of the friendship,
sealed in blood, between Finland and Germany, I should like to give
the assurance at the same time that the common fate with Germany
is felt more strongly here than ever before at a time when our soldiers
stand side by side as comrades in arms to ward off the threatening
danger from Finland's traditional enemy.
"Your message that, come what may, Germany would never desert
Finland, finally guarantees a successful conclusion of Finland's long
fight for independence. I am sincerely gladdened by the fact that the
heroes of the mighty German Army are, in this battle, the brothers- in-
arms of the Finnish warrior. At the same time I express the firm hope
that this final battle against Bolshevism will guarantee the prosperity
and the peace of the new Europe. Yours, etc. Risto Ryti."
Weizsacker
a Hitler's letter to Ryti has not been found. In telegram No. 400 of June 23
(260/170040) Blticher reported, "Copy of FUbrer's letter to President Ryti has
been delivered immediately. M. Eyti acknowledged contents with satisfaction."
See also John H. Wuorinen, editor, Finland and World War II, 1939-1944 (New
York, 1948), pp. 111-112.
No. 53
82/00234-37
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Telegram
most tjkgbnt Etjropa, July 1, 1941 — 5 : 35 p. m.
FBIORITT
No. 634 from the Special Train Received Berlin July 1—6 : 40 p. m.
No. 942 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 1.
Secret for officer in charge.
I request that you deliver to the Foreign Minister at your post, as
soon as you possibly can, the following telegram, which I have ad-
dressed to him personally. The telegram should be written at your
end on white sheets, without any letterhead, over my signature. The
text of the telegram is as follows :
"To His Excellency the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Matsuoka,
Tokyo.
Personal.
"When Your Excellency was in Berlin we envisaged that we would
get in touch with each other personally if occasions of special im-
portance to the welfare of our two countries should arise. Such a
moment has now come, and I have the honor to inform Your Excel-
lency of the following :
(1) As a result of the heavy blows dealt by the Wehrmacht it has
been possible in the first week of the German-Eussian campaign to
break the back of the Russian Army, A considerable part of the best
62 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
combat divisions of the enemy has partly been destroyed, partly cap-
tured, and partly so battered that the remnants will hardly operate
effectively any more during this war. The enemy air force is almost
completely smashed, so that on the main battle front German air
supremacy has been complete since yesterday. A vast amount of ma-
terial has been captured or destroyed ; the German army communiques
give specific figures for this.
In the meantime the German armies are driving farther and farther
to the east all along the front. I have no doubt that the impending
operations of the German army will destroy the enemy forces still
engaged in battle in the same manner, and it is to be expected that
Russian resistance, in the entire European area of the Soviet Union,
will be broken — perhaps in only a few weeks. As I have already
informed Your Excellency a few days ago through Ambassador Ott, 1
this in turn will most probably lead before long to a final collapse of
the Bolshevist regime.
(2) These historically unparalleled military successes, which are
due primarily to the bravery of the German soldiers and which have
eliminated the great military threat to which Europe was exposed,
create for Germany's leadership the obligation to bring about in the
future a political situation in the East that will once and for all pre-
vent a repetition of such occurrences. Moreover, it is our conviction
that so long as Russia remains as the germ cell of Bolshevism, neither
Europe nor East Asia nor the world as a whole will ever have tran-
quillity. Germany is resolved to take the action called for by the
realization of these facts. In this, she hopes for Japan's cooperation,
as a definitive settlement of the Russian question can be brought about
most quickly and effectively by Japan and Germany acting jointly.
(3) The impending collapse of the Russian's main military power,
and thereby presumably of the Bolshevik regime itself, offers Japan
the unique opportunity to free herself also from the Russian threat
and give the Japanese empire the security in the north which, is a
necessary condition for its vitally important expansion in the south.
It therefore seems to me that the need of the hour is for the Japanese
Army to seize Vladivostok as soon as possible and penetrate as deeply
toward the west as possible. The goal of these operations should be
to have the Japanese Army in its march to the west meet the German
troops advancing to the east halfway, even before the cold season
sets in; then to establish a direct connection between Germany and
Japan over Russian territory, both by way of the Trans-Siberian
Railway and by air ; and finally to have the whole Russian question
settled by Germany and Japan jointly in such a way as to eliminate
for all time the Russian threat to both Germany and Japan.
(4) Only after the Soviet Union has been defeated by Germany
and Japan will it be possible to develop truly the actual power of the
states joined together in the Tripartite Pact. Germany and Italy
will thus be the absolutely dominant factor in the whole European-
African hemisphere. They will then be in a position to intensify
enormously their pressure on England by air raids and submarines,
and by appropriate action to bring about the final defeat of England.
For her part, Japan, free in the rear, will be able to employ all her
Eower to bring about a final settlement of the problems of interest to
er in the south. In passing, it might be mentioned that the elimina-
1 See document No. 36.
JULY 1941 63
tion of the Soviet regime will of itself facilitate the settlement of
the Chinese problems.
As far as America is concerned, I hope that after Russia has been
brought to her knees, the weight of the Tripartite Pact nations,
Germany, Italy, and Japan and the powers aligned with them, which
I hope will soon be joined by a number of other European states, will
suffice to paralyze any tendency toward intervention in the war that
may still arise in the United States.
In summary I should like to say the following :
It is my conviction that the victory of German arms in the past week
has now given Japan the historic opportunity, which may never come
again, to settle the Russian problem jointly with Germany and to
free our peoples for all foreseeable time from any threat from this
large area, whether it be of an ideologieal-political or of a military
nature. The fact that our nations will simultaneously be able, in
pursuance of the joint anti-Comintern policy which we have always
followed, to strike the decisive blow for the elimination of Bolshevism,
this archenemy of mankind, will be for the two nations and their
leaders the classical confirmation of their common political ideas and
their greatest claim to fame for all time.
I believe, moreover, that the defeat of Russia will substantially
hasten the defeat of England by the Axis Powers. This would estab-
lish the necessary conditions for the new order in Europe and East
Asia which our nations desire, and no one in the world, which in its
battle against Bolshevism is already rallying with ever-increasing
solidarity behind the Axis, will be able any longer to dispute the states
of the Tripartite Pact the right to create a new and just world order.
Ribbentrop."
End of the telegram.
Ribbentrop
No. 54
105/113635-37
Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I
Berlin, July 1, 1941.
Pol I M 2051 g. Rs.
General Himer, German General with the Hungarian High Com-
mand, reported to the OKW under the date of June 23 as follows :
"On the basis of the telephone conversation with General of Artil-
lery Jodl at 6:00 p. m. on June 22, I immediately got in touch
with the Hungarian General -Staff. It then developed that the Hun-
garian Chief of the General Staff i could not be reached, the Defense
Minister 2 had gone fishing, the Regent was at a polo game on Margaret
Island.
"According to the Minister President's statement to the Minister
today, the members of the Government could not be assembled because
it was Sunday. Only General Laszlo, a who is still very much in
need of consideration, could as always be reached and was ready to
* Gen. Henrlk Werth.
' Gen. Karl Bartha.
'Chief of the Operations Group of the Hungarian General Staff.
64 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
lend every support. General Laszlo passed on my communications
to General Werth that very evening. I asked for a personal talk
with General Werth, which unfortunately took place only today from
12 ; 50 to 1 : 15 p, m., as the Chief of the General Staff went to the
country in the morning. In this very plain and emphatic conversa-
tion between the Chief of the General Staff and me, I once again
personally transmitted the view of the OKW and of General Haider,
that every support by Hungary was most welcome to Germany.*
However, no demand would be made. I stressed in particular the
necessity that the German transport traffic to Rumania must not
be disturbed by any Hungarian movements that might be made. Gen-
eral Werth said that he did not know what was in the Fiihrers
letter to the Regent. 8 If it did not particularly mention the request
for participation in the fight against the Soviet Union, the politicians
would hardly go along.
"He regretted that no hint had been given by political quarters
as early as 4 weeks ago. Then they would now stand ready with
an army and could have crossed the frontier with it yesterday. At
his instigation, about 10 days ago a political inquiry had been made
regarding Hungarian participation, but the Fiihrer did not seem to
want to let Hungary participate. General Werth stressed again and
again the lack of political preparation of the matter, whereupon I
replied that now the soldiers were speaking.
"I again pointed to my personal view, which I had set forth to him
some time ago. I rejected the Chief of the General Staff's remark
that the Fiihrer had said that Hungary had no claims on Russia
and consequently had other tasks, pointing out that this most prob-
ably involved a remark by Ambassador Oshima. Whether it was
actually made in that form is not certain. Furthermore, General
Werth pointed out that General Haider had asked on June 19 that
nothing be done so that Russia would not be alarmed prematurely.
Now, in Worth's opinion, any intervention by Hungary came too late
in any case. In answer to this I stressed that it was still a little
before 12: 00 o'clock, and Hungary could still participate in the cru-
sade against Bolshevism in the otherwise solid front.
"In the course of the conversation I had the impression that Gen-
eral Werth is after all not equal to the greatness of the hour. The
result of the talk was that my statements were passed on to the
Government. After talking with the Chief of the General Staff
and the Defense Minister, the Minister President went to see the
Regent at Kenderes. The decision is still to be taken."
Supplement by the Military Attache: 8
"In oral statements to me General Himer stressed the urgency with
which he had given expression to the views of the OKW in the
conversation with General Werth.
"General Werth had expressed astonishment that Rumania and
Finland were informed at an early date concerning the planned
operations, but not Hungary."
Kramarz
* Tho Haider Diary has the following entry for June 23 : "12 : 00 : Conversation
with Himer : We accept gratefully any participation by Hungary if It does not
impair our transport communications with Rumania."
* Vol. sii of this series, document No. 661.
* Col. G. Krappe,
JULY 1841 65
No. 55
93/103765
Memorandum by the State Secretary l
St.S. 446 Berlin, July 1, 1941.
The Hungarian Minister again complained to me today that life in
the Banat was at present being made difficult for the inhabitants of
Hungarian ethnic origin. Great numbers of such inhabitants of the
Banat were applying to the Hungarian mission in Belgrade so that
their transfer to Hungary may be facilitated.
I replied to Minister Sztojay that as it happened I had spoken just
yesterday with our representative in Belgrade, who was here for
the present, concerning the repeated Hungarian complaints about
the Banat. In this connection Herr Benzler had told me two things :
1. The Hungarians were already engaged in a quiet deportation of
Serbs from the Banat 2 to Old Serbia.
2. It had been ascertained by dispatching a member of our mission
in Belgrade to the Banat and was confirmed by the signatures of
inhabitants of the Banat who were Volksdeutsche or of Hungarian
ethnic origin that the latter were not doing badly in the Banat but
very well. However, I did not yet have the pertinent report.
Incidentally, I asked M. Sztojay why the Hungarian representative
in Belgrade did not get in touch directly with Herr Benzler, in order
to spare the two Governments the conversations resulting from his
reports. Perhaps it would also be expedient if Sztojay spoke with
Herr Benzler while the latter was here, for after all he was well
acquainted with him. 3
1 The file copy of this memorandum Is not signed.
2 Apparently this ought to read "BaCka." Cf . footnote 3.
*In a memorandum of July 3 (93/103767-70) Benzler recorded having had a
detailed discussion with Sztojay regarding conditions in the Banat and Backa
in accordance with Weizsacker's suggestions. The topics discussed were: (1)
The deportation of Serbs from the BaCka ; (2) Repeated Hungarian complaints
about alleged unfavorable treatment of the Hungarian national group in the
Banat; (3) Interference by Hungarian officials and military in the Banat con-
trary to existing agreements.
Weizsacker's memorandum St.S. 462 of July 7 (93/103778) records a complaint
by SztSjay regarding administrative measures in the Banat tending to consolidate
Serbian administration. Weizs'aeker asked if Sztojay doubted the German
promise regarding the Banat; if not, he would have to admit that the psychologi-
cal moment for a declaration regarding the transfer of the Banat to Hungary
had not arrived.
In a memorandum of July 9, St.S. 446 (93/103795) Weizsacker recorded another
demarche by Szt6jay in the matter of the Banat. On this occasion Sztojay
emphasized, however, that his demarche did not imply "any doubts in the
FUhrer's word regarding the Banat."
682-905—64 10
66 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 56
93/103764
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 444 Berlin, July 1, 1941.
The Hungarian Minister, as he informed me today, had instructions
to hand to the Fiihrer personally a letter from the Eegent of Hungary.
When I explained to the Minister that the Fiihrer was at his head-
quarters and that it was not quite simple to reach him, Sztojay gave
up the idea of an audience and left the letter with me. It will be
forwarded to the Foreign Minister by the Foreign Minister's Secre-
tariat as quickly as possible.
The letter is sealed. Sztojay was not informed with regard to its
contents. 1
The Minister had no instructions to make additional statements
orally if the audience with the Fiihrer should come about. Obviously,
he merely wished, if he were received, to advocate German-Hungarian
solidarity also with respect to the later development of the war.
Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister (by telegraph).
Weizsacker
1 This letter has not been found in the German Foreign Ministry flies. Like-
wise not found were Hitler's letter of July 3 to Horthy and Horthy's letter of
reply which Sztojay handed to Weizsacfeer on July 7 (Welzsacker's memoran-
dum St.S. 460 of July 7 : 93/103777). For a summary based on Hungarian docu-
ments of what seem to be the same three letters, see C. A. Macartney, A History
of Hungary, 1929-191,5, vol. n, pp. 30^31.
No. 57
F17/093-9S
General Antonescu to Adolf Hitler 1
July 1, 1941.
Excellency : Filled with admiration, I have followed the victorious
operations of the German Wehrmaeht along the entire front from the
Baltic Sea to Lw6w.
The splendid victories on land and in the air make it apparent
that a decisive victory is very near at hand and that the Soviet armies
can be regarded as having been annihilated.
In the course of these 7 days, the German and Kumanian Army
Groups have succeeded in checking the Soviet armed forces on the
Rumanian front and achieving air superiority, and at the same time
have prepared the offensive which must lead to the final destruction
of the Soviet military forces on the southern wing.
1 The document printed is from a German test of the letter. The Rumanian
original text Is filmed on F17/090-92.
JULY 1941 67
In order to assure unified command, the following Rumanian forces
have been placed under the immediate command of the German
Eleventh Army :
Six divisions, three mountain brigades, three cavalry brigades, the
armored divisions; furthermore, additional units of heavy artillery,
antitank artillery, engineers, etc.
In accordance with Your Excellency's directions i this army will
carry out the main operations ; it is to attack in the general direction
of Vinnitsa, in order to strike the Soviet forces in southern Galicia
from the rear.
The attack by the German Eleventh Army is to be secured on the
right flank by the Fourth Rumanian Army with six divisions and
one cavalry brigade, which is to attack in the general direction of
Hu§i, Kishinev, and Dubossari, by shifting almost its entire strength
to the left wing.
An army group, advancing from Dobrudja, will cross the Danube
in the region of Tulcea and drive north with two divisions in the
attack.
All measures have been taken for the protection of the oil fields. I
may add that this area is no longer threatened, because the Soviet
Air Force was vanquished at the very first moment on this front too.
I have taken all necessary steps to insure that the petroleum prod-
ucts are transported with the greatest possible speed. All the tank
cars needed will be made available by me.
I should not omit to inform Your Excellency that General Ritter
von Schobert and I are on the best of terms and that all the require-
ments of Army Group, Rundstedt in regard to the operations to be
undertaken will be given full consideration.
With confidence in final victory and the unshakable friendship
which forever links Rumania and the Greater German Reich, I beg
Your Excellency to accept the assurance of my highest consideration.
General Antonesctt
'This might refer to a letter of June 29 In which Hitler had set forth the
task of the Rumanian forces in the operations of the Eleventh German Army
and requested that the required Rumanian units he placed tinder the command
of the Eleventh Army.
For a summary of this letter see Andreas Hillgruber, Hitler, Konig Carol
und Marschall Antonesou (Wiesbaden, 1954), pp. 134-135. No record of Hitler's
letter has been found in the archives of the Foreign Ministry.
68 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 58
222/149772
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Bucharest, July 2, 1941—1 :10pm
TOP 6ECRET deceived July 2-1 : 38 p.m.*
No. 1953 of July 2 *
For the Foreign Minister.
The report of the advance of Hungarian troops in the direction
south of Lw6w impels General Antanescu to make the following
request :
1. He again asks that a common frontier between Germany and
Jttumama be established. 2 J
2. He asks that we avoid employing Rumanian and Hungarian
troops side by side, in order to avoid incidents.
KlLLINGER
USOp.mT n ° te: " Transmitted t0 tUe Special Train as No. 2114. July 2,
* See vol. sii of this series, document No. 416.
No. 59
205/142791-92
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Stockholm, July 2, 1941—4 : 45 p m
No. 822 of July 2 Received July 2-6 : 30 p. m.
With reference to our telegram No. 769 of June 27, last paragraph. 1
Today the Swedish Government gave me a list of its wishes in regard
to deliveries of German war equipment, namely :
1. Licences for airplane engines (1600-1700 horsepower) and
delivery ot the machine tools necessary for starting production. De-
tails are known to Mimsterialrat Midler of the Reich Air Ministry.
2. Delivery of Me[sserschmitt] 110's.
a ' ™ liv ?^ of Twin Was P en g in es from stocks in France.
4. 1 he delivery to Sweden of tanks and the provision of German
licences in return for which Sweden will provide spare parts for
tanks— a, transaction with which Daimler-Benz and the OKW are
already familiar.
5. Armor for tanks, namely, 1,500 tons of 10-60 mm. armor for
covering 20-ton tanks.
6. Magaz ine equipment for tanks [Kampf-wagen-Kastengerat].
1 Document No. 28.
JULY 1941 69
7. Ten cross-country motor vehicles with equipment, specifically,
1-ton half-tracks from Demag A.G. Also there is Swedish interest in a
considerable number of 3-ton tractors.
8. 21-cm. cannon along with ammunition and equipment, regarding
which there have been negotiations for some time with Skoda. The
prerequisite for Swedish interest is a shorter delivery period.
9. A list of orders concluded but not yet carried out, especially for
optical and radio equipment — familiar to Captain Flues at the OKW.
In consideration of the great cooperation shown by the Swedish side
in connection with all German military wishes 2 and in order to sup-
port the German and Finnish wishes regarding supplies, I consider
it necessary that I be provided at this time with considerable con-
cessions in the areas of deliveries of war equipment important to
Sweden. An accommodating attitude in this area will, moreover, con-
siderably advance our political efforts here. Please check on the
above-described Swedish wishes with these views in mind. 3 I should
welcome it if Ministerialrat Miiller of the Air Ministry and a repre-
sentative of the Office of Economics and Armaments (Colonel Becker
or representative) would then be sent to Stockholm with the necessary
authority so that negotiations could be begun on this subject with
Sweden at the beginning of the coming week. Please send telegraphic
instructions at once.*
SCHNURRE
WlED
1 See documents Noa. 8, 16, 17, and 28.
s See document No. 92.
* See document No. 98 and footnote 4.
No. 60
J2D/121106-0T
The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 1405 of July 1 Lisbon, July 2, 1941—11 : 00 p. m.
Received July 3 — 8 : 25 a.m.
In the course of today's conversation with Salazar the talk turned
to the establishment of a corps of Spanish volunteers to fight against
Bolshevism 1 and to the question of carrying out a similar demonstra-
tion in Portugal. I informed Salazar that we received daily applica-
tions from Portuguese to be taken into the German Army, but that we
always rejected these with our thanks for the friendship demonstrated,
for the reason that foreigners were not accepted in the German Army.
I also personally considered it to be the right thing for the Portuguese
1 See documents Nos. 12 and 70.
70 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
to express their commitment to the new Europe by standing firm on
the Continent, in the islands, and in the colonies. Salazar explained
that this was his opinion, too. In Spain it was somewhat different.
Aside from the fact that Spain had a debt of gratitude to pay for the
help in the Civil War, the nature of the Spaniard was also more ex-
pansive and more demonstrative than that of the reserved Portuguese.
Furthermore, the small contingent that Portugal could provide at best
could not exercise any sort of influence on the success of the victori-
ously advancing tremendous German Army. On the other hand, how-
ever, he had already been considering for several days in what way he
could give widely visible expression to Portugal's sympathy with
Germany's fight against Bolshevism. He would perhaps organize a
demonstration by the Portuguese Legion, which after all had been
established at the time for the fight against Bolshevism and still today
had to perform this in the interior of the country, and would use this
occasion for a presentation of his political views. Portugal's deathly
enmity toward Bolshevism was known to the world and particularly
also to England, but he nevertheless considered it necessary during
these days of the decisive struggle to commit himself also toward the
outside. I replied to the Minister President that I was convinced
that such a demonstration would find a strong response not only in
Germany but all over the world. 2
Huene
" In telegram No. 1430 of July 6 (129/121109) Huene reported that while pro-
German Portuguese officers were advocating a special Portuguese formation for
the employment at the eastern front, the Portuguese Ministry of War favored
a strengthening of the garrisons in Portugal and on the Atlantic islands. In
telegram No. 1603 of July 27 {129/121120) Huene reported that the organization
of a small Portuguese military unit for the eastern front was still being
considered.
In telegram No. 2407 of Oct. 31 (129/121193) Huene reported that he had again
brought up the matter with Salazar who listened to the arguments in favor of a
unit of Portuguese volunteers for the fight against Russia but who asked that
Huene not request an Immediate reply.
No. 61
Fl/0579-81
The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the
Foreign Minister
Fuhrek's Headquarters, July 2, 1941.
The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht
WFSt/Abt. L (IV/K) No. 1557/41g. Kdos.
Dear Reich Minister : In reply to your letter of June 27 x and with
reference to the decisions of the Fiihrer on the occasion of Ambassador
Abetz' visit, 1 I confirm the agreement of the High Command of the
1 Document No. 31.
* See document 24, footnote 4.
JULY 1941 71
Wehrmacht with the conceptions you advanced on the application of
the Paris Protocols."
The concluding negotiations concerning the use of the port of
Bizerte are now, in accordance with the French views, directed at
having transport to Bizerte at first sail from ports in southern Italy
only, and not from Toulon. 4 A convoy guard by the French Navy
is thus eliminated. What matters now, however, is to charter as many
fast French merchant vessels as possible. Traffic can be expected to
start from about the middle of this month with the inclusion of
Italian transports.
To my regret I have to reply in the negative to your question relat-
ing to Dakar and whether some Luftwaffe units could be transferred
there by the middle of this month. Before the conclusion of the war
in the East, German aerial forces will not be available for this purpose.
But I should also like to point out that in the Paris negotiations
the French characterized the establishment of a German air base in
French West Africa as a serious encumbrance for a sympathetic
reception of German-French military collaboration in the colony.
Besides, it was rightly pointed out by them that from this step, more
than from the provisioning of German U-boats by a tender stationed
in the port of Dakar, an immediate outbreak of open conflict with
England or the United States would have to be expected. Hence
it was laid down in the Paris Protocols that a German air base near
Dakar was not to be established until a later date.
Furthermore, the measures of the French armed forces for rein-
forcing the defense potential in West Africa are, according to the
Protocols, on a scale sufficient by themselves for prolonged defense,
and even against considerable forces. The employment of the Luft-
waffe in that area was not intended to add to the defense potential,
but mainly for the offensive against enemy commerce.
For these reasons the prior or simultaneous movement of Luftwaffe
units to Dakar is not necessary, even if in accordance with the Fiihrer's
decision the date for its utilization as a naval base must be postponed
for political reasons.
I will make it my business, however, to urge the French that they
carry out the military reinforcements of Dakar and the West African
region which is provided in the Paris Protocols. In this fashion it
will be possible to let the exploitation of Dakar as a base for the Ger-
man Navy take effect immediately if the political conditions permit
it, and the further political concessions which in this connection are
expected by the French can then be made to them from our side.
Heil Hitler!
Yours, etc. Keitei,
' See vol. xu of this series, document No. 559.
* See vol. in of this series, document No. 559, footnote 5.
72 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 62
Fl 9/393-05
Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler x
Rome, July 2, 1941/XIX.
Fuhree : To begin with, I should like to thank you heartily for the
letter 2 you sent me informing me of the progress of the initial phase
of the operations against Russia. The bulletins issued by your High
Command on Sunday, June 29 , 3 have strengthened my conviction,
which I expressed in my last letter to you, that the campaign against
Russia will culminate in a triumph of your arms. The space is no
obstacle to maneuvering units such as yours, but rather an advantage.
I was aware that the military organization of the Soviet Union
had made remarkable progress in these past years, but what you tell
me is a surprise to me also. It appears clear that this mighty military
organization, not being able to be with us, would have been against
us when the time came. It is therefore necessary and f oresighted to
eliminate it, so as to deprive Great Britain of all hope of aid from the
European Continent. The marshaling of the European nations
against Russia with regular and volunteer troops is actually a mar-
shaling against Great Britain, which has allied herself with the
Kremlin. This is very important for the future development of the
Avar and for American intervention, which in my opinion has been
postponed. After Russia's liquidation, Great Britain's fate will soon
be decided, particularly if we should succeed in drawing Turkey over
to our side and attacking Egypt from two sides.
As regards the sending of the Italian Army Corps, the three divi-
sions are ready and can depart as soon as the timetable has been
established by the proper authorities.
I accept with pleasure your proposal for a meeting at your Head-
quarters and am of the opinion that, morally as well as politically,
such a meeting will rouse a wide response in both our countries and
in the rest of the world. The task of beating Russia in order to extir-
pate Bolshevism is truly epic, and to have dared to do this will be
the imperishable glory of your armies and the Axis revolution.
I want you, Fiihrer, in this great hour of your life and of the history
of your people, to feel that I am with you in comradeship and faith.
Mussolini
1 The translation is from the original Italian. The first page of the German
translation (F19/391-92) is only partially legible.
* Of June 30, document No. 50.
8 This bulletin listed the capture of 40,000 prisoners of war and 600 guns, the
destruction or capture of 2,233 armored vehicles and the destruction of 4,107
enemy planes.
JULY 1941 73
No. 63
82/60241-43
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Tokyo, July 3, 1941—3 : 55 a. m.
No. 1101 of July 2 Received July 3—10 : 50 a. m. 1
For the Foreign Minister.
With, reference to my telegram No. 1069 of June 28 2 and your
telegrams Nos. 916 s and 917 4 of June 28.
In accordance with instructions I tried in every way as soon as the
above-mentioned telegrams arrived to bring influence to bear on the
Japanese Government and other leading circles in favor of a rapid
military action against Soviet Russia. For that purpose I have kept
in touch with both the Foreign Minister and prominent leaders of the
Nationalists; I have had the Wehrmacht Attaches and members of the
Embassy working toward the same end and have also assured myself
of the cooperation of the Italian Ambassador. 5 It became apparent
that the Nationalist wing, which had previously been influenced in
favor of action in the south, will not readily adopt the new line. This
tendency intends to cling tenaciously to prosecution of the campaign
in the south, which was almost to be expected in view of the slowness
of the reaction but which at the moment has led to that paralysis
of the opposing tendencies mentioned in telegram No. 1069 of June 28.
According to reliable information Matsuoka personally has strongly
advocated a clear-cut decision. He was unable, however, to prevail
with all the leadership committees of the Cabinet, the full Cabinet,
and with the Emperor in favor of an immediate decision for a
Japanese entry into the war.
After this morning's Cabinet meeting, presided over by the
Emperor, 6 Matsuoka asked me and also the Italian Ambassador to
call on him at 2:00 p. m. He first made an oral statement to us,
addressed to the Reich Foreign Minister, which was drawn up on the
basis of a Cabinet decision, and then gave me an English translation
of it. The text will follow by a separate telegram, 7 A statement
addressed to the Italian Government was likewise presented. It is
identical in content but differs in the wording of the introductory
1 Marginal note : "Forwarded as No. 2130 to the Special Train, July 3."
' Document No. 33.
* Document No. 35.
4 Document No. 36.
* Mario Indelli.
"The record of the decisions of this Imperial Conference of July 2 was
submitted to the International Military Tribunal of the Far Bast as exhibit No.
588 (Doc. No. 1652).
' Document No. 64.
74 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOHEIGN POLICY
sentence. Text likewise follows by separate telegram. 8 The state-
ment to the Italian Government, by the way, does not speak of the
German-Soviet war but of the war of the Axis Powers against the
Soviet Union. Matsuoka gave an oral explanation of the statement
he had presented, saying that Japan was not at present in a position
to enter the war against the Soviet Union without facing other com-
plications. The meaning and purpose of the Japanese attitude would
become clear to the German Government upon a careful and thorough
study of the statement. 11
I replied to Matsuoka that I would immediately forward his state-
ment to the Eeich Foreign Minister. I had to reserve comment on
it, but asked for a technical explanation with respect to the extent of
the East Siberian territory in which the Japanese Government, accord-
ing to its statement, intended to achieve the destruction of communism.
Matsuoka replied that this territory was not precisely delimited geo-
graphically, but in his opinion about to Irkutsk.
Matsuoka stated further that he would ask the Russian Ambas-
sador 10 to call on him after he had received the Ambassadors of the
Axis Powers. He would hand him a statement, the text of which he
gave me in an English translation. The text will follow by a sep-
arate telegram. 11 Matsuoka emphasized the closing sentence in
particular. 12
For the public only a communique would be issued on today's Cab-
inet session presided over by the Emperor. 13 This communique would
also serve as a guide for conversations with the American " and
English 15 Ambassadors. If they should insist on further information
about the Cabinet decision, he would point out Japan's commitments
under the Tripartite Pact.
Matsuoka then expressed his appreciation for the fact that because
of the information received from the Reich Foreign Minister before
"In telegram No. 1108 of July 1, dispatched July 3 (82/60248) Ott forwarded
the text of this introductory sentence of the statement handed to the Italian
Ambassador.
" In a memorandum of July 3 (82/60238-39) Weizsacker recorded having been
informed by Oshima of the Japanese position following the recent Cabinet
decision. In this connection Oshima said that he had told Tokyo that "he
was not prepared to participate in representing a weak Japanese policy."
10 Konstantin Smetanin.
"Telegram No. 1104 of July 1, dispatched July 3 (82/60246-47). The text
of this statement handed to the Soviet Ambassador is printed In Foreign Rela~
tions of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941, vol. n, p. 504.
" This sentence read as follows : "I need hardly add that their Excellencies,
Messrs. Stalin and Molotov, may rest assured that I will do my best but that
future developments will largely decide if the Japanese Government can con-
sistently abide by this policy."
a For text of the Government communique and of a statement by Matsuoka
regarding the Imperial Conference, see Foreign Relations of the United States,
19 hh vol. rv, p. 287.
"Joseph C. Grew.
"Robert L. Craigie.
JULY 1041 75
the outbreak of the German-Soviet conflict " he had not been caught
unawares by events in this difficult period,
Ott
"Presumably a reference to Matsuoka's conversations with Ribbentrop in
March and April 1941. See vol. xn of this series, documents Nos. 218, 230,
233, and 278.
No. 64
82/60244-45
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
NoJl.102 of July 2 Tokyo, July 3, 1941—3 : 55 a. m.
Received July 3 — 8 : 25 a. m. 1
For the Foreign Minister.
With reference to my telegram No. 1101 of July 2. 2
Text of declaration of Japanese Foreign Minister follows : 3 Oral
statement. Strictly confidential. (Translation).
Please convey the following to His Excellency Herr von Ribbentrop :
I have duly noted your Excellency's request made through Am-
bassador General Ott in Tokyo and Ambassador General Oshima in
Berlin. I have taken particular care in studying the views set forth
by your Excellency in approaching the Japanese Government with
the request.
In reply I take pleasure in stating that Japan is preparing for all
possible eventualities as regards the U.S.S.R. in order to join forces
with Germany in actively combating the communist menace. Japan
is keenly watching developments of conditions in Eastern Siberia in
particular, determined as she is to destroy the communist system es-
tablished there. It is, I believe, hardly necessary to add that the aug-
mentation of military preparations, among other things ? with an
, eye to realizing this object, together with the aim of restraining Soviet
Russia at the Far Eastern end in her struggle with Germany is
steadfastly kept in the mind of the Japanese Government.
At the same time I beg to state that the Japanese Government have
decided to secure points d'appui in French Indochina which will
enable Japan further to strengthen her pressure upon Great Britain
and the United States. In this connection I would like to draw your
Excellency's attention to the fact that Japan has been keeping constant
vigil in the Pacific, including the southwestern ocean with a view to
restraining these two powers and will continue the efforts and even
intensify them, if necessary. I trust that your Excellency is in full
agreement with me that this really constitutes a vital contribution to
our common cause, indeed no less vital than Japan's intervention at
this junction in the German-Soviet War.
1 Marginal note : "Forwarded to the Special Train as No. 2131, July 3."
' Document No. 63.
*The test of Matsuoka's statement is in English in the original.
76 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Japan cannot and will not relax her efforts in the south which after
all possess a very important bearing upon the whole course of the
war out of which I am most confident that Germany and Italy will
soon emerge victoriously. I assure your Excellency once again that
the Japanese government will not fail to act in accordance with the
aims and spirits of the Tripartite Pact.
Ott
No. 65
82/60249-50
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
mosttjkgent Tokyo, July 3, 1941— 3 : 55 a. m.
No. 1109 of July 2 Received July 3—6 : 30 a. m. 1
For the Foreign Minister.
With reference to your telegram No. 942 of July l. 2
Immediately upon receipt of the above telegram I called on Mat-
suoka and transmitted to him personally the message of the Reich
Foreign Minister. Matsuoka stated that he had already received from
Ambassador Oshima the announcement of the message even before
today's Cabinet session, presided over by the Emperor, had begun. 3
Even without knowing the exact text he had made use of the fact that
a special message from the German Foreign Minister was imminent
for backing up his point of view and for bringing about a clear-cut
decision. He was grateful for the message with which he would to-
morrow immediately acquaint the Army and Navy, as well as the
Emperor. He was personally in full agreement with the ideas of the
Reich Foreign Minister. He regretted that his opinions had not pre-
vailed for the moment. During the Cabinet session he had warned
Prime Minister Konoye and other Cabinet members and pointed out
that the Japanese people would, after some time, demand government
action against the Soviet Union. Opposing forces, who now dominate
the scene, will in the long run be unable to carry their point. He re-
quests that the Reich Foreign Minister be assured that he will adhere
to the old policy.
I drew Matsuoka's attention to the fact that the Cabinet decision
will certainly not be understood by the people who will in the future
heavily blame the Government for the missed opportunity. Matsuoka
explained the wording of the Japanese statement to the Soviet Ambas-
sador 1 with the necessity of deceiving the Russians or at least of
* Marginal note : "Forwarded to the Special Train as No. 2129 July 3 "
Document No. 53.
* See document No. 63 and footnote 6.
See document No. 63 and footnote 11.
JULY 1941 77
keeping them in a state of uncertainty, owing to the fact that the
armaments were still incomplete. At present Smetanin did not suspect
that speedy preparations were being made against the Soviet Union
as is hinted at in the Government decision transmitted to us. 5 He had
furthermore informed Smetanin that, as far as was known to Japan,
neither had the USA promised assistance with regard to arms nor
had the Soviet Union asked for it. He wished to give the earnest ad-
vice not to attempt any cooperation of this kind as Japan, at the re-
quest of her allies, would not tolerate shipments. I told Matsuoka
that Japan's attitude could not satisfy us. Matsuoka replied that he
had expected this and personally regretted the Cabinet resolution;
but he assured us again that deficiencies in preparedness would be
eliminated as fast as possible, and that the Army was preparing for
alWventualities.
Ott
* See document No. 64,
No. 66
65/45212S— 13X
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry *
Telegram
MOST OTMJENT
top secret Tehran, July 3, 1941 — 10 : 15 p. m.
No. 565 of July 3 Received July 4^i : 20 a. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 351 of June 30. 2
Shortly before the arrival of the above-mentioned telegraphic in-
struction the Egyptian Ambassador 3 had requested a conference,
which took place on July 2 after arrival of the telegraphic instruction.
The Ambassador told me about a telegram of June 29 from King
Farouk to him, in which the King stated that he had information in
his possession according to which the British General Staff had de-
cided upon the occupation of the Iranian oil region. This occupa-
tion was necessary for protection against a possible German attack
on Iraq and Iran from the territory of the Soviet Union. A period
of two months was set for the necessary preparations. For carrying
out the operation of occupation, for which only three weeks were al-
lotted, the British General Staff had asked that up to 500,000 (live
hundred thousand) men be provided. The occupation is to extend
to the entire concession area of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in-
1 Marginal note : "Shown to the FUhrer. Hew[el]."
1 Document No. 49.
'Zoulfikar Pasha.
78 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
eluding the ports on the Persian Gulf, and also Kermanshah. Fur-
thermore the decision of the British General Staff provided for an
advance from Euwandiz via the Rayat Pass into the Iranian province
of Azerbaijan for the protection of the Iraq oil areas near Kirkuk
and Mosul. The main push is to take place in the west at Lake Urmia
through Khoi to Dzhulfa. In the telegram the King had issued him
the express instruction to inform His Majesty the Shah and the
German Minister of these British intentions. The Shah had been in-
formed on July 1. -The Shah had been very much impressed by the
news. He had expressly requested the Ambassador not to speak to
anyone about it. The Shah is thinking over the situation at the
present time in order to become clear about the precautionary defense
measures to be taken.
The Ambassador stressed several times that it was not a matter of
rumors but of a decision of the British General Staff that should be
taken seriously. The Ambassador referred in particular to the fact
that this decision was taken before the tremendous successes of the
Wehrmacht over the Bolshevists had become known. Under the
pressure of the situation the preparations for the Iranian operation
would probably be shortened so far as possible.
The Ambassador asked that the King's communication be passed
on to the Reich Foreign Minister, and that the telegram be regarded
as a proof of an attitude of candor and good faith toward Germany on
the part of the King. The Ambassador then described the King's
position, which had become still more difficult and dangerous since our
last conversation ; the latter had been characterized quite openly by the
English as enemy No. 1.
The Fiihrer's message 4 had made a deep impression upon the King;
it had been received by him with great gratitude.
Upon inquiry the Ambassador stated that Azzam was at the present
time detailed to the Egyptian Foreign Ministry with the rank of min-
ister plenipotentiary, without however exercising any function. Any
political activity was impossible for him as a result of the strictest
possible British supervision. The Ambassador did not know the
whereabouts of Ali Maher. The Ambassador could not give any in-
formation about the possibility of carrying on the aspirations repre-
sented by the two. 5
Ettel
* Vol. in of this series, document No. 427.
8 In telegram No. 574 of July 7 (266/173624) Ettel reported having been told
by the Egyptian Ambassador that the preparations for the British operation
referred to in the document printed were being carried on "roost actively."
JULY 1941 79
No. 67
•4685/B225279
The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania
Telegram
secret . Berlin, July 3, 1941—10 : 30 p. m.
Multex446of July 2
Russian emigres who volunteer for the fight against the Soviet
Union should be treated in a friendly way, but not be registered, since
it is not intended to employ them. The decisive thing among others is
the consideration that in case of capture they will probably not be
treated according to the laws of international warfare. There will
be a) reservation regarding the employment of individual persons be-
cause of special suitability for special tasks in accordance with the
decision of the military authorities.
For your confidential information: We have no interest in the Rus-
sian emigres being in evidence.
Confirm receipt.
Weizsacker
No. 68
1B1/138817-18
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 453 Berlin, July 3, 1941.
As was to be expected, the Chinese Ambassador informed me this
evening that Chiang Kai-shek is breaking off relations with the Ger-
man Government.
Mr. Chen did not give me a note. Rather, he only informed me
orally, for the use of the German Government, that after Wang Ching-
wei had been recognized by Germany his Government had decided to
break off diplomatic relations with Germany. The Ambassador as-
sumed that a formal notification in writing was being given to our
representative in Chungking. 1
The Ambassador said that all the members of his Embassy and all
the members of the Chinese Consulates in the Reich had been in-
structed to leave Germany. He asked that this departure need not
take place before July 10, since there was a great deal of business to
wind up. I told him that I agreed to having the departure take place
some time after July 10 at a date still to be fixed. (I did not press for
an earlier date, since our Mission in Chungking is estimated to need
1 According to telegram No. 100 of July 2, dispatched from Chungking July 3
(191/138823), a note to this effect addressed to Altenburg was delivered by the
Chinese Chief of Protocol on July 2 at 7 : 30 p. m.
80 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
at least £ to 5 days by automobile to leave the country in the direction
of Indochina. ) The Ambassador put in a word for the approximately
150 Chinese students and 800 to 900 other Chinese citizens staying
behind in Germany. He believed that he might express such a recom-
mendation as the break-off of relations with Chiang Kai-shek was not
the same as a state of war. Regarding this I replied that our conduct
toward the Chinese citizens would be guided, among other things, by
the treatment of the Germans in the area controlled by Chiang Kai-
shek, as well as by the conduct of the Chinese concerned on the terri-
tory of the Reich, 2
Weizsacker
"In telegram No. 53 of July i (191/138826-28) Weizsacker informed the
Mission in Chungking of the Chinese step and asked that preparations be made
for terminating the Mission.
No. 69
1584/382515
Reichsleiter Bormann to Reich Minister Lairvmers
Fuhrer's Headquarters, July 3, 1941.
Bo/Fu.
RK 10036A.
Subject : Confiscation of the property of the Netherlands Royal House.
Dear Herr Lammers : The former Queen Wilhelmina of Holland
gave a radio speech on June 27, 1941, in which she stated that her
House feels deep sympathy for the Russian people, which would soon
be confronted with terrible trials. Today it was Russia's turn, but
she knew that tomorrow and the day after the mighty bulwarks of
our civilization — Great Britain and North America — would have to
resist the main force of the German war machines; therefore they
would fight on the side of the Russian people. In conclusion Wil-
helmina then praised the resolute stand and the wise and courageous
policy of the British Empire in the face of the new conflict.
The Fiihrer has now given the permission requested earlier by
the Reich Commissar to confiscate the property of the Netherlands
Royal House. 1
Heil Hitler!
Yours, etc. M[artin] Bormann
'In telegram No. 224 of July 7 from the Hague (173/84441) Betz reported
that Seyss-Inquart had received Hitler's approval for the connscation of the
property of the Netherlands Royal House. In a letter of July 18 (1584/382517-
18) Lammers notified Seyss-Inquart of Hitler's approval of this step, informing
Bormann at the same time (1584/382518) that Hitler's decision had been
communicated to the Reich Commissar.
JULY 1941 81
No. 70
502/234719-20
The Charge d'Aff aires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 2329 of July 4 Madrid, July 4, 1941.
With reference to your telegram No. 1516 of July 3.*
The call for volunteer enlistments for the "Blue Division" to be
sent to Russia has produced 40 times the number of volunteers needed.
Final selection will take place in all army corps districts today. The
volunteers will then be staged in the vicinity of Irun, on the Spanish-
French border, whence shipment to Germany by railroad will prob-
ablyjbegin next week. An advance party of seven Spanish officers
is leaving for Berlin by plane tomorrow to take up first contacts
with German military command organizations. A billeting party
will follow soon.
The strength of the Division including rear services and replace-
ment units totals 641 officers, 2,272 noncommissioned officers and
sergeants, and 15,780 men.
The Division is made up of the following units; three infantry
regiments, four artillery battalions, one reconnaissance battalion, one
ccmbat engineer battalion, one antitank battalion, one signal bat-
talion, one medical unit, and a complete division headquarters. 8
The Military Attache is reporting all details to the Attache Group
on a continuing basis. 3
HeberleiN
l Ia this telegram (95/106947-48) Weizs&cker stated that the Reich Govern-
ment would gladly welcome volunteers from the Spanish Army, Navy, and
Air Force, as well as from the Falange, and hoped that they would constitute
an integrated Spanish formation under Spanish command, but which could
be incorporated as a unit into the Wehrmacht. He asked that Russian emigres
not be accepted.
3 In addition there was a group of Spanish Air Force pilots who volunteered
for service against Soviet Russia (see document No. 34, footnote 1).
In a confidential report of July 30 (138/77031) Likns recorded that when the
first contingent of Spanish pilots arrived at the Tempelhof airfield they were
greeted by a band of the Luftwaffe which rendered not the Spanish national
anthem, but that of the former Spanish Republic.
8 In telegram No. 1889 of Aug. 20 (502/234775) Sonnleithner explained that
reports had been received that Communists were Infiltrating into both the
French and the Spanish volunteer formations in order to spy and then to defect
to the Russians. Having noted that the Communist elements in the Spanish
formation were reported to have come chiefly from Spanish Morocco, Sonnleith-
ner directed that the report be investigated.
In telegram No. 2892 of Aug. 21 (95/107022) Stohrer reported that the pre-
dominant part of the Blue Division was made up of regular troops; that no
Moors were included; and that 10 years of earlier service had been required
for admission so that Communist infiltration seemed improbable. Stohrer
advised against approaching the Spanish Government in regard to the rumors
of communistic penetration. He recommended that inasmuch as the Division
was now in Germany any further investigation be by German security agencies.
Farther reports on the Blue Division are filmed on serial 502.
682-905—04 11
§2 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 71
2361/488576-79
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
top beckbt Therafia, July 4,. 1941.
No. A 2422
Political Report
Subject: Conversation with State Secretary Baron Benoist-Mechin,
For the Foreign Minister.
(1) As I have already reported by wire, the visit of State Secretary
Benoist-Mechin brought only slight satisfaction to the wishes of the
French Government with regard to Syria. 1 During the many discus-
sions which the State Secretary had with Turkish leaders their
tendency was constantly noticeable to observe strict neutrality and
to avoid any English demands aimed at direct or indirect support of
Soviet Russia.
At first the State Secretary met with a cool reception, probably be-
cause of Darlan's speech about the events of 1919-1920, which was
very widely misunderstood here. Later, however, the State Secretary
was assured that Turkey considered the three power pact 2 to be in
full force also with respect to France, and that she would in no case
yield to an English request which might prejudice French interests.
In addition, M. Saracoglu very frankly discussed with me the ques-
tion how it would be possible, without hurting French interests, to
obtain satisfaction of the Turkish demands known to us (of making
the Baghdad railway secure). He mentioned that the French, in
case they could not hold their position in Syria, as is to be expected,
perhaps might find it convenient to make the Turks trustees of Syria.
In such an event Turkey would be prepared immediately to occupy
Syria, to grant the French Army an honorable departure, and after
conclusion of the war to return Syria to France, except for the north-
ern part. I replied to the Minister that I could not express any
opinion in this matter, but would convey the suggestion to the State
Secretary.
M. Benoist-Mechin and I agreed that discussion of such an idea
was unacceptable as long as the possibility to defend Syria existed and
1 In telegram No. 1860 of June 21 (386/211108) Abetz had reported having
been Informed by the French Government that Benoist-M<§chln would fly to
Ankara "to take personal charge of negotiations with Turkey regarding the
passage of French troops and arms to Syria and to see that the transports of
gasoline were speeded up." In telegrams No. 2 (265/173047) and No. 3
(265/173045) of July 1 sent from Therapia, Papen reported about the results
of Benoist-Meehin's negotiations. .
1 A reference to Turkey's mutual assistance pact with Great Britain ana
France, sighed October 19, 1939. For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series,
vol. cc, p. 187.
JULY 1941 83
that furthermore a Syria under Turkish trusteeship would be far
more inconvenient to Germany's conduct of the war later on than a
Syria in British hands. Neither M. Saracoglu nor the President made
any subsequent reference to this idea.
The clear and precise manner in which the State Secretary ex-
plained the basic concept of German-French collaboration to the
Turkish statesmen has had an excellent effect. The decision of the
French to participate with volunteer detachments in the European
struggle against Bolshevism 3 has underscored the fact that the
development of a new Europe was making rapid progress.
(2) In the exhaustive conversations which I was able to have with
Baron Benoist-Mechin he discussed in detail the evolution of German-
French relations and the impediments which the Laval crisis * has
created. Obviously wishing that I should convey this to you (because
he assumes that the reports of Ambassador Abetz' might, perhaps, not
have fully elucidated this point) he emphasized that Petain had sep-
arated from Laval solely after it had become evident that Laval had
promised his parliamentary friends that he would later on, that is,
after the present difficulties had been overcome, reinstate them into
their posts and places. Abolition of the parliamentary system was not
a matter of principle for him and was merely aimed at a temporary
compromise. • The Marshal, however, did not want to hear anything
of the old methods, wishing to build up a new France. Germany
ought therefore to have confidence in the persons on whom he was
calling for this purpose.
I must confess that the frankness and the views of Baron Benoist-
Mechin as supporter of a close German-French understanding had the
effect of convincing me. He mentioned of course that in order to
obtain a firm backing for the development in France, Germany ought
to carry her promises and good intentions into effect. When he told
me about the offer of the English Government with regard to Syria
and I asked him what further French colonies England could attack,
he mentioned Dakar and the concentration of British-French forces
which pointed to an attack. Yet Germany had hitherto not fully
complied with the French wishes for the strengthening of the means
of defense.
The State Secretary further said that people in France were prob-
ably better informed than we were with regard to public opinion and
developments in the United States. If the victorious conclusion of
the German-Eussian war were to bring on peace, it could be done only
if Germany took into account the desires and hopes of the smaller
countries, presently occupied, such as Holland, Belgium, and Norway,
for administrative autonomy and independence. But above all, said
8 See document No. 78 and footnote 2.
' See vol. xi of this series, document No. 510 and subsequent documents.
84 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Baron Benoist-Mechin, it was necessary to find a political solution for
Russia, which would leave the individual parts of that empire their
territorial and administrative sovereignty and above all their religious
freedom. It was known that with respect to the struggle of National
Socialism against the churches a parallel was being drawn in the
United States between the former system and Bolshevism. Yet the
Eussian people could not exist and even less be governed well unless
they had a firm religious foundation. The solution of this very prob-
lem -would indicate whether it was true that National Socialism was
not an "export commodity."
Counselor of Embassy Kelley, B who recently returned from leave
in the United States, has spoken in a similar sense about the possi-
bility of ending the war and America's position regarding this. How
much the problem to which I have referred already occupies our
enemies is shown by the fact that the English propaganda is spread-
ing the rumor that the conquered parts of Russia would be put under
Herr Eosenberg and incorporated in the German administrative
system.
The aim of such propaganda is all too plain :
The offensive against Bolshevism has become an European affair,
a "crusade". It is therefore necessary to disturb this European unity
and to tell the participants: "You do not fight to restore a 'Christian
order' of the Occident but for the 'Anti-Christ', National Socialism."
This shows the greatness of the danger which appears at the cradle
of the new Europe.
Baron Benoist-Mechin spoke with great satisfaction of the coopera-
tion with Ambassador Abetz, of his constant efforts to promote
German-French collaboration, and asked me to convey his regards
to the Foreign Minister.
Pafen
1 Robert Francis Keller, First Secretary, later Counselor of Embassy of the
United States Embassy in Turkey.
No. 72
82/6026B-67
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Telegram
No. 598 Special Train Eubopa, July 5, 1941—12 : 17 a. m.
from the Special Train Received Berlin, July 5 — 1 : 10 a. m.
No. 981 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 5.
On the occasion of the discussion concerning Japan's attitude toward
Soviet Russia, I wish to correct below for your own information
what Matsuoka has told you at the time concerning my conference
JULY 1941 85
with him about the conclusion of a Japanese-Russian pact of non-
aggression or neutrality.
As you reported in your telegram No. 685 of May 6, 1941, ' Matsuoka
told you at that time that after his departure from Berlin, he did
not at first consider the possibility of concluding a Japanese-Russian
treaty of neutrality. [He said] he had even brought this up in his
conversation with me stating his willingness to accept only in case
Russia was willing to conclude such a pact. By telling you this,
Matsuoka obviously wanted to say that I ought to have reckoned
with the conclusion of the pact after the conversations at Berlin.
After agreement had already been reached on the conclusion of
the pact and immediately before it was formally signed, Matsuoka
also informed Count Schulenburg in Moscow in a similar vein. 2 At
-'this occasion Mr. Matsuoka described his conversations with me at
Berlin as follows : He had told me that while at Moscow he would prob-
ably not be able to avoid discussing the long pending question of a
Japanese-Soviet Russian neutrality or nonaggression pact. He
would, of course, show no eagerness in the matter but would be com-
pelled to do something in case the Russians agreed with Japan's
wishes. I had consented to this point of view.
Neither the presentation of the matter made to you nor that made
to Count Schulenburg corresponds to the facts. The subject of a
Japanese-Soviet pact of nonaggression or neutrality had been touched
upon by Matsuoka and me in our conversation of March 28, 1941, in
the following way, according to the memorandum drawn up immedi-
ately after the conversation by Minister Schmidt : 3
Following a remark on the conclusion of a Japanese-Russian long-
term trade agreement, Matsuoka asked me directly whether during his
return trip he should remain in Moscow for a somewhat longer period,
in order to negotiate with the Russians on a nonaggression or neutrality
pact. He emphasized in this connection that the Japanese people
would not countenance a direct acceptance of Russia into the Tripartite
Pact, which would call forth a unanimous cry of indignation all over
Japan. I replied to Matsuoka that the adherence of Russia to the
Pact was out of the question and recommended that he should not bring
up the previously mentioned question ; i.e., the question of a nonaggres-
sion or neutrality pact in Moscow, since this would not fit into the
framework of the present situation. On Matsuoka's further remark
that the conclusion of a fishing and trade agreement would improve the
atmosphere between Russia and Japan, I replied that there were no
objections to the conclusions of such purely commercial agreements.
Thus, what I said to Matsuoka at the time unmistakably indicated
that I did not consider the conclusion of a Japanese-Russian pact of
nonaggression or neutrality to be appropriate. The news of the con-
clusion of the Pact therefore came as a surprise to me. However, I
refrained at the time from making this known to Matsuoka.
1 Vol. xir of this series, document No. 464.
2 See vol. xii of this series, document No. 332.
3 See vol. xii of this series, document No. 230.
86 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Even now there would be no sense in pointing out to Matsuoka the
incorrectness of the account which he gave you at the time, as well as
pointing to the fact that by concluding the Pact he confronted the
German Government with an astonishing fait accompli. I am never-
theless informing you of the actual course of events because during
your future political conversations, there may arise an opportunity to
rectify this point to Matsuoka in a suitable way, should it be deemed
useful. In the same way, there may be an occasion in the further
course of events to remind Matsuoka that during the same conversa-
tion in which he discussed the conclusion of the Japanese-Soviet Pact
with you, he made the following noteworthy statement : "If war should
break out between Germany and the Soviet Union, no Japanese Prime
Minister or Foreign Minister would be able to keep Japan neutral.
In such a case Japan would be impelled by natural consideration to
join Germany in attacking Russia. No neutrality pact could change
anything in this respect." 4
Should you deem it advisable to draw attention to both of the points,
when there is an occasion, please do it in a very gentle manner so that
Matsuoka will not receive the impression that I wish to take him to
task on these matters.
RlBBENTROP
* See vol. xii of this series, document No. 464,
No. 73
233/156556-56
The Ambassador in Argentina to tlie Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Buenos Aires, July 5, 1951 — i : 11 p. m.
top secret Received July 6—1 : 40 a. m.
No. 1068 of JulyS
In yesterday's lengthy conversation the new Argentine Foreign
Minister 1 also spoke about the impressions he had gained during his
stay in Rome during the war and his trip back here via Spain,
Portugal, and North America, and he summarized his opinion on the
present war situation as follows :
He was counting on the defeat of Russia in the immediate future,
which would lend new emphasis to the already existent indisputable
supremacy of the Wehrmacht. There could be no doubt that Ger-
many, in possession of the Russian wheat areas (Ukraine), her
minerals and other resources, especially petroleum, could continue the
war for a long time, and was really unconquerable. Germany was
therefore in a position, after the total defeat of European Russia to
1 Dr. Enrique Ruiz-Guifiazti.
JULY 1941
87
be expected in a few weeks, to end the war by a new offer of peace that
would have a quite different basis from those of the former peace
offers after the conquest of Poland 2 and France: 3 All of Europe was
prepared for a new order under German leadership. The tremendous
economic prospects which the prompt conclusion of peace would offer
to Germany were unmistakable.
On the other hand it should not be forgotten that the course of
the war for almost 2 years had shown that Germany, in spite of the
greatest efforts, could not [force] England, supported by North
America, to her knees. England's situation would rather improve
owing to the constantly increasing assistance of North America, so
that she, too s could continue the war indefinitely. Only a successful
invasion, which, it was generally believed, would cost Germany a tre-
mendous number of casualties and still not guarantee a thorough
success, could bring about a fundamental change in the situation.
inasmuch as the prospect of direct negotiations between the Ger-
many of Adolf Hitler and England under Winston Churchill prob-
ably had to be termed hopeless for some time to come, the (group
garbled) of a mediator appeared indispensable for bringing about
peace, Only President Koosevelt could be considered for such ; aside
from the military power now being developed he could also throw
the entire economic and financial influence of North America into the
scales, whereas the position of the Pope, in spite of his high personal
prestige, was not strong enough for such mediation. Roosevelt's en-
tire past policy had been directed toward the strengthening of his
domestic position and he had been largely successful in this. He
certainly had sufficient authority to stop all the warlike noises in the
United States and to apply his great influence to mediation. If
such peace negotiations did not materialize the end of the war was
entirely out of sight. The resultant disorganization of the entire
economic life, under which South America also suffered severely,
and particularly the threatening destruction of England and Ger-
many and a large part of Europe was terrible, and the responsibility
of the leading statesmen for the continuation of the war was extremely
grave.
Without appropriate authorization from Berlin I did not consider
myself empowered to further develop the conversation and therefore
I did not ask whether the ideas that were expressed had anything to
do with the conversations held with Roosevelt and the leading offi-
cials in the State Department during the Minister's recent visit in
' See vol. viii of this series, Editors' Note, p. 227.
3 In a major speech before the Reichstag on July 19, 1940, in which he reviewed
the achievements of the German armed forces Hitler also said, "In this hour, I
feel it to be my duty before my own conscience to appeal once more to reason
and common sense in Great Britain as much as elsewhere. I consider myself
in a position to make this appeal because I am not the vanquished, begging
favors, but the victor speaking in the name of reason. I can see no reason why
this war must go on . . ." The German text is printed in Monatshefte filr
Ausmirtige Politik, August 1940, pp. 603-622. The official German translation
is in German Library of Information, Facts in Review (New York, 1940), vol. n,
No. 32, pp. 362-375.
88 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Washington.* Eather, I limited myself to replying to the Minister
that in the first place President Roosevelt with his odious statements
about Germany lacked any sort of objectivity, which, after all, was
the necessary basis for such mediation; therefore it was precisely he
whom we consider responsible for lengthening the war because of
the support of England. Finally the German people had not for-
gotten the fateful role played by another American President at the
close of the World War and would therefore be extremely distrustful
with regard to any proposal coming from North America. The Min-
ister thereupon stated that the situation today was after all entirely
different, because Germany was victorious on all fronts as the ac-
cepted ruler of Europe and therefore had opportunities to be "gen-
erous." I have the impression that the Foreign Minister expressed
mainly his personal opinion, though he doubtless wanted to offer the
gcod offices of the Argentine Government for personal mediation,
without his being authorized or commissioned to do so by the English
or North Americans. I request instructions. 5
Thermanst
*Dr. Ruiz-Guiiiazti was in Washington in May for discussions about a trade
agreement between the United States and Argentina. For the record of a
conversation with Sumner Welles, see Foreign Relations of the United States,
1941, vol, vi, pp. 399-401. No record of a conversation between Ruiz-Guinazti and
President Roosevelt has been found and it is doubtful whether a meeting be-
tween the two men took place.
6 Document No. 112.
No. 74
386/211175-76
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris
Telegram
Special Traijt Westfalbn, July 5, 1941 — 7:25 p. m.
No. 605 of July 5
from Special Train Eeceived Berlin, July 5—8 : 30 p. m.
No. 3556 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 5.
KAM 291/EV
With reference to your telegram No. 1909 of June 26. 1
Please tell M. Darlan orally that we are prepared to consider a
pardon for the territorial guards in our custody as requested by
Marshal Petain in his letter to the Fiihrer, 2 although from the legal
point of view we would certainly be justified in treating them as
snipers. We are also prepared to renounce the extradition, offered us
by Darlan, of Raynaud and Mandel, who were the intellectual insti-
1 Document No. 23.
2 The text of the letter was transmitted in telegram No. 1909. See footnote 1.
JULY 1941 89
gators of the activities of the territorial guards. We are, however,
making the pardon dependent on the condition that the French Gov-
ernment on its part impose imprisonment for life on Reynaud and
Mandel and that it assume the strict responsibility that the two former
Ministers never escape from detention and flee abroad. We must
further demand that the French Government place at our disposi-
tion all the documents in its hands that would furnish information
about the political collaboration of Reynaud and Mandel with the
American Government. We already have evidence that the two former
Ministers together with Roosevelt and his followers, especially the
former American Ambassador Bullitt, had worked toward war. We
are moreover interested in strengthening our material by the exhibits
in the French files, which are, no doubt, voluminous and convincing.
France, just like Germany, has a great interest in shedding light upon
these warmongering intrigues, because this would surely contribute
to opposing the present warmongers in the United States effectively
and thereby speed the conclusion of peace. In publishing the French
material we would keep its delivery by the French Government secret
and announce instead that we ourselves had found the material in
France.
As soon as the French Government fulfills the two above-mentioned
conditions, that is the imprisonment for life of Reynaud and Mandel,
and the delivery of its documentation concerning the warmongering
collaboration of the two Ministers with Roosevelt and his followers,
we would declare a general pardon of the territorial guards. The
pardon could not, of course, extend to offenses punishable also in the
case of regular French soldiers. Those members of the territorial
guards who might have committed such offenses would in their prose-
cution be treated like regular French soldiers.
Please report by wire. 3
RlEBENTROP
3 See document No. 211.
No. 75
4S03/E23 7277-80
The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Reich
Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry
The Hague, July 5, 1941.
Subject : The political situation in the occupied Netherlands territories.
The war against Bolshevism naturally has also greatly excited the
population in the Netherlands and is constantly in their minds. In
this connection the most varied opinions and hopes are expressed with
90 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
feelings ranging from joy to depression.- Joy because Germany -will
supposedly experience her defeat in the east, as did Napoleon, because
this will give England time to repair the breaches, because a Ger-
many weakened by Russia "will no longer be able to fight England
and the United States successfully and so on; depression because
Germany may win in the east and then smash England. The majority
of the Dutch are optimistic, however, regarding the fate of their
country; they believe more than ever in the final victory of England
and expect some sort of operation against the Germans in the west
as long as the latter are occupied in the east. The attitude of the
people has become noticeably more intransigent.
The attitude of the "Nederlandsche Unie" x probably reflects this
hope most clearly in the editorial which appeared in its newspaper
Unie on July 3. (A translation is attached.) This article is con-
sidered by the Reich Commissar to be an unequivocal rejection and
a challenge to the speech given by the Reich Commissar in Amster-
dam. 8 In any case this attitude of the Netherlands Unity party
makes continued recognition of the N[ederlandsche] U[nie] impossi-
ble. The Office of the Reich Commissar is considering the dissolution
of this party. In the meantime all German agencies have been ordered
to limit contact with the Unie functionaries to only the most necessary
official conversations.
Since the appearance of this article we can no longer reckon with
the formation of a Netherlands legion for the fight against Bolshe-
vism ; 3 the suggestion to this effect made by the National Front has no
possibility of realization owing to the slight importance of this party.
The NSB takes a negative attitude toward a "Netherlands legion"
because it fears that the value of the 4,000 men of the Waffen SS
who are already participating in active fighting in the east with the
Standarte Westland would thereby be lessened. Moreover, an appeal
by the NSB or the NSNAP would only achieve the opposite among
the people of the Netherlands. Therefore, as we can no longer count
on a Netherlands legion originating spontaneously, so to speak, it is
intended to designate the SS-Standarte Northwest stationed at Ham-
burg, in which 2,000 Netherlanders are already serving, as a Nether-
land legion under the name of the "Volunteer Standarte of the
Netherlands," and to call for recruits to this regiment through the
Office of the Reich Commissar. At the moment a few formal ques-
1 For the development of the political parties in the Netherlands during the
German occupation, see vol. xi of this series, document No. 667.
'The German translation of this article has been filmed on 4803/E237281-S4.
In his speech at a meeting of German and Dutch National Socialists on June
27, Seyss-Inquart reminded people of the Netherlands that their fate was de-
cided in the east. Excerpts of this speech are printed in Dokumente der
Deutschen Politik (Berlin, 1944), vol. ix, pt. 1, p. 257.
a See document No. 45.
JULY 1941 91
tions are still being clarified with the Reichsfiihrer SS but it can be
assumed that recruiting can be started in the next few days. 4 Propa-
gandistically the 2,000 SS men in Hamburg can be utilized as a
nucleus.
Besides the 4,000 Netherlander in the Waffen SS another 4,000
Dutch NSKK men are in action in the east. These 8,000 Dutchmen
come almost exclusively from the ranks of the NSB and NSNAP.
To what extent they should be counted as being in the "legion" for
purposes of propaganda should be clarified with the Reichsfiihrer SS.
The Reich Commissar will give his opinion with regard to this.
The new situation makes it necessary and possible to proceed against
the old political parties. The Reich Commissar has ordered the
dissolution of all the old parliamentary parties and the confiscation
or their property. 5 The main blow is directed against the anti-
revolutionary party, which had been known for a long time as an
organized resistance movement against National Socialism. The
leader of this party, former Minister President Dr. Colijn, has been
ordered not to leave the Limburg town of Valenberg. About 90 of
his close co-workers have been interned in a camp. Dr. Colijn is
under constant surveillance, but has a certain amount of personal
freedom of movement. Nothing can be said as yet about the effect
of the prohibition of the old parties.
Along witli this, most of the clubs of all kinds are to be dissolved
in order to eliminate the centers of resistance which they represent.
As a further measure of the Reich Commissar, the dissolution of
the States-General and an extensive amendment of the Netherlands
Constitution is planned, as a result of which the reassignment of
important administrative posts will become necessary and possible.
Thereafter the dissolution of the trade unions is to be ordered. These
have been under the administration of a Dutch commissar for almost
a year. Reports will be made on the course of these actions.*
The order for the collection of metal has met with a very negative
reception. The general attitude of the population is best characterized
by the current whisper propaganda: "Better to throw it into the
canal than to give it to the Jerries."
After the Queen's speech T the Reich Commissar ordered that all
pictures of the members of the Royal House now living be removed
from all public buildings. Although the people expected and under-
stand this measure they show their annoyance at it nevertheless.
'In telegram No. 218 of July 5 (173/84440) Bene reported that Hinimler bad
approved the organization of the "Volunteer Standarte of the Netherlands."
• For text of this decree of July 4, see Kaphae'l Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occu-
pied Europe (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.,
1944), pp. 459-460.
* These reports have not been found.
' See document No. 69.
92 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The English air raids, which have become more frequent in recent
weeks, are taken without excitement.
Owing to the general tension described above, there is a possibility
that there will be some attacks and raids, but no major revolts are
expected.
Bene
No. 76
105/113675-76
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris
Telegram
MOST URGENT
No. 607 of July 5 Special Train, July 5, 1941—8 : 00 p. m.
from the Special Train Received Berlin, July 5—8 : 30 p. m,
No. 3554 from the Foreign Ministry ■ Sent July 6.
For the Ambassador personally.
The Russian Grand Duke, Vladimir, has sent the Fiihrer from
St. Briac a proclamation drawn up by him, addressed to all Russians,
along with a cover letter. 1 In the proclamation all Russians are called
upon to cooperate in the liberation of their homeland from Bolshevism.
Please summon the Grand Duke at once and communicate the
following to him :
1. The Reich Government had taken cognizance of his proclama-
tion. This proclamation was of a nature to help the Soviet Govern-
ment and make the fight of the Wehrmacht more difficult, because
it gave the Bolshevist rulers the opportunity of claiming in their
propaganda that Russia was now threatened by the return of the old
Tsarist feudalism, which would strengthen the will of the Red Army
to resist.
2. We wish to learn from the Grand Duke what he had so far
done with his proclamation, in particular whether and to what offices
he had sent it and whether he had had it published anywhere.
3. The Reich Government had to demand of him that he refrain
from any dissemination of the proclamation, as well as from all
similar steps and from any political activity whatsoever, and that
he give you a strict assurance to that effect.
4. In case he should not comply with the foregoing demand, the
Reich Government to its regret would be forced to intern him at once.
Please also see that from now on the Grand Duke is watched most
carefully by German security organs with respect to his entire activity,
particularly his personal connections and his correspondence, and
that the information gained in this connection is reported to you at
once. Any dissemination or discussion of the proclamation in the
French press or in any other manner must absolutely be prevented.
1 Neither found.
JULY 1941 93
Please report at once by wire concerning the course of your con-
versation "with the Grand Duke. 2 Furthermore, please report regu-
larly your future information and observations concerning the Grand
Duke. 3
RlBBENTKOP
3 Nothing f oud(I.
3 Ho further reports found.
No. 77
205/142793-95
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
\ Telegram
top secret Stockholm, July 6, 1941—8 : 04 a. m.
No. 861 of July 5 Eeceived July 6^10 : 35 a. m.
With reference to your telegram 1094 of July 4. 1
1. The implementation of the German military wishes which in-
volved not only the transit of the Oslo Division but also required
important departures as regards the Navy and Air Force from the
policy of neutrality of Sweden up to now was a severe test in domestic
policy which the structure of the coalition Government could not
cope with immediately. The pros and cons are still being heatedly
discussed, and opinion in the country is divided. The Social Demo-
cratic party, which possesses the absolute majority in the Government
and in both houses of the Riksdag, displays a split which casts doubt
on the work of the Cabinet in future decisions. The Cabinet will
hardly be capable of bearing still graver tests than those thus far.
2. The request to accede to the Tripartite Pact would represent such
an encumbrance that it would mean the total abandonment of the
present neutrality policy so far maintained with all means toward
the outside and would bring about a political decision by Sweden
in the sense of the Axis Powers against England and America. Such
a result is difficult to attain with the present Cabinet. It is more than
doubtful that the King would find an authoritarian minority govern-
ment that would support such a decision, because strong personalities
who could sweep the Swedish people along with them will be difficult
to find. At any rate stable conditions that would be needed precisely
for the case of a future accession by Sweden to the Tripartite Pact
could hardly be created, since a minority government would find the
Social Democratic party and thus the majority of the country in
opposition.
3. Even Foreign Minister von Giinther, who like the King would
push the rapprochement with Germany to the limits of what could
possibly be tolerated domestically, will not be able to justify Sweden's
* Not found.
94 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
accession to the Tripartite Pact to the political public opinion of
the country. Giinther probably desires Sweden's political decision
for Germany, but not a commitment of Sweden to distant powers like
Italy and Japan who are alien to Swedish interests.
4. What Foreign Minister von Giinther personally considers to be
necessary and worth striving for, as is evident from numerous con-
versations with him of recent date, is a treaty regulation of Sweden's
relationship with the Reich expressing Sweden's cooperation in the
consolidation of the new Europe, in particular in the great tasks
arising in the east. Such a treaty would in practice mean the option
for Germany and would fix Sweden's position at the side of Ger-
many, but would still tend more toward the east than toward the
west. Evidently Giinther would accept an orientation against Eng-
land inevitably resulting from this as a necessary consequence. More-
over such a treaty, in Giinther's opinion, (clear text evidently miss-
ing) could be put through great domestic policy difficulties which
in some circumstances could lead to a Cabinet change. Further-
more, at such negotiations we could count on the present Foreign
Minister to support our wishes, and in this he would also be able to
rely on the authority of the King. The problem would be simpli-
fied for Sweden, without a doubt, if Finland and Denmark would
accede to such a treaty first or simultaneously. In all political con-
versations with Giinther he expresses the great concern of standing
isolated after a political accession of Finland to the Reich.
4. [sic] A treaty of the above- sketched type, which would fix Swe-
den's position at our side in the northern and eastern European area,
could be of considerable importance and utility for us. Accession by
Sweden to the Tripartite Pact could only rest upon an exceedingly
unstable political situation. 2
Schnukrb
WlBD
* See, further, document No. 79.
No. 78
386/211182
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT P ABIS) July Q f 1941.
No. 2030 of July 6 Received July 6—2:00 p. m. 1
For the Foreign Minister.
After arrival of the information of German agreement for the
organization of French volunteer units for the struggle against Rus-
1 Marginal note : "Forwarded as No. 2178 to the Special Train. July 6."
JULY 1941 95
sia, 2 I assembled at the Embassy the leaders of the Rassemblement
National Populaire, 3 of the Doriot party, 1 of the Francistes, 5 and of
the Ligne Frangaise. 6 These groups agreed on a common organiza-
tion of volunteer units and on the text of a proclamation which will
be published tomorrow in the press and on the radio. 7
Marshal Petain as Chief of State has given his approval to the
organization by private initiative of volunteer units for the struggle
against Russia, and for this case he has canceled the law which pre-
vents military service by French subjects outside the French armed
forces. 8
Abetz
"Paris telegram No. 1862 of June 23 (386/211115) reported that Russian
Emigres had asked to enroll.
--TVeizsacker's draft telegram of July 1 (4641/E20926G) forecast German ap-
proval of the enrollment of French volunteers in the Wehrmacht but indicated
that Russian emigres would not be enrolled.
Ritter's telegram No. 3555 of July 5 (386/211177-78), No. 606 from the Special
Train, confirmed the decision to accept French volunteers ; indicated that sup-
port for such enrollment on the part of the French Government was not wanted ;
and suggested an upper limit of 10,000.
'Marcel Beat.
•Jacques Doriot, leader of the Parti Populaire Francais.
B Marcel Bucard.
' Constantinf.
' Abetz' telegram No. 2031 of July 6 (386/211183-84) indicates that publica-
tion of the proclamation was temporarily held up by an officer of General von
Stulpnagel's staff.
■ Abetz' telegram No. 2035 of July 7 (386/211186) indicated that there would
be large participation ; some 50 trained pilots had enrolled.
In telegram No. 3653 of July 14 (386/211208-209), No. 662 from the Special
Train, Ritter instructed Abetz that so large a number of French volunteers as
the 30,000 which had been reported, was politically undesirable ; 10,000 to 16.000
was the upper limit
No. 79
205/142796
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden
Telegram
Special Train Westphalia, July 6, 1941 — 8 : 40 p. m.
No. 614 of July 6
from the Special Train Received Berlin, July 6 — 9 : 20 p. m.
No. 1156 of July 7 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 7.
RAM 295/R.V.
For the Minister personally as well as for Minister Schnurre.
I have taken cognizance of the statements in your telegram No. 861
of July 5. 1 I reserve a final instruction concerning the further treat-
ment of the question of Sweden's accession to the Tripartite Pact,
but for your personal orientation at this time I wish to point out
1 Document No. 77.
96 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
that the possibility of a bilateral pact of Sweden with Germany men-
tioned in your telegram is out of the question. If Sweden wishes to
participate with Germany in the new European order, then only the
form of the Tripartite Pact can be considered for this. Should
Sweden in actuality finally decline accession, then we would bring
about the accession of Denmark and Finland alone. I therefore re-
quest that, in case Swedish quarters should bring up for discus-
sion in conversations there the idea of a bilateral pact with Germany,
you, for your part, not treat this as any actual possibility. However,
as already stated, please await my further instructions 2 before taking
any steps in regard to Sweden's accession to the Tripartite Pact.
RlBBENTROr
2 No record of further instructions on this point has been found.
No. 80
1527/373619-21
The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
urgent Washington, July 7, 1941 — 5 : 65 a. m.
secret Received July 7 — 5 : 40 p. m.
No. 2098 of July 6
For Chief of OKW, Ausland; Chief of the Army General Staff;
Chief of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff
Evaluation of the military situation July 6.
The wirepullers around Roosevelt had planned to carry on the
war according to the plan that the English along with other deluded
people should fight and bleed for America until the time had come for
ending the war by means of an intervention by America that no longer
entailed any danger. The plan has long been disrupted by the
Fuhrer's measures and the uncertainty because of Japan's attitude,
and was upset in the last fortnight by Germany's initiative against
Russia. It has been noted quite correctly on the part of best (clear
text evidently missing) that a Germany which was victorious against
Russia would have all the possibilities of victory in her hands. Soon,
however, the primitive strategists at the helm of the English and
American governments comforted themselves with the idea that
Germany would be tied down with her main forces in Russia for at
least three months and Japan would likewise hold back militarily
for months until the decision had been reached in the Russian cam-
paign. They pushed aside the American General Staff, which warned
against such wishful thinking, [they said that] now was the time to
strike Germany in the West by continuing and strengthening the air at-
tacks in order thereby to shatter German morale; in the Middle East
JULY 1941 97
to replace General Wavell, who does not believe in Roosevelt's mes-
sage of salvation and his strategy, with a more suitable soldier; 1
and to propose to the American people through the Secretary of the
Navy 2 that the bulk of the American fleet should "purge" the Atlantic
Ocean of the German "threat". 3 The Russians were informed that
the United States was not yet ready now, but from 1942 on the big
blow would come from America. The Russians should keep to the
tradition of the campaign of 1812 and like the United States try to
draw out the war.
These ideas characterize the primitive strategical thinking and, as
always in history, the lack of clarity in military matters, typical of
opportunist politicians. They are doing the Japanese a favor in with-
drawing naval forces from the Pacific ; they live in a realm of fantasy,
intoxicate themselves with slogans and do not have the slightest con-
ception of how one is to purge the Atlantic of the German threat for
the duration of the German-Russian war; they believe with boundless
presumption that they can hold the Japanese exactly to the policy
which is agreeable to the Americans, and they hardly take any account
of German initiative. Of military importance at the moment is the
fight now going on inside America as to whether the United States
should enter the war in order to lengthen the war thereby and to keep
England going.
The events of the first two weeks of the Russian campaign have not
by any means increased the sentiment for war, but have increased the
nervousness about Japan's attitude. Again American war policy
regards as its most important task the elimination of the danger
threatening from the Pacific and shrinks from decisions as long as
clarity in the relations with Japan, and if possible, an understanding
with Japan has not been achieved. For this reason threats are ad-
dressed to Japan which are 'backed only by an increasingly dispersed
fleet which is incapable of attack. In the Sunday newspapers of July 6
there are also tendentious reports regarding the slowing down and
halting of the German attacks, which are clearly meant for Japan.
The United States today has neither the fleet to carry on this struggle
against Japan in the Pacific and at the same time support the English
in the Atlantic with adequate forces, nor will it have in the course of
this year an adequate army and a suitable air force. Finally, the uti-
lization of even the few serviceable divisions is badly hampered by the
scarcity of shipping space.
Bottichee
Thomsen
1 On July 5, General Sir Claude Auchinleck replaced Sir Archibald Wavell as
British Commander In Chief, Middle Bast.
' Frank Knox.
3 In address to the conference of State Governors on June 30 Secretary Knox,
according to the New York Times of July 1, 1941 (p. 1, col. 4), stated that "the
time to use our Navy to clear the Atlantic of the German menace is at hand."
682-905—64 12
98 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 81
765/270453-55
The Charge & Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
top secret Washington, July 7, 1941—7 : 04 p. in.
No. 2110 of July 5 Received July 8—2 : 30 p. m.
Pol IM 2131 gRs.
With reference to telegram No. 2082 of July 5. 1
[1.] Following announcement of the espionage case arrests in New
York, the Consulate General reported as follows : Mas Albrecht Blank,
who was taken on by the Library of Information some 3 weeks ago, is
personally known from the time when he was employed by the Wester-
mann & Company concern. He came to the Consulate General on
several occasions and dropped hints that he had various secret
contacts.
2. The Consulate General knew that Axel Wheeler-Hill operated a
transmitter. It immediately reported this to the Foreign Ministry
and asked that this contact be immediatey broken off in view of Wheel-
er's personality. At the same time, attention was called with renewed
emphasis to the damage which such an operation was bound to cause.
Wheeler had received training in radio communications and intelli-
gence work in Hamburg.
3. Karl Reuper returned from Germany after the outbreak of the
war and immediately started telling that he had undergone training
and would send intelligence reports to Germany by means of Wheeler's
transmitter.
4. The transmitter was procured by Schroder of the D.A.B.
5. The wife of the arrested Georg Schuh, who is a German national
herself and left for Germany a few weeks ago, is personally known ;
she regularly sent information to an agency in Hamburg through ship
stewards, etc. Her maiden name was von der Osten. Her nephew,
one von der Osten, was sentenced to a long prison term as a German
spy in Turkey some time ago.
Most, and probably all, of the persons involved in this affair were
totally unqualified for operations of this kind, according to everything
the Consulate General had heard about them. To give themselves
importance, these people kept hinting all the time among their ac-
quaintances that they had been given such missions and were carrying
them out. It can be assumed that the American authorities had long
1 This telegram (765/270450) reported the arrests of a number of persona
in New York, seven of whom admitted having been engaged in espionage
activities on behalf of Germany; among those arrested was the operator of a
secret radio transmitter whose activity had been known to the FBI from the
very beginning.
JULY 1941 99
known all about the network, which, certainly would not have been any
great feat, considering the naive and sometimes downright stupid be-
havior of these people. The Consulate General repeatedly called the
Foreign Minister's attention to this mischief. 3 The various counter-
intelligence agencies in Germany have indiscriminately trained totally
unqualified persons, and then sent them over here on missions, supplied
with sympathetic ink and the like. Even immature, young fellows of
twenty-one years were expected to set up transmitters here.
The operations of the German agencies concerned in this field were
marked by naivete and irresponsible carelessness, and on top of that
lacked any kind of coordination. One almost had the impression that
the various "counterintelligence" agencies were competing against one
another.
Tarn completely in agreement with the Military Attache with re-
gard to this evaluation. I should add that such poorly organized
operations by irresponsible and incompetent agents, which most likely
have not benefited our conduct of the war, may cost us the last rem-
nants of sympathy which we can still muster here in circles, whose
political opposition is of interest to us. 3
Thomsen
a See vol. ix of this series, documents Nos. 289, 299, and 505 ; and vol. ii of this
aeries, document No. 255.
* Referring to the telegram which is printed here, Sonnlelthner informed Coun-
selor Kramarz of Political Division IM In telegram No. 637 of July 11 from the
Special Train (765/270457) that the Foreign Minister requested a report as to
"who of those arrested in New York on suspicion of espionage worked with the
Abwehr and who with the SD". In telegram No. 2349 of July 15 (765/270458)
Counselor Grote told the Foreign Minister's Secretariat that inquiries were
being made with the Abwehr and that a report could not be submitted before
8 days. See, further, document No. 266.
No. 82
866/211187-89
Ambassador Abets to the Foreign Minister
Telegram
MOST URGENT
top secret Wiesbaden, July 8, 1941 — 8 : 20 p. m.
No. 204 of July 8 Received July 8—10 : 20 p. m.
For the Foreign Minister.
I introduced the conversation with the French Government which,
jointly with General Vogl, was started yesterday and resumed this
morning, with the remark that :
1. For the Iraq/Syrian sector? the French services agreed upon
and the German services in return in the political, military, and eco-
nomic field have been carried out.
1 See vol. mi of this series, documents Nos. 546 and 559.
100 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
2. For the North Africa Sector, French services agreed upon,
namely, deliveries of trucks for the German Africa Corps, have been
fulfilled ; transfer of guns and ammunition in progress, but transport,
escort, and transshipment of supplies via Bizerte has not yet started,
whereas German services promised in return in this sector in the po-
litical, military, and economic field have been carried out or are in
progress.
3. For the West Africa Sector the agreement on French services
planned was not expected by Germany by the date contemplated and
therefore the discussions of German services in return have been
postponed. Darlan replied that since the signing of the protocol
on North Africa a number of events had occurred which had greatly
increased the dangers incident to transportation via Bizerte. Eng-
land had succeeded in bringing very considerable aerial reinforce-
ments to Egypt through the Strait of Gibraltar and via the Gold
Coast. By using an aircraft carrier near the Balearics 50 planes a
day have been brought to the Eastern Mediterranean during the past
month and by way of Central Africa a total of 200 machines. The
Luftwaffe, on the other hand, had had to withdraw forces for the
Russian campaign. French North Africa's own defenses had been
greatly weakened because a major portion of the Air Force and six
battalions had to be removed to Syria. 2 It seemed doubtful to him
that England would wish to venture attacks on French North Africa ;
on the other hand, it had to be expected that England would make the
most remote French position of Dakar the target of attacks as soon
as the support of the German military operations via Bizerte fur-
nished her a pretext for this. The French Government was still
determined to take this risk and made no change at all in its basic
attitude. It could, however, defend a second Syria before public
opinion only if moral weapons, in addition to military ones, were
placed at its disposal. General Vogl refuted Darlan's opinion con-
cerning the unfavorable development of the military strength in
the Mediterranean. The German air forces there had suffered no
reduction and could, moreover, soon be reen forced by wings from
Russia, since the operations in the east were taking such a surprisingly
swift and favorable turn. He believed that England, who had met
in Syria with so fanatical an opposition on the part of the French
troops, would not risk a thrust against French possessions a second
time. Until now all English landing maneuvers had failed, and if
France feared English attacks on Dakar, it should be recalled that
in the past year such an attempt had been prevented with far smaller
forces than were available today. The reasons of the French for
a In telegram No. 191 of June 28 (378/209754-62) Welck reported that the
French had received permission to transfer six infantry battalions and other
troops and equipment to Syria.
JULY 1941
101
the delay in the implementation of the movements of supplies via
Bizerte could, therefore, not be recognized, and he had been commis-
sioned by the OKW to press for a speedy performance of the services
agreed upon. Darlan replied that the loss of Syria had shown that
the most valiant resistance was doomed to failure if technical prepa-
rations were not made in time. From the moment the transports
started to move through Bizerte, he counted on a large-scale attack
of the English on Dakar, by sea, air, and land; so that the problem
of Dakar arose indirectly already in the North Africa sector of
negotiations. Since the events in Syria, he also had to be in a posi-
tion, more than previously, to expound the policy adopted toward
England before his people through [suitable] propaganda. In this
morning's conversation, Darlan asked for an early opportunity for
a talk with the Foreign Minister in which he took it for granted
that the peace treaty would not be prejudged. He would, however,
like to submit the proposal for a political protocol which regulates
relations between Germany and France for those questions that have
arisen outside of the Armistice and those which may still arise. 3 In
conclusion Darlan then stated that at the end of the week he would
call a Cabinet meeting in Vichy, which Weygand was also being asked
to attend, in order to obtain a decision as to whether supplies could
start to move through Bizerte at once, in compliance with the German
request. 4
Abetz
a See document No. 110.
♦In a note to Abetz of July 8 (3485/E019480) and referring to this
conversation, Darlan wrote "... in order to clear up any misunderstanding,
I wish to make it plain that the political position of the French Government
has not changed at all. If I insist on the necessity for a broad political con-
versation, it is because I consider this to be indispensable for the French Gov-
ernment so that it can proceed along the path it has traced for itself . . .
For the outcome of the Cabinet meeting see document No. 100.
No. 83
1327/373635-36
The Charge d 1 Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
urgent Washington, July 9, 1941—1 : 44 a. m.
No. 2138 of July 8 Eeceived July 9—5 : 00 p. m.
For the State Secretary.
With reference to my telegram No. 2126 of July 8. 1
The reaction to the landing of the American naval forces on Ice-
1 Not found.
102 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
land 2 shows how skillfully Eoosevelt exploits the power which he has
gradually usurped. To this extent the occupation of Iceland is to be
regarded as a touchstone of what public opinion and a generally
quite amenable Congress will accept. As I have reported, Roosevelt's
tactics consist in suggesting gradually to the public by word and deed
the mood which he needs for consistently pursuing his policy. Today
the American people are not yet ready to make blood sacrifices far
away from America in addition to paying high taxes within the
country.
They are nevertheless already following Eoosevelt more or less
fatalistically along a path that does not seem to involve any dangers
for the time being, but whose general direction can be clearly recog-
nized. Through an appeal to the ideals of conditional "defense" the
American public is to be pushed into a course which will make it
psychologically ripe for asking the President for war. Eoosevelt
himself is much too skillful a politician to ask the people for war.
Even though most of the material prerequisites are lacking for Ameri-
ca's entry into the war, one must reckon nevertheless with Eoosevelt's
unpredictableness as well as with factors that cannot be entirely
judged from here, particularly Japan's attitude, which determines
the freedom of action in the Atlantic. If there should be an incident
because of Iceland, then Eoosevelt will operate with the argument
of defense against an unprovoked attack.
Public opinion here is at heart prepared to recognize that the Presi-
dent's policy makes such incidents almost unavoidable; and as soon
as the American honor is engaged and the first American blood has
been shed under the American flag, the propaganda will have a rela-
tively easy game. But it should not be simply assumed that the
President would regard such an incident as an adequate reason for
United States Forces arrived in Iceland on July 7, 1941. For the United
States-Bntish-Icelandic negotiations preceding this move, cf. Foreign Relations
Of the United States, 1941, vol. u, pp. 776-792.
Counselor Etzdorf, the Foreign Ministry's representative with the High Com-
m «?&r 0lf the Army recorded tne following in his notes of July 16 (1247/337687) :
OKM has requested a political decision on whether with regard to naval
warfare the occupation of Iceland is to be considered as the entry into the war
by the U.S.A., or whether it is to be regarded as a provocation which should
be ignored.
"The Fiihrer stated in this connection that he is most ansious to delay the
entry into the war by the U.S.A. for another month or two, because on the one
hand, the entire Luftwaffe is needed for the campaign in the East, and on the
other hand, a victorious campaign will have a tremendous effect on the situation
as a whole— presumably also on the U.S.A. Therefore, the existing instructions
issued to the Navy are not to be changed for the time being ; rather, one should
continue to avoid ail incidents."
Etzdorf 's notes apparently refer to a conference at Hitler's field headquarters
on July 9 at which the High Command of the Navy submitted a paper on the
effects of the entry of American troops into Iceland with proposals for possible
countermeasures. Cf. U.S. Navy Department, Office of Naval Intelligence
"Fiihrer Conferences on Matters Dealing With the German Navy 1941" (Wash-
ington, D.C., 1947), vol. ii, pp. 3-7.
JULY 1941 103
asking Congress for a declaration of war. For until the rearmament
of the United States is completed on land, sea, and in the air, his
policy is not interested in carrying on a full war with all of its con-
sequences, particularly in view of the undefined situation in the
Pacific. The immediate aim of Roosevelt's policy is exclusively to
strengthen England and her allies materially and morally and to
prolong the war until America either can intervene decisively on the
side of England or is so well armed that she can take over the English
inheritance and settle accounts once and for all with her opponents,
in particular Japan. This policy is served by the authorization law, 3
which is misused by Roosevelt propagandistically as an expression of
the will of the people, by the closing of the German consulates, 4 by
the promise of aid to Russia 5 and by the occupation of Iceland.
Further similar bombastic actions can be expected, which basically
obligate America to very little and do not involve any immediate
dangers.
Thomsen
* See vol. xii of this series, document No. 146, footnote 1.
* See vol. xii of this series, document No. 634.
* Presumably a reference to the statements made by Acting Secretary of State
Sumner Welles on June 23 concerning the German attack on Russia, the last
two paragraphs of which read as follows :
"In the opinion of this Government, consequently, any defense against Hit-
Ierism, any rallying of the forces opposing Hitlerism, from whatever source these
forces may spring, will hasten the eventual downfall of the present German
leaders, and will therefore redound to the benefit of our own defense and
security.
"Hitler's armies are today the chief dangers of the Americas."
For text, see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. I, pp. 767-768.
No. 84
65/45749-50
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
secret Tehran, July 9, 1941 — 8 : 40 p. m.
No. 590 of July 9 Received July 11-4 : 35 a. m.
Owing to the increasing flow of reports about English intentions to
attack which have reached the Shah, 1 especially from the source named
in telegram No. 565 of July 3, 2 he has ordered extensive military
defense measures. Troops in the provinces of Azerbaijan and Ker-
manshah have consequently again been reinforced. The Shah has
also given orders that Khuzistan Province, where the concessions of the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company are located, including Abadan, is to be
1 Riza Shah Pahlevi.
' Document No. 66.
104 DOCUMENTS ON GEHMAN FOREIGN POLICY
defended with all possible means. Further troop reinforcements were
therefore dispatched to that province, too.
Hand in hand with the military preparations went the diplomatic
steps the Shah ordered to be taken with the British Government,
which through the Iranian Ambassador in London s and simultane-
ously through its Minister here * was informed, that consistent with
her policy of neutrality, Iran would turn against "the aggressor." In
the event of any British attack, the Iranian Government would appeal
to Germany for aid and enter the war on Germany's side. The same
applied in the event of a Russian attack ; just as in the opposite case of
a German attack, the Iranian Government would request aid from
Britain. The British Government, which was visibly impressed by
this plain language, hastened, as the Minister President told me, to
declare that it had no intention whatever of attacking Iran,
The Minister President 5 is of the opinion that the English, who did
not remain unaware of the serious military defense preparations of
Iran, would not risk an attack on Iran in view of the clear position
of the Iranian Government, of which they had been notified. If the
attack should be made, nevertheless, the Iranian armed forces, despite
their weakness in some modern weapons, would fight for every square
meter of Iranian soil. Then the Iranian Government would approach
the German Government with a request for help.
I made it plain to the Minister President that any feeble, tacit
consent to a British attack would make the worst possible impression
in Berlin. I disposed of the question of a German attack on Iran,
which he discussed only theoretically, to be sure, by pointing to Ger-
many's sufficiently proved determination to avoid as far as possible an
extension of the war. I am convinced that Iran will counter a British
attack with resolute military resistance and that the appeal to Germany
for help announced by the Minister President in that contingency will
be issued. Because of the military and diplomatic steps taken by the
Iranian Government, I believe that the danger of a British attack on
Iran has become less acute.
Ettel
3 Mohammad Ali Mogbaddam.
4 Sir Reader William Billiard.
6 AU Mansur.
JULY 1941 105
No. 85
260/170076-77
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland
Telegram
Special Train, Westfalen, July 9, 1941—10 : 10 p. m.
No. 630 at the Code Room
of the Foreign Ministry Received Berlin, July 9 — 10: 30 p. m.
No. 849 of July 9 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 9.
For the Minister personally.
Recently I telegraphed you, in reply to your inquiry, that you may
mention to the Finnish Government that it should break off diplomatic
relations with England. 1 Since then I have heard nothing definitive
from you in this matter. I just read that Eden has stated in the
House of Commons that England intended to maintain diplomatic
relations with Finland and to keep her Minister there. 2 I ask that you
now take up this matter with the Finnish Government and say more or
less the following :
England, both through Mr. Churchill's utterances and through the
exchange of military missions and, according to our information,
through the agreements made by these missions for cooperation in all
military fields, had openly made herself an ally of the Soviet Union in
its war against the German Reich. 3 Inasmuch as Finland is Ger-
many's ally in this fight against the Soviet Union, it appeared to us,
both out of fundamental considerations and in view of the possibilities
for espionage and the reporting of intelligence, detrimental to the
interests of the allied Finnish- German armies, if Finland continued
to maintain contact with England and keep the Finnish Minister in
England. We should thus like to assume that Finland now on her
part, is drawing the consequences from this situation and breaking
diplomatic relations with England and recalling her Minister as soon
as possible.
I also refer to the telegram recently transmitted to you,* according
to which the English themselves had apparently, as a matter of course,
counted on the break of diplomatic relations with Finland and had
already sent instructions to the English Minister that the intelligence
organization was to be turned over to his American colleague. I
assume that the Finnish Government is not closing its eyes to these
1 See document No. 29 and footnote 2.
' On July 2, Mr. Eden, replying to a question in the House of Commons, stated,
"His Majesty's Government are at present maintaining diplomatic relations with
Finland." (Parliamentary Delates, fifth series, H of O, vol. 372, col. 1325.)
s Cf. Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston, 1950), pp. 377-395.
4 Not found.
106 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN" POLICY
facts and request a telegraphic report from you in the near future on
the settlement of the matter. 5
Ribbemtrop
5 In telegram No. 632 of July 16 (260/170079-80) Zechlin reported further dis-
cussions with Witting regarding a Finnish break of diplomatic relations with
Great Britain. It appeared that Witting advocated this course ; recognized that
the Anglo-Russian treaty of July 13 had completely changed the situation ; but
had been unable to make his views prevail.
In telegram No. 645 of July 19 (260/170083-84) Bliicher reported an hour-long
discussion with Witting in which he again urged that Finland break off relations
with Britain. It appeared that President Ryti opposed such a move because of
the reaction which it would have on the United States.
See, further, Editors' Note, p. 185.
No. 86
265/173076
The Ainbassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 24 of July 9 Ankara, July 9, 1941.
Eeceived July 9—10 : 52 p. m.
For the Keich Foreign Minister.
The Foreign Minister has advised that General Dentz is suing for
an armistice. 1 Furthermore, a French minelayer and a tanker have
come into the port of Alexandretta, probably to seek safety. Sara-
coglu recalled his statement that Turkey has the greatest possible in-
terest in northern Syria but has made no agreements with England
in this matter. He requested consideration whether Germany might
not give consent to Turkish occupation of northern Syria (approxi-
mately up to the pipeline Abu Kemal-Tripoli) , of course just as a
temporary solution until conclusion of a peace. The French Army
in Syria could be returned to that section and repatriated to France.
Please state your view. 2 Sharp reaction against England in Antalya
affair s not yet exploited by our propaganda. Fifty-two dead.
Papek
1 Cf . document No. 101.
* See document No. 97.
The French auxiliary vessel St. Didier was sunk by British aircraf t In the
Gulf of Antalya off the southern coast of Turkey on July 4.
JULY 1941 107
No. 87
278/178644-46
Memorandum, by the Director of the Political Department
most ttrgent Beklin, July 9, 1941.
U. St.S. Pol. 631
The Bulgarian Minister called on me today and for his part, too,
brought up — in a somewhat different form from the past reports —
the Italian wishes for a change of the frontier with Bulgaria, regard-
ing which we already have a memorandum from Minister Beckerle of
July 8 1 and the telegram No. 703 of July 8 from the German Charge
d'Affaires in Sofia. 2
T$ie description of the frontier which the Italian Minister in Sofia 3
gave the Bulgarian Government is appended as an enclosure 4 and
drawn on the accompanying photostat of a map. 5
Minister Draganov, as instructed, expressed doubts as to whether
the line proposed by the Italians was in accordance with the agree-
ment made between Germany and Italy, 6 and asked, as instructed,
that information regarding this line be communicated to the Bul-
garian Government. His presentation, however, differed in one point
from the telegram from our Charge d'Affaires in Sofia. Whereas
according to this telegram the Italian Minister in Sofia in transmit-
ting the draft treaty stated that this frontier was in accordance
with the one agreed upon in Vienna between Germany and Italy,
according to Draganov's statement the Italians had admitted that
this was not the case in several points, particularly at Mount Lju-
boten, northwest of Skoplje.
M. Draganov asked in addition that because we had made Italy
accept the Vienna line of the frontier with Bulgaria we now sup-
port Bulgaria in holding this line. Finally the Minister also men-
tioned that the Italians had offered the Bulgarians compensation
'This memorandum (278/178841-42) dealt with a forthcoming visit to Rome
by the Bulgarian Minister President and the Foreign Minister for the purpose of
negotiations on the final determination of the Albanian-Bulgarian frontier, and
in this connection recorded an Italian suggestion made in Sofia that Bulgaria
give up a large territory to the west and northwest of Skoplje. The memorandum
stressed that this involved an area where there were mines which were of
Importance to Germany.
'This telegram (278/178843) reported that, according to the Bulgarian For-
eign Minister, the Italian Minister in Sofia had handed in a draft treaty provid-
ing for a frontier which greatly differed from the present line of demarcation.
The Bulgarian Foreign Minister requested German corroboration of the Italian
assertion that this line of the frontier was in accordance with the line which
Germany and Italy had agreed upon at Vienna.
' Count Massimo Magistrati.
'Not printed (278/178847)..
1 Not found.
* See vol. xii of this series, document No. 398.
108 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
at Vranje for the cession at Mount Ljuboten, not at the expense of
Albania but of Serbia.
As is known, this line of the frontier was carried through in
Vienna with respect to Italy because there are chrome deposits in
the area nortlrwest of Skoplje which according to the present Italian
wishes, as shown in the appended map, would partly fall into Italian
hands. Furthermore, as is known a special agreement has already
been made between Germany and Bulgaria regarding these chrome
deposits,' so that we are also directly interested in the question.
A memorandum by Senior Counselor von Schmieden, who was
present at the negotiations in Vienna, is appended. 8
Since according to present plans the Bulgarian Ministers are to
be in Rome on July 14, a quick decision is necessary as to whether
and in what form we should help the Bulgarians in this matter.
I therefore propose that we give the Bulgarian Government con-
fidentially a map with the line agreed upon in Vienna, and tell
the Bulgarians that they should not give in to the Italians in this
matter. We might also consider speaking openly with the Italians
about the matter; we could probably first wait and see, however,
what the Bulgarians themselves accomplish in Rome.
Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the State
Secretary. 9
WOERMANN
7 See vol. xn of this series, document No. 393 ana footnote 3.
* Not found.
* See, further, document No. 94.
No. 88
82/60298-98
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Minister
Telegram
most urgent Tokyo, July 10, 1941 — 11 : 50 a. m.
No. 1184 of July 10 Received July 12—3 : 10 a. m.
For the Foreign Minister.
With reference to your telegram No. 1112 of July 9. 1
Following the Japanese Foreign Ministers communication on the
status of the Japanese- American talks, reported in telegram No. 865
of June 3, 2 I have regularly called the Foreign Minister's attention
1 A marginal note identifies this telegram as Special Train telegram No. 6277.
Neither telegram No. 1112 nor No. 6277 has been found but it is probable that
an error Is involved and that the reference is to telegram No. 627 from the Special
Train forwarded to Tokyo as No. 771 of July 9. See document No. 89, footnote 1.
a In this telegram (177/85139) Ott reported having been informed by Matsuoka
that the American reply to the Japanese position with regard to a previous
American statement was being expected.
JULY 1941
109
to the necessity of promptly informing the German Government
about the awaited American reply. The Foreign Minister assured
me repeatedly, most recently at the end of June, that Japan's state-
ment of her position, on which I reported by telegram No. 731 of
May 13, s had not yet been answered. Information received by me
from other sources confirmed the fact that the Japanese Ambassador
in Washington, Admiral Nomura, as was to be expected, was trying
to keep the Japanese- American negotiations going but had not yet
received any statement of the American Government's position. In
my last conversations with Foreign Minister Matsuoka after the
beginning of the German-Russian conflict, he told me in reply to
my question about the status of Japanese- American relations that he
was ifully occupied with internal political conflicts and by delibera-
tions regarding Japan's attitude toward the German-Russian conflict
and that he consequently was unable at present to devote any atten-
tion to the American problem. I thereupon tried to keep informed
about the status of Japanese- American relations through other chan-
nels as well. In so doing I learned from an informed person in
the Japanese Foreign Ministry, who, however, was not authorized
to make any statement, that at the insistence of Admiral Nomura
an American reply to" 1 the Japanese statement had actually been
received. My informant told me that the American reply is an
attempt to reinstate the original American plan of April 18. 5 In
particular, the American Government demanded a statement from
Japan ruling out application of the Tripartite Pact in the Pacific.
With regard to China, the American Government did not want to
agree to a commitment to break with Chiang Kai-shek in the event
that he should refuse to accept the American advice that he arrive
at an agreement with Japan. Finally, Secretary of State Hull had
pointed out in an oral statement made to Nomura that a successful
continuation of the discussions was possible only if that were desired
uniformly by the entire Japanese Cabinet. However, certain state-
ments by individual members of the .Government cast serious doubt
regarding the existence of such a desire. 8
I have also learned from my informant that Matsuoka felt per-
sonally offended by Hull's approved (group missing) and will try
to take the wind out of the sails of the pro-American clique by calling
attention to this improper interference in Japanese internal affairs.
* See vol. sii of this series, document No. 512, footnote 2.
'The following portion of this telegram was sent separately by radio via
Osaka, received in Berlin on July 12, 6 : 45 p. m„ and forwarded to the Special
Train at 9 : 35 p. m.
5 See vol. xii of this series, document No. 454 and footnote 1.
*The foregoing presumably refers to the statement given to Ambassador
Nomura by Secretary of State Hull on June 21 and to the draft proposal
which Secretary Hull handed to Nomura on that occasion. Cf. Foreign Rela-
tions of the United States, Japan, 1931-ldM, vol. n, pp. 485-492.
110 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
My informant categorically denies that these negotiations might lead
to an agreement with the United States. He doubts, however, whether
a majority of the Japanese would decide on a clear break. It is much
more probable that the Japanese Government in its reply to the
American statement will revert to its own proposal of May which
would then result in a ' 'deadlock. " 7
I learned confidentially that this morning there was a meeting
of the leadership committee of the Cabinet in which Matsuoka told
for the first time of the existence of the American reply. According
to my information the leadership committee has adjourned till
Saturday , a when it will continue the discussions.
In accordance with instructions I shall in the course of our next
conversation ask Matsuoka, without indicating that I have been told
to do so, about the state of the negotiations and remind him again
of our request for detailed information.
Since, as experience shows, Matsuoka feels, in American affairs,
which are always treated here with special secrecy, greatly dependent
on the group of Cabinet leaders, I should, for the sake of counter-
acting the pro- American clique, appreciate it if you would inform me
oi all details winch have come to light at your end with regard to
the new American move.
_ Ott
T In English in the original.
' July 12.
No. 89
82/60285-89
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Telegram
>r »„» , Special Train Westfalen, July 10, 1941—2 : 51 p. m
No. 707 from the Special Train P
Received Berlin, July 10—4 : 00 p. m.
No. 1018 from the Foreign Ministry gent July 10.
For the Ambassador personally.
Please wire immediately detailed analysis of conditions there. The
ioiiowing items are of particular interest:
1. IVhat are the present relations between Japan and the United
btates? I had already asked you to inquire of the Japanese Foreign
Minister of your own accord and without instructions,* at the next
occasion, whether the recent Japanese-American conversations on
m™in Slvl&^^f ^ £? SpeclaZ Train Awarded to Tokyo
JULY 1941 111
rapprochement 2 have come to naught, and above all, in which way
they were terminated. Do you think it possible that the Japanese
Ambassador in Washington, Nomura, has given any oral assurances —
without any written agreement having been made — to the American
Government, which could have induced Roosevelt to occupy Iceland, 3
knowing that in the rear he has nothing to fear from Japan? Please
wire at once all available information on the subject of Japan-
America. Of course I request you not to show the slightest suspicion
with respect to the Japanese Government in official conversations.
2. How was America's occupation of Iceland received by Japanese
public opinion in the press, and above all, in important government
and army circles ? How is this action evaluated? Have you the im-
pression that there could be a tendency in Japan to pursue perhaps
a'Very shortsighted policy, which by coming to terms with America,
would result in involving the latter in a European war for a long
time in order to have a free hand in East Asia without openly clashing
with America, to settle the Chinese business and to expand further in
the South? I need not emphasize that this would be, as I said, an
extremely shortsighted policy which would mean that Japan could
miss the great historical opportunity that will never come again.
With England and America, Japan will never be able to establish
a Greater East Asia; this is only possible against those two coun-
tries. The Japanese Government woidd be under a terrible delusion
if it should believe itself to be able to obtain by diplomatic barter a
gigantic, historical decision such as the establishment of its position of
power in East Asia from the clever English and Americans.
Out of opportunism the latter would perhaps make certain tempo-
rary compromises but would never yield on principles, in order to
attack Japan at a favorable opportunity, seizing from her everything
she has won during the last years with the blood of her army.
3. I request a detailed report regarding the reaction of the Japanese
Government to my message to Foreign Minister Matsuoka.* I do not
quite understand why you have not yet reported on this in detail. As
Mr. Matsuoka told you, he intended to lay the message before the Jap-
anese Cabinet and the Emperor. What was their reaction? Did not
Mr. Matsuoka inform you about this during your conversation? If
necessary please take up this question anew with the Japanese Foreign
Minister, whereby an answer to this message must, of course, be ex-
pected by us.
' See vol. xn of this series, documents Noa. 454, 455, and 456.
8 See document No. S3.
* Document No. 53.
112 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
4. Please thank the Japanese Foreign Minister on this occasion for
having transmitted the telegram from the Japanese Ambassador at
Moscow. 5 It would be good if we could receive further news from Rus-
sia in this way at regular intervals.
Summarizing, I would like to say this : I still have full confidence in
Japan's policy and in the Japanese Foreign Minister, above all, because
the present Japanese Government would actually act irresponsibly to-
ward the future of the nation if it did not seize this unique opportunity
to solve the Russian problem as well as to secure once and for all Ja-
pan's expansion to the south and the settlement of the Chinese prob-
lem. Since, as the Japanese Ambassador reports from Moscow, Russia
actually is faced with impending collapse, which tallies, incidentally,
with our observations in so far as we are able to appraise the situation
during the present phase of the war, it is practically impossible for
Japan not to solve the question of Vladivostok and of the Siberian
area.
It is, of course, also in our interest that Japan intends to secure for
herself further positions in Indochina, 6 etc., just as any expansionist
measure on the part of Japan is welcomed by us on principle. Re-
garding the consequences which may and probably will result from the
occupation of Iceland by American armed forces, and the attitude to
be taken by us toward Japan in this connection, I will send you de-
tailed instructions within the next few days. I wish to say today for
guidance in your conversations that the fact that American armed
forces were being sent for the military support of England into the
area of operations officially declared by us not only clearly proves the
aggressive intentions of Roosevelt but that the penetration of Ameri-
can armed forces into this combat zone to support England amounts,
as such, to an aggression against Germany and Europe. For it is im-
possible to join one of the armies in a theater of war where two armies
are locked in combat without wishing to join in the shooting and with-
out actually doing so. I do not doubt for one moment that, in the case
of an outbreak of hostilities between America and Germany, Japan
will stand by her obligations resulting from the Tripartite Pact. In
this connection it can be regarded as absolutely certain even today that
America is the sole aggressor.
For the rest, I request that you go on with your efforts to bring
about the earliest possible participation of Japan in the war against
5 In telegram No, 1171 of July 8 (82/60274-75) Ott had forwarded excerpts
from a telegram from the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Yoshitstigu
Tatekawa, which Matsuoka had given him that day.
a In telegram No. 670 from the Special Train, forwarded to Tokyo as No. 1068
of July 16 (216/147719) Ribbentrop informed Ott that this remark regarding
Indochina was for his personal information, adding the following instruction :
"Please be noncommittal In conversations about Indochina with the Japanese
and otherwise so that the impression may not arise that we urged this occupa-
tion on the Japanese, so to speak, at the expense of the French.
JULY 1041 113
Russia, in accordance with my message to Matsuoka, using all the
means at your disposal, for the earlier this participation in the war
materializes, the better it is. The natural goal must he, as before, to
bring about the meeting of Germany and Japan on the Trans-Siberian
railroad before winter sets in. With the collapse of Russia the position
of the Tripartite Pact Powers in the world will be so gigantic that the
question of the collapse of England, that is, the absolute annihilation
of the British Isles, will be only a question of time. An America com-
pletely isolated from all the rest of the world would then be faced with
the seizure of those of the remaining positions of the British Empire
important to the Tripartite Powers.
I have the rock-like conviction that the new order which we desire
will be achieved as a matter of course and will present no more insur-
mountable difficulties if the Tripartite Powers will firmly stand to-
gether, countering at once every action on the part of the Americans
by employing the same weapons. For the rest, please report in future
as often and as detailed as possible about all developments of the
political situation at your post.
RlBBENTROP
No. 90
246/162034-35
The Charge d' Affaires in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 708 of July 10 Zagreb, July 10, 1941—8 : 40 p. m.
Received July 10 — 10 : 10 p. m.
Subject : Persecution and resettlement of Serbs. 1
The Serbian question has become considerably more acute in the
last few days. The ruthless carrying out of the resettlement with
many unfortunate by-products, and numerous other acts of terror in
the provinces in spite of the strict decree of June 27, 1941," by the
Poglavnik are giving even the sober-minded Croatian circles reason
for serious concern. The various previous acts of terror and excesses
1 This telegram was sent in reply to Foreign Ministry instruction Pol IV 2141
of June 25 (4832/B243223-39) , which forwarded a report from the Plenipo-
tentiary of the Foreign Ministry with the Military Commander in Serbia with
a number of enclosures dealing with the persecution and forceful expulsion of
Serbs in Croatia.
2 In telegram No. 608 of June 27 (4827/E241186) Kasche reported that on
June 26 Pavelie' had issued an "Extraordinary Decree and Order" for the pre-
vention of arbitrary excesses. It provided for trials by courts martial with
the death penalty against perpetrators of arbitrary acts. This decree was
published in the Croatian press on June 27. A summary of the first four
paragraphs of that decree is contained in a document from the flies of the
Legation in Zagreb, initialed by Kasche on June 27 (4827/E241187-88) .
682-905—64 13
114 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
by the Ustase committed against the Serbian population in many
regions of the country, which, had come to the knowledge of the
Legation through communications from the Military Commander
in Serbia, 3 through reports by individual Wehrmacht command posts,
through the Sarajevo Consulate and a number of other sources, had
already induced the Minister to point out orally and in writing as
well both to the Marshal * and to the Foreign Minister s the dangerous
character of these occurrences. 6 The more so, as it was necessary for
the understanding between the Wehrmacht and the Croatian people
to limit these occurrences.
Taking into consideration this last point General Glaise von
Horstenau yesterday evening, after talking witli me, felt impelled to
bring up this matter of the Serbs first with the Marshal and then,,
at the latter's express wish; also with the Poglavnik. General Glaise
von Horstenau expressed to the Poglavnik in the presence of the
Marshal his grave concern over the excesses of the Ustase, supporting
his statements with numerous specific examples from the most recent
period. The Poglavnik had to agree with him in general, spoke of the
phenomena common to all revolutions and referred to the decree of
June 27 mentioned above. The Poglavnik and the General agreed
that in the future particularly striking cases reported by Wehrmacht
authorities would be subjected to a close investigation.
The German General stated in his report to the OKW, which he
submitted at the same time, that he could not make any proposal
that could induce the German occupation forces to interfere directly
with the misdeeds of the Ustase, because Croatia was an independent
state belonging to Italy's sphere of influence. Furthermore, the
occupation forces were much too weak to take over police surveillance
to the extent necessary. Moreover, intervention in individual cases
would involve the Wehrmacht much more than heretofore in a share
of the responsibility in the tremendous majority of cases where it
could not intervene.
The General states in his report that the whole country has been
seized with a feeling of the gravest legal insecurity. Unfortunately,
*A letter of June 25 from the Chief of the Administrative Staff of the
Military Commander in Serbia to the Legation in Zagreb (4827/E241181-84)
listed a number of terroristic acts committed against Serbs on the territory of
the Independent State of Croatia and requested the Legation to make serious
representations with the Crotian Government. A copy of this letter was sent
to the Foreign Ministry by the OKW on July 15 (4827/E241159). The cover
note stated that the OKH "considered it intolerable that incidents of that kind
should be permitted in the Army's zone of operations."
* Slavko Kvaternik,
6 Mladen Lorkovic".
* A note verbale of the German Legation in Zagreb sent to Foreign Minister
Lorkovic" on July 7 (4827/E241180) enclosed the report from the Military
Commander in Serbia referred to in footnote 3. Additional data on terrorist
acts against Serbs were sent to the Croatian Foreign Minister with riotes
verbales of July 10 and 15 (4827/E241162-79) .
JULY 1941 115
as one who has been acquainted with the entire former Yugoslav area
for many years, I must concur in this opinion, because the Serbian
question has become very much more acute as a result of the resettle-
ment of the Serbs now under way. This resettlement which is being
carried out harshly and the many atrocities preceding it will heap up
tremendous amounts of incendiary material everywhere where Serbs
live, and will create centers of unrest in the near future which will be
difficult to control.
Troll
No. 91
3197182473-77
Tne Head of Division W VI of the Economic Policy Department to
the High Command of the Wehrmaoht and Other Offices and
Ministries 1
Berlin, July 10, 1941.
Ha. Pol. lib 2367 * I.
Subject: New German-Swedish Agreement regarding Overseas Mari-
time Traffic to and from Goteborg.
With reference to my letter of February 10, Ha. Pol. lib 374/I, 3
and of March 8, Ha. Pol. lib 750.*
The Swedish ship traffic to and from the overseas areas by way
of the harbor of Goteborg whicli was established by the German-
Swedish exchange of notes of February 7 5 and of March 5 * of this
year was brought to a standstill by the inclusion of the sea area around
Iceland in the German zone of operations at the end of March of this
year. 6 The difficulties arose from the establishing of the course to be
followed through the zone of operations by the incoming and out-
going Swedish ships. On the German side a course was prescribed
for the ships along a loxodrome halfway between Iceland and the
Faroes. The Swedish Government meanwhile had informed us that
it had not succeeded in getting the consent of the British Government
to this course: that rather the British side for control purposes had
1 This letter was addressed also to the High Command of the Navy, to the
Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, to the Reich Ministry of Economics, to the
Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture, and to the Reich Ministry of
Communications.
3 Ha. Pol. lib 2367 : Not found.
s This letter (319/192537-38) addressed by Leitner to the same group of re-
cipients as are indicated by the heading and footnote 1, announced the Initial
establishment of the Goteborg traffic by means of the exchange of notes of
Swedish Minister Arvid Richert and Rudolf Leitner.
4 Not found,
•This exchange of notes, filmed on 319/192539-43, served as an enclosure to
Lettner's letter of Feb. 10 identified in footnote 3.
" See vol. xii of this series, document No. 210.
116 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN" POLICY
demanded that ships sailing from east to west or from west to east
take a course leading through the Faroes and touching at Skopen
Sund.
At the wish of the Swedes, negotiations have taken place in the
Foreign Ministry, July 4-8, with a Swedish delegation headed by Rear
Admiral Lindstrom with the aim of getting the Goteborg traffic again
under way. The results of the negotiations are set down, in the offi-
cial minute, a copy of which is enclosed.
By order:
RtJTER
[Enclosure]
Berlin, July 9, 1941.
Official Minute ok the Results of the Discussions Conducted in
Berlin From July 4 to July 8, 1941, Regarding the Continuation
of the Goteborg Traffic
Copy zu Ha. Pol. lib 2367.
I. On the German part it is agreed that the wish of the Swedish
Government be granted that the five Swedish ships now lying in
America, namely the Satumus, Sveadrott, Brasil, Stegeholm, and
Peru, may make the trip to Goteborg by the course over the Faroes
whereby the Swedish Government assumes every risk of loss in the
zone which is prescribed in paragraph 1 of II below, under the stipu-
lation that the five ships observe the conditions of notification, identifi-
cation, etc.
II. After the Swedish delegation had proposed that Sweden her-
self bear the risk for the ship traffic near the Faroes and further that
she give guarantees that no exchange of goods take place at the
Faroes, the German delegation agreed with the continuation of the
Goteborg traffic itself along a course for the ships by way of the Faroes
under the following conditions :
1) Within the area that is comprised within a circle with a radius
of 60 nautical miles with its center at Skopen the traffic goes exclu-
sively at Swedish risk. At this occasion it is emphasized on the Ger-
man part, as it has been repeatedly before, that a guarantee for a
safe trip by the ships through the German zone of operations cannot
be undertaken on the German part.
2) The Swedish Government guarantees that neither on the out-
ward nor on the return trips of the ships will there be any goods dis-
charged or taken aboard at or near the Faroes ; and the stipulation ap-
plies for the crew, for passengers, and to mail, newspapers, and films.
3) The Swedish Government pledges that for the whole voyage
of each ship it will have aboard a Swedish officer as supercargo who
will be responsible that the regulations which are to be issued by the
Swedish Government are not violated, particularly by the captain
or by the crew.
JULY 1941 117
4) The German consent to this reactivation of the Goteborg traffic
represents .only an experiment until further notice which can be given
up again in accordance with the war situation and with the experi-
. ences gained.
5) Under the condition that the stipulations which are enumerated
as 1 to 4 under II are fulfilled on the Swedish part, it is declared on
the part of the Germans that they will be ready to be considerate of
the Swedish ships sailing on the Faroe course according to the possi-
bilities. The voyage of the ships in the zone which is described in
paragraph 1 of II goes, however, essentially at Swedish risk.
III. The assurance is given on the part of the Swedes that they
will strive so to regulate the Goteborg traffic that the trips of ships
through the German zone of operations do not take place more than
twicje a month in each direction and that the traffic will be simplified
and lightened as much as possible (grouping the ships together, agree-
ment as to times, etc.). The prescribed regulations which are to be
observed (notifications, identifications of the ships, prescriptions for
the voyage) will be made known to the Swedish Legation in Berlin
(Naval Attache) once more by the High Command of the Navy. 7
IV. The German delegation declares its agreement that the goods,
bought on Swedish account and which in total weight of approxi-
mately 8000 tons are still lying in England, be brought to Sweden. It
is agreed that this can be carried out : a) either by means of a Swed-
ish ship which goes in ballast from overseas to England and brings
the goods from there to Goteborg and then will be left free on the
German part for outward voyage with goods; i) or in such fashion
that the goods will first be shipped from England to a harbor in some
neutral country (e.g., Portugal or South America) and then reach
Sweden in the Goteborg traffic.
V. The Swedish wish for an extension of the list of goods which
according to the exchange of notes of March 5, 1941, are valid for
the Goteborg traffic e will be examined benevolently and will be con-
sidered generously.
'The exchange of notes of Feb. 7 (see footnote 5) had provided for a German
Control Office (Geleitstelle) which was to operate at GSteborg. For each enter-
ing or departing ship the Swedish maritime authorities were to submit complete
data to the Control Office : name of the ship, list of passengers and crew in all
cases. For outgoing ships they were to provide the destination and full details
regarding the cargo : kind, amount, name of the exporter, name of the ultimate
receiver. For incoming ships the Swedish authorities were to provide the port
of departure and date, the probable date of entry, and full description of the
cargo. Such data were to be presented at least 8 days prior to the arrival or
departure by the ship. Each outgoing ship on reaching its port of destination
was to report Its arrival to the nearest German Consulate and was also to report
the discharge of its cargo.
8 RUter's letter of July 14 addressed to OKM, to OKW, OKL, and to various
ministries ( 319/192452-64) forwarded a memorandum with the revised list of
items for the trade with South America, Central America, and Mexico, and for
Japan and China.
118 DOCUMENTS ON GEEMAN FOREIGN POLICY
VI. In view of the present stoppage of freight traffic over Petsamo
it is agreed that closer agreements over the exportation and importa-
tion of Swedish goods by way of Petsamo are not in order but that
in principle the list of goods valid for the Goteborg traffic can be
applied in approving Swedish wishes for exports as soon as the Pet-
samo traffic is resumed. 9
Initials of Minister Leitner
Initials of Office Chief Stahle
•In telegram No. 1129 of Aug. 5 (319/192430-31) Wied reported that Hagglof
had told him that Sweden's trade in Europe was practically confined to Germany
and Finland, and her overseas trade was confined to the GBteborg traffic which
was controlled by Germany.
No. 92
819/192471
Memorandum, ~by ike Head of Division W V of the Economic Policy
Department
Berlin, July 10, 1941.
e.o.Ha.Pol.454g.Ks.
Major Radtke, 1 by order of Colonel Becker, 2 telephoned that he
would go to Stockholm on Friday. 3 Colonel Becker himself cannot
go, unfortunately.
I. As to the individual Swedish wishes * he will bring the following
answers.
1) License for motors: positive, within the framework of the com-
munications already made to us by Ministerialrat Miiller.
2) Airplanes : negative.
3 ) Motors from captured material : positive.
4) Delivery of tanks to Sweden in exchange for the delivery from
Sweden to Germany of spare parts for tanks : essentially negative.
5) Armor for tanks : negative.
6) Magazine equipment for tanks. Inasmuch as the Swedish wish
is not clear, no position with regard to it can be taken now.
7) Cross-country motor vehicles and tractors: a partial compliance
is possible.
8) 21- cm. cannon from Skoda. A good substitute offer can be made
to the Swedes.
9) Lists of the still open orders for optical and radio equipment :
positive.
1 Major Badtke, of the OKW, Wi RU.
* Colonel Becker, of the OKW, Wi RU.
* i.e., July 11.
* See document No. 59.
JULY 1941 119
II. A general directive whether the basic tendency in the actual
discussions of the Swedish wishes is in large measure to be benevolent
or scarcely so is expected from Headquarters today. 5
Herewith respectively submitted through the Dirigent of Ha. Pol.
to Ministerialdirektor Wiehl. 6
VAN SCHERFENBEKG
! A minute by Seherpenberg, e.o. Ha. Pol. 459 g. Bs. (319/192468), of July 12
records : "According to a communication from Colonel Becker, General Thomas
brought the directive from the Fuhrerheadquarters for Major Radtke that in the
negotiations with the Swedes regarding war material he was to show a reserved
attitude rather than a benevolent attitude."
•Wiehl's memorandum of July 12, zu Ha. Pol. 459 g. Rs. (319/192469-70),
records the point by point discussion of Schnurre's telegram of July 2 (docu-
ment No. 59) with the War Economy and Armaments Office of OKW and with
the Reich Air Ministry.
No. 93
326/195002
The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy
in Brazil
Telegram
No. 967 Berlin, July 10, 1941.
Sent July 11, 5 : 40 a. m.
zu Ha. Pol. 4187^ II.
With reference to your Nos. 630 * and 1108. x
Please inform the Brazilian authorities that we shall continue to
hold to the execution of the contract as in the past and that the Wehr-
macht together with Krupp is investigating a new plan of produc-
tion regarding which a further communication will be made as soon
as possible. 3 Please inf orm Schluchtmann * of your step as soon as
possible so that he will proceed pari passu.
For your information and to guide your conversation :
Krupp submitted to the Wehrmacht a proposal for the resumption
of the manufacture interrupted by the exigencies of war ; 5 to be sure,
it also necessarily represents a postponement of the original delivery
plan, but signifies a considerable extension and improvement of the
proposal in the letter of March 11, 1941. 6 Meanwhile a decision on
1 Ha. Pol. 4187: This was telegram No. 1108 of June 19 (326/194994) In which
Priifer reported that the Brazilian Ministry of War could no longer be put off
regarding the delivery of the promised war materials.
For previous developments, see vol, xn of this series, document No. 612.
! See vol. xn, document No. 612, footnote 1.
8 Not found.
' The representative of Krupp in Rio de Janeiro.
* See vol. xn, document No. 612, footnote 3.
* See vol, xn, document No. 612, footnote 2.
120 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Krupp's proposal is possible e»ly after oonoluoion ef- the dceioiro ep-
WlEHL 8
* The words scored through were crossed out on the original and new words
added in longhand to read : "only after further progress has been made with
current operations in the east."
8 Typed marginal note :
"Note: The original version of the statement to be transmitted to the Bra-
zilians, agreed upon in yesterday's conference, seems to me to be too laconic;
the Ambassador will have to say a little more to the Brazilians, after all. I
have arranged the present version by telephone with Major Radtke, who was
entirely of my opinion.
The phrase 'in agreement with Schluchtmann' intended by H. Pamperrien
seemed ambiguous to me ; of course the Ambassador must proceed alone, and
merely a pari passu procedure by Schluchtmann is to be assured. Here, too,
Major Radtke and I are of one opinion. M [oraht] ."
"2. A[fter] dis[patch] re[submit], H. Pamperrien.
(Let Krupp know by telephone for the purpose of informing Schluchtmann
in Rio. Information to OKW and RWM on 4559) ."
No. 94
278/178852
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
U. St.S. Pol. 643 Berlin, July 11, 1941.
In connection "with the conversation of this morning (U. St. Pol.
641 ) l I gave the Bulgarian Minister, in accordance with instructions,
a map showing the Vienna boundary line between Albania and Bul-
garia, And I added, in accordance with instructions, that the Bul-
garian Government could use the argument with the Italians that it
had already concluded an agreement with us regarding the exploita-
tion of chrome and that it could not agree to a unilateral modification
of the frontier without Germany's consent.
The Minister expressed his thanks for this communication the im-
portance of which he correctly understood.
I furthermore told the Minister that on the basis of his statements
I could not see on which side of the Vienna line the chrome mines
were which Italy demanded to have handed over to her last night.
Finally, anticipating every possibility, I also pointed out to him that
there were minor differences between the German and the Italian map.
WOERMANN
'In this memorandum of July 11 (278/178850) Woermann recorded having
been informed by Minister Draganov that an Italian colonel had confronted the
Bulgarian Military Commander in Skoplje with the demand "in form of an ulti-
matum" for the evacuation of the chrome mines north of Mount Ljuboten held
by Bulgaria. On this occasion the Bulgarian Minister again requested informa-
tion regarding the line of the frontier agreed upon by Italy and Germany in
Vienna.
According to this memorandum Woermann was subsequently authorized by
Ribbentrop to give Minister Draganov a map of the Vienna line.
JULY 1941 121
No. 95
82/60301-02
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Tokyo, July 12, 1941 — 10 : a. m.
No. 1208 of July 12 Keceived July 13—12 : 20 ajn. 1
For the Foreign Minister.
With reference to your telegram No. 771 of July 9 2 and my tele-
gram No. 686 3 of July 10.
In the absence of the Foreign Minister who was indisposed I saw
Deputy Foreign Minister Ohashi today about current matters and in
thap connection turned the conversation to American-Japanese rela-
tions. Ohashi confirmed to me that an American reply had been
received. His statements about its contents agree in general with
the reports I had already received confidentially from within the
Foreign Ministry. He also confirmed to me the oral statement by
Secretary of State Hull, which has already been reported. He
added, more specifically, that the American Government had refused
to be bound by any agreements in the matter of an entry into the war
"for self-defense." Furthermore, the American Government had
stated with regard to a settlement of the Japanese-Chinese conflict that
it could not agree to the continued presence of Japanese troops in
North China and Inner Mongolia. With regard to China the Amer-
ican Government intended to adhere to the principle of the Open Door.
Finally, the American reply contained the offer to settle all questions
of trade and of procurement of raw materials in the Pacific with
Japan in a fair manner on the basis of reciprocity,
Ohashi told me that the proposal was of course unacceptable. He
himself believed, however, that the Japanese Government would for
the present avoid breaking off the negotiations abruptly so as not to
aggravate the present difficult situation. I asked Ohashi to let me have
all the details of the American reply and keep me currently and
promptly informed about further developments. Ohashi promised
me that he would inform the Foreign Minister immediately.
Ott
1 Marginal note : "Forwarded to the Special Train as No. 2315, July 13."
* See document No. 89, footnote 1.
3 Marginal note : "Presumably 1184".
Telegram No. 1184 is printed as document No, 88,
X22 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 96
105/113710-12
Circular by Ambassador Bitter 1
Multex No. W JtJLY 10 ' 1ML "
Pol. I M 5166 g.
With reference to my instruction Pol. I M 4796 g. of July i>
In consultation with the authorities concerned, particularly the
OKW and the Waffen SS, guidelines have been set up for the em-
ployment of foreign volunteers in the struggle against the Soviet
Union and for their technical implementation. The essential points
1 In principle only compact units under their own leadership will
be useS^whSn general ^ill be *^ ""« iSTb?^^^
untpprs Formations in a state of readiness will be reporteaio me
OKW V t™ German Diplomatic Mission, if there is one through
tht Forlign Ministry. Transportation will ^e a-anged by he
branches of the Wehrmacht or, in the case of untrained ™^y the
commander of the Replacement Army m conduction with the _ Cmef
of Wehrmacht Transportation. Immediate employment is intended
!n SrSE ^ of volunteer formations which are tramed and equipped
by the homelands. Formations that have to be first inspected,
equipped, and trained in Germany will be ^^¥Kd
Armv for the time being. Danish, Norwegian, Swedish, Dutcn, ana
FlS volunteers will" In principle be taken by the ^chs^rer |S
nnd nlaced in the Waffen SS. In general Reich citizenship will not be
SreTthrough enlistment. In the case of countries with legation
SS to which entry into the Wehrmacht results, in loss of citizen-
ship negotiations, if necessary, will be considered m order to make
iT^b^SSt&onahip is retained. Please send a written report on
^^SSS'SSSSS^V ^ion -ill not as a rule rece^ew
uniforms, but will receive the important f ha ™ c ^ st ™ ^^S
uniform steel helmet, rank and national insignia ^ ^™*£°J^
are trained in Germany will receive German uniforms w^h the badges
of their nationality. Arms will be provided by Germany. Arms
brought along will be utilized in so far as the supply of ammunition
pSX Thl oath will be rendered to the Fuhrer as Supreme
Commander of the Wehrmacht for the fight against Bolshevism.
i Sent t0 the Embassies in Italy and Spain, the Embassy in Paris, the Lega-
■Not printed L (34/2474<Ml7). This instruction forwarded to a number o ! Mis-
slom, coMes of the minutes of an interdepartmental conference held in the
Foreign Ministry on June 30 which dealt with foreign volunteers for the struggle
against the Soviet Union.
JULY 1941 123
3. Assumption of all costs by the Reich is planned. This is con-
fidential for the time being, since negotiations regarding this are still
in progress with the responsible Reich authorities. In any case for-
eign volunteers will receive soldier's pay, front allowances, reimburse-
ment of travel and expenses for detached service as well as cash
allowances for feeding themselves. Further details are still being
settled.
4. Compact volunteer formations will in principle be subject to the
military disciplinary regulations of their country, German discipli-
nary regulations will apply to formations lacking their own disci-
plinary regulations or with German superiors. Large formations with
their own military courts will retain them. Smaller units will be
sub j ect to German military j urisd iction.
D.VThe Waffen SS has already issued or intends to issue similar
regulations.
6. In countries where there are German Missions I request the
Mission chiefs to take care that all political negotiations in the ques-
tion of volunteers, i.e., negotiations with the government, political or-
ganizations, and similar groups, are carried on by the Mission chief,
whereas the handling of the technical military questions, falls to the
Wehrmacht Attache. In France the volunteers will be handled by
the Military Commander in accord with the Paris Embassy.
RlTTER
No. 97
265/173081
The Foreign Minister to tlie Embassy in Turkey
Telegram
RAM 308/R Special Train, July 12, 1941— 2: 00 p. m.
Received Berlin, July 12—2 : 20 p. m.
No. 902 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 12.
With reference to your telegram No. 24 of July 9. 1
With regard to the wish of the Turkish Government expressed to
you through the Turkish Foreign Minister that we give our consent
to the occupation of northern Syria by the Turks, you are requested
to convey the following :
The English justified their attack on Syria on the ground that the
French had permitted German aircraft to be there. While we believe
that the English used this merely as a pretext and would have taken
action against Syria in any event, France nevertheless has acted very
loyally toward us in this matter. Consequently, we also feel an obliga-
tion of loyalty on our part not to range ourselves against French in-
terests in the Syrian question, and it is therefore not possible for us
to take a favorable stand regarding the Turkish request for occupation
of northern Syria.
RlBBENTROP
1 Document No. 86.
124 DOCUMENTS OK GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 98
310/I924Q7
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Mini§ti*y
Telegram
No. 926 of July 12 Stockholm, July 12, 1941—5 : 30 p. m.
Received July 12 — 8 : 05 p. ra.
Also for Ambassador Ritter.
In my telegram No. 822 of July 2 1 I asked that after examination
of the Swedish wishes for arms a negotiator with adequate full
powers be sent here. Today Major Radtke arrived, bringing a fully
negative answer that was not cleared with the Foreign Ministry.
According to the statements of Radtke there are a few minor items
in the Swedish list of wishes which were cleared in a positive sense
in Berlin," but Radtke cannot make even these few concessions to
the Swedes because the OKW, for certain basic considerations, does
not wish to make any concessions at all without new massive Swedish
counterservices. 3
On the basis of this instruction of Radtke's I was obliged to call
off the negotiations set for today with the Swedish officials. In addi-
tion to this the instructions of Radtke are in contradiction to the
directives for the Air Attache here which on individual points were
positive and which have just been confirmed by telephone by the
Reich Ministry of Air. 4 I shall therefore take up the aerial ques-
tions separately on the basis of the directives which the Air Attache
has received. 3 In this situation the question of the delivery of Ger-
man war material to Sweden requires basic clarification, hereafter
as hitherto, particularly because we will have to present further
German and Finnish wishes 6 of the most varied kind to the Swedish
Government. 7
' Document No. 59. ScHNURRE
* See document No. 92.
* See document No. 92 and footnote 5.
4 A draft telegram of July 5, Ha. Pol. 440 g. Rs. Ang. 3 (31G/192480-81),
outlined the provisional views of the Reich Ministry of Air (pending final deci-
sion by the Reichsmarsehall), end indicated that Colonel Becker would be
on hand in Stockholm to be of assistance in the negotiations on aerial matters.
5 Not found.
* In telegram No. 1196 of July 8 (319/192478-79) Schnurre was informed that
because of the general difficulties in transportation the situation with respect
to rubber had become critical, and was directed to ask for the delivery to
Germany of some 3,000 tons of raw rubber from Swedish stocks against payment.
Schnurre replied In telegram No. 942 of July 13 (319/192466) that he had
carefully checked the matter with Friedrich, the expert of the Reich Office for
Rubber. On the basis of the niggardliness of the German response to Sweden's
wishes, Schnurre did not consider it appropriate to ask the Swedes for rubber.
Friedrich agreed with this view and planned to return to Berlin to see if it
might not be possible to offer the Swedes buna in return for rubber and to
offer also the process of manufacturing buna.
'In telegram No. 1301 of July 14 (319/192465) Wiehl informed Schnurre
that Ambassador Ritter would bring up the matter of Sweden's wishes again
with the OKW.
See, further, document No. 254.
JULY 1941 125
No. 99
1527/373659-58
The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
urgent Washington, July 12, 1941 — 8 : 33 p.m.
No. 2194 of July 11 Keceived July 13—10 : 00 a. m.
For OKW, Ausland; OKH, Attache Department; KLM, Attache
Group.
The development of American rearmament up to the middle of this
year has in general proceeded in such fashion as we have continu-
ous)^ reported since the spring of 1939. In the middle of this year
the American Army reached the planned strength and organization
and now requires a few more months in order to receive as a whole
the latest training and equipment. Parts of the Army are ready
today.
As a result of large deliveries to England, the equipping of the
Army Air Force with material has also not yet been completed.
The previous evaluations of the rearmament and of the American
armament industry have proved to be accurate in all essential points,
even where they differed from the opinions of American experts. I
refer to my individual reports. The fact remains, which is also
important for the political measures of the American Government,
that the second half of 1941 will bring a sharp rise in the development
of the Army, Air Force and armament industry.
On July 1 the American Army, including its air force, had a strength
of about 1,400,000 men, consisting of 4 armies, 9 army corps, 27 in-
fantry divisions, one of them motorized, 2 cavalry divisions and
4 armored divisions, which will be increased to 6 in the near future,
. under one commander of armored troops. 120,000 men are employed
in the overseas possessions including Newfoundland and Alaska.
The Air Force is supposed to consist of 54 combat groups and 6
transport groups, the organization of which was reported in the
dispatch of January 23. 1 It is 167,000 men strong.
The equipment of the Army and the Air Force will improve con-
siderably by autumn; by spring of 1942 it will be complete. At the
moment the equipment is still inadequate. Only 2 divisions can
be considered as fully equipped, and a total of 5 as being ready for
immediate use.
The demand of the War Department that the service period of
the men called up under the military law, 2 of the reserve offi-
1 Not found.
'Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, approved Sept. 16, 1940- U.S.
Statutes at Large, 1939-1941, vol. 54, p. 885.
126 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
cers, and of the National Guard units be extended beyond the one year
so far stipulated, is being justified on these grounds: Between 75
and 90 percent of the officers are reserve officers, and the new units
cannot be set up with their modern training or kept in the high state of
readiness which is desirable if there is an annual turnover of officers
and men.
At the same time the Army demands abolition of the provision ac-
cording to which men called up under the military service law and the
National Guard must not be used outside the Western Hemisphere.
In order, nevertheless, to have always some forces available for over-
seas employment, two divisions were formed solely of volunteers
serving 3 years, with regard to whose employment there are no
restrictions.
Whereas the entire Army in its present organization will be pro-
vided with modern equipment by spring of 1943, certain formations
in the meantime are being prepared for special tasks according to
completion of their training and equipment. They are called "task
forces", 3 formations of all service arms, usually reinforced divisions
that are equipped for immediate independent use for special tasks.
Thus there are two divisions for landing operations. Two armies with
4 army corps including army and corps troops are supposed to be
constantly in the highest state of readiness after completion of their
armament.
In my reports I have regularly noted the development of American
armament and the armament industry, also their weaknesses. I ur-
gently warn against overestimating the weakness and underestimating
American efficiency and the American determination to perform.
It is easy to draw incorrect conclusions from statements and
criticism in the American press. In cases of doubt I recommend that
my evaluation be used as a basis.
As I have done for years I repeat in particular my report that the
American officers' corps of the Army and the Air Force in general
meets high requirements and that the influence of the tradition going
back to Washington and Steuben, and thereby to Frederick the Great,
supports the structure of the American armed forces. They are work-
ing intensively and are giving greatest attention to the problem of
modern warfare. Unsuitable individuals are now being eliminated,
good officers are being advanced with priority ; the officers of the re-
serves and the National Guard are being trained intensively.
BornoHEK
Thomsen
•In English in the original.
JULY 1941 127
No. 100
386/211199
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST -URGENT
top secret Paris, July 12, 1941 — 9 : 50 p. m.
No. 2091 of July 12 Received July 12—10 : 50 p. m.
For Herr Schwarzmann.
For immediate presentation to the Foreign Minister and Ambassa-
dor Abetz.
"This evening Fatou x and Guerard handed me the instruction
they received after today's Cabinet meeting 3 for transmission to
the Embassy. The text of this instruction, translated into German,
reads p,s follows : 3
I have the honor to inform you that after hearing the presentation
of Admiral Darlan, under the chairmanship of Marshal Petain, the
Cabinet decided that:
1. It did not seem possible to proceed to carry out part II of the
Military Protocol of May 28,* as long as the political negotiations,
within the framework of which this protocol is placed, have not been
concluded.
2. The French Government will remain loyal to the policy es-
tablished on May 11 in Berchtesgaden, 5 but it believes that at this
moment any decision other than the one it has made would be con-
trary to the interests of France as well as of Germany.
3. A note verbale e will be addressed to you at once that will exactly
define the attitude of the French Government.
SCHLEIEIt
'Louis Marie Pierre Fatou, Commander (promoted to Captain in November
1941), Naval Representative of the French Delegation in the Occupied Zone.
' See document No. 82.
'The French text is printed in La Delegation francaise aupr&s de la Commis-
sion atlemande d' Armistice, vol. rv, pp. 58SW590.
* See vol. xii of this series, document No. 559.
6 See vol. xii of this series, documents Nos. 490 and 491.
' See document No. 113.
128 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 101
366/211198
The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy
and to tlw Embassy in Paris
Telegram
SECRET
To Rome No. 1735 Berlin, July 12, 1941.
To Paris No. 3649 zu Pol. VII 3832 g. 1
For Chief of Mission ! For your information :
By direction of the Foreign Minister, I have informed Minister
Cosmelli of the Italian Embassy as follows: 2
"The French Government has recently informed us that, through
the American Consul General in Beirut, 3 the English had sent to
General Dentz proposals for the suspension of hostilities.* The French
Government at the time secretly inquired as to our view. We had
thereupon replied to the French Government that we were convinced
of the insincerity of the English intentions and could therefore only
warn the French against making agreements with the English. 5 We
had at the same time added, however, that if the French considered
themselves incapable of offering further resistance, we naturally would
have to leave to them the final decision as to how they should pro-
ceed. Since that time the French had not approached us in the matter
any more. In the last few days a number of conflicting reports con-
cerning the Anglo-French armistice negotiations had come to our
attention." e
End of the communication.
1 Pol. VII 3832 %. : Not found.
1 In telegram No. 643 of July H from the Special Train (TO/50567) Ribbentrop's
instructions were conveyed to Woermann.
" Cornelius Van H. Engert.
4 In Paris telegram No. 1946 of June 29 (70/50529-30) Sehleier reported the
fact of the British proposal and the text of a French reply. Cf. Foreign Rela-
tions of the United States, 191,1, vol. nr, pp. 755-756.
"No record of such a German reply has been found.
"In telegram No. 221 of July 9, dispatched July 10 (70/50558-59) Rahn<
reported having been informed by the French High Commissioner of Syria
that he was forced to approach the British with a request for negotiations re-
garding cessation of hostilities. Cf . document No. 165.
By a message of July 11 (70/50570) Weizsacker sent to the Special Train the
text of an instruction which he proposed be sent to Rahn. A minute of July 32
by Weber (70/50509) records Ribbentrop's approval of the instruction which
requested Rahn to limit himself to giving the following general advice:
"a) If honorable terms, compatible with the dignity of France, could not he
obtained in the armistice negotiations an unconditional surrender without as-
sumption of political commitments of any kind would be preferable.
"6) Any concession favoring the de Gaullists, above ail any recognition of
the de Gaullists as a political or military factor ought to be avoided in the
negotiations".
According to a teletype message sent by Woermann to Gaus on the Special
Train on July 14 (70/50576) the instruction which was dispatched on July 12,
10:45 p. m. failed to reach Rahn because of conclusion of the armistice.
JULY 1941 129
I then referred to the Anglo-French exchange of notes of which, we
had meanwhile been informed from Vichy. 7
WOERMANN -
* Following a proposal by General Dentz of July 8 addressed to the British
authorities for cessation of hostilities an Anglo-French exchange of communica-
tions took place through the good offices of the United States which resulted
in the signing of an armistice agreement on July 14. See Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1941, vol. m, pp. 762-774.
[Editors' Note. On July 12 the German Foreign Minister had a
conversation witli Minister M. C. Agikalin of the Turkish Foreign
Ministry who on instruction from Saracoglu conveyed thanks for
Bibjaentrop's part in the achievement of the German-Turkish Treaty
of June 18 (Volume XII of this series, document No. 648). The
record of this conversation which was drawn up by Loesch on July 13
(F20/320-32) is in large part illegible on the copy from the film of
files of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.
From those parts of the document which can be read it appears that
most of the conversation was taken up by Ribbentrop's explanations of
past German policy toward Britain, Turkey, and the USSR.]
No. 102
62/42334
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Denmark
Telegram
Special Train Westfalen, July 13, 1941 — 1 : 00 a. m.
No. 651 of July 13
from the Special Train Received Berlin, July 13—2 : 10 a. m.
No. 772 of July 13 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 13.
With reference to your telegram No. 882. 1
It is entirely in our interest that the Danish Government or the
King of Denmark 2 should protest to the American Government
against the occupation of Iceland by American troops. 3 Please make
strong representations to this effect with the Government at your post.' 1
RlBBENTROP
1 In this telegram of July 8 (62/42328-29) Kotze reported that he had talked
with Foreign Minister Sea venius "about the occupation of Iceland by American
troops" and asked for instructions regarding the Foreign Ministry's attitude to
a possible Danish protest to Washington.
Christian X.
s See document No. 83, footnote 2.
4 See document No. 118.
662-905— 64 14
130 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 103
1527/373669
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Portugal
Telegram
Special Train Westfalen, July 13, 1941—1 : 00 a. m.
No. 652 of July 13
from the Special Train Received Berlin, July 13—2 : 10 a. m.
No. 1062 of July 13
from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 13.
In connection -with the occupation of Iceland by American troops, 1
American politicians are speaking openly for America also occupying
the Azores. 2 Please call the attention of the Government there to
this news and ask them how they evaluate the matter and what position
they will take toward an American occupation of the Azores. 3
KlBBENTROP
1 Document No. 83, footnote 2.
3 On May 6 Senator Claude Pepper proposed in a speech in the United States
Senate that the United States seize various bases in the Atlantic, among them
the Azores and the Cape Verde islands (for text of his speech, see U.S. Congres-
sional Record, vol. 87, pt. 4, p. 3617) . In telegram No. 982 of May 9 (129/121081-
82) Huene gave the text of an official declaration of the Portuguese Government
repudiating these proposals. For the attitude of the United States Government
concerning the Azores and the other Atlantic Islands, see Foreign Relations of
the Vnited States, 19H, vol, n, p. 839-859.
3 No reply to this directive has been found. For Portugal's attitude see doc-
ument No. 141.
No. 104
1527/373670-71
The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
urgent Washington, July 13, 1941—5 : 44 p. m.
No. 2210 of July 13. Received July 14—2 : 45 a. m.
For the State Secretary.
From the reports by agents regarding statements by Early and
Willkie (cf. telegram No. 2146 of July 9 1 and No. 2165 of July 10 *)
l This telegram (1527/373638-40) relayed reports from a "reliable source"
regarding statements made by Early, President Roosevelt's Press Secretary,
that "Roosevelt intended to occupy suddenly the Cape Verde Islands and Dakar
within the next two weeks." Cf. document No. 133.
'This telegram (1527/373642-43) reported that "Wendel Willkie, the Repub-
lican candidate for the Presidency in the 1940 election, told his friends about
a recent conversation with President Roosevelt in the course of which the latter
allegedly expressed his "firm resolution to bring about a state of war with
Germany, and as early as possible at that."
JULY 1941 131
as well as from other data, the following appraisal of American for-
eign policy after the occupation of Iceland may be made :
1. The President does not want a formal declaration of war on
Germany because it would commit him irrevocably to a total effort.
He still believes that he will be able to attain his goals, namely, the
protection of the Western Hemisphere and the destruction of National
Socialism without a full war effort of his own. He has intimated to
the English that they will have to wage total war at the front alone.
2. This does not exclude Roosevelt's being determined to wage
undeclared war. The frequent use of the expression "pirates" with
respect to German air and naval forces indicates a tendency toward
"shooting without declaration of war."
X For this the President reserves for himself freedom of action even
without asking Congress. The President on the basis of his powers
is at any time in a position to take steps which place America de facto
in a state of war, and with respect to which Congress has no other
choice than to give its subsequent approval if he demands it. Ameri-
can history offers many such examples.
4. One must reckon with further operations after the fashion of
the occupation of Iceland, possibly also in the Pacific. With respect
to Portugal, too, the principle propounded by Hull applies that the
inalienable right of self-defense has precedence over the respect for
foreign territorial sovereignty.
Thomsen
No. 105
82/B0316-19
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Tokyo, July 14, 1941—2 : 30 a. m.
No. 1217 of July 13 Received July 14—11 : 20 a. m.
For the Foreign Minister.
With reference to your telegram No. 1018 of July 10, 1 received in
Tokyo on July 12, 1941.
(1 ) With regard to Japan's present relations with the United States
I wish to refer to my telegrams of July 10 2 and 12, 3 which crossed
with your telegrams referred to above. Japanese-American relations
are marked by increasing tension. Measures of economic strangula-
tion by the United States against Japan, most recently in evidence in
the breaking off of the Japanese-Netherlands Indies economic nego-
1 Document No. 89.
= Document No. 88.
1 Document No. 95.
132 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
tiations * at the instance of the Anglo-Saxons, have greatly aggravated
the situation. Attempts of Anglophile Japanese circles still to try for
a compromise are doomed to fail in view of the American attitude and
the Japanese activists' growing determination to resist. In the cir-
cumstances I consider it improbable that there has been any secret
oral assurance from the Japanese Government giving Roosevelt
reinsurance and a free hand to occupy Iceland. However, the majority
of the Japanese Cabinet and also the Japanese Foreign Minister view
the possibility of America's entry into the war with marked concern,
which is also expressed in point 5 of a "personal message" of July 11,
from Matsuoka, which has presumably in the meantime been handed
to the Foreign Minister by Ambassador Oshima. 5 As Matsuoka
already stated in Berlin, the Japanese Government believes that the
military conflict will be extremely long-drawn-out after an American
entry into the war. Matsuoka is therefore most anxious to keep
America from intervening actively, because he realizes that American
offensive actions in the Atlantic will of necessity, as he fears, lead to
the extension of the war to the Pacific. Japan, incidentally, is taking
precautionary measures in the increasingly probable event of war with
America. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Admiral Kondo, stated that
Japan is discontinuing shipping to the East Coast of the United
States and is also avoiding the Panama Canal as much as possible, so
as to prevent seizure in case America enters the war. Shipping to the
West Coast of the United States is being directed in such a way that
an immediate withdrawal will be possible there too.
'Announcement of the breaking off of these negotiations which had begun
in September 1940 in Batavia was made in Tokyo on June 18, following the
"unsatisfactory reply" to the Japanese proposals in a memorandum of June 6
by the Netherlands delegation. Cf. Foreign. Relations of the United States, 1941,
vol. v, pp. 179-180.
6 The message was conveyed to Ribbentrop in a telegram of July 12 (1007/-
307790-92) in which Matsuoka explained that he had originally assumed that
his statements made to Ott on July 2 (see documents Nos. 63 and 64) consti-
tuted an adequate reply to Ribbentrop's message (document No. 53). He had*
now decided, however, to express his views to Ribbentrop directly.
He reiterated his conviction that Japan's policy had been clearly set forth
in his statements of July 2 to Ott and proceeded to explain to Ribbentrop the
difficulties arising from the absence of a strong central direction in Japanese
policy. Assuring the German Foreign Minister that "my opinion regarding
the future treatment of the Soviet Union remains the same as I stated it to
Tour Excellency in Berlin" Matsuoka then made the following statements in
point 5 of his message, to which a reference is made in the document printed :
"In our conversations in Berlin Tour Excellency as well as I clearly realized
that our views regarding a possible participation in the war by the United
States of America differ somewhat Every day I pray to Heaven that the
matter may turn out as your Excellency believes that it will; in my opinion,
however, every conceivable step must now be taken to prevent America's entry
into the war until the conclusion of the Russian campaign. Regarding later
developments I am of the same opinion as your Excellency. The Japanese
Government is making incessant efforts to attain this goal. But as the Foreign
Minister of an allied state and as Tour Excellency's good friend I would like
to repeat that I am unable to suppress concern on this point because I believe
that I know America to some extent. I would ask your Excellency to be so good
as to convey this view of mine to the German Reich Chancellor. May we be
sufficiently well armed, morally and materially, even in the most unfavorable
case!"
JULY 1041 133
(2) Regarding press reaction to the occupation of Iceland I refer
to telegraphic report No. 1175 of July 9 and No. 1177 of July 10. 8
The occupation of Iceland is interpreted as an unequivocal step by
the United States of America in the direction of entry into the war.
In view of the statements made in point (1) above, I do not believe
that the Japanese Government is striving to reach a compromise with
America and tie the latter down in a long European war in order to
have a free hand in East Asia. To be sure, Anglophiles and also Na-
tionalists view the transfer of strong American naval units from the
Pacific with relief, since they expect that the Indochina operation will
as a result be carried out without hindrance. This operation, which
Japan decided upon only after long consideration, demands at present
the full attention of the Japanese leadership. I have learned confiden-
tially that the instruction mentioned in my telegram No. 1181 of
July 10 7 was sent on Saturday 8 to the Japanese Ambassador in Vichy,
who will carry it out nest week with the French Government. In
the Army and Navy as well as in other activist circles it is firmly
believed that Japan's position of power in East Asia can be made a
reality only in opposition to the Anglo-Saxon powers. True, in these
■circles, too. one encounters the view that the further course of the war
and the German successes will mean a weakening not only of the Soviet
Union but also of the Anglo-Saxons in the Pacific to an ever- increas-
ing degree. The main difficulty is to convince these circles again and
again that further waiting will not be profitable for Japan.
(3) When the personal message of the Foreign Minister 9 was
handed to Matsuoka on the evening of July 2, the conversation had
assumed a serious character in view of the unsatisfactory content of
the message addressed to Germany. 10 I considered it self-evident
that Matsuoka, in keeping with the importance attributable to the
Foreign Minister's personal message, would carefully discuss it with
the Emperor and the Government and reply in detail. I therefore do
not understand how Matsuoka, as stated in the introduction to his
"personal message" to the Foreign Minister, could be of the opinion
that no personal reply was expected. In my next conversation with
Matsuoka, which took place on July 8, 11 1 deliberately refrained from
insisting on a reply, however, in order not to give the Japanese Gov-
ernment the mistaken impression that its participation in the German-
Russian war, and even less so its aid, were indispensable. In view of
* Neither found.
""This telegram (83/60283-94) announced the Impending presentation of the
Japanese proposals in Vichy which are referred to in document No. 126.
•i.e. July 12.
* Document No. 53.
* See document No. 64.
11 The only record of a Matsuoka-Ott conversation on July 8 is telegram No.
1171 of July 8 referred to in document No. 89, footnote 5.
134 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the Japanese mentality this seemed to me tactically inadvisable. In
the conversation on July 8, moreover, Matsuoka gave the distinct im-
pression of being unsure of himself and nervous — which, I am told,
was due to worries about his personal position. In accordance with
instructions I will ask the Japanese Foreign Minister in our next con-
versation to tell me about the reaction of the Japanese Cabinet and
the formation of the Cabinet to the personal message of the Foreign
Minister [urn Mitteilung der Reahtion japanischen Kabinetts und
Kabinettsbild.ung . . . ansprechen]. I was able to ascertain today
at the War Minister's, 13 where I had been invited, that the Foreign
Minister's message has found wide support among army leaders, al-
though it was emphasized that a certain period of preparation is
necessary for intervention against the Soviet Union.
(4) With regard to the reports of the Japanese Ambassador in
Moscow " I refer to my telegram No. 1207 of July 12." In the mean-
time (group garbled) there are noticeable indications here that Japan
is proceeding seriously with military mobilization measures. The
Military Attache 16 has reported on this in telegram No. 1200 of
July 12." Regarding Japan's attitude in the event of American ag-
gressive action against one of the Axis Powers, I wish to refer to point
2 of my telegram No. 893 of June 6. 18
I am trying to exert all the influence I can with Matsuoka person-
ally, with the Foreign Ministry, the branches of the Armed Forces,
the Nationalists, and friendly business circles, to bring about Japan's
entry into the war against Russia as soon as possible, making use
especially of the arguments in the personal message of the Foreign
Minister and your above-mentioned telegram, and I believe, as in-
dicated by the military preparations, that Japan's participation will
come about in the foreseeable future. 19 The greatest obstacles which
will have to be overcome in this connection are presented by the dis-
unity among the activist group which, without unified leadership,
pursues different goals and adjusts only slowly to the changed
situation.
Ott
a Lt. Gen. Hideki Tojo.
"Yosbitsugu Tatekawa.
"In this telegram (105/113721) Ott reported that the Japanese Deputy For-
eign Minister promised to instruct the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow to report
currently on the questions taken up in Foreign Ministry telegram No. 1029 of
July 11— Pol. 8512. The latter telegram has not been found.
"Colonel Kretschmer.
"Not printed (82/60300).
*■ Vol. hi of this series, document No. 596. ,■.„.«■„
" In telegram No. 1248 of July 15 (82/60335) Ott reported that the Soviet
Ambassador had called on Matsuoka on July 12 to inquire officially whether
Japan's pact of neutrality with the Soviet Union would apply to the present war
between Germany and the Soviet Union. Matsuoka had replied that it could
not apply having been concluded at a time "when German-Russian relations
had been substantially different."
JULY 1041 135
No. 106
278/178854-65
The Legation in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Budapest, July 14, 1941 — 10 : 15 a. m.
No. 806 of July 14 Received July 14—11 : 00 a. m.
Del. No. 15
For the Foreign Minister.
With reference to your No. 1203. 1
According to the determination of the frontier which was agreed
upon in Vienna and regarding which I informed King Boris on
April 27 in accordance with the instruction of the Foreign Minister, 2
the chromium mine Jesserina falls within the Bulgarian territory.
In order to make absolutely sure that the Jesserina mine belongs incon-
testably to Bulgaria and to avoid later frontier disputes, we have,
precisely on account of this mine, made the line of the frontier deviate
from the ridge of the Sar Planina north of Tetovo and to the west
of Mount Ljuboten in a northwestern direction and drawn the line
across the low ridge situated approximately 15 to 20 kilometers north
of Mount Ljuboten toward the east to the railroad line and then
further into the valley of the Black Morava.
A subsequent change in the line of the frontier would not only be
in contradiction to the communication made to King Boris but would
also represent a considerable economic disadvantage to Germany.
The Jesserina mine is one of those mining enterprises, the exploita-
tion of which has been left to us on the basis of the Protocol signed
with the Bulgarian Foreign Minister on April 24. 3 Even prior to
April 24 the Foreign Minister hinted to Count Ciano that we had
special economic interests in the territory northwest of Skoplje. In
the latest Berlin agreements with Italy of June 19 * we conceded to
the Italians the delivery of 7,000 tons of chromium from the area
of Skoplje. In the negotiations regarding this matter it was quite
clear that the Italians knew and expected that the chromium mines
situated around Skoplje had become Bulgarian territory and would
1 There is in the files only what appears to he an unnumbered draft copy of
this telegram which was sent to Clodius in Budapest by the Foreign Minister's
Secretariat on July 13 (93/103811) . It informed Clodius of the dispute between
Italy and Bulgaria regarding the Jesserina mine and requested his view as to
whether it was to go to Italy or Bulgaria in accordance with the Vienna deci-
sions of April 1941.
' See vol. xn of this series, documents Nos. 405 and 450.
* See vol. xii of this series, document No. 393, footnote 3.
* This refers to the Eighth Secret Protocol of June 19 which with its annexes
is filmed on 2033/445489-525. Cf. vol. xn of this series, document No. 652.
136 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN" POLICY
be administered by Germany, or that at least their production would
be managed by Germany. 6
Oloditts
Erdmannsdorff
* In a memorandum of July 14 (278/178856) Woermann recorded having been
told by the Bulgarian Minister that the Incident involving the Jesserina mine
had been settled.
No. 107
617/248975-76
The Legation in Afghanistan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
top secret Kabul, July 14, 1941 — 6:40 p. m.
No. 224 of July 12 Received July 14—8 : 20 p. m.
With reference to my telegram No. 192 of June 21. 1
Italian Counselor of Legation Anzilotti, -who has returned from
his trip to the Fakir, 2 reports basic willingness to intensify border
fighting. This is dependent upon financial assistance in gold pounds,
af ghanis or rupees. Gold bars are less desirable.
After the first assistance to the Fakir in February 1941, whereby
we and the Italians each paid 80,000 af ghanis, the Fakir was prom-
ised 25,000 English pounds every 2 months; of this Afnzilotti] has
already delivered 12,000 English, pounds, of which we contributed
7,000; our assets today are 25,000 dollars, 11,445 gold pounds, and
about 190,000 afghanis. The Italians possess no funds here at the
moment, since the promised equivalent of 6,000,000 lire has not yet
arrived.
A greater effort by the Fakir would have to be ordered at your
end within the framework of other operations according to the time
and extent desired. An auxiliary action, the effect of which requires
time, was discussed by the Fakir with A. as follows:
For maintaining and intensifying the present petty hostilities,
instead of 25,000 English pounds every 2 months, 300,000 rupees
every month; for extension to further areas, double the amount of
this; for a general border uprising, triple the amount. Providing
arms and ammunition would release free money for winning over
additional followers, who are now in the pay of the English and
would fight for the Fakir under the same conditions. It is important
in this connection that financial assistance begin at the earliest possi-
1 Not found.
' The reference is to the Fakir of Ipi, religious leader of the Waziri tribe In
the "independent zone" between India and Afghanistan. Cf. vol. xir of this
series, documents Nos. 300 and 511.
JULY 1941 137
ble moment, because recruiting and intensifying [hostilities] "will
require several months; therefore transfer to the Fakir now the
remainder of the promised sum of 25,000 English pounds, equal
to 13,000 in gold pounds and afghanis.
Please send as soon as possible the additional sums needed ; paper
pounds are also usable.
A suitable dropping point which was inspected by A. is being
re-examined for air drop : English rifles and ammunition, tank guns,
IMG [infantry machine guns] with antiaircraft equipment, hand
grenades.
According to A., the Fakir welcomes temporary detailing of a radio
operator for instruction, also two additional Europeans. The Fakir
allegedly has no connection with the Russians; nor, supposedly, are
there any Europeans with him. A German agent in Baluchistan
reported that the local police are alerted ; it is questionable whether
they are strong.
The Kabul area is under the strictest surveillance at the moment,
presumably as a result of A.'s trip having become known. Since
July 9 gasoline consumption has been limited to 3 gallons per car
per day.
Rasmuss
PlLGER
No. 108
611B/E285S36-37
Memorandum J>y Dr. Karl Megerle
Berlin, July 14, 1941.
Brief for the Foreign Minister
The occupation of Iceland by the USA, the further designs on Ire-
land, the Spanish and Portuguese islands in the Atlantic and also
on Dakar permit us now to make the struggle against England
and American aggression a European issue and to develop the con-
cept of a European Monroe Doctrine. In this way the connection
between the anti-Bolshevist and the anti-English aspects of the pres-
ent struggle can be established. In making use of this in propa-
ganda it will be advisable to proceed only gradually in order to
get the European states which are outside the sphere of the Tripartite
Pact slowly used to this line. With respect to the Nordic sector
(Scandinavia) the emphasis will have to be more on the attack against
Iceland, with respect to the Latin [Lateinischen] states (Spain,
Portugal, and France) on the danger for their outlying possessions.
The necessary slogans and data must be furnished first of all and
138 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
primarily by the press and public opinion of the regions directly
concerned and then be taken up by Germany and her friends. 1 A
further important bridge between the anti-Bolshevist and the anti-
Anglo-Saxon sector of the struggle for the defense of Europe is
formed by the Anglo-Soviet alliance which is now complete and
with regard to which it is to be insinuated that Europe has already
been promised by England to Bolshevism as its spoils of victory.
Submitted to Minister Dr. Schmidt for his information and with
the request that this be forwarded to the Foreign Minister. 2
Megerle
1 Marginal note In Ribbentrop's handwriting : "Yes".
''Marginal note "Submitted to the Foreign Minister. I have issued to the
German press this line as its guide line as early as the end of last week.
Dr. Schmidt, July 14."
The text of a directive along similar lines for the guidance of the German
press in dealing with the United States was sent by Schmidt to the Embassy
in Italy in telegram Multex 484 of July 12 (4865/E248873-74).
No. 109
205/142807
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden
Telegram
RAM 315/R Special tract, July 14, 1941,
Foreign Ministry Code Eeceived Berlin, July 15 — 3 : 00 a. m.
Room No. 664
No. 1303 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 15.
With reference to your telegram No. 869. 1 For the Minister per-
sonally as well as for Minister Schnurre.
Please decline in a friendly way the offer of the Government there
to detail a group of Swedish officers to the German Wehrmacht :
The Reich Government expressed sincere thanks for this offer, of
which it has taken cognizance with pleasure. It is of the opinion, how-
ever, that since the Swedish officers, unlike the officers coming from,
other countries, would not command any volunteer cadres of their
^his telegram of July 7 (205/142799-800) reported that the question of
volunteers had been discussed by Major General von Uthmann with the Swedish
military and by Wied and Schnurre with the Foreign Minister. The plan was
produced that Sweden send a group of selected officers, possibly one general, one
colonel, and several ranging from lieutenant colonel to lieutenant, and includ-
ing some General Staff officers and some from the Air Force. At such time as
Germany would suggest, they would be released from the Swedish armed forces
and allowed actively to participate in German units in the war against Hussia,
On the part of the Swedish military it was suggested that they be committed on
the sector of the front south of the Gulf of Finland which would insure their
employment over a considerable time. The Swedish Government, on the other
hand, had determined to restrict the participation of Swedish volunteers to the
Finnish armed forces.
JULY 1941 139
own, they would not have any real sphere of activity and therefore
would come into a somewhat difficult situation.
We believed that the Swedish officers would feel this themselves and
therefore would request that they not be sent, much as we would have
appreciated Swedish participation per se. 2
Ribbentrop
' See, further, document No. 270.
No. 110
386/211230-31
) The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Telegram
No. 669 of July 15 Special Train, July 15, 1941—7 : 30 p. m.
Eeceived Berlin, July 15 — 8 : 45 p. m.
For Ambassador Abetz personally.
For the immediate future, please fashion your policy in France as
follows :
1. The question of the shipments, etc., via Bizerte is important to us.
Please see to it, therefore, that the agreements reached with the
French on this question 1 are kept and that the shipments can start
as soon as possible. Please check the attempts of M. Darlan to delay
on this question in view of the case of Syria. We are not in a position
to make any more concessions than we have already made.
2. Furthermore I ask that, until further notice, you treat all other
pending questions in a dilatory manner and confine yourself to con-
stant observation of further developments both in internal French
matters as well as of the relations of France to England and America,
and to reporting on them.
3. A meeting between Darlan and me is inopportune at the present
time. It is possible that this might be advantageous in the foreseeable
future, but as yet it is impossible to tell. I cannot at this time accede
to Darlan's suggestion tor the conclusion of a political protocol, 2
regarding whose contents you have reported nothing, but I should like
first to await the conclusion of the Russian campaign before making
further decisions with regard to France.
Ribbentrop
1 In telegram No. 2057 of July 9 (386/211194) Schleier reported the conclusion
of a protocol for implementation of the agreement regarding supplies via Tunisia,
1 See document No. 113.
140 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOHEIGN POLICY
No. Ill
1200/331628-30
State Secretary Weisscicker to Reicksteiter Rosenberg
July 15, 1941.
Pers.2658g.
Dear Reichsleiter : With reference to the conversation which we
had on July 8 1 concerning the future treatment of the questions of the
now eastern European areas of occupation, I should like once more to
clarify below the standpoint of the Foreign Ministry in summary, on
the basis of the instruction issued me by the Foreign Minister. 2 In
so doing I should like to state at the outset as a principle that the au-
thority given to you applies to the internal administration of the oc-
cupied eastern European areas, and that in case questions should arise
regarding these areas, which are to be taken with the governments of
third countries, the Foreign Ministry has exclusive responsibility for
them.
For the rest I should like to make the following comment on the
questions which we discussed :
1. The question of how the eastern European areas of occupation
are to be politically constituted in the further course of events affects
the entire foreign policy of the Reich to such a degree that the Foreign
Minister can never disinterest himself from it. He must therefore
reserve the right at any time to intervene in the questions connected
with this in order to report on them directly to the Fuhrer. The
Foreign Minister therefore expects that you will keep him regularly
informed concerning the developments in these areas on account of
their connection with the over-all formation of our foreign policy.
2. The function of the representatives of the Foreign Ministry with
the Reich Commissars, in addition to their activity in local questions
involving foreign policy and the propaganda work directed to third
countries regarding the future political shape of the individual east-
ern European areas, consists in reporting to the Foreign Ministry on
the internal developments in these areas, to the extent that they are
important for the future foreign relations of the Reich with the new
political structures. Thus, their activity in this respect is purely as
observers. The representatives do not have the task of themselves
exerting active influence on the internal developments.
3. As regards the question of who is to appoint the representatives
of the Foreign Ministry, it is quite self-evident that as representatives
of the Foreign Ministry they cannot be appointed by another author-
ity, but only by the Foreign Minister himself. It is just as self-
evident that as representatives of the Foreign Ministry they can receive
1 Weizsacker's memorandum of July 8 (1200/331623-25) records this conver-
sation which dealt primarily with the position of the representatives of the
Foreign Ministry with respect to the administrative authorities in the occupied
eastern areas.
"Telegram No. 665 of July 14, sent from the Special Train on July 15 (1200/-
331626-27) . The document printed follows verbatim the text of this instruction.
JULY 1941 141
instructions only from the Foreign. Minister, and that they have to
address their reports to him. As a special concession the Foreign Min-
ister has agreed that the representatives of the Foreign Ministry with
the Reich Commissars in the eastern European areas of occupation
shall give the Reich Commissars carbon copies of each of their reports,
which is not done by the Foreign Ministry representatives in the other
areas of occupation.
Finally, the Foreign Minister has instructed me to tell you the
following: He has reported to the Ftihrer on the matter in the last few
days. The Fiihrer has stated that the Foreign Minister, of course,
could send a Foreign Ministry representative to each Reich Commis-
sar, as it had done in The Hague, in Belgrade, etc. The represent-
atives of the Foreign Ministry at these last-named places, who are
naturally appointed by the Foreign Minister, receive their instructions
exclusively from him and report to the Foreign Ministry without
submitting copies of their reports to the authorities to which they are
attached. I may therefore assume that these questions can now be
regarded as having been definitively settled, also as regards the repre-
sentatives of the Foreign Ministry with the Reich Commissars in the
eastern European areas of occupation, with the provision that the
Foreign Minister will keep the promise he made as a concession that
copies will be given to the Reich Commissars. 3
Heil Hitler!
Weizsacker
'According to a memorandum by Weizs&cfeer of Aug. 28 (34/2483&-41) the
Foreign Ministry did not receive a reply from Rosenberg ; Weizsftcker then dis-
cussed the matter with Rosenberg's permanent deputy, Gauleiter Meyer, on Aug.
15 and 28, In these discussions certain principles were formulated regarding
the position of the Foreign Ministry and its representatives with the Ministry of
Occupied Eastern Territories, which were to be submitted to Ribbentrop and
Rosenberg for their approval. See, further, document No. 277.
[Editors' Note. On July 15 Hitler received Ambassador Oshima
at his field headquarters' in the east. Hewel's memorandum of this
conversation of July 15 on the film of files of the Foreign Minister's
Secretariat (F7/0137-20) is only partly legible. From the legible
portions of this document it appears that Hitler spoke at length about
the German campaign against the Soviet Union and then urged Japan
to participate in the annihilation of Russia.]
142 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 112
233/166560
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Argentina
Telegram
No. 847 Berlin, July 16, 1941—5 : 20 p. m.
zu Pol. II 489 g. Rs. 1 Ang. II.
For the Ambassador.
With reference to your telegram No. 1068 of July 5. 2
I agree with your attitude toward the opinion of the Argentine
Foreign Minister regarding the war situation. You can point out to
the Minister the new manifestation of Roosevelt's aggressive and
provocative policy demonstrated in the meantime in the case of Ice-
land. 3 With this the President admits quite openly that he wants war
and not peace. I suggest a friendly word for the Argentine Foreign
Minister, whose understanding attitude is known also in Berlin.
Please, however, do not touch on the idea of the possible good offices
of the Argentine Government.
Kebbentrop
1 Pol. II 489 g. Es. : Not found,
* Document No. 73.
' Document No. 102.
No. 113
F10/460-4T8
Memorandum, for the Fiihrer
Westfalen, July 16, 1941.
The enclosed communication of the French Government was de-
livered to the Embassy in Paris and forwarded to Ambassador Abetz, 1
who is now in Berlin. He transmitted it to me yesterday by teletype.
I have instructed the Ambassador, subject to the Fiihrer's ap-
proval, to go back to Paris immediately and return the communica-
tion to the French Government with the oral comment that the
communication indicated a complete misconception of France's posi-
tion as a nation defeated by Germany, and that he, Ambassador
Abetz, was therefore unable to transmit the communication to his
Government.
1 Paris telegram No. 2101 of July 14 (386/211214-224) transmitted the text
of the French note as printed below except for the last section,
beginning with "The Government of the Reich and the Italian Government
make the following declaration to the French Government . . ."
The telegram also contains a version of the German draft armistice agree-
ment (less article 22) in Syria of July 12 (386/211224-228), the French text of
which is printed in La Dttler/ation francaise aupris de la Commission alletnande
d' Armistice, vol. rv, pp. 627-30.
JULY 1941 143
I believe it is necessary to put an end once and for all to these naive
French attempts at blackmail.
R[lBBENTROP]
[Enclosure]
Note Vekbale*
Vicht, July 14, 1941.
In pursuance of the conversation of May 11, 1941, at Berchtesgaden, 3
three protocols concerning the Levant, Tunisia, and French Africa,
respectively, were signed by Ambassador Abetz and by General Warli-
mor^t as the representative of the High Command of the Armed Forces
onahe one hand, and Admiral Darlan, Vice President of the Council
of Ministers on the other.*
These protocols, which referred to the military assistance which
France, should the occasion arise, could give to Germany in her war
against England, were drawn up in the course of a series of political
conversations, and their practical implementation was explicitly made
contingent on, first : "the prior reinforcement of our military defenses
in Africa"; and, second : the granting of a certain number of political
and economic concessions capable of justifying, in the eyes of French
public opinion, the possibility of an armed conflict with England and
the United States, which might result from the said protocols.
Trusting in the prompt conclusion of the political negotiations
promised by Ambassador Abetz, and satisfied with the military rein-
forcement of our defense resources in Tunisia granted by the OKW
the French Government felt on May 28 that it was in a position to
assume immediately the risk that might result from the concessions it
had made regarding Bizerte.
Since the signing of the protocols, however, new circumstances out-
side French control have unfortunately changed the existing situa-
tion, giving rise to an exchange of letters of June 17 and 19, 1941, 6
between General VogI, President of the German Armistice Commis-
sion and Delegate of the OKW, and Baron Benoist-Mechin, State
Secretary with the Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and
delegate of Admiral Darlan.
According to the text of this exchange of letters, General Vogl
stated explicitly "that the military conversations had the character of
' Marginal note by Ribbentrop: "[Tor] Ffiihrer],"
The French text of this note verbale, except for the draft declaration (see
p. 149), has been found amoni? the persona! papers of Abetz as part of his memo-
randum of July 1, 1943 (P3/P150-165) . See La TicUgatinn frcmcaise aupris de la
Commission allemande of d' Armistice, vol. iv, p. 564, footnote 3.
* See vol. Tir of this series, documents Nos, 490 and 491.
4 See vol. jh of this series, document No. 559.
•Not found; see, however, Jean-Louis Aujol, Le Procds Benoist-M4chin (Paris,
1948), p. 238.
144 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN" POLICY
preliminary explorations and that the entry into force of the two
agreements was reserved for a later ■date."
Acknowledging General Vogl's declaration, Baron Benoist-Mechin
replied :
"I thank you very much for confirming to me that these provisional
conversations had an exploratory character and that the date for the
entry into force of these two agreements will be determined later in
consultation with the French Government."
What are the new factors which have entered the picture since
May 28 to change the general situation ?
(1) The English attack on Syria.
(2) The attitude of increased hostility toward France demonstrated
by England.
(3) The deadlock in the political conversations which formed the
framework for the military protocols.
In order to give a clear and absolutely unequivocal picture of the
situation in which the French Government finds itself at the present
moment, it appears appropriate to examine each of these three factors
individually :
1. The English attack on Syria.
The English attack on Syria, which was launched on the pretense
that the French Government had extended assistance to the German
Air Force operating in Iraq, has had the following consequences:
a. The French Government was compelled to transfer from Algeria
and Tunisia certain defense forces and equipment needed for Syria,
and thus correspondingly to weaken its military potential in North
Africa.
b. France has lost one of the most valuable territories of her empire,
without having been compensated for this loss by any tangible
advantage.
g. French public opinion has become aware of the disastrous con-
sequences which the French Government's policy of aid to Germany
could have for the empire if the resulting operations lack sufficient
military and psychological preparation.
d. The contradiction which exists between a policy which must
lead France to fight in widely separated parts of her empire, and the
fact that France is at the present moment subject to an armistice
regime designed to put her out of action, has been brought home to
the French Government with great clarity.
e. An armed conflict between England and France is being provoked
without France having received an explicit declaration from the
Reich Government that the fact of France's fighting with Germany's
Erincipal enemy has brought about a fundamental change in the
rerman-French statute [Statuf] .
2. The attitude of increased hostility of England and the United
States toward France.
JULY 1941 145
This hostility, brought on by the heroic opposition of our troops in
Syria, the failure of the English de Gaullist propaganda, and the
French Government's perseverance in the policy it had determined
upon, has manifested itself in a series of actions and statements by
the leading Anglo-American statesmen, namely :
a, Mr. Winston Churchill's address before the House of Commons,
in which he stated that England, "in the desire to conquer the enemy
wherever he is to be found, would not limit herself to attacking only
areas actually occupied by German forces, but would also attack all
areas which the British Government assumed might be taken over by
German forces." 6 The declaration seems to forecast a series of pre-
ventive attacks which would have the purpose of counteracting actual
or presumed German military plans.
S.yVarious speeches by President Roosevelt (May 28, July 10,
1941, 7 etc.), which defined the American designs on Dakar and
the Atlantic coast of the African continent.
c. The increased military preparations of the English in their vari-
ous possessions on the west coast of Africa.
It is evident from the foregoing that the execution of the military
operations envisaged in Protocols No. 2 and 3 of May 28 would in-
volve infinitely greater hazards today than at the time of the signing
of the protocols in question and for the following reasons :
(1) The withdrawals, especially in the field of aviation, effected to
strengthen the defense of Syria have weakened our defense resources
in North Africa.
(2) The operations in the east now begun by the bulk of the Wehr-
macht — though there can be no doubt as to the outcome — have never-
theless compelled the German General Staff for the moment to strip
the occupied French territories of aircraft and antiaircraft weapons,
rendering these areas, the French cities and factories, infinitely more
vulnerable to the incursions of the Royal Air Force; what is more,
this at the very moment when these factories were starting to manu-
facture war material for the account of the Reich. 8
(3) The several declarations by Messrs. Churchill and Roosevelt
make it impossible any longer to view the operations in Tunisia,
French West Africa, and French Equatorial Africa as isolated actions.
Rather, they must be looked upon as one operation, because the execu-
tion of only a part of the protocols in question must, with virtual
certainty, provoke a reaction by the Anglo-Americans in other, some-
times very distant parts of the French Empire.
In fact, it may be expected that the counterblow to Bizerte will be
struck, not against this port, but against Dakar and French Equatorial
The date and place of this speech have not been found. A similar statement
was made by Eden on May 22, 1041. For text, see the New York Times, May 23,
1941, p. 4, col. 3.
1 The dates of the President's radio address and his message to Congress were
May 27 and July 7, respectively. For the texts, see Department of State,
Bulletin, 1941, vol. rv, p. 647 and vol. v, p. 15.
'See vol. xii of this series, document No. 559, footnote 9.
682-905—64 1 5
146 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Africa. There are not two problems : Bizerte and Dakar ; there is only
one single problem : Africa. The whole of French Africa, i.e., the
most important part of our empire by far, is thus threatened with be-
coming involved in an armed conflict with the English land, air, and
naval forces.
3. The deadlock in the political conversations which form the
framework for the military protocols.
The German-French negotiations have since May 28 not kept pace
with the military events, despite certain minor concessions, the value
of which the French Government certainly does not fail to recognize,
and have to this date produced no results capable "of justifying in the
eyes of French public opinion the possibility of an armed conflict with
England and the United States." This conflict today, however, is no
longer a mere potentiality; it has actually broken out in Syria.
For all of these reasons, the French Government, on July 8, 1941,
addressed itself to the Reich Government to request a new meeting
between Admiral Darlan and the Reich Foreign Minister. 9
Admiral Darlan intended in the course of this conversation to dis-
cuss with Herr von Ribbentrop the new problems that had arisen since
the conference of May 11, 1941, in order to adapt the common course
of action of the two Governments accordingly and enable France to
take another step forward on the path of German-French collaboration.
It has been impossible to date to hold this meeting, and the French
Government submits to the compelling reasons which have prompted
the German Government to postpone it. 10 The French Government
believes, however, that it is not in the interest of either the Reich
or France to precipitate an operation in Africa with all the hazards
it involves without careful military preparation and a drastic change
in the political climate ; for these two conditions are essential for carry-
ing such an operation to its conclusion with every chance of success.
The views of the French Government on the nature and the purpose
of this change of climate are presented in an appended note, 11 which
will be delivered to Ambassador Abetz simultaneously with the pres-
ent documents.
Conscious of the obligations imposed by the policy which it has
traced for itself, and by which it intends to abide without reservation
and equivocation, but conscious also of the responsibilities it assumes
with this policy toward both the French nation and the Reich, the
French Government therefore has the honor to repeat its request in
the hope that a conference of this nature, from which it anticipates the
best results, may take place in the very near future and enable it to
proceed immediately to the implementation of the military protocols,
' Document No. 82 and footnote 4.
10 See document No. 110.
11 See the Appendix printed on p. 147.
JULY 1941 147
the preliminary study of which has already been completed and with
regard to the modalities of which the French and German military
experts have already reached agreement.
APPENDIX
France has made it a point of honor to carry out in an irreproach-
able manner all of the clauses of the Armistice, with which the names
of Mers-el-Kebir 12 and Dakar 13 will forever be associated.
On October 24, 1940, at Montoire Marshal Petain adopted the
policy of collaboration which Reich Chancellor Hitler had proposed
to him. 14
This collaboration has been strengthened progressively until it has
brought France into conflict with her former ally. The continued
development of this policy carries with it the risk that the hitherto
localized and intermittent attacks by Great Britain will develop into
a general war with the attendant destruction and suffering.
The prospect of these new ordeals, in which the French Army, the
French Air Force, and the French Navy will find opportunities, as
in Syria, to demonstrate their traditional valor, will not deflect the
French Government from the path which it has taken consciously
and of its free will.
This prospect, however, imposes on it new obligations and new
responsibilities toward the French nation as well as toward Germany.
If the French Government addresses itself today to the German
Government, it does so in order to be in a position to assume these
obligations and these responsibilities.
The French Government would incur a grave responsibility with
respect to the French nation if it were to involve its people in a
new war without having the assurance that such a policy, inspired
by the great French traditions, which are both European and hostile
to British imperialism, provides the only means to restore France
to her place in the community of the great nations. The French
Government would incur no less a responsibility toward Germany
if it did not in all candor indicate the moral and material conditions
on which, in its view, depend the efficacy of its political and military
actions.
So that France may in honor fulfill the mission to which she has
been called, it is first of all necessary that all the moral forces of the
country be united. This unification can be achieved only if all citi-
zens are unanimous in their faith that the destinies of France and
Europe are henceforward united. The Government has the will and
13 See vol. x of this series, document No. 93.
11 See vol. xi of this series, document No. 92.
" See vol. xr of this series, document No. 227.
148 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the certainty of achieving this accord if it is given the possibility
of acting without, hindrance, and if Germany and Italy will give
precise promises and hopes that will reassure French patriotism. In
the military sphere, the reconstructed French Army, Air Force, and
Navy must be enabled in the common interest of Europe and France
not only to fight heroically against the British forces, as they did at
Mers-el-Kebir and in Syria, but also as at Dakar, to triumph over
them.
Finally, French policy must have the value of an example on the
international plane and so convert the still undecided countries to
the European order, thereby depriving of their foundation any poten-
tial coalitions likely to form about Great Britain.
None of these results can be achieved at the present stage of the
Franco-German relations prescribed by the Armistice of June 22,
1940. 15 The policy of collaboration may lead France to a point where
she would have to wage war everywhere. But she cannot do this
under an armistice regime, the very object of which is to render her
impotent.
The armistice treaties currently in force actually block the exer-
cise of French sovereignty and in an even greater measure the use
of French military strength.
For all these reasons they appear no longer compatible, in either
letter or spirit, with the new tasks of which France believes she has
proved herself worthy, through the loyalty of her leaders and the
bravery of her soldiers. While the present situation does not imperil
the spiritual unity of the state, and while, in particular, the Govern-
ment, as it has shown, has remained the master of its political deci-
sions, nevertheless, apart from this, the situation created by the Armi-
stice prevents it from affirming this freedom with sufficient force and
detracts from the moral and material value of its actions both at
home and in the international field.
In consideration of these statements, the French Government which,
in view of the marked hostility on the part of Great Britain, deems
itself henceforth freed from any obligation toward that country, and
fully conscious of France's own mission in Europe and the world,
requests the opening of negotiations with the German and Italian
Governments.
In the opinion of the French Government, these negotiations should
aim at an immediate and definitive settlement of certain vital ques-
tions, and at replacing the armistice regime by a regime founded on
the sovereignty of the French State and a loyal collaboration by
France with Germany and Italy.
" Vol. ix of this series, document No. 523.
JULY 1941 149
The Government of the Reich and the Italian Government make the
following declaration to the French Government : 18
If France, as a result of the Anglo-American attack on French
North Africa, -will participate with all the resources at her command
in the war against England and the United States and in the Euro-
pean war of liberation against Bolshevism on the side of the Axis
Powers, they will give France the following assurance :
1. France shall retain her territorial possessions in Europe in ac-
cordance with the status of 1914.
2. France shall retain her colonial possessions in Africa. Certain
changes which within the framework of the final settlement of the
entirS African colonial situation should also be necessary in the French
colonial possessions, among others, shall be equalized by the Axis
Powers by compensations of at least equal value.
"This draft declaration follows the Appendix to the French note without any
further comments or notations. The French text is filmed on F10/480. In the
Abetz Memorandum of July 1, (see footnote 2) the Appendix to the French note
closes with this sentence: "In the opinion of the French Government this new
regime could be established on the following principles ;" This is followed by : a
draft of a provisional treaty between Germany, Italy, and France ; a secret draft
protocol ; a French declaration joining the Tripartite Pact ; a joint declaration
by the German and Italian Governments, and by a draft of a revision of the
Armistice conditions (P3/P160-163).
No. 114
Nuremberg Document 221-L
Unsigned Memorandum 1
top secret Fuhrer's Headqtjartees, July 16, 1941.
Bo/Fu.
A conference attended by Reichsleiter Rosenberg, Reich Minister
Lammers, Field Marshal Keitel, the Reichsmarschall, and me was held
today by order of the Fiihrer at 3 : 00 p. m. in his quarters. The con-
ference began at 3 : 00 p. m. and, including a break for coffee, lasted
until about 8 : 00 p. m.
By way of introduction the Fiihrer emphasized that he wished
first of all to make some basic statements. Various measures were
now necessary ; this was confirmed, among other events, by an assertion
made in an impudent Vichy newspaper that the war against the Soviet
Union was Europe's war and that therefore, it had to be conducted
for Europe as a whole. Apparently the Vichy paper meant to say
by these hints that it ought not to be the Germans alone who benefited
from this war, but that all European states ought to benefit from it.
1 The document is from the files of Martin Bormann. The text is printed in
Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal,
vol. xxxviii, U.S. Exhibit 317, pp. 86-94, and in English translation in Nasi
Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. vii, pp. 1086-1093.
150 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
It was essential that we not proclaim our aims before the whole
world; also this was not necessary, but the chief thing was that we
ourselves know what we wanted. In no case should our own way be
made more difficult by superfluous declarations. Such declarations
were superfluous because we could do everything wherever we had the
power, and what was beyond our power we would not be able to do
anyway.
What we told the world about the motives for our measures ought
to be conditioned, therefore, by tactical reasons. We ought to proceed
here in exactly the same way as we did in the cases of Norway, Den-
mark, Holland, and Belgium. In these cases too we said nothing
about our aims, and if we were clever we would continue in the same
way.
We shall then emphasize again that we were forced to occupy, ad-
minister, and secure a certain area; it was in the interest of the
inhabitants that we provide order, food, traffic, etc., hence our meas-
ures. It should not be recognizable that thereby a final settlement is
being initiated ! We can nevertheless take all necessary measures —
shooting, resettling, etc. — and we shall take them.
But we do not want to make any people into enemies prematurely
and unnecessarily. Therefore we shall act as though we wanted to
exercise a mandate only. It must be clear to us, however, that we
shall never withdraw from these areas.
Accordingly we should act :
1. To do nothing which might obstruct the final settlement, but
to prepare for it only in secret ;
2. To emphasize that we are liberators.
In particular :
The Crimea has to be evacuated by all foreigners and to be settled
by Germans only.
In the same way the former Austrian part of Galicia will become
Keich territory.
Our relations with Rumania are presently good, but one does not
know what our relations will be at any future time. This we have
to consider and we have to draw our frontiers accordingly. One
ought not to be dependent on the good will of other people; we have
to arrange our relations with Rumania in accordance with this
principle.
In principle we have now to face the task of cutting up the giant
cake according to our needs, in order to be able: first, to dominate it;
second, to administer it ; and third, to exploit it.
The Russians have now given an order for partisan warfare behind
our front. This partisan war again has some advantage for us; it
enables us to exterminate everyone who opposes lis.
JULY 1941 151
Principles :
Never again must it be possible to create a military power west of
the Urals, even if we have to wage war for a hundred years in order
to attain this goal. All successors of the Fiihrer must know : Secu-
rity for the Reich exists only if there are no foreign military forces
west of the Urals; it is Germany who undertakes the protection of
this area against all possible dangers. Our iron principle must be
and must remain :
We must never permit anybody but the Germans to carry arms/
This is especially important; even when it seems easier at first to
enHst the armed support of foreign, subjugated nations, it is wrong
to do so. This will prove some day to be to our disadvantage ab-
solutely and unavoidably. Only the German may carry arms, not
the Slav, not the Czech, not the Cossack, nor the Ukrainian !
On no account should we apply a wavering policy such as was done
in Alsace before 1918. What distinguishes the Englishman is his
constant and consistent following of one line and one aim. In this
respect we must absolutely learn from the Englishman. Therefore
we ought never to base our actions on individual contemporary per-
sonalities; here again the conduct of the British in India towards the
Indian princes, etc., ought to be an example : It is always the soldier
who has to consolidate the regime !
We have to create a Garden of Eden in the newly won eastern ter-
ritories; they are vitally important to us; as compared with them
colonies play only an entirely subordinate part.
Even if we divide up certain areas at once, we shall always proceed
in the role of protectors of the Right and of the population. The
terms which are necessary at this time should be selected in accord-
ance with this principle : We shall not speak of new Reich territory,
but of the task which became necessary because of the war.
In particular:
In the Baltic territory the country up to the Diina will now have
to be administered in agreement with Field Marshal Keitel.
Reichsleiter Rosenberg emphasizes that in his opinion a different
treatment of the population is desirable in every Commissariat. In
the Ukraine we should start with attention to cultural matters ; there
we ought to awaken the historical consciousness of the Ukrainians,
establish a university at Kiev, and the like.
The Reichsmarschall on the other hand states that we have to think
first of securing our food supply; everything else can come later.
(Incidental question: Is there still anything like an educated
stratum in the Ukraine, or do upper class Ukrainians exist only as
emigrants outside present day Russia ? )
Rosenberg continues, also in the Ukraine certain efforts toward
independence should be encouraged.
152 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The Reiclismarschall asks the Fiihrer to indicate what areas had
been promised to other states.
The Fiihrer replies, Antonescu desired Bessarabia and Odessa with
a strip (of land) leading west-northwest from Odessa. 2
Upon objections made by the Reiclismarschall and Rosenberg, the
Fiihrer replies that the new frontiers desired by Antonescu contained
little outside the old Rumanian frontiers.
The Fiihrer stresses furthermore that nothing definite had been
promised to the Hungarians, Turks, and Slovaks.
The Fiihrer then submits for consideration whether the former
Austrian part of Galicia ought to be added immediately to the Gen-
eral Government; upon objections being voiced the Fiihrer decides
that this part shall not be added to the General Government but shall
only be placed at the same time under Reich Minister Frank (Lwow) .
The Reiclismarschall considers it right to assign East Prussia several
parts of the Baltic region, e.g., the Forest of Bialystok.
The Fiihrer emphasizes that the entire Baltic area must become
Reich territory.
Likewise the Crimea, including a considerable hinterland (the area
north of the Crimea) must become Reich territory; the hinterland
must be as large as possible.
Rosenberg had misgivings about this because of the Ukrainians
living there.
(Incidentally : It appeared several times that Rosenberg has a soft
spot for the Ukrainians; thus he wishes to enlarge the former Ukraine
to a considerable extent.)
The Fiihrer emphasizes further that the Volga colony too will have
to become Reich territory, also the district around Baku; the latter
will have to become a German concession (military colony).
The Finns wanted East Carelia, 3 but the Kola Peninsula should
come to Germany because of the large nickel mines there.
The annexation of Finland as a federated state should be prepared
with great caution. The area around Leningrad is wanted by the
Finns; the Fiihrer will raze Leningrad to the ground and then hand
it over to the Finns. 4
There ensues a rather long discussion as to the qualifications of
Gauleiter Lohse, 5 who has been considered by Rosenberg as Governor
of the Baltic area. Rosenberg emphasizes again and again that he
had approached Lohse already and it would be very embarrassing if
For Hitler's discussions with Antonescu regarding Rumania's territorial
aspirations to Soviet Russian territory, see vol, xir of this series, document No.
614. Cf . document No. 159.
* Gf. vol. xn of this series, document No. 592 and footnote 3.
* See document No. 388 and footnote 1.
5 Hinrich Lohse, Gauleiter of Schleswig-Holstein.
JULY 1941 153
Lolise were not appointed; for the western part of the Baltic country
Kube 8 was to be appointed, but subordinated to Lohse; for the
Ukraine Rosenberg proposes Sauckel. 7
The Reichsmarschall, however, emphasized the most important
criteria which for the time being must be exclusively decisive for us :
securing of food supplies, and as far as necessary, of the economy ;
securing^of the roads, etc.
The Eeichsmarschall emphasizes that Koch e should either be con-
sidered for the Baltic area because he knew it very well, or that Koch
should receive the Ukraine because Koch was the person with the
greatest initiative and with the best training.
The Fiihrer asked whether Kube could not be appointed as Reich
Commissar for the Moscow area ; Rosenberg and the Reichsmarschall
both thought that Kube was too old for this position.
Upon further representations Rosenberg replied he was afraid that
Koch might soon refuse to obey his (Rosenberg's) instructions; Koch
had, by the way, said this himself.
As against that the Reichsmarschall pointed out that it was after all
not possible for Rosenberg to guide every step of the appointees;
rather these people had to work quite independently.
For the Caucasus area Rosenberg proposed his Stabsleiter, Schicke-
danz. He emphasized time and again that Schickedanz certainly
would fulfill his task very well, a statement which is doubted by
the Reichsmarschall.
Rosenberg then stated Lutze 9 had proposed to him to appoint sev-
eral SA leaders, namely Scheppmann for Kiev; Manthey, Dr. Ben-
necke, and Litzmann for Estonia; and Burgomaster Dr. Drexler for
Latvia.
The Fiihrer has no objections to the employment of the SA leaders.
Rosenberg then states he had received a letter from Ribbentrop
who desired the participation of the Foreign Ministry; 10 but he
asked the Fiihrer to state that the internal organization of the newly
acquired areas was no concern of the Foreign Ministry. The Fiihrer
absolutely shares this view. For the time being it will suffice for
the Foreign Ministry to appoint a liaison officer to Reiehsleiter
Rosenberg.
The Fiihrer emphasizes that the Ukraine will undoubtedly be the
most important district for the next 3 years. Therefore it would be
best to appoint Koch there; if Sauckel were to be employed it would
be better to use him in the Baltic area.
' Wilhelm Kube, former Oberpriisident and Gauleiter of Brandenburg.
' Fritz Sauckel, Gauleiter of Thuringia.
" Erich Koch, Gauleiter of East Prussia.
'Viktor Lutze, Chief of Staff of the SA,
" See vol. xii of this series, document No. 649, footnote 6.
154 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN" FOREIGN POLICY
Rosenberg further states that he intends to appoint Schmeer,
Selzner, and Manderbach as Commissars in the Moscow area. The
Fiihrer desires that Holz be employed too, and that the former Gau-
leiter Frauenfeld should be placed in. charge of administration of
the Crimea.
Rosenberg states he intends also to employ Captain von Petersdorff
because of his special merits; general consternation, general rejec-
tion. The Fiihrer and the Reichsmarschall both insist that without
doubt von Petersdorff is insane.
Rosenberg states furthermore that the employment of the Burgo-
master of Stuttgart, Strolin, has been proposed to him. There were
no objections.
Since Kube is considered too old for the Moscow district by both
the Reichsmarschall and Rosenberg, Kasche is to take over this
district.
{ Memorandum for Party Comrade Klopf er :
Please ask Dr. Meyer " at once for the files concerning the plans
for the future organization and the intended appointments.)
The Reichsmarschall emphasizes he intended to assign to Gauleiter
Terboven 12 the exploitation of the Kola Peninsula ; the Fiihrer agrees.
The Fiihrer emphasizes that Lohse, provided he feels equal to this
task, should take over the Baltic area; Kasche Moscow; Koch the
Ukraine; Frauenfeld the Crimea; Terboven Kola; and Schickedanz
the Caucasus.
Reichsleiter Rosenberg then broached the question of providing
for the security of the administration.
The Fiihrer tells the Reichsmarschall and the Field Marshal that
he had always urged that the police regiments be provided with
armored cars ; this has proved to be most necessary for police opera-
tions within the newly-occupied eastern territories, because a police
regiment equipped with the appropriate number of armored cars of
course could perform much service. Otherwise though, the Fiihrer
pointed out the security protection was very thin. However, the
Reichsmarschall was going to transfer all his training fields to the
new territories, and if necessary even Junker 52's could drop bombs
in case of riots. Naturally this giant area would have to be pacified
as quickly as possible; the best solution was to shoot anybody who
looked askance.
Field Marshal Keitel emphasizes that the inhabitants themselves
ought to be made responsible for their affairs because it was of course
impossible to put a sentry in front of every shed or railway station.
u Alfred Meyer, Gauleiter of Westphalia, North.
" Josef Terboven, Reich Commissar for occupied Norway.
JULY 1941 155
The inhabitants had to understand that anybody who did not per-
form, his duties properly would be shot, and that they would be held
responsible for every offense.
Upon a question of Reichsleiter Rosenberg the Fiihrer replied that
newspapers, e.g., for the Ukraine too, would have to be reestablished,
in order t<^ obtain means of influencing the inhabitants.
After the interval the Fiihrer emphasized that we had to under-
stand that the Europe of today was nothing but a geographical term ;
in reality Asia extended up to our previous frontiers.
Reichsleiter Rosenberg then described the organizational arrange-
ment he intended to establish; he did not intend to appoint a perma-
nent deputy of the Reich Commissar from the outset, but always the
most efficient of the General Commissars would be called upon to
deputize for the Reich Commissar.
Rosenberg will set up four departments in the office of the Reich
Commissar: first for the general administration; second for politics;
third for economics ; fourth for engineering and architecture.
(Incidentally : The Fiihrer emphasizes that activities on the part of
the churches are out of the question. Papen had sent him through the
Foreign Ministry a long memorandum 13 in which it was asserted
now was the right moment to reestablish the churches ; but this was
completely out of the question. )
The Reichsmarschall will detail to Rosenberg's organization Minis-
terialdirektoren Schlotterer andRiecke.
Reichsleiter Rosenberg requests appropriate premises to house his
administration ; he requests the premises of the Trade Mission of the
Soviet Union in Lietzenberger Street ; the Foreign Ministry, however,
was of the opinion that these premises were extraterritorial. The
Fiihrer replies that this was nonsense; Reich Minister Lammers was
charged to inform the Foreign Ministry they were to hand over these
premises to Rosenberg at once and without any negotiations.
Rosenberg then proposes to detail a liaison officer to the Fiihrer ; his
aide, Koeppen, was to be appointed; the Fiihrer agrees and adds that
Koeppen should take over a role parallel to that of Hewel.
Reich Minister Dr. Lammers then read the rough drafts which he
had made. (See the annex! 14 )
"Not found. In a note of July 17 (1247/337693) Counselor Etzdorf, the
Foreign Ministry's representative with the High Command of the Army, recorded
the following :
"Papen has proposed to the Fiihrer that Russia be led back to Christianity in
order to strengthen morale. Fiihrer : Idea of the 'old Jockey' missionary activity
was entirely out of the question. If one did it at all, one should permit all the
Christian denominations to enter Russia 'in order that they club each other to
death with their crucifixes'."
" Not found.
156 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
A longer discussion takes place concerning the authority of the
Reichsfiihrer SS ; obviously at the same time all the participants have
in mind the authority of the Reichsmarschall.
The Fiihrer, the Reichsmarschall, and others reiterate that Himmler
was to receive no other authority than he had in Germany proper ; but
this much was absolutely necessary.
The Fiihrer emphasizes repeatedly that this quarrel would soon
subside in practice; he recalls the excellent cooperation between the
Army and the Luftwaffe at the front.
In conclusion it is decided to call the Baltic country "Ostland."
Annexes. 15
18 Not found.
No. 115
5077/H292425-427
Memorandum ly an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Beklin, July 16, 1941.
d ix 44.
Subject : Letter of M. Wolodymyr Stachiw of July 2, 1941.
Respectfully submitted to Consul General Grosskopf with the
request that further action be taken.
If it should be considered necessary that the matter be submitted to
the Foreign Minister, the Foreign Minister's Secretariat would be
grateful if a position were taken. 1
Bruns
[Enclosure]
Berlin- Wilmersdokf, July 2, 1941.
Youk Excellency, Highly Honored Reich Foreign Minister : On
behalf of the Ukrainian Government for the Western Ukraine in
Lwow I take the liberty of communicating the following :
On June 30, 1941, there met in Lwow, the capital of Western
Ukraine, a Ukrainian national assembly where Jaroslav Stecjko, the
deputy of the leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,
OUN., proclaimed the establishment of authority of the Ukrainian
State in the Western Ukraine and read aloud the proclamation of the
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.
At the same time the proclamation of the leader of the OUN.,
Stepan Bandera, was read, according to which Jaroslav Stecjko was
appointed chief of the Government of Western Ukraine.
1 See document No. 138.
JULY 1941 157
Speeches of welcome were held by Bishop Dr. Joseph Slipyj in
the name of the Metropolitan of the Uniate Greek Church, Andreas
Count Scheptyckyj, and by Dr. Hrynioch in the name of the
Ukrainian Legion and its commander Captain Eoman Schuchewytsch.
High officers of the victorious Wehrmacht were present at this
Ukrainian ^assembly. Captain Professor Dr. H. Koch 2 made the
welcoming speech on behalf of the Wehrmacht.
By radio the Ukrainian Government in Lwow appointed the under-
signed as its Plenipotentiary Extraordinary with the Government
of the German Reich and with the governments of the countries
allied with and friendly to the German Reich.
This communication is being sent to the Imperial Japanese Gov-
ernment, the Royal Italian Government, and the Governments of the
countries which have acceded to the Tripartite Pact. 3
Yours, etc. Wolodymik Stachiw
* Representative of the Abwehr.
•An almost Identical communication dated July 3 (105/113736-37) was
addressed to the Rumanian Minister in Berlin. Woermann's memorandum
U.St. S.Pol. 652 of July 16 (105/113735) records that Bossy showed him the
communication that day and in that connection asked about the future shape
of the Soviet Union. Woermann replied that nothing could be said at the
time on this matter and emphasized that Germany did not recognize any
Ukrainian government in Lwow or its representative in Berlin.
No. 116
4828/E241315-18
The Director of the Department for German Internal Affairs to the
Legation in Croatia
Telegram
No. 650 Berlin, July 17, 1941—2 : 10 a. m.
Received July 17 — 2 : 15 a. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 577 of June 25. *
The draft of a treaty between the German and Croatian Govern-
ments concerning the resettlement of Slovenes and Serbs in the area
of the former Yugoslav state, which Minister Kasche submitted, 2
has been thoroughly reviewed. The review has shown that it is
expedient not to conclude a formal agreement in consideration of
the fact that no provisions are intended regarding the treatment of
the property of the persons involved in the resettlement which is
being carried out as a war measure, and also in view of the fact
*In this telegram (4828/E241317) Kasche had reported that the Military
Commander in Serbia had agreed to the Croatian request that 30,000 Serbs he
resettled in Serbia in addition to those who were to he resettled in accordance
with the decisions taken in the conference of June 4 (see vol. xn of this series,
document No. 589) .
1 See vol. in of this series, document No. 589, footnote 3.
158 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
that the necessary speed in ^^^^^^^^
with this nrocedure. It is considered to be sufficient if an excnange
Tf L^ betw^i the Legation and the Croatian Government m the
^ arising which go beyond the content of the memorandum would
steps and report regarding them. 3 Luther
T7— ^patch of Au g . V^ t Stl A ** SoSSSS SoS^
reported that an exchange of notes between me £°™ truetlon , The German
SS?^S £ Wan* r cSan^te^aie of Au, 5 are «!»-
on 4828/E241309-14.
No. 117
82/60338-41
r he Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
Tokyo, July 17, 1941-12 : 30 p. m.
MOST URGENT x " ' . J , I , -|7_Q.5f, a m.
No. 1250 of July 16 Reived Ju ly 17-8 • « * £
I have taken the opportunity, together .ith the ^Attaches ^ ; h
armed forces, to discuss the present pohtical J^^ ™*^££
Withdrawalof the Russian Army, which washeld close to the borderby
Ihe Amur railway, was difficult. One would therefore have to reckon
from the very outeet with severe fighting which would have to bring
aLut the annihilation of the enemy. Japan's Army did not £ave at ,t
disposal large mechanized forces like the German Army ^and fl«rf ore
no ranid conquest of territory could be expected The primary oo
•e°cS was therefore the destruction of toW**Vg*o f ^
enemv which might form the support for a Siberian- BolslieviK gov
"nmenlother gene-Is said the same thing. They emphasized that
JULY 1941 159
effective preparations to strengthen the Array had not begun till after
June 22. Prior to that date Germany had not expressed any wish for
Japan's participation in a possible conflict with Russia. Consequently,
the Japanese Army had made no preparations against the Soviet
Union in order not to alert it prematurely and act contrary to any
plans that the Germans might have.
Vice Admiral Kondo, Chief of Staff, who has headed the naval staff
for 2 years, spoke enthusiastically about the success of German arms.
Unfortunately, it was impossible for Japan to go into action immedi-
ately, in view of the lack of preparations and the strength of the
Russian adversary. It was hardly practicable to withdraw large
forces from China. For the Navy it was primarily a question of com-
mitting sufficient naval air forces against about 2,000 remaining com-
bat and pursuit planes of the Russian Far East Army. The naval air
force, which is the backbone of the Japanese Air Force and also takes
a decisive part in land operations, was partly tied down in China.
Other units had to stand by for defense against possible action by the
Americans in East Asia. To be sure, it was not expected that there
would be any serious American-English interference with the Indo-
china operation. 1 However, the Navy, including the air force, had to
be ready for action. In reply to my remark that America was not in
a position to take action and that the American Navy, moreover, was
not rated very highly, he said that in the last 2 years the American
Navy had made great progress in training and that the younger offi-
cer corps in particular *was good. It would be a mistake to under-
estimate the American Navy. Units of it would probably operate
over the South Pacific and attack forward Japanese positions from
the South Sea base (Port Darwin). The Japanese Navy would im-
mediately have supply difficulties. However, he had to concede that
the danger would not become acute for about 6 months. I pointed out
to the Vice Admiral Chief of Staff that if the Russian enemy were
first disposed of, that very fact would then free the Japanese Navy
in the rear; in the contrary case, it was to be feared that the Americans
would obtain a foothold in Kamchatka. Admiral Kondo replied
that the Japanese Navy was on its guard and would immediately take
action to prevent that. Japan would not permit military support of
Russia, and the Russian Government had indicated to Ambassador
Tatekawa that it expected American war material only through Iran.
Russia had only an insignificant amount of merchant tonnage in the
Pacific and the English and Americans would hardly make any ton-
nage available. Reminded of the possibility of procuring raw mate-
rials, Kondo admitted that recently three Russian tankers had been
sighted at the latitude of Sakhalin and a few Russian ships were now
1 See document No. 126.
160 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
lying in Manila, probably in order to take on copra and other goods
there. Admiral Kondo pointed out in conclusion that the question of
the timing of Japanese intervention was largely a matter to be decided
by the Army, which would undoubtedly have to wait for the end of the
rainy season, that is, till the middle or the end of August. He asked
that it be borne in mind that Japan was now in the fifth year of a hard
war. It was important that Japan not suffer any reverse but remain a
strong factor in the event of a conflict with the United States of
America which may become necessary.
From circles close to the Prime Minister and the War Minister I
hear that they are absolutely determined to persist with the China
campaign as the center of Japanese interest. They have not yet come
round to the conviction that a determined attack first on the Russian
and then on the Anglo-Saxon position will also force Chiang Kai-
shek to give in. The Army leaders want to make adequate prepara-
tions in any case before beginning a new military operation, especially
since the position of the Army, after years of war, is no longer the
same as it was 5 years ago. The Army leadership also intends for the
time being to await the result of the Saigon operation and at the same
time to proceed consistently with further mobilization. The political
leadership is toying with the idea of convoking the Diet at the end
of August in order, if necessary, to put through an enabling act. The
internal political situation in Russia is being closely watched, with
occasional expressions of hope that independence movements will
arise in parts of Siberia. This idea, it seems to me, is also suggested
in Matsuoka's oral statement of July 2 to the Foreign Minister. 2 It
is further indicated by Matsuoka's repeated questions about when
the Stalin regime will collapse and the question about German ideas
on the future internal organization of Russia.
Under the impact of the great German victories overcautious con-
siderations will in my opinion finally be pushed aside by public opinion
and by the war sentiment of the officers' corps, which is growing as
mobilization progresses. To be sure, there is still great anxiety about
a long war with the United States. On being reminded of the aggres-
sive attitude of the United States and asked what Japan's reaction
might be, leading figures in the Armed Forces and the Foreign Min-
istry repeatedly replied to me that this matter should be handled by
the three-member Commission of the Tripartite Pact. 3
Ott
' Document No. &t.
* See vol. xi of this aeries, documents Nos. 153 and 270, and vol. xn, document
No. 304.
JULY 1941 161
No. 118
63/42336-38
The Charged'' Affaires in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT COPENHAGEN, July 17, 1941.
secret Received July 17—7 : 10 p. ra.
No. 915 of July 17
With reference to your telegram No. 772 of July 13, 1 and with
reference to my telegrams Nos. 882 of July 8 i and 889 of July 9. 3
The request of the Foreign Ministry for official information has
so far had the result that the American Charge d' Affaires * has sent
over Roosevelt's statement to Congress, which is known to you, to-
gether with the letter of the Icelandic Prime Minister to Roosevelt,
and the reply to it. a The Icelandic Charge" d'Aff aires « transmitted
a copy of a telegram from the Prime Minister from Reykjavik, in
which it is confirmed that all parties of the Althing, with the excep-
tion of the Communists, have approved the Jonasson-Roosevelt agree-
ment. This circumstance, it is thought in authoritative circles in the
Foreign Ministry, precludes a protest by the King because he, too,
would violate the Icelandic Constitution, upon which he took an oath,
and, apart from the practical futility of the entire step, this would
bring him into opposition to the people and Parliament in Iceland,
in which he would be in the wrong.
I, on the other hand, took the very emphatic stand that in connection
with the most recent events, one came up against the amazing and
inexplicable fact that the same Icelanders who, less than a year ago,
had protested most vehemently against the English occupation, 7 and
in January 1941, used an obscure American press notice to proclaim to
the world emphatically that they would prevent any form of Anglo-
American traffic in arms through Iceland's harbors and intended to
remain very strictly neutral, 8 were now, without discernible opposi-
1 Document No. 102.
1 See document No. 102, footnote 1.
' In this telegram (130/70788) ETotze reported that according to the Danish
Foreign Minister, the American Charge d'Affaires had received no instructions
regarding the landing of American forces in Iceland.
' Mahlon F. Perkins.
6 For the test of President Roosevelt's message of July 7 to Congress trans-
mitting a message received from the Prime Minister of Iceland, Hermann Jonas-
son, and the President's reply, see Department of State, Bulletin, 1941, vol. v, p.
15.
' Jon Krabbe.
7 British troops landed in Iceland on May 10, 1940. Cf. Foreign Relation* of
the United States, 1940, vol. n, pp. 679-684.
'Details concerning the Icelandic protest are found in a memorandum by
Grundherr of May 19, 1941 (130/70742-52) which discusses developments in
Iceland.
682-905—64 — —16
162 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
tion, voluntarily summoning into the country tens of thousands of
American soldiers. We had thought of a statement to be issued by
the King, because despite a voluntary aloofness since April 1940, he
must still be regarded as the de facto head of the state. Even now
we believed that such a statement, particularly in view of the future
of Denmark and Iceland, could be of great importance. But what
mattered, above all, was that this act of a new, forcible occupation of
Iceland by foreign troops should not be accepted without any expres-
sion of opposition from the Danes. One should not be deterred by
formalistic objections from speaking plainly in a matter so decisive
for Iceland's future position in the European world.
After this discussion, M. von Scavenius called" in his aides and in my
presence instructed them first of all to assemble material and prepare
texts for an official statement which would take into account the con-
stitutional objections, and which could ultimately be issued by the
Minister President s or the King. He said he would inform me as
soon as possible of his proposals on this matter. 10 In addition, mate-
rial was to be prepared in order that through the pens of well-known
journalists, like Professor Gudmund Hatt, attention might be called
publicly in more comprehensive form, less bound by formal objections,
to the sudden change in position of the Icelanders, its internal
implications and the importance of the entire question for the future.
In view of the age and the well-known general attitude of the King,
it is improbable that after the vote of the Icelandic Parliament, he can
be induced to take some sort of public stand, particularly since he has
refrained from any such interference since April 1940. As far as the
contemplated statement by the Government and the public discussion
in the press are concerned, it will take constant pressure by us to
induce the Danes to take more effective action.
The Danish Minister in Eeykjavik, 11 who has likewise been asked
for his reaction, but who is probably hampered the most by Anglo-
American censorship, has not yet replied. 12 In the Foreign Ministry
they still hope to get from him information through special channels
concerning actual sentiment in Iceland.
Kotze
Thorvald Stauning. . tl , ..
10 In telegram No. 989 of Aug. 4 (62/42345-49) Renthe-Fink transmitted the
confidential draft of the statement which the Minister President was going to
read in Parliament regarding the landing of American troops in Iceland. German
proposals for changes in the text of the draft and Renthe-Fink's reports about
these changes are contained in Weizsacker's instruction of Aug. 8 (130/70814-18)
and in Copenhagen telegrams of Aug. 12 (unnumbered: 62/42359-60), Nos. 1031
of Aug. 14 (62/42361-66), and 1038 of Aug. 16 (62/42367).
" F. le Sage de Fontenay. .
" Renthe-Fink transmitted the report of the Danish legation at Reykjavik
in telegram No. 968 of July 30 (62/42340-^1) .
JULY 1941 163
No. 119
34/24761-63
Fiikrer's Decree of July 17
Fuhker's Headquarters, July 17, 1941.
Enclosure 1 zu WFSt/Abt. L (IV/Qu) No. 334/41 of July 18, 1941.
Concerning the administration of the newly-occupied eastern
territories.
In order to restore and maintain public order and public life in the
newly-occupied eastern territories I order as follows :
Paragraph 1
As soon and in so far as the military operations in the newly-
occupied eastern territories are terminated, the administration of these
territories will be transferred from the military authorities to the au-
thorities of civil administration. I shall in each case designate by
special decree the territories which are accordingly to be transferred
to the civil administration, and the date at which this is to be done. 1
Paragraph 2
The civil administration in the newly occupied eastern territories,
in so far as these territories are not incorporated in the administration
of the adjoining areas of the Reich or of the General Government,
shall be placed under the "Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern
Territories."
Paragraph 3
The military sovereign rights and powers shall be exercised in the
newly-occupied eastern territories by the Wehrmacht commanders
in accordance with my decree of June 25, 1941. 2
The powers of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan in the
newly-occupied eastern territories are separately defined by my decree
of June 29, 1941, s and those of the Reichsfuhrer SS and Chief of
1 A Fiihrer decree of July 17 (34/24765) assigned the civil administration of
the region of Bialystok to the Oberprasldent of the province of East Prussia
a ad that of former Polish Galicia to the Governor General. The territories of
the former states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia together with the area in-
habited by the White Ruthenians was designated the Reich Commissariat, "Ost-
land," whose precise boundaries were to be stated later.
A decree of July 18 (34/24764) separated the western part of this area from
the zone of operations and ordered the civil administration to take over effective
July 25.
A directive of July 22 (5083/E292814-14/3) placed the regions of Vilna, Bialy-
stok, and Lw6w under civil administration effective Aug. 1.
'Not printed (5078/E292510-11).
■Not printed (5078/E292512) .
164 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the German Police by my decree of July 17, 1941, 4 and are not affected
by the following provisions.
Paragraph 4
I appoint Reiehsleiter Alfred Rosenberg Reich Minister for the Oc-
cupied Eastern Territories. He shall have his headquarters in Berlin.
Paragraph 5
The parts of the newly occupied eastern areas placed under the
Eeich Minister for the Occupied Eastern territories shall be divided
into Reich Commissariats, these into General Regions \General-
hesirke] and these again into Districts [Kreisgebiete]. Several dis-
tricts can be combined into a Main Region. The Reich Minister for
the Occupied Eastern Territories shall issue the more specific
regulations concerning this.
Paragraph 6
At the head of each Reich Commissariat there shall be a Reich Com-
missar; at the head of each General Region a General Commissar;
and at the head of every district a District Commissar. In case of the
formation of a Main Region a Main Commissar shall head it.
The Reich Commissars and the General Commissars shall be ap-
pointed by me, the heads of the main departments in the offices of the
Reich Commissars as well as the Main Commissars and District Com-
missars shall be appointed by the Reich Minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories.
Paragraph 7
The Reich Commissars shall be subordinate to the Reich Minister for
the Occupied Eastern Territories and shall receive their instructions
from him exclusively, in so far as paragraph 3 does not apply.
Paragraph 8
It shall he the responsibility of the Reich Minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories to legislate for the newly-occupied eastern terri-
tories placed under him. He may delegate to the Reich Commissars
the power to legislate.
Paragraph 9
The Reich Commissars shall be responsible for the entire adminis-
tration of their areas with respect to civil affairs.
As long as military operations are in progress the security of the
*Not printed (34/24766). This decree gave Himmler responsibility for the
policing of the occupied eastern areas and also authorized him to Issue directives
in this field to the Belch Commissars.
JULY 1941 165
operation of the railroads and the mails is the responsibility of the
competent supreme authorities of the Eeich in accordance with the
instructions of the Chief of the OKW. A different arrangement may
be considered for the time after the conclusion of the military
operations.
Paragraph 10
In order that the measures taken by the Eeich Minister for the Oc-
cupied Eastern Territories or the Reich Commissars in their areas may
be harmonized with the larger viewpoints of the interests of the Eeich,
the Eeich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories shall keep
close contact with the supreme Eeich authorities. In case of differ-
ences of opinion which cannot be resolved by direct negotiations, my
decision shall be obtained through the Eeich Minister and Chief of the
Eeich Chancellery.
Paragraph 11
The regulations necessary for carrying out and supplementing this
decree shall be issued by the Eeich Minister for the Occupied Eastern
Territories in agreement with the Eeich Minister and Chief of the
Eeich Chancellery and the Chief of the OKW.
The Fuhrer
Adolf Hitler
The Chief of the OKW
Keitel
The Reich Minister and
Chief of the Eeich Chancellery
Dr. Lammers
No. 120
195/139184-87
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Departinent
U. St.S. Pol. 661 Berlin, July 17, 1941.
M. Bose called on me today after his return. 1
I first informed him regarding the tasks assigned to State Secretary
Keppler. After his visit with me M. Bose called on Herr Keppler.
Bose first spoke in detail concerning the repercussions of the Ger-
man-Eussian war on public opinion in India. The Soviet Union had
been popular in India, especially among the intelligentsia, from which
1 Following Ills visit to Germany the Indian nationalist leader, Subhas Chandra
Bose, had gone to Rome on May 29 (see vol. xn of this series, document No. 561
and footnotes 3 and 4). In a memorandum of July 10 (195/139182-83) Woer-
mann recorded having received a letter from Bose who announced that he was
coming to Germany and would arrive in Berlin by July 14 at the latest. In this
letter of July 5, which is attached to Woermann's memorandum, Bose remarked
that his talk with Oiano was not encouraging and that prospects for the realiza-
tion of his plans looked gloomy as a result of the outbreak of the war in the east.
166 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAJST FOREIGN POLICY
the leader group came, because in India they believed that the Soviet
Union was an anti-imperialist power and thus the natural ally of
India against England. The German-Russian pact of 1939 had been
a climax for India. It had made it possible for the basically anti-
National Socialist intelligentsia now to regard Germany and Italy as
those powers which, in friendship with the Soviet Union, would put
an end to the British rule in India, although the British propaganda
had succeeded in preserving hostile feelings against the Axis Powers
in large parts of India. In the German-Russian war the feelings of
the Indian people were very decidedly on the Russian side, because the
Indian people were sure that Germany was the aggressor and thus
also an imperialist power dangerous to India. Even after a complete
German victory over Russia it would be difficult to change public opin-
ion in India in this regard.
At the same time Bose expects — and there are already reports from
London confirming this — that England will now carry out reforms in
India that will make it appear inviting to that portion of public
opinion which is always inclined to compromises to continue to bet on
the English, while at the same time the danger of a German attack on
India is pictured ; not in the sense of a liberation of the Indian people
but of a replacement of British rule by German rule.
Bose expects that India will become even more than before a center
for the development of British military power and considers it very
probable that England will advance not through Afghanistan but
through Iran in order to seize first the oil fields and then to join hands
with the Soviet Union in the Caucasus region.
Bose's statements indicated that, away from Berlin, he is strongly
influenced by the Soviet thesis even in the question of the origin of
the German- Russian conflict, so that it will be one of the first tasks
to set him right on this point.
I told Bose that we adhered unchanged to the intention of a procla-
mation in favor of a free India ; 2 naturally a favorable moment had to
be chosen for this.
At this point M. Bose became very excited and asked that the Foreign
Minister be told that this proclamation should be issued as quickly as
possible. Every day that passed gave England the lead with the
projected measures of reform in India, whereas on the other hand he
did not see any reason for holding back the proclamation. However,
he could understand that the moment had to be chosen by judging the
situation as a whole.
I did not deal in detail in our short conversation with the other cur-
rent questions, in particular with that of preparations here for the
establishment of a free India 3 center. It was obvious, however, that
' See vol. xir of this series, document No. 553.
' In English in the original.
JULY 1941 167
for Bose these questions are of lesser interest as long as lis does not
have the certainty that the declaration regarding a free India will be
issued.
I refer also to the report of July 13 * from the German Embassy in
Rome and the memorandum of the Italian Foreign Minister contained
therein regarding Bose's conversations in Rome. The idea discussed
there in point 4, of keeping Bose in reserve in a neutral country for a
later suitable moment, appears to me to be inapt.
Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister. Proposals for the
further treatment of the questions concerned are being prepared by
State Secretary Keppler and me.
Woermann
4 Report No. 61 g. (41/28496; 2849S^501).
No. 121
1527/373694-85
The Charge d? Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
urgent Washington, July 18, 1941 — 9 : 03 p. m.
secret Received July 19 — 8 : 20 a. m.
No. 2301 of July 18
1, The opposition is incessantly demanding of Roosevelt and Knox
an authentic interpretation of their orders to the American fleets which
was announced in Roosevelt's message to Congress * on the occasion of
Iceland. Assertions by the opposition that the American fleets had
received orders from Roosevelt to shoot at German war vessels have
become so annoying to the President that he felt compelled in his press
conference today again to deal with this matter in a detailed fashion.
The English text of his statement to the press conference in the United
Press version follows en clair as No. 2302.* According to this Roosevelt
said the following : The occupation of Iceland was simply necessary
for the defense of both the United States and the Western Hemisphere
as a whole in order to forestall seizure by an unfriendly power. For
the protection and maintenance of the American garrisons employed
for this it is imperative that the lines of communication with Iceland
be kept open.
The President interpreted this statement in the sense that because of
basic military considerations he had to refuse to state what means
the fleets would use in order to keep the lines of communication with
Iceland open.
1 See document No. 118, footnote 5.
•Not found.
168 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
These evasive tactics of parliamentary maneuvers [Parlamentsver-
handhmg] indicate that on the one hand he is trying to calm the oppo-
sition which is troublesome for him, but that on the other hand he does
not want to disappoint the English but rather to encourage them, as
they might fear that the opposition had forced him to withdraw a
possible order to shoot.
2. In this connection the leading Senator of the noninterventionist
opposition informed me that Roosevelt always expresses himself un-
clearly also for the purpose of being able to exploit to his best advan-
tage any possible incident with the German naval forces. The leader
of the opposition was deeply concerned about the gravity of the situa-
tion developing from these dishonest statements by the President. He
urgently let it be suggested to me that everything be done to ensure
that the German Government saw through these intrigues by Roose-
velt aimed at provoking an incident with every possible means. Time
and again he stressed that the calm dignity of the Reich Government,
which did not allow itself to be provoked by any American impudence,
had so far been successful in that the opposition had had the time to
rally and to organize. The Fuhrer's restraint, as he well knew, put
Roosevelt in a white heat. If an incident could be avoided until the end
of this year the opposition, in the opinion of its leaders, would be so
strong that no one would be able to induce this country any longer to
take an active part in the war ; by that time, namely, the majority of
the American people would be sufficiently convinced of the selfishness
of Britian's policy and conduct of the war as well as of the lack of
scruples of the American interventionists and. would likewise have
gained clarity regarding the steps toward American military
intervention.
Thomsen
No. 122
496/233480
Memorandum oy an Official of Political Division IM
Berlin, July 18, 1941.
zuPol.IM2247g.Rs. 1
With reference to telegram No. 2443 of July 17 from Madrid. 2
On the basis of strictly confidential arrangements between the Ger-
man Navy and the Spanish Naval Command, German submarines
1 Pol. I M 2247 not identified. It may be Madrid telegram No. 2443 of July 17.
See footnote 2.
■ In this telegram (95/106953) an official of tee German Embassy reported that
it was clear from the British note of protest to the Spanish Government that the
British were aware of the submarine supply action by the German Naval Attache 1
in the Canary Islands.
JULY 1941 169
have for some time been supplied by German tenders based on Canary
Islands ports. 3
According to a communication received from the Naval Operations
Staff in reference to the above telegram from Madrid, it appears that
the English have closely observed such a supply operation of a Ger-
man submarine. The detailed and correct information relating
thereto in the British note of protest leaves no doubt in that respect.
The Naval Operations Staff has the impression that the Spaniards
will not let themselves be affected by the English protest and are
prepared to continue their collaboration. The German Naval Attache
in Madrid,* however, has on his own taken care to have these supply
operations discontinued for the next months. 6
Herewith submitted to Ambassador Hitter.
von Geote
* See vol. xi of this series, documents Nos. 268 and 450.
* Cmdr. C. Meyer-Dohner.
6 For further developments see documents Nos. 391 and 403.
No. 123
1007/307749-57
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Konigsbeeg, July 18, 1941.
Brief for the Foreign Minister
By telegram No. 1247 of July 15, 1 the German Embassy in Tokyo
reported the counterproposals which the Japanese Government made
regarding the text of the proposed Japanese- American agreement. 2
Using the text communicated by telegram No. 731 of May 13 from
Tokyo a as a basis, the wording as amended by the changes now pro-
posed is as follows : *
"Actuated by a desire to restore their traditional friendship, the
Governments of Japan and the United States will embark upon the
negotiation of a general agreement with a view to establishing, by a
joint effort, a just peace in the Pacific and thus arresting the tragic
confusion that now threatens civilization.
'Not printed (82/60328-32).
1 What is involved here are Japanese counterproposals to the American draft
proposal of June 21. See document No. 88 and footnote 6, which in turn was
a reply to the Japanese proposal of May 12 (see vol. in of this series, document
No. 512, footnote 2) .
8 See vol. xii of this series, document No. 512, footnote 2.
4 The texts of the American and Japanese drafts cited in the original of the
document printed are actually translations into German of English texts cited
in telegrams Nos. 1247 and. 731 (see footnotes 1 and 3). This has been taken
into account in producing the translation printed here. These English texts
transmitted in the telegrams referred to above are likewise cited in an unsigned
memorandum of July 17 from the Foreign Minister's Secretariat (82/60354-60)
comparing the pertinent American and Japanese drafts.
170 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
"I. The concepts of Japan and the United States respecting inter-
national relations and character of nations.
"The Governments of Japan and the United States jointly acknowl-
edge each other as equally sovereign States and contiguous Pacific
powers. . .
"Both Governments assert the unanimity of their national policies
as directed towards the foundation of a lasting peace and the inaugu-
ration of a new era of respectful confidence and cooperation between
their peoples.
"Both Governments declare that it is their traditional and present
concept and conviction that nations and races compose as members
of a family one household ; each equally enjoying rights and admitting
responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful
processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical
welfare which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are
bound not to destroy for others. There should, of course, be neither
oppression nor exploitation of the backward peoples.
"Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective
traditional concepts on the character of nations and underlying moral
principles of social order and national life will continue to be pre-
served and that they will not be deformed by foreign ideas or ideologi es
contrary to those moral principles and concepts.
"II. The attitudes of both Governments towards the European war.
"It being the common aim of both Governments to establish world
peace, they will join forces with a view to preventing the extension
of the European war and restoring peace speedily when the proper
time arrives"
(Note: The American reply had proposed leaving out the
words "and restoring peace speedily," since there is not at present
any prospect of peace. Japan, on the other hand, proposed sub-
stituting for those words "and restoring peace speedily when the
proper time arrives.")
"The Japanese Government -maintains that the purpose of the
Tripartite Pact was and is defensive and that this purpose indubitably
is thus to contribute to the non-extension of the present war. If,
however, the European war should experience an extension, the
Japanese Government wUl fulfill the obligations of that Treaty and
they will decide their attitude solely by considerations of the defense
of their welfare and security."
(Note: The original text read:
"The Government of Japan believes that the purpose of the
Tripartite Pact was and is defensive and designed to prevent the
participation of nations in the European war [not] present [ly J
involved in it. . .
"The Government of Japan declares that there is no question
that the obligation of military assistance under the Tripartite
Pact comes into force in the case stipulated in article 3 of the
said Pact." ■ »
The American reply had proposed that the two foregoing
paragraphs be omitted entirely. The Japanese Government
JULY 1Q41 171
thereupon made the above counterproposal which is underscored
with dots.) °
"Being pledged to the hate of war the attitude of the United States
towards the European war is and will continue to be determined solely
and exclusively by considerations of the protective defence of its own
national welfare and security. The Government of the United States
declares that it does not and will not resort to any aggressive measure
aimed to assist any one nation against another."
(Note: The American Government proposed as paragraph 4
the following text :
"The Government of the United States maintains that its atti-
tude toward the European hostilities will be determined solely
by considerations of its national security and defense."
The Japanese Government, however, demands in its counter-
proposal mat the old text of the former paragraph 4 be restored
as given above.)
"III. China.
"The Japanese Government declares to the Government of the
United States that the fundamental condition for the solution of the
China affair is not contrary to the principles mentioned in the Konoye
declaration and the arrangements already put into effect in pursuance
of that declaration. The Government of the United States will rec-
ommend to the Chiang Kai-shek regime to enter into negotiations
with the Japanese Government for the purpose of cessation of hostili-
ties and restoration of peaceful relations."
(Note : The American Government had proposed a longer text
for paragraph III, according to which Japan would from the
outset tie her hands with respect to any negotiations with Chiang
Kai-shek. Orally the American Government declared with re-
gard to this that it was against the stationing of Japanese troops
in China, and it demanded finally that the Japanese peace terms
had to be acceptable to Chiang Kai-shek. Instead of that, the
Japanese Government proposed the above text which is under-
scored.)
"IV. Commerce between both nations.
"When an understanding is reached between the two Governments,
Japan and the United States shall assure each other to supply mu-
tually such commodities as are respectively available or required by
them. Both Governments will take steps necessary for the resumption
of normal trade relations as once existed under the treaty of naviga-
tion and commerce between the two countries.
"V. The Economic Activity of both nations in the Southwestern
Pacific Area.
"On the basis of the pledges hereby given the activity of Japan
and of the United States in the Southwestern Pacific area shall be
carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle
of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, the
Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree
5 The passages which in this English translation are italicized are underscored
with dots in the German original of the document.
172 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
to cooperate independently each without the other in the production
and procurement of the natural resources in these areas (such as, for
example, mineral oil, rubber, tin and nickel) which each of the two
countries needs."
(Note: Instead of paragraph V the American reply proposes
a text by which Japan and the United States undertake to co-
operate m the entire Pacific area in questions of trade and raw
materials and not to practice any discrimination. Thereby
America seeks to restore the Open Door in China. The Japanese
counterproposal would, adopt the above-quoted test whicli is
underscored for paragraph V.)
"VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilisation in
the Pacific.
"A. Both Governments declare that the policy underlying this
understanding is peace in the Pacific area, and further that it is their
fundamental purpose through cooperative efforts to contribute to the
maintenance and preservation of peace in the Pacific area, and that
neither of them has territorial designs in the area mentioned.
"B. The Governments of Japan and the United States jointly guar-
antee the independence of the Philippine Islands on the condition that
the latter observes permanent neutrality and accords to the Japanese
subjects a treatment equal to the Commonwealth citizens.
u O. The Government of the United States wUl make endeavors that
amicable consideration shall be accorded to Japanese emigration to
the United States. Japanese immigrants shall be placed on a basis of
equality with other nations, free from discrimination."
(Note: With reference to paragraph VI the American reply
stipulates that a guarantee of the independence and neutralization
of the Philippines is not to be given immediately but only when
it is desired by the United States. The Japanese counterproposal
has the present text under paragraph VI, the passages underscored
being new. The American reply would delete clause C
completely.)
Telegram No. 1247 of July 15 from Tokyo, on the basis of whieh the
above text is composed as it now appears in accordance with the Jap-
anese proposals, also states the following :
"Foreign Minister Matsuoka, whom I have been trying to see since
the end of last week, is indisposed for the time being and informed
me through his office that his doctor had ordered for him complete
rest. In response to an extremely urgent request from the Russian
Ambassador, however, he had gotten up on Saturday e to receive him
briefly. The doctor had thereupon strictly forbidden him to engage
in any activity if he wished to be able to work again in the next few
weeks. In his absence the head of the European Department * in-
formed me of the contents of the American reply to the Japanese
communication of last May. At the same time he said that the Japa-
nese Government had drawn up a counterproposal, which would be
* i.e., July 12.
'Ryuki Sakamoto.
JULY 1941 173
transmitted to the American Government in the next few days by
Ambassador Nomura. 8 Unfortunately, he was not in a position to
furnish the exact text of the American proposal, but he would reveal
the substance of it. A few unmentioned details concerned only the
Chinese question. The American reply and the Japanese counterpro-
posal are both largely based on the text transmitted by telegram No.
731 of May 13, 1941. The head of the European Department also
informed me that Ambassador Nomura had received instructions to
tell the American Government that the oral statements by Secretary
of State Hull about certain members of the Japanese Government
were considered inappropriate. 9 One did not wish to assume that the
American Government intended thereby to intervene in internal Jap-
anese affairs. The Head of the European Department emphasizes as
his personal opinion that the Japanese counterproposal merely tossed
the ball back ; on account of the great divergence of views an agreement
was out of the question. On the China question the positions of the
two Governments were diametrically opposed to each other,"
(Weber)
s Cf. the Konoye memoirs, printed In Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings before
the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Cong.,
2nd sess., pt. 20, Joint Committee Exhibit No. 173, pp. 3994-4003.
'This presumably refers to a portion of the oral statement handed to Am-
bassador Nomura by Secretary of State Hull on June 21 (see document No. 88
and footnote 6) where Hull spoke of some influential Japanese leaders who
were committed to the support of Germany and who made public statements
emphasizing Japan's commitments under the Tripartite Pact. "So long as such
leaders maintain this attitude in their official positions and apparently seek to
influence public opinion In Japan in the direction indicated, is it not illusory
to expect that adoption of a proposal such as the one under consideration offers
a basis for achieving substantial results along the desired lines?" See Foreign
Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941, vol. n, p. 485.
No. 124
82/60304
Memorandum by Ambassador Stahmer
By Teletype
to Special Train Westfalen
Berlin, July 18, 1941.
Brief for the Foreign Minister for Presentation to the Fuhrer
Subject: Situation in Japan after the resignation of the Cabinet.
For Weber.
The resignation of the Cabinet * is attributable to inner conflicts over
the attitude of the Japanese Government with respect to foreign
1 The resignation of the Konoye Cabinet had been first reported by Ott in
telegram No. 1258 of July 16 (82/60345). In telegram No. 1271 of July (82/-
60348-49) Ott stated that the "Cabinet crisis had come as a surprise even for
those who were initiated" and then gave a detailed discussion of the background
of the crisis based on information "from generally well informed sources." The
resignation of the Konoye Cabinet was also the subject of a brief memorandum
for the Foreign Minister drawn up by Woermann on July 17 (82/60352-53).
174 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
policy. The Minister of War 2 and the Minister of the Navy 3 pressed
for an energetic implementation of foreign policy and acceleration of
the military preparations against Russia and in Indochina, which -were
opposed by the Foreign Minister, who apparently still wanted to ad-
here to his policy of delay. There are now two possibilities: (1) A
new cabinet will be formed with a Foreign Minister who will vigor-
ously push developments in Japan in accordance with the Tripartite
Pact. (2) A cabinet will 'be formed which will continue trying to steer
a middle course. I consider the first possibility very likely, because
according to reports just received Prince Konoye has been asked to
form the new government and the former Minister of War and the
Minister of the Navy will remain in office. At the time of the con-
clusion of the Tripartite Pact these two Ministers worked very vig-
orously to help bring the Pact into being, and it may definitely be
assumed that they will press for a speeding up of military preparations
and a clear and unequivocal stand by the Japanese Government. The
Minister of the Navy in particular is reputed to be a strong personality.
General Araki, likewise a very dynamic officer, who has already in
the past taken an unequivocal stand in favor of the Tripartite Pact,
seems to have the best prospects of becoming the future Foreign Min-
ister. The candidacy of Toyoda, the former Minister of Commerce,
which has been mentioned in the American press, is considered ex-
tremely unlikely in the Japanese Embassy here.
Stahmer
* Gen. HIdekl Tojo.
1 Adm. Koshiro Oikawa.
VI 1/0362;
F2/038O-7T
No. 125
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
No. A2335 Ankaea, July 14, 1941.
[Sent July 18.] *
Received July 20. 2
Political Report
Subject : The development of Turkish foreign policy.
For the Foreign Minister.
My many reports will have shown with what unqualified satisfac-
tion Turkey has welcomed the outbreak of the German-Soviet War.
'The dispatch date is supplied from another copy (2361/488584-88).
1 Marginal notes :
"To Special Train Westfalen by closed circuit secret teletype."
"[For] F[tthrer]."
"Shown to the Fiihrer. Hew [el], July 21."
JULY 1941 175
The Turkish press, in conformity with the Government's neutrality
declaration, 3 to be sure, has been instructed to restrain its enthusiasm.
Its reports are therefore strictly factual. The country, however, is
following the decisive developments with tremendous attention. While
the restrained reporting of the German Supreme Army Command
has not had the effect of shaking the firm confidence in a German vic-
tory, it has nevertheless brought certain anxieties to the surface, which
clearly reflect Turkey's attitude. Secretary General Numan Men-
emencioglu mentioned that although, according to the reports of his
Ambassador in Moscow,* the Russians were beaten on the Stalin Line,
they would upon the advice of their English friends attempt to build
up a new solid front east of Moscow. There is talk of 120 divisions
which the Russians could activate and arm.
This very idea is a nightmare for the Turks, If carried into reality
it would mean that the Russian campaign which, as was hoped here,
would bring an end to the war could not be terminated. On the con-
trary parts of the German Army would in that ease remain tied down
in Russia and the Reich would be exposed to the grinding effect of
a war on two fronts of long duration.
In my conversations with M. Saracoglu and M. Numan I have re-
peatedly pointed out that Turkey's self-evident interest in the elimina-
tion of the Bolshevik system was naturally bound to bring the country
over to the side of the German Reich. As soon as the campaign
against the Soviets was victoriously concluded, the Reich would be in
a position to get down to the reorganization of Europe which had
been discussed for such a long time. Then the moment would have
arrived when Turkey would have to make the decision whether she
belonged to Europe or whether she wanted to remain an appendix
to the British- American-Russian front. I further pointed out that
Churchill's and Roosevelt's decision to fight side by side with Bol-
shevism until Germany was destroyed had made it plain to anyone
who had not yet grasped this fact that England, who never through-
out her history had shown the slightest interest in European solidarity,
must henceforth be reckoned among the foremost of Europe's declared
enemies.
I have reason to assume that this train of thought meets with full
approval here, for the official Ulus writes in its editorial of July 11 :
"If Germany should lose this war, all mankind from the Pacific to the
Atlantic would be shaken to its roots. If Germany wins, the Russian
world would be divided up and scattered, and the edifice of the Com-
munist International would be forever overthrown. Those on the
European Continent who but recently were at each others' throats
•According to Papen's telegram No. 788 of June 23 (105/113586) this declara-
tion was made in an Anatolian News Agency report of June 23.
* Ali Haydar Aktay.
176 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
have united to ward off domination by the Kremlin. Europe has
been unified in the mystique of a crusade." Also, the clumsy attack
of Litvinov's in his radio address 6 has been rejected by the entire
press in the manner it deserved.
There is no mistaking the wish of the Turkish Government that the
Reich, after defeating Bolshevism, will succeed in ending the war on
the basis of a compromise that would afford Germany the possibility
of satisfying her needs for Lebensraum and raw materials in the east
and would put her in a position to offer France, Holland, Belgium,
and Norway a peace that would be acceptable to all of these countries.
It is the unspoken wish of the Turkish Government to offer its good
offices in such a situation. The further the war progresses and the
closer it comes to the areas of Turkish interest in the Caucasus, the
greater will be the inducement for the Turks to talk with us about the
future situation in that region. As Ali Fuad 8 intimated to me today,
Turkey would be pleased if in the Caucasus a federation of the local
tribes, which are in greater or less degree related to the Turks, could
be established while east of the Caspian Sea formation of an inde-
pendent Turanian state would be regarded as the best solution. These
buffer states would relieve Turkey for a long time of the Russian
pressure and at the same time greatly strengthen her economic
situation.
The English are of course not unaware of these ideas. For that
reason it is not likely, as is feared in military quarters, that the
English might try to move major forces from the Mosul area through
Iran so as to make common cause with the Russians in the Caucasus.
It goes without saying that the English are busying themselves with
organizing a strong defensive front in northern Iraq, in order to be
able to exert political and military pressure on Turkey from there
and from Syria.
The close interconnection of English interests with Bolshevism is
most severely condemned here although the greatest reserve is observed
publicly. As I have previously reported, 7 it has been learned from
Moscow that at the beginning of the campaign Stalin was still hope-
ful that he might reach an understanding with the Fiihrer on the
basis that if the Russian Army were beaten in the west, he would
be granted continued existence in the eastern part of Russia. It
lias become known that he refused to receive the English delega-
tion 3 and that he harbors as much as ever the strongest distrust
s Presumably a reference to an English language broadcast by Litvinov of
July 8 in which he called on Britain and the USSR to strike at Hitler
"untiringly."
8 Gen. Ali Fuad Erden, head of the Turkish Military Academy.
7 Not found.
8 Probably a reference to the British Military Mission in Moscow which
arrived in Moscow on June 27 following arrangements made regarding the
exchange of British and Soviet military missions. Of. Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1941, vol. i, pp. 175-177.
JULY 1941 177
of England's war aims. It is said that he agreed to sign the agree-
ment s that he would conclude no separate peace, only after the Eng-
lish, with American help, had given him a guarantee of continued
existence in all circumstances. Incidentally it is generally believed
here that Churchill's fall in the foreseeable future is more probable
than the fall of Stalin. It is reported that the English opposition
is getting nervous because of America's constant approach toward the
British Empire's sphere of influence. It is this distrust of Ameri-
can intentions which prompted Churchill not to withdraw the British
troops from Iceland although the Americans advised him to do that
and to throw the surplus of his numerous divisions, unemployed in
England, into the struggle against Germany. Another peril for
Churchill is said to be the charge of fraternization with Bolshevism.
It is predicted that he will some day be overthrown for these reasons.
As regards the position of Turkey toward the problems on her
southern front, the desire is to continue to maintain a correct atti-
tude toward England, as in the past. Because of the unfortunate
outcome of the Syrian campaign, England will now be in a position
to exert even greater influence in economic and transit matters than
ever before. Added to this is Turkey's fundamental antipathy toward
all so-called Arab liberation movements. Although recognition is
given to the principle of independence of the near eastern Arab
states, it has not been forgotten that the Arabs, who yesterday went
with the British and today are going with us, would tomorrow ally
themselves with the devil himself in order to march against Turkey,
The current complicated position of Turkey with respect to the
problems on her southern border can be resolved only through a
policy in accord with us.
In view of this situation it might not be uninteresting, once mat-
ters in Eussia have developed to a certain point and agreement is
reached on the future organization of Europe, to let Turkey take
the initiative. Because after the English ally has brusquely rejected
every possibility for peace, she would be fully justified in burying
the alliance for good and making an unequivocal decision in favor
of Europe.
I believe that skillful exploitation of the situation by us could
accomplish a great deal toward extricating Turkey from the present
dilemma of alliance versus friendship. This should not be by politi-
cal, let alone military, pressure upon her, but on the contrary by
slowly bringing psychological influence to bear and by emphasiz-
ing the "European" mission which is devolving upon that country
*A reference to the British-Soviet Agreement for Joint Action and Mutual
Assistance signed in Moscow on July 12. For text, see League of Nations
Treaty Series, vol. cciv, p. 277.
682-905—64 17
178 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
and its peace-minded leader out of the course of historical events.
Carrying out this mission affords Turkey a unique opportunity for
occupying once more a top-rank position in world politics.
Papen
No. 126
216/147722-23
The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Embassy in Japan
and to the Embassy in Paris
Telegram
No. 678 of July 19 RAM (Konigsberq), July 19, 1941.
from Konigsberg Eeceived Berlin, July 19 — 1 : 05 a. m.
No. 1094 to Tokyo from the Foreign Ministry
No. 8712 to Paris from the Foreign Ministry
Sent July 19.
On July 17 Ambassador Oshima handed to the Foreign Minister the
following memorandum with an appendix concerning the Japanese
demands on France regarding Indochina : 1
"The Japanese Government has started negotiations with the
French Government with a firm resolve to secure, among other things,
naval and air bases in Indochina. A Japanese proposal made in this
connection is attached. The realization of this plan is the first step for
our advance to the South. It will undoubtedly play an important part
as a diversion of the English- American forces. In this sense the Japa-
nese Government believes that in pursuing this aim it is giving
valuable assistance to Germany and Italy, loyal to the spirit of the
Tripartite Pact. It therefore believes that it may assume that the
German Government will not only refuse any entreaty of the French
Government to arrange for a refusal or mitigation of the Japanese
proposal but that it will also assist the Japanese Government by
endeavoring to convince the French Government of the advisability of
compliance.
End of the memorandum.
Appendix follows:
"confidential
1. France and Japan undertake to cooperate militarily for the
common defense of French Indochina.
2. For this purpose the French Government will authorize Japan to
adopt the following measures :
1 See vol. ■xa of this series, document No. 611. Ambassador Ott had reported in
telegram No. 1246 of July 15 (216/147716-17) that the Japanese Deputy Foreign
Minister had told him "strictly confidentially" that the Japanese Ambassador In
Vichy had received instructions to seek French agreement to the stationing of
Japanese troops and the establishment of a few Japanese naval and air bases In
Indochina.
JULY 1941 179
(a) Dispatch of the necessary number of Japanese troops,
naval units, and air forces to South Indochina ;
(&) Use of the following eight localities as air bases : Siemreap,
Pnompenh, Tourane, Nhatrang, Bienhoa, Saigon, Scotrang and
Kompongtrach.
Use of Saigon and the Bay of Camranh as naval bases; the
Japanese forces will bring the necessary installations.
(c) These forces will have all freedom regarding billeting,
maneuvers and movements. They will be granted special facilities
for the fulfillment of their task. This also includes the abolition
of the restrictions provided in the Nishihara-Martin agreement. 2
(d) The French Government will supply the Japanese forces
with the necessary amount of foreign exchange; the Japanese
Government is willing to pay for these in accordance with methods
which are to be determined jointly.
3. The French Government will agree to a general plan of entry of
these forces. The manner of such entry will be the topic of consulta-
tion between the local Japanese and Indochinese authorities. In order
to eliminate the possibility of a conflict the French authorities will
adopt appropriate measures such as the removal of Indochinese forces
from the vicinity of points of debarkation of the Japanese forces."
End of Appendix.
The Foreign Minister requests that you observe restraint in the
matter.
Rintelen
'A military accord signed by the Japanese and French local eommanders in
Indochina on Sept. 22, 1940. Under its terms the French granted Japan the use
of three airfields in Tonkin, 'the right to station 6000 Japanese troops there, the
passage of up to 25,000 Japanese troops through Tonkin to Yunnan, and per-
mission to evacuate a division of the Canton army through Tonkin. Cf. Foreign.
Relations of the United States, 19^0, vol. rv, p. 142 and footnote 92.
No. 127
82/60374-75
The Foreign Minister to the Emhassy in Japan
Telegram
most urgent Konigseerg, July 19, 1941—10 : 45 a. m.
No. 680 of July 19 from
the Special Train Received Berlin, July 19—12 ; 00 noon.
No. 1098 of July 19 from
the Foreign Ministry Sent July 19 [1 : 20 p. m.] 1
RAM 318 [Pol. VIII 4117 g.]
For the Ambassador personally.
An examination of the text of the Japanese counterproposals to the
American Government, transmitted in your telegram No. 1247 of July
1 The information in brackets Is supplied from another copy (1680/395735-36).
180 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
lo, 2 shows that these counterproposals have been noticeably toned
down, particularly in those passages which refer to the Tripartite
Pact, and that this toning down is attributable to the American Gov-
ernment's wish that these passages be omitted entirely. In view of
thi« to us undesirable, development in this matter I request that you
call 'on the Deputy Foreign Minister 3 or the Head of the European De-
partment i and, without indicating that you have received any instruc-
tions from here, state approximately the following as your personal
view. ,
You had carefully examined the text furnished to you by the Head
of the European Department and, of course, had forwarded it to
Berlin. As yet you had no instructions from Berlin but believed that
on your own initiative you ought to bring up one point immediately.
For it appears that the passages of special importance to the other
powers of the Tripartite Pact which were contained m the first Japa-
nese counterproposal obviously met with the disapproval of the Wash-
ington Government and led to the demand of the Americans that these
passages be deleted.
To be sure, the second Japanese counterproposal retained the sense
of these passages but in such a substantially weakened form that you
could not but express the fear that this method of partial compliance
with American wishes would only strengthen the Washington Gov-
ernment's hope that it would be able in the end to put through formu-
lations which would make the Tripartite Pact more or less ineffectual.
It was therefore your opinion that yielding with regard to those very
passages relating to the Tripartite Pact was extremely risky and in-
consistent with the sense and spirit of that Pact.
Actually, the situation was rather this : that the Americans would be
more careful the more categorically Japan's determination to stand
by the Tripartite Pact were stated, whereas every concession in. this
regard would encourage Washington to take further steps toward
America's entry into the European war and thus by its aggressive ac-
tion bring about the very situation that the Japanese Government
wished to avoid.
In view of this situation you urgently requested that the presentation
of the new Japanese counterproposals through Ambassador Nomura
be postponed for the time being, so that the above-mentioned point
might be re-examined and you yourself be provided with an oppor-
tunity, if need be, to inform the Japanese Government of the views of
the Reich Government regarding the present state of the Japanese-
American negotiations, which you expected to receive.
* See document No. 123 and footnote 1.
1 Chulchi Ohashi.
' Ryuki Sakamoto.
JULY 1941
181
If it should become apparent from your conversation that Nomura
has already submitted the counterproposals, there is nothing that can
be done about it ; in the contrary case, please use your influence to have
the presentation of these proposals postponed. Please report by wire. 5
RlBBENTROP
1 Document No. 1S7.
8589/E602970-73
No. 128
Fuhrer's Directive
CHEFSACHE FtJHRER's HEADQUARTERS, July 19, 1941.
TOP SECRET MILITARY
The Fiihrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op. No. 441230/41 g.K. Chefs.
By officer only
Directive No. 33 : Continuation of the War in the East
(1) The second round of battles in the east has ended on the whole
front with the breakthrough of the Stalin Line and sweeping ad-
vances of the armored units. With Army Group Center the elimina-
tion of the strong enemy combat forces remaining between the motor-
ized units will still require considerable time.
The northern wing of Army Group South is hampered in its action
and freedom of movement by the Fortress of Kiev and the Fifth
Soviet Army in its rear.
(2) The aim of the next operations must be to prevent further
strong parts of the enemy from withdrawing into the vast Russian
expanse, and to destroy them.
Preparations to that effect are to be set afoot along the following
lines :
(a) Southeastern Front:
The principal objective is the destruction of the enemy's Sixth and
Twelfth Armies, while still west of the Dnieper, by a concentric
attack. The Rumanian main forces will have to cover this operation
in the south.
The enemy's Fifth Army can also most quickly be destroyed by
joint action between forces of the Army Group Center's southern
wing and Army Group South's northern wing.
Some infantry divisions of Army Group Center will have to be
turned toward the south. Additional forces, motorized units partic-
ularly, will have to be committed in a southeasterly direction after
fulfilling their present missions, securing their supplies, and screening
in the direction of Moscow. This will be in order to cut off those
enemy forces which transfer to the far side of the Dnieper from
escape into the depths of the Russian space, and to destroy them.
182 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
(&) Center of the Eastern Front; _
Army Group Center, after eliminating the numerous encircled
enemy pockets and after making its supplies secure, will continue its
advance upon Moscow with infantry units, with the mission of cutting
the Moscow-Leningrad communications with the motorized units that
are not being employed southeastward in the rear of the Dnieper
Line, and thereby covering the right flank of the thrust of the Army
Group North toward Leningrad.
(c) Northeastern Front:
The advance in the direction of Leningrad must not be resumed
until the Eighteenth Army has closed up with the 4th Armored Group
and the deep flank is dependably shielded toward the east by the
Sixteenth Army. Army Group North must also endeavor to block
the withdrawal to Leningrad of the Soviet forces still fighting in
Estonia.
The early seizure of the Baltic islands, as possible bases of the
Soviet fleet, is desired.
(d) Finnish Front :
It remains the mission of the Finnish main forces, reinforced by
the bulk of the 163rd Division, to attack the enemy confronting them
with the main effort east of Lake Ladoga and later, by concerted ef-
fort with the Army Group North, to destroy them,
The targets of the attack under command of XXXVI Corps and
the Mountain Corps remain unchanged with the understanding, that
for the time being stronger support cannot be expected from air units
and therefore, if necessary, one will have to put up with a temporary
postponement of the operations.
(3) For the Luftwaffe, upon the release of any units from the cen-
ter of the front, it is especially important to support the attack along
the southeastern front as the main effort [schwerpwnktmassig] by the
commitment of air and antiaircraft forces, and if necessary, by the
prompt bringing up of reinforcements or by a suitable regrouping.
The attack on Moscow -with forces of the Second Air Force, rein-
forced by fighter formations from the west, is to be carried out as
soon as possible as "retaliation for the Soviet attacks on Bucharest
and Helsinki."
(4) The mission of the Navy remains to maintain the maritime
traffic, especially for the sending of supplies for the land operations,
as far as enemy situation in the sea and in the air permits. Further-
more, while we progressively threaten the enemy bases, our actions
must as much as possible be directed at preventing enemy forces from
escaping to Swedish ports of internment.
After the fleet units in the Baltic are set free once more, the motor
torpedo boats and minesweepers — at first in the strength of one flotilla
of each — are to be transferred to the Mediterranean.
Several submarines are to be dispatched to the Arctic Ocean for
the support of the German operations in Finland, which are hampered
by the bringing up by sea of enemy reinforcements.
JULY 1941 183
(5) In the west and north all three Wehrmacht branches must be
on the alert to repel possible British attacks on the Channel Islands
and the Norwegian coast. The rapid transfer of combat aircraft from
the western theater into all parts of Norway must be ready and
prepared.
Adolf Hitler
No. 129
512/235521-23
Memorandv/m, by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 493 Beklw, July 19, 1941.
ZUDVIII837I. 1
For the Foreign Minister.
I should like to make the following comments in regard to the
enclosure :
Concerning the treatment of German church matters in so far as they
take place abroad or have an effect abroad, general guidelines should,
in my opinion, be set up according to which one can proceed without
having to obtain the decision of the Foreign Minister or the State
Secretary in each separate case.
Foreign policy interests must be observed in two respects :
a. cultural ethnic German interests, which are connected with
church-type institutions more often abroad than at home, and in dif-
ferent ways.
b. general foreign policy interests which require a careful treatment
of church questions (e.g., the European mobilization against Bolshe-
vism under German leadership) .
I therefore recommend that the Foreign Ministry be guided by the
following considerations for the issuance of exit and entry permits,
foreign exchange permits, and funds for church-cultural items :
1. The exit and entry of church personages who are as such above
reproach shall be permitted if, in the opinion of the competent agency
abroad, a refusal of the permit would provide an occasion for propa-
gandists exploitation.
2. German cultural institutions on a denominational basis abroad,
such as hospitals, schools, universities, etc., shall be kept viable and
capable of functioning both as regards personnel (through approval
of the departure of the absolutely necessary replacements) and finan-
cially (through donations or approval of the issuance of foreign
1 See enclosure.
184 DOCUMENTS ON" GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
exchange permits), if in the opinion of the competent agency abroad :
they are directed in a manner above reproach,
their disappearance would arouse considerable attention that could
be utilized against us propagandistically,
there are no other equivalent German cultural positions in existence,
or
there is a danger that if they are given up cultural positions of our
enemies will gain a foothold (e.g., the Catholic University at Peking) .
3. In countries with a marked ecclesiastical life, such as Spain,
Sweden, Italy, Denmark, there should be the possibility of religious
instruction in our propaganda schools, i.e., in the German schools in
which foreign children are educated together with German children.
Weizsacker
[Enclosure]
Department Germany 2 Berlin, June 28, 1941.
e.o.DVIII837I.
The dispatch of Reich German clergymen involves churchmen who
care spiritually for the Germans abroad who are organized in their
own German congregations. In processing the applications for exit
permits Department Germany also asks the participation of the Chief
of the Auslandsorganisation and the Chief of the Security Police
and of the Security Service. Through this participation a position
is taken both as regards the person of the proposed clergyman and
also objectively as regards the pastoral post involved. In its efforts
at consolidating the Germans abroad the Auslandsorganisation con-
siders itself to be hampered through their ecclesiastical organization.
The Party Chancellery shares the view of the Auslandsorganisation.
On the occasion of a report which I gave the Foreign Minister on the
subject of the participation of the Foreign Ministry in church matters,
the Foreign Minister expressed himself as opposed in principle to
special consideration by the Foreign Ministry of German church work
abroad.
The Foreign Ministry therefore will support church matters only in
exceptional cases if there are considerable ethnic German interests
involved, and will therefore also facilitate the dispatch of Reich Ger-
man clergymen to foreign German congregations only in isolated
cases. 3
Herewith again submitted to the State Secretary.
Luther
' Department Germany (Abteilung Deutschland) , a shortened form for Depart-
ment for German Internal Affairs.
1 Marginal note : "In my opinion the closing paragraph is too narrowly formu-
lated. Besides the ethnic German interests purely foreign policy interests also
come into question. See separate memorandum (St.S. No. 4&3), July 19.
Weizsacker."
JULY 1941 185
[Editors' Note. The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim translated
by Eric Lewenhaupt (London, 1953) , page 423, mention a letter which
Hitler wrote to President Kyti regarding the intelligence service main-
tained by the British Legation in Helsinki. The letter is also men-
tioned in the book edited by John H. Wuorinen, Finland and World
War II, 1939-WU (New York, 1948), page 116, which states that
Hitler demanded that Finland break off diplomatic relations with
Great Britain because the British Legation served as a center for
espionage for Soviet Kussia. It is stated that the letter was received
on July 19 and it is further stated that the Finnish Government took
up the problem on July 22. No trace of such a letter by Hitler to Ryti
has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.]
No. 130
82/60382-83
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most -urgent Tokyo, July 20, 1941 — 1 : 50 a. m.
No. 1297 of July 19 Keceived July 20—4 : 20 a. m.
[Pol. VIII 3982 g.] 1
With reference to my telegram No. 1295 df July 19. 2
The translation of the Foreign Minister's declaration follows :
"Entrusted with the post of Foreign Minister, I have the honor of
hereby introducing myself to the German (the Italian) Ambassador
in Tokyo.
I respectfully request that you transmit my regards to your Foreign
Minister and inform him that I was unexpectedly entrusted with
the post of Foreign Minister in the formation of the new Cabinet.
At the same time I would like to inform you and your Government
officially of the change of the Imperial Japanese Government. As
you have perceived from the announcement by the Imperial Govern-
ment, this governmental change was effected in order first to carry out
political measures in accordance with the international situation, and
further to be able to take, as soon as possible, the necessary steps to
strengthen the inner political situation of the country. Apart from
these points there were no reasons for the governmental change, and
the present policy of the Japanese Empire will in no case undergo
any change.
I request that you take particular cognizance of the fact [that]
Japan's policy will rest on the basis of the spirit and aims of the Tri-
1 The file number ia supplied from another copy (1680/395710-11).
! In this telegram (82/60379) Ott reported that the new Japanese Foreign
Minister, Admiral Toyoda, had summoned him and the Italian Ambassador to
give them the statement which Is printed here.
186 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY
partite Pact, concluded between Japan, Germany, and Italy. No
change whatever will take place in Japan's attitude toward Germany
and Italy, as former Foreign Minister Matsuoka clearly expressed it
to you, on the basis of cabinet decision of 2 July. 3 I respectfully
request that you also notify your Government of the above. I per-
sonally was active in the Navy at the time of the conclusion of the
Tripartite Pact, and had a share in bringing it about. As successor
of former Foreign Minister Matsuoka, I intend to continue his foreign
policy and to strengthen even more the close unity of Japan, Germany,
and Italy, and to march forward in the common spirit. I express the
hope that you, Herr (Signor) Ambassador, will bestow upon me,
just as upon the former Foreign Minister, your valued friendship and
cooperation."
Ott
' See documents Nos. 63 and 64.
No. 131
82/60376-T8
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Tokyo, July 20, 1941 — 1 : 55 a. m.
No. 1293 of July 19 Received July 20—7 : 50 a. m.
Prince Konoye's third Cabinet 1 has not brought about any stronger
concentration of national forces, the urgent necessity of which had
been given as the reason for the reshuffling of the Cabinet. Not
represented in it, to be sure, are those ministers that belonged to the
former political parties. Furthermore, the Navy is more strongly
represented through the appointment of Admiral Toyoda as Foreign
Minister and Minister of Colonies, and of Vice Admiral Sakonji as
Minister of Commerce and Industry. The new Cabinet, however, is
also largely under the influence of big business, which is shown in the
first place by the fact that the former Director General of the Sumi-
tomo combine, Ogura, has received the important post of Finance
Minister. Ogura, who wielded a strong influence in the former Cab-
inet even as Minister without Portfolio, will undoubtedly try to carry
out one of his conservative financial policies and therefore, if anything,
obstruct the heavy demands of the armed forces. Furthermore, Vice
Admiral Sakonji, as Director of the North Sakhalin Petroleum Com-
pany, and Admiral Toyoda, as a result of his family connection with
1 Ott bad reported the formation and composition of the new Konoye Cabinet
in telegram No. 1284 of July 18 (82/60368).
JULY 1941 187
the Mitsubishi combine, have close ties with industry. Business
circles accordingly show satisfaction with the new government.
The former Minister of the Interior, Baron Hiranuma, who, as I
reported, has repeatedly created personal and substantive difficulties
for Matsuoka, has remained as a very influential person in the Cabinet.
In spite of strong pressure Konoye could not bring himself to eliminate
this powerful man. He did, to be sure, make him relinquish the post
of Minister of the Interior, under whom the police prefects are placed,
and remain in the Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio, but behind
the scenes his influence is still strong, especially since his friend and
long-time collaborator, Tanabe, has received the post of Minister of
the Interior. Furthermore, Hiranuma is close to Lieutenant General
Yanagawa, president of the "Society for the Support of the Imperial
Government," who belongs to the Cabinet as Minister without Port-
folio. Everything indicates that the aim of the Cabinet's resignation
was to get rid of Matsuoka. This man of fertile mind and animated
manner had already been long disliked by the conservative elements.
His oratorical talent and his ability to gain popularity among the
masses made him appear to these circles as downright dangerous. For
this reason the press has received strict instructions to ignore him as
far as possible — which on the whole has indeed been successful.
Though his resignation is consequently to be attributed mainly to
domestic Japanese causes, reasons of foreign policy were also involved.
In spite of his well-known weakness Matsuoka did during his term
of office show himself to be an advocate of a broad interpretation and
application of the policy of the Tripartite Pact. He was confirmed
therein particularly by the personal impressions he received on his
trip to Germany and Italy.
As I have reported, he had to fight on that account against strong
opposition in the Cabinet, in the business circles and among the Anglo-
philes. On various points, as for example in dealing with the Amer-
ican proposal, he did not prevail with the policy that we desired and
for that reason made himself the target of vehement criticisms from
the nationalist camp. The conclusion of the Neutrality Pact with the
Soviet Union, 2 which he himself probably regarded as a mistake, was
strongly held against him after the beginning of the Russian-German
war, and the resulting reproach that he had put Japan into a difficult
moral position was cleverly exploited by his opponents. Furthermore,
his opponents declared that at the last Cabinet session he had, as
confirmed by Furuuchi, [?] championed the view of Ambassador
Oshima and of the German Government and was kept in leading
strings by them.
* See vol. xrr of this series, document No. 332, footnote 2.
188 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Konoye's colorless statement after the formation of the Govern-
ment, 3 which was transmitted by D.N.B., and the vague press com-
ments on the situation do not hold out any prospect that the new
government aims to pursue a vigorous policy. Rather, it is to be
assumed that after Matsuoka's ouster a continued policy of wait-and-
see will be adopted toward the United States and that still greater
safeguards in the matter of preparation will be demanded with regard
to taking action against the Soviet Union. Finally, the circles around
Konoye and Hiranuma are primarily concerned about China, without
developing constructive plans for the solution of this problem.
I am convinced that after a while these obstacles will be overcome.
In this connection there are the Indochinese operation,* the prepara-
tions for which are already too far advanced to be called off, the
impossibility of reaching an agreement with the United States on
China, and the weight of the current mobilization preparations which
commit Japanese policy to that of the Tripartite Pact. I should
therefore like to suggest that no doubts about Japan's attitude be
evinced by Germany, although for the time being a certain reserve
toward the [Japanese] Government might be advisable.
Ott
s This statement reads as follows: "The policy of this country to cope with
the international situation is already fixed ; it now remains for us to put it into
practice with speed and decision. It is my firm belief that the only way to
realise this is to put our internal affairs in order on the basis of national
policy. With the earnest support of a population of 100,000,000 I Intend to do
everything in my power to accomplish the great ideal of founding an empire
by overcoming all difficulties that may lie in our country's path." See Keestng *
Contemporary Archives, 1940-19^3, p. 4703.
* See document No. 126.
No. 132
71/50882
The Foreign Minister to tlie Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Telegram
No. 684 Special Train Westfalen, July 20, 1941—3 : 10 a. m.
Eeceived Berlin, July 20—3 : 20 a. ra.
For the Acting State Secretary.
Please notify all Foreign Ministry personnel concerned with prop-
aganda in the Arab question of the following directive :
Regard for the French rule in Syria has so far imposed on us a
certain reserve in supporting the demands of the Arabs for political
freedom and independence. With the collapse of French resistance
against England in Syria, the reason for this reserve has been elimi-
nated. I ask you therefore to support vigorously henceforth the
wishes of the Arabs for the achievement of unlimited freedom in
JULY 1941 189
the propaganda treatment of the Arab question. This propaganda
must he carried on under the slogan of "The Axis fights for the free-
dom of the Arabs" ; appropriate Italian cooperation is to be arranged.
RlBBENTROP
No. 133
1527/373706-08
The Charge d> Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 2324 of July 19 Washington, July 20, 1941—8 : 59 a. m.
Received July 20—8 : 20 p. m.
"With reference to my telegrams No. 2146 of July 9 1 and No. 2301
of July 18. 2
According to all indications President Roosevelt had postponed for
the moment his intention to occupy the Cape Verde Islands, the
Azores, and Dakar.
Thus the chairman of the "America First Committee", General
Wood, announced in a press statement on July 18 3 that he had just
been informed that the military advisers had prevented the implemen-
tation of Roosevelt's plan. General Wood was doubtless given this
information by Army circles.
The fact that the President has actually changed his original inten-
tion is also evident from the following announcements of two well-
informed periodicals : The United States News predicts in the issue
published on July 15 the dispatch of American troops to Atlantic
bases on foreign territory ; 3 days later Lindley writes in Newsweek
that the occupation of the Portuguese and French bases had now
become improbable unless Germany should make motions to occupy
England or Portugal. Pearson and Allen on July 17 also pointed
to a repeated change in military orders according to which the orders
were given to the American Marine landing troops four times and
withdrawn three times previous to the occupation of Iceland. .
This change in the President's opinion certainly was decisively
influenced not only by the grave misgivings of the Army and the Navy
but also by the reports which were heeded here regarding a strength-
ening of the Portuguese garrisons on the Azores and the Cape Verde
Islands, 4 as well as regarding preparations of the French to defend
Dakar. A further reason for Roosevelt's hesitation to push further
1 'See document No. 104, footnote 1.
1 Document No. 121.
* No report of such a press statement has been found.
* Cf. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. u, pp. 841-842.
190 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
into the Atlantic lies in the momentary lack of clarity about Japan's
next steps.
A definite prediction about the President's intentions is hardly
possible at the present time. It is at any rate a fact that at the
present time — mainly because of American productive capacity — he
is providing restricted war aid to England ; however he has thus far
resisted the full and open employment of the Atlantic fleet and he
has also resisted giving in to the English wish that he personally sup-
port the propaganda for the entry of the United States into the war.
The President adjusts his measures to the daily developments at any
given time, whereby his decisions often represent the character of an
emotional reaction — be it to the actions of Germany or to the pleading
of England. His position thus far, would, as reported, 5 indicate a
continuation of the policy of aid to England while avoiding a binding
declaration of war, whereby it is being taken into account here that
after the conclusion of the German campaign against Russia, England
will demand a clear decision. At the same time he is utilizing what
is probably his own existing indecision as a tactical expedient by
means of changes, secrecy, and in part misrepresentation of his actual
intentions. He thereby calls the attention of the whole country to his
person, does not commit himself to any decisions and tries, through
intentional lack of clarity about Ms measures (orders to shoot), to
bring the opponent to undertake actions which he can utilize as justi-
fication of his own measures. It is at any rate certain that nothing
would be more welcome to the President than an incident for which
he can make Germany responsible.
Thomsen
4 Document No. 104.
No. 134
F19/373-81
Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini 1
At present Fuhrer's Headquarters, July 20, 1941.
Duce: Now that the fourth week since the beginning of the war
in the east has come to an end, I should like, Duce, to give you a
brief summary of the situation as it appears to me.
I read your last letter 2 with hearty pleasure. I share your politi-
cal views entirely, Duce. Some important new problems have now
arisen that I should like to refer to briefly :
1 In telegram No. 1630 of July 21 (B12/B001091) Mackensen reported that
at 8 : 00 p. m. he handed the letter to Mussolini who read It aloud, translating
it into Italian for Ciano. Mussolini suggested that the meeting with Hitler
take place after the Italian formations took over their sector on the eastern
front which would he in the second half of August.
* Of July 2, document No. 62.
JULY 1941 191
1. France has again started playing her double game; either as an
aftereffect of the loss of Syria or, as I believe, as a result of the
budding of new hopes in view of the tying down of substantial
German forces in the east. Although we had recently, among other
things, reached an agreement on the landing of miscellaneous war ma-
terial in Bizerte, the French Government now states again that it
could permit this only after new concessions of a psychological and
military kind. 3 In other words: the present French Government
sees itself in the role of Talleyrand at the Congress of Vienna, and
at the same time forgets that I am neither Metternich nor Harden-
berg. 4 I do not have to become mistrustful about it now, because,
as a matter of fact, I have never lost my mistrust. At any rate,
more than ever, I consider it necessary to be constantly on my guard.
Moreover, I am not at all thinking of making still more conces-
sions, because every concession always means the ultimate loss of
a position without the French Government's seriously committing
itself to counterservices. To put it differently our concessions, Duce,
cannot be revoked, while the French Government, on the other hand,
is always in a position to retract its commitments.
Nevertheless, this situation gives rise to problems for the solution
of which we must be particularly concerned, Duce. Because the
additional safeguarding and development of the sea routes to Tripoli
and Bengazi gain thereby added significance.
I consider it the primary goal of our common effort to exclude
any possibility of a new critical development in the supply situa-
tion in Libya. Beyond tliat, traffic facilities must further be
expanded in such a way that the requirements resulting from future
intentions for this theater of war may be met to the full extent and
with as little interference from the enemy as possible.
Perhaps it is conceivable, Duce, that a means for the improvement
of the present situation could be found similar to the splendid com-
panionship in arms of the Italian and German army units in Libya,
and a much closer collaboration could be achieved between the Italian
and German naval and air staffs which are concerned with the main-
tenance and protection of communications to Libya.
I would place at your complete disposal for this purpose the liaison
staffs of the German Navy and Luftwaffe which have been stationed
in Eome for some time, and would ask that you call on them for
assistance within the framework of the Italian High Command.
I would cite as important tasks in which German military experi-
ence could prove useful :
1. Activation of the fighter and antiaircraft defense at sea and
as protection for the loading and unloading ports against attacks
by sea from surface and submarine forces.
! See document No. 113.
* Karl August von Hardenberg, Prussian delegate at the Congress of Vienna.
192 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
2. Antisubmarine defense in which, particularly in our transporta-
tion to Norway, we acquired very valuable experience. We succeeded
there in only a few weeks in eliminating the British submarines
completely. ....
3. Distribution and use of naval and air forces, particularly in
the convoy service.
4. Effective immobilization of the Island of Malta as a base tor
the enemy air force committed against our transports.
5. Management of merchant ship tonnage.
I am mentioning these points only so as to leave it to you to give
an appropriate order in which such a collaboration could take place.
I ask only that you make such effective use of the German liaison
staffs that you, too, Duce, in your fight will profit from the results
of our experience. For it is my ardent desire, Duce, to help with
our means which are naturally limited to the best of our ability in
this distant theater of war; not only that Italy may retain her North
African colonies, but that she may, in addition, satisfy those demands
which, to my mind, are so well justified that, unless they are granted,
there will be no peace for Germany either.
2. Spain. The present attitude of Spain, and particularly Franco's
latest speech, 5 at last seem to me permeated with the realization that
not only the freedom of Germany and Italy, but actually the future
of Europe is at stake in our battle. If, in the end, active collaboration
could still result, I would be sincerely glad of it. I hope that as far as
Germany is concerned, our armed forces will regain complete freedom
of action by autumn at the latest. Collaboration with Spain then
could, in certain circumstances, still be very advantageous generally.
3. Turkey. I hope here that with continued success on the eastern
front, we may perhaps succeed in drawing Turkey more into our sphere
of interest in order at least to be able to consider those ideas that you,
Duce, touched upon in your last letter. Yes, it will perhaps be pos-
sible, as operations progress in the east, to confront the English mili-
tary leaders with new problems altogether. I wanted to talk with
you about it, Duce, the next time we see each other. Even the attack
upon Egypt from the side of Asia Minor would make our military
situation much easier.
4. Japan. I still don't quite understand the reason for the Cabinet
crisis in Japan. 6 I consider it impossible that the Japanese Govern-
ment should overlook or fail to grasp the unique opportunity that the
present situation offers it. To be sure, whatever step it decides to take,
it naturally requires a certain period of preparation. I do not believe
that Japan will be in a position to proceed against Soviet Russia be-
fore the middle of August. The measures toward the south too can-
"Of July 17 1941. The contents of the speech were reported by Heberlein.ln
Madrid telegram No. 2460 Of July 18 (95/106955-56). See also document No. 157.
* See document No. 124.
JULY 1941 193
not be taken without further ado. I consider it possible that before a
step, particularly against Russia, is undertaken an improvement in
Japan's strategic position to the south will have to be assured. On
one point, I believe, there is no longer any doubt in Japan : Through no
fault of our own, America, thanks to her Jewish leadership, is not
only the enemy of Europe but also the enemy of East Asia. Day after
tomorrow it will, in exactly the same way, be the enemy of the British
World Empire, and, moreover, its most dangerous enemy. Only the
narrow-minded stupidity of the present English administration fails
to foresee this future development, or else, they force themselves to
shut their eyes to this development.
The occupation of Iceland,' Duce, has, in these circumstances, only
strengthened me in my determination to end the war in the east with
all available means as rapidly as possible. The prospects are favor-
able for it !
After the first breakthrough had been initiated for the destruction
of a number of Russian armies, as well as the smashing of or attack on
numerous Russian divisions, some time passed, in order
1. that these encircled Russian armies, which after all consisted of
more than a million men, might be destroyed or forced to capitulate ;
2. that the infantry divisions might be allowed, after conclusion of
these battles, to catch up with the armored divisions which had ad-
vanced far ahead ; and
3. that the general supply base, that is, particularly the railroad and
the communications network, might be put in order and connected
with the advancing armies.
In the latter field particularly a tremendous amount has been
achieved. Numerous Russian railroads are again operating, other
lines are in process of having the gauge changed, that is, our supply
trains are already advancing on the German gauge to far east of
Minsk. These lines will in a few days, despite all the destruction,
already have reached or crossed the so-called Stalin Line. After these
preparations were made, and the infantry divisions had caught up with
the motorized units ahead of them, I gave the order to attack the Stalin
Line and to break through at the places foreseen. This operation suc-
ceeded along the entire front. At the moment there are trapped Rus-
sian units or armies at eight places along our front. The noose is
being drawn tighter almost hourly, and I do not believe that any con-
siderable portions can succeed in breaking through. It will then
probably take 8 days again before the mass of our infantry will have
followed the armored units which will have pushed far to the east.
But I estimate that by the end of next week large portions of the Rus-
sian armies that were previously stationed at the Stalin Line will
T See document No. 83.
6S2-905— 64 18
194 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
be destroyed. Further actions of annihilation are now being started.
They will follow very shortly. I already consider it entirely out of
the question that the Russian Command will succeed in bringing any
considerable force back across the Volga or even behind the Urals. At
any rate I am determined to pursue the Russian Army until it is
entirely destroyed and annihilated. This resolve is also shared by
the troops. This hard resolve was born under the influence of the
horror that Bolshevism has only now revealed to us; for the power
against which we are fighting here, consists not of people, but of devils.
Every day the conviction grows, both among officers and men, that we
stepped in at the last possible moment to combat a danger that threat-
ened Europe to a degree unsurpassed since the Hun or Mongol inva-
sions. The atrocities that are perpetrated by these beasts defy the
imagination. My Leibstandarte, for example, came upon an advance
detachment of the armored group Kleist, which had hurried far ahead,
been cut off, and finally, after all its ammunition gave out, had been
overpowered. They were found, all tied up, in a condition so horrible
that the photographs cannot be circulated even in Germany. The
consequence of these impressions is a growing fanaticism, even among
our own soldiers, who prefer not to take prisoners at all any more.
What we do find here in the way of prisoners is — whether enlisted man
or officer—- so brutalized and unspeakably debased that again there
emerges the sharp boundary line between Europe and Central Asia,
as distinguished from the Far East, from those old highly cultivated
races, that is, who for thousands of years had to defend themselves
laboriously in bloody battles against Mongol Asia.
The German and Rumanian formations attacking from Rumania
under the command of Antonescu have now liberated large parts of
Bessarabia and have for 3 days been engaged in crossing the Dniester.
It is precisely the Rumanian units of this Army group that have fought
splendidly. Their Chief, General Antonescu, himself is certainly a
very rare person, not only thoroughly energetic, but also particularly
competent. Just as gallantly, however, did the 2y 2 divisions of the
Slovak Army and particularly also the Hungarian units fight. 'Unfor-
tunately the press cannot refrain from continually re-opening the
barely healed wounds between Hungary and Rumania. At the
moment, therefore, in addition to other troubles, I also have the worry
of preventing the troops of these countries from coming in direct con-
tact with each other in order, if possible, to avoid incidents ; I believe,
however, that the soldiers are much more averse to them — if only
because of the bloody mission they have in common — than the journal-
ists in the various capitals.
JULY 1941 195
The battle in the extreme north is primarily a battle against nature.
General Dietl 8 in particular first has to cut at least a small path
through every kilometer covered in order to be able to bring up ammu-
nition and food. There is, morever, I hear, in the tundra amidst the
snow and ice, a veritably inconceivable plague of gnats. This is,
therefore, a war like that in Narvik, in which patience and endurance
are just as decisive as bravery — three virtues which the Finns especially
have to an extraordinary degree. They are just as splendidly led as
they are unprecedentedly reliable and at the same time extremely
unassuming. A small but brave race of heroes !
Your formations, Duce, are now being brought up as rapidly as
possible in the circumstances and I am convinced that they will par-
ticipate successfully and advantageously in the second phase of the
battles in the south. I am particularly glad that this corps of yours is
a complete and numerically adequate one because this also poses
simpler problems in the matter of supplies later on. It will be espe-
cially a joy to me, Duce, to be able to greet you yourself again. This
time, even more than before, I am convinced that the war is won; for
after the annihilation of Russia, there will be no power in the world,
Duce, that can shake our European or your North African position.
Aside from this, however, we shall succeed in ©laranteeing out of the
immeasurable expanse of the eastern area, those^ 1 basic economic con-
ditions that would be calculated, even if the war lasts very long, to
free the rest of Europe from its ever-present want and its attendant
anxiety.
Please accept, Duce, my heartiest and comradely greetings,
' Your
* Eduard Dietl, General of Mountain Troops ; Commanding General, Mountain
Corps Norway In Finland.
8 No typed signature appears on this -version of the document which is the film
of a copy made from the carbon of the original.
No. 135
199/140808-99
The Minister in Bolivia to the Foreign Ministry 1
Telegram
No. 211 of July 20 La Paz, July 20, 1941.
With reference to my telegram No. 210 of July 19. 2
Today's press announces in big headlines that a state of siege has
been proclaimed and that I have been declared persona non grata.
'Marginal note: "Shown to the Foreign Minister. R[intelen], July 21."
s In this telegram (203/141631) Wendler first reported that the Under State
Secretary had informed him that he was no longer persona grata and that his
departure was desired by next Tuesday, July 22.
196 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The conjecture I made in my previous telegram is confirmed by
the banning of the daily newspaper La Calle for 4 weeks, the daily
newspaper Inti and the weekly newspaper Bulletin for 2 weeks each.
A number of journalists and officers whose personal identity is not
known have been arrested. 3 The former head of Lloyd Aereo Boli-
viano, the Keich German Schroth, is said to have been arrested in
Cochabamba.
In a statement to the press the Minister of the Interior * states that
the Government has proof of an intended Putsch by pro-National
Socialist circles and the German Legation is implicated in the prepara-
tions for it. Nothing can be revealed about the proofs, however. The
charges against the Legation are pure fabrications. 5 I request author-
ization to make a statement to the press to that effect. 8
I am convinced, furthermore, that the assertions about an intended
Putsch are also based on a fiction. The Government, which is being
severely criticized among the broad masses of the population because
of the increasing cost of living and the scarcity of foodstuffs, is resort-
ing to its sensational action chiefly for the purpose of silencing the
opposition by banning the opposition press.
In the diplomatic corps there is strong criticism of the action taken
against me. There is thought of suggesting to the Nuncio that he
undertake an appropriate intervention with the Foreign Minister. 7
Wendler s
8 Marginal note at this point: "DNB, Arnold."
* Gen. J. de la Vega. „ n , ,.„..., ^
B In telegram No. 215 of July 21 (203/141644) Wendler reported having learned
that the material which was considered to incriminate him was a letter allegedly
written to him by Major Belmonte, the Bolivian Military Attache in Berlin.
The letter was said to have been intercepted by the secret service of a foreign
power and made available to the Bolivian Government. Wendler termed the
letter a forgery and stated that he had never had any relationship with Major
Belmonte^^ instruction of July 21 (251/164739-40) Woermann for-
warded to Wendler the test of a note to be delivered to the Bolivian Government
and if possible also to the press denouncing the action of the Bolivian
G ° T Marginal note at this point in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "No".
At the end of the document is the notation : "Under State Secretary Woermann
has been informed by telephone of the instruction noted on the margin by the
Foreign Minister. R[intelen], July 21." lomn^msw
' In telegram No. 398 of July 24 addressed to Wendler at Santiago (203/141660)
Woermann requested him to render a completely candid account of the back-
ground for the action of the Bolivian Government, particularly whether there
were anv compromising actions on Wendler's part. ,
In the reply, No. 396 of July 27 from Santiago (203/141672) Wendler denied
any compromising activity on his part and insisted that the principal and im-
mediate factor was the fabricated letter from Belmonte which apparently was
supplied to the Bolivian Government by the United States.
See, further, document No. 158.
JULY 1941 197
No. 136
82/60388-89
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Telegram
No. 690 of July 20 Special Train, July 21, 1941—1 : 33 a. m.
from the Special Train Received Berlin, July 21 — 1 : 55 a. m.
No. 1110 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 21.
[Pol. VIII 4118 g.] *
With reference to your telegram 1293 of July 19. a
From your report I gathered that the impression which had already
arisen here that the Japanese Cabinet crisis was mainly engendered by
the person of Matsuoka was correct. On the other hand the report
touches only incidentally on the question of the Neutrality Pact with
the Soviet Union concluded by Matsuoka, which, it was assumed here,
played a decisive role in the origin of the crisis. Also, you say in your
statements in one place that Matsuoka made himself the target of ve-
hement criticism from the nationalist camp because of his American
policy, whereas it is stated in another placCHiat he is accused of having
made himself the spokesman of Oshima and Germany and of being
kept by them in leading strings. These statements are not entirely
consistent with each other.
In view of the political interest we have in understanding as clearly
as possible the reasons behind the ouster of Matsuoka, especially in so
far as his foreign policy had something to do with it, I ask you to
comment on the matter again by telegram. 3 Is it true, as assumed
here, that the reason for the Cabinet crisis was really, in the last analy-
sis, Matsuoka's mistaken policy in concluding the Neutrality Pact with
Moscow, by reason of which his continuation in office was considered
to be no longer tolerable ?
RlBBENTROP
1 The file number is supplied from another copy ( 1680/395729-30) .
1 Document No. 131.
a In 'telegram No. 1318 of July 22 (82/60399-401) Ott explained that, while It
was true that Matsuoka had aroused violent criticism from Nationalist circles as
a result of the Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union and of his failure to make
Germany's views prevail with regard to the negotiations with the United States,
his fall was brought about "not so much by the nationalists with whom we co-
operate but rather by that tendency which wishes Japan to observe a wait-and-see
attitude." "Under the slogan of keeping Japanese policy independent of foreign
influence these circles fought in reality against Matsuoka's allegedly excessive
dependence on Germany."
198 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 137
82/60395
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most ukgent Tokyo, July 21, 1941 — 10 : 40 a. in., summer time.
No. 1308 of July 21 Keceived July 21—10 : 20 p. m?
For the Foreign Minister.
With reference to your telegram No. 1098 of July 19. 2
With regard to the Japanese counterproposals addressed to the
American Government I have told the Deputy Foreign Minister 3
about my personal objections to the toning down of the passages relat-
ing to the Tripartite Pact and urgently requested that Ambassador
Nomura postpone their presentation so that they can be re-examined.
The Deputy Foreign Minister replied that the instructions had in
the meantime been, sent, as Foreign Minister Matsuoka had specially
expedited the transmittal before he resigned in order to commit Japa-
nese policy to the unbridgeable antagonism toward the United States
of America. Like Matsuoka, the Deputy Foreign Minister was con-
vinced that in view of these antagonisms, which have arisen particu-
larly on the China question, a practical agreement was impossible.
Moreover, further tension in relations with the United States of Amer-
ica was to be expected in the next few days as a result of the Japanese
action against Indochina. In these circumstances the Japanese coun-
terproposals were (group missing), as I had repeatedly been told, only
a tactical maneuver to clear Japan of the blame for the failure of
the negotiations.
Ott
'Marginal note: "Forwarded to the Special Train as No. 2442, July 21."
1 Document No. 127.
' Chuiehi Ohashi.
No. 138
B077/E292421-24
Memorandum, oy an Official of the Department for German Internal
Affairs
Berlin, July 21, 1941.
zu D IX 44. 1
Subject : Letter of M. Wolodymyr Stachiw of July 2, 1941, 2 addressed
to the Eeich Foreign Minister recording his appointment as
Plenipotentiary of the Ukrainian Government.
1 D IX 44 : Document No. 115.
' Document No. 115, enclosure.
JULY 1941 199
The events from -which M. Wolodymyr Stachiw, in his opinion,
can derive his mandate for announcing to the Reich Foreign Minister
his appointment as Plenipotentiary of an alleged Ukrainian Govern-
ment, in Lwow are briefly described in the enclosed memorandum.
What is involved is an arbitrary action of the ambitious and active
Bandera group. The action which it staged in Lwow has no constitu-
tional significance ■whatsoever from our viewpoint. This view has
been expressed unequivocally to the leading people of the Bandera
group by the German military and domestic authorities, which, how-
ever, presumably does not exclude that the dispute described will not
be the last one. If nevertheless Bandera and his staff have so far
been treated leniently this is explained by the fact that the activities
of this section of the OUN have often turned out to be quite useful,
and by the wish that the groups of the Ukrainian youth which are
particularly attached to it should not lose their enthusiasm for their
cause.
A reply to the letter of M. Wolodymyr Stachiw in my opinion is
out of the question. Likewise the matter should not be submitted to
the Reich Foreign Minister at the present stage.
Herewith to the Foreign Krister's Secretariat through Under
State Secretary Woermann,
Gkosskopf
[Enclosure]
Memorandum
Berlin, July 21, 1941.
zuDIXM. 8
■ Subject: Proclamation of the "Ukrainian Government" by Bandera
followers in Lwow on June 30, 1941.
Reference: Letter of July 16, 1941, from the Foreign Mini-
ster's Secretariat and letter of July 2, 1941, from Wolodymyr
Stachiw to the Foreign Minister.
The occurrences of June 30 in Lwow represented a surprise coup of
the Bandera people, i.e., the group of the OUN, the "Ukrainian na-
tionalists," led by Stepan Bandera; this group doubtless wanted
thereby to assure themselves of priority over the other Ukrainian
groups. For this purpose they utilized what was first announced
simply as a liberation celebration of the Ukrainian nationalists in
Lwow which the Wehrmacht representatives mentioned in M.
Stachiw's letter had had no hesitation in attending. Without having
notified any German authorities at all in advance, Bandera's deputy,
' D IX 44 : Document No. 115.
200 DOCUMENTS OX GEEMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Jaroslav Stecjko— after the general welcoming addresses mentioned
by Stachiw had first been given— suddenly read a proclamation by
Bandera concerning the establishment of a Ukrainian Government
in western Ukraine, regarding the prosecution of the war by this
new state "shoulder to shoulder" with the Reich against the Soviet
Union, and the appointment of Stecjko as chief of the Government
of Western Ukraine.
The fact that the Bandera people could steal a march upon the
other Ukrainian groups can be attributed not only to their greater
lack of scruples but also to the fact that they had shown themselves
to be particularly active. A considerable number of their followers
belonged to the Ukrainian battalion fighting in German uniforms
which occupied the Lwow radio station and the town hall; they were
active in the radio propaganda, etc. _
As for the German military authorities they were interested in
establishing contact with any kind of organized Ukrainian groups
which for their part supported the measures that were taken with re-
spect to tranquillity, order, and welfare in the occupied territory.
As the Bandera people along with their cells which operated withm
the country seem to have been on the spot earliest, they evidently had
priority in this cooperation, too. On the German side, naturally, only
aims of maintaining order locally had been envisaged ; the Lwow meet-
ing tried to give the situation a political turn .
Professor Koch, who attended the Lwow meeting as a representative
of the Abwehr and who had welcomed it merely as a liberation cele-
bration before the proclamation was read reproached M. Stec]ko
sharply for the disloyalty of his conduct and left the hall together
with the other representatives of the Wehrmacht. In the meantime,
however, the Bandera people had taken another high-handed step by
disseminating Bandera's proclamation over the Lwow radio.
As a reaction on the part of Germany, security measures were or-
dered against Bandera and some of his closest coworkers; they were
relatively mild, to be sure, but were meant to remind the people con-
cerned of the realities of the situation. Bandera was told to move
from the General Government where he had been staying to Berlin.
There he was placed under house arrest for a while; even now he is
still on parole, but with freedom of movement within Greater Berlin.
The same procedure was followed in the case of Stecjko.
Regarding the situation in Lwow I have heard in connection with
the matters described that with the controlling participation of Pro-
fessor Koch a "Ukrainian Territorial Council"— according to another
version, incidentally, called only a "Ukrainian Council of Trusted
Representatives" {Vertrawnsrat)— is in the process of formation ; this
body is supposed merely to be available to the German administration
JULY 1941 201
as an advisory organ. It is intended to include the Bandera people,
too; evidently, however, all differences of opinion have not been
eliminated as yet.
Submitted herewith to Senior Counselor Grosskopf.
Battm
No. 139
152T/373705
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United States
Telegram
No. 696 of July 19 Special Traix, July 19, 1941—1 : 15 p. m.
from the Special Train Received Berlin, July 22 — 1 : 40 p. m.
No. 1395 of July 22 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 22.
For the Charge d'Affaires.
Please see that the following ideas are circulated in the United
States, using the channels at your disposal.
Of all parts of thepopulation in the United States, the Jews, surely,
have the greatest interest in America's not entering the war, because
the effects of America's entry into the war will sooner or later be for
no one so disadvantageous as for the American Jews. In the first
place one can expect as a certainty that the war will bring to America
exactly what the Jews feel to be a particular nightmare, namely a
strictly authoritarian regime that will reduce the possibilities of in-
fluence for the Jews to a minimum. The tremendous losses certainly
to be expected in a war of America against Europe will bring out
strikingly clear the hatred of the Jews which is latent in the United
States anyhow. People will soon recall that the Jews were the prin-
cipal warmongers and they will be made responsible for the losses that
occur. The end of the story will be that one day all the Jews in
America will be beaten to death.
I should think that a dissemination of these ideas among American
Jewry could produce an effect desired by us, and I ask you to report
by wire to what extent indications of such ideas, which doubtless pre-
dict the future development correctly, can be observed there even at
this time. 1
Eibbentrop
1 See document No. 150.
202 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOEEIGN POLICY
No. 140
260/170091
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Helsinki, July 22, 1941 — 5 : 04 p. m.
top secret Received July 22 — 5 : 40 p, m.
No. 659 of July 22
With reference to my telegram No. 652. 1
1) The meeting of the Cabinet has just taken place. 2 All of the
members with the exception of two supported the proposal that the
President authorize the Foreign Minister in his relations with England
"to go as far as breaking off diplomatic relations." Thereupon the
President extended this authorization to the Foreign Minister.
2) The Foreign Minister would be very pleased if the English Gov-
ernment would take the most recent Finnish answer as the occasion
for breaking off relations. 3 If this does not take place within the
next few days, however, the Foreign Minister is resolved to act on the
basis of the authorization.*
3) The Foreign Minister in this connection pointed out to me that
the doctrine was widespread among the Finnish people that Finland
should not enter the war in the West. The Foreign Minister would
therefore welcome it if, in case of a breach of relations with England,
the German press would not represent this as entrance of Finland on
the side of Germany in the war against England, but simply as the
cessation of diplomatic relations between Finland and England.
Bluchek
L In this telegram (260/170088) Bliicher reported that Ryti and Witting were
suggesting to members of the Foreign Affairs Committee the breaking off or rela-
tions with England; that the Cabinet would meet the next day ; and that a sharp
telegram was being sent to London refusing further British demands and de-
manding the return of confiscated cargoes.
* See Editors' Note, p. 185.
' See footnote 1.
* See, further, document No. 180.
No. 141
129/121118-19
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
IT. St.S. Pol. 698 Berlin, July 22, 1941.
The newly appointed Portuguese Minister, Count Tovar, visited me
today for the first time. We agreed that his communication with the
Foreign Ministry could take place in the usual manner even before
the presentation of his credentials.
JULY 1941 203
The Minister was very open in the conversation. I note the follow-
ing points :
1. Count Tovar expressed unequivocally his fears concerning the
policy of the United States, especially with regard to the Azores, and
confirmed that Portugal was not tranquilized by the statements of
Sumner Welles. 1 In no case was Portugal willing to enter any
sort of compromises whether open or covert with respect to the
Azores but would rather fight if the occasion arose. With regard
to the possibilities of defending the Azores, the Minister said that
the defensive strength had been greatly increased through the arrival
of new batteries and troops, so that an operation with a few destroyers,
for example, could not be successful. Large ships would have to be
used, and it was doubtful whether the Americans would run this risk.
2. Kegarding Spanish-Portuguese relations, the Minister said that
they were iftore cordial than ever before. In all of Spain there was
only one mWi who stood outside the ranks; this was unfortunately
Foreign Minister Serrano Sutler. The printing of the abdication
statement of King Alfonso in the Portuguese press had occasioned
in him an entirely unjustified and incomprehensible irritation with
Portugal.
Count Tovar evaluated the internal situation of Spain very skep-
tically, particularly her situation with regard to supplies of food and
gasoline. Portugal was willing to help with provision of food and
had just now given Spain an unsecured credit for overseas foods,
especially for the delivery of vegetable oils. 2 Spain's lack of oil was
to be explained by the fact that in order to obtain foreign exchange
she sold her oil abroad, especially to the United States, for a much
higher price than the price she now had to pay for imports.
3. The Minister said with regard to German- Portuguese relations
that actually there had never been any political talks between Germany
and Portugal in recent years. If we wished to begin such talks,
Portugal would certainly always be ready for them.
WoERMANN
1 In a press conference on July 14, Sumner Welles said "that the United
States hoped that Portugal would remain in control of the Azores and Cape
Verde Islands and that this country [the U.S.A.] had no Intention of acting
against them." (The New York Times, July 15, 1941, p. 9, col. 1)
' Portugal and Spain had signed a trade agreement in Llshon on July 2 pro-
viding for the supply to Spain of colonial produce, and for the financing of the
shipments by Portugal. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Bulletin of
International News, vol. xvin (1941) , pp. 930-831.
[Editors' Note. On July 22 Marshal Kvaternik, the head of the
Croatian armed forces, visited Hitler at his field headquarters.
Hewel's record of this conversation on the German film of files of
the Foreign Minister's Secretariat (F7/0119-108) is badly damaged
204 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
and for the most part illegible. The invitation to this visit which
was to be followed by a trip to the front was transmitted in Kibben-
trop's telegram No. 631 sent to the Legation in Zagreb on July 14
(116/66943) . The text of an exchange of letters, between Kibbentrop
and Kvaternik at the end of this visit was transmitted to the Legation
in Zagreb in telegram No. 724 of July 29 (116/66962-63) .]
No. 142
851/284432
Memorandum hy Ambassador Bitter
Special Train, July 23, 1941.
The OKW informs us of the following :
"A Danish request for reinforcement of the Danish Army by
about 2,000 men has been addressed to OKW through the Military
Attache in Copenhagen. 1 .
The Commander in Chief of the Keplacement Army 2 is of the opin-
ion that this request could be complied with, but that it should be made
conditional on the demand that a contingent of the Danish Army, of
about regiment strength, should, as in the case of Croatia 3 be made
available within the framework of the German Army for the fight
against Bolshevism." *
OKW asks for our comment.
I propose that we should agree to Denmark's wish of reinforcing
her Army by about 2,000 men on condition that a contingent of the
Danish Army, of approximately regiment strength, in addition to the
Danish corps of volunteers, will, as a unit, join in the war against
Kussia. s
Bitter
"This is probably an error and should read, "the Commander of German
Troops in Denmark" (see document No. 198). The German Military Attache for
Denmark before the German occupation was Lt. Gen. v. Uthmann with offices in
Stockholm.
2 Col. Gen. Fritz Fromm,
1 See document No. 46 and footnote 2.
•Marginal notes: "Together with General Jodl, I submitted this memorandum
to the Fiihrer. The Fiihrer agrees with the proposal as set forth above. He also
thinks that the inclusion of foreign contingents would ease the task of our Army
later on in the occupation. Hewel, July 30."
"Ambassador Ritter: The Foreign Minister has been informed. R[intelen],
July 31."
"Yes.Rtibbentrop]." ^ iV ^ „
*In telegram No. 990 of Aug. 5 (851/284425) Kenthe-Fink reported that the
German decision in this matter had been transmitted to the Danish General Staff
by the German Military Commander. For the Danish reply and German reaction,
see document No. 198.
JULY 1941 205
No. 143
535/23D871
An Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs to the
Foreign Minister
Teletype
Berlin, July 23, 1941.
e.o.DIX49.
I request the Office of the Foreign Minister to have the following
telegram sent to the Foreign Minister :
Teletype, Special Train.
ForiCounselor of Legation Weber.
At the conference at Leibbrandt's 1 on July 23 the following matter
was discussed :
I. The appointment of Reichsleiter Rosenberg as Reich Minister z
and the decrees in connection therewith will probably be announced
in the press together with a large military victory.
II. The Dienststelle Rosenberg claims the right to regulate church
questions. 3
In principle it was intended to mark time and, in general, without
prompting religion, to leave it to the individual in keeping with the
free exercise of religion. Efforts of foreign countries to contact church
organizations in the occupied area in order to gain influence are not
to be allowed. A more sympathetic attitude toward the Ukrainian
(autocephalic) Church owing to its national ties.
I should like to remark on this that we must expect efforts by the
Papal See to make contact with the Greek Orthodox Uniate Church
in the Western Ukraine (Lwow, Bishop Sheptyzkj) and also to
approach the Catholic (Polish) population in Western Russia and
Lettgallia (in eastern Latvia) as well as the Lithuanian population.
Moreover, the Greek Orthodox churches in the Balkans and in other
foreign countries will probably try to take up contact with the rem-
nants of the Greek Orthodox Church in the U.S.S.R.
Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.
Grosskopf
1 Georg Leibbrandt, Ministerialclirektor ; Chief, Political Division, In Reich
Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, 1941-1943.
a See document No. 119.
* See document No. 114.
206 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOKEIGN POLICY
No. 144
1527/37372B-30
The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Telegram
No. 703 of July 24 Special Train, July 24, 1941—3 : 00 a, m.
Received July 24 — 4 : 00 a. m.
Subject : Proposals for mendacious reports.
For the acting State Secretary.
It has been shown that England and America are daily flooding
the world with mendacious reports which in some instances are quite
clever. Following the motto that offense is the best defense, I there-
fore wish that every day one or two very clever mendacious reports be
launched in the world concerning the intentions of Roosevelt or of
Churchill. According to the type of report the question will be
whether to plant the reports in the foreign press, to have them pub-
lished in the German and foreign press, to disseminate them by radio
or to circulate them through occasional remarks and information
issued in the course of press conferences.
The formulation of these reports must be based upon close study of
the weak points in American or English policy, which is to be under-
taken in close cooperation with the Political Department. For ex-
ample, the London radio report that U.S. troops had arrived in
British Guiana 1 can be used to represent this report as the signal for
further American troop landings, say, in neighboring Venezuela, and
to this could be added a large number of further reports in order to
denounce North American annexationist attempts in South America.
Other reports should be aimed at exposing in our propaganda directed
at England the American design to inherit the British Empire. Fur-
thermore, Boston reports could be disseminated in England concerning
the difficulties that had arisen between Churchill and Roosevelt on
account of Iceland because the folly of leaving this island to America
was being realized in England. These examples are meant to serve
only as an indication of how I visualize our counteraction against the
Anglo-American fabrications.
I am assigning to Dr. Megerle the task of carrying out this counter-
action in close cooperation with the Political Department and the Press
Department. Moreover this counteraction is to be included among the
matters discussed in the daily conference on propaganda questions in
1 Under the agreement of Sept. 3, 1940 (see vol. xi of this series, document No.
10 and footnote 4) , the United States acquired the right to lease naval and air
bases in British Guiana and other British possessions in the Western Hemisphere.
The text of the agreement for the use and operation of these bases was trans-
mitted in a letter of March 27, 1941, from the President to the Congress. For test,
see Department of State, Bulletin, 1941, vol. rv, p. 387.
JULY 1941 207
which Dr. Megerle participates. Dr. Megerle -will submit to me
weekly a short compilation of the false reports planted in accordance
with the foregoing.
RlBBENTROP
No. 145
FU/0347-S1
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey 1
Telegram
No. 7|7, of July 23 Westfalen, July 24, 1941— S : 15 a. m.
from the Special Train Received Berlin, July 24-3 : 45 a. m.
No. 997 of July 24 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 24.
For the Ambassador personally.
American and English radio and press reports since yesterday hare
been asserting that the German Ambassador in Ankara has started a
vigorous peace offensive. 2 It is said that he has already made in-
quiries of the diplomatic representatives of the various countries. In
a lengthy report of the Associated Press from Ankara it is stated that
there is hardly an Ambassador or Minister of a neutral country in
Ankara whom the German Ambassador has not yet told that it is his
country's mission to mediate peace between Germany and England. 3
These reports are partly on the same lines as the statements in your
last dispatch on Turkish foreign policy, 4 in which you suggest that the
idea be considered whether it would not be expedient to let the Turks
take the initiative in order to clarify the question of England's readi-
ness for peace after the conclusion of the Russian campaign. This
might also be advantageous inasmuch as in the event of a negative
outcome of such an attempt, Turkey would decide more easily to give
up her alliance with England and to develop further her friendship
with Germany.
As to the substantive aspect of these statements, I want to say
first of all that I consider such a course entirely erroneous because :
1. We will not make a peace offer either through the Turks or
otherwise, for our experience with previous offers of this kind has,
as you know, been completely negative ;
1 Marginal notes :
"[For] F[fihrer]."
"Shown to the Fiihrer. Hew[el], July ..."
' The texts of DKB summaries of such reports dated July 22 and 23 are on the
film of files of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat (Fll/0353-54). One of them
has a marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting which reads: "Papen."
*A German text of this Associated Press report of July 23 is filmed on
Fll/0352.
* Document No. 125.
208 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
2. I consider the idea an illusion that instead of using power politics
we can bring Turkey into our camp by assigning to her the friendly
role of a mediator with respect to England.
I therefore ask you in any case not to pursue this idea any further
nor to discuss it in conversations with diplomats at your post. The
above-mentioned English and American reports are obviously based
on indiscreet talk in the diplomatic corps at your post, in which the
ideas which you suggested for consideration were rendered in distorted
form. Such reports are, however, extremely prejudicial to the inter-
ests of the Reich. Every kind of conversation on questions of this
nature in diplomatic circles is immediately regarded by our enemies
as an indication of weakness on the part of Germany and is exploited
accordingly by the press. I wonder how it is that foreign journalists
time and again place the German Embassy there in the center of such
conjectures, which interfere with German foreign policy. 5
I therefore find it necessary to request that in your conversations
at your post you refrain in all circumstances from saying anything
about a peace ofier from Germany or about a possible activity with
respect to mediation on the part of Turkey or about any German
plans at all unless you have received appropriate authorization from
here to do so.
RlBBENTROP
e This passage is partly illegible on the document printed and was supplied
from another copy (F2/0372-68).
No. 146
216/147730-31
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Tokyo, July 24, 1941—11 : 50 a. m.
No. 1353 of July 24 Received July 25—1 : 30 a. m.
The Japanese Foreign Minister, who had asked me to see him this
afternoon, received me in the presence of an interpreter in order to
inform me that the Japanese-French negotiations on the occupation
of bases in Indochina, 1 as he stated, had resulted in an agreement
concluded in Vichy on July 20. At present the two Governments
were arranging for a protocol and a communique which will state,
among other things, that the integrity of Indochina and French
1 See document No. 126.
JULY 1941 209
sovereignty over the territory would not be affected. The communique
would be published probably on July 26. 2
The Foreign Minister then expressed his thanks for the cooperation
afforded to Japan by Germany.
In reply to my question as to whether the preparations and agree-
ments were of such nature as to preclude any local difficulties, Admiral
Toyoda stated that the agreements would assure a smooth course,
particularly because the chief of the Japanese military mission in
Indochina, General Sumita, had discussed all details with Governor-
General Decoux. I then conveyed to the Japanese Foreign Minister,
as instructed, the thanks of the Minister for the statement delivered
to met^t my last call. 3
In response to his request I then outlined for the Foreign Minister
the progress of our military operations in the Soviet Union on the
basis of the available information. The Foreign Minister acknowl-
edged my report with visible satisfaction. I then asked him to keep
us informed also in the future of the reports of the Japanese missions
in the Soviet Union and England, which he promised to do, and fol-
lowing this asked him whether the report on the reception of the
Japanese reply by the American Government had already been re-
ceived from the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. 4 The Foreign
Minister replied that owing to the Japanese-French negotiations he
had not yet been able to occupy himself with questions concerning
America. I reminded the Japanese Foreign Minister of our urgent
interest to have prompt and complete information on the progress of
the talks.
Ott
* The protocol was actually signed on July 29 and made public that day. For
text see Department of State, Bulletin, 1941, vol. v, p. 286. Signed simultane-
ously was a secret agreement which followed closely the text of the appendix
printed in document No. 126 and which was subsequently presented to the Inter-
national Military Tribunal for the Far East as Exhibit No. 651.
8 See document No. 130.
* See documents Nos. 88, 95, and 127.
No. 147
105/113781
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
U. St.S. Pol. 707 Beelw, July 24, 1941.
The Rumanian Minister * inquired today about the future fate of the
Ukraine and advanced the special wish of the Rumanian Government
that the future Ukrainian state should not be too large. The 40 mil-
1 Raoul Bossy.
682-905—64 19
210 DOCUMENTS ON GEBMAN FOREIGN POLICY 1
(
lion Ukrainians would otherwise again exert pressure upon Rumania !
and on other European countries. In particular the Minister advo-
cated that former Greater Galicia not become part of the Ukraine, so
that in this manner a direct connection between Germany and Rumania !
would remain assured. The Minister then also asked whether we j
were cooperating with particular groups of the Ukrainian national- i
ists, and if so with which ones. j
I told the Minister that it was still too early to make any sort of ■
statements regarding the future organization of the territory of the '
former Soviet Union. At the moment the Soviet Union was still an '
area of operations. Gradually portions would be taken out of the area
of operations and transferred to civil administration. I could not
give him further details. As far as the Ukrainian groups were con-
cerned, we had a clear policy of not making any one of the feuding
nationalist groups the matrix of a future government. The Ukraine
would certainly remain first under military and then under civil ad-
ministration for a rather long time to come. 2
"WoERsrANM-
«'v ln , ^ram No. 2303 of July 25 (105/113793-84) Killinger reported that
Minal Antonescu had indicated interest In the future of the Ukraine and ex-
pressed the wish "that no great Slav territory be established on Rumania's
Doraer.
No. 148
BS5/S39972-74
Memorandum, by the Director of the Political Department
Berlw, July 24, 1941.
The Party in the appended letter, 1 the Ministry for Ecclesiastical
Affairs and the Governor General 2 have recommended that in the
appointment to high offices in the Catholic Church the right of control
of the State, which is recognized in the Reich Concordat s only to a
limited degree (see annex 1),* be extended to the filling of all church
offices with episcopal powers and expanded beyond the area of validity
of the Reich Concordat to include the entire area under German
sovereignty.
The demand for participation by the State in filling the high offices
of the Catholic Church has been the subject of dispute between the
temporal an d spiritual powers in Catholic countries for a thousand
1 Not found.
*Hans Frank.
* See Series O, vol. i, document No. 371.
'Not printed (535/239975).
JULY 1941 211
years. From the standpoint of National Socialist Germany it is a
matter of course. What church offices this demand is to apply to and
the form and the time of application are, on the other hand, questions
of political expediency.
II
On occasions of individual cases the question has already been dis-
cussed repeatedly in a loose form with the Nuncio. Thus just recently
when bishoprics hecame vacant outside the area of the Concordat
(Prague, Budweis, among others) he was warned that the Curia was
creaGhg accomplished facts. 5
As^gainst an official assertion of our claims there are a number of
very serious objections which would argue in favor of postponing this
problem to the time of a basic new regulation of questions of church
and state. These objections, however, can be overcome. They are:
a) The right of control, whose extension within the Old Reich
and whose expansion to the entire area of German sovereignty is
being demanded, is based on the Eeich Concordat which has not as
yet been denounced, but which we in practice considered no longer
capable of application in the majority of its stipulations since it is
intrinsically outdated. In the case of negotiations or even com-
munications on the subject of this right of control, the obstacle of
the express or silent recognition of stipulations of the Eeich Con-
cordat is difficult to avoid.
b) Negotiations on services of the Curia which, like our present
wishes, go beyond the Concordat, lead to new concordat-like agree-
ments which we do not want and to wishes of the Holy See for
counterservices.
Ill
Nevertheless the Political Department considers it likewise nec-
essary that those cases of uncontrolled filling of the higher offices in
the Catholic Church, utilizing the deficiencies of the Concordat, be
halted and that the Vatican be warned in an appropriate communi-
cation against continuing the procedure so far practiced. It is a
matter of finding a form for reducing the objections expressed under
II a) and b) . This form has been found in that no proposals for a
new settlement will be made to the Curia but it will be notified of
a claim by the State.
It is therefore proposed that the Embassy at the Vatican be directed
to present a note verbale, a draft of which is appended as annex 2. 6
We can comply with the wish of the Party Chancellery to treat
the matter in a somewhat still, exclusively written way for the present.
6 Weizsacker recorded conversations with the Nuncio about this problem in
memoranda of May 8 (534/239948) and June 26 (534/239926). A memorandum
of June 19 (534/239896) shows that Weizsacker also discussed the question of
the bishopric of Prague with Neurath.
' Not printed (535/239976-77) . See document No. 241.
212 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The probably sols concession which could be made to the Vatican
in the future would be the summary communication of the reasons
in case of rejection of the proposed candidates. The Party Chancel-
lery, too, according to its letter would now go along with this con-
cession. There is however no reason to come out with this concession
at this time.
A memorandum with an explanation of ecclesiastical terms used
is appended as annex 3. T
The Party Chancellery has requested that it be given the draft
of the communication to be directed to the Vatican for comment before
it is sent out. This would be done through the Department for
German Internal Affairs.
Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister with the request for
his decision. 8
WOERMAKN
'Not printed (535/239978-79).
* Marginal notes :
"To me after return from vacation. W."
"H. Siegfr[ied] : Please determine as to what had happened with the original.
Wfeizsacker], Aug. 1."
"It haB been approved by BAM ; draft Is being prepared. Sifegfried], Aug. 8."
See document No. 241.
No. 149
4699/E226915
Memorandum, by the Director of the Department for German Internal
Affairs
Berlin, July 24, 1941.
e.o. D VIII 52 g.
Subject : Removal [Aussiedelung] of the Volksdeutsche from South-
eastern Europe.
In the Department for German Internal Affairs it became known
confidentially that the Fiihrer is supposed to have made a decision
about the future fate of the German national groups in South-
eastern Europe and overseas. They are to be resettled in the Reich.
It is said that Reichsleiter Bormann and the Reichsfuhrer SS are
informed of this decision.
In many questions regarding ethnic policy in Southeastern Europe
it is of decisive importance to know the future of the national groups.
Thus, for example, the decision which the Foreign Ministry has
to make as to whether a separate volksdeutsch labor service should
be established in Croatia or whether the Volksdeutsche should serve
in the Croatian labor service will depend essentially on whether the
German national Group there is to be removed within the foresee-
able future or whether it will be a lasting political factor.
JULY 1941 213
The Foreign Ministry constantly has to make similar decisions.
The Department for German Internal Affairs therefore requests
the Foreign Minister to ask the Fiihrer himself about this matter. 1
Luther
1 See document No. 187.
No. 150
1527/373745-46
The Charge d' 'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
V Telegram
top secret Washington, July 25, 1941 — 6 : 06 p. m.
No. 2424 of July 24. Received July 26—6 : 30 a. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 1395 of July 22. 1
I had the opportunity to discuss the ideas set forth in the telegraphic
instruction with influential leaders of the opposition. They showed
great interest and indicated time and again how very much they
agree with these psychological observations and the evaluation of the
domestic political situation in America; for example, one of the
Senators, who has just travelled through a large part of America on
a speaking campaign lasting several weeks and by so doing was able
to gather excellent information regarding the present mood in the
country, mentioned that the ideas under discussion had lately become
subjects for conversation among American Jews themselves. The
respected, intelligent and far-sighted Jews shared the same fears that
in case a scapegoat later had to be found for America's entry into
the war this would be the American Jews. In 1918 it was the big
industrialists and Wall Street high finance; this time it would be
the Jews. The emotionally exceedingly excitable American people
would then not display the moderation and discipline of the German
people, but would proceed against the Jewish warmongers with ruth-
less severity. Out of these considerations far-sighted Jewish circles
are avoiding taking an active part in the warmongering and leave
this to radical warmongers in the Roosevelt cabinet and to English
propaganda. Indicative of this is that some of these Jews are trying
to enter the America First Committee which is the leading militant
instrument of the isolationists. In this connection the interview with
the leading American Jew, B. Baruch 2 several weeks ago is note-
worthy, [in which he said] that a victory by Germany would not
represent any kind of economic threat to America. The wealthy
Jews are alarmed by the warmongering and the anti-business tendency
3 Document No. 139.
2 Bernard M. Barueh, American financier, Chairman, War Industries Board,
1918-19.
214 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY
of the "New Deal", -which is dominated by numerous, often penniless
but all the more ambitious Jews. Also the opinions of Americans
who have been here for. many generations are increasing, to the effect
that they no longer intend to allow themselves to be kept on political
leading strings and be criticized by Jews who have newly immigrated
such as Felix Frankfurter, 3 etc.
The beginnings of such ideas are to be observed all over the country.
So far, however, there has been no leadership and organization for a
possible anti-Semitic movement, particularly for the reason that the
most important media of information such as press, radio and film
are ruthlessly controlled by the Jews. This control is made easier for
them by the pro- Jewish policy of Roosevelt. A further report may
be sent.
Thomsen
* Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
No. 151
205/142843
The Charge d'Ajf aires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Stockholm, July 25, 1941—6 : 30 p. m.
No. 1048 of July 24 Received July 25— 9: 15 p. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 1452 of July 24. 1
Your instruction has been carried out. The State Secretary of
the Foreign Ministry stated that the Norwegian ships in Goteborg *
were being most sharply watched. In order to be able to put to sea
the laid-up ships, which at present had only skeleton crews on board,
would need at least 2 weeks of preparations. So far as he knew no
such preparations had as yet taken place. The law regarding the
supervision of foreign merchant ships provides for definite berths for
ships which are withdrawn from traffic, but it does not prevent them
from departing after clearing in accordance with the regulations.
Boheman took note of my allusion to the fact that the agreement re-
garding the Goteborg overseas traffic 3 was closely connected with the
question of the Norwegian ships in Sweden, and of my wish that in
any case attempts by the Norwegian ships to break out should be pre-
vented. He asked that further discussions on these matters be post-
poned until the return of Ministerial Director Hagglof which would
1 Not found.
" See document No. 28 and footnote 4.
* See document No. 91.
JULY 1941 215
be at the beginning of August. In any case according to his view
there was no threat that an attempt to break out would take place.*
Below
"In telegram No. 1047 of July 25 (205/142841-42) the Legation reported such
a thickening of reports as to leave no doubt that there was the Intention on
the part of the ships soon to attempt a breakout.
The next day, however, in telegram No. 1056 (205/142844) Below reported
having been assured by Boheman that the Swedish officials were unable to verify
any preparations aboard the Norwegian ships for a breakout.
By telegram No. 1509 of July 28 (205/142845) Elsenlohr directed that Wied
himself go to the Swedish Foreign Minister and state that the explanations made
by Boheman were completely unsatisfactory; that the German Government
•"f,™ certain that the first breakout by Norwegian vessels a few months
befftpe had come about as a result of the cooperation of English warships Nor-
wegian crews, and English spies in Sweden ; and with the toleration if not the
actual help of subordinate Swedish officials. Germany could not accept legal
explanations and excuses. Sweden was to be warned emphatically that a new
breakout would have most serious consequences: Germany would cancel the
Goteborg traffic agreement.
Below replied in telegram No. 1070 of July 29 (205/142851) that both Wied
and Giinther were on leave and he had therefore presented the matter again
. .,; i :? ai1 ' e State Seer etary promised an answer after some days but
indicated that he feared English retaliation if Sweden went beyond the law.
See, further, document No. 174.
No. 152
230/153286
An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the
Foreign Ministry
Telegram
N ' - 713 Special Train, July 25, 1941—10 : 10 p. m.
Received Berlin, July 25—10 : 45 p. m.
Submitted to Ministerialdirektor Schroeder through Under State
Secretary Woermann.
Telegram No. 404 of July 22 from Belgrade 1 regarding increased
communist activity in Serbia has been submitted to the Foreign
Minister and on his instruction was passed on to the Fiihrer. Regard-
ing the last paragraph 2 of this telegram the Foreign Minister ordered
that Standartenfiihrer Veesenmayer go to Belgrade at once. The
Foreign Minister requests that the matter be taken up further from
there.
Weber
1 Not printed (230/153287-89).
•This paragraph read as follows: "In these circumstances I would appreciate
it if Veesenmayer came to Belgrade at the earliest opportunity and I request
that a telegram be sent regarding the time of his arrival."
216 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOHEIGN POLICY
No. 153
1527/373749-50
The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
ttrgent Washington, July 25, 1941 — 10 : 23 p. m. i
No. 2435 of July 25 Keceived July 26—3 : 00 p. m.
For Chief of OKW Ausland; Chief of the General Staff; Chief of
the Luftwaffe Operations Staff. ,
Evaluation of the situation on the evening of July 25.
1. The American fleet is dispersed. Even if it were brought together
in the Pacific the Americans would not dare to attack Japan, because,
being otherwise inadequately armed, they would in this way stake
their future on one card with highly uncertain chances of success and
would commit themselves to a Pacific front.
2. Consequently America must content herself with empty threats '
and possibly economic measures to counter a Japanese initiative. i
She will not go so far, however, as to provoke a war by doing this.
3. Thus Japan can do whatever she likes in the Far East and in
the western part of the Pacific, Consequently America must keep the
bulk of her naval forces assembled in the Pacific; to disperse them
increases the existing weakness .
4. As long as this situation lasts American freedom of action is
paralyzed. Accordingly nothing remains for America but to seek
in every way an understanding and accommodation with Japan. I
5. As long as this objective has not been attained, the U.S.A. must ,
avoid a war with Germany, because the whole Atlantic would, as a I
result of this, immediately become a zone of war. The Americans i
would then have to use convoys to secure their indispensable imports
of raw materials from South Africa and South America, as well as
transports to the Middle East and England, and would in this way dis-
perse their fleet more and more. Conducting the war would put an
even greater strain on the already limited merchant shipping for pur-
poses of the fleet, etc. America would have to reckon with a war on
two fronts with dispersed naval forces and insufficient merchant ship- ,
ping. In this case she would lose her imports from the Netherlands
Indies that are essential to the war effort and at the same time would
possess neither a complete army for reinforcing and occupying out-
lying positions nor even an approximately adequate air force.
6. The result is that the continued serious Japanese threat and the
incomplete state of American armament paralyze the American free-
dom of (group garbled) and make an entry into the war against Ger-
many extremely unlikely.
JULY 1941 217
7. If the Japanese threat continues after the victorious conclusion
of the Russian war the United States of America will not be capable of
seriously interfering with further German measures. It will con-
tinue to scatter its increasing production of war material between
deliveries to England, China, etc., and equipping its armed forces, but
will not be able to exercise decisive influence in any direction. The
hope is for a change in case it is possible to drag out the war until far
into the year 1942. 1
Bottichek
Thomsen
1 Tfelegram No. 2488 of July 29 (1527/373775-77) reiterated the appraisal of
the situation as laid down in the document printed, emphasizing that a moment
had arrived "when America not only wants to but has to seek an understanding
and accommodation with Japan." It stated that the United States needed above
all time and therefore aimed at avoiding any major decisions in the course of
1941, both with respect to Germany and Japan. Depending on the needs of the
situation, Japan was being either "intimidated with empty threats and economic
measures or wooed with kindliness for the sole purpose of avoiding in 1941 an
occupation of the Netherlands Indies, not to speak of a struggle for Singapore."
No. 154
341/19932C-27
The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in
Argentina
July 25, 1941.
With reference to my telegram No. 686. 1
For your information.
An affirmative reply memorandum was given the Argentine Am-
bassador here on July 22, 2 in which the following is stated :
The question whether the most- favored-nation clause would stand
in the way of the conclusion of a complete customs union can be left
open, because only the granting of limited, preferences is envisaged
for the time being. Limited preferences, however, according to gen-
erally recognized international concepts, are not excepted from the
most-favored-nation treatment even if they should prepare the way
for a customs union. The German Government for its part, however,
is willing to contribute to the favorable development of economic
relations between Argentina and her neighboring countries, and is
'This telegram has not been found. For previous developments see vol. xi
of this series, documents Nos. 555 and 698 and vol, in, documents Nos. 166
and 597.
' The reply memorandum has not been found. There is another memorandum
of July 22 by WIehl (341/199329-30) in which he records giving the reply
memorandum to the Argentine Ambassador who mentioned that it would
make a good impression in Brazil, but that the plan for a customs union was
no longer actual. It had been promoted by the former Argentine Foreign
Minister, he said, but his successor had not yet taken it up.
218
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
therefore ready to waive its right to take advantage of preferential
tariffs on the basis of the most- favored-nation clause, in so far as it is
a question of preferential tariffs that Argentina may arrange with
Brazil and other South American countries bordering on Argentina.
In this the German Government proceeds on the assumption that all
the other countries entitled to most- favored-nation treatment also
agree. Furthermore it requests confirmation that Argentina, too, will
not claim such preferential tariffs as may be agreed upon in the future
between Germany and other European countries. Finally, the Ger-
man Government assumes that the Argentine Government will no-
tify it in due time concerning the extent and type of the preferential
tariffs to be arranged. End of the memorandum.
In our reply we started from the assumption that the realization of
a customs union between Argentina and Brazil, and possibly other
neighboring countries as well, lies in our interest. An economic al-
liance of the South American countries among themselves will, as long-
as it is limited to them, make them more resistant to the plans for eco*
nomic and political supremacy of the United States; a larger South
American economic area will probably provide a more efficient and
receptive partner for the Greater German economic area of the future. 8
WlEHL
recorded ThTJT&nfn^L ^ B £- S ' %?■ 52J U«ffl/B12OT8-7B) WeizsScker
r^™=trr.„ ? d i^ ""** 1 **"> Brazilian Ambassador of the view of the
German Government on the projected customs union.
No. 155
2236/476117-18
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department
Dir. Ha Pol No. 175 Berlw, July 25, 1941.
The Food Situation in Greece.
Minister Altenburg, the Plenipotentiary of the Reich m Athens, has
been pointing for weeks to the fact that the food difficulties of Greece
are reaching a critical point, and has advocated German assistance,
especially for the cities of Athens and Salonika. Up to now his
suggestions have not been complied with, first because Greek matters
are primarily Italy's business and also because the Reich Ministry
of Food, in consideration of our own food situation, categorically
refuses such help.
According to the last telegram from Athens from the Reich Pleni-
potentiary, No. 824 of July 19, 1 the Greek Government has again
approached him and the Italian Plenipotentiary with an appeal for
help because of the desperate food situation. The Reich Plenipo-
1 Not printed (4697/E226766).
JULY 1941 219
tentiary reports that in large areas of Greece there has been no bread
for weeks, the population is gradually dying off, and in the last few
days there were hunger revolts in Argos.
The main difficulty is with bread grain. Meat requirements can be
met in a pinch, and there is plenty of olive oil, even for export. The
annual Greek requirement of bread grain is 400,000 tons, their ap-
proaching harvest is 240,000 tons; accordingly they lack 160,000 tons.
Their own harvest would last to about the end of February. Starting
in March, 140,000 tons are supposed to be delivered from Bulgaria, as
the grain surplus from the former Greek and presently Bulgarian
aresCamounted bo about 120,000 tons. Until now it was assumed that
the difficulties would be eliminated during these days through the new
harvest which is already under -way. The Reich Plenipotentiary re-
ports, however, that, because of disruptions in organization and trans-
portation, this is evidently not coming about.
Italy's Plenipotentiary* informed our Plenipotentiary that grain
was available in Italy, but that payment presented difficulties. Italy
therefore intended for the time being to supply only 8,000 tons at the
end of July. Our Plenipotentiary considers it necessary to increase
this amount to at least 15,000 tons. On Tuesday, July 29, negotiations
conducted by Minister Olodius will take place in Rome, 3 in which
Greek food supplies are also to be discussed with the Italians. It is
intended to aim in these negotiations primarily at adequate grain de-
liveries to Greece by Italy, if necessary with German support in regard
to payment through a triangular clearing arrangement ; since because
of our extensive purchases of tobacco, we already have a considerable
and growing clearing debt with respect to Greece. Should this not
be successful, perhaps" one could consider making from 10,000 to 15,000
tons of grain from Germany available on a loan basis, but only as
a loan absolutely to be returned out of the new Greek harvest by Sep-
tember at the latest. However, the Reich Ministry of Food would
agree to this only if such an action were designated as necessary by
higher authority.
Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the Deputy
State Secretary in accordance with instructions.*
Wieiil
* Pellegrino Ghigi.
s See document No. 245, footnote 3.
* See, further, document No. 323.
220 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 156
B12/B0O110O-1O3
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most tjkgent Rome, July 26, 1941 — 1 : 50 a. m.
top secret Received July 26 — 4: 15 a. m. 1
No. 1668 of July 25
For the Reich Foreign Minister personally.
Translation of the letter of July 24 of the Duce z to the Fiihrer.
"Fuhrer : I lose no time in replying to your last letter 3 and, follow-
ing your example, I make a survey of the situation.
France. You are familiar with my ideas, Fuhrer. It was Nicolo
Machiavelli who first characterized the French in the words: The
more they promise, the less they give you. There is nothing substantial
to be expected of them. Weeks and months have gone by, and the
conversations on the ports in Tunis have not progressed one step.*
Meanwhile you have liberated more prisoners and Italy has made
available to France her air and sea bases at home and in the Greek
(text missing) for the Syrian campaign, which in the last few hours
has become a Franco-English comedy with an American director, the
United States Consul at Beirut. 5 In the interior of France a very
strong revival of Communists and pro-English elements is to be noted.
De Gaulle reflects the thinking of 90 percent of the French, including
perhaps the Marshal himself.
In these circumstances, it is necessary, so far as the Mediterranean
sector is concerned, to rely entirely on our forces and, above all, to
effect their constant coordination. Because of this incomplete co-
ordination painful losses have occurred. The von Tirpitz, for ex-
ample, was shipwrecked (the whole crew was saved!) 2 miles off
the coast of San Remo, because it had left Marseilles 2 days too soon
and without having inquired as to the position of our mine fields
along the Ligurian coast.
It is also important to perfect this collaboration, which is already
in progress, and I am happy to give this collaboration the form that
you, Fiihrer, desire.
1 intend to issue instructions to the effect that the present German
liaison organs now assigned to us be transformed into agencies of
the Admiral attached to the Admiral's Staff of the Royal Navy or of
the General attached to the Royal Air Force. These agencies would
be established as special services with the respective general staffs to
which they are attached and would be intended, each in the person
of its chief, to participate in the various studies that will be under-
taken, as well as in decisions that are reached in regard to the questions
'Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 2511 to the Special Train Westfalen,
July 26."
2 Another copy of the telegram is filmed on F19/369-72. The Italian text is
found among the Lisbon papers of the Italian Foreign Ministry.
' Of July 20, document No. 134.
* See document No. 113.
Consul General Cornelius Van H. Engert.
JULY 1941 221
that you have so clearly defined in your letter. Thus, in addition to
General von Eintelen at Headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces,
Admiral Weichold would take over the post with the General Staff of
the Italian Navy, and General von Pohl with the General Staff of
the Italian Air Force.
It is important to work together to solve in the best possible way
the most important problem that faces us in the Mediterranean; that
of the transportation of men and materials. I believe that there will
then happen in Rome what is happening in Libya, where Italian-
German comradeship is fully realized. In order to be prepared to cope
with possible special situations on the western front, I have again
brought the 10 divisions of the Fourth Army up to strength, and I
intend, to set up 4 divisions to guard the Tunisian front.
Spain. I do not believe that Spain wants to or can do more than
the dispatching of the volunteer division. 6 In his speech the Genera-
lissimo burned his bridges behind him but he has not moved from the
sphere of words into action. 7 I shall continue my efforts to bring our
plans to fruition, but all this must be done with great restraint in view
of the oversensitivity of the Spaniards, which is a peculiarity of their
race. The attitude of Spain is useful for curbing possible indiscre-
tions on the part of France.
Turkey. In this sector, too, it is necessary to proceed with much
moderation. A month ago I was more optimistic. According to the
last reports that I have received from Ankara, Great Britain's stock
is rising and this is to be explained as a consequence of the failure
of the Iraq venture and the Syrian campaign. The Turks will go
along with us only if they have the mathematical certainty that Great
Britain has lost the war. Nevertheless we must not give up our work
and efforts. If Turkey should one day do what Sweden has done —
that is, let the troops march through B — the fate of Egypt would be
sealed; and I am more than ever deeply convinced that if England
is liquidated in Egypt the British Empire will be liquidated. Great
Britain is aware of this and is constantly fortifying her positions and
allowing a large portion of American aid to be concentrated in Egypt. 9
Japan. The recent governmental crisis in Tokyo has causes, aside
from the official ones, with which we are not familiar. 10 It is my con-
viction that Japan will remain in our camp, partly because she will
be forced to by reason of the fact that the help that the United States
is giving Chiang Kai-shek is constantly increasing. 11 She will not
begin with the march on Russia ; she will occupy Indochina and that
will lead to the break with Washington.
Russia. I have read with the Keenest interest what you, Fiihrer,
have written me about the campaign in Russia, and about the races
of which the Bolshevist Army is composed. Precisely because of its
heterogeneous composition, because of the disorganization in its com-
mand and because of the bestial stupidity of the people, I have the
* See documents Nos. 12 and 70.
7 In this speech of July 17 on the fifth anniversary of the revolution. Franco
talked about Spain's policy toward the United States and the Soviet Union. For
text see, ifonatshefte filr Auswartige Politik, September 1941, pp. 764-769.
8 See documents Nos. 16 and 17.
" Cf. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. m, pp. 275-298.
10 See document No. 124.
" Cf. Foreign Relations of the United Slates, 191,1, vol. v, pp. 598-773.
222 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
mathematical conviction that your armies will rapidly destroy the
Russian armies, which have already been severely weakened. As my
generals tell me, the Italian Army Corps will be able to go into action
between the 10th and 15th of August. Meanwhile, however, I am
preparing a second Army Corps, and I could, if necessary, prepare
also a third. There are men enough. As far as their "morale" ia is
concerned, it is very good, and their bravery is indisputable, provided
they are well armed and well led. General Rommel will, I believe,
have informed you what our divisions are doing around Tobruk and
in this connection it should be noted that many of these men have
been living in the desert uninterruptedly for 15 to 20 months.
I, too, Fiihrer, earnestly desire to see you again. That I will be
able to do after the 10th of August, and I am prepared to come to
your headquarters in former Russian territory. I need have no
scruples about leaving Italy for the Italian people are quietly at
work and believe more than ever in victory.
Please accept, Fiihrer, my cordial and comradely greetings and the
expression of my undying friendship. Mussolini."
The original of the Duce's letter will follow in a sealed envelope
by regular messenger leaving tomorrow morning, the 26th, addressed
to the Foreign Minister personally.
Mackensen -
17 "Stimmung" used in the Italian original.
No. 157
95/106966-68
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
secret Madrid, July 27, 1941—12 : 10 a. m.
No. 2542 of July 27 Received July 27—2 : 45 a. m.
As I was invited yesterday by the Foreign Minister to his country
estate near La Granja, where he has been staying since my return
from Germany, I had an opportunity for a lengthy talk with him.
After I told the Minister the excellent impression about the polit-
ical and military developments with which I had returned from Ger-
many, and discussed with him some urgent current matters, on which
I am reporting separately, 1 the Foreign Minister sketched out for
me a detailed picture of the international situation as it affects Spain.
Answering and treating in detail my various questions and comments,
the Minister told me substantially the following :
After the threat of a premature involvement in the war had dimin-
ished for Spain during the past weeks, the situation had changed
significantly since the well-known aggressive speech of the General-
1 In telegram No. 2541 of July 26 (95/106964) Stohrer reported that he had
discussed with Suner the closing of the Polish Legation.
JULY 1941 223
issimo on the anniversary of the national liberation. 2 The speech
had been premature. It suddenly opened the eyes of the English and
the Americans about the true position of Spain. Previously, the
English Government especially kept on believing that only he, the
Foreign Minister, was pushing for war, while the "wise and thought-
ful"^ Caudillo would preserve neutrality unconditionally. That
illusion has now been taken from them. They had come to realize
that Spain, in understanding with the German Government, would
enter the war at a suitable moment. This is apparent from consistent
reports of the Spanish Ambassadors in London 3 and Washington.*
He t^d no doubt that the English and Americans were in consultation
with -each other on how to meet this new situation; it was evident
that our enemies were trying, somewhere at long last, to forestall
Germany. American propaganda for the occupation of the Azores
and certain parts of West Africa, togther with the steadily increasing
activtity of English and especially American agents in North and
West. Africa, were plain indications of this. More recently, the
Spanish Government has been receiving information indicating that
plans were being studied for a landing operation in the Spanish
zone of Morocco. Neither would he exclude the possibility of a land-
ing attempt in Portugal to establish a new European front. Tangier,
too, was threatened, to say nothing of the Canary Islands, which would
surely be attacked as soon as the Azores were occupied. 5
The Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco, General Orgaz, who
was currently in Spain for reporting and who was present during
part of my talk with Serrano Suner, confirmed the Minister's anxieties
on the strength of his experiences on a recent visit to French Morocco.
He explained that it was a matter of common knowledge that every-
where in West Africa English and American agents were studying
intensely all questions relating to a landing operation. The attitude
of General Nogues B was more than doubtful. Almost all the French
in Morocco were basically followers of de Gaulle. Anti-Spanish
sentiment was clearly visible. A striking illustration of this was the
* See document No. 156, footnote 7. In telegram No. 2460 of July 18 (95/106955-
56) Heberlein summarized Franco's speech of the day before and concluded:
"Franco's speech is the most open declaration up to now of his position on the
side of the Axis Powers against communism and democracy and of his trust in
the final victory of the Axis Powers."
3 Jacobo, Duke of Alba and Berwick.
1 Juan Francisco de Cardenas y Rodriguez.
ml: «#Ew52F t «2 ated Aug ' 10 from the German Information Office III in Madrid
(1)5/107006-07) records that the conviction was growing that Spain would
become involved in the war by some act of desperation by the British : an attack
by way of Portugal; or even more likely from the northwest African coast.
In telegram No. 2890 of Aug. 21 (95/107026-27) Stohrer reported that the
Spanish Foreign Ministry had learned that Britian and America were con-
sidering the project of demanding bases from Portugal both on her islands
and on her mainland territory,
'Gen. Auguste Paul Nogues, French Resident General and Commander in
Chief in Morocco.
224 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
theft of the code from the Spanish Consulate in Casablanca by the
French secret police.
When I interjected that it seemed most unlikely to me that the
English or American would attempt a landing in Portugal because
in such an event Spain and we too would be immediately on the scene,
etc., the Minister replied that Spain naturally would take immediate
action, but although a deployment plan was in existence, few practical
preparations had been undertaken for it. The Minister inquired about
the strength of our troops, and especially the strength of the air arm,
held in readiness in southern France against all contingencies. I
answered evasively, the more so because I had no exact information on
the matter.
To impress upon me how seriously he viewed the situation, Serrano
Suner finally explained that only a few days ago he declined the
Generalissimo's invitation to the mountains to hunt ibex, because he
could not take the responsibility at this time for being away from
Madrid and out of reach for several days.
Stohreb
No. 158
203/141669
The Director of the News Service and Press
Department to Various Missions 1
Telegram
MOST URGENT BERLIN, July 27, 1941.
Multex 552
Major Belmonte, the Bolivian Military Attache here, will make a
statement to the domestic and foreign press on Monday in which he
will brand a letter allegedly written by him to Minister Wendler as
a tendentious falsification. 2 The Eeich Government will send a note
to the Bolivian Government. DNB will publish a detailed report.
The text of Belmonte's statement, the note of the Beich Government,
and the DNB report s will be given by NPD. 4
Every means should be employed to ensure that the matter is prom-
inently pu blicized in the press at your post and among the people
1 The designated Missions were listed on the annex which has not been found
A memorandum by Woermann dated July 26 (199/140876-80) records a
discussion of that date with Major Belmonte. ' 'After Belmonte had read the text
of the alleged letter to Wendler he declared most decidedly that he never had any
relationship with Wendler and that he had never received a letter from him or
sent one to him.
J T ? a men lorandum of July 27 to Hitler (190/140859-72) Ribbentrop appended
!? e ™™ Belmonte's statement, of the note of the Reich Government; and of
*££ w -4,T epo , ■ this memorandum there also appeared this marginal note :
The Ffiihrer] agreed to everything, H[ewel], July 27."
NPD (Nachrichten-und Pressedienst) , News and Press Service.
JULY 1941 225
under the catchword, "Belmonte Case," and that the catchword gains
acceptance. See that comments are made in which the Belmonte Case
is held up as an action by the President of the United States infring-
ing the soyereignty of South American countries. In the campaign
of inflammatory agitation against Germany the U.S.A. President has
pressured the Bolivian Government into an unheard-of action against
ar representative of the Greater German Reich. "The Belmonte Case"
must be made into a slogan characterizing the criminal Jewish gangster
methods used by the U.SA. President to poison relations between
nations. Every means should be used to propagate and popularize
the slogan.
Report by wire on the reaction and the reproduction in the press
there and among the people. 5
Acknowledge receipt.
Schmidt
* No replies have been found, A confidential report of July 29 by Likus
(138/77038-40) stated that the declaration made by Major Belmonte to the
foreign diplomats and journalists in Berlin created a sensation.
No. 159
Nuremberg Document USSE-237
Adolf Hitler to General Antonsscu 1
At present Fuheer's Headquarters, July 27, 1941 .
Your Excellency : Permit me to begin this letter with my thanks
for your letter which indicated to me not only the accord of our
views held in common but above all your determination to fight this
struggle — which in my opinion will decide the fate of Europe for
centuries to come — at the side of the German Reich to the bitter end.
I know, General Antonescu, that this is primarily your decision. It
is your determination, your energy, and your manly bravery which
made your people embark upon this course; a course, which, I am
convinced will result not only in new successes but also in a new
flowering of Rumania.
. For me personally it is a great joy as well as a satisfaction, which
is easy to understand, to congratulate you today from the bottom of
my heart on these great successes. The recovery of Bessarabia is the
most natural reward for your efforts and those of your brave troops.
As for myself, I can but thank you for your vigorous leadership
as well as for the splendid achievements of your troops. These
achievements and the universal will to arrive at an unselfish coopera-
tion between German and Rumanian units have been described and
1 This document was Introduced at Nuremberg but is not in the published
collection. No copy has been found in Foreign Ministry files.
68^-905—64 20
226 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
confirmed to me by the commanders with expressions of the highest
esteem.
Just as soon as the pressure exerted from the northwest by Army
Group South unhinges the defense along the Dniester and the pivotal
■points southward, I would greatly appreciate it if you would advance
with yow troops into the area southwest of the Bug and thereby take
over the protection of this area also. At the same time the Eleventh
Army, with the Rumanian IV Army Corps under command and form-
ing the right wing, will, under command of Army Group South, drive
eastward of the Bug toward the lower Dnieper.
Permit me, General Antonescu, to add a few more words about the
course of the entire operations. I am thoroughly satisfied with the
results attained so far. In general, they are as good as the marching
capacity of the infantry allowed them to be, considering the truly
horrible roads. We have many units which in 5 weeks have now
covered a distance of approximately 700 kilometers beeline, i.e., more
than 1,000 kilometers in marching. I had hoped that the Russians
would accept battle near the frontier. From the outset I was of the
opinion that the claims regarding an early retreat, for instance, beyond
their great rivers or even beyond the Urals were merely utopian wishes
of the English. Either they will defend their territory in front of
their industrial centers or they will have lost it, one way or the other,
behind their industrial centers. To be sure, the fact that on the basis
of this necessity which was soberly realized they chose to give battle
at the very beginning resulted immediately in a number of bloody
battles; these, however, without exception, ended either with the
destruction of the enemy formations or at least with their being
smashed and beaten. Our breakthrough across the Dnieper in the
direction of Smolensk alone has again cost the enemy 200,000 pris-
oners, innumerable dead, and the loss of war material, the amount
of which cannot be estimated at this time. The number of Russian
tanks which we either shot to pieces or captured is today already close
to 10,000. Enemy losses of guns and other material are incalculable.
Replacement of these arms whicli are now lost is impossible. I do not
have to assure you, General Antonescu, that what I am primarily
interested in is not at all the winning of space but the annihilation
of the enemy not only with regard to men but above all to materials.
To replace man power may be easy for the Russians, to replace good,
trained fighters is again much more difficult for them; but replacing
arms and material on this scale is impossible for them.
This will be particularly hopeless the moment we will have taken
possession of the most essential Russian centers of production. After
5 weeks of the campaign I realize that we will attain this goal probably
at an earlier date than we had assumed.
JULY 1941 227
Permit me, General Antonescu, to thank you once more for the help
which you personally and your brave soldiers are rendering us in this
struggle and to congratulate you and your people today very specially
from the bottom of my heart on the recovery of a province, the loss
of which was unavoidable in the circumstances of the year 1940 and
which at that time particularly could not have been prevented by
military measures.
Please convey these sincere congratulations of mine also to His
Mijesty, the young King. 2
tn loyal comradeship,
Yours, etc. A [dolf] Hitler
* In telegram No. 2337 of July 28 which was forwarded to the Special Train
as No. 2549 (222/149845) Killenger reported having handed Hitter's letter to
Antonescu in Ploesti at 10 : 30 a. m. that day. Antonescu asked that the follow-
ing provisional oral reply be transmitted to Hitler :
"As I have emphasized from the beginning, I, the General, shall march on
to the end without asking for anything and without putting forth any conditions
J?. a t e «" confldence ir > the Piihrer's [sense of] justice. Apart from the forces
which Rumania has already at her disposal at the front, I Bhall mobilize all
the forces that will be needed."
See, further, doenment No. 167.
No. 160
260/170095-96
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Helsinki, July 28, 1941—7: 10 p. m.
top secret Received July 28—8 : 25 p. m.
No. 689 of July 28
1) Today the Foreign Minister told the English Minister the fol-
lowing: Finnish foreign trade, which had been reduced since 1940
by England's actions, had been completely blockaded since June 14,
of this year. 1 Since Finland was waging a common war with
Germany against the Soviets, England had concluded a military
alliance with the Soviets and declared her will to help the Soviets
with all means possible. Because complications were to be predicted
from this, the Finnish Government has decided to close its Lega-
tion in London until further notice. The Finnish Government would
be grateful to learn what the English Government intended to do
with its Legation in Helsinki.
The English Minister asked what that meant and whether he should
leave. 2 The Foreign Minister replied that he saw no other
possibility.
1 See vol. xii of this series, document No. 643, footnote 1.
In the text there is "withdraw" in parentheses.
228 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY
2) The Minister asked whether it was a case of German pressure.
The Foreign Minister answered that Finnish military and civil
authorities had found the situation neither normal nor logical.
3) The Minister asked whether he should leave immediately. The
Foreign Minister replied that his departure would be arranged as
well as possible.
4) The Minister said that the Foreign Minister would probably
understand that his action would have a great effect in the United
States.
5) The Finnish Government will not inform the press before
Thursday.* In agreement with the Foreign Minister I request that
the German press : a) not present the matter before the Finnish press
does, b) minimize the matter, o) not present it as Finland's entry
into the war against England but only as a break in diplomatic
relations.
6) The Finnish Minister in London has so far not been able to
meet the Irish High Commissioner* who is allegedly abroad. The
Foreign Minister hopes that Gripenberg can apply for agrement today
with the High Commissioner.
7) The Foreign Minister asked me to which Power Finland should
entrust the protection of her interests in England. I recommended
Spain.
Blucher
* July 31.
' J. W. Dulanty.
No. 161
F2/037S-73
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
top secret Therapia, July 28, 1941.
A 2854
For the Foreign Minister personally !
I should like to reply as follows to telegram No. 997 of July 24, 1
addressed to me :
1. Regarding the formal aspect :
The assumption made by the Foreign Minister that the American
or British agencies' '■'■reports especially prejudicial to the interests
of the Reich" had their origin and explanation in conversations which
I am supposed to have conducted with diplomats here — particularly
as these reports were "partly on the same lines" as the statements in
1 Document No. 145.
JULY 1941 229
my written report No. A 2335/41 of July 14 z is an imputation -which
is very astonishing to me and which I must reject emphatically.
The relationship of mutual confidence that must exist between
an Ambassador and his Foreign Minister if the Foreign Service is
to function, should preclude the Foreign Minister's making such a
grave charge before he had asked the Ambassador for a report and
had studied the facts in the case.
fl declare that I have at no time and with no diplomat discussed
a fpeace offer on the part of Germany after conclusion of the Kussian
campaign." If the Associated Press says that there is no Ambassador
or Minister of a neutral country whom the German Ambassador
has not yet told that it is the mission of his country to mediate peace
between Germany and England, let it be stated, in reply to this ridic-
ulous report of the Jewish representative of the Associated Press,
that there is no longer any Ambassador of a neutral power at Ankara
(with the American Ambassador there is no social intercourse, the
Afghan Ambassador is traveling, the Iranian Ambassador has been
ill for some time), and that of the three to four Ministers of neutral
countries only the Swiss representative can be considered at all so
far as political conversations are concerned.
If the Foreign Minister raises the question why foreign journalists
time and again place the German Embassy there in the center of such
conjectures which interfere with German foreign policy, I would
repeat the truism that Ankara has been one of the centers of diplo-
matic activity of both friend and foe since Turkey acceded to the
three power treaty. 8 It necessarily follows therefore that the
foreign journalists, particularly the Jewish ones, are making every
effort to discredit the representative of the Reich and to frustrate his
work, after the [British] Intelligence Service has failed to eliminate
him through an attempt at assassination.
2-. Regarding the factual aspects :
Reporting as fully as possible from sources in the diplomatic corps
regarding the opinions and positions of the enemy powers with respect
to the momentary situation is in accordance with the repeated instruc-
tions of the Foreign Minister. In the political talks held for this
purpose I have constantly pointed out since the beginning of the war
against the Soviet Union that this war had created an entirely new
situation in Europe; that the problem of the destruction of Bolshevism
had created for the first time a united European front, from which
no country within the frontiers of the Occident could withdraw.
Therefore Turkey, also, would not be spared an early and clear deci-
sion as to whether, on the basis of her interests, she ought to be
3 Document No. 125.
* Apparently a reference to Turkey's mutual assistance pact with Great Britain
and France, signed Oct. 19, 1939. For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series,
vol. co, p. 167.
230 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
considered as belonging to Europe and whether she could continue to
remain an ally of the enemy camp in view of the war which we were
waging for her interests as well.
I have in this connection stressed the fact that such a solidly united
front would mean the end of the war, because it must seem folly
to every American, to support and continue to wage England's war
against a united Europe and for Bolshevism.
That is something entirely different from a "peace offer on the
part of Germany."
Naturally it is clear that nothing could be more unpleasant for our
enemies, particularly the war-mongering Americans, than such a
development, and that they are therefore even now trying to discredit
it with all the means at their command.
In my dispatch of July 14, I dutifully reported the present views
of the Turkish statesmen on the situation. The Foreign Minister
has characterized the ideas continued therein as "entirely erroneous"
and as "illusions." This does not alter the fact that Messieurs Sara-
coglu and Numan and other members of the Cabinet have repeatedly
expressed themselves to me in this sense. With what skepticism, on
the other hand, the political alliance with Turkey is regarded in
England is clearly revealed by the authentic questionnaire of the
Intelligence] service forwarded to us by the Turkish Police. I have
considered it my duty to suggest that we take advantage of such a
situation.
If the Foreign Minister in his telegram No. 997 expresses the
opinion that Turkey can be drawn into our camp only "by way of
power politics," I should like to state in reply that the policy hereto-
fore laid down by him and expressed by the Fiihrer in his letters to
the State President * consisted in a wise exploitation of our position
of power combined with diplomatic accommodation.
I did not want to propose anything else for the future either in
order to secure for us this most important position in the Near East
without striking a blow. I have therefore kept entirely within the
bounds of the policy heretofore pursued— a policy which was not
without success.
The diplomatic aspect is dominated by military exigencies: If,
after conclusion of the Russian campaign, the final attack on Egypt
is to be launched from two directions, then, in the opinion of the
military, the route from the Caucasus through Iran and Iraq is the
logical one. But in northern Iraq a strong defensive front is being
built up with American assistance and considerable manpower. Given
the long supply line for the German troops, an attack against this
front could probably not be launched without difficulty. The neutrali-
zation of the 50 Turkish divisions in this connection is a military
* See vol. xii of this series, documents Nos. 113 and 514, footnote 7.
JULY 1941 231
requirement, which can for the present be achieved only in the
diplomatic field.
The Foreign Minister finds that the influences disturbing to Reich
policy always emanate from Ankara. However, in a period when
documents allegedly found or secret orientation manuals regarding
Turkey are exploited as proofs of aggressive intent on the part of the
Reich toward the partner with which it had just concluded a friend-
ship pact, and when Mr. Sumner Welles announces that he is in posses-
sion of sure proof of the aggressive intent of the "Nazi system" toward
other neutral states, 5 it could not be so prejudicial to the interests of
the Reich that the German Ambassador at Ankara has the reputation
of working sincerely for a European understanding which would
crown the victory of the Reich.
Let me repeat in conclusion :
Only a relationship based entirely on mutual loyalty and trust be-
tween the Ambassador and his Foreign Minister can be the condition
for any profitable work in the field of foreign policy. I have fully and
completely kept my promise of March 1939 e in this respect. Should
the Foreign Minister be of another opinion, it would be in the interest
of the Reich and in my interest personally that the collaboration be
terminated at once.
Papen
According to the report in the New York Times of July 22, 1941 (p. 1, col. 7),
Welles stated : "This Government has information that leads it to believe other
steps of the character taken against Russia are under contemplation."
Of. Franz von Papen, Memoir* (New York, 1953), pp. 443-446.
No. 162
386/211278-80
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST TTRGENT
top secret Paris, July 30, 1941—1 : 15 a. m.
No. 2274 of July 30 Received July 30—2 : 00 a. m. 1
1. Dr. Schwarzmann, for the Foreign Minister.
2. Armistice Commission, attention Minister Welck, Wiesbaden.
In today's conversation with State Secretary Benoist-Mechin I in-
formed the French Government, in accordance with my instructions, 2
that the Foreign Minister had expressed surprise at the French note
verbale of July 14 3 and was unable to take any official cognizance of it.
* Marginal note : "Forwarded as No. 2578 to the Special Train. July 30."
' See document No. 110.
a See document No. 113, enclosure.
232 DOCUMENTS ON GEHMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Inasmuch as this note had announced a delay over [the execution of]
French obligations in Bizerte, the German return services regarding
Bizerte have also been suspended.*
I reminded Benoist-Mechin that I had urgently warned the French
Government in the conference of July 7 5 not to delay the carrying out
of the supply movements through Tunis. Apart from the fact that
the transmission of the note displays a total misconception about the
situation as between Germany and France, it was also conceived in a
petty spirit. A f arsighted French policy would have utilized the Ger-
man campaign against Russia as an occasion to effect immediately
[Germany's requests regarding] Bizerte and Dakar without asking for
anything in return, in order to make a French contribution toward
weakening Europe's western enemy, England, at the very moment
when the Reich was liberating all of Europe forever from Bolshevism.
Benoist-Mechin at first answered with the familiar arguments
which had already been presented by the French Government in the
note verbale and the preceding talks. France wanted to fulfill the
obligations undertaken with respect to Bizerte as well as Dakar. The
state of open war with England which could then be expected with
certainty and from which the French Government did not shrink
would nevertheless be difficult to justify before the French public if
it yielded no hope for improved relations with Germany. There was
no connection between the French note and the campaign against
Russia. The ideas expressed in the French note had been drafted
prior to the beginning of the war against Russia. The commitment
to the position on the question of Bizerte had been formulated by the
French Cabinet while he had been away in Syria and in Turkey. He
very much regretted not having been able to make any changes after
his return to Vichy. The Reich Government should not overlook the
fact, however, that France, by this note, did not withdraw from her
commitments for military collaboration with Germany against Eng-
land, but merely wanted to assure for herself popular support for
carrying this out in a most comprehensive and resolute manner.
I objected to Benoist-Mechin that if France were given an oppor-
tunity to collaborate with a victorious Germany it was not our task
to impress the value of this policy on the French people by constantly
• In telegram No. 227 of July 26 (694/260247-49) Welck reported a conversation
of General Vogl with Admiral Miehelier in which the Chairman of the German
Armistice Commission had informed his French counterpart that French attempts
to link the agreements of the Paris Protocols with political negotiations could not
he recognized and that the fulfillment of further concessions on the part of
Germany would have to depend on a change of the French attitude regarding the
Tunisian question. For further details on the Vogl-Michelier conversation see
La Ditegation francaise auprds de la Commission allemande d' Armistice, vol. v,
pp. 5-12.
* The record of this conference, printed as document No. 82, does not contain
any warning to the French Government on the part of Abetz. No other record
of this conference has been found.
.lilt, IT 1941 233
making concessions; instead, the French Government itself should
find ways and means to gain popular support for such a policy. For
this decision, however, the French Government lacked, by and large,
the necessary enthusiasm, despite the admittedly good will of some
members of the French Cabinet. Even if a sharper tone had recently
been struck against England in official speeches both in the press and
on the radio in the unoccupied territory, the forbearance toward
warmongering circles in the United States impressed us unpleasantly
as (did also the fact that little or nothing ensued in presenting the
prodigious European accomplishments of the Fiihrer and the justifi-
cation of the German claim to leadership in Europe. Too many
French Government departments and agencies were still today nests
of de Gaullist intrigue, and the Government was devoting a great
deal less energy to combating these than to the attempt to keep from
power protagonists of Franco-German collaboration, who disagreed
with Vichy's reactionary course.
Benoist-Mechin side-stepped this question of domestic policy with
the remark that this was outside his responsibility. To refute the
charge of double-dealing with respect to the United States he cited
the accord with Japan over Indochina, 6 which he had managed to
have the Cabinet accept forthwith despite the strongest opposition
pressure from Washington. 7
He himself was well aware that the French Government and public
opinion in France still left much to be desired. He pleaded however
to place the necessary confidence in Darlan and the ministers ap-
pointed by him to the Cabinet that they would accomplish the re-
orientation of French policies and of the French public in favor of
integrating France into a Europe led by Germany.
At the end of the week in a Cabinet meeting at Vichy he wished
again to press for immediate execution of German supply movements
through Bizerte and, following that, he would ask Darlan to bring to
Paris any resolution of the French Government to this effect. 8 His
intervention at Vichy would be made much easier if Darlan were
given the hope that he would be able to raise political questions, once
the military measures had been undertaken.
I told Benoist-Mechin that I lacked instructions on this subject and
was therefore not in position to make any statement thereon.
Abetz
* See document No. 146.
T On United States pressure on France, see Foreign Relations of the United-
States, 1941, vol. v, pp. 212, 218, 243-244, 246-247.
8 In telegram No. 2335 of Aug. 6 (386/211300-04) Schleier transmitted the text
of a French note of Aug. 4 which was handed to him by Benoist-Mechin. Among
other matters it listed three conditions which would have to be fulfilled before
Bizerte could be utilized for supply shipments. The text of the French note
ha's been printed in La DMgation francaise auprte de la Commission allemande
d'Armistice, vol. v, pp. 53-56.
234 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 163
927/297338-39
The Charge d' 'Affaires m the United /States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
top secret "Washington, July 30, 1941 — 5: 28 p. m.
No. 2475 of July 29 Received July 31—5 : 10 a, m.
Inf. 648 g.
With reference to my telegram No. 1686 of June 6. 1
In recent months the mass dispatch of postcards has proved to be
particularly effective as a propaganda action which can be carried out
very quickly and suddenly and which is to be directed at as large a
group of persons as possible who do not have much intellectual
training. Therefore through the agency of the [Embassy] press
officer the mailing of about a dozen cards, each in 100,000 — in words a
hundred thousand — to a million copies has been organized and fi-
nanced. They contained sarcastic attacks on Roosevelt and the war-
mongering members of his Cabinet, reminders of his campaign
promise to keep America out of war, a reference to the American
blood sacrifices in the World War, an appeal to American mothers,
and they asked recipients to write or telegraph in this sense to their
representatives in Congress and the White House. As all of the
postcards had the letterhead of the American Congress or of the
members of Congress concerned and contained mainly material which
was taken from purely American sources and also appeared in one
form or other in the official "Congressional Record'''', our hand was
not in any way recognizable. Alarmed by the success of this cam-
paign of postcards, the interventionist press is already starting to at-
tack their being sent through Congress, but so far without success.
There follows a detailed telegram No. 24 (group garbled) of July 29
regarding the preparation and effectiveness of these postcards. 2 This
telegram and the pertinent papers have been destroyed.
Thomsen
'This telegram (593/245372-74) was a report on the propaganda activities
carried on by the Embassy.
"This presumably refers to telegram No. 2476 of July 29, sent July 31 (1527/-
373773-74) which lists seven members of the House of Representatives and one
Senator under whose names such cards were sent. Thomsen particularly
emphasized the "telling effect" of the card sent out In a million copies by Senator
Burton K. Wheeler and the great controversy between Wheeler and Secretary of
War Stimson which had resulted from it.
JULY 1941 235
No. 164
S589/E602987-91
Filkrer's Directive
chefsachb Fuhrer's Headquarters, July 30, 1941,
TOP SECRET MILITARY
The Fiihrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
OgW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.) No. 441298/41 g.K. Chefs.
Byofficer only
Directive No. 34
The development of the situation in the last few days, the appear-
ance of strong enemy forces before the front and in the flanks of Army
Group Center, the supply situation, and the necessity to give the
2nd and 3rd Armored Groups about 10 days of time to rehabilitate
their formations, compel for the moment the postponement of the more
distant missions and targets assigned in Directive 33 of July 19 * and
its supplement of July 2S. 2
I order therefore :
I. (1) In the northern sector of the eastern front the attack with
the main effort between Lake Ilmen and Narva is to be continued in the
direction of Leningrad with the objective of encircling Leningrad and
establishing contact with the Finnish Army.
This offensive is to 'be screened off north of Lake Ilmen in the Volk-
hov sector, and south of Lake Ilmen to be pressed to the northeast only
as far as securing the right flank of the advance north of Lake Ilmen
demands. Previously the situation around Velikie Luki is to be
cleaned up. All forces not required for this mission are to be added
to the assault wing to the north of Lake Ilmen. The contemplated
thrust of the 3rd Armored Group upon the Valdai Hills will not take
place until the armored formations are again fully ready for action.
Instead, however, the left wing of Army Group Center must be pushed
ahead to the northeast as far as the flank protection of the right wing
of Army Group North demands it.
Estonia is first to be cleared with all the forces of the Eighteenth
Army ; only then can divisions be brought through in the direction of
Leningrad.
(2) Army Group Center, with the utilization of favorable terrain
sectors, will shift over to the defensive.
In so far as it is necessary to gain favorable jump-off positions for
the later assault operations against the Twenty-first Soviet Army,
some attacks with limited objectives may still be carried out.
1 See document No. 128.
'Not printed (8589/E602975-77).
236 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
For the rest, the 2nd and 3rd Armored Groups are to be withdrawn
from the front as soon as the situation permits, and be speedily
rehabilitated.
(3) On the southeastern front the operations, for the time being,
will be continued with forces of Army Group South alone.
Their objective must be the destruction of the strong enemy forces
west of the Dnieper and for the rest, by gaining bridgeheads near
Kiev and to the south, the creation of suitable conditions for later
pulling the 1st Pansergrenadier Division across to the eastern bank of
the Dnieper.
The Fifth Red Army, fighting in the swamp area northwest of
Kiev, must be forced to give battle west of the Dnieper and be
destroyed. The danger that it might break through to the north
across the Pripet must be forestalled in good time.
(4) Finnish Front ;
The attack in the direction of Kandalaksha is to be called off.
With the Mountain Corps the threats to the flank from Motovskiy Bay
are to be eliminated and only those forces left to XXXVI Corps
Headquarters that are necessary for defense and for the feigning of
further assault preparations.
The cutting of the Murmansk railway is now to be attempted in the
sector of the III (Finnish) Corps, especially in direction Loukhi; all
the forces suitable for this attack are to be transferred there, with
any surplus units to be turned over to the Karelian Army. If, be-
cause of the terrain difficulties, the attack should come to a halt with
the III (Finnish) Corps, too, the German forces are to be withdrawn
and added to the Karelian Army. This applies particularly to mobile
units, tanks, and heavy artillery.
The 6th Mountain Division is to be moved to the Mountain Corps,
with the utilization of all available transport routes. Whether the
rail route through Sweden to Narvik can also be used will be clarified
by the Foreign Ministry. 3
II. Luftwaffe
(1) Northeastern Front:
The Luftwaffe will shift the main effort of the conduct of the air
combat to the northeastern front, by bringing the bulk of the VIII
Air Corps into the First Air Force. The reinforcements are to be
brought in early enough for their utilization at the beginning of
the main point of the attack by Army Group North (early on
August 6).
(2) Center:
It will be the mission of the Luftwaffe units remaining with Army
Group Center to provide the absolutely necessary fighter protection
* See documents Nos. 172 and 176.
JULY 1941 237
before the front of the Second and Ninth Armies and possibly to
support local attacks. The attacks on Moscow are to be continued.
(3) Southeastern Front;
Missions as before. No reduction of the Luftwaffe units employed
with Army Group South is contemplated.
. (4) Finland:
The principal mission of the Fifth Air Force is the support of the
^fountain Corps. In addition, the attack of the III Finnish Army
Corps is to be supported at some promising sector.
The requisite preparations are to be made for the possibly necessary
dispatch of forces in support of the Karelian Army.*
Adolf Hitler
1 The supplement of Aug. 12 (8589/EG03003-006) .
No. 165
70/50828-81
Memorandum hy Minister Bahn
Westfalen, July 30, 1941.
Report on the German Mission in Syria From Mat 9 to
July 11, 1941
I. Mission.
On May 6, 1941, at 10 p. m., Ambassador Abetz in Paris transmitted
to me the order of the Foreign Minister, in line with the general
agreement reached with the French Government, to fly to Syria and
there to prepare for the purchase of French arms for the equipment of
the Iraq Army. 1 Ambassador Abetz informed me that, in the opinion
of the French, the Levant, of all of France's overseas possessions, was
most strongly infected by de Gaullism and that High Commissioner
General Dentz himself was known as an Anglophile. It was, there-
fore, necessary above all, to overcome the psychological resistance on
the spot, to get the consent of the Italian Control Commission in Syria
to the release of the stores of arms, to ascertain the most suitable
transportation route to Iraq, and to prevent a sabotaging of the ship-
ments by de Gaullist elements. I received written authorization from
Ambassador Abetz in the name of the Foreign Minister, and from
General Vogl in the name of the Armistice Commission. Admiral
Darlan sent along a representative, M. Guerard, provided with appro-
priate powers, to accompany me and to establish the contact with
General Dentz and the French General Staff in Syria. He indeed
gave me untiring and very skilfull assistance in all conversations.
Herr Eitel Friedrich Mollhausen, of the Paris Embassy, accompanied
1 See vol. xii of this series, document No. 476 and footnote 3.
238 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
me as secretary; the Foreign Ministry placed at my disposal the radio
operator, Weller. Both gave an excellent account of themselves, as
did Consular Secretary Hornberger and radio operator Hontsch, who
were later assigned to me.
II. Journey.
On May 7 we flew to Berlin in order to pick up the radio operator
and some spare parts. On May 8, in the morning, we flew to Athens.
There I learned late in the evening that Minister Grobba was on the
way to Iraq * with two bombers and had already landed in Rhodes.
Through the wireless connection of Field Marshal von Reichenau, 3 it
was possible to reach Minister Grobba around 4 : 00 o'clock in the
morning, and to get him to await my arrival in Rhodes. On the
morning of May 9, I met Grobba and invited him to fly with me in
my plane to Aleppo and also to have his two bombers land there. I
assumed — and this was confirmed in the further course of events —
that the arrival of two representatives of the Reich and a special
courier of Marshal Petain's at a Syrian airport would deter the some-
what de Gaullist-minded French officers from making difficulties for
the German officers and their planes in continuing their flight. But
this also established a precedent for the arrival of additional German
bombers. When the three planes made a surprise landing in Aleppo
late in the afternoon of May 9, the French officers after a short discus-
sion, took in fact an entirely correct attitude; they made ground
organization and a guard detail available and invited the German
officers to dinner in the officers' mess. There over the door hung a
sign bearing the ambiguous text: "Vivent les Gaulles nos ancetres"
[Long live the Gauls, our ancestors] .
A threatening little incident, which was fortunately, however,
hardly noticed by the French, was averted through the intervention of
Grobba and me. The French had assigned a lieutenant to the Ger-
man officers as a liaison officer. The French designation "sous-
lieutenant" was translated by the German officers as "Sergeant"
[Unteroffisier] and this apparent faux pas was commented upon
with loud and vehement protests. The German officers, moreover,
wanted to inspect the city and the citadel of Aleppo, with its French
military garrison, in full uniform. This, in view of the sensationalism
characteristic of Arab countries, would at once have become known
throughout Syria and prematurely drawn the attention of the French,
Syrians, and English to our further plans. The rather sharp dis-
cussion which arose in this connection may have been the first cause
of certain misunderstandings with which Minister Grobba later on
had to contend in his cooperation with the German military authorities
in Iraq.
' See vol. xii of this series, document No. 435.
' Commanding General of the Sixth Army.
JULY 1941 239
Through orientation on the spot and after talks with Lieutenant
Commander Voissard, a confidential agent of Darlan's who had mean-
while arrived in Aleppo, and with the Iraq Consul in Aleppo, I
realized that the only reliable and quick route to be considered for the
transportation of arms to Iraq was the Baghdad Railway, but that
it^ could only be used if the arms were expedited so quickly and un-
obtrusively that neither the Turks nor the English would have time
to©repare a sabotage operation.
III. First Meeting with High Commissioner General Dents.
Since our He. Ill was unable to land at the small airport near
Beirut, I flew with Guerard on May 10 in a special French plane to
Beirut, where General Dentz had come to meet us from his summer
seat in Damascus. The High Commissioner received me courteously
but with extreme coolness. Right after the first sentences he stated
that the mission of Minister von Hentig * had at the time touched off
a series of disorders, demonstrations, strikes and small revolts, which
up to now he had not been able to put down completely, and which
had taken a toll of over 100 lives. I replied that I had not been sent
to pursue an Arab policy and that I would concern myself with Arab
questions only in closest agreement with him. It was my task to prove
that German-French collaboration, for which the Fiihrer had estab-
lished the principle of "do ut des", was no ideological game, but led
to tangible results. From this point of view we regarded the Iraq
question as the touchstone of French good will, and here he [Dentz]
could win a battle for France. Since I had to conclude from his replies
that he was by no means informed about the new status of German-
French relations, I spent about 1 hour in telling him about the policy
which had led to the meeting of the Fiihrer with Marshal Petain at
Montoire, 5 and after various reverses, to the new rapprochement
between the Reich Government and Darlan's Cabinet. In the end
Dentz stated that he was prepared to give loyal support to the policy
of Darlan and, together with his General Staff, to consider at once
what quantities of arms could, without jeopardizing their own fight-
ing strength, be released for deliveries to Iraq. He had to point out,
however, that the Army of the Levant was exposed to strong Anglo-de
Gaullist propaganda, and that, in the event of a British attack on
Syria, he could not vouch for its reliability. He therefore asked me
for the time being to see to it that no German officers came to Beirut,
and that I myself appear camouflaged under a French name. He mis-
understood my suggestion that I would choose for this purpose the
name "Robert Renoir," and wrote on the identification card intended
for me: "R obert Renouard". In reply to his question whether this
•For the background of Hentig's trip to Syria in January 1941 see vol xi of
this series, document No. 626.
1 See vol. xi of this series, document No. 227.
240 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
was written correctly, I replied that I was glad to get this name from,
him, "because there were so many things to put together again
(renouer) between our two peoples." 6 This spontaneous reply seemed
to please him. From that moment on until the day of the Armistice
he met me with decided personal cordiality.
We arranged a second meeting for the afternoon, and I took it
upon myself to get the head of the Italian Control Commission,
General de Giorgis, to release the arms that were impounded and — as
a precaution — to deploy and disperse the planes that were tightly
packed in the sheds among the various airports. General de Giorgis
seemed at first not to be greatly edified by the appearance of a German
delegation. It was possible, however, after a short time to create a
close, even cordial and comradely relationship with de Giorgis and the
gentlemen of the Italian Control Commission, due primarily to M611-
hausen's social grace and his excellent command of Italian. During
the entire time there was not a single difference of opinion between
us and the Italians. General de Giorgis and his chief aide, Lieutenant
Colonel Invrea, performed their duty objectively and dauntlessly.
Most of the other men, above all, the great throng of civilian officials,
including primarily Consul General Sbrana, who is equally unpopular
with the French and Arabs, showed a striking lack of courage and
were greatly shaken at every atrocity report.
On the afternoon of May 10, General Dentz submitted to me a list
of arms for Iraq, drafted by his General Staff, which, however, was at
first entirely inadequate. When I pointed out that half measures
were more harmful than helpful, he approved a substantial extension
of the list, so that the following items were finally scheduled for the
first shipment : 15,500 guns and 200 machine guns with 900 belts of
ammunition and B million rounds and four 7.5 field guns with 10,000
rounds. Everything with the proper equipment, accessories, spare
parts, etc. This transport, like the ones that followed, was so as-
sembled that each individual shipment was a unit in itself and was
entirely usable in the event of the loss of another shipment.
When General Dentz stated that, according to the information of
his General Staff, a period of 11 days was needed for the assembling
and shipment of the arms, I replied to him: "General, permit me to
make a remark : our armies won their battles through their speed. I
intend to do the same. You will not let yourself be put to shame
by a civilian. Eleven days — that is impossible ; the English will know
about it long before the time expires, they will accuse you of com-
plicity, bomb the transports, or prepare acts of sabotage. I can give
your General Staff not 11 days, but 10 hours." Whereupon Dentz
said : "Would you like to tell an old General Staff officer how this is
' In the original, the passage within quotation marts ia given in French as
well as in German.
JULY 1941 241
to be done technically ?" And, in response to my question, "may I ?"
he said "Please dictate." He then wrote down my suggestions: per-
sonal commitment of a reliable General Staff officer, the placing in
readiness of all available trucks of the Army, the commandeering of
the troops closest to the depots for round-the-clock loading, truck move-
ments radiating to the nearest railroad station ; there, preparation of
cars and locomotives, collection of the individual transports and assem-
bling of the final transport train in Aleppo. After a brief scrutiny
of-the proposals, General Dentz picked up the telephone, saying, "in
order to give you pleasure," and transmitted the orders literally to the
General Staff. Ten minutes later the General Staff officer in charge
of the organization was, in my presence, put on his honor as an officer.
Seventeen hours later two transport trains with a total of 27 fully-
loaded cars were assembled in Aleppo.
When I was informed that the Turkish Government requested ad-
vance notice of 5 days for each transport through Turkish territory,
I suggested to the High Commissioner that the Turks be informed
through his railroad commissioner that he feared the thinly garrisoned
Syrian-Iraq frontier would be imperiled by Iraq troops who might
stream back and he therefore requested immediate permission for the
transit of 200 men, together with material, for the purpose of strength-
ening the protection of the border. General Dentz agreed to this
also. Permission was received from the Turks a few hours later.
The Turks, to be sure, later protested against this deception, but did
not interfere with the transports that followed.
In discussing the possible consequences of our transports and a
possible English attack on Syria, I asked General Dentz about the
supply situation of the Army and the civilian population. The
General replied that there were, to be sure, abundant supplies in the
country. But, as a result of famine propaganda which had noticeably
increased recently the supplies had disappeared from the market and
obviously had been bought up and concealed by speculators. Official
food supplies were practically not available. Depending on the kind
of commodity, there was enough for two to eight days. I suggested
that, under the name of Kenouard, I be given unrestricted permission
for the importation of food from Iraq. We would then on a certain
key date, throw the goods on the central markets of Beirut, Damascus
and Aleppo at low prices and through clever allusions in the press to
additional shipments from Iraq, intimidate the speculators and get
them to unload their stocks. As soon as the downward movement
got under way, I suggested that he buy up as large supplies as possible
in order to assure supplies for the Army and to be able to step in and
regulate prices on the free market. The High Commissioner was glad
to accept the offer. (After the imports came through successfully,
682-905—84 21
242 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the prices of the most important commodities fell : grain, sugar, rice,
and edible fat prices 30 to 50% in a few days. When the armistice
was signed, the Mandate Government still had supplies sufficient for
15 to 20 days.)
On the evening of May 10, I followed General Dentz to Damascus
and also had my staff follow me from Aleppo.
IV. Damascus.
Shortly after my arrival in Damascus, the first German bombers
arrived there under the command of Major von Blomberg. I asked
him if possible not to route further planes via Damascus, which was
too near to the British air bases and also offered the British espionage
service a convenient field for activity, but via Palmyra, whose large
airport lay at some distance from the city, completely isolated in the
desert. There, too, there was less danger of incidents. Furthermore,
he should also give orders that the German planes stop for only a
very short time at Syrian airports and do as little refueling as possible
in order to share the scanty and irreplacable French supply (totaling
about 4500 tons) . I wired several times to this effect to Berlin. 7 The
death of Major von Blomberg e and the obvious difficulties in the trans-
mission of orders to, and communications with the planes intended for
the operation in Iraq prevented the execution of these suggestions.
The loss of a number of German bombers would otherwise have been
avoided and I would have been spared numerous vexatious arguments
with the French General Staff and the Commandant of the airfield.
Again and again German planes came to Damascus; again and again
the pilots made excessive demands for gasoline ; again and again they
asked for permission for an extended stay in order to await further
flying orders. The conduct of the German soldiers was, in general,
excellent. Only the pilots of some transport planes were an exception
to this and compelled me to intervene and occasionally to act as a
mediator with the French Commandant. I then arranged in great
haste for gasoline to be supplied from Damascus and Palmyra; ob-
tained food supplies, beverages, also articles of equipment that were
needed for the German fliers, and had quarters and beds pre-
pared for them. This took, all told, May 11 and the morning of
May 12, On the morning of May 11, after another conversation with
High Commissioner Dentz. I reported to Berlin that the latter was
skeptical about the prospects for Iraq. If Germany wanted to make
more than a heroic gesture, supplies had to be assured through Turkey
or through the occupation of Cyprus. At the same time I asked that
Turkey's consent be obtained for one through train per week, in order
to assure supplies in the event of danger of an English attack.
1 An unnumbered telegram by Rahu of May 12 (TO/50270) deals with this
matter.
* See vol. xii of this series, document No. 528.
JULY 1941 243
On May 12, after the appearance of a British reconnaissance plane
oyer the airfield of Damascus the High Commissioner placed the en-
tire country; in a state of defense and concentrated troops on the
Palestinian border.
V. First Arms Transports.
The arms trains meanwhile rolled through Turkish territory. On
the afternoon of May 12, 1 flew with a small French special plane to
Ka^nichlie on the northeastern border of Syria, in order to arrive
simultaneously with the transports at the frontier station of Tel Kot-
chek, to take over the trains and take them to Mosul. Captain Cornet,
the aide to the High Commissioner, escorted me. Since the plane had
heavy sandstorms to contend with on the way, we ran out of gasoline,
and were forced to land near Hassetche with our last drop of fuel.
The five officers of this little desert garrison received us hospitably
and promised to place a car at our disposal for the trip to Tel Kotchek.
Since I was appearing in the guise of a French merchant from Paris,
I had to endure 2 distressing hours of a lively question-and-answer
game at dinner. I used the 5-hour trip through the desert at night,
disturbed only once by the stone- throwing of anti-French Bedouins,
to rouse Captain Cornet from his decidedly cool reserve and win him
over to the common game. Subsequently, he rendered us valuable
services. At 2 : 00 o'clock in the morning of May 13j we arrived in
Tel Kotchek only to find that, despite my telegraphic requests, nothing
was prepared. Obviously the telegrams had not arrived. The Iraq
station master, whom I had aroused from his bed, had received no in-
structions. The Iraq locomotive requested was not on hand, nor
was the Iraq guard, and there was not a trace of Grobba himself, whom
I had asked to meet us at Tel Kotchek. After much talking I finally
learned that a few hundred meters beyond the border there was an
Iraq police station, from which, if necessary, Mosul could be reached
by telephone. The Iraq station master, who claimed that the border
police fired at nocturnal visitors, and who called upon the French offi-
cer to corroborate this, had to accompany me there despite his great
reluctance. We drove up to the station with flash signals and violent
honking and by means of promises and threats, got the police ser-
geant on duty to connect us by telephone with the Iraq general in
Mosul. A quarter of an hour later Minister Grobba was on the phone ;
he promised to send at once a locomotive and some guards as far as
the second station on the Iraq side and to come by automobile himself
to meet me. He was also going to see to it that eounterdeliveries of the
provisions that were most important for Syria were made ready at
once. The first trainload of arms arrived in Tel Kotchek around 6 : 00
o'clock in the morning, the second toward 8 : 00. With the help of
the Iraq station master, we were able for a small fee to get a Turkish
locomotive engineer to attach his locomotive to the cars which had
244 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
meanwhile been coupled together to make a long train, I got into
the locomotive and around 10 : 00 a. m. rode across the Iraq frontier.
In Tel Kotchek I heard rumors to the effect that the English already
knew about the arms transport and had gotten a friendly Bedouin
tribe to attack the train at a distance of about an hour and a half from
Tel Kotchek on the other side, when it was on a curve of almost 90
degrees, and therefore going very slowly. At the spot indicated a
troop of Bedouins actually did rush toward the train with rifles swing-
ing, garments a-flutter, and with loud cries. It was entirely super-
fluous, for me, however, to unlock my powerful 6.3-mm. pistol and thus
get the poor engineer to drive faster. They meant no harm, they were
simply giving us a little ovation with greetings and handclapping and,
with beaming faces, pointed to the guns that were loaded in open cars.
Shortly afterward the meeting point agreed upon came into view.
The Iraq escort personnel were already waiting with a locomotive,
and a cloud of dust on the highway of the steppes announced the ar-
rival of Grobba. When the train left the station again, an English
plane dropped a bomb, which, however, landed in the sand, about 500
meters from the tracks. On May 13, at i : 00 o'clock in the afternoon
the transport arrived unmolested in Mosul — about 75 hours after my
first talk with General Dentz.
VI. Additional Arms Transports.
After the food deliveries had been assured and had begun with
the energetic assistance of Minister Grobba, I flew on May 14 via
Palmyra back to Damascus. My observations in Mosul had given me
the somewhat depressing impression of doubt in the efficacy of German
aid. All sorts of things were lacking : there were no bombs, no spare
parts, no gasoline — above all, however, so it seemed to me, no firm
and purposeful leadership. At the same time, the young fliers them-
selves made the best possible impression. I thought, therefore, that
through increased arms deliveries, I should so strengthen the striking
power of the Iraq Army that sufficient time would be won for the or-
ganization of German supplies. Since it was to be expected, moreover,
that by that time the Turkish Government, despite its commitments to
England, would have to approve the transit of German and French
supplies, I tried to make all necessary preparations for the provision-
ing of any German motorized units that might arrive. For this reason
I had urgently requested in Mosul the reopening of the pipeline to
Tripoli.
In Damascus I found a mood of great nervousness. At almost the
same time as we flew over Palmyra, two English Blenheims had at-
tacked the airport. The Gaullist General Catroux had had leaflets
dropped on Damascus calling upon the French to rise in revolt. On
May 15 the airports of Rayak and Palmyra were attacked, and two
German planes and one French plane were hit in Palmyra. Among
JULY 1941 245
the French, only General Dentz himself was entirely calm and almost
serene in his composure. He congratulated me on the "sportsmanlike
achievement" of the first arms transport and discussed further deliv-
eries. We agreed to stagger the trains so that the third should arrive
in Mosul on May 26, the fourth on May 28, the fifth on June 3, the
sixth on June 10. There were still available three 15.5 batteries, 354
machine guns, each with adequate ammunition and all spare parts,
lGlJjlOO hand grenades, 60 heavy trucks, 20 command cars, 400 binoc-
ulars, 30 km. of cable ; also optical instruments, telephone apparatus,
etc.
The third and fourth trains, in charge of Mollhausen, crossed the
Iraq border shortly before the English succeeded in blowing up a
bridge in the northeast corner of Syria, near Kubur el Bid not far
from Kamichlie. Dispatching of the two last trains was delayed on
account of repair work which required 5 days — fortunately, because
in the meantime the collapse of Iraq's resistance had become evident.
My desperate efforts to bring back to Syria the war material that
was still stored in Mosul failed. Mollhausen deserves credit for
getting two trainloads of grain off to Syria through forceful action
before the English had time to close the border on the very day that
the German fliers left Mosul precipitately because of a false report.
VII. War Preparations in Syria.
At first we all were convinced that the English would not dare
to attack Syria openly. It was clear that they hoped, through de
Gaullist intrigues, to win the Army of the Levant and thus conquer the
country by subversion. And this hope was not unjustified according
to the information that they were able to get concerning the Army
of the Levant in the preceding months. But they had not reckoned
with the attraction of the idea of German-French collaboration for the
French. We had soon realized that every Frenchman in Syria, every
officer, and every official could be won over to it if he only retained the
illusion that he could thereby help his country. While they them-
selves were slow and hesitant in making their decisions, they expected
of us rapid and soldierly action and absolute good faith when our
word was pledged ; however, they were then ungrudging in rendering
of their reciprocal service and stuck it out. I was therefore on my
guard against making a promise that I could not fulfill at once.
This won their confidence and finally they let me participate in their
most intimate political and economic, nay, even their military
decisions.
When it became clear from the more and more threatening
demarches of the English and American Consuls General, from leaflets
and bombs dropped on Syrian airfields, that the English meant busi-
ness, we concentrated our entire strength on influencing the Army
through propaganda, and on counteracting de Gaullist agitation.
246 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Guerard, whom I met every night in the hotel between 12 : 00 and
2 : 00 o'clock, worked with me in drafting speeches which General
Dentz took, in part verbatim, and repeated before the officers' corps,
the chamber of commerce, the French colony. The most reliable
General Staff officers, who had also been influenced by us personally,
drove to the military outposts, pledged their loyalty as soldiers and
treated de Gaullism with contempt. Strong pressure was exerted on
the press, which was influenced by American money; the radio was
strengthened and reoriented.
On May 16 1 followed the High Commissioner to Beirut, who within
24 hours furnished an empty apartment for me with office furniture
and had an antenna put up for my radio communication with Berlin ;
he also placed at my disposal three automobiles of the office of the
High Commissioner which, because of their distinctive appearance,
had access every where.
The attitude of the Army was still vacillating. Almost daily I
received reports of heated arguments in officers' circles and an unfor-
tunate remark of the High Commissioner's, in which he spoke of "emer-
gency landings of German planes at Syrian airfields," already exposed
him to the repeated reproach of insincerity. For this reason he
received the announcement of the arrival of a 33-man German liaison
staff under the command of Colonel yon Manteuffel with obvious
displeasure. He urgently asked, for the sake of making his position
less difficult with respect to the Army, to the French population, and
to the English and American Missions, that we refrain from sending
German officers to Beirut and that he be allowed to deal with German
military authorities exclusively through me or, possibly, through the
Italians. He expected, moreover, that the liaison staff would handle
only questions of traffic between Germany and Iraq.
On May 17, at the airport of Eayak, which had never been touched
by our planes, the first Frenchman, an officer, was killed by an English
aerial bomb. T at once requested that the English Consulates in Beirut,
Damascus, and Aleppo be closed and the Consuls and their entire
staffs expelled. This request was complied with upon confirmation by
Vichy: Thus, English espionage activity was, in general, confined to
the Americans, who were carefully watched. The request of the High
Commissioner to have the American Consul General also recalled was
not granted by Vichy.
Our relations with the General Staff had, in the. meantime, been
so strengthened that I was allowed to inspect the French plans of
defense. In so doing I had to note with alarm that General Dentz
wanted to take up a position near Kisane, due south of Damascus, and
confine the defense to Lebanon and the coastline. If Germany was
really thinking of intervening in Syria — and at this point I could not
yet doubt that this was so— this decision to abandon Syria was fatal
JULY 1941
247
to our plans and absolutely had to be changed. Guerard and a few
officers of the General Staff took it upon themselves, at my urgent
request, to convince the General of the need for a defense of Syria.
I myself advised him to withdraw his troops which had been sta-
tioned along the Turkish border to the south, since I thought I could
guarantee that the Turks would not dare, despite their ardent desire
for the possession of Aleppo, to enter Syria. At the request of the
ffigh Commissioner, I had this view confirmed by the Foreign Min-
isWy in Berlin » and by the German Embassy in Ankara, whereupon
he withdrew almost his entire northern army, about half a division,
and had it take up a position south and southeast of Damascus. He
agreed, I regret to say, only hesitantly to the proposal that the troops
be made more mobile through the requisitioning of all available ve-
hicles for the desert war. To be sure, he admitted the correctness of
Schlieffen's thesis as applied in this area that attack was not only the
best defense, but the only form of defense, but when motorization
was finally carried out, it was already too late. Nevertheless, Colonel
Collet's desertion with 3000 Circassians, almost all of whom returned
on the following night, offered the welcome excuse for pointing out
that Collet, against whom I had already warned the High Commis-
sioner, being the best expert on the Damascene area, was in possession
of all the plans of defense and that these therefore had absolutely to
be changed. This argument was convincing, and the General shifted
the line of defense very much to the south, to the areas of El Kuneitra,
Esra {I sra?} and Es Suweida, that is, close to the Trans Jordanian
border. Meanwhile our days were filled with efforts for the improve-
ment of the supply situation, for the strengthening of propaganda,
and for combatting the activities of English agents, which the High
Commissioner with incomprehensible indulgence permitted. It was
not until a Polish agent was discovered in our house and two English
reserve officers were seized with a trunk full of teller mines, allegedly
intended for the German representatives in Beirut, that he decided to
establish a concentration camp. Also, not until we suggested it were
secret transmitters watched and put out of commission. Still in
expectation of Turkish approval for transit, I saw to it that the
dispersal landing fields in the Jezira district in the northeastern part
of Syria, near the Baghdad Railway, destroyed after the German-
French armistice, were rebuilt.
Through the efforts of Guerard, I was able to establish close and
lasting contact with Admiral Goutton, Commander in Chief of the
Fleet and a friend of Admiral Darlan's, and with Air Force General
Janneckeyn. Both discussed keenly and willingly the idea of Ger-
man-French collaboration, and seemed greatly impressed with the
Rintelen telegram No. 23 of May 18 ( 83/61268) .
248 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
honorable treatment meted out to the defeated French Army by the
German Command and the German soldiers.
VIII. Representatives of the Weh/rmaoht in Syria.
Relations between the representatives of the Foreign Ministry and
the representatives of the Wehrmacht in Syria could not always be
conducted without friction. I do not believe that this is to be at-
tributed to lack of good will on the one side or the other, but prin-
cipally to the difference in duties and in views. The representative
of the Foreign Ministry regarded it as his duty :
1) to bring unobtrusively to Iraq the largest possible quantity of
French arms ;
2) in doing this to spare French sensibilities and the French sense
of honor ; in other words, to persuade, not to command ;
3) if possible to deprive the English of an excuse for invading
Syria, by their referring to German interim landings and German
purchases of arms in Syria ;
i) to aggravate, nevertheless, with all possible means the differences
between the French and the English, in order thereby to frustrate and
perhaps ultimately make impossible a rapprochement on the part of
Vichy toward English policy.
Thus, the reiterated demand: as few German officers as possible in
Syrian or Lebanese cities; reserved behavior at the airfields ; no appeal
to the rights of the victor.
The German officers understandably felt themselves to be repre-
sentatives of a victorious army. They considered it undignified not
to appear in uniform. They considered their being concentrated in
the barracks of the Syrian airfields a galling imprisonment. Major
Hansen of the Department of "Foreign Armies" on the General Staff,
who stopped for a few days in Beirut, understood and approved our
attitude. I got valuable hints from his intelligent and calm judgment.
Unfortunately my wish that he be sent to Beirut as Military Attache
could not be granted. My relations with Colonel v. Manteuffel, the
head of the liaison staff, who suffered noticeably from isolation at
the Aleppo airfield, were difficult. He complained constantly about
the unreliability and lack of discipline of his subordinates, suspected
betrayal behind every French measure, and so flew in the face of
Major de Russe, the especially obliging commandant of the airfield,
that the latter went to Beirut, spoke of injury to his honor as an
officer and asked that he be relieved. I had trouble in patching the
matter up in the General Staff. Shortly after his arrival, Colonel
von Manteuffel reported to Berlin that General Dentz was under
increasing English influence. 10 He himself later termed this a mis-
take. When, after two previous brain concussions, he finally suffered
10 In telegram No. 67 of May 27 (83/61373) Kramarz requested Hahn's view
toward this report by Manteuffel. In telegram No. 60 of May 28 (S3/61370-72)
Rahn replied, expressing the same views as are here recorded.
JULY 1941 249
a third, one following an automobile accident, his behavior toward
his subordinates, his aides and finally also toward me became so over-
bearing and his statements so contradictory that it seemed to me he
was in urgent need of a rest and I had to suggest that he be relieved.
There were hardly any real and serious differences between us. I
attribute the difficulties that he encountered exclusively to reasons
ofhealth and climate.
'%f a more serious nature was an incident with Colonel Junk, the
leader of the Iraq venture, who called me on May 31 from Aleppo,
to tell me that the joint German-French defense of Syria had been
decided upon in Paris with Darlan and Huntziger. He asked at once
for permission to come to Beirut in uniform in order to discuss the
details. He intimated, moreover, at decided criticism of the camou-
flaged activity in which I had engaged and declared that he now
wanted to "put the cards on the table." I stated that I had no in-
structions as yet from Berlin on this score, but I called on the High
Commissioner at once in order to get his approval for Colonel Junk's
trip to Beirut. The latter declined gruffly; he had no instructions
from Vichy concerning German- French military collaboration in
Syria. The announcement of such a collaboration and the arrival of
a uniformed German officer in Beirut would mean immediate war
with England, and in the present state of affairs could still lead to
a revolt in the Army. He finally decided, in response to my request,
to order Air Force General Janneckeyn from Damascus to Beirut
and to send him with me by plane to Aleppo. General Felmy " had
meanwhile arrived there, and it was soon evident from his explana-
tions that the statements of Colonel Junk were based on a misunder-
standing. The incident was thus patched up. 12
A flawless collaboration based on comradeship characterized my
relations with Captain Roser, the representative of the Abwehr in
Beirut. Only once was my intervention necessary, when I learned
that Captain Roser and Major Arnold, who had been sent to Beirut
specifically for this purpose, had instructions to secretly distribute
among insurgent Arabs— that is, without the knowledge of the
French— a shipload of arms destined for Syria. Roser had already
negotiated concerning this with two of the nationalist leaders,
Chiikrii Kuatli [Shukri al Quwatli] and Emir Adel Arslan [Amir
"Hellmuth Felmy, General of the Luftwaffe, head of the German military
mission to Iraq.
"In telegram No. 71 of May 31 (83/61402-04) Kami reported Junk's request
as well as the French High Commissioner's reaction and requested instructions.
Ribbentrop's Instructions transmitted in telegram No. 97 of May 31 from
Fuschland dispatched to Rahn as No. 481 (83/61427) read as follows:
"There are to be no attacks by German planes against the English from
Syrian territory. They could be considered only if Syria, for her part, should
be attacked by England and request German assistance. German officers must
not appear in uniform in Beirut. Please transmit this instruction which was
issued in accord with OKW to Colonel Junk also."
250 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOKEIGN POLICY
Adil Arscdan], who were regarded with mistrust by the French.
Major Arnold notified me, moreover, of the imminent arrival of about
20 members of the Abwehr in Beirut in order to carry out this opera-
tion. It was clear in this connection that, without the knowledge of
the French, the ship could not berth, trucks could not be bought for
the transshipment, large quantities of the gasoline rationed throughout
Syria could not be bought, drivers could not be hired, and, above all,
the distribution of arms could not be organized in a country that was
in a state of alert. Moreover, a distribution by the old rebel, Kuatli
[Quwatli], would have been interpreted by the French as an attempt
at preparation of an internal rebellion. Also, the dispatch of a 20-
man military mission to Beirut was contrary to clear-cut German-
French agreements. Only later was it apparent, to the astonishment
of Major Arnold and the obvious annoyance of Quwatli, that the
French had meanwhile been informed and asked to cooperate. A few
days later Major Arnold went to Berlin to report and did not return
to Beirut. In response to my urgent request, Major Meyer-Ricks
was assigned to me on June 22, that is, unfortunately, not until the last
phase of the Syrian war, "camouflaged as a military attache." I re-
quested and obtained for him a liaison officer from the General Staff,
and his zeal and circumspection in reporting eased substantially the
burden of my work.
IX. The "Arai Movement".
After a brief stay in Syria, I found to my astonishment that there
was, at all events, no Arab movement there. True nationalist senti-
ment is unknown to the Syrian tribes, a wild, and for the most part,
unlovely mixture of races and religions, spoiled by greed, intrigue, and
jealousy, accustomed from olden times to bribery by rival powers.
What Beirut wants, is opposed by Damascus. What Damascus ad-
vocates, is considered treason in Aleppo, Horns, or Hama. Inde-
pendence is the pretext for unbridled speculation— freedom, the shield
for unrestrained exploitation of the workers by the ruling class. F.ven
the best racial part, the Bedouins, have succumbed to the general cor-
ruption and follow whichever power is the strongest, as the jackal
follows the beast of prey. AH of them demand arms— in order to
plunder the neighboring tribe; all demand money— in order to extort
still greater sums from the enemy power. Undoubtedly the European
powers, above all, the French Mandate Government, are mainly
responsible for this, and undoubtedly, among the youth of Syria, too,
forces are stirring that clamor for a cleanup and national concentra-
tion. At any rate, I found nothing in Syria that would have been
capable of militant action. At the moment of danger, they all failed,
the swaggering leaders of the Arab freedom movement. In undis-
guised anxiety, they asked for our assistance in fleeing abroad, if they
had not already preferred "as a precaution" to make contact with the
JULY 1941. 251
English, There remained only a few groups of professional bandits,
smugglers, and common thieves, of whom the few genuine rebels, such
as Fauzi Kauktchi [Fawsi al-Qavruqchi] — he, too, half adventurer,
half national hero — made use in their struggle. We tried to win these
groups over to the fight against England and to cooperation with the
French Army by assuring them that the French were not being paid
their price in France itself at the expense of the Arabs for the defense
orjthe Syrian area; that the declaration of the Reich Government
concerning recognition of the Arab struggle for freedom 1S was con-
sidered unalterable and that only the fighter would have anything to
say in the future in the reorganization of the Arab countries. Not a
few of these people could be won by such and similar statements.
They fought partly in the ranks of the Army of the Levant, partly in
groups of their own; some tried to injure the English by acts of
sabotage, for which we supplied them with abundant suggestions.
After long and laborious efforts, I had to give up working with the
old, national groups. Finally it proved to be the most effective
measure, also with respect to the Bedouins, to threaten them with the
severest penalties in the future, for every act of plunder, every attack
on neighboring tribes, every interference with the Army of the Levant,
and every instance of active support of the English. Through
messengers I made this known throughout all the tribes — without
forbidding the acceptance of English money — and, as the French
found, I was entirely successful. Also, the simple command, trans-
mitted to the party leaders, to quell all disorders, had the effect that
the Syrian and Lebanese populations remained entirely quiet during
the entire campaign; yet I was able to read in the reports of the Office
of the High Commissioner to the Vichy Government given me for
perusal that, from December 1940 to April 1941, at intervals of a few
days or weeks, the French had had to deal with an almost uninter-
rupted series of petty revolts, strikes, and demonstrations. The au-
thority of the German name was almost unlimited. It was possible
to get anything from the population — only they did not want to fight.
X. German Intervention in Syria.
At the end of May the conduct of the Army of the Levant seemed
so assured that its commitment in the event of an English attack
could be counted on with a fair degree of certainty. So much the
more necessary was it to strengthen its idea that an attack would not
be directed against a threatening or already existing German occupa-
tion of the country. First it itself had to fight; then the German
intervention could be regarded as welcome assistance and the last
internal resistance to a military collaboration could be overcome. In
view of the fact that German preparations, which to our knowledge
13 See vol. xi of this series, document No. 190 and footnote 4, and document No.
596.
252 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
were going on in Greece, were not yet concluded, it seemed in any case
advisable to exploit any possibility of a delay in the English attack.
On May 31, Guerard addressed the following telegram to Admiral
Darlan : "
"The collapse of Iraq may have the following consequences:
1. Combined English attacks from the south and east; at the same
time, in the east, endangerment of the indispensable granary of Jezira.
2. Turkish reaction aiming for the protection of certain zones near
Aleppo and along the railroad.
3. Internal de Gaullist revolt, against which preventive measures
have to be taken at once.
4. German-French military collaboration, which should be studied
under the following aspects :
a) general policy,
b) technical possibility of a large-scale operation of assistance
which alone would be effective,
c) moral reaction of the French troops (the latter question will
depend on the effectiveness of German aid, the moment of German
intervention, the reason given) .
If there is no certainty of an effective defense of Syria, it is better
to gain time by statements about our purely defensive intentions and
to point out that an attack against Syria would start an Anglo-French
war and shift German-French collaboration from the peaceful sphere
to the military sphere."
Thus, Guerard and his friends had themselves already come to
accept the idea of a German-French military collaboration, and Gen-
eral Dentz could certainly also be brought around to it — if Berlin de-
sired it. Without knowledge of the pending German-Turkish discus-
sions, 16 on which the decisive question of supplies depended, I could
not be clear on this point. On June 5 and 6, 1 reported to the Foreign
Ministry that, according to reliable French information, Turkey was
pressing for an English occupation of Syria, since she was otherwise
in danger of encirclement and could not permanently withstand Ger-
man pressure for transit permission. 16 We were, to be sure, hoping
very much for this and were not particularly edified at the German-
Turkish Friendship Pact 17 which followed soon after, and whose
background became comprehensible to us only upon the outbreak of
the war with Russia.
Despite all this, I secretly persisted in the conviction that a German
intervention in Syria would come sooner or later, since, in the cir-
cumstances, relief for Rommel's army seemed feasible only from
" See vol. in of this series, document No. 581, footnote 2.
11 On the German-Turkish discussions of May and June 1941, see vol. xn of this
series.
" Rahn telegrams No. 79 of June 5 (70/50373) and No. 81 of June 6 (70/50375).
See vol. xn of this series, document No. 602, footnote 2.
" For text, see vol. xn of this series, document No. 648.
JULY 1941 253
Syria. Also, I was convinced, after the outbreak of the German-
Russian -war, that the English would attempt a thrust through Iran
to the oil fields of Baku and that this could be prevented or, at any
rate, seriously impeded, from Syria, if we wanted to avoid a break
with Turkey.
Meanwhile we tried with all the means of propaganda at our com-
mand to strengthen the will of the French to fight. Through Min-
ister Grobba I got in touch with the Arab outlaw, Fawzi al-Qawuqchi.
As-he had been sentenced to death in Syria, I obtained a pardon for
him and advised the High Commissioner to establish contact with him
through a liaison officer. The latter reported upon his return that
he had come in the nick of time, just as Fawzi wanted to come to terms
with the English because of the impossibility of an escape on Syrian
territory. When he heard from us and of the revocation of his
death sentence by the French, he placed himself with his entire group
at the disposal of the French for the common fight against the
British.
XI. The English Attach.
Early in the morning of June 8, Anglo- Australian troops attacked
Syria south of Damascus, near Dera and at other points. The de
Gaullist units held back. From the leaflets circulated by them and
the English, it seemed that they had expected to be received with
open arms by the Army and population in Syria. According to the
testimony of prisoners, the English expected to be able to occupy
the country in a few days. Instead of this they encountered a foe
who was fighting more doggedly every day and was causing them
heavy losses of men and material.
I made regular daily reports concerning the various phases of the
battle and [so did] Major Meyer-Ricks after the arrival of the Mili-
tary Attache Staff. The British troops, English, Australians, New
Zealanders, Hindu regiments, and native troops, numerically far
superior to the Army of the Levant, and equipped with an over-
whelming amount of material, especially of motorized arms, fought
badly. The English command was obviously inferior to the French.
It is incomprehensible that the English should have attacked for
weeks on the difficult southwestern front and with their superiority
in motorized forces should not at once have pushed an attack from
an easterly and southeasterly direction on Palmyra-Homs-Tripoli
and on Aleppo. The French would have been able to oppose such
an attack with only a small force.
It is indicative of the fighting strength of the British troops that
a handful of Frencli Legionnaires, some 130 to 150 men, succeeded,
in the final attack on Palmyra, in stopping at least 3500 troops of the
well-known Major Glubb, 18 equipped with 800 armored cars, machine-
"John Bagehot Glubb, Commander of the Arab Legion of Transjordan.
254 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
gun carriers, and trucks in repelling them, and, in repeated counter-
attacks, inflicting severe losses on them.
Gn the other hand, according to all expert opinion, the French
fought too much in the classical French manner; slow in their deci-
sions, inelastic, too intent on security. Also, their fighting spirit was
strongly affected by emotional elements. It was necessary to call
on the officers of the General Staff two, three, four times a day, to
cheer them up, and inflame them by an appeal to their French mili-
tary spirit and constant reminders of Dakar and Mers-el-Kebir. On
the day that the war broke out, General Dentz told me — and this
was the only bitter word that I heard from him : "Now the Near East is
aflame, and it is you who have set it ablaze." When, on the other
hand, I asked him, with reference to the reports published concern-
ing the negotiations in Paris ; 19 "Are not the French northern prov-
inces worth more than ten Syrias?" he replied merely: "You know,
indeed, that I shall fight — and to the last man."
In the afternoon of May [June] 8, with the aid of Captain Roser,
I organized the departure of the German colony, and this went off
smoothly. The commitment of strong British naval units on the
Lebanese coast, which pounded the French positions meter by meter
with a tremendous outlay of material, in a few days resulted in the
loss of more than 3000 men. As was expected, General Dentz asked
for help by the Luftwaffe. I seconded this request most strongly
in my radio messages, since it seemed to me to be the beginning of a
logical chain : First the French would ask for German help against
the fleet, then against the motorized English troops; finally they
would gladly reconcile themselves to a commitment of German ground
forces. Not knowing German intentions, I naturally did not express
these thoughts or make promises of any kind.
The attack of two German Stuka formations was enough to scatter
the British fleet and force it to observe the utmost caution. While
at the beginning it patrolled back and forth in a leisurely way in
close proximity to the coast, and — as Dentz put it — chased the defense-
less French coastal positions "for breakfast, as it were," it later
returned only at long intervals, for rapid and ineffective bombard-
ments. The spirited attack of the two small French destroyers on
the far superior British naval force, which led to the loss of an
English torpedo boat, played its part in admonishing the British
to observe caution. An English counteraction, which continued at
night right into the Bay of Beirut directly before our eyes, and
presented a splendid picture, was unsuccessful and was not repeated.
On June 10th it was reported that Fawzi al-Qawuqchi, following
our suggestion, had attacked the pipeline station H-l on Iraq territory,
° See vol. xii of this series, document No. 559.
JULY 1941 255
and, for lack of dynamite, had dismantled the pumps. H-2 had also
been set afire by Bedouins friendly to us and had burnt out completely.
At the same time 12,000 hectolitres of fuel oil had been destroyed.
An aerial photograph which I had made, however, made it appear
questionable whether destruction had occurred on such a large scale.
Unfortunately, my intention to destroy the important H-2 station
with two German detonation experts hastily summoned from Aleppo,
w»s frustrated at the last moment by the arrival of heavily motorized
English forces.
As the English were able, by lavish use of men and material, in
just a few days to push the attack on Damascus to the French main
line of defense near Onissus, due south of Damascus, it was possible,
through our friends on the General Staff, to induce the General to
launch a counterattack. The plan was to launch a double drive south-
west, in the direction of El Kuneitra and southeast of Jebel ed Druz,
on Izra, establish communications between the two groups, thereby
cut the English off from their southern line of communications and
then cut them up. At first the operation proceeded according to plan.
It brought in valuable booty and, in the course of a few days, over
500 prisoners. Then there was a setback, due in part to the inadequate
reserves of the French, principally, however, to psychological causes.
As early as June 11, Darlan's unsure and irresolute speech, 20 in which
the hard anti-English tone expected of him was completely lacking,
had had a discouraging effect on the General Staff and the troops in
the field. On June 18 the State Secretary for Air, General Bergeret,
arrived and reported to the High Commissioner and the officers of
the General Staff that German-French conversations in Paris had
bogged down completely. 21 Not a single one of the German promises
concerning the restoration, of administrative unity with the northern
provinces, concerning the reduction of occupation costs, etc., had as
yet materialized. On that day, Dentz, who was visibly depressed,
asked me: "Tell me, what are we fighting for here anyway?" I was
able to calm him, and I believe I convinced him that the principal
blame for the impasse reached in the negotiations lay with the French.
Nevertheless, the fighting spirit of the General Staff was temporarily
paralyzed. On June 21 Damascus fell without any apparent necessity,
and the political director of the High Commissioner told me, — and
this was his only comment on this report : "The fall of Damascus bears
the name of Bergeret." In the night of June 22 to 23, the High
Commissioner summoned me and told me that the situation was
hopeless and that collapse was inevitable in 2 or 3 days, because some
600 — in reality 800 — English armored cars, trucks, and tanks had
M Apparently a reference to Darlan's radio address to the French people which
dealt with Franco-German collaboration.
21 See vol. xn of this series, documents Nos, 616 and 633.
256 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
arrived, before Palmyra, and would very soon be threatening Homs,
Tripoli, and Aleppo. Previously he had always had only requests to
make of me; today he was giving me an order: to flee, for he had
information that the English would shoot me at once if I fell into
their hands. Then he added: "I have a further statement to make
to you. The English assert that they attacked Syria because of the
transit nights of German planes. That is not true. The attack had
been prepared long in advance and would have come sooner or later."
This chivalrous attempt of the old officer to relieve us of the responsi-
bility for the death of so many French soldiers made a deep impres-
sion on me. I declined to leave Syria, but promised to go that same
night to Aleppo with Mollhausen, who was present at the conversa-
tion. I had already, upon news of the fall of Damascus, sent the staff
there, together with the transmitter and secret material.
A few days prior to this I had received the information that the
native governments of Syria and Lebanon had asked the High Com- !
missioner in high-flown, written statements to cease hostilities and
to surrender. I had in my hands the original of the letter signed
by Premier Naccache 22 which reflected all the pitiful fear of the
dangers to life and property. 23 Then when two Syrians close to
Naccache came to see me and made the naive request that I use my I
influence with the High Commissioner to declare Beirut at least an \
open city — as if it were only a matter of protecting the interests of I
these Levantine house-owners— I replied to them : "I admire the in- ;
dulgenco of the High Commissioner. In his place I would have had j
M. Naccache strung up on the highest cedar of Lebanon. This is the '
first thing. And second : If the English occupy Syria, there will be
total war. That I promise you. You may study it in Alexandria." —
and there I left them. This reply made the rounds of all Syria, caused i
much amusement, and won me many friends in the Army. The two
governments did not insist on their demand. It was not until the day
of the armistice that M, Naccache is supposed to have distributed his
letter in the form of a leaflet.
XII. Economic Matters.
Shortly after the commencement of hostilities, on June 13, 1 wired
to Berlin: 24
"In order to prevent stocks of goods here from falling into the hands i
of the English, I have arranged that the largest possible quantities
of scrap rubber, wool, and wire be seized and sent through Turkey
to Germany. I am trying to load them on the gasoline trains expected |
here anyway. Prices will follow. I should appreciate receiving \
directives regarding prices." \
' Head of the Lebanese Government.
"Cf. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. in, pp. 742-743.
'In telegram No. 119 (70/50442).
JTJLY 1941 257
After the prompt reply from Berlin, the business seemed to get off
to a good start, but then began an endless and fruitless exchange of
telegrams with Berlin " because the Syrian merchants, in expectation
of the English victory and the inclusion of Syria in the Sterling bloc,
were requesting cash payment for the goods upon their exportation
to Turkey, but Berlin would agree, as its final offer, to only 60 percent
upon testing in Istanbul and 40 percent upon arrival in Germany.
Tills, in turn, was rejected by the merchants on the grounds that they
haa^io interest in frozen balances in Germany. Although I informed
Berlin that the French had given me as the sole "merchant" in Syria,
in appreciation of the food deliveries which I had arranged for, unre-
stricted export permission, that 2,500 tons of wool were available, and
that three opinions had been received from the Aleppo Chamber of
Commerce concerning their quality, that the prices I had been able to
obtain locally were up to 35 percent below those asked in Hamburg,
and that I would pay only upon receiving the export papers, the credit
I asked for was refused me.
Result: The 2,500 tons of wool and some 200-300 tons of old rubber
available remained, on the whole, in Syria, and fell into the hands of
the English. The 170 tons of wool already exported through my
efforts were sold in Istanbul, at a considerably higher price, for ship-
ment to Switzerland.
On June 14 I wired to Berlin : 2a
"Since the merchants here believe in an English victory and are
counting on the inclusion of the Levant in the Sterling bloc, the price
of gold has fallen about 30 percent. Through a direct wire to Vichy
I obtained approval for the conversion of at least 20 million francs
into Syrian pounds and obtained secretly the consent of the Office
of the High Commissioner to my buying gold pieces here. Because
of the favorable rate of exchange, which will perhaps rise again soon,
I have started on my own responsibility to purchase gold, since gold
appears to me more valuable, at any rate, than French francs. I have
thus far purchased 13,975 Turkish gold pounds at the price of approx-
imately 7.7 million francs."
Reply from Berlin : 2T
"Please discontinue the purchases of gold for the present. The offi-
cial purchase price of the Reichsbank for one Turkish gold pound is
18.39 reichsmarks, while the price paid by you amounts to 27.50 reichs-
marks. There is no interest here in the purchase of gold at such a
price, even in French francs."
25 Only a few of these telegrams hare been found. They are filmed on serial
4756.
"In telegram No. 125 (70/50449).
"Unnumbered draft telegram of June 16 by Wlehl (4756/E233839).
682-90 S — 64 22
258 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
My reply 88 to this:
"I proceeded on the basis of the following calculations : The Turkish
gold pound is worth 25 to 26 pounds in Turkey. Thirty-three French
francs are the equivalent of a Turkish pound (State Bank rate of
exchange). If you wish, I shall re-purchase francs in Turkey with
gold and credit the profit of about. 5.3 million to the account of the
Embassy, Paris. Please send telegraphic instruction."
No telegraphic instruction was received. No further gold purchases
were made.
XIII. Supplies.
When I arrived in Aleppo on June 22, after the somewhat dramatic
farewell with General Dentz, I received a telephone call from the
Office of the High Commissioner in Beirut: A telegram had just
arrived from Vichy stating that four battalions with 40 planes were
being dispatched to Syria as . a reinforcement. This information,
which had been communicated to the Army, had so strengthened its
fighting morale, that it would perhaps be able to hold out for the
8 days it would take until the arrival of the transports. Moreover,
the Luftwaffe had attacked the English columns near Palmyra at
quarter-hour intervals and in large part dispersed them. The Bed-
ouins, recruited and armed by us, were taking part in the battle. The
small garrison of Legionnaires was holding Palmyra and had thus
far victoriously repelled all attacks. The gasoline question was again
decisive, since the supply of aviation gasoline was declining at a furi-
ous pace. Could we not arrange for transports through Turkey?
And with this I come to the darkest chapter of my Syrian ex-
periences: Under pressure from the Eeich Government, the Turkish
Government had declared itself ready to approve the transit through
Turkey of German aviation gasoline— some 70 cars. 28 The gasoline
arrived in Haydarpa§a on June 1 and was there reloaded on the
railroad on June 1, 2, and 3. To the unending regret of the Turkish
Government, which failed completely to understand it, the major por-
tion of the transports first got lost on the Turkish section. New
reasons were forever being found for the delay : only so many Turkish
cars could go to Syria as there were Syrian cars in Turkey; yet, there
were 244 Syrian cars in Turkey as against 40 Turkish cars in Syria.
Or: the line capacity was insufficient for these movements; yet the
normal line capacity of some 10 trains in either direction was, accord-
ing to French authorities, not reached on any one of these days be-
cause of the sharp decline in trade. Or: Turkish brake regulations
forbid the braking of cars loaded with fuel, etc. It was nerve-racking.
Finally I flew in Benoist-Mechin's special plane to Ankara, and asked
the firm of Schenker, which had been commissioned to make the ship-
38 Not found.
28 See vol. xn of this series, document No. 556 and footnote 4.
JULY 1941
259
ments, to send a representative to every Turkish station to find out
what the "technical difficulties," so often referred to, were. On the
afternoon of the same day, the Secretary General in the Turkish For-
eign Ministry, Ambassador Numan Menemencioglu, informed Min-
ister Kroll, the German Counselor of Embassy, that he was fed up
with the constant complaints and he guaranteed that the remaining
gasoline shipments would reach Syria within 4 days. So, after 20
c«rs had only by dint of the greatest effort, been brought to Syria in
24-days, it suddenly became "technically possible," to get nearly 50
cars to Aleppo in 4 days.
There was another reason also for my journey to Ankara: in the
middle of June the French Charge d'Affaires in Ankara had re-
quested Turkish permission for the transit of 750 men in civilian
clothing and for 7 trainloads of military equipment, but this had been
refused by the Turks on grounds of their absolute neutrality. 30 Then
Admiral Darlan's Chef de Cabinet, State Secretary Benoist-Mechin,
flew here by special plane in order at the last moment to get the
Turks to change their minds and either to return a portion of the war
material delivered by the French and never paid for by the Turks, or,
at least, to obtain transit permission for war material. 31 I had re-
turned to Beirut on June 24 in order to introduce Major Meyer-Ricks,
who had arrived in the meantime, to General Dentz and the General
Staff, and to prepare for the return of my staff, in view of the more
favorable military situation. In the evening Benoist-Mechin called
me from Aleppo and asked me urgently to come there. The High
Commissioner placed a special plane at my disposal for this purpose.
In Aleppo, Benoist-Mechin told me he had landed in Syria only in
order to invite me to assist him in his Turkish mission. He did not
wish to visit General Dentz in order to avoid painful questioning and
in order that he might not achieve by his replies a similar effect to
that of General Bergeret on his visit to Beirut. Actually German-
French conversations in Paris had bogged down completely. And
yet, the French Government was prepared to do everything; ulti-
mately, even to go to war against England. Only it could not live
in a state of war with Germany and England at the same time. If
the Reich Government still entertained doubts as to the good faith of
its statements, Darlan was also prepared to give practical guarantees,
such as appointing General Dentz, who was immune with respect to
an alignment with England, to the top command in North Africa, and
requesting the Reich Government to send me there, too.
The Benoist-Mechin negotiations were, as was to be expected, un-
successful. The talk might perhaps have taken another turn if we
had known of the reports of Consul General Hoffman-Folkers and
* See vol. xn of this series, document No. 651, footnote 1.
31 See document No. 71.
260 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
to which I later on accidentally obtained access in Adana, and from
which it appeared that the Turks were not deterred by their absolute
neutrality from channeling through Turkey Norwegian, Polish, and
Rumanian refugees liable to military duty, in part, evidently, still in
uniform, by the hundreds, and in Mersin putting them on shipboard
for Egypt. And this even after the signing of the German-Turkish
friendship pact!
XIV. "Desert War".
On June 27 1 flew with the plane that Benoist-Mechin had given me
for a few days, via Aleppo, to Beirut. There I learned that the
English had suggested, through the intermediary of the American
Consul General, that negotiations be started. 32 I called on General
Dentz at once. Concerning the English offer and the course of the
conversation, I wired from Aleppo in the evening as follows : 33
"1.) Upon my return to Beirut, I learned of the following situation
report of June 26 to Vichy by the High Commissioner (excerpt) :
'English offensive in southern Lebanon on the road from Da-
mascus to Beirut and Damascus in the direction of Horns checked,
but heavy losses in troops and material. Without reinforcements
the resistance cannot last more than one week. English troops
tired out, but have an abundance of rolling stock; also superi-
ority in artillery, tanks, and machine guns, continuous supplies
and reinforcements (16th Brigade), future air base Damascus.
'If the English take Horns, our Air Force would be confined
to Aleppo and threatened there ; Lebanon, with exhausted troops,
would be encircled ; [there would be] a grain supply of 12 days
and hostile native elements. In the event of the speedy arrival
of the five battalions announced, the offensive could be stopped
and the resistance extended. But only a substantial reinforce-
ment with regard to tanks, antitank guns, and air force would
permit us to drive the enemy back across the border.
'In the political field : English proposals transmitted by the
American Consul General: General Wilson prepared to nego-
tiate concerning suspension of hostilities. At the same time
nothing was said about a political regime, but the example of
Damascus would seem to indicate a de Gaullist administration.
The offer is that officers and officials should have the choice of
remaining — hence, to join the de Gaullists — or being sent home.
'Contrary to Catroux's proclamation, no sanctions are being
imposed on the French who remain loyal to Vichy. No offer
with regard to the troops; hence, possibly, the hope of winning
them for the de Gaullists.
'Conclusion: Long resistance possible if Horns is held, which
presupposes the immediate arrival of reinforcements. Only if a
sufficient number of pieces of artillery arrive, can the enemy be
routed. This depends on negotiations with Turkey, in which con-
nection German intervention is decisive. The English proposal
™ See document No. 101 and footnote 4.
B Telegram No. 191 of June 28 (70/50524-26) .
JULY 1941 261
means practically our complete elimination through cooperation
with elements which are defecting to the de Gaullists. With
German approval, I recommend sending English prisoners to
France and, in the event of a defeat, negotiating for an exchange
of prisoners.
'I shall not start negotiations of any kind without formal in-
structions. If resistance has become impossible, I shall, after
peace and order are assured, destroy the arms and discharge the
O troops. Dentz.'
w End of excerpt.
"2.) Disturbed over English attempts at negotiations, I at once had
a long talk with the High Commissioner. I implored him not to
compromise the newly-won laurels of his troops through negotiations
and offered him further assistance in the equipping of Arab bands,
with arms, above all, the group Fawzi al-Qawuqchi, in accordance
with your offer in telegram No. 182 of June 25. 34 It seemed to me
braver, in an extreme case, to attempt a desperate attack on Haifa than
to let oneself be starved ignominiously into submission in Lebanon.
Moreover, there was hope that the promised reinforcement of five bat-
talions would soon arrive. The High Commissioner stated with
warmth that he shared this view and put me in entire charge of the
Fawzi group ; at my request he authorized at once the seizure of 45
automobiles in order to give the Fawzi group mobility, provided six
German members of the Foreign Legion as junior officers, ordered
that arms, gasoline be supplied, sent for an Air Force General and
gave the order that a transport plane be sent to Salonika at once in
order to pick up the German arms. I then discussed with Meyer-
Kicks and an officer of Fawzi's, who had been summoned in haste, the
plan of action of the Fawzi group : after reinforcement and equipment
with arms and vehicles, a flank attack on the English group at Pal-
myra. I am now in Aleppo to make the preparations. When the
arms arrive, I shall fly with Meyer-Ricks to Deir-ez-Zor."
On June 24 Fawzi Qawuqchi was seriously wounded in an attack
on a motorized English column. We had him taken at once in an air-
plane ambulance to Aleppo, where I saw him briefly and then sent him
on to Athens in a German plane. So the Fawzi group was without a
leader, and from past experience this meant: strife, dissolution,
plunder, anarchy. On the 28th I made preparations for the re-equip-
ment of the group, and on the 29th flew with Meyer-Ricks to Deir-ez-
Zor on the Euphrates, where it was to stay at the moment. But what
we had feared had happened. The Commandant of Deir-ez-Zor, who
later on also failed us completely in the military field, had not suc-
ceeded in keeping the group together: it had gone off in the night
"somewhere to the north, to Hassetche or Rakka." So, after being
detained by an English reconnaissance plane longer than we liked in
Deir-ez-Zor, we flew to Hassetche, where I had asked a Sheik of the
Shammar who was friendly to us to come for a conference, since I had
been informed that another Sheik of that tribe, who was under the
84 Not found.
262 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOHEIGN POLICY
influence of the English, was planning an invasion of Syria from the
direction of Iraq. I had grown accustomed from previous experience
to appearing at such meetings dressed all in white, without headdress
or arms and to observing and demanding a certain ceremonial. Our
friend, who had appeared with an imposing retinue, promised to post
his men at the border in order to impede the advance of the English —
in return for which he was to receive arms and money after having
been put to the test— and to send one of his people to his faithless
cousin with a threatening message from me. In so far as I later
learned, in actual fact the Iraq Shammar did not budge.
The Fawzi group was not in Hassetche. However, there were re-
ports that it had clashed with French troops in Eakka. So we hastened
to get there, and after much effort, succeeded. I alighted; Major
Meyer-Kicks flew back to Aleppo without stopping in order to con-
tinue to observe the military situation in the south. In Eakka there
was complete chaos. French troops had fired at the Fawzi people
and killed one of them. Part of the group had gone off into the desert,
to the north; another part was interned behind barbed wire. When I
got there and hailed them with the Arab greeting, "Dach-el-arab,"
they were like children. Some wept; others kissed my hand. Others,
again, talked at me so much that the interpreter could hardly follow.
They said that the French had given them nothing to eat; they
had been told that they would be delivered up to the English and that
Fawzi himself had been sent off to France and would be hanged there.
I was soon able to calm them. In the night I had the groups that were
scattered in the desert assembled through messengers, and bade Colonel
Malartre come to Eakka from Deir-ez-Zor, to map out a joint opera-
tion. At my suggestion, the Fawzi group took up a position north of
Palmyra in order to disrupt British supplies, to relieve the small, brave
band of Legionnaires in Palmyra, and if possible, later on to cover
their retreat to the north. But the French always had an unfortunate
touch in their handling of the Arabs. Only 2 days later there was
another clash. The soldiers of the same Colonel Malartre killed three
Fawzi people. The group withdrew to Aleppo in indignation and
the Legionnaires in Palmyra no longer had cover and had to surrender.
On June 30 I flew back to Aleppo in an airplane ambulance in
order to organize additional Arab groups as a cover for Palmyra,
Homs, and Aleppo. I also made contact with the Druses and the
Kurds , but was called back in haste to Beirut as the result of a report
of another slackening of the French resistance. General Dentz told
me that Vichy had at the time informed him that five replacement
training battalions would be brought to Aleppo in 50 German trans-
port planes on July 1, or July 3 at the latest. But he still had no
information as to their whereabouts. To be sure, his troops were
fighting doggedly, especially after the bestial acts of brutality com-
JULY 1941 263
mitted by the English and Australians against wounded and pris-
oners had. become known, but they were already very exhausted and
in hope of the promised relief. And this did not come and did not
come.
On July 3 Palmyra fell ; on July 4 — almost without a struggles —
Dpir-ez-Zor. On July 5 I got an urgent call from Captain de Bernon-
ville, the French Security Officer, to come to Aleppo, where the Fawzi
peWple had arrived and were threatening public safety. He informed
mej-moreover, that the French indigenous troops had scattered before
the approaching English columns and that the road from Deir-ez-Zor
to Aleppo was practically without cover. So I rode back at once to
Aleppo, merged the remnant of the Fawzi group with a second group
that had been hastily set up, under the unified command of Aref , an
old comrade-in-arms of Fawzi, supplied them that very night with
arms, ammunition, subsistence and equipment, and the next day, after
a brief address, had them take the oath of allegiance to the Arab flag.
This aroused wild enthusiasm and brought ovations for the Fiihrer
and for Germany. In the afternoon I stationed about 360 of them in
Meskene and placed them, divided into small groups, under the
military command of seven German members of the Foreign Legion,
whom General Dentz had at my request placed at my disposal. That
same night two patrols pushed as far as Palmyra and Deir-ez-Zor ;
in the following night the group attacked the airport of Rakka,
which had been occupied by English motorized units, and killed 10
Englishmen, took five prisoners, and captured one tank, a number of
trucks, and miscellaneous military supplies. The English withdrew
to the north and east, and Aleppo seemed secure for the time being.
On July 7 I went back to Aleppo, where, upon news of the Arab
presentation of the colors, numerous delegations, also about 10
Bedouin sheiks, had arrived from Horns, Haraa, and the environs of
Aleppo, in order to express their readiness to fight with the Aref
group. In the midst of the organization of the reinforcements and
supplies for Aref, I received on July 8 the news from the High Com-
missioner that he had been compelled upon orders from Vichy to ask
the English for an armistice. Five hours later, after a breathless
chase over the rough Syrian roads, I was with him.
I reported on the conversation to Berlin : S5
"The High Commissioner told me, in explaining the military situa-
tion, that he had been forced to wire the English through American
channels that upon orders from his Government he was asking for
the immediate cessation of hostilities on land, water, and in the air,
and for the commencement of negotiations for their definitive termi-
nation. He asked that a place be named for the negotiations. When
I suggested that this was not in harmony with his previous attitude,
K In telegram No. 221 of July 9, dispatched July 10 ; see document No. 101,
footnote 6.
264 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
he merely replied: What I have are 10 battalions, the largest con-
sisting of 300 men. His instructions from Vichy (which arrived
July 8, at 10 a.m.) concerning the aims in negotiation provide, among
other things, for: recognition of the French rights to Syria and
Lebanon, retention of a coastal area to include, if possible, Tripoli
and Aleppo, free departure of the troops with arms, retention
of the French administration under English supervision, in the areas
occupied or to be occupied by the British; no de Gaullist government.
The instruction further orders that there should be no destruction of
economic values, thus not of the pipeline station of Tripoli, or of
the oil supplies (over 100,000 tons); only destruction of tanking
equipment for ships. It is evident from the instruction that Vichy
has already approached England with a view to starting negotiations,
but has received no reply. The objective of the negotiations envisaged
by Vichy contains, in my opinion, an objectionable compromise
formula of a general political nature. I therefore urgently request
instructions concerning tha opinion entertained at your end. Above
all, on the question of the retention of a coastal area, are we inter-
ested in this as a later beachead or will it facilitate the future solu-
tion of the Arab question if the French are completely removed ? At
first I advised the utmost strengthening of the resistance until the
situation is clarified, and, in the event of negotiations, I advised the
use of dilatory tactics; moreover, I registered serious objections to
a lame compromise in the field of administration, which is really
tantamount to a compromise with the de Gaullists. The High Com-
missioner wired to Vichy to this effect. Unfortunately he could not
be persuaded to blow up, contrary to instructions from Vichy, the
oil supplies and pipeline station of Tripoli. The political director,
whom I entreated not to permit the English to receive as a gift an
easing of their supply situation in the eastern Mediterranean with
regard to oil and gasoline, shared this view and himself suggested
that German pressure be applied at once to Vichy to the end that
the High Commissioner receive a formal order to this effect. The
High Commissioner promised me he would issue an amnesty to
political prisoners."
XV. The Armistice.
The English took their time about replying to the General's pro-
posal. On the other hand, they made every effort to accelerate their
advance along the coast in order to capture Beirut before the com-
mencement of the negotiations. With disparaging leaflets, which
attacked also the personal honor of General Dentz, they tried to incite
the population to revolt. When English motorized units were only
8 km, away from Beirut and, according to rumor, had penetrated to
the suburbs, we withdrew to Tripoli, and late in the night to Latakia.
I had already transferred the office there the day before, because the
people of Aleppo, under the influence of the heavy bombardments
of the previous nights, which, according to the English radio, were
caused by our presence, had already begun to take an unfriendly
attitude.
On July 10 I went to Tripoli, where a part of the French General
Staff had already been transferred, and tried to get for the men of
JULY 1941 265
the Aref-Fawzi group 350 Syrian blank passports in order to be able
to get them through Turkey to Athens.
On July 11, I announced to the High Commissioner by wire the
visit which I and Meyer-Ricks were going to make in Beirut, but I
was stopped in Tripoli. There, General Dentz sent me word that
the English had replied and agreement had been reached in principle
concerning the commencement of negotiations. The demand had
beSl made, however, as the first condition for the suspension of hostil-
itiek-that I leave Syria at once with my entire staff. The High Com-
missioner therefore urgently requested that I cross the Turkish border
before midnight. I later learned that the English had also requested
that we and the Italians be surrendered to them.
We returned to Latakia, entered German visas into the 350 Syrian
passports and sent them through a reliable officer to Aleppo for de-
livery to the Aref-Fawzi group.
Shortly after midnight, we crossed the Turkish border with secret
material under seal and our transmitting equipment.
XVI. Conclusion.
The French have fought bravely up to the point of complete exhaus-
tion and, in so doing, have lost some 9,000 dead and wounded. Ac-
cording to the information received thus far, no Frenchman has as
yet exercised the option to go over to de Gaulle instead of returning
to France. I was convinced and still am today that the making of
50 planes available for the transportation of the five French battalions
from Salonika to Aleppo, would have enabled us to hold Beirut and
Aleppo, that is, the Syrian-Lebanese gateways of invasion for the
relief of Eommel's army, 4 to 6 weeks longer.
The opportunity is lost; a second one will perhaps be offered in
French North Af rica. M
"For Balm's published account of his activities in Syria, see Rudolf Rahn,
Rvheloaea Leben (DUsseldorf, 1949), pp. 152-181.
No. 166
35TB/E024568
Memorandum oy the Head of Political Division I M
secret Berlin, July 30, 1941.
Pol.IM2363g.Ks. 1
Memorandum
According to a communication from the competent military au-
thorities, in accordance with a decision by the Department of National
1 The copy of the document which is printed here was filed in the Department
for German Internal Affairs and was given there an additional file number,
D II 99 g. Rs.
266 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Defense the establishment of a Ukrainian national militia within the
framework of the Wehrmacht according to the directives of the Fiihrer
is not being considered. The formation of auxiliary police units from
reliable residents has been permitted to the High Command of the
Army in the area of operations. Within the areas under the Reich
Commissars responsibility for this falls to the civil authorities.
Kramarz
No. 167
Jf"17/08a-89
General Anto?iescu to Adolf Hitler x
Bucharest, July 30, 1941.
Your Excellency : Please accept, Your Excellency, the expression
of my most sincere thanks for your appreciation and praise of the
Rumanian soldier and of the German-Rumanian companionship in
arms. 2 At the same time I would express to Your Excellency my
deep gratitude for the words of appreciation and understanding with
which you have rewarded my efforts to give the Rumanian people
a new destiny of liberation.
It was a great satisfaction to me, Your Excellency, to be able to
prove through the achievements of the Rumanian soldier that the
Rumanian people are a nation on which it is possible to depend. And
soldier as I am, I was at all times certain of the military prowess of
the Rumanian people.
Certainly this people should have been able to accomplish more;
and their military and especially technical organization, as well as
their rearmament might have been far more advanced. The regime
of moral disintegration which for 10 years, under the former rulers,
held sway over this country, the unscrupulousness of many people who
had command of the Army, could not so soon be repaired by my
efforts and the work of the Rumanian officers' corps.
I am pleased, however, that the Rumanian soldier has done his duty
and especially that he has won the recognition of the superb German
Army and its great Fiihrer.
Just as I have asked Minister von Killinger to be good enough
to report in answer to your letter, 3 1 would reaffirm to Your Excellency
that in the campaign that we have begun in the east against Russian
1 The file copy of this letter is in German. There are two other copies (F17/-
081-82, F17/083-85) each of which is incomplete. In the remaining sections
of these copies some passages are considerably more legible than in the docu-
ment printed and they have therefore been used in establishing a complete and
clear text.
" Document No. 159.
* See document No. 159, footnote 2.
JULY 1941 267
Bolshevism, the arch foe of European civilization as well as of my
country, I shall fight on with the German Army until the final goal
is attained. I therefore do not put forward conditions of any kind,
nor do I have any proposals to make for a discussion of this military
collaboration in a new field,
I shall perform the military task for which provision is made in
Your Excellency's letter and shall take over the protection of this
ar^a.
t-shall perform this task in the firm conviction that I am thereby
not only serving the Rumanian people and the Rumanian popula-
tion beyond the Dniester, but that, by being able to participate in
the fight for the new order in Europe, I can at the same time comply
with demands of civilization.
I fully share the conviction of Your Excellency that only through
effort and through the unification of Europe can its destiny be assured
for centuries to come.
With deepest thanks to Your Excellency for the information re-
garding the gigantic campaign against Russia and extending to
you as well as to the glorious German Army my most sincere con-
gratulations on the unparallelled military victory — a blood sacrifice
for civilization and the future of Europe— I beg you to accept the
expression of my most loyal sentiments of admiration.
His Majesty the King likewise thanks Your Excellency for the
congratulations extended to him and requests that you accept the
assurance of his highest consideration.
Yours, etc. General Antonescd
No. 168
1527/373778-79
The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No.. 2511 of July 29. Washington, July 31, 1941—12: 37 p. m.
Received August 1—1 : 10 a. m.
With reference to my telegrams No. 2349 of July 21 1 and No. 2473
of July28. 2
I. The occupation of the Portuguese island possessions continues to
he discussed vigorously behind the scenes. In addition to the propa-
gandist^ preparation of American public opinion described in my
1 In this telegram (1527/373711-12) Thomsen reported that various Indications
pointed toward attempts by the administration to make amoral case for the sub-
sequent occupation of the Azores, the Cape Verde, and the Canary Islands.
a In this telegram (1527/373767) Thomsen listed various reasons why the
occupation of Dakar by U.S. troops had been postponed for the time being.
268 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
telegram No. 0449, 9 it seems to be the aim of the American Government
to obtain a Portuguese invitation on the model of the occupation of
Iceland.*
II. As I have learned from a reliable source, the American Govern-
ment is trying to involve Brazil in order to attain this objective.*
The Brazilian Government is said to be encouraging the right atmos-
phere in Lisbon in favor of the occupation of the Portuguese island
possessions by America, and thereby among other things is supposed
to have also suggested the proclamation of an independent republic
on the Azores. This new republic would then request military assist-
ance from Washington through Brazil. For this delicate game Wash-
ington wants to use the Brazilian Navy, of whose pro- Anglo- American
sympathies it believes it can be sure. The American Naval Attache
in Rio de Janeiro 6 is supposed to have received appropriate instruc-
tions about the middle of July.
The negotiations are being carried on in strict secrecy, for the further
purpose of deceiving the Portuguese Minister in Washington, Bianchi,
whose independent and patriotic attitude Roosevelt resents and whom
the State Department fears, in that he might frustrate the American
machinations.
III. As reported, 7 so far the occupation of the island groups in the
Atlantic and also of Dakar has been postponed for political and mili-
tary reasons. Further procedure will depend essentially on the suc-
cess of the above-mentioned efforts to obtain some sort of invitation to
take over the military defense. Nevertheless, according to my in-
formation, preparations have already been made for the forceful
occupation of the Azores, 8 The American naval staff believes they
could get along with a landing corps of about 4,000 marines as landing
troops, who would be used together with about eight cruisers, a few
torpedo boats and an aircraft carrier. The resistance of the Portu-
guese forces is not held in too high esteem, particularly if it were
possible to eliminate coastal batteries from the air within a short time.
Please pass on II and III of this telegram to the Naval Command
as a report from the Naval Attache (Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires
are receiving copies) .
Thomsen
* This was apparently an error. A typed marginal note states : "Cannot be
traced."
4 See document No. 118 and footnote 5.
5 Cf. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. vi, pp. 504-510.
" Cm dr. E. D. Graves, Jr.
* Document No. 133.
' For details of American military preparations see Stetson Conn and Byron
Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense in the series United States
Army in World War II: The Western Hemisphere (Washington, Government
Printing Office, 1060), pp. 116-122.
JULY 1941 269
No. 169
«17/249988-90
The Minister in Afghanistan to the Foreign Minister
Telegram
top secret Kabul, July 31, 1941 — 6 : 55 p. m.
ISfo. 259 of July 30 Eeceived July 31—8 : 20 p. m.
'Jy"ith reference to my telegram No. 257 of July 28. 1
The Minister President 2 expressed deep regrets about the Ober-
dorffer incident; he stated that the patrols sent out had believed they
had the son of Amanullah 3 and the nephew of Ghoulam Sidiq * before
them. A report to this effect was also spread by the Waziris, to whom
the two had entrusted themselves. Interrogation of witnesses had
shown that the two had fired first with sub-machine guns they had
with them when they had realized they were surrounded. Only after
Brandt had lost his turban were they recognized as Europeans. This
account contradicts Brandt's testimony. A thorough clarification
(group garbled) pursued. Gold and paper pounds as well as Indian
rupees and afghanis and also all other objects except weapons which
the two had carried along will be handed over to us. Brandt is to
leave Afghanistan after his recovery.
The Minister President stated in strict confidence that the English
Minister 5 had already filed a protest upon announcement that Hentig
had been granted an agrement, 6 because the latter was known to the
English as an "agitator". After the Oberdorffer incident the English
Minister had protested anew and in almost the form of an ultimatum
had demanded, on behalf of the Soviets, too, that the German colony be
restricted, as it had now been demonstrated that the constant English
references to agitation against England through the colony had proved
to be true. The Minister President stated that in both cases he had
rejected the English protest, pointing to Afghanistan's unshakeable
neutrality. Afghanistan would also continue to do everything to
preserve her neutrality. However, the Minister President asked me
to use every means to see that such incidents could not be repeated,
because they were in any case condemned to failure in view of our
'This telegram (617/249987) was one of a number of reports concerning an
incident in which two German agents, Oberdorffer and Brandt, carrying out an
assignment by the Abwehr to establish contact with the Fakir of Ipi, were shot
by Afghan soldiers. Oberdorffer was killed while Brandt was wounded in the
leg. Other documents dealing with this incident were : Kabul telegram No. 239
of July 20 (329/195562) ; Kabul telegram No. 242 of July 21 (617/249984) ; Kabul
telegram No. 246 of July 23 (617/249985-86) .
1 Sardar Mohammed Hashin Khan.
! Former King of Afghanistan, forced to abdicate in 1929.
* Former Afghan Foreign Minister and Minister to Germany.
6 Sir William Kerr Fraser-Tytler was British Minister until August 1941.
" See document No. 44.
270 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
unf amiliarity with the country and the people and the large English
espionage network. Mir Sahib Khan, with whom the two had pre-
pared the sally [Vorstoss], was a well-known English provocateur who
had now stated that it had been the intention to hand the two over to
the English upon their entry into the border area.
In the course of the 2-hour conversation the Minister President
stressed several times his friendly feelings toward us. However, he
replied to all my remarks that Afghanistan's situation as a buffer be-
tween two allies was so unfortunate that the Government requested
urgently that everything be avoided that could give the English an
occasion for exerting any sort of pressure. Among other things he
pointed to the fact that the Soviet frontier had already been closed,
so that for example gasoline could be imported only from India, as
Iran could not be considered for gasoline exports. Furthermore,
Afghanistan's entire assets were in the United States, whither most of
the karakul was exported, and as the most important source of revenue,
it had to go there in the future as well. If there should be a freezing
of assets in America at the instigation of the English, and if the In-
dian border should also be closed, then the domestic difficulties result-
ing from this could possibly destroy Afghanistan. The Minister
President does not believe in England's military designs against
Afghanistan, although he did not consider Wavell's appointment 7 to
mean that he was pushed aside, but rather to indicate a special English
activity aiming perhaps at passage through Iran. The Minister
President stated that the Government was ready, when the moment for
intervention had arrived as a result of the approach of German troops,
to let all of Afghanistan take up arms on our side. In that case he
would then mobilize about 500,000 men including the border Afghans.
As regards our operations at the border, with which he was ac-
quainted from papers and maps from Oberdorffer and Brandt as well
as from Anzilotti's 8 earlier sally and from the present testimony of
the provocateurs, he begged repeatedly that they be abandoned, since
nothing was achieved thereby. India could be made amenable only
with a strong army.
When I again broached the question of the Military Attache, 9 the
Minister President said that in Major Schenk we had the best military
adviser. He was happy to cooperate with him. The basic tone of his
statements was : Willingness for a close alignment, but to show this
openly only when the weak country could no longer be endangered
by enemy pressure.
' Early in July, Sir Archibald Wavell was appointed British Commander in
Chief, India.
* See document No. 107 and footnote 2.
" Nothing has been found regarding the background of this matter.
JULY 1941 271
Because the Prime Minister is afraid of enemy reaction, especially
in case of repetition of an awkwardly planned operation similar to the
Oberdorffer case, I should be grateful for telegraphic instructions as
to what the further intentions of the Abwehr are this respect. 10
PlLQER
^ Instructions not found. See, however, document No. 190.
^ No. 170
278/178888-88
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
U.St.S.Pol. 730 Berlin, July 31, 1941.
On the basis of an instruction from Sofia the Bulgarian Minister
today passed on to me the impressions of the conversations which Bul-
garian Foreign Minister Popov had brought back from Eome. 1 They
are essentially in accord with what is already known about this matter
from the reports from Rome and Sofia. 2 The Foreign Minister sees a
success in the following points :
Improvement of the atmosphere between Italy and Bulgaria. The
Italians did not at all bring up again the modification of the boundary
at Kacanik. 8 The Bulgarians were promised an improvement of the
frontier at Ohrid and Resan even though in an undefined form and
dependent upon the decision of the boundary commission.' 1 In a still
more undefined form they were given a certain prospect of fulfillment
of their wishes with respect to the Bulgarian national shrines in St.
Naum at Lake Okhrida.
The Bulgarian Foreign Minister furthermore obtained the impres-
sion from the conversations that the Italians are insisting that Fiorina
and its vicinity should be Albanian. This point had not been the
subject of the actual discussion, and the Italians had also indicated
that the solution of this question had to be found in cooperation
with Germany.
WoERMANN
^he visit to Rome of Minister President Filov and Foreign Minister Popov,
originally planned for July 14, took place July 21-23.
' In telegram No. 1632 of J'uly 22 (278/178867-69) Mackensen reported what
the Bulgarian Ministers had told him about their negotiations with Mussolini
and Ciano. Beckerle's telegram No. 809 of July 28 (278/178883-84) regarding
this Rome visit was based on statements by the Italian Minister in Sofia and
by the Bulgarian Foreign Minister.
* See document No. 87 and footnotes 1 and 2.
'According to Mackensen's account of the Italo-Bulgarian negotiations (see
footnote 2) botia sides had agreed to establish a mixed commission which would
have authorization to determine the boundary on the spot and to make certain
changes in the line agreed upon in Vienna.
272 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 171
65/45770
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
urgent Tehran, August 1, 1941 — 10 : 31 a. m.
secret Received August 1 — 11 :15 a. m.
No. 717 of August 1
A few days ago the British Minister * handed a note to the Iranian
Foreign Ministry the text of which, according to a reliable source, is
approximately as follows :
The British Government felt bound to call the attention of the
Iranian Government to the fact that a great many Germans were liv-
ing scattered over the whole country. Among these Germans there
were some elements which gave the British Government cause for con-
cern in view of its large oil and other interests in Iran. The British
Government recommended the removal of these elements as soon as
possible.
In its reply, the Iranian Government first pointed out that Iran
was a sovereign, independent, and neutral country, which in its de-
velopment had to make use of the assistance given by foreign citizens.
Among these were also Germans who, like all aliens, were known to
the Iranian authorities and like all aliens were under the surveillance
of the police. Since it needed these aliens, the Iranian Government
was not in a position to give consideration to the recommendation of
the British Government.
Ettbl
1 Sir Reader W. Billiard.
No. 172
205/142881-83
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT STOCKHOLM, August 1, 1941 8 : 15 p. HI.
No. 1095 of August 1 Received August 1 — 10 : 50 p. m. 1
For the Foreign Minister.
Yesterday I advanced the German request for transit of another
division 2 through Sweden s in a long conversation with Foreign
1 Marginal Note : "Forwarded as No. 2617 to Special Train, Aug. 2, 1941."
1 The 6th Mountain Division.
3 There is no indication of any telegraphic instruction from the Foreign
Ministry about this matter.
The instruction apparently was issued to Schnurre directly in Germany. In
telegram 745 of July 2SJ (205/142848) Ritter notified Wied that Schnurre would
arrive in Stockholm Thursday morning (July 31) and asked that an appointment
with the Swedish Foreign Minister be made for Schnurre for that day but
without stating the nature of Schnurre's mission.
AUGUST 1941 273
Minister Giinther and discussed it with him in detail. Directly after
my conversation with Giinther, the Finnish Minister * made the same
request. s Giinther then discussed the German-Finnish request by tele-
phone with the King, who is in southern Sweden at the moment.
Yesterday evening and this morning there was a Cabinet session of a
limited group owing to the confidential character of its discussion.
' Giinther had me call on him this afternoon in order to inform me
le decision of the Swedish Government :
_.ie Swedish Government was not in a position to comply with the
German request for the overland transit through Sweden of another
division. At the beginning of the Russian war it had given such
consent once and for all, because there was at that time no other way,
such as the sea route, available. 6 The Swedish Government had ac-
cordingly committed itself in Parliament and before the public. The
German side, too, had stated at the time that it was a question of the
overland transit of one division only.
A deciding factor in this decision by the Swedish Government, as
the King has confirmed, had been the fact that the sea route through
Swedish territorial waters, in the opinion of the Swedish Government,
was usable without restriction and that for this reason there was no
pressing necessity to make use of the land route. We were already
using the route through Swedish territorial waters regularly for large-
scale troop transports. In the time from July 29 to July 31, for
example, six large steamers with several thousand men on board had
sailed this way, some of them under Swedish escort. There had been
two groups of three steamers each, aside from other German ships
sailing separately. The Swedish Government could not understand
why the additional troop transports planned by us should not also use
this route. The Swedish Government would protect the Swedish
territorial waters, which they placed completely at our disposal for
these transports, against all attacks. An attack on German ships in
Swedish territorial waters would be considered an attack on Sweden,
and Sweden would take the consequences upon herself, in spite of
the resulting danger to Sweden's neutrality. In this respect the
Swedish Government had a different attitude from that of the Nor-
wegian Government at the time when England had used the Norwe-
gian territorial waters for aggressive acts of war. 7 If we so desired,
an escort of Swedish warships could be provided.
Giinther expressed the hope that this point of view of the Swedish
Government would be understood in Germany. Personally, he added
* .Tarl de Vasastjerna.
5 In telegram No. 921 of July 29 (205/142849-50) Ribbentrop informed the
Legation in Finland that the OKW intended to employ another division there
and that it would ask the Swedish Government, through Schnurre, to permit
the transit of the division through Swedish territory. The division was to be
transferred from Germany to Sweden and thence overland to northern Sweden
and Finland. Ribbentrop asked that the Finnish Government be informed and
that It support Germany's request in Stockholm.
" See documents Nos. 16 and 17.
7 See vol. ix of this series, documents Nos. 17, 58, and 60.
6S2-005— 64 23
274 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
that he would rather have had Swedish divisions dispatched to Salla.
But for this the situation in Sweden was not yet ripe.
I left Foreign Minister von Giinther no doubt that this answer of
the Swedish Government would be considered entirely unsatisfactory
by the Reich Government. I would report his answer to the Keich
Government and ask for further instructions. Giinther asked me
whether, although the King shared the attitude of the Swedish Gov-
ernment, I would like to bring up the question with the King once
more on my own initiative. I reserved my answer to this question.
I should like to ask for telegraphic instructions whether the German
request for permission to transport overland should be carried to the
King with a corresponding instruction from the Fiihrer, or whether
we should accept the sea transport proposed by the Swedish Govern-
ment as feasible in practice. In the latter case please send more exact
instructions on what specific wishes we have toward the Swedish Gov-
ernment in carrying out the sea transport. 8 I may add that it unfor-
tunately weakens my negotiating position here decisively that,
contrary to the point of view I have taken here, that only the land
route can be considered for the transit of the divisions — the sea route
has regularly been employed by us for large troop transports, par-
ticularly in the last few days.
Schnurre
WlED
s In telegram No, 1581 of Aug. 4 (205/142887-88) Ribbentrop informed the
Legation that in view of the negative attitude of the Swedish Government, the
OKW would not pursue the matter further but that the division would be shipped
by sea with its motorized elements passing through Swedish territorial waters
and the non-motorized parts going via Denmark, Oslo, and Trondheim, and thence
by ship along the Norwegian coast. "Detailed instructions will follow in the
next few days concerning our specific requests to the Swedish Government as
regards the sea transport through Swedish territorial waters and in particular
the escort by Swedish naval vessels."
Schnurre was also instructed to inform the Swedish Government that Germany
would not persist in its request and at the same time to express Germany's
regret over Sweden's decision, and to emphasize the need for secrecy about the
matter.
"In telegram No. 15C9 sent Aug. 3 (319/192436), Bitter assured Schnurre that
the OKW had ordered that in the future all requests to Sweden regarding mili-
tary transports were to be through the Foreign Ministry or through Minister
Schnurre in Stockholm.
No. 173
51M/E302957-59
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal Department
Berlin, August 1, 1941.
ZUR21600. 1
In the enclosed note verbale of July 19, 1941, 1 the Swedish Lega-
tion has stated that the Soviet Government recognizes The Hague
1 B 21 600: Not printed (5144/E302956).
AUGUST 1941 275
Rules of Land Warfare 2 and is willing to apply them on condition
of reciprocity.
Before the World War Tsarist Russia was a party to the Hague
Convention of 1907. However, quite generally the Soviet Govern-
ment has stated that it is committed only to those international agree-
ments concluded by the Tsarist Government which it specifically
recognizes. This recognition is contained in the note verbale. How-
ev£r, this alone does not make The Hague Rules of Land Warfare
binding for the present war between Germany and the USSR,
because the Hague Convention contains the clause on universal par-
ticipation and, for example, Italy and Slovakia are not parties to
the Convention. The Russian statement passed on by the Swedes
takes account of this legal situation in that the Soviet Government
states that it is willing to go beyond a recognition and to apply
The Hague Rules of Land Warfare in the relationship between
Germany and Russia on condition of reciprocity.
The High Command of the Wehrmacht, to which the Swedish note
has been communicated, has stated the following orally:
The Wehrmacht already has directives for warfare which corre-
spond with The Hague Rules of Land Warfare. The High Com-
mand of the Wehrmacht is therefore of the opinion that the Swedish
note verbale must be treated purely in accordance with considera-
tions of foreign policy. Experience up to now has shown that the
Soviet troops have often proceeded against German prisoners of
war and wounded in a manner contrary to The Hague Rules of
Land Warfare. If the Soviet Union wishes to apply The Hague
Rules of Land Warfare, the High Command of the Wehrmacht
expects that it will immediately issue appropriate orders to its troops
and assure their being carried out.
From considerations of foreign policy, the matter is evaluated as
follows :
1. An express rejection of the proposal made in the Swedish note
that the Rules of Land Warfare be applied in the German-Russian
war would be exploited propagandistically among the public in a
manner highly detrimental to Germany. Therefore such a course
of action cannot be recommended.
'Signed Oct. 18, 1907; for text, see Foreign Relations of tlie United States,
1907, pt. 2, p. 1204.
276 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
2. As the Soviet Union so far has not acceded to the prisoner
of war agreement of 1929, s a German-Russian agreement on the recip-
rocal application of The Hague Rules of Land Warfare would be
the sole way of creating a basis for organizing the care for the
German prisoners of war in Russian hands.
3. The Hague Rules of Land Warfare contain in chapter 3 rules
concerning the military authority on occupied enemy territory. As
far as is known, however, the German Government intends to estab-
lish a civil administration in the occupied Russian territories. Enemy
quarters have characterized the same procedure in the f ormer Polish
areas, in Norway and in Holland as a violation of The Hague Rules
of Land Warfare. Although such assertions can be countered with
good arguments, it is to be assumed that the Soviet Union would
make the enemy standpoint its own. Furthermore, the provisions of
The Hague Rules of Land Warfare presumably do not contain any-
thing regarding the administration of the occupied territories which
is contrary to the intentions pursued by the German Government.
However, in announcing the German measures The Hague Rules of
Land Warfare ought to be taken into account to a certain extent
by making clear from the outset that these measures are compatible
with the stipulations of the Rules of Land Warfare.
It is proposed that the Swedish note verbale be answered by stating
that the general directives issued to the German Wehrmacht for the
conduct of the war are in accordance with the provisions in The Hague
Rules of Land Warfare, and that these directives also apply to the
conduct of the war in Russia. If necessary it could be added that the
German Government expected that the Government of the U.S.S.R.
would give its troops the same directives.
• Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armies in the Field, signed at Geneva, July 27, 1929 ; for text, see
League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxvm, p. 303.
In a memorandum of Aug. 12 (1386/358922-23) Senior Counselor Albrecht
of the Legal Department recorded the text of a telegram forwarded by the
International Committee of the Bed Cross which that organization had received
from the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in reply to an inquiry. In
this message the Soviet Government after confirming its adherence to The
Hague Rules of Land Warfare on the terms stated in the message transmitted
through the Swedish Legation expressed its willingness to apply article 4 of
the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, but not the other articles of that
Convention as these were already covered by The Hague Rules of Land War-
fare. The Soviet message as well as the preceding correspondence between the
Soviet Government and the International Committee of the Red Cross is printed
in XVIIth International Red Cross Conference, Report of the International
Committee of the Bed Cross on Us Activities During the Second World War
(September 1, 1939-Jnne 30, 1947), vol. i (Geneva, 1948), pp. 408-412; cf.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. i, pp. 1005-1024.
AUGUST 1941 277
Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the Under
State Secretary in the Legal Department 4 with the request for
approval. 5
Dr. Albrecht
4 Friedrich Gaus, Director of the Legal Department.
„' According to a minute of Aug. 10 by Lohmann of the Foreign Minister's Sec-
retariat (5144/E302960) a memorandum regarding application of The Hague
Rifles of Land Warfare was drafted by Gaus and with amendments by Eibben-
trop sent to Hitler on Aug. 8. Following a communication from Hewel to Rib-
bentrbp on Aug. 9 a draft note of reply to the Swedish Legation was submitted
to Hitler by Steengracht on Aug. 10.
This undated draft (5144/E302961-62) after acknowledging the Swedish note
denounced the conduct of the Soviet troops toward the German prisoners of war
and stated that there could be no agreement with the Soviet Government about
the treatment of war prisoners unless it gave proof "that it was now really
willing and In a position to bring about a complete change In the conduct of its
troops and other authorities with respect to German prisoners." A copy of the
note which was finally handed to the Swedish Legation has not been found. See,
however, document No. 389.
No. 174
205/142884-85
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Stockholm, August 2, 1941 — 1 : 30 p. m.
No. 1100 of August 2 Received August 2—3 : 10 p. m.
With reference to my telegram No. 1070 of July 29. 1
The Director of the Foreign Trade Department of the Foreign
Ministry told me today of the reply which was planned on the question
of the Norwegian ships in Goteborg. He explained that the Swedish
Government had earnestly studied all possibilities in order to find some
way to prevent these ships from sailing to England. According to
the Swedish view, it would be best if the ships in question would sail
to Norway. As was well known the Chief Bailiff (Oberexekutor) in
Goteborg had rendered a judgment which declared the Norwegian
decree of May 18, 1930 \19¥>V according to which the Norwegian
ships abroad (clear text apparently missing) to the Norwegian Direc-
tor of Navigation in London, to be invalid (cf. Report No. C-893 of
June 23) . 3 On the Swedish side, it is proposed that the Oslo shipping
firms send captains who would be ready to bring the ships to Norway.
1 See document No. 151, footnote 4.
! "Provisorlsk anordnlng om rekvisisjonerlng av skip og skipsbyggings-kon-
trakter," Samling av proiHsoriske anordninger, kgl. res. m.v., 1940-1945 (pub-
lished by the Royal Norwegian Department of Justice and Police, temporarily at
London, 1945), pp. 20-22. By this decree the Norwegian Government in exile
requisitioned all the ships flying the Norwegian flag and ships being built under
contract with Norwegian firms.
* Not found.
278 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
In case the Chief Bailiff should let these captains on hoard in spite
of the objection which is to be expected of the Norwegian Legation
in Stockholm, their crews could be sent in after them and with these
the trip could be undertaken. If the objection of the Norwegian Lega-
tion were upheld by the Swedish courts, then the shipping firms should
propose detention of the ships on the argument that the right to dis-
pose of the ships was a matter of dispute and with the aim of getting
a judicial decision on the right to dispose of ships. Considerable time
would pass before issuance of a decision in the last instance and in
this way there would be assurance that the ships remained in Goteborg.
Hagglof sees no other possibility of preventing the ships from sailing,
because a Swedish law provides that clearance may not be denied to
ships which produce their papers in accordance with regulations. It
would be impossible to abrogate this law by administrative measures.
Hagglof nevertheless expressed the hope that the way which he pro-
posed would attain the goal. In this connection he indicated the need
for haste beeause in the last few days he had received news of certain
preparations on the ships in question. 4
WlED
'In telegram e.o. Ha. Pol. 5174/41g. (319/192434-35), identified in the reply as
No. 1583 of Aug. 4, Eisenlohr instructed the Legation in Stockholm that HUgglBf 's
answer was completely unsatisfactory; that the way proposed by him was not
practicable for It had been tried once before and had failed. Germany would
hold Sweden responsible if any of the ships escaped.
In the reply telegram No. 1114 of Aug. 4 (319/192433) Wied reported having
presented the matter to Gunther who mentioned that as far as the Swedish au-
thorities knew, only two ships were making preparations for a breakout and
these would require some 8 days to make ready. He promised to obtain the
names of the two ships. He urged, however, that the best method for holding
the ships would be legal action by Norwegian shipping firms. He pointed out
that if the Swedish Government on Its own were to take measures against the
ships it would run the risk of seizure of all its overseas tonnage by the British.
Telegram No. 1128 of Aug. 5 (319/192432) reported that the ships preparing
to run out were the Dioto and the Lionel.
After Schnurre's return to Stockholm the matter was again pressed as is re-
ported in telegram No. 1161 of Aug. 11 (319/192426) but when Schnurre and
Wied demanded that Sweden take measures to seize the ships, or transfer them to
the Baltic, or to put them in the Swedish service, Giinther reiterated that such
measures would be viewed by England as participation by Sweden in Germany's
blockade measures. Gunther would not take such responsibility himself but
would present the problem to the Cabinet.
On Aug. 14 in telegram No. 1183 (319/192424-25) Schnurre and Wied were
able to report the decision of the Swedish Cabinet as explained by the Foreign
Minister. The Swedish Government, Gunther declared, was not able de jure to
take the measures which Germany demanded, but de facto Giinther gave the
assurance that the ships would not break out. His declaration applied not only
to the 10 oil-burning ships in Goteborg harbor, but also to ships which mean-
while had been completed for Norwegian firms. If the de facto situation were to
change then Germany would be notified in ample time. Schnurre proposed that
on his return to Berlin he discuss with OKM further measures by which Ger-
many could get the ships into her own hands.
No record of these discussions in Berlin or of the ensuing instructions to
Stockholm has been found.
See, further, document No. 290.
AUGUST 1941 279
No. 175
B12/B001128-3O
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
ukGENT Rome, August 2, 1941—9 : 10 p. m.
1% 1732 of August 2 Received August 2—10 : 00 p. m. 1
feor the Foreign Minister personally !
Pursuant to my conversation of today with Minister Bene and
Brigadefuhrer Greifelt, 2 I wish to report as follows:
The recent low daily figures of emigration caused by the war, and
the general talk of a resettlement that would no longer be necessary,
had created strong mistrust on the Italian side. That was why per-
haps a certain tension arose in Bolzano that made it appear necessary
to hold a consultation in Rome between Under State Secretary Buf-
farini, Minister Bene, who had come here from Holland, and SS-
Brigadefiihrer Greifelt. This consultation took place in a comradely
manner and with due appreciation of the difficulties caused by the
war on both sides. It was possible to convince Buffarini again on this
occasion that everything was being done on the German side to carry
out of the decision of the Fuhrer and the Duce which was clearly and
unequivocally in the sense of a radical, ethnic solution. So far some
72,000 persons have emigrated. Within the next 6 months approxi-
mately 16,000 more persons will be able to emigrate as a result of
possibilities discussed here, so that in the first 2 years, some 88,000
persons (equal to 47 percent of the Italian figure for optants, or 40
percent of the German figure), including farmers and other persons
of property, will have emigrated. This percentage is considered
satisfactory by Buffarini. The removal of persons with real prop-
erty cannot take place on a sizable scale until it is possible to announce
publicly the prospective new area of settlement. 3
As a special difficulty existing on the Italian side, it appears that
the Prefect of Bolzano, 4 by way of a personal union, is, on one hand,
the deputy of Under State Secretary Buffarini, and in this capacity
is responsible for the carrying out of treaties and agreements aiming
at a radical ethnic solution, while, on the other hand, as Prefect of
the Province of Bolzano, he is responsible for the further economic
welfare of a heretofore flourishing province. The interests involved
'Marginal note: "Transmitted as No. 2624 to the Special Train."
'Ulrich Greifelt, Himmler's principal executive officer for the resettlement
of the Volksdeutsehe, Chief of the Staff Main Office of the RKFDV (Reich
Commissariat for the strengthening of the German national community ) .
' Cf . vol. xi of this series, document No. 291 and footnote 1.
4 Agostino Podesta.
280 DOCTMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
in. these two tasks are in part diametrically opposed, 5 so that the exist-
ing "personal union." must cause, has caused and, independent of the
person, will cause the Prefect a conflict of conscience. Because the
difficulties existing at the present time are largely attributable to this
conflict of conscience of the Prefect, they were pointed out to Buffa-
rini by the German side, and the thought was suggested to him for
consideration whether it would not be desirable to abolish this per-
sonal union. Buffarini admitted these difficulties and their conse-
quences, seized on the idea at once, and suggested for his part the
appointment of a commissioner with his seat in Bolzano and authority
to issue instructions to the four Prefects in question. He is going to
think this over and together with Bene discuss it again with Greifelt
on August 8. Buffarini stressed the fact that then a position of equal
authority must exist on the German side. In my opinion, this already
exists in the case of the German Reich representative, but, because of
the repeated long absences of Minister Bene, unfortunately, with
very limited effectiveness.
Since the appointment of a commissioner on the Italian side would
mean a change in an existing condition, a corresponding change would
have to be made in the text of the German-Italian directives of No-
vember 15, 1939. 6 This could be by means of an extension of the
arrangements made for the economic part regarding the handling of
all South Tirolese problems with respect to Italy as provided in the
confidential correspondence between Ciano and Mackensen of Decem-
ber 11, 1939. In the event that Buffarini takes a positive stand on the
idea of a special commissioner in the conversation to be held on
August 8, please authorize me to arrange for this change with the
Italians. 7
The Reichsfuhrer SS will receive a direct report through Brigade-
fuhrer Greifelt.
Mackensen
1 Cf. vol. si of this series, document No. 291.
•Not found. . ,,..,. j. , ,
' By telegram No. 1973 of Aug. 5 (4865/E249484) the Foreign Minister directed
that Mackensen agree to the idea of an Italian special commissioner if Buffarini
favored the plan. , , , .. .
In telegram No. 1827 of Aug. 11 (B12/B001193-94) Mackensen reported that
Mussolini in principle agreed to the idea of the appointment of a high commis-
sioner for all South Tirolese resettlement problems but that he was considering
making the execution dependent on a parallel action by G ermany .
In telegram No. 2437 of Sept. 19 (4865/E249515) Mackensen was informed
that the German Government was planning to appoint Mayr, Consul General
at Genoa, as High Commissioner for South Tirolese resettlement questions.
AUGUST 1941 281
No. 176
205/142889-90
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Stookholm, August 4, 1941 — 7 : 00 p. m.
top secret Received August 4 — 10 : 00 p. m.
NQll05ofAugust4
With reference to your telegram. No. 1581 of August 3. 1
This afternoon I conveyed to the Swedish Foreign Minister the
statement outlined under item 2 of the above telegraphic instruction.
Giinther once more expressed his personal regret that it was not possi-
ble for the Swedish Government to accede to the German request, and
asked that we draw from this instance no broad inferences on Sweden's
attitude toward the struggle against Bolshevism. The Swedish Gov-
ernment would do everything in its power to assure the safe passage
of the German transports through Swedish territorial waters. He
was looking forward to the forthcoming communication of our wishes. 1
I emphatically recalled to Giinther the need for absolute secrecy.
Giinther listed for me the members of the Government and the Armed
Forces, whom he had informed of the matter in addition to the King;
ha will not go beyond this group. In the subsequent arrangement of
the technical details he will also proceed in accordance with our wishes.
He suggested that the group of persons in Finland to be informed on
this matter be also kept as small as possible. I shall report separately
on the rumors circulating in Stockholm in connection with the troop
transports carried out during the past days. 2
I request the earliest possible transmission of our further proposals.
Our Naval Attache will fly to Berlin tomorrow to discuss details with
the Naval Operations Staff. I would request however that instruc-
tions be sent also directly to me by telegraph. 3
Schnureb
Weed
1 See document No. 172, footnote 8.
s In telegram No. 1106 of Aug. 4 (205/142892) the Legation reported that
Giinther had mentioned that numerous rumors were current in Stockholm
regarding a new, secret German-Swedish agreement regarding troop transporta-
tion. "They had their origin in the fact that last Sunday three ships filled with
troops passed through the cliff zone of Stockholm and past some Swedish bath-
ing resorts, whereupon the band struck up a tune and there was a lively exchange
of greetings between the troops on deck and the population,"
s See document No. 178, footnote 4.
282 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 177
1007/307696-97
Memorandum by an Officer in the Intelligence Department of the Army
General Staff
Local Quarters, August 5, 1941. 1
Eecord of the Visit of the Japanese Military Attache, Lieutenant
General Banzai, Accompanied by Major Endo, at the Intel-
ligence Department [O Qu IV] on August 4, 1941, in Jagerhohe 2
1. The visit had been requested by the Japanese Military Attache
by letter and was arranged for August 4, 1941 in Jagerhohe with the
consent of the Chief of the General Staff 3 and the Commander in
Chief 4 of the Army.
2. Lieutenant General Banzai stated that he came in agreement
with his Ambassador and on official instructions of the Chief of the
Japanese General Staff, Colonel General Sugiyama. He asked that
the following information communicated by him be brought to the
attention of the Commander in Chief of the Army.
3. Japan — Army and Governments determined, despite all mili-
tary, economic and (internal and external) political difficulties, in the
spirit of the Tripartite Pact, to enter the war against Soviet Russia
on Germany's side just as soon as the strategic concentration of troops
would permit it.
The difficulties— which are presumably known— are to be found in
the military field:
(a) the necessity of maintaining continued occupation of China;
(b) the further demands on the military forces caused by the recent
occupation of Indochina (reference to the necessity of this step in order
to obtain an initial base for the later attack on Singapore— desired by
Germany, t)
(c) the situation of transportation to Manchukuo, both from the
mother country and from China (single-track railways!)
4. Nevertheless the Japanese General Staff expects that by the end
of August, 16 divisions, the minimum for opening hostilities against
Soviet Russia in the Far East, can be assembled in Manchukuo. (This
means strengthening the present Kwantung Army by about six
divisions.)
Probably four army groups will be set up, the most important of
which (Vladivostok?) is to be commanded by Lieutenant General
Kawabe, the former Japanese Military Attache in Berlin.
1 O.U. (Orts-Unterkunft) in the original.
1 Headquarters of the OKH, Mauer Lake in East Prussia.
" Colonel General Franz Haider.
* Field Marshal Walther von BraucMtsch.
AUGUST 1941 283
The necessary mobilization measures have been in progress for some
time. The exact date for the entry into the war has not yet been set.
5. Through threats of resigning Ambassador Oshima has exerted an
appropriate influence on the activating of Japanese policy.
The leading figure in the Japanese cabinet, is now as before, the
War Minister, Lieutenant General Tojo. 5
Matzkt 8
-^
'A summary of the contents of this memorandum was submitted to the
Foretgn Minister's Secretariat by Counselor Etzdorf, the Foreign Ministry's
representative with OKH on Aug. 5 (1068/313421).
Matzky's memorandum was submitted to the Foreign Minister on Aug. 15 with
a cover note by Ritter (1007/307694-95) which read as follows: "For the forth-
coming visit of Ambassador Oshima. Enclosed is a memorandum regarding
a statement by the Japanese Military Attache concerning Japan's entry into the
war against Soviet Russia. Field Marshal Keitel considers it desirable that
the Foreign Ministry, too, tell the Japanese Government that it has taken note
of this statement. Field Marshal Keitel would therefore like to ask the Foreign
Minister to bring the matter up with the Japanese Ambassador during his
forthcoming visit". Oshima's visit to Ribbentrop took place on Aug. 23. An
unsigned memorandum of this conversation (F7/O096-88) on the film of the
files of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat is only partly legible. The parts
that can be read do not indicate that a statement as suggested in the foregoing
was actually made by Ribbentrop on that occasion.
" Major General Gerhard Ernst Ludwig Matzky.
No. 178
205/142894
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT STOCKHOLM, August 5, 1941 7 I 00 p. HI.
No. 1125 of August 5 Received August 5 — 10 : 45 p. m.
With reference to our telegrams No. 1105 1 and 1106 2 of August 4.
I have taken advantage of the discontent existing in informed
military circles over the attitude of the Swedish Government, in
order to discuss with the Foreign Minister once more the practical
aspect of the transport question. The result is as follows : By anal-
ogous application of the transit agreement between Gunther and me
concluded on July 8, 1940, 3 the Swedish Government would give its
consent to unrestricted transport of materials over Swedish railroads
to Haparanda. The same would apply under the aforementioned
agreement to transport of materials to Narvik and Trondheim.
Materials would include horses and mules together with personnel
needed for their care and as guards. This would reduce the trans-
ports by the hazardous sea route in considerable measure, because the
entire equipment of the division could be shipped by this route. In
1 Document No. 176.
8 See document No. 176, footnote 3.
' See vol. x of this series, document No. 132.
284 DOCUMENTS ON GEEMAN FOREIGN POLICY
accordance 'with, its basic decision the Swedish. Government persists in
its refusal to permit troop transports, but under the agreement of
July 8, 1940, regarding furlough travel to Norway, it will be possible,
with the tacit acquiescence of the Swedish Government, for small
contingents of a few thousand men to travel to Narvik and Trondheim
by Swedish railroads. The troops transported in this way must,
however, conform to the requirements set forth under paragraph 3
of the agreement of July 8, 1940, which means that their small arms
must be carried in a separate car and that they must maintain the
appearance of furlough personnel. I am in no position to judge
whether the separation of equipment and troops necessitated by this
route is acceptable to us. I request that I be given instructions on this
matter at the earliest opportunity. 4
ScHNTTRRE
WlED
4 In telegram 1628 of Aug. 8 (205/142899) Ritter informed Schnurre that the
first transport ships would probably leave Stettin on Aug. 26; that although
Germany's wishes could not yet be formulated with precision they would
comprise escort by Swedish warships and Swedish assistance during the voyage
in ease of need.
Cf. document No. 530.
No. 179
265/173127
Memorandum, by the State Secretary
St.S. 494 Berlin, August 5, 1941.
The Turkish Ambassador today introduced to me his new Counselor
of Embassy. He soon brought the conversation around to the prob-
lem of the nationalities of Turkic ethnic origin who live on the fringes
of Soviet Bussia. He called my attention to the possibility of spread-
ing anti-Soviet propaganda among these Turkic tribes. Then he
expressed rather frankly the idea that the Caucasian peoples could
eventually be united into one buffer state and hinted that an independ-
ent Turanian state might be established east of the Caspian Sea also.
Gerede stated this in the casual tone of a conversation. However,
his remarks were by no means casual, since they agree to a large
extent with the statements made by Ali Fuad in a conversation with
Herr von Papen (see Ankara dispatch No. 2335 of July 14 x ) . Gerede
put his finger upon the decisive question by characterizing Baku as an
entirely Turkish-speaking city.
Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister.
Weizsacker
3 Document No. 125.
AUGUST 1941 285
No. 180
794/273240-2
Memorandum, by Minister Orobba 1
Beelin, August 5, 1941.
Subject: Proposals relating to Gaylani's intended trip to Berlin
(telegram No. 986 of August 1 from Therapia 2 ) .
Regarding the agreement he intends to conclude in Berlin with the
German Government, which by being published is calculated to bolster
his position in Iraq and assist the revolt now in progress there,
Gaylani, as shown by his statements in Tehran, has obviously in mind
an agreement in which the Gaylani Government is publicly recognized
by the German side as the sole legal Government of Iraq. His per-
formances in return therefore are likely to be what he has repeatedly
offered, especially during his last premiership: a secret agreement
with the German Government, involving close military, political, and
economic collaboration.
In May Gaylani proposed : 3
(1) The invitation of a German military mission ;
w . . . . _
The invitation of a German adviser to the Iraq national bank
of emission, who in effect would be a financial adviser ;
(3) The invitation of advisers for various branches of the admin-
istration, especially the police;
(4) Cancellation of the Iraq Petroleum Company's concession and
negotiations on new arrangements in this matter ;
(5) Abolition of the present Iraq currency tied to the pound ster-
ling, and its replacement by a currency based on a German gold
credit ;
(6) Delivery to Germany of all Iraq raw materials that can be
spared.
1 Grobba's signature is missing on the file copy of this document. The author-
ship is indicated by Woermann's memorandum of the next day, document No. 183.
*In this telegram (83/61948) Papen reported having been visited by former
Iraq Minister President Gaylani who expressed hope that he would be allowed
to proceed to Berlin where he expected "to conclude agreements with the Helen
Government" calculated to strengthen his position in Iraq and the insurrection
there.
Gaylani and the Grand Mufti had gone to Iran after the collapse of Iraq's
military resistance to the British (see vol. xn of this series, documents Nos.
590 and 599), Reports on the political plans and activities of Gaylani and the
Grand Mufti were made in Tehran telegrams No. 573 (71/50876-77) and No.
577 (71/50878-79) , both of July 7.
In telegram No. 645 of July 17 (83/61446) Ettel reported having been informed
by Gaylani that he expected to leave Tehran on July 20 and to cross the Turkish
border on July 22.
*No record of proposals made by Gaylani in May as listed below has been
found. Some requests by the Iraq Government at that time which are alo.ng
similar lines are referred to in vol. in of this series, document No. 457.
286 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
His counterdemands were :
(1) Delivery of needed war materials on credit ;
(2) Granting of a credit of 1 million gold pounds ;
(3) Delivery of urgently needed commodities, especially medicines.
Gaylani, by taking up the struggle against the English, has proved
his hostility against England, In this struggle, as already in the past,
he has proved himself as a leader-type personality. By affiliation
with the Gaylani family, which is respected throughout the entire
Near East, he is qualified for the job of leader of the Iraq state. He
has also demonstrated great understanding for a cooperation with
Germany and proved himself a suitable partner for us. Our future
interests in Iraq will therefore be best served if we reinstate Gaylani
as Minister President in Iraq. We can leave the selection of his min-
isters to him; there is no objection against the reappointment of his
previous ministers who all are lesser personalities than he.
The public recognition of his government by Germany will certainly
strengthen his standing in Iraq and give new impetus to the insur-
rection now in progress there ; but it should not take place until we
can be sure that we will shortly occupy Iraq.
I should therefore propose that after his arrival in Berlin we
negotiate with Gaylani about the subjects referred to above and
conclude agreements which, however, would not become effective
until his government is again accorded recognition by us. This will
save us the necessity of trying to improvise a solution of these ques-
tions upon the occupation of Iraq.
I further suggest that the statement be made, in reply to his request
for public recognition of his government, that the German Govern-
ment was in principle prepared to do this, but that the moment
would be opportune only when the entry of German forces into Iraq
and the joint operation of German forces with Iraqi forces and tribal
units was either imminent or had already started.
For Gaylani's appropriate lodging in Berlin I suggest that a draw-
ing room and bedroom be reserved for him in the Adlon Hotel and his
retinue be lodged in the same place. I would also suggest that he be
received by the Foreign Minister and the Fiihrer. 4
Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat through
the Under State Secretary and the State Secretary.
* For the follow- up, see document No, 183.
AUGUST 1941 287
No. 181
205/142897
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
Stockholm, August 6, 1941 — 12 : 10 a. m.
N£>1130 of August 5 Received August 6—2 : 30 a. in.
According to a communication from the Chief of the Political De-
partment of the Swedish Foreign Ministry 1 there was a captured
English officer on the German furlough train z which passed through
Sweden coming from Kornsjo to Halsingborg. He was discovered
by the Swedes and reported because he wore an English uniform. 3
The furlough train in question left Sweden in the direction of Ger-
many on the 5th of this month at 2 : 00 a. m. with the captured English
officer. The Swedish Government refrained from any measures lead-
ing to the release of the English officer during the transit over Sweden
in order to avoid any complications. It intends, however, to remon-
strate regarding the matter through the Swedish Legation in Berlin. 4
In the Foreign Ministry here they expressed their earnest wish that on
the German side care be taken lest the captured English officer com-
municate to England the fact of his transportation over Swedish
territory in a German furlough train by letter or any other means at
his next opportunity.
Wied
1 S. J. Suderblom.
* For the trans-Swedish furlough traffic, see document No. 178.
3 According to the Swedish memorandum of Aug. 7, ku St.S. No. 497 (319/-
192429) it was a British Air Force officer.
' Weizsacker's memorandum, St.S. No. 497 (205/142900-901) , records a visit by
the Swedish Minister who brought a memorandum regarding the Incident (foot-
note 2) and who delivered orally a "sharp protest." Weizsacker wondered if
further action were called for inasmuch as the Military Attache In Sweden had
taken measures to preclude any repetition of the infringement and recommended
that the military authorities be warned.
No. 182
2293/483867
The Legation in Rumania, to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 2486 of August 6 Buchaeest, August 6, 1941.
Received August 6 — 11 : 20 p. m.
On the basis of the order of the Leader of the State to use 60,000
Jews for road-building in Bessarabia the police Prefects have had all
able bodied Jews assembled in Bucharest, too, and in part taken away
to labor camps. By this measure considerable damage was inflicted
288 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
on the Rumanian economy in which Jews were still occupying many
positions because of the lack of suitable substitutes, particularly during
the mobilization. In addition, German-Rumanian trade was endan-
gered, because in the enterprises newly established by Germany (for
example, the Rumanian Commercial Bank, and the shipping firms of
Intercontinentala and Carmen) Aryanization could not start until
just now, and because Jewish merchants could no longer pick up from
the custom houses the German goods they had bought.
I therefore advised the Deputy Minister President 1 to undertake
the elimination of Jewish elements only systematically and slowly.
Deputy Minister President Antonescu said that he had already pro-
posed in the Council of Ministers on his own initiative that the
measures be rescinded, as in this case [General] Antonescu had evi-
dently overestimated the number of Jews who could be used. The
Prefects have now received instructions to halt the measures. Fur-
thermore, an interministerial commission was established, with the
task of bringing back the Jews already deported, in so far as they are
important to the war effort.
Neubaoher
KlLUNGER
1 Mihai Antonescu,
No. 183
784/273238-39
Mejnorandu?n by the Director of the Political Department
Berlin, August 6, 1941.
Position of the Political Department on the Enclosed Proposals
or Minister Grobba 1
(1) The Italian Government, which has not given up its claim to
leadership in the Arab questions, follows our relations with Gaylani
with a certain jealousy and in any case desires that he should come to
Rome too. A visit to Italy by Gaylani will therefore have to be
included in the program from the outset. But the visit should take
place only after conversations with Gaylani here have led to some
conclusion.
The program outlined by Minister Grobba considers Germany and
Iraq exclusively. It will not be possible to avoid some degree of par-
ticipation by the Italians, e.g., in the question of revising the conces-
sion of the Iraq Petroleum Company. The moment for calling in the
1 Document No. 180.
AUGUST 1941 289
Italians may not come until a certain degree of clarification has been
achieved in the conversations with Gaylani here.
(2) Some of the questions listed in the program for negotiations,
especially those relating to economic policy, require careful internal
preparation before they are taken up with Gaylani. It is proposed
that such internal preparation begin immediately and that the other
Tistries be consulted in so far as that is absolutely necessary.
WOERMAKN
No. 184
1131/323273-75
Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal
Affairs
Berlin, August 6, 1941.
e.o. D IX 64.
Subject: Assumption of the administration in former eastern Galicia
on August 1 by Governor General Dr. Frank.
Discontent in all Ukrainian circles.
33 enclosures : 30 petitions by Ukrainians and Ukrainian orga-
nizations ; l
2 reports by Professor Dr. Koch (enclosures I
and II) ; »
1 report (enclosure III) by the Representative
of the Foreign Ministry with Sixth Army
Headquarters. 3
The news of the assumption of civil administration in former east-
ern Galicia by Governor General Dr. Frank had already become
known in Ukrainian circles even before August 1, when he took over.*
It caused great disappointment in these circles, and among other
things gave rise to numerous letters and telegrams directed to the
Foreign Minister which protested against the "dismemberment of the
Ukrainian national organism" and requested the abandonment of such
plans as would "frustrate the restoration of a separate state comprising
the entire Ukrainian territories in accordance with the fundamental
principles of newly organized Europe as proclaimed by the Fiihrer,
Adolf Hitler." Among the senders of these protests and petitions
directed to the Foreign Minister the local affiliates of the Ukrainian
National Organization (OUN) are most frequently represented with
1 Not found. However, a number of letters and telegrams from Ukrainian
organizations and individuals protesting the incorporation of Ukrainian terri-
tory into the Government General and into Rumania were found in another file
and are filmed on serial 34.
'Not printed (1131/323276-81).
'Hellenthal report of July 26 (1131/323282-83).
* See documents Nos. 114 and 119, footnote 1.
682-905—64 24
290 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
23 petitions, and their action gives the impression of being organized.
However, other Ukrainian organizations, such as for example the
Central Association of Ukrainian Students in Vienna, the World
Association of Ukrainian Women, etc., are also represented with a
total of 7 petitions.
Likewise from Ukrainian circles, but from resettlement camps of
Ukrainian emigrants from Bessarabia and Bukovina, there are tele-
grams to the Foreign Minister protesting against the incorporation
of Bukovina and Bessarabia in Rumania s and asking that all Ukrain-
ian areas be united into one whole, which would make it possible for
the emigrants to return to their homes.
Captain Professor Dr. Koch, the representative of the Reich Min-
ister for the Occupied Eastern Territories with Army Group South,
likewise stated in the two enclosed reports (enclosures I and II) that
the administrative transfer to the General Government had disap-
pointed the Ukrainians and that their morale was low as a result
of this.
On the other hand Professor Koch reports that in spite of our police
actions compact units of Ukrainian nationalists of the Bandera group
are systematically penetrating into the entire occupied area of the
eastern Ukraine in order to engage there in propaganda for a Greater
Ukraine.
I have the feeling that our administrative measure of placing Galicia
under the General Government was not adequately explained to the
Ukrainian population in advance as an administrative measure, and
that it therefore caused this discontent.
In the eastern Ukraine such attitudes and feelings probably do not
have to be feared for the time being.
I should also like to point out the churchly sentiment among the
population that is being expressed (enclosure I, page 2).
The Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the Sixth Army
Headquarters has suggested (enclosure III, report of July 26, pages
2), that the Ukrainian prisoners of war whose homes are in the oc-
cupied territory be released and permitted to return home as so on as
possible. Regarding this I should like to remark that in an OKW
proclamation dropped by plane from the middle of July on it was
stated at the express instruction of the OKW that the Fiihrer had
ordered the release of all -Ukrainian prisoners of war, if they would
protect the harvest from being destroyed and burned.
Because of the connection between the Ukrainian question and gen-
eral policy I believe that I should point to the feeling that has
developed.
6 A memorandum of Aug. 1 by Ritter (34/24813) recorded a conversation with
Ribbentrop regarding tbe establishment of Rumanian civil administration in
Bessarabia and Bukovina. The memorandum took for granted that Bessarabia
and Bufcovina would be returned to Rumania. See also document No. 159.
AUGUST 1941 291
Submitted herewith to Counselor of Embassy Hilger with the re-
quest that he place the matter before the Foreign Minister. 6
Grosskopf
"According to a covering memorandum of Aug. 7 by Grosskopf (1131/323272)
this memorandum was submitted together with one that dealt with the harvest
In the occupied territories and another one regarding civil administration in
Estonia. The following marginal note is found on this covering memorandum :
"Presented to the Foreign Minister on Aug. 10. The Foreign Minister said that
nothing could be done in this matter. Hipger] , Aug. 11,"
No. 185
1543/375578-80
The Charge d? Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
urgent Washington, August 7, 1941 — 6 : 49 p. m.
No. 2636 of August 7. Received August 8—9 : 00 a. m.
For the State Secretary.
Although the American press has almost without exception put
public opinion under the pressure of Russian propaganda, and the
warmongers are utilizing this opportunity, an appraisal of the whole
political situation must proceed from the fact that Roosevelt is re-
solved, as in the past, to maintain the median course of "non-belligerent
means" 1 between the two alternatives of entering the war and isola-
tion. To this have contributed :
(1) The circumstances of Hopkins' dispatch to Moscow. 4 My re-
port that Hopkins went to Moscow in reply to an urgent call for help
from Stalin s is confirmed by a remark of Early * of which I have
recently been told.
(2) The fact that the United States has no current reason for a
declaration of war against Germany. The Congress is not inclined
tacitly to approve an undeclared war against Germany. Rather, it
reserves its rights.
(3) The situation in the Pacific which makes it impossible for the
United States to participate actively in a war against Germany as
long as there is the risk of a two-front war for which America is in
no way prepared.
1 In English in the original.
"Harry Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt, went to Moscow
on July 28 to investigate possibilities for material assistance by the United States
to the Soviet Union. Cf. Foreign Relations of the United, States, 1941, vol. i,
pp. 797-798, 802-815.
"No report containing such a statement has been found. References to the
Hopfcius visit in Moscow are found in telegrams Nos. 2543 of Aug. 1 (1527/
373788-89) and 2588 of Aug. 4 (1527/373804-05).
4 Stephen Early, Secretary to President Roosevelt.
292 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
(4) The outcome so far of the debate on extension of the period
of military service, reports of poor morale among the draftees, and
the widespread opinion that America is not directly threatened, in-
dicate a cleavage of public opinion that is so great that in the circum-
stances the moral impulse and the unity of the nation are lacking for
a war which is not exclusively waged for the defense of the country.
All the measures taken by Eoosevelt to date indicate that despite his
erratic nature and his opportunistic attitude he fully realizes that
under these psychological conditions he cannot wage an effective war
of aggression requiring every possible means.
(5) Moreover, the American army is in the beginning phase of its
being equipped and trained; the two-ocean navy will not be ready
until 1946 and the existing fleet is today scattered between the At-
lantic and Pacific. The requirements for an American expeditionary
force in the sense of 1917 are lacking, especially tonnage.
(6) America's own interests are never absent from Roosevelt's cal-
culations. Roosevelt wishes to enter upon the inheritance of England,
also with respect to the balance of power, the maintenance of which
will have to be America's task in the future. The determining factors,
to be sure, were the wish to help England to victory and to support
Russia and China. But there was also the endeavor to achieve effec-
tive security against encirclement and attack in both oceans in case
of a German or Japanese victory. This was to be achieved by gaining
bases from England, by the forward thrust outside the Western Hemi-
sphere into the Atlantic area, by the build-up of Alaska, Samoa, etc.,
and by influencing Russia in order to obtain bases in Siberia.
Under these conditions Roosevelt even under British pressure will
consistently adhere to the policy of postponing decisions and pro-
longing the war. His efforts to avoid hostilities in the Far East in
any circumstances are confirmed by the events of the last few days
which clearly show that America does not have full freedom of action.
The impression which the British and Russian propaganda are trying
to create, as if Germany were now involved in a two-front war and
therefore the opportunity for America to intervene were especially
favorable, cuts no ice with Roosevelt. The many warnings addressed
to Japan remain ineffective, because they are not backed up by suffi-
cient military power and because the reinforcement of the Atlantic
fleet cannot be cancelled as long as the danger of Russian collapse
and of a German attack against England exist. A Japanese-Thai
agreement for Japan's taking over the protection of Thailand at this
time would at most be followed by a strengthening of the American
sanctions against Japan as an American counter move, a half measure
by which, as in the past, no decisions can be brought about.
Thomsen
AUGUST 1941 293
No. 186
386/211305-07
An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Embassy
in Paris
Telegram
N ( © 5 792 of August 7 Special Train, August 7, 1941—12 : 25 p, in.
(_/rom the Special Train Eeceived Berlin, August 7 — 1 : 10 p. m.
No. 3915 of August 7
from, the Foreign Ministry Sent August 7.
For the Ambassador.
The Foreign Minister has received the following communication
from the Military Commander in France :
According to the communication from the Military Commander
in France, Ambassador de Brinon reported concerning his conversa-
tions with Petain, Darlan, and Huntziger in Vichy on August 1 and
2, as follows :
1. The cause of the present crisis lies in the Ministerial Council
of June 6, 1941. 1 At that time General Weygand protested
against the Bizerte program after Darlan's report on the Paris
Protocols of May 28, 1941. 2 In "Weygand's opinion the imple-
mentation of this program involved the danger of an immediate
English or Anglo-American attack on Dakar by naval and land
forces and the possible defection of all of North Africa. The
Ministerial Council of June 6, 1941, unanimously supported Wey-
gand's opinion.
In the meantime the difficulties with Weygand have increased.
Weygand had written Petain a letter: "Je pousse un cri
d'alarme." 3
Weygand could no longer carry the responsibility for a collab-
oration with Germany that had brought France nothing. If
the French Government reverted to the policy proposed by Darlan
on June 6 and rejected by the Ministerial Council, then he
(Weygand) would resign. In a letter of reply dated July 23,
Petain informed Weygand that there was no reason for a cry
of alarm, and that the Government was only carrying out the
pol icy formerly approved by Weygand.
Darlan had now resolved not to work with Weygand any
longer and was working to get rid of him.*
2. The French Government had taken cognizance of the rejec-
tion of the note of July 14 (Abetz to Benoist-Mechin)'. 8 The
Marshal intended to tell the Fiihrer in a letter that he desired the
'For Weygand's account of this episode see Maxime Weygand, Mimolres
rappeH an service (Paris, 1950), vol. m, pp. 428-437.
8 See vol. m of this series, document No. 559.
6 In French In the original.
* See document No. 211.
* See document No. 162.
294 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
collaboration with Germany at any price. 8 He had no commit-
ments with respect to England. In the fight against Russia he
wanted to participate to the highest degree both in a moral and
in a material sense.
At the moment he was not in a position to carry out the
Bizerte commitments, since this would probably result again in
the loss of part of the French empire.
Darlan for his part was resolved to keep the commitments.
Huntziger as the responsible War Minister did not want to
undertake the risk of Bizerte because of the deficiencies in the
defenses of Dakar. He reckoned on the possibility of a land attack
from Freetown by the English within a short time.
The Ministerial Council of August 2 had resolved as an interim
solution to carry out the "camion program" for the time being,
and to make the African transp ort p rogram the sub j ect of personal
negotiations once more by Admiral Darlan in Paris owing to
the great risk involved (6th, 7th, 8th) . 7
The Marshal had the personal wish to discuss the over-all
situation with a leading German figure and was seeking a way
out by any means. The close, confidential relationship between
Petain and Darlan was untroubled.
3. The situation in Vichy was not confused as it appeared to
be. A Governmental reorganization was not imminent. Ac-
cording to statements by Darlan and also by Chef de Cabinet
du Moulin, 8 an anarchistic spirit reigned in parts of the Army.
Officers of the Deuasieme Bureau were in contact with England.
Colonel Lousterau 8 had been arrested at an airfield where he
was about to pass a secret code to an English agent. Except
for this case and Generals Baton 9 and Cochet, 10 no officers had
been arrested up to date.
4. Following the report to the Military Commander of France,
de Brinon had informed the (one group garbled) that the Amer-
ican agitation in Vichy was extraordinarily active. At the last
reception of Admiral Leahy by the Marshal only supply ques-
tions had been discussed.
Supplement [from] German Armistice Commission :
Be item (2) : The so-called "camion program" concerns the transfer
to Libya via Tunis of the 400 trucks purchased for the Africa Corps
in Metropolitan France.
The French delegation in Wiesbaden stated on August 4 that
the French Government had given orders for the regular transfer
of the vehicles in running condition. 11
Re item (3) : The extensive report concerning arrests of French
officers which originated with the Counterintelligence headquarters
in France have not been confirmed except for the arrest of Colonel
Groussard, the former leader of the Groupe de Protection (G.P.).
" See document No. 417.
* This is a reference to Darlan's visit to Paris, Aug. 6-8, 1941.
E H. du Moulin de Labarthfete, Chef de Cabinet to Petain.
* Not identified.
10 Gabriel Cocbet, General, Air Force.
11 See La D&Wgation frangaise aupres de la Commission allemande d,' Armistice,
vol. v, pp. 43-51.
AUGUST 1941 295
The G.P. was established at the time by the then Minister Pey-
routon 12 as a bodyguard for the Government and has been expanded
by Darlan as his personal guard (group garbled).
German Armistice Commission, Gruppe Wehrmaeht I C No. 260/41-
gKdos, August 6, 1941.
The Foreign Minister requests a report from you whether in your
opinion the information contained in the communication, in par-
ticular in so far as it concerns the present crisis and the resulting
conclusions, corresponds to the actual situation. 13
SoNNLEITHNER
"Marcel Peyrouton, Secretary General of the French Ministry of Interior,
August 1940; Minister of Interior, Sept 6, 1940-Feb. 15, 1941.
13 See document No. 189.
No. 187
4699/E226846-47
Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal
Affairs
Beklin, August 7, 1941.
zuDVIII52g. 1
Regarding the postponement of the resettlement of the Volks-
deutsohe from southeastern Europe until after the War I talked
today with SS-Standartenf iihrer Creutz, the deputy of SS-Brigade-
fiihrer Greifelt, and asked him whether the resettlement of the
Volksdeutsche from Kocevje, which, as is known, is to start at the
beginning of September, would also be affected by this.
SS-Standartenf iihrer Creutz telephoned me on August 7, at 5 : 30
p. m. and informed me that he had had an opportunity of putting
this question before the Reichsfiihrer SS today. Regarding this,
the Reichsf iihrer SS said that he was present when the F iihrer gave
the Foreign Minister his instructions in this matter. The Fiihrer
apparently had had in mind resettlement in the Balkans but not
Kocevje, i.e., Italian territory. 2
Accordingly, the Reichsfiihrer SS, as before, held the view that
the Fuhrer's instructions did not refer to the impending resettle-
ment from Kocevje and that this resettlement could start at the
date planned after conclusion of the agreement regarding this ; bar-
gaining concerning its first part would presumably be over by
August 8.
1 D VIII 52g. : Document No. 149.
* A German-Italian treaty establishing the definitive line of the German-
Italian frontier resulting from the collapse of the Yugoslav State had been
signed by Weizsacker and Alrleri in Berlin on July 8. The German and Italian
tests of this treaty with an appended map showing this line are in the files
(2871/563654-702).
296 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The previous document, D VIII 5S/41g, and a memorandum of
Aug. 2 of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat are attached.
Herewith submitted to Under State Secretary Luther.
Grosskopf
[Enclosure]
Westfalen, August 2, 1941.
The Fiihrer has decided that there is to be no resettlement of Volks-
deutsche from southeastern Europe for the duration of the war.
After the end of the war it is planned that the Volksdeutsche will
be removed and resettled.
From this point of view one should examine in each individual
case which measures have to be taken at the time (Labor Service,
etc.). .
Returned to Under State Secretary Luther through the Foreign
Minister's Secretariat.
Steengracht
No. 188
67/47047-56
Memorandum, by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Berlik, August 10, 1941.
Fuh. 1
Record of the Bestowal of the Knight's Cross on General
Antonescu by the Fuhrer in the School at Berdichev
(Ukraine) on August 7, 1941
The Fuhrer personally presented the Knight's Cross to General
Antonescu in the presence of Field Marshals Keitel and von
Rundstedt, General Jodl and their immediate staff. Antonescu was
accompanied by Ms Chief of Staff * and an aide.
Before presentation of the decoration the Fuhrer stated that when he
decided a year ago to give a guarantee of the inviolability of the
Rumanian frontiers e he had been aware that this measure as well as
others which followed later would cause Russia sooner or later to
become the implacable enemy of Germany. In the further course of
the developments Russia had then made more and more attempts at
blackmail, so that he (the Fuhrer) had to make up his mind to act
'No number is indicated. A marginal note reads as follows: "Not to be
entered in the journals."
" General A. Joanntyiu.
! See vol. x of this series, document No. 413.
AUGUST 1941
297
quickly in order to anticipate the enemy who, as one now knew, was
unbelievably well armed. In this connection he (the Fiihrer) had
asked himself what attitude Rumania would be likely to adopt. The
fact that that country was today fighting on the German side, after
having overcome its own internal crisis within a short time, was ex-
clusively due to General Antonescu, whose courage, determination,
devotion, and will to work represented values which were not measur-
a%, to be sure, but which had had an extraordinary influence on the
course of things. From the very beginning Antonescu has possessed
the Fiihrer's personal trust.
Since the weapons had begun to speak the General had shown courage
and the qualities of a leader. Without hesitation he had immediately
placed himself at the side of Germany, and it turned out that in the
short time he had been governing Rumania he had accomplished
astonishing things. In these circumstances it had given the Fiihrer
pleasure and deep satisfaction to know that German units, too, were
under the command of General Antonescu.
The liberation of Bessarabia represented Antonescu's first success,
and he (the Fiihrer) wanted to use this occasion to award General
Antonescu the decoration with which the German nation rewarded
the courage, the heroism, and the qualities of leadership of its men.
General Antonescu thanked the Fiihrer most sincerely for the ac-
commodating attitude which he had always shown toward him. He
gladly accepted the decoration on behalf of the Rumanian Army and
the Rumanian people. In so doing he repeated the assurance which he
had already given the Fiihrer at his first meeting with him,* namely,
that Germany could count on the Rumanian people fully and entirely;
for after all it had not been General Antonescu alone who had marched
with Germany; the entire people had stood behind him. Germany
could place her trust in the brave and honest Rumanian nation in the
future, too. Rumania felt honored to be able to fight against the
common foe side by side with Germany, and in this way to contribute
her share toward the defense of civilization.
Thereupon the Fiihrer presented General Antonescu with the
Knight's Cross as well as the Iron Cross first and second class.
In a short conversation in the presence of Field Marshal Kietel and
Colonel Schmundt, which followed the bestowal of the decoration, the
Fiihrer stated that the quick clarification of the relationship with
Russia had been very important. At the beginning of June he had
gained the conviction that every further effort to reach such a clarifi-
cation had merely been treated in a temporizing manner by the Rus-
sians, so that the unavoidable conflict could only have been postponed
for 1 or 2 months at the most. Thereby the conflict would have hap-
* See vol. xr of this series, document No. 381.
298 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICT
pened at a time that was highly unfavorable for Germany; for after
the middle of August and the beginning of September it was difficult
for reasons of climate to start a military operation against Russia.
After long deliberations and after a thorough examination of his
own conscience he (the Fuhrer) had reached the conviction that the
fight was unavoidable. He thanked Eumania for having immedi-
ately recognized this situation for her part and for not having made
any kind of difficulties.
The problems that had to be solved were the same ones as at the start
of the Russian campaign, that is, first the destruction of the living
strength of the foe and second the destruction or capture of the im-
portant industrial centers and raw material bases of Russia. As far
as the first question, i.e., the destruction of the living strength of the
foe, was concerned, the Russians themselves had answered it by doing
what the Fuhrer had always hoped, to be sure, but what was by no
means certain. They had accepted battle near the frontier. Consider-
ing their own tremendous concentration probably nothing else had been
left for them to do, as a retreat by the strongly concentrated masses of
troops had no longer been possible. In this manner essentially the
major part of the Army had suffered crushing defeat, and had been
taken prisoner or dispersed. Only fragments of the Army had suc-
ceeded in establishing a new front. These, however, were already
forces of lesser quality.
The results of the German advance could be seen in the numbers of
prisoners and amount of booty : 900,000 prisoners, 10,000 planes, 13,000
tanks, 10,400 guns and very considerable amounts of other material
had been captured. Because according to World War experience there
were at least two casualties to one prisoner, and the Russians had this
time fought with particular fanaticism, one could probably assume
that 3 to 4 million Russian soldiers had been put out of action. The
fact that the Russians had suffered heavy losses was also indicated by
the combining of troop units. Thus the first objective could be con-
sidered to have been attained. As regards the second ob j ective, namely,
the capture or destruction of the industrial centers and raw material
bases, he (the Fuhrer) hoped that in the coming month it would be
possible to occupy Leningrad with its industrial center, the ore regions
in the southern Ukraine, the industrial area around Kharkov, and the
industrial area of Moscow. He hoped to achieve these objectives by the
beginning of the bad weather season.
The Fuhrer termed the next major objective the attack on Lenin-
grad, which was to begin day after tomorrow, the straightening of the
bulges still existing in the front, and the mopping up of the troop
units which were still surrounded in the pockets. Furthermore, an
advance had to be made in the south toward the ore areas, and finally,
as the last operation, Moscow had to be taken.
AUGUST 1941 299
Even with still greater achievement than had actually been attained
it would not have been possible to accelerate the advance because sup-
plies would not have kept up. In these circumstances it was a triumph
for Germany that she could put into operation again practically the
entire Russian railroad network in the portions of Russia occupied
by her, in part with Russian rolling stock but partly also with German
riffling stock after changing the gauge. However, supplies had to be
assured in all circumstances, before the further advance could be
begun, if one did not want to fall into the same error that another
famous man had committed in his operation against Russia.
In the further course of the conversation the Fiihrer then discussed
with Antonescu a few strategic questions as to how to proceed in the
Ukraine, especially with regard to the possibility of driving the Rus-
sian forces in the southern Ukraine into a pocket by having several
tank divisions wheel around them.
Antonescu affirmed this possibility and explained with the aid of
the map the plans which he had in regard to the army group placed
under his command. He mentioned in this connection that in the
area which he was now facing he would have cleared out all nests
of resistance within 2 weeks; and stressed repeatedly that after the
various pockets had been sealed off too many troops were assembled
there, so that supply difficulties were to be feared. He suggested that
above all the Italian divisions which were now being brought up be
shifted farther to the north so that the concentration of troops might
be prevented.
The Fiihrer replied that the necessary orders for shifting Italians
and also for the general directing of troops to the north had already
been issued.
Antonescu stated further that in the south he wanted to occupy not
only Odessa, but also Sevastopol and the Crimea, in order thus to
seize the air bases of the Russians from which the Russian Air Force
with its new bombers, which had a speed of 500 kilometers, was mak-
ing heavy bombing attacks on Constanta.
With the aid of the map Antonescu also described his further plans
concerning the advance in the Ukraine to the east and south by the
troops under his command, without however providing precise data in
this connection. He merely indicated with gestures of his hand the
general direction of the advance planned by him.
After the conclusion of the conversation with the Fiihrer, the latter
had a conference with Field Marshal von Rundstedt, whereas
Antonescu was informed in a room nearby of the further German
intentions regarding Kiev, etc., by the responsible members of Field
Marshal von Rundstedt's staff.
Schmidt
Minister
300 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 189
386/211320-21
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST TTCGENT PaRIS > AU S USt 8 > 1941 '
No. 2367 of August 8 Received August 8—9 : 55 p. m.
For the Foreign Minister.
With reference to your telegram No. 3915 of August 7, 1941. 2
The picture of the situation in Vichy as drawn by Brinon has
proved to be essentially correct and can be supplemented by the fol-
lowing reports which also come from a trustworthy source:
1. The main reason for the delay in carrying out the Bizerte pro-
gram seems indeed to lie in military considerations of the *rencfi
Government. It has lost 180 of its best airplanes m the Syrian cam-
paign and it is afraid that it cannot defend itself sufficiently against
English air attacks in the Mediterranean area and against Anglo-
Saxon land or sea attacks on West Africa. The spokesmen for this
position are not only General Wevgand, who because of his hatred
of Germany follows a policy of military collaboration with Germany
only by command, but also Minister of War Huntziger, Air Minister
Bergeret and Colonial Minister Platon. In contrast to Weygand,
who by all means wants to avoid calling for German aid in case oi
need, the three last-named, according to a report by State Secretary
Benoist-Mechin, stated last week in a ministerial conference that they,
in case of an English or American attack against French possessions
in Africa, would immediately call for German help. In this connec-
tion Darlan had expressed the hope that German-French Cjeneral
Staff talks, concerning the questions of the practical implementation
of German help, might begin as soon as possible.
2. A further reason for the delay in the Bizerte program by the
French Government lies in the pressure which the United States
exerts on Vichy. 8 Without disavowing Darlan's policy m principle,
Petain still lives in the illusion that he can improve the relationship
with Germany while at the same time retaining good relations with
the United States. Leahy is supposed to have threatened Petain in the
name of his Government that in case of a military collaboration of
France with Germany in North and West Afnca, America would
recognize de Gaulle as the official French Government and support
measures by de Gaullist forces against French possessions in the
Western Hemisphere. ,.« u. ■,- •„ ^
3 In these circumstances Darlan has a difficult position in the
Cabinet, since he is reproached for having, through the military
collaboration with Germany, brought about the loss of Syria, pro-
voked attacks against the African possessions that are difficult to ward
off, and for letting the Antilles and Martinique run the danger oi like-
wise being lost to the Anglo-Saxons.
1 Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 2680 to the Special Train, Aug. 8, 9:45
p. m."
a Document No. 186. _ njj „_„
1 See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. n, pp. d2l-d7T.
AUGUST 1941 301
Darlan. can master these reproaches and these opponents only in the
area of domestic policy in that he succeeds in strengthening his posi-
tion toward Petam on the one hand and the Cabinet on the other. It
is questionable whether he has the personal stature to accomplish these
things. In spite of the increase in military rank intended for him,*
he will probably hardly be able to put through his program without
German support.
y Abetz
' As commander of the French armed forces ; see document No. 211.
No. 190
017/249095
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Afghanistan
Telegram
No. 815 from Special Train, August 9, 1941 — 4 : 45 p. m.
the Special Train Eeceived Berlin, August 9 — 5 : 30 p. m.
No. 223 from the Foreign Ministry Sent August 9.
Reports received here indicate that strong pressure by England and
Soviet Russia is being exerted at present on the Afghan Government
to induce it to proceed against the Reich Germans there. In view of
this state of affairs I ask you to make it incumbent on all Reich Ger-
mans in Afghanistan that they observe complete restraint for the time
being so as not to aid and abet English and Soviet Russian efforts
through any kind of incidents.
Ribbentrof
No. 191
245/161362-63
The Charge a? Affaires in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT ZAGREB, August 10, 1941.
No. 958 of August 10 Received August 10 — 2 :15 p.m.
The situation in the insurrectionary areas in Bosnia is no longer
dangerous. A small rebel group operating northeast of Sarajevo has
been broken up by intervention of German military forces, including
artillery. German losses are one dead and three wounded. Contrary
to Croatian accounts, which blame these uprisings wholly on Serbian
influences, the German military headquarters and thoughtful Croat
circles agree that the ruthless, bloody methods of the Ustase bear part
of the responsibility for these outbreaks. The feeling against the
Ustase among the Croat military is very tense. The recall of several
302 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN TOEEIGN POLICY
senior officers is due to conflicts with the Ustase. The Poglavnik has
now been compelled to take account of this intolerable situation and
yesterday ordered with immediate effect the disbanding of all Ustasa
units, especially the so-called Irregular Ustase, excepting only the
regular Ustasa militia. A reorganization after the purge is being con-
sidered. Finally, drastic action is also to be noted in connection with
criminal actions of an Ustasa official who, day before yesterday, was
sentenced to death by the court-martial here, and executed. All
Ustasa members of the Poglavnik's bodyguard who are on furlough
or who are detailed elsewhere are by special order called back im-
mediately to Zagreb. The measures ordered have created a certain
nervousness among the public. In this connection it must be men-
tioned that, as revealed by a confidential statement by the Marshal, he
will today establish contact with the leaders of the former "Croat
Defense Guard" (HrvatskaZastita) of the Macek party. 1
Troll
1 The Croatian Peasant party whose leader had been Yugoslav Deputy Minister
President Vladko Macek.
No. 192
1543/375596-98
The Charge d'Aff aires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
Washington, August 10, 1941 — 4 : 52 a. m.
No. 2675 of August 9 Received August 10—5 : 25 p. m.
With reference to my telegram No. 2636 of August 7. 1
American foreign policy is now on the horns of a dilemma, having to
reconcile several mutually contradictory problems in foreign relations.
In the first place, the course of the war in Russia has intensified,
almost to the point of an ultimatum, Churchill's and Stalin's urgings
that America should enter the war before the fall of Moscow. Accord-
ing to the best available information Churchill is said in the event of
a refusal to have threatened an armistice and peace negotiations with
Germany.
(2) Both to continue his imperialistic foreign policy (the so-called
defense of the Western Hemisphere) and to cover up the failures of
his financial and domestic policies Roosevelt needs the continuation
and prolongation of the war against Hitler. This policy has borne
fruit for Roosevelt in domestic policy as well as in the field of foreign
affairs ; his position with respect to South America became that of an
overlord and at home he managed to obtain dictatorial powers hitherto
unknown and undreamed-of in America.
1 Document No. 185.
AUGUST 1941 3Q3
(3) The overwhelming majority of the American people lack
ZpS^ Predisposition for entering the war, just as the
American Government lacks the practical prerequisites for actively
waging a two-ocean war.
JZ f T ^t impo ^ ibIe to percei ™ or recognize how Eoosevelt
Snl™ u* ^ Pr ° blen ? s ' a11 the more be <^use for obvious reasons
Roosevelt tnes to conceal as far as possible the dilemma into which
who LTTTf ^fT an ? *° b7paSS th0Se a<Ws and "Memento
who normally help to shape American foreign policy. He neither
informs nor consults the Senate, Congress, department of Sl^
American ambassadors and the other Departments. With others than
RotumaT* Y P6K5 ° n ir fekn ? (H0pkklS ' Wallace ' ^ankfurter,
RosenmanJ) he is unwilling to discuss his plans, or to accept advice
Sumner Welles, too, is probably informed about Eoosevelt foreigt
policy plans only to the extent that the latter needs him as a technician
for carrying out specific tasks.
Roosevelt's predicament outlined above is aggravated by the fact
that following a successful and speedy termination of the war with
Russia m our favor a German peace offer is expected here, which would
be highly unwelcome to Roosevelt because of its effect upon the Amer-
S JT i Attentive u obserrers d ° "ot think it impossible that
Roosevet, alone or with Churchill, will invent an Anglo-American
peace slogan", m order to anticipate a German peace move and Zt
An JnT™ ^ T^™, ° n Germany - 3 In this connection, L
Anglo-Amencan watchword against the totalitarian countries would
anTthe ^TfH UP i t0 da £ S ° that B0lshe " k Eussia wiI1 fit **> it
and the effect of the slogan "Fight Bolshevism I" which has not failed
to make an impact on America too, is canceled out. Roosevelt is
engaged in an intense exchange of views with London on this subject,
too. It is possible that the blessings of American foreign policy which
have recently been proclaimed from the mouth of SumL Welled
will find e xpression in the sense that the German "New Order" in
to become Special Counsel to PreSt BoXyeU ' ^ When he reSigned
^J:Xt^J^A W r!S^irL%^ l" (WWB600), Woennann
Roosevelt was planning to m^wblirf w^J^™* to which President
™*e things difilult^ "- order to
slogan" and added the comment- lnterfer e by means of a so-called peace
wiM ^^^^^S^SSr^ « -nehow interfere
mend that Dr. Megerle be artfd^ftalt SS?«£ ^^ ° f tte PreSS ' * recom -
orga^izaUoSwMch w^rTmade 'bTIctini ^ t ?* a ?/ future international
July 22 at the dedication of a nl„ A *£* * t The NnVt^^ 8 ™^ Welles on
ington. For text see Department* K, 1 ^ ^f £ in Wast "
304 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Europe, and that of Japan in the Pacific, will be solemnly confronted
by ■ The future assurance of world peace through disarmament, super-
vision of armaments, an open door for everybody to the essential
raw materials of the world. Equal rights for big and strong, small
and weak nations, in other words the new League of Nations under
American leadership.
Thomsen
No. 193
265/173132
The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister
Teletype
Berlin, August 11, 1941.
With regard to the question of Russian designs on the Dardanelles
I wish to call attention to (1) DNB Istanbul (Blue Sheet 39 of August
10 No. 222 and (2) the so-called Yellow Friend report of August 7
of the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow 2 to Ankara. 3
As far as I am aware, the Turkish Government does not as yet
know the text of the Molotov proposal of the end of November 1940
known to us* concerning Soviet-Russian bases on the Straits. To
complete the disclosures made some months ago to the Turkish Ambas-
sador in Berlin regarding this question ■ and to supplement the perti-
nent passage in the Fiihrer's proclamation of June 22, 8 one might
perhaps consider letting the Turks have the paragraph in question
from the Molotov proposal in writing as irrefutable proof of the
Russian designs. 7
Weizsacker
i This DNB release (265/173133) cited an article from the Turkish newspaper
ra™hich stated that the propaganda duel of the belligerents accusing each
otter of ha'taS designs on the Straits was gradually becoming annoying to
Turkey I Turfed that these powers therefore should prove their sincerity by
bringing theSnents concerned to the attention of the Turkish Government.
' All Hayder Aktay.
3 Not found.
on Mar. 17, 1941. See vol. in of this series, document No. 177.
• See vol. xii of this series, Editors' Note, p. 107d.
'Marlinal note: "The Foreign Minister at first had agreed to this mode of
proceeding but Tow wants to take the necessary steps himself and to summon
Gerede in the near future. W [eizsacker] , Aug. 12.
AUGUST 1941 305
No. 194
F2/0363-87
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Ambassador Papen
personal Ik the East, August 11, 1941.
y Dear Herb von Papen : Regarding your report of July 28 * I should
like to make the following comment :
, One tiling to begin with, there is no question of confidence whatso-
ever between you and me. I asked you, as you may recall, whether
you were prepared to take over the important ambassadorial post at
Ankara ; and subsequently, following our conversation in March 1939,
I suggested to the Fuhrer that you be appointed to that post. I
neither could nor would have done this had I had but the slightest
doubt as to cooperation with you based on good faith and trust.
Neither does my telegram of July 23 2 addressed to you, which lies
before me now, suggest anything that might give you cause to speak of
a lack of confidence in you. Because — and here I come to the subject
matter itself — the reason for sending the instruction of July 23 was,
on the one hand, your report of July 14, 3 in which you say that perhaps
it would not be an uninteresting development if, following conclusion
of the Russian campaign, Turkey were allowed to take the initiative
as a peace mediator; and, On the other hand, it was the fact that at the
same time reports were received here from various agencies in Ankara
according to which a German peace offensive had been or would be
launched from there. The purpose of the instruction was to call your
attention to the possible connection between these two things and to
point out what extraordinary caution has to be exercised by your
Embassy with regard to any acquiescence in such Turkish ideas. I
have neither maintained nor assumed that the manner in which you
acted was responsible for such press reports — something you appar-
ently have read into my telegram. But, on the other hand, I wanted to
call your attention to this fact. According to our experience, if the
Turkish ideas mentioned in your report of July 14 had at all been dis-
cussed by you with any person whatsoever or if they had merely been
considered fitting subjects for discussion (instead of their being op-
posed vigorously from the outset), the enemy propagandists, wishing
to uncover any sign of weakness on the part of Germany, would imme-
diately distort this and represent it as a new German peace offensive.
From the wording of your report I gain the impression that in the
excitement you have completely misunderstood this purpose of my
1 Document No. 161.
'Document No. 145.
* Document No. 125.
682-005—64- 25
306 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
telegram, and given it an interpretation that was far from my
intentions.
As far as Turkish policy is concerned, I see the situation as follows :
Turkey will want to continue to keep out of the war, if at all possible.
For this reason she will not incur either Germany's or England's
displeasure. Therefore, winning Turkey over completely to our side
in the manner desired by us is feasible only —
1. if the Turks realize that Germany's position of power in the
southeast is so great that Turkey's own display of power is insignif-
icant in contrast and that Germany is at any time in a position to
defeat England in the Near East, and
2. if, in addition, we could interest the Turks in the acquisition
of new territories, which might include the well-known and previously
discussed points: border rectifications at Edirne, the Greek islands
at the entrance to the Straits, also, if need be, territorial acquisitions
to the south and east of Turkey. 4
I hope that these conditions will obtain after Russia is definitely
smashed in the autumn of this year. A situation will then have been
established which from the standpoint of political power and diplo-
macy will represent the maximum attainable ; and should we even then
be unable to win the Turks over to our side, then this aim can presum-
ably not be attained through diplomatic methods at all.
Until that time comes I conceive of our diplomatic effort in these
terms:
1. To strengthen the Turks in their confidence that we will never
make any territorial demands on them but that, on the contrary, we
will at all times regard them as the historic guardians of the Straits ;
2. To promote and keep alive the hitherto somewhat dormant Turk-
ish imperialist tendencies. In this connection I have read with interest
your report concerning the following up of the Pan-Turanian idea, 5
and one of these days I shall send you some more information on that
subject. In this respect your ideas are absolutely identical with mine ;
3. To maintain a strong negative attitude to all peace feelers in gen-
eral and to all idea of compromise, especially with respect to England.
This therefore means that I am of the opinion that the more uncom-
promising the position taken by the Reich Government and, conse-
quently by all Reich Missions abroad, is — in which connection of
' See vol. xn of this series, documents Nos. 154 and 303, footnote 5.
'Presumably Papen's report of Aug. 5 (1047/311692-95) dealing witb the Pan-
Turanian movement and its leaders. The report emphasized the interest of
political figures in Turkey in this movement. For a published text of this report
in French translation, see Documents secrets du Ministere dea Affaires Stran-
aeres 4'Allemagne; Turguie (Paris, 1946), document No. 10. A brief dispatch of
July 25 by Papen on the same subject, A 2756 (1047/311699-700) and a mem-
orandum of Aug. 3 by Hilger commenting on that dispatch (1047/311697-98)
are also in the files. See, further, document No. 298.
AUGUST 1941 307
course there can be no exceptions -whatever — the easier it will be for
us to pursue our political objectives at the proper time ; and this is
true in general as well as with regard to Turkey in particular.
I should like to say in conclusion: Turkey will presumably move
more and more into the center of international interest in the immedi-
ate future. We wish and want friendship with this state for all time
to come. Nor do I see the slightest reason for conflicts between the
interests of Turkey and those of Germany. On the contrary, I believe
that by joining us Turkey will again be able to assume a much more
important position of power in this part of the world than heretofore.
Germany for her part has a great interest in having Turkey on her
side in the further course of the war. We can accomplish this with
respect to England only by having an overwhelming position of power
and the complete coordination of Turkish interests with ours. Both
ought to be possible. In this connection we must absolutely avoid
pursuing political ideas likely to blur our position of power as well
as the parallel interests of the two states, both before world and
Turkish public opinion. The psychological effect of a sort of per-
manent German readiness for peace might induce the Turks to think
that we did not have altogether such an iron determination to make
the Fiihrer's words come true, i.e., to grapple with the English wher-
ever we can catch them. Your work, which after all has the aim of
possibly obtaining Turkish assistance in this matter, would of neces-
sity become more difficult.
I believe, dear Herr von Papen, that in this way I have once again
given you a full explanation of my political views and at the same time
I assume that neither with regard to the substantive nor the personal
side of this matter will you entertain any longer the slightest doubt
that might stand in the way of continuing our hitherto trusting and
successful cooperation. Besides, I assume that within the foreseeable
future an opportunity will be offered for a personal discussion of
this subject so important for the future.
Heil Hitler,
Yours, etc. Eibbentkop
308 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 195
230/153316
The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Com-
mander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 493 of August 12 Belgrade, August 12, 1941—9 : 05 p. m.
Received August 12 — 10: 00 p. m.
With reference to my telegrams Nos. 446 of August 1 * and 476 of
August 8. 2
The situation has deteriorated since the telegram of August 1.
Attacks and acts of sabotage have been on the increase with the excep-
tion of Belgrade. The destruction of a Communist band of 50 was
successfully accomplished between August 7 and 9, requiring a three-
day operation of 3,000 police and troops.
As a result of numerous attacks on the hitherto weak Serbian gen-
darmerie posts, the gendarmerie is now being concentrated into larger
groups, which are being reinforced by the German military command.
This is designed to strengthen the morale and the fighting spirit of the
Serbian gendarmerie. In some instances there have been defections by
gendarmes. Collaboration between the Chetnik leadership and the
Communists has not yet been encountered, but the Communists are
seeking to influence the Chetnik rank and file with false slogans and
in some instances by coercive means, successfully as the Military Com-
mander 3 has learned. In case the Chetniks make common cause
with the Communists, it will not be possible to use the Serbian gen-
darmerie. The provisionally appointed [Komissari&che] government
shows good will but is getting weaker and unsure. The SD and the
German police are overburdened with work, as they are too weak
numerically. Since the urgent request for German police reinforce-
ments was rejected, the Military Commander in Serbia has now re-
quested a division,* at the same time taking every conceivable security
measure and activating the available troops to the greatest possible
extent.
This telegram has been cleared with the Military Commander.
Benzler
'Not printed (230/153303-04). This telegram reported terroristic acts,
attributing them to the Communists while expressing the opinion that the
danger of a general Communist insurrection In Serbia had passed.
•Not printed (230/153310-11). This telegram proposed ways of dealing with
the Communist insurrection in Serbia ; strengthening the police force of the
Serbian Government; and playing the Chetniks off against the Communists.
' Gen. Ludwig Schroeder was Military Commander in Serbia from June 1941
to his death in August 1941. He was succeeded by Gen. Heinrich Dankelmann.
* See document No. 318.
AUGUST 1941 309
No. 196
82/60461-82
The Charge d? Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
t|rgent Washington, August 12, 1941 — 12 : 52 p. m.
No. 2709 of August 12 Eeceived August 12—11:30 p. m.
' With reference to my telegram No. 2699 of August ll. 1
If the American Government is able to pursue a consistent policy
it is, despite Hull's denials, that of attempting to "appease" 2 Japan.
The aim of the American Government can only he to induce Japan
to consider herself s bound by the Tripartite Pact if an incident in the
Atlantic should occur and if Germany could be declared the aggressor.
With respect to this policy it is apparently counting on aid from the
Japanese court clique and the business circles represented by Mr.
Wakasugi* Naturally, it does not act from love of Japan; but
America cannot risk a two-front war and needs a pacified Japan as
long as the American stockpile of strategic raw materials from the
Pacific is so low that the interruption of regular supplies of rubber,
tin, and silk might seriously interfere with the American rearmament
program and thus with aid for England, as well as with the whole
private industry. War with Japan at this moment, apart from other
implications, would bring on that interruption without the American
navy's being able to prevent it. The synthetic rubber industry will
not be able to function fully until a few years from now and the same
applies to the tin reducing plants; nor can there he as yet a substitution
for silk on a sufficient scale. I therefore believe myself not to be wrong
in assuming that the American Government will seek a compromise
with Japan also in the matter of supplies for the Soviet Union through
Vladivostok.
This situation is apparently not fully realized in isolationist circles.
Prominent isolationist leaders, convinced that at present the danger
of war is greater in the Pacific than in the Atlantic, have approached
me with the request that the German Government exert its influence
in Toyko to prevent the Japanese from creating the conditions for an
incident that could lead to war between America and Japan and thus
to war between America and Germany. This move of the isolationists
shows at any rate that they correctly appreciate the dangers of an fn-
1 According to this telegram (82/60458-60) recent American economic "re-
prisals" against Japan, in the light of American press reports were merely
means of political pressure "to lure Japan away from the Axis powers and to
neutralise her so that America would be freed from the permanent threat in
thePaciflc."
' "appeasen" in the original.
* Marginal note in WeizsScker's handwriting : "Not?"
4 Kauame Wakasugi, Minister in the Japanese Embassy in the United States.
310 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POUCY
cidenfc which, considering its expected propagandists exploitation by
the Government, would greatly impair the political influence of the
isolationists with the American people.
Thomsen"
No. 197
260/170121
Memorandum hy the State Secretary
St.S. No. 507 Berlin, August 12, 1941.
The Minister of Finland told me today that the Japanese Minister l
in Helsinki had suggested Finland's accession to the Anti-Comintern
Pact. 2 Actually the Finnish Government did not feel that such a step
was necessary. Its attitude toward communism was sufficiently clear.
M. Kivimaki then expounded on Finland's relationship to the Tri-
partite Pact. 3 He stated that the current war of Finland against Eus-
sia was after all the realization of this pact and if Finland were now
belatedly to join the Tripartite Pact, this would have only declaratory
value and would actually cause Finland more harm than good in the
United States. I expressed my doubt about this and demurred in
particular when the Finn mentioned that Finland's accession to the
Tripartite Pact would even hurt Germany more than it would benefit
her. Kivimaki however reiterated that the Finns would fail to under-
stand nowadays what value there was in joining the Tripartite Pact.
These remarks, he said, were valid, however, only as far as the immedi-
ate present was concerned.
I told the Minister that the Tripartite Pact was for us the crystal-
lizing core for countries adhering to our policies. In this regard it
was of great significance. I should like to interpret Kivimaki's state-
ments therefore to the effect that he wished to indicate that Finland's
attitude toward the Tripartite Pact was, for the moment, an open
question.
I should like to note further that Kivimaki broached this subject
and discussed it entirely of his own accord. 4
Weizsacker
1 Tadaskl Sakaya.
'Agreement and Supplementary Protocol between Japan and Germany, signed
at Berlin, Nov. 25, 1936; with Protocol of adherence by Italy, signed at Rome,
Nor. 6, 1937. For texts, see Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan,
19S1-19U, vol. n, pp. 153-155 and 159-160, respectively. For the Secret Addi-
tional Agreements, see vol. vi of Series C, documents Nos. 57 and 58. Of. Theo
Sommer, Deutschland und Japan zicischen den Machten 1985-J940 {Tubingen,
1062) , pp. 45-47 ; 493-499.
Bliicher reported in telegram No. 701 of July 30 (260/170100) and telegram
No, 733 of Aug. 4 (260/170115) that the Japanese Minister had approached the
Finnish Government about its accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact.
* For text of the pact, see vol. sr of this series, document No. 118.
* In a minute of Aug. 14 (260/170133) Weizsacker noted Ribbentrop's remark
that for the time being he did not want to go into Finland's attitude toward the
Anti-Comintern or Tripartite Pact.
AUGUST 1041 311
No. 198
851/284420
The Com/mander of German Troops in Denmark to the High
Command of the Army i
© Copenhagen, August 12, 1941.
(Abt. la Br. B.No. 1135/41 geh.
( Subject : Increase of Effectives of the Danish Army. Formation of a
Eeinforced Danish Infantry Regiment against Soviet Russia. 2
With reference to our letter la No. 330/41 off. of August 5, 1941.*
The following enclosures regarding the increase of effectives of the
Danish Army and the dispatch of a reinforced Danish infantry regi-
ment to fight against Soviet Russia are being transmitted :
(1) The reply of the Danish General Staff.* This has been dictated
verbatim, by the Danish Ministry of War. From it, it follows that the
Danish Ministry of War as part of the political government of Den-
mark will not approve the request by the Danish General Staff re-
garding an increase in strength of the Danish Army which has been
sent to us recently. According to our information the Ministry of War
is in agreement with the entire Danish Government in this matter.
■ (2) A memorandum which gives some information about additional
reasons for the Danish reply. 5
An increase in the strength of the Danish Army is therefore no
longer under consideration.
LiJDKE
General of Infantry
'The letter was also addressed to the Chief of the Armaments Office of the
Army and to the Commander of the Replacement Army. The document printed
here, together with the enclosures, was sent from the High Command of the
Wehnnacht to the Foreign Ministry on Aug. 25 (851/284419) .
s See document No. 142.
* Not found.
•Letter of Aug. 11 (851/284421) by Colonel Ramsing of the Danish General
Staff. It referred to the original Danish request and informed the Commander
of German Troops in Denmark as follows: "The [Danish] Ministry of War,
having been informed of the conditions attached by the German side to the ful-
filment of its request mentioned ahove, withdraws the request."
"A memorandum of Aug. 9 (851/284422-24) records statements made by Gen.
E. GSrtz, Chief of the Danish General Staff, regarding the political background
of the withdrawal of the Danish request.
312 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 199
386/211338
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris
Telegram
No. 830 of August 13 Special Train, August 13, 1941—2 : 50 a. m.
from the Special Train Received Berlin, August 13—4 : 15 a. m.
No. 3977 of August 13
from the Foreign Ministry Sent August 13.
RAM343/R
For the Ambassador personally.
At your next meeting with Admiral Darlan please tell him in the
course of your conversation approximately the following :
The operations tinder way in the east fully occupied at this time
the interest of the leading personalities of the Reich Government.
This explained why we could not at present comply with the Admiral's
wish for a renewed discussion about the problems arising between
Germany and France. 1 That did not mean, however, that we on our
part did not also have the desire to continue the discussions with the
French Government at the proper time in order to reach a sincere
understanding. As soon as it was possible to resume the discussions
of the matters in question in detail, you would inform the Admiral.
The purpose of this communication to Admiral Darlan is to prevent
the breaking off of the thread between the Vichy Government and us
without, however, getting into concrete discussions at this time. 2
Please report by wire the progress of your conversation 3 and
afterwards come here.
RlBBENTROP
1 See document No. 82.
' For the resumption of German-French military talks see document No. 26o
and footnote 4.
' Document No. 211.
No. 200
222/149908
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
[Bucharest, August 14, 1941.]
[Received August 14 — 11 : 03 a. m.]
No. 2588 of August 13
The Rumanian Government has received reports according to which
Hungary will occupy the Serbian Banat on August 16. The Deputy
AUGUST 1941
313
Minister President has asked me to [pass on] 1 this report to Herr von
Weizsacker with the remark that as far as the Rumanian Government
knew the Fiihrer had the intention to settle the question of the Banat
definitively only after the end of the war. 2
KlLLINGER
^The words within brackets were garbled in transmission and were supplied
from a clear text found with an appended note by Weizsiicker (4672/E221601).
See footnote 2. .
2 A note by Weizsacker regarding this telegram (see footnote 1) for the
Foreign Minister's attention reads as follows : "I neither know of such an
intention of the Ftihrer's nor have I spoken with the Rumanian Minister about
this subject."
See, further, document No. 218,
No. 201
142/127672-73
Ambassador Ritter to the Foreign Ministry and to the Belch
Plenipotentiary in Greece
Telegram
URGENT
top secret Special Train No. 930, August 14, 1941—6 : 10 p. m.
No. 841 of August 14
from the Special Train Received Berlin, August 14—6 : 45 p. m.
No. 992 of August 14 from the Foreign Ministry Sent August 14.
With reference to your telegrams Nos. 965 of August 7 1 and 1002
of August 12. 2
I
For your own information only. The Italian Embassy in Berlin
has twice expressed the wish of the Italian Government that Greek
volunteers not appear in the Russian theater of war. Thereupon this
question was again reviewed and the decision was made that Greek
volunteer formations would not be organized for [the war in] Russia.
II
Please inform the Greek Minister President 3 in an appropriate
manner that the Reich Government has taken cognizance with satis-
faction of the intention of the Greek Government to participate in the
fight against Bolshevism by establishing a Greek legion, but that the
Reich Government would like to refrain from employing Greek volun-
1 Not found. . , . . . ,. 4 „t.,.„i,
"This telegram (142/127671) requested an early decision about the establish-
ment of a Greek legion for combat on the eastern front in view of the fact
that preparations by the Greek Government had reached an advanced stage.
3 Gen. Georg Tsolakoglou.
314 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
teer formations at the Russian front. In so doing please avoid letting
the refusal assume a character which is offensive to Greece. You
can therefore point out in a general way that at the present stage
of the operations in Russia the incorporation of new volunteer forma-
tions would involve difficulties, after numerous other volunteer
formations had already been incorporated. Moreover, the numerous
trucks that are indispensable in Russia cannot now be withdrawn from
other formations for moving up supplies.
Please do not mention anything about the fact that the refusal
results from the Italian initiative.
RlTTEH
Supplement for Under State Secretary Woermann :
With reference to the memoranda U.St.S. Pol. Nos. 756 of Au-
gust 8 * and 767 of August 12.* Please inform Minister Cosmelli that
Greek volunteer contingents will not be permitted in the Russian
theater of war. You can add that the Reich Government had origi-
nally taken a positive position regarding the Greek offer, 6 from the
general standpoint that in order to demonstrate European solidarity
in the fight against Bolshevism the participation of all the European
states and nations was desired. However, at the wish of the Italian
Government the Reich Government had now refrained from establish-
ing Greek volunteer formations.
RlTTER
Supplement for Minister Eisenlohr:
The High Command of the Wehrmacht has been informed.
Rioter
' In this memorandum (B13/001178) Woermann recorded Cosmelli's statement
of the Italian Government's position that the appearance of Greek volunteers
in the Russian theater of war was undesirable.
"According to this Woermann memorandum (142/127670) Cosmelli repeated
nis earlier statement that Italy did not want to see any Greek volunteers at
the Russian front.
'Otter's telegram No. 699 of July 22. forwarded to Athens as No. 863
(142/127665-66), had stated that upon presentation of the matter by the High
Command of the Wehrmacht a decision had been made in favor of accepting
a Greek offer to establish a legion of volunteers for the struggle against
Bolshevism.
No. 202
187/88326
Memorandum oy the Director of the Political Department
U.St.S. Pol. No. 773 Berlin, August 14, 1941.
According to a communication from Minister von Rintelen, the
Reich Foreign Minister remarked with regard to telegram No. 435
AUGUST 1941
315
from Santiago, 1 regarding the arrest of five Party members, that he
assumed that it automatically justified the official resort to reprisals
in this and similar cases.
I told Herr von Rintelen that preparations were in progress. 2
WOERMANN
^This telegram has not been found. On Aug. 10, an official announcement
by the Chilean Government stated that a Nazi plot had been discovered m south
Chile and that several Nazi leaders had been arrested. Subsequent details of
these arrests were reported in telegrams No. 519 of Sept. 10 (197/88344) , No. 523
of Sept. 11 (197/88345-46), and No. 535 of Sept. 16 (197/88357).
* See document No. 351.
No. 203
5077/E292456-57
Stefan Bandera to Reich Minister Rosenherg
Berlin, August 14, 1941.
Your Excellency, Highly Honored Reich Minister: On Au-
gust 6, 1941, Captain Professor Dr. Koch, as the authorized represent-
ative of Your Excellency, the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern
Territories, in the presence of Professor Dr. Mende 1 handed to the
representatives of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, OUN,
the conditions after the fulfillment of which the German authorities
-will permit the activity of the OUN as well as of other Ukrainian
political groups and movements friendly to Germany in the Ukrainian
territories occupied by the German Wehrmacht.
The conditions read :
a. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, OUN, will refrain
at the present moment from all partisan political propaganda, limiting
itself to general national Ukrainian propaganda slogans.
h. The OUN will not carry on any propaganda for any living
Ukrainian compatriot. . .
The two conditions are also to be imposed on other Ukrainian
groups and movements. ^-i-™- ^- i, ■ *
c. Furthermore, a special demand was made of the OUN , wnicn is to
be considered as a prior condition to the negotiations concerning
further cooperation by the OUN with the German authorities, namely
to dissolve the Ukrainian Government established in Lw6w on June
30, 1941. 2
Regarding the conditions under a. and &., I, as leader of the Organi-
zation of Ukrainian Nationalists, stated that the OUN, although it
did not for its part see the usefulness of these conditions, was willing
1 Gerhard von Mende, specialist for nationalities question in the Ministry
for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
' See documents Nos. 115 and 138.
316 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
to accept them for a temporary period determined by the requirements
of the war, because Germany had made them a prerequisite to any
cooperation.
However, the demand that the Ukrainian Government be dissolved
is a matter of far-reaching significance to the Ukrainian people, to
Ukrainian-German relations and, in our opinion, to the further devel-
opment of the German policy concerning the new order of Eastern
Europe. One cannot answer this demand with a short "yes" or "no" ;
rather it is absolutely necessary to take account of the factors that are
inseparably linked with it. Since Captain Professor Dr. Koch, as
representative of Your Excellency, refused to discuss our arguments
in this matter, stating that he had no authorization regarding this,
and since he rejected at the same time the request of the representa-
tives of the OUN to clarify the standpoint of the OUN to Your
Excellency in a personal audience, I have the honor herewith of setting
forth in writing the standpoint of the OUN in this matter in the
appended memorandum. 3
Deeply convinced that Your Excellency will consider our objections
in deciding about the cooperation of the OUN with the German
authorities, I remain,
Yours, etc. Stepan Bandera
Leader of the Organization
of Ukrainian Nationalists
' Not printed (5077/E292458-59).
No. 204
F17/079-S0
Adolf Hitler to General Antonescu 1
At present Fubrer's Headquarters, August 14, 1941.
Your Excellency/: After the victories achieved in our common
fight, our allied forces on the southern wing of the Eastern Front are
now engaged in rapid pursuit. The area this side of the Bug River
will be cleared of the enemy up to the Black Sea within a foreseeable
time. In this situation it appears advisable to me to continue the
exchange of views with you, General Antonescu, regarding the further
conduct of operations. I consider that the next task in the combat
sector north of the Black Sea is to prevent the enemy from building
up an organized line of defense on the Dnieper, and thereby to create,
also on the southern wing a basis for the seizure of the Crimean Penin-
1 The final page of this letter is missing from the available copies on the film of
flies from the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.
AUGUST 1941 317
sula, which presents a threat as an air base against the Rumanian oil
region, and also for the pursuit further on.
Within the framework of these impending operations I propose,
in amplification of my original thoughts, General Antonescu, that
filter reaching the lower Dnieper you take over with the bulk of your
Kfrces, the protection of the area between the Dniester and the
Dnieper. Furthermore it would be especially desirable if the mobile
Rumanian forces — Cavalry Corps and Armored Brigade — and the
Mountain Corps were to participate in the coming operations east of
the Dnieper, too. Should you concur in this I would suggest that the
units participating in the operations east of the Dnieper, which will go
a long way from their operational base, be allocated all possible
reinforcements with regard to material, perhaps from the armies re-
maining behind for the protection of Bessarabia.
I shall direct the Commander in Chief of Army Group South,
Field Marshal von Rundstedt, on the basis of the decisions taken by
you, General Antonescu, to settle directly with you the questions
arising from the cooperation of our allied armies, such as the reversion s
of the LIV Army Corps to the Eleventh Army and the exploitation of
the conquered territories for provisioning the operations.
I suggest that the cooperation of the allied air forces continue to
be arranged between the headquarters on both sides. In this connec-
tion the protection of the movement of shipping in the western part of
the Black Sea will also assume importance in the future.
' The remaining part of this letter could be read more clearly on another
copy (F17/077-78).
No. 205
4827/E241249-49/1
The Deputy Director of the Legal Department to the Legations in
Croatia and Hungary
Berlin, August 15, 1941.
R 23646.
Subject : Executions on Croatian and Hungarian Territory.
Appended for your information are copies of two letters of July 21
and 25, 1941, 1 from the Serbian Red Cross to the Representative of
the German Red Cross in Serbia regarding executions of Serbs on
Croatian and Hungarian territory.
As regards the executions reported in the two letters, one will have
to proceed from the idea that the struggle against communism, which
'Not printed (4827/E241256; E241250-55).
318 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOHEIGN POLICY
was rather widespread in Yugoslavia, demanded severe and drastic
measures. It is suggested that you examine, if necessary in con-
sultation with the Government at your end, what measures are to be
taken in order to counteract a propagandistic exploitation of these
incidents.
Dr. Albrecht
No. 206
617/250004
The Foreign Minister to the Legations in Iran and Afghanistan
Telegram
TOP SECRET
No. 845 of August 15 Special train-, August 15, 1941—10 : 40 p. m.
from the Special Train Received Berlin, August 16—1 : 50 a. m.
From the Foreign Ministry Sent August 16.
To Tehran No. 560
To Kabul No. 235
For the Minister personally.
If amounts in gold currency could be usefully employed at your post
for political purposes, please submit appropriate requests, referring
to this telegraphic instruction. 1 The amount needed will be promptly
dispatched to you. This may even involve large amounts provided
these will yield adequate results.
RlBBENTROF
1 The reply from Tehran has not been found. In Kabul telegram No. 300 of
August 10 (329/195537) Pilger referred to earlier requests by the Legation
and stated that "the immediate dispatch of a sizeable amount in gold pounds
or dollar notes seems urgently necessary".
In a marginal comment on this Kabul telegram, Woermann asked Counselor
Melehers for a statement of the amounts that had been sent to the Legation in
Afghanistan. Such a statement listing the amounts sent and the names of
the couriers is in the flies {329/195539). It indicates that the Foreign Minister
had approved that 1 million reichsmarks be made available, of which 490,980
reichsmarks had already been dispatched.
No. 207
4S06/E237574
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 2624 of August 16 Bucharest, August 16, 1941 — 8 : 20 p. m.
Eeceived August 16 — 10 : 20 p. m.
Dili 361 g.
General Antonescu complained today that Bessarabian Jews who
had been taken along by the Soviet troops were now being moved
AUGUST 1941 319
back from the Ukraine to Bessarabia by German military authorities.
Th'ere are involved for the time being 11,000 Jews, who are waiting
at the Bessarabian border in the vicinity of Soroca for permission to
enter. The General requests urgently that the return of these Jews
fij Bessarabia, which is contrary to the guidelines which the Fiihrer
Q^d set forth to him in Munich regarding the treatment of the eastern
Jews, be prevented, and that the German authorities be instructed
to move the Jews routed in another direction. In this context I wish to
remark that from the standpoint of domestic policy, too, the return
of Jews to Bessarabia would represent an undesirable burden for
Eumania. Please wire instructions. 1
Killinger
1 According to a minute of Aug. 19, by Rademacher (4806/E237567) this doc-
ument was forwarded to Hewel with the request for information as to the
treatment of the eastern Jews which Hitler was said to have suggested to
Antonescu in Munich.
In a letter of August 27 (4806/E237568-69) Hitter informed the OKW of the
substance of the telegram adding the following comment : "I have been unable
to discover anything at the Foreign Ministry regarding guidelines which the
Fiihrer gave General Antonescu with respect to the treatment of the eastern
Jews. The official record of the conversation between the Fiihrer and Antonescu
in the Fuhrer's apartments in Munich does not contain anything on this subject.
However, as the Fuhrer talked to Antonescu in Munich also on other occasions
it is entirely possible that the question of the eastern Jews was also discussed
there. In any case, there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of General
Antonescu's assertion.
"I therefore recommend that General Antonescu's wish be given consideration
and that the German military authorities concerned be instructed not to move
the Jews back to Bessarabia."
Bitter was notified of the decision by the OKW in this matter by a letter of
Aug. 30 (4806/E237550) . See also document No. 332.
No. 208
93/103960-82
Memorandum, by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy
Department
Berlin, August 16, 1941.
On August 13 I reported to the Foreign Minister on my impressions
during my recent negotiations in Budapest, Rome, and Bucharest.
The Foreign Minister ordered me to set down in writing certain points
of this report. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed .
To be submitted herewith to the State Secretary.
CtODITJS
320 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
[Enclosure]
Impressions of Mt Recent Negotiations in Budapest, Rome, and
Bucharest 1
I. Hungary
The Hungarian Government has tried as far as possible to take
account of the German wishes in the economic field. Thus, among
other things, it agreed to do away with the undervaluation of the
reichsmark ; it provided a credit of 200 million reichsmarks for financ-
ing German purchases of strategic goods from Hungary and greatly
improved the conditions for activity of Reich Germans and Reich
German capital in Hungary in compliance with our requests. 2
It was obvious, however, that the Hungarian Government was greatly
concerned in this connection about preserving Hungarian independ-
ence with respect to the German preponderance which, naturally, is
constantly growing. For this reason the German request that Hun-
gary should agree to the purchase of the shares, now in American
possession, of the only large Hungarian oil company "Maort" by a
German group at first encountered considerable resistance. The sig-
nificance of "Maort", which provides all of Hungary with oil, is for
Hungary about the same as that of the Ruhr coal "mining for Ger-
many. The Hungarian Government argued that the American par-
ticipation represented purely a capital interest, whereas Germany
as owner of the majority [of the shares] would certainly intervene
very actively at once. In the end the Hungarian Government, after
thorough negotiations with the Minister President, nevertheless gave
its consent upon the latter's personal intervention, on condition of
the later internal settlement of the ownership relations between Ger-
many and Hungary. Minister President Bardossy prevailed in this
question against considerable resistance within Hungary, and he him-
self assumed the responsibility for complying with the German de-
mand, because he had become convinced that in the circumstances
one could not act otherwise toward Germany, the ally to whom
Hungary owed her large territorial expansion. 3
Inasmuch as the Hungarian oil deposits are the largest in Europe
after those in Rumania and Russia, compliance with the German
request was of great importance for Germany's oil supply. The
1 The parts of this memorandum relating to Rome and Bucharest have not teen
found.
'Clodius' telegram No. 1713 of July 31 from Rome (93/103901-03) presents
a more detailed account of the Hungarian concessions.
'Clodius' telegrams from Budapest, No. 858 of July 24 (93/103886-88), No.
866 of July 26 (93/103885), and No. 870 of July 29 (93/103981-93), describe his
negotiations with Bardossy for gaining German control of the Maort company.
AUGUST 1941 321
Reichsmarschall therefore repeatedly and urgently asked that this
request be put through with the Hungarian Government. 1
I gained the impression in Budapest that in the short time of his
^premiership M. de Bardossy has been successful and that in spite of
pertain domestic policy difficulties (e.g., Jewish legislation, marriage
raws) his position is quite strong. In matters of foreign policy Hun-
gary has likewise become somewhat calmer, and M. de Bardossy
expressed himself rather moderately on the Rumanian question. 6
* According to a draft teletype message of July 25 from Clodius to Ribbentrop
(2148/469006-08), be had discussed that day the matter of the Hungarian oil
company, Maort, with Keppler and State Secretary Neumann of the Four
Year Plan : "Both gentlemen insisted that we should insist on compliance with
our demand, if necessary, by applying the strong political pressure required.
The Reichsmarschall attached decisive importance to German acquisition of
'Maort' because every oil deposit in Europe had to be utilized for German
military purposes to the utmost limit of its capacity. This, however, was
possible only if the enterprise came completely into German hands with respect
to technical and business management The Hungarians could be given only
a minority share; and furthermore, certain promises could be made to theni
regarding Hungary's domestic supply and with respect to the continued employ-
ment of Hungarian personnel to a major extent. In the discussion of the ques-
tion whether it was not sufficient to assure full utilization of the enterprise
by Germany for the duration of the war only and to leave Hungary the majority
of shares after the war, State Secretary Neumann gave a negative reply. For
business reasons, no German company could be expected to take over an enter-
prise during the war and afterwards to cede the majority of the shares."
3 A note by Keppler of Nov. 26 (93/104401) records soine remarks by Pro-
fessor Bentz of the Reich Office for Mineral Exploration (Retcbstelie fur
Bodenforschung) who had returned from Hungary. Production by the Maort
company had gradually Increased during the course of the year so that in
October it reached 41,000 tons. The company managers had proposed a quota
of 550,000 tons for the year 1942 but the Hungarian Government had set a ceiling
of 480,000 tons.
No. 209
46/31086-91
Memorandum by the Foreign Minister 1
Westfalen, August 17, 1941.
Brief for the Fuhrer
Subject : The Roosevelt-Churchill meeting according to the informa-
tion on hand.
The Roosevelt-Churchill meeting 2 had long been contemplated.
Churchill apparently now insisted on an immediate meeting. Church-
ill is probably afraid that the main strength of the Russians has
been very badly impaired and largely destroyed. He sees also how
1 Marginal note: "Shown to the Fuhrer. Hew[ell, Aug. 18."
'This refers to the Atlantic Conference between President Roosevelt and
Prime Minister Churchill, Aug. 9-12. See Foreign- Relations of the United
States, 19J,t, vol. I, pp. 341-3T8.
682-905—64 26
322 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the Wehrmacht, in repeated battles of envelopment, is systematically
smashing the Russian units still remaining and the new ones that are
being formed. He must also, therefore, on his part, realize that our
goal, that is, the disarmament and occupation of large parts of Euro-
pean Russia with her most important industrial centers, is definitely
being attained ; that the fate of the Stalin regime is thus becoming
uncertain; that by and large, Russia, having been forced back to
Asia, either through a special peace, or through collapse, will be lost
as a potential ally ; and finally that Germany's war potential will be
enormously increased through the grain of the Ukraine and the raw
materials and industrial possibilities of occupied Russia.
I believe, therefore, that Churchill has urged the early entry of
the United States into the war. Roosevelt evidently refused this.
It seems probable that he referred in this connection especially to
Japan and to the fact that it is impossible for him to wage a two-front
war at this time. The risk of being cut off from East Asiatic sources
of essential military raw materials in the event of a war with Japan
has probably also been a consideration. In addition to this is the
fact of popular sentiment, as revealed in various reports from America,
which indicate that there is no reliable majority among the American
people at present in favor of Roosevelt's policy and of entry into
the war. Roosevelt will therefore want to wait a while and see how
the war and his own rearmament situation progresses, and will mean-
while try to induce England to hold out. He knows that England
will make peace unless he promises all conceivable aid for the future.
The war must go on, however, in order that he may complete his
own rearmament which he wants to, and must carry through in any
case, if only on account of Japan, and in order that he may secure
his positions on the American continent and in South America at the
expense of England and France,
For lack of really positive results of the meeting, they are beating
the propaganda drum all the harder. Without any imagination they
are drawing up eight new "Wilson" points, 3 which no longer make
an impression on anybody ; and although America herself must first
of all arm, the whole world is being promised arms and other war
material. To be sure, the Russians are at the same time being given
to understand that they will have to pay for the arms themselves,
while theLend-Lease Law is reserved for England.
'The eight points of the joint declaration known as the Atlantic Charter,
Issued by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on Aug. 1 i. For
text see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. I, pp. 367-369.
AUGUST 1941 323
The meeting planned in Moscow * is, in my opinion, also primarily
a propaganda trick, to impress the world, and particularly Japan, and
in order to strengthen what still remains of Russia's power of resist-
< CtyJce and to keep her in the fight. Undoubtedly Eoosevelt's policy
at present lacks any real basis of power. It is a great big bluff, which
Roosevelt can afford because the United States cannot be attacked
straight away. What is certain is that Roosevelt's personal prestige
is more firmly committed to his anti- German policy as a result of the
Roosevelt-Churchill declaration. But there is really absolutely
nothing else for him to do than to continue along this path for the
time being because a German-English peace would be a catastrophe
for him. Whether he has the courage and will yet succeed in the
course of time in driving his country into the war through some
incident or other, or whether he will realize the hopelessness of an
English victory and retire to the role of the "augmenter" of North
American power on the American continent, remains to be seen. I
think that if all the "pros" and "cons" are considered, there will
probably be no active intervention on the part of America in the war
after our goal here in the East has been attained. It is even con-
ceivable that the realization is dawning even at this time that it will
be impossible to defeat Germany and her allies militarily in this war
at all. Victory is therefore probably hoped for as a result of diffi-
culties inside of Europe. This is also indicated by the fact that the
new eight "Wilson" points are, so-to-speak, being presented to the
world as the core of the results of this meeting, apparently in the
hope by means of this humbug to incite the conquered nations against
us and to confuse the nations of the [Axis] allies and set them against
their governments. The Jewish emigres in England and America will
undoubtedly strengthen them in this belief. When they realize how
utterly misleading these hopes are, they will perhaps talk in an entirely
different vein after conclusion of the Russian campaign.
Whether Roosevelt and Churchill have, in view of today's situation,
discussed plans for concrete military collaboration (except in ques-
tions of supplies to England via the Atlantic) in the various parts of
the world, such, for example, as East Asia, Africa, the Near East, etc.,
must at least be doubled in view of the uncertainty of future political
developments, especially in East Asia, and the problematic nature
of the American rearmament status in all three areas. At any rate,
they probably did not get beyond general considerations.
* In a joint message of Aug. 15 to Stalin, the President and the Prime Minister
suggested that in order to arrive at speedy decisions regarding "the apportion-
ment of our joint resources", preparations be made for a meeting at Moscow,
"to which we would send high representatives who could discuss these matters
directly with you". For text of the message, see Department of State, Bulletin,
1941, vol. v, p. 134.
324 DOCUMENTS ON GEBMAN FOREIGN POLICY
I enclose herewith for the Fiihrer some telegrams from Wash-
ington, 5 which are of interest because they shed light on the meeting
between Roosevelt and Churchill from the perspective of Washington.
K [ibbentrop]
'These enclosures have not been found. Reports and comments on the
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting were sent in Washington telegrams Nos. 2752
(1543/375021-24) and 2759 (1543/375625-20), both of Aug. 14,
No. 210
FIB/ 334-36
General Antonescw to Adolf Hitler 1
August 17, 1941.
Excellency : I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of August 14 2
and have the honor to reply as follows :
1. I am happy to be able to contribute with Rumanian troops to the
consummation of the victory beyond the Dnieper and to the saving of
civilization, justice, and liberty among the nations.
The Cavalry Corps and the Mountain Corps are available for the
operations east of the Dnieper.
The Armored Brigade, the material losses of which I am no longer
able to replace, will participate in these operations with those forces
that can be reorganized after conclusion of the operations against
Odessa, in which it is participating.
I shall get in touch with Field Marshal von Rundstedt, Commander
of Army Group, South, regarding the reorganization and provisioning
of the Rumanian units which will operate east of the Dnieper.
Since it is practically impossible for me to assure the transportation
of supplies for lack of motor vehicles, it will be necessary to have them
transported by German vehicles.
The Air Force will likewise continue to cooperate with the Luft-
waffe ; for that, however, it is absolutely necessary that the losses it has
suffered be replaced, at least in part, and that it be assured of means
to obtain supplies.
For the protection of shipping in the western part of the Black Sea
I have already placed all the Rumanian naval forces at the disposition
of Admiral Schuster for escorting supply convoys.
1 The document printed Is based on the German translation of the Rumanian
original of this letter, which, according to a memorandum of the Foreign Min-
ister's Secretariat of August 19 (F19/340), was forwarded to Hitler on the Special
Train on Aug. 19 at 8 :00 p.m. The Rumanian original which was received in the
afternoon of Aug. 19 is filmed on F19/337-39.
z Document No. 204.
'\J
AUGUST 1941 325
The German LIV Corps was never, even for a moment, under my
orders, with the exception of the 50th Division, -which -was employed
in mopping up the area toward Ochakov.
I shall return that division, too, to the Eleventh German Army.
2. In conformity with Your Excellency's wish, I shall assume the
responsibility for protection, policing, and security in the territory
between the Dniester and the Dnieper. This territory must still be
delimited in the north.
3. As I have already pointed out to Minister von Killinger, 3 I am
not in a position, for lack of means and prepared personnel, to assume
the responsibility for the administration and economic exploitation
of any territory other than that between the Dniester and the Bug,
the more so as the whole of Rumania, as well as Bessarabia in par-
ticular, is in need of a complete reorganization both administratively
and economically.
' 4. In order to assure the order, administration, and economic ex-
ploitation of the occupied territories, I consider absolutely necessary
with regard to the further prosecution of the war, the establishment
of a unified command and the elimination of two authorities.
I therefore request that Your Excellency issue precise instructions
to the effect that the rights and responsibilities with regard to the
administration and economic exploitation between the Dniester and
the Bug, as well as regarding the protection, security, and policing
of the whole area between the Dniester and the Dnieper, are entirely
the province of the undersigned.*
Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my distinguished consideration.
Yours, etc.
Antonescu
General
1 In telegram No. 2633 of Aug. 16 (222/148916) Killinger had reported that
Antonescu had expressed his fundamental agreement with Hitler's wishes.
Antonescu had added the reservation, however, that he was able neither to sup-
ply the Rumanian forces employed east of the Dnieper nor take over the civil
administration in the area between the Dniester and the Dnieper.
' An arrangement in accordance with these proposals by Antonescu was laid
down in detail in a directive by the OKW of August 24 (34/24829-31). Agree-
ments "regarding security, administration, and economic utilization of the terri-
tories between Dniester and Bug (Transnistria), and Bug and Dnieper (Bug-
Dnieper Territory)" were signed by representatives of the Rumanian General
Stan* and the German High Command at TIghina, Rumania, on Aug. 30, A copy
of these agreements was sent to the Foreign Ministry by the OKW on Sept. 3
(34/24845-53).
326 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 211
388/211357-58
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT
top secret Paris, August 18, 1941 — 9 : 15 p. m.
No. 2450 Received August 19 — 1 : 10 a. m. 1
For the Foreign Minister.
1. Darlan paid a visit to the Embassy this morning. In the course
of the conversation I informed him, in accordance with the instruction
of August 13,* that the operations under way in the east fully occupy
the interests of the leading personalities of the Eeieh Government at
the moment ; therefore they could not comply with the Admiral's wish
for discussions on. the questions arising between Germany and France.
As soon as it was possible to take up the discussion of these questions
I would let the Admiral know.
Darlan replied that he would be very grateful for such an opportun-
ity, since nothing had changed in the decision he had made on May 11 3
for France's collaboration with Germany in the fight against
England.
2. Darlan, on his own accord, spoke of Weygand and stated that
both Marshal Petain and he desired his removal from North Africa as
soon as possible, but had to find a suitable way to do it. He was con-
sidering sending Weygand to Washington as the French Ambassador.
This would flatter Weygand's great vanity, without his being able to
do any damage in the present situation in the United States. Follow-
ing this, Darlan came to speak of the Franco-American relationship
and Admiral Leahy, whom he tried to represent as a person without
any influence. He, Darlan, had asked Leahy only a short time ago
why the American policy was working to prolong the war, when after
all America had already won her war against England. America had
pocketed the English gold and occupied the most important English
bases in the Atlantic.
Leahy did not know what to answer to this and had also made no
reply to Darlan's question whether the United States felt comfortable
in the company of the Soviet Union.
S. In today's discussion, I also pointed out to Darlan how necessary
it was for the French Government to proceed forcefully against the
machinations of the English, Americans, and de Gaullists in France.
The American Embassy in Vichy disseminated unimpeded propa-
1 Marginal Note: "Forwarded as No. 2780 to the Special Train, Aug. 19."
! Document No. 199.
a See vol. xa of this series, documents Nos. 490 and 491.
AUGUST 1941 327
ganda material of the English in the French ministries, and large
portions of the administration were infected through and through
with de Gaullism.
Darlan stated that he intended to punish unrelentingly every case
that came to his attention, and that he had given the new Minister of
the Interior * instructions to proceed severely in this sense.
He himself intended, on the basis of his new position as Commander
in Chief of the three armed services, to introduce a purge against de
Gaullist elements primarily in the Army. Furthermore he planned to
inspect a number of garrisons in order to gain a personal influence on
the officers corps.
4. Regarding the members of the Territorial Guard in German
captivity 5 Darlan stated officially that the French Government was
willing to bring about the conditions for a pardon designated by the
Reich Government.
The sentencing of Reynaud e and Mandel, 7 like that of the others
accused before the State Court in Riom, was to occur according to
political viewpoints by October 15, 1941, pursuant to Marshal Petain's
order. 8
No evidence of warmongering intrigues implicating Reynaud and
Mandel with Roosevelt and Bullitt has been found in the French
ministries. The French Government hoped, however, to be able to
make documents available from the Riom files and possible private
files. 9
Abetz
1 Pierre Pucheu.
* See document No. 74.
8 Paul Reynaud, President of Council of Ministers, March-June 1940.
'Georges Mandel, French Minister of Interior, May-June 1940.
*In telegram No. 3409 of Oct 31 (4601/E21136B-67) Abetz reported a con-
versation with Benoist-Meehin who informed him that additional material
incriminating Mandel and Reynaud had been uncovered, that there was a strong
possibility that the two former Ministers would be convicted on the basis of
legal considerations, and that even the death penalty might be invoked.
•In a memorandum of Dec. 19 (4661/E211379) for Under State Secretary
Gaus, Abetz noted that Hitler, in a conversation with RIbhentrop, had announced
his approval of having the members of the Territorial Guards reprieved if
Mandel and Reynaud would be sentenced to life imprisonment by the French
Government.
328 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 212
142/127676
The Foreign Minister to the Reich Plenipotentiary in Greece
Telegram
No. 866 of August 18 Special Train, August 18, 1941—10 : 17 p. m.
from the Special Train Received Berlin, August 18 — 11 ; 00 p. m.
No. 1028 of August 18 from the Foreign Ministry Sent August 18.
RAM 352/R
For the Reich Plenipotentiary personally.
With reference to your report No. 51 g. of August ll. 1
I cannot agree with the conclusions in your report. The consid-
erations regarding economic policy which you bring forward cannot
prevail over the fact that the alpha and omega of our policy in the
Mediterranean area must be the alliance with Italy. I request that
you never lose sight of this principle in dealing with the questions
which arise at your post. Of course, our interests there must be
preserved with respect to the Italian claims too, in so far as this is
possible within the framework of a friendly exchange of views. Never-
theless, following a line of policy which would of necessity have
to bring us into conflict with the Italian ambitions in Greece cannot
be considered.
Ribbentrop
'Not found.
No. 213
195/139197-202
Memorandum, by the Director of the Political Department
U.St.S. Pol. 788 Berlin, August 18, 1941.
M. Bose gave me the attached letter for the Foreign Minister with
the request that it be transmitted, and explained it orally.
Bose attaches special importance to the description of the dangerous
deterioration of the political situation in India, also with regard to
the increasing American influence on the Indian national resistance.
He places this objective point of view in the foreground. How-
ever, Bose also sees his personal possibilities for later influence vanish
if he remains inactive here any longer. A certain note of urgency
in his letter is explained by this attitude of Bose's, and this should
not be held against him.
If one considers the situation in India solely by itself, it would
be urgently desirable to have the declaration regarding a free India
issued soon, because it would supply the nationalist forces with a
AUGUST 1941 329
weapon against Gandhi's 1 willingness to compromise which is grow-
ing under Anglo-American influence. Naturally the question can-
not be viewed from this standpoint alone. Rather it is a question
of choosing a favorable point of departure with respect to general
policy. Thus, the entry of English troops into Iran would perhaps
be an event that would offer a plausible occasion for an Indian dec-
laration, which could then be placed in the even larger contest of
the British rape of the eastern nations. The provisional draft
declaration submitted at the time in Fuschl is again appended. 2 This
draft lacks the introduction, which would provide an essential part
of the declaration and would have to be adapted to the specific cir-
cumstances in which the declaration is issued.
I told Bose that he had to recognize, after all, that the Fiihrer was
a master in choosing the moment for political actions; so that he
could have full confidence.
I believe that it would have a good effect on Bose's present mood
if the Foreign Minister wrote him a few personal lines in reply, and
a draft is enclosed for this purpose.' Otherwise Bose could be in-
formed accordingly by word of mouth.*
State Secretary Keppler likewise received a copy of the letter from
Bose and is informed of this memorandum.
Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the State
Secretary.
WOERMANN
[Enclosure] s
Hotel Esplanade, Berlin, August 15, 1941.
Your Excellency : I feel constrained to take the liberty of address-
ing Your Excellency because the situation in India today is extremely
serious.
I have been here since the beginning of April and my proposals
were placed before Your Excellency soon after my arrival. 8
The situation in my country was then exceedingly favourable for
the success of my proposals. Unfortunately, no decision was arrived
at by the German Government and since then, the situation in India
has worsened considerably.
The outbreak of the war with Soviet Russia has been made to appear
to India as an act of aggression and Soviet-British- American propa-
1 Mohandas K. Gandhi, Indian nationalist leader, President of the Congress
party.
1 Draft of May 19 (195/139203-04) .
'Not printed (195/139205).
* See document No. 296.
5 The enclosure is in English in the original.
" See vol. in of this series, document No. 300.
330 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
ganda has made the fullest use of it. Day after day, the Soviet-
British-American propaganda machine has been telling the Indian
people that Germany is out for world-domination and, in particular,
for the domination of the Orient. I am alarmed to see how effective
this propaganda is gradually proving to be.
Even prominent people who have spent their whole life in fighting
England and have been in prison for long years, are being increasingly
influenced by this propaganda and are thinking that if there is no hope
of obtaining India's freedom through the help of the Axis, it is better
to make peace with Britain on the best terms available. If this process
is not arrested, the time will soon come when the majority of the Indian
people will definitely take their stand on the Soviet-British-American
side. We cannot hope to bring India over to the side of the Axis, if
the Axis Powers do not first declare their policy regarding India,
India is being prepared as the central military base of the British
Empire. An army of one million men is being raised in India which
will be fully equipped by modern war-industries newly established
there. If this plan succeeds, we have no doubt that even after the
German occupation of England, the British Empire will carry on the
war, using India as the base.
America is now playing an increasing role in the internal politics of
Oriental countries, e.g., of China, where she has brought about an
agreement between Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communist
Party.' "With a new American Minister 8 and an American Military
Attache in India, America will also play a role in the internal politics
of India. And if America succeeds in bringing about a similar
compromise between Gandhi and the British Government, the posi-
tion of the party standing for Independence and Revolution will be
greatly weakened.
There is still time to save the situation in India, but if there is
further delay in issuing the declaration regarding Indian Independ-
ence, I am afraid it will become extremely difficult for us to win over
the Indian people to the side of the Axis. Once the majority of the
Indian people go over definitely to the Soviet-British-American side,
the declaration will no longer have any value for India.
Further, if there is no declaration regarding Indian Independence,
the nearer the German armies move towards India, the more hostile
' This may refer to press reports published in Japanese-oeeupled China at the
end of July regarding an alleged agreement between the Chinese Government
and the Communists according to which the latter would disband parts of their
armed forces in return for subsidies paid by the Government. Of. Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. v, pp. 533-536.
8 Announcement of an agreement regarding the reciprocal exchange of repre-
sentatives between the United States and India was released to the press on July
21. The nomination of Thomas M. Wilson as Commissioner of the United
States to India with rank of Minister was confirmed by the Senate on July 24.
See Department of State, Bulletin, 1941, vol, v, p. 74.
AUGUST 1941 331
will the Indian people become towards Germany. The march of the
German troops towards the East will be regarded as the approach, not
of a friend, but of an enemy.
If, therefore, the declaration is to come at all, it should come before
the German armies are moving further eastwards.
The new Anglo-Soviet guarantee to Turkey 9 indicates that the
British attack on Iran is imminent. The road to Afghanistan which
has been open all these months will be cut after the British occupy
Iran and it will then be difficult for us to work out our plans regarding
India. With Iran under British occupation, there will be one solid
bloc under British control, stretching from the Mediterranean to
Burma. The work in the Tribal Territory and in India will then be
much more difficult than before.
The joint announcement made by President Roosevelt and Prime
Minister Churchill regarding their programme of post-war recon-
struction 10 has been interpreted by the London radio to mean that
India will get her freedom after the war. America has also decided
to negotiate directly with the Dominions on outstanding problems of
common interest, independently of Britain. All these facts further
confirm the view that America will in future, intervene in the internal
affairs of the British Empire and in consequence thereof, a compro-
mise between Gandhi and the British Government appears highly
probable in the near future.
I fully realise the complexity of your problem and I certainly can-
not expect Your Excellency to do anything for India which may be
considered prejudicial to your national interest. But India stands
today at one of the cross-roads of her history and the situation there is
deteriorating from day to day. If, therefore, we are to be effective in
our work for India, we must act at once. I would, therefore, beg
Your Excellency not to leave us in suspense any longer but to come to
an early decision, whatever that decision may be.
Thanking Your Excellency,
Yours respectfully, Subhas Chandra Bose
" See document No. 238 and footnote 3.
11 See document No. 209.
No. 214
13S/76075-83
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministers Personal Staff
Berlin, August 19, 1941.
Confidential Report
An agent who has been a regular correspondent for leading Swiss
newspapers for many years and who was now able, under this camou-
332 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
flage to visit Swiss editorial offices inconspicuously, has been in per-
sonal touch -with well-informed editors of leading Swiss newspapers
in Zurich and Bern. 1
The agent has summarized the impressions gained by him in Swit-
zerland in two separate reports, which are attached as enclosures.
Report I considers the Swiss domestic situation with reference to
the English propaganda activities carried on there. Report II deals
with specific diplomatic developments. 2
Particular attention should in this connection be directed to the fact
that part of the information contained in the reports is derived from
within the Swiss Federal Council, where no one has even the slightest
suspicion that the information could become known to any official
Germany agency.
L[ikus]
[Enclosure]
Berlin, August 19, 1941.
Switzerland's international situation is currently being viewed by
the Swiss as being less tense than it was only a short while ago. Swiss
politicians and journalists are generally expressing the view that
Switzerland's position of independence will probably not come under
attack for the duration of the German-British war. Although the
military measures for the national defense will be continued, they have
diminished in intensity owing to the feeling of external security.
This sense of security, the Swiss believe, has been strengthened by the
outbreak of the German-Soviet war because it is felt that Switzerland
will not again find herself in the immediate proximity of a theater of
war.
The major factor contributing to this sense of security of the Swiss
evidently is the conviction that Germany, more than ever before, now
has a direct interest in preserving Switzerland's position of neutrality
and dependence 3 for the duration of the war. A number of reasons
are cited in this connection.
Most remarkable, in my opinion, is the statement made by an active
member of the Federal Council, Meyer,* who, through his past pro-
fessional activities is particularly closely associated with the Neue
Zilrcher Zeitung, to the effect that in the sphere of business and finance
1 A report of June 28 by the German Embassy in Bern on Swiss public opinion
regarding the Rnsso-German war has been filmed on 4826/E241057-E241059.
'This report (138/76984-89) summarised intelligence reports from the British
and French Legations in Bern.
3 The original reads : "Neutralitats-und AbMngigkeitsstellung".
4 Presumably a reference to Alfred Meyer, a member of the Federal Council
until 1939, former commercial editor of the Neve Zilrcher Zeitung.
AUGUST 1941 333
Switzerland was for all practical purposes no longer neutral. It was
fortunate that this position of Switzerland's was not fully understood
in London, but the fact remained that from the economic and financial
standpoint Switzerland had become pro-German. Switzerland's con-
tribution, viewed in this light, had to be regarded as important. The
trade agreement recently concluded with Germany 5 was just the outer
frame of this development from which Switzerland simply could not
escape whether or not she wished to do so. In this connection the
remark is made by other Swiss individuals that the Eeich, to be sure,
did make some gratifying concessions in this trade agreement which it
is hoped will improve the country's coal supply and supply of other
raw materials. Switzerland has, on the other hand, now committed
herself to making continuing deliveries to the Eeich on credit only, the
value of which, according to various estimates, will perhaps run from
800 millions to 1 billion a year.
Extension of such credits to the German Eeich has been described by
a leading Swiss economist as a "political life insurance premium" for
the Swiss Confederacy. Germany's attitude during the economic
negotiations with Switzerland is being described as entirely "fair."
General Guisan 6 is regarded as the big man of Switzerland. His
position at the present is stronger than that of the Federal Council,
His popularity is without parallel for Swiss conditions. He is
strongly relied upon to make no military concessions in any cir-
cumstance at the expense of Switzerland's traditional neutrality.
Other high Swiss military figures in contrast to General Guisan are
under mild suspicion of being on the side of Germany with their per-
sonal sympathies, as they were during the World War. There is
almost talk of a "German course" in high military circles, and in this
connection the well-known Swiss officer family of Willed but also the
well-known Colonel [Oberstdivisionar] Birchner as well as others are
being mentioned.
The Swiss appear to be convinced that for the rest the internal unity
of the Swiss nation is greater than it was during the World War.
Partisan political struggles have ceased as have social conflicts, and
the Marxist Social Democrats can in fact be seen outdoing themselves
to surpass all other political groups in the country by the eagerness
of their professions of national solidarity.
The labor unions are constraining their members not to make any
wage demands despite the rising cost of living, and not to provoke
industrial strife in any circumstances.
"The second supplementary agreement (4982/E278747-48) to the Swiss-German
clearing agreement of Aug. 9, 1940 (see vol. x of this series, document No. 318
and footnote 1) was signed in Bern on July 18.
s Henri Guisan, Commanding General of the Swiss Army, 1939-1945.
' Col. Tjlrich Wille, Chief of the infantry arm of the Swiss Army to December
1940 ; cf. vol. xi of this series, document No. 138.
334 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
When talking about the European war situation, all Swiss show
great reserve. The admonitions from the highest level to keep silent
are evidently heeded to a very large extent. Yet it can remain no
secret that popular sentiment overwhelmingly would like to see an
English victory. In regard to the German-Bolshevik war, people
show that they want National Socialist Germany to vanquish Bol-
shevik Russia. But at the same time the opinion is expressed by
many that the National Socialist Germany would so weaken herself
in the process of smashing Bolshevism that she would no longer be
able to win against Great Britain.
With regard to judging the war prospects it is therefore apparent
that the number of those still believing in the possibility of an English
victory has increased lately. Swiss observers who claim to be ob-
jective affirm that especially since the outbreak of the war between
Germany and the Soviet Union, the Swiss people are no longer
positively convinced of Germany's victory .
The prevailing view in leading Swiss political circles, too, as was
possible to observe, seems to be that the chances of victory have shifted
in favor of Great Britain. This view is based on the following
considerations :
1. Germany is not going to bring the Russian campaign to a con-
clusion this year. Adolf Hitler's plan of campaign has been only
partially successful in Russia. Soviet Russia's resistance in the
strength now shown has been a surprise as much to him as to the rest
of the world, and even in the coming year Germany will be compelled
to tie down large forces in the war against the Soviet Union.
2. The active war aid by the United States has become larger and
more effective. No one doubts any longer Roosevelt's active entry into
the war at an early date. . . , .
3. German air superiority over Great Britain is diminishing from
month to month.
4. Military experts no longer see any likelihood of a German in-
vasion of Great Britain.
5. For a war of long duration, the Anglo-Saxon powers in particular
would possess the greater endurance.
These are by and large the considerations on the basis of which the
international situation is being viewed by Swiss political circles at this
time. But it is also added that it is impossible to see how Great Britain
and the United States could ultimately overcome Germany's military
might. There is no military power in the world capable of vanquishing
the Wehrmacht of the National Socialist Reich. The inference drawn
from this is that one will have to reckon with a war of long duration
and that ultimately everything will depend on how the "home fronts"
of the belligerents will stand up.
These considerations governing Swiss opinion are unmistakably
influenced to a large degree by British propaganda. British propa-
AUGUST 1941 335
ganda, according to a Swiss observer, operates rather through a whis-
pering campaign than by visible means. British propaganda has
largely implanted the notions that Germany is disappointed over the
course of the campaign in Russia because casualties are reportedly
tremendous, that German war equipment is being worn out at an un-
expected rate, and that Germany, despite all partial successes, will not
completely finish off the Soviet Union militarily. This approach taken
by the British propaganda is supplemented by alleged reports over
supposedly devastating effects of the "British air offensive" against
Reich territory. Fantastic tales about the effects of British air bom-
bardments are being circulated and believed.
While British diplomacy in Switzerland observes great outward
restraint, it has all the more forceful aid and support from the Ameri-
can diplomats and journalists. This is the unanimous opinion of the
Diplomatic Corps in Bern.
Swiss newspaper offices confirm that they are continuously subjected
to heaviest pressure from the Federal Council and also from the
General to exercise restraint in all expressions of opinion. There are
many instances showing that vigorous action was repeatedly taken
when there were lapses in an anti-German direction. Moreover, pres-
sure in the same direction is constantly exerted by leading Swiss
business circles, as indicated by several instances that have become
known.
L[ikus]
No. 215
85/45243X-49X
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry 1
Telegram
MOST URGENT TEHRAN, AugUSt 19 [1941],
TOP SECRET
No. 815 of August 19
Today I had a conversation with the Minister President, 2 lasting
one hour, in which for the first time he appeared worried about the
continued British pressure. When I asked what the enemy demanded,
the Minister President replied that they always demanded one thing,
namely the removal of the Germans. The Iranian Government knew
very well there was no justification for this demand, but that it served
merely as a pretext. From conversations with the British Minister
1 Marginal notes :
In Ribbentrop's handwriting : "For F[(ihrer]."
"Shown to the Ftihrer. Hew [el] , Aug. 21."
" All Mansur.
336 DOCUMENTS ON" GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
it was obvious that England was greatly worried about the develop-
ment of the war against Soviet Eussia. England expected Soviet
Russia's defeat, to be followed by a German attack on Iraq, Iran, and
finally India.
The Iranian Government, on the other hand, tried to make it plain
to the British Government that a German attack on Iran would work
only to the disadvantage of Germany, and that in the long run Iran's
policy of strict neutrality was the best protection for the British
interests in Iran. The British had indeed recognized Iran's policy
of neutrality, but the British Government stubbornly insisted that the
Germans living in Iran would form a fifth column, at the very latest
as soon as German troops stood at the Soviet-Iranian border. The
presence of the Germans was therefore a threat to Iranian neutrality
and British security. The Iranian Government, on the other hand,
emphatically stated that neither now was there any German fifth
column, nor would there be one in the future, and that the demand
for the expulsion of the Germans amounted to interference with
Iranian sovereignty, which was not a subject of discussion for a free
and independent state. If England and the Soviet Union should use
force, Iran, faithful to her policy of neutrality, would offer armed
resistance. In his further frank comments the Minister President
portrayed Iran's present isolated position. Apart from a few friendly
remarks in the press, Turkey had remained silent with regard to
Eden's threats 3 and the strong British-Soviet pressure upon Iran.
The Iranian Government had thereupon taken the initiative
in order to obtain an official utterance of the Turkish Government
in favor of Iran. But so far the latter had refrained from speaking
out. From this attitude the Iranian Government could only conclude
that in the event of an English-Soviet Russian attack upon Iran no
help could be expected from Turkey. Nor could any really effective
military aid be expected, as the German forces were still too far away.
If Iran were facing only one of her two hereditary enemies, the situa-
tion would be much easier. "Unfortunately, however, the Soviet
Union still lives."
3 Presumably a reference to statements made by Eden in the course of a debate
on the war situation in the House of Commons on Aug. 6. These were as
follows :
"There 3s in Iran to-day a large number of Germans. Past experience in
many lands has shown that these German colonists, or however they may be
described— whether they are experts, or whether they are tourists, or whatever
they have been called— are extremely dangerous to the country in which they
are found at a critical hour. So it is that we have drawn the attention of the
Iranian Government — their serious attention — to the danger, in their own inter-
ests, of continuing to permit an extremely large number of Germans to reside in
their country. I trust the Iranian Government will not fail to heed this warning,
which is given in all friendliness and in all sincerity, and will take the necessary
measures now to deal with this situation."
See Parliamentary Debates, fifth series, H of C, vol. 373, col. 2041.
AUGUST 1941 337
The Iranian Government noticed with apprehension the approach
of the bad weather season in the Soviet Union, which would put
further great obstacles in the path of the Wehrmacht. In these cir-
cumstances the Iranian Government must try to gain time. In my
reply, I first of all again reassured the Minister President that the
Shah could firmly rely on the loyalty of the German nationals living
in Iran. Concerning developments adverse to the Bolsheviks, their
complete collapse in the Western Ukraine and the occupation today
of Nikolayev were the best proof of the imminent and final German
victory over the Soviets, which even the English expected. Actually
the hardest part of the work had been accomplished, namely the
destruction of the greatest part of the irreplaceable war material.
The Soviet Union would not live much longer and thereby one of
Iran's hereditary enemies would be disposed of. Nor would England,
which today was maintaining herself only with the support of Amer-
ican crutches, escape her fate. The steadfastness of the Iranian
Government was of decisive importance for the future of the country.
Just as little reason as Iran had to be afraid of an attack by the Ger-
man side, so was it certain that the entry of British troops into Iran
would create an entirely new situation that would give Germany the
right to strike the British, if necessary, in Iran too. I had to admit
that at present, owing to the British-Soviet pressure, Iran's situation
was delicate and that the time factor was of great importance. I
was convinced that the German Government shared this view and
that it was its wish and will to assist the Iranian Government in its
plight by helping it to gain time. As the Iranian Government had
again refused to accept the latest demand of the enemy for the removal
of the Germans, I was in a position frankly to inform it that, because
of the interruption of deliveries of goods and material from Germany,
a number of German employees and technicians had become surplus
or soon would be unemployed. All of these specialists were urgently
needed in Germany, so that it was in the German interest that they
should return home as soon as possible. This return movement was
motivated by economic, and not at all by political, circumstances.
The voluntary return of Germans was not only further proof of our
good faith with respect to Iran, but might also be used by the Iranian
Government as an argument that British-Soviet apprehensions were
unfounded, provided the Iranian Government believed that time would
be gained thereby.
The Minister President in his reply, stated that the Iranian Govern-
ment was chiefly interested in preventing the British and Soviets from
getting the impression that the pressure which they brought to bear
upon the Iranian Government had been successful. He therefore
urgently requested that the repatriation of the Germans should not
682-905—64 21
338 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
take place upon instructions or through a transport arranged by the
Legation. If the German Legation today gaye instructions for the
departure of Germans — even if relating to women and children only —
this would not only have devastating effects upon the morale of the
Iranian people, but merely encourage the foe to make new demands
upon and use new pretexts with the Iranian Government. 4 The
departure, if carried out in consequence of economic difficulties, would
be a natural occurrence, indeed a telling argument against the asser-
tions of the opposing side. He believed that valuable time would be
gained thereby.
To my question whether England had not detected that the Iranian
policy was aimed at gaining time, the Minister President replied that
this was probably the case, but the Shah and he himself knew how to
talk with the English. Every week gained, during which the German
forces victoriously advanced, improved Iran's difficult position. He
was therefore especially grateful for the German assistance in gaining
time. The Minister President added that Iran's friendship for Ger-
many was sincere and firm. Iran would never join the camp of Ger-
many's enemies. The Shah could visualize his country's happy future
only in the closest cooperation with Germany.
As a result of this conversation, the organized departure of the
women and children is, for the time being, not being carried out. On
the other hand, on the basis of talks with managers of German enter-
prises, I shall arrange that all personnel no longer needed and not
fully employed be sent home with their families. In the present
situation this is the best solution for all parties.*
Ettel
4 Marginal note : "Yes. R[ibbentrop]."
No. 216
S2/60485-88
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department
Dir. Ha. Pol. No. 185 Berlin, August 20, 1941.
Regarding Eubber Negotiations and General Economic
Negotiations in Tokyo
1. The rubber negotiations carried on with the Japanese Govern-
ment since February 1941 by our Embassy in Tokyo are not develop-
ing in a very satisfactory manner. 1 Although we tried to take account
1 For the background of German-Japanese negotiations regarding rubber and
general economic matters see vol. xi of this series, documents Nos. 341 and 424, '
and vol. xn, documents Nos. 190 and 429. J
AUGUST 1941 339
of the Japanese wishes as much as possible, e.g., by inducing the French
to give to the Japanese the Indochinese rubber earmarked for the
U.S.A., we could only achieve that if the Japanese carried to Japan
on Japanese ships the 25,000 tons of Indochinese rubber earmarked
for us. On the other hand, they refused our request that they obtain
more rubber for us from other countries and that they provide the
same transportation assistance for the 18,000 tons earmarked for
France as for us. On the contrary, they wish to take for themselves
the rubber earmarked for France, too. In June 1941 when we could
not immediately comply with a sudden Japanese request for the im-
mediate loan of 2,500 tons from our stocks in Japan, owing to our own
extremely tight rubber situation, the Japanese began to apply quite
disproportionate and, considering the German-Japanese friendship,
astonishing means of pressure (stopping assistance with regard to
transportation, impeding our measures in support of blockade run-
ners and auxiliary cruisers in the Pacific Ocean, preventing exports) .
The telegrams from our Embassy even indicate concern that the Japa-
nese would confiscate rubber belonging to us or earmarked for us and
make further direct purchases in Indochina and Thailand impossible,
for us in accordance with their position that we should in the future
carry on trade in the greater East Asian area only with Japan as
intermediary. 2
Because we have, at the present time, particularly since the Siberian
Railway has been cut off, no means of economic pressure of any sort
on Japan — on the contrary, we are largely dependent for our raw
material purchases and transportation in the Far East upon Japanese
help — we have had to restrict our wishes in the face of this Japanese
attitude. In the last instruction to the Embassy in Tokyo 3 we only
insisted on assistance in transporting our rubber and on a share in such
amounts of rubber as Japan is able to purchase beyond her own needs,
and we pointed to the interest that we, too, have in France's receiving
her rubber. The Embassy was also authorized to agree to the loan
of up to 5,000 tons to the Japanese. On the other hand, the Embassy
was instructed to oppose most vigorously a possible confiscation of our
rubber and to demand that the Japanese cease immediately applying
their means of pressure.
The negotiations conducted by the Embassy so far had reference
to a rubber settlement for 1941. The Wohlthat delegation 4 lias been
charged with the negotiations for 1942. We intended to insist as a
matter of principle in 1942, too, on our right to carry on business
directly with independent countries within the Greater East Asian
! A certain number of documents on this subject have been filmed on Serial
4684.
3 Not found.
1 See vol. xii of this series, documents Nos. 190 and 429.
340 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN" FOREIGN POLICY
area, such as Thailand and France on behalf of Indochina, and to
make sure of this principle, any rate for the postwar era. To -what
extent it can continue to be enforced in practice during the war in the
face of the Japanese effort to the contrary will depend upon the fur-
ther military development (reopening of the Siberian railway, Jap-
anese advance in Indochina and Thailand) . Of the total amount of
100,000 tons expected in the Far East for Japan in 1942 we must claim
at least 50,000 tons, and in case of a larger total correspondingly more.
2. So far there have also been few results from the general economic
negotiations that have been carried on since April of this year by the
Wohlthat delegation in Tokyo. The delegation reports that in the
face of the restriction in the possibilities of trade resulting from the
closure of the Siberian railway the Japanese interest in the negotia-
tions is waning, and that since the resignations of Matsuoka and the
Japanese chief of the negotiations, Saito, so far no new Japanese dele-
gation chairman has been appointed. Immediately after the start
of the Russian campaign Matsuoka had expressed himself in favor of
an unswerving continuation of the negotiations, whereupon our dele-
gation, too, received corresponding instructions.* We still consider it
the right thing not to let the negotiations lapse, but to continue to
negotiate regarding agreements that can enter into force as soon as
the conditions of transportation again permit a fair-sized volume of
trade, and also about arrangements for the exchange of urgently
needed strategic goods which can be delivered even under the present
limited transportation conditions.
3. The decisive strategic importance of an adequate supply of rub-
ber for Germany has been stressed by Ambassador Ott time and again
with all the necessary vigor to Foreign Ministers Matsuoka and Toy-
oda as well as the Japanese armed forces. The Embassy and the
delegation point out, however, that given the present Japanese atti-
tude an acceptable solution of the rubber question can be expected only
if a pointedly political demarche is made by the highest authorities in
Berlin, too. This is also true with regard to the continuation of the
general economic negotiations.
I therefore suggest that the two questions be discussed as soon as
possible by the Foreign Minister with Ambassador Oshima or, in case
this is not possible in the near future, then by the State Secretary. It
should be stressed that Japan, too, has an essential interest that the
German war effort not be impeded by a scarcity of rubber; that in our
latest instructions for the rubber negotiations we complied to the full
with all Japanese wishes but that we must now expect that Japan not
only remove all impediments to our rubber program but do everything
in the future to assist its implementation; that we consider it impor-
"Not found.
AUGUST 1941
341
tant, for economic as well as political reasons, to continue the economic
negotiations intensively and in so doing attain concrete results soon in
regard to the exchange of strategic goods by blockade runners. If we
receive important raw materials (rubber, whale oil, metals and ores,
soy beans) , we shall also do everything we can to furnish Japan with
important finished goods (armament material, machines, patents,
licenses) .
Submitted herewith to the Reich Foreign Minister through the
State Secretary with the request for his approval and for instructions
on whether the conversation with Ambassador Oshima should be con-
ducted by the Eeich Foreign Minister or the State Secretary. 6
*On Aag. 22, Counselor Weber forwarded to Weizsacker the Foreign Min-
ister's instructions (82/60492) that he discuss with Oshima the rubber and
general economic negotiations. See, further, document No. 278.
No. 217
116/66993
Memorandum by the Foreign Minister
Westfalen, August 20, 1941.
Brief for the Fuhrer
On August 16 the Italian Government demanded of Croatia that
she hand over executive authority in the entire Adriatic littoral to the
Italian military authorities in order to guarantee peace and security in
this area. 1 This demand immediately caused great excitement in
Zagreb. Pavelic has asked Minister Kasche whether he might appeal
to us regarding mediation. In Berlin, too, the Croatian Legation has
asked for German help. 2
I have had the attached telegram 3 sent to Minister Kasche and
instructed Berlin to proceed accordingly. 4
R[lBBENTROP]
1 This had been reported in Zagreb telegram No. 1005 of Aug. 16 (116/66967-68) .
s Woermann's memorandum U.St.S.Pol. No. 786 of Aug. 18 (116/66974-75)
recorded a step by the Croatian Charge" d'Affaires in this matter. Weizsacker's
memorandum, St.S.No. 536, of Aug. 19 (116/66991-92) dealt with a similar
demarche by the Croatian Minister.
'Document No. 219.
4 Marginal note at the head of the document : "Regarding this the Fuhrer said
that the Italians have gone mad. He fully agrees with the Minister's telegram.
Hew [el], Aug. 20."
342 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 218
222/149924
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania
Telegram
Special Train, August 21, 1941 — 1 : 05 a. m.
No. 876 from the Special Train
Received Berlin, August 21 — 2 : 10 a. m.
No. 2260 from the Foreign Ministry Sent August 21, 4 : 00 a. m.
RAM 357 R.
With reference to your telegram No. 2588 of August 13. 1
Please remain entirely noncommittal whenever the Rumanians bring
up the question of the Banat, and answer if necessary that you have
no instructions of any sort in this matter. For your personal infor-
mation I wish to remark that we do not want this question to be revived
in any way at this time. 2
Rtbbentrop
1 Document No. 200.
2 In his memorandum St.S. No. 548 of Aug. 26 (222/149937) Weizsacker
recorded a visit of Bossy, the Rumanian Minister, who brought up the matter
of the Banat, stating that Antoneseu had Hitler's assurance that the boundary
questions in the Balkans would remain, open during the Russian campaign.
Weizsacker denied knowledge of any negotiations with Hungary regarding a
time set for occupying the Banat or regarding the alleged assurances of Hitler
to Antoneseu.
No. 219
116/66997-99
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Croatia
Telegram
Special Train" Westfalen, August 21, 1941 — 1 : 55 a. m.
No. 965 of August 21 from
the Special Train [Received Berlin, August 21 — 2: 10 a. m. 1 ]
No. 830 from the Foreign Ministry Sent August 21—7 : 05 a. m.
RAM 356/R
With reference to your telegram No. 1006 of August 16. s
In the matter of the demands addressed to the Croatian Govern-
ment by the Italian Government our attitude must remain the same
as we adopted at the time in the question of determining the bound-
ary between these two countries. 3 As was the case then, nothing else
1 Supplied from another copy (245/161417-18).
1 Not printed (116/66969-72). This telegram reported the text of Mussolini's
instruction to the Italian Minister in Zagreb demanding that Italy be given
administrative authority in the Adriatic littoral. Cf. document No. 217.
* See vol. in of this series, documents Nos. 394 and 440.
AUGUST 1941 343
can be considered by us at this time than to advise the Croatian
Government to reach an agreement on these questions directly with
Italy. We feel sure that an agreement can be achieved which is fair
to both sides just as it was at that time.
The first interpretation of the Italian demand as an attempted
"annexation of foreign national territory" which has «4s© entered
furtively yet* tologram 2k* WQG e4 A«gr i& has indeed proved * to
be not entirely accurate, 5 also according to your telegram No. 1007
of August 17," because it speaks of the retention of civil Croatian
authorities in the areas concerned. A direct Croatian approach to
the Duce will surely result in a further clarification of the Italian
intentions and a diminution, of the original Croatian excitement.
In dealing with this whole matter please never lose sight of the
fact that the alpha and omega of our foreign policy in the entire
Mediterranean area is the preservation of our cordial r alliance with
Italy, and that in comparison the Croatian question can only have
lesser s importance for us. Therefore we must indeed avoid in so far
as possible letting the Croatian Government push us into the role of
a protecting power w even " an arbiter which we could only assume at
the expense of our alliance with Italy and which we therefore would
not assume in any case. Therefore, if possible please do not accept
at your post direct appeals for our help aimed against Italy to be
forwarded to us, 10 but point out to the Croats from the very outset
again and again the necessity for direct, friendly 11 agreement with
Italy.
RlBBENTROP
* The passage scored through was deleted before the telegram was dispatched.
6 Originally the phrase "not entirely accurate" read "inaccurate." The cor-
rection was made In Ribbentrop's handwriting.
"Not printed (116/66973).
' This word was inserted in Ribbentrop's handwriting.
8 Originally this read "subordinate." The correction is in Ribbentrop's
handwriting.
' The words scored through were deleted before the telegram was dispatched.
"Originally this passage read: ". . . do not allow direct appeals . . . even
to be articulated ..." The correction is in Ribbentrop's handwriting,
"This word was inserted in Ribbentrop's handwriting.
344 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOBEIGN POLICY
No. 220
245/161425
The Minister in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
DKGBNT Zagreb, August 21, 1941 — 7 : 40 p. m.
secret Received August 21 — 8 : 00 p, m.
No. 1030 of August 21
With reference to my telegram No. 1022 of August 19. 1
Lorkovic states that the Duce has accepted the Croatian proposal.
Accordingly, the civil administration in the disputed territory remains
with Croatia who will appoint a civil commissioner who will ensure
cooperation with the Italian High Command. Croatian troops will
remain in the littoral. In case they are employed they will be placed
under Italian command. The details for carrying this out will be
settled between the Croatian Government and the Italian Commander
in Chief, General Ambrosio. As a result of this the situation has
quieted down.
Kasche
'Not printed (245/161406). In this telegram Kasche had reported that
Croatian-Italian talks In Rome and his own conversations with the Italian
Minister in Zagreb indicated an improvement in the Italian-Croatian conflict.
No, 221
65/4S2S0X
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
secret Tehran, August 21, 1941 — 8 : 00 p. m.
No. 841 of August 21 Received August 22—3 : 15 a. m.
The secretary of the Grand Mufti told me the following today in
strict confidence:
Ever since his arrival, Mellini, Second Secretary of the Italian
Legation, has been trying to induce Gaylani and the Grand Mufti to
conclude political and economic agreements with Italy even at this
time, in other words, before the conclusion of the war. His Govern-
ment has supposedly attached him to the Legation for the express
purpose of making such agreements. Apart from that, he has noth-
ing to do with the affairs of the Legation. When the secretary coun-
tered that such agreements could be concluded only with the Axis,
Signor Mellini replied that the Arab countries were Mediterranean
countries and consequently part of Italy's living space. Germany was
a Nordic country which had created a vast living space for herself
AUGUST 1941 345
in the north and the east, and consequently was not interested in the
Mediterranean area: The Italian Government and especially the Duce
were most anxious to arrive at political and economic agreements of
a general nature even at this time.
The Grand Mufti and he on the other hand took the position that
if any agreements were to be concluded, they could only be concluded
jointly and in full accord with Germany.
The secretary also dropped a remark that Mellini was very generous
with financial contributions to Iraqis. It is not my impression, how-
ever, that this remark was made to suggest that the same be done by
the German side.
Etteii
No. 222
58T/243642-45
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department
Dir. Ha. Pol. 186 Berlin, August 21, 1941.
Subject : French Occupation Costs.
To the Foreign Minister's Secretariat with the request for trans-
mission by teletype to the Foreign Minister.
When the French in May of this year during the negotiations over
a reduction of the occupation costs requested a suspension of their
installment payments and finally ceased the payments arbitrarily on
May 11, Minister Hemmen lodged a protest, as ordered, and reserved
his further decisions. 1 On June 11 the French resumed payments
retroactive to May 11, [they payed] however, not 20 million reichs-
marks but 15 million reichsmarks per day. 2 Thereupon Minister
Hemmen, as ordered, informed the French by note of June 14, a as
follows :
"The German Government cannot recognize a justification for this
procedure by the French Government. When, nevertheless, it disre-
gards for the time being the demand for a supplementary payment, it
does so only because it expects that a new settlement will be accom-
plished by June 30. In the case that these expectations should not be
fulfilled, the German Government reserves the right to request the
immediate supplementary payment of the amounts with which the
French Government will then be in arrears."
1 See vol. xu of this series, document No. 475, footnote 3.
1 Hemmen reported this development, details of which were contained in a
French note, in telegram Del. No. 287 of June 11 (378/209691-94). The text of
the French note has been printed in La, Dttegation franoaise anpr&s de la Com-
mission allemande &' Armistice, vol. rv, p. 518.
'The draft of this note, which was dated June 12, has been filmed on 587/-
243571-72.
346 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
A new settlement was not achieved by the end of June. Negotia-
tions continued on the basis of a reduction to 10 million reichsmarks
and of a transfer of 3 million reichsmarks per day. Inasmuch as this
adjustment would release the French, who continued up to then to pay
15 million reichsmarks, of the payments of several installments be-
cause of the higher amounts they thus turned over, a subsequent claim
for the difference up to 20 million reichsmarks was suspended for the
time being. At the end of July, the French accepted a new settlement
on the aforementioned basis. Its implementation was, however,
treated dilatorily at the order of the Reich Foreign Minister. 1 On the
assumption that this would be only a short-term delay, I recommended
in memorandum No. 183 of August 14 s to leave it at the payment of
15 million reichsmarks for the time being, that is until the new ar-
rangement became effective.
From the foregoing we have the right at any time to request again
the payment of 20 million reichsmarks per day and with retroactive
payments since May ll. 6 In this connection it should be considered,
however, that the French, following the political-military negotia-
tions, were permitted on May 7 the publication of a press communi-
que, according to which, "an initial reduction of occupation costs
from 20 to 15 million reichsmarks is being contemplated." 7 The de-
mand to come up to 20 million reichsmarks again would put Darlan
in a difficult position in the eyes of French public opinion. Ambassa-
dor Abetz also points out especially that a reduction to 15 million
reichsmarks constitutes our counterservices for the French concessions
regarding Iraq/Syria. 8 In these circumstances, the Darlan Govern-
ment would at present hardly comply with a request for an increase
of payments to 20 million reichsmarks. On the other hand, Am-
bassador Abetz rightly points out that the present situation is unsatis-
factory, inasmuch as a daily credit of 15 million reichsmarks is easier
for the French than a daily credit of 10 million reichsmarks plus a
daily transfer of 3 million reichsmarks as provided for in the planned
new arrangement. For this reason he proposes as a means of pressure
an interim solution, according to which the French, in addition to their
present daily credit of 15 million reichsmarks, would effect a transfer
of 3 million reichsmarks per day. 8 However desirable such an interim
solution would be, there are few prospects that the French would
* Wiehl referred to this in his memorandum of July 29 (1003/306517-20). See
also document No. 110.
e Not found.
'Marginal note: "Which today would come to about one-half billion reichs-
marks=10 billion French francs." /
7 The test of this commnniquS was reported by Abetz In telegram No. 1398 of
May 7 (221/149280-81).
" Paris telegram No. 2425 of Aug. 15 (386/211347).
AUGUST 1641 347
accept it — a fact to which the Hemraen delegation also calls atten-
tion — especially since at the negotiations just concluded they agreed
to our transfer requests only after prolonged resistance, even after
a reduction of the credit to 10 million reichsmarks. 9
There are two possibilities if the implementation of the new ar-
rangement (for credit of 10 million reichsmarks plus transfer of 3
million reichsmarks, as agreed to with the French) , the execution of
which is being supported by all internal departments, should further
be dealt with in a dilatory manner :
(1) Minister Hemmen would explain to the French that the new
arrangement could not be executed for the time being; that, on the
other hand, we could not be content with the unilateral reduction of
payments to 15 million reichsmarks. We would therefore demand
an immediate increase to 20 million reichsmarks with additional pay-
ments from May 11 on. In case the French would reject this, Minister
Hemmen would be authorized to accept, without prejudice to our
demands for additional payments, the interim solution proposed by
Ambassador Abetz. In case the French rejected this too, we should,
in the last^resort, have to consider sanctions. Military sanctions, such
as an extension of the zone of occupation, are not to be considered.
Most of the economic sanctions, such as the restriction of the French
commercial shipping permitted by us or of German deliveries to
France, or of French trade relations with third countries, etc., would
be against our own interests. The most expedient thing would be
to confiscate French assets in the occupied zone (securities, jewelry,
and other movable valuables) so as to utilize them for the transfer
which has been rejected by the French. But even these sanctions
would be risky in view of the repercussions on the attitude of the
population in the occupied zone, which to a large extent works for us.
The agreement of the Military Commander and the internal depart-
ments to any kind of sanctions would therefore be doubtful. Because
the prospects that the French will willingly agree to such proposals
by Minister Hemmen are very slim and because, on the other hand,
the possibilities of applying sanctions are also very poor, I should
not like to recommend these measures.
(2) We are content, for the time being, with the French payment
of 15 million reichsmarks daily. If, however, contrary to my ewg-
i^w^^ 1(, assumption we have to count on a dilatory treatment of the
implementation of the new arrangement for a prolonged period, then
"Paris telegram No. 405 of Aug. 18 (386/211355-56).
"The typed word scored through has been crossed out and the words "so
far" have been Inked in.
348 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
I consider it necessary to renew the reservations in our Note of June
14, by a new note of perhaps the following content :
"In view of the fact that the French Government since May 11 has
by unilateral action provided for the occupation costs at the daily rate
of 15 million reichsmarks instead of 20 million, I have the honor, in
behalf of my Government, to refer to my note of June 14. The ex-
pectation expressed therein that a new arrangement for the install-
ments would De achieved by June 30 of this year, has not been fulfilled.
In spite of this, the German Government has not up to now made use
of its right to insist on daily rates of 20 million reichsmarks and on
the additional payments of the amounts overdue since May 11. It
attaches great importance, however, to stating explicitly that it re-
serves its right to exercise this prerogative at any time in the future."
If in this way our legal reservations are secured for the future, the
first alternative can always be followed when the application of sanc-
tions can be considered more favorably.
Herewith submitted in accordance with instructions to the Foreign
Minister through the State Secretary with reference to telegrams No.
2425 of August 15 of Ambassador Abetz and Nos. 404 u and 405 of
August 16 and 17 from the Hemmen delegation with the request for
a decision. 18
Wiehl
"Not printed (587/243640-41).
"According to "Wiehl's memorandum No. 194 of Sept. 12 (587/243650-51),
Ribbentrop approved the text of the note which was transmitted to the French
Government on Aug. 26. For further developments see document No. 531, foot-
note 16; La Delegation ftancaise aupres de la Commission altemande d' Armis-
tice, vol. v, pp. 250, 336; and Yves Bouthillier, Le Drame de Viehy, vol. n:
Finances sous la constrainte (Paris, 1951), pp. 80-83.
No. 223
616/249817
Memorandum ~by an Official of the Department for German
Internal Affairs
Berlin, August 21, 1941.
D IX 153.
Subject: Estonian suggestion for establishing an Estonian govern-
ment and an Estonian army. One annex (report by Ungern-
Sternberg of August 11 ) - 1
Secretary of Legation von Ungern-Sternberg, Foreign Ministry
liaison officer with Eighteenth Army Headquarters, submitted 2
with the attached report of August 11 a memorandum by the last
1 Not printed (616/249818-21) .
' The German original reads here "angeregt" but it is clear from the report
referred to 'that this word was -written by mistake instead of "vorgelegt".
AUGUST 1941 349
Estonian Minister President J. Tlluots addressed to General von
Kiichler, the Commander in Chief of the Eighteenth Army, regard-
ing the formation of an Estonian government and an Estonian army
as well as an Estonian army command. The military has left the
memorandum unanswered.
Submitted herewith to Counselor of Embassy Hilger with the re-
quest that he inform the Foreign Minister at a convenient oppor-
tunity of this phenomenon in Estonia, and likewise regarding the
hope in some intellectual Estonian circles for a possible stronger as-
sociation with Finland later on.
At the same time I should like to request a decision whether we can
comply with a suggestion by Pol. V concerning forwarding this re-
port to Reich Minister Rosenberg. It is not necessary to ask the
Reich Minister for the Eastern Territories to take a position in the
matter because the policy of establishing indigenous advisory councils
\V ertrauensrate] which has already been adopted is unequivocally
clear. 3
Gkosskopp
3 In a memorandum of Aug. 24 which Hilger sent Grosskopf (616/249823) he
recorded having presented the memorandum of the former Estonian Minister
President to Ribbentrop who agreed to having the document forwarded to
Kosenberg and "expressed the wish that the memorandum should be left
unanswered."
No. 224
■4360/E080497-98
The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
secret Lisbon, August 21, 1941.
No 10206
Subject: Tungsten purchases.
With reference to your instruction Ha. Pol. 5058 g. of July 30 1
and Ha. Pol. 5163 g. of August 9. 2
Through increased purchases of tungsten concentrates and addi-
tional purchases of still unprocessed tungsten it has been possible for
the local German purchasing firms to acquire a total of 245 tons of
tungsten in the past month.
According to information from the Minero-Silvicola, tungsten mines
or participations in tungsten mines in a total value of 32 million
'Not found. In a minute of Aug. 20 (4359/E080241-242) Schiiller noted that
the Legation in Portugal had been asked (in directive Ha. Pol. 5058 g.) whether
there were any political Objections to purchasing a tungsten mine belonging to
the Beralt Tin Mines, Ltd.
a Not found.
350 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
escudos have been acquired here by order of the syndicate made up
of the Gesellschaft fur Metallurgie, the I. G. Farbenindustrie, the
Krupp firm and other firms. This involves in particular the
Campanhia Minera del Norte de Portugal (12 million), Dr. Jose
Maria da Silva, Vale da Cabra (10 million) , Empreza Minera Sabreso
(3 million), Minas de Cerva (7 million).
Furthermore, the Minero-Silvicola has acquired an option on a
number of other mines to a total value of 39 million escudos, among
them in particular the Mina Belanca (25 million) .
There are no fundamental political objections here to an attempt
also to acquire a majority in the firm, Beralt Tin Mines, Ltd. Con-
sidering, however, the capital strength of the company, which is in
English possession, it does not appear that this attempt would be
likely to succeed. In these circumstances it would probably be advis-
able to carry on the negotiations through a suitable straw man who
would have to work very closely with the local experts from the Keich
in order to avoid a loss of prestige in case of the expected failure in
the negotiations.
According to confidential information from the local German firms
entrusted with the export of tungsten to Germany, one will have to
count on intervention by the Portuguese Government in the export of
tungsten in the near future. Because of the increase in the price of
tungsten, a real "gold rush" has set in, particularly in the northern
part of the country, as a result of which the necessary workers are
being withdrawn both from agriculture and the big mining companies.
This development has already led to a doubling of the wages of farm
workers and has drawn the attention of the tax authorities, because
the profits made from the "wild" tungsten mines cannot be reached
by taxes.
The English mining company, Panasqueira, and the American
Portuguese- American Tin Company are also energetically calling for
relief. Because the Portuguese Government cannot permanently re-
main inactive toward this, perforce only temporary development in
the mining industry, one can count on governmental measures, pos-
sibly even a governmental supervision of the ore production.
The Legation will continue to watch this development and if neces-
sary make the necessary representations against such measures, which
could restrict the export of tungsten to Germany in some form or
other.
AUGUST 1941 351
No. 225
100T/307668-71
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry l
Telegram
most urgent Tokyo, August 22, 1941—10 : 43 a. m., summer time.
No. 1607 of August 22 Received August 22—11 : 45 p. m.
[Pol. VIII 4632 g.] 2
The announcement known to you regarding American shipments
of aviation gasoline to Vladivostok 3 has placed the Japanese Govern-
ment in a serious dilemma.
At the Foreign Ministry and with the Army and the Navy which,
for lack of a unified political leadership, are the deciding factors, I
have pointed out that to permit such shipments, apart from having
the effect of supporting the Soviet Union, would in America give the
impression of weakness and induce her to engage in still more exten-
sive provocations. After the Panama Canal was closed to Japanese
shipping, 1 Japan had a right, politically if not juridically, to prevent
American shipments to Vladivostok through the access routes to
Japan. The United States would be careful not to make this a cause
of war.
From conversation I have received the impression that while de-
tailed consultations are being held about the measures to be taken, no
decision has been made as yet. Legal misgivings are being voiced, to
begin with, to the effect that blockading of the access routes would go
beyond the American measures taken thus far and might be regarded
as an act of war. The person I talked to tried, moreover, to minimize
the importance of the United States shipments which are now being
sent to the Soviet Union.
The handling of these shipments shows the uncertainty of the lead-
ing Japanese elements regarding the decision Japan should take in
questions of high policy.
In the Navy there is a noticeable tendency to exaggerate the danger
of any operation in the north. America, which, if possible, wants
without fighting to bring Japan to her knees by means of coercive
economic measures, it is said, is even wishing for a Russo-Japanese
1 Marginal note : "Same text to Washington as No. 1633."
2 Taken from another copy (1680/395767-70).
8 The Department of State made public on Aug. 5 an exchange of notes between
Acting Secretary Welles and Soviet Ambassador Oumansky providing for
economic assistance to the Soviet Union by the United States and stating that
favorable consideration would be given "to requests for the extension of available
American shipping facilities for the purpose of expediting the shipment to the
Soviet Union of articles and materials needed for the national defense of that
country." See Department of State, Bulletin, 1941, vol. v, p. 109.
* Cf. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. iv, p. 301.
352 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
war. Thereby the army, already weakened by the China campaign,
will be completely committed without being able in the circumstances
to achieve quick successes. These naval circles say that it is impos-
sible in the foreseeable future to clear the Siberian route. The chief
purpose of an operation in the north is thereby nullified. On the other
hand, the Navy is demanding an operation which, -without further
specification, is called operation in the south for the purpose of safe-
guarding vitally essential raw materials. It is taken into considera-
tion that in the event of an advance to the south the Soviet Union
will probably remain neutral, whereas in the event of an action in the
north it must be expected that the Anglo-Saxons, too, will enter the
war. An advance to the south would, first of all, include Thailand
after Indochinese bases have been, consolidated by the transfer of
sufficient army units. This would eliminate a flanking threat from
the west and would threaten the Burma Road, Singapore, if it can-
not be captured, could be blockaded by the superior Japanese navy.
It would then be easy to seize Borneo with its rich oil fields. The
eastern flank would be made secure by seizing Manila before or after
the operation.
In the discussions I strongly stressed the dangers to Japanese policy
which have arisen also in the past as a result of differences of opinion
between the Army and the Navy. Experience shows that unless they
agree, an order from the Emperor, with whom the decision lies, is
not to be expected. In view of the changed situation a showdown
with the Soviet Union should be given priority. So far it has not
been possible to convince the Naval High Command of the correctness
of this view.
In the Army, too, whose preparations in the north and at home are
continuing, misgivings about an early war with the Soviet Union are
increasing. No decision can be taken without the Navy, whose air
force and to a certain extent also whose fleet units are necessary for
an operation against Vladivostok. I was confronted with the argu-
ment that in view of the numerical superiority of the enemy and the
length of the front the focal point of a Japanese operation had to be
skillfully selected. Fear of provoking a war with the so-called ABCD
[American-British-Chinese-Dutch] states, in addition to the Soviet
Union, by any strong ultimatum was paralyzing the present cabinet's
power of decision. Konoye said recently that Japan was in the most
difficult situation of her entire history. The present political leader-
ship of Japan believes that in view of the weakening effect of more
than four years of conflict in China it cannot successfully conduct a
war against the above-mentioned group of powers. There is no deny-
ing that Anglo-Saxon measures of intimidation have to that extent
actually produced the intended effect. In these circumstances the
AUGUST 1941 353
Japanese Government is confining itself primarily to exerting pressure
on the Soviet Union in order to deter her from going through -with
the importation of arms from America and, in addition, participating
in the encirclement of Japan. This is also plainly evident from the
press.
As in the earlier crisis it is to be expected now, too, that friends
of America and Anglophile circles will try through the Japanese
Embassy in Washington — which is in sympathy with them — and other
underground channels to bring about a compromise with America
and thereby eliminate the nightmare of encirclement. The Foreign
Minister assured me that the Japanese-American negotiations about
a general settlement which were begun in the spring have not been con-
tinued. I have now learned that after the resignation of the Cabinet
in July Ambassador Nomura, presumably in the hope of a more accom-
modating attitude on the part of the new government, did not deliver
the Japanese note of reply that was transmitted to him (cf. my tele-
gram No. 1247 of July 15) , B In view of America's unwillingness to
compromise in the China question, etc., which has always prevented
an understanding heretofore, and in view of the aggravated tension,
which further obstructs the possibility of an accommodation, such
attempts cannot succeed. Such a policy of renunciation would not
be permitted by the armed forces and the nationalists. However, we
have to reckon with the danger that the clear-cut decision which is
called for will be further delayed.
Ott
5 See document No. 123.
No. 226
95/107025
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
secret Madrid, August 22, 1941 — 12 : 40 a. m.
No. 2888 of August 21 Received August 22 — 2 : 25 a. m.
The Spanish Foreign Minister returned yesterday from northern
Spain to his country seat near La Gran] a. When I visited him there
today he showed himself to be somewhat pained that the new Spanish
Ambassador in Berlin had not yet been received in spite of the
fact that he had already been there for 4 weeks. 1 In Berlin it was
*A memorandum by Weizsacker, St.S. No. 496 dated Aug. 6 (95/106985),
records that he received the new Spanish Ambassador on that day. Inasmuch
as no date had been set for the presentation of his credentials, Weizsacker
assured him that he could conduct himself toward the Foreign Ministry as
if he were already accredited,
682-905—64 28
354 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
known that Count May aide was his personal confidant and just as un-
conditionally friendly to Germany as he himself and filled with the
conviction that Germany had to win in this war, not only in the inter-
est of Spain but also in the interest of Europe.
I would be grateful for telegraphic instruction for the purpose of
informing the Minister approximately when it is intended to have the
reception of Mayalde. 2
2 Weizsitcker's memorandum St.S. No. 534 of Aug. 18 (95/107019) records a
conversation with Mayalde who asked about the travel plans for the Foreign
Minister and mentioned that Serrano Suner had wondered about the fact that
Mayalde had not yet been received whereas Espinosa had been received but a
short time before. . „ , „ *
Mayalde was received by Hitler on Sept. 11 together with the Portuguese
Minister, Count Tovarde, and the Danish Minister, Mohr (Monatshefte fur
AuswiirUge Politik, October 1941, p. 879) .
Stohrer
No. 227
1099/318795-07
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey
Draft Telegram
SECRET WESTFAtEN, August 22, 1941.
I. It may be expected even at this time and still more so as the
military operations progress, that Russian warships or merchant ves-
sels with military personnel on board or Russian units and aircraft
will try to escape to Turkish territorial waters or territory. We re-
gard it a matter of course that such Russian armed forces will im-
mediately be disarmed and interned by Turkey in accordance with the
rules of international law, Nevertheless, I consider it useful to call
the Turkish Government's special attention to this question. For
example, Russian warships or merchant vessels with military per-
sonnel on board might try on some pretext or other to remain for a
longer period of time in Turkish territorial waters without permit-
ting themselves to be interned. It is therefore necessary that the
Turkish local authorities be given clear instructions to intervene im-
mediately in such borderline cases also.
II. Of special importance in that connection are the Russian mer-
chant vessels in the Black Sea. It can be assumed with certainty
that with the progressive occupation of the Russian ports on the
Black Sea by German troops, England will put increasingly strong
pressure on Russia to transfer the Russian merchant vessels to the
Mediterranean, that is place them at the disposal of England in the
struggle against Germany. This question is therefore of great im-
AUGUST 1941 355
portance to us. The situation being what it still is, there would be
little prospect of success if we should demand of Turkey that Bussian
merchant vessels be flatly refused passage through the Dardanelles
and that the merchant vessels be handed over to Germany. However,
we do expect of the Turkish authorities that they will do everything
possible under the provisions of the Montreux Convention 1 to ob-
struct and delay the passage of Russian merchant vessels through the
Dardanelles (of. my telegram No. 726 of June 22 2 ). That would at
least leave time to report the passage of Eussian merchant vessels to
the naval forces of Germany and her allies.
I request that you bring up these questions with the Turkish Gov-
ernment in an appropriate manner and indicate that we will consider
Turkey's attitude in this question as a test of her attitude toward
Germany. I request further that in these questions you cooperate
very closely with the Military Attaches and the local consular
authorities. 3
[Foreign Minister] *
1 For text of the Montreux Convention of July 20, 1936, on the regime of the
Straits, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxiii, p. 213.
' See document No. 2. footnote 1.
s Typewritten marginal note : "Copy to Naval Captain Bttrkner with the re-
quest to investigate whether the Admiral, Southeast is already doing everything
possible in conjunction with the Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Italian Navies to
prevent the Russian merchant fleet from breaking out of the Black Sea. West-
f alen, Bitter, Aug. 22."
*Ritter's typed signature on this copy of the document was deleted and the
words "Name of the Foreign Minister" substituted.
No. 228
911/294606-809
Field Marshal Keitel to Field Marshal Mannerheim 1
2
TOP SECRET MILITARY FuHRER's HEADQUARTERS, August 30 [#£] , 1941
The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht
No. U 1418/41 gK WFSt/Abt.L (I Op.)
Your Excellency : The successes of your offensive, on the one hand,
and the break-through of Army Group North between Lake Ilmen and
the Narva, on the other hand, bring the operations of our allied forces
into closer and closer contact. It thus seems to me to be necessary,
J The document printed here is a copy which was forwarded on Aug. 30
(911/294605) by the OKW to Ambassador Ritter in the Foreign Ministry.
2 The copy of the letter bears the incorrect date Aug. 30. The correct date was
Aug. 22. See Earl F. Ziemke, The German Northern. Theater of Operations,
1940-1945 (Washington, Government Printing Office, I960), p. 196, footnote 13.
In his report No. 761 of Aug. 24 (911/294610-11) General Brfurth wrote:
"Field Marshal Mannerheim received me this afternoon to talk to me about the
letter of the Chief of the OKW, which has been handed to him yesterday."'
356 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOEEIGN POLICY
on the part of the German Military Command, to have an exchange of
ideas with you, dear Field Marshal, above and beyond the existing
liaison.
I should like to develop our point of view as follows :
1) On the front between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga the
enemy is still holding his front toward the north. For us it is a ques-
tion of cutting off Leningrad and the Karelian Isthmus from the
South by a thrust from the Army Group North. The later the enemy
withdraws from your front, to the South, in face of this danger, the
better it will be. He will stand between two fires and, with every
regrouping to the South, will be open to your vigorous second thrust.
We do not intend to take Leningrad at the first assault. The city
shall rather be encircled and destroyed from the air and by artillery
fire as a preparation for occupation. 3 From the German point of
view it is preferable that fairly strong Finnish forces participate later
on from the north in the encirclement of Leningrad at which time the
junction of our assault groups would be established between Lenin-
grad and Lake Ladoga*
2) On the front between Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega your aim
remains, I assume, to reach the Svir sector. In the interest of the
entire operation the formation of a bridgehead somewhere near
Lodeynoye Pole and Svirstroi is desired. From it a mobile group
could be committed to join with the German forces south of the Lake
of Ladoga.
3) The aim of Colonel General von FalkenhorsPs army remains to
take Murmansk in any event in order to exclude any possible use of
this harbor for further conduct of the war. To continue the attack
the mountain corps will be supplied with another mountain division,
besides the forces from the Norwegian sector that are being regrouped
to Kirkenes. Likewise a strengthening of the air force is being pre-
pared. My request, dear Field Marshal, is that you leave your 14th
Regiment with the mountain corps for the time being. For this im-
minent difficult task the mountain corps cannot be strong enough.
Eastward of the Salla region the attack has again been taken up
concentrically from the North and the South by the XXXVI corps.
The reinforced regiment of the 163d Division which, at one time was
sent to Rovaniemi, is taking part in this too. As soon as it should be
released it will again be sent back to its division.
The attack of the III (Finnish) Army Corps seems to me most
promising in the direction of Loukhi.
4) In the way of special operations there are in the Baltic Sea area
the capture of the Baltic Islands and of Hanko.
An operation against Sarema and Khvrnna is being prepared. It
will be carried out when the Eighteenth Army has mopped up
Estonia.
The attack on Hanko depends on the transportation of heavy artil-
lery there, thus among other things, on the liberation of the Karelian
Isthmus. Dive bombing units will also have to be employed for the
attack on Hanko. Inasmuch as Hanko remains possibly the last base
* Cf. document No. 388,
* Of. document No, 283.
AUGUST 1941 357
of the Red Fleet, from which it could delay the urgently desired paci-
fication of the Baltic Sea, it is of the utmost importance to us too that
the time of attack be set as early as possible. I should be grateful to
you, my dear Field Marshal, for a communication of your views in
this connection.
Care has been taken, through a blockade of the exits in the Danish
area, and the Red Fleet cannot escape from the Baltic Sea.
In conclusion may I express the deep admiration that we Germans
feel for the heroic and extensive actions of the Finnish Army and
beyond that, for the Finnish people during the great events of our
time. I am certain that the campaign will lead to a complete success
and, in particular, will put Finland in possession of the areas belong-
ing within her "Lebensraum." 5
Yours, etc. Keitel
8 For Mannerheim's reply see document No. 248. In his report No. 761 of
Aug. 24 (911/294610-11) General Erfurth records a conversation with Manner-
lieim which touched upon Keitel's letter as well as the Field Marshal's reply.
No. 229
95/107031-32
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry 1
secret Madrid, August 22, 1941.
To my telegram No. 2888 of yesterday z regarding the ill feeling of
the Spanish Foreign Minister regarding the delay in the reception of
the new Spanish Ambassador Mayalde I should like to add the
following.
Serrano Suner felt particularly hurt in that his confidant Mayalde
had not yet been received while it had been made possible for the
former Spanish Ambassador Espinosa twice to come to headquarters
during recent "weeks for farewell visits, 3 apparently even with trans-
port by special plane. The Minister added that naturally the taking
of leave by an ambassador was quite a usual procedure. Furthermore
he was convinced that the German Government had not learned of
the undisciplined and ugly fashion in which Ambassador Espinosa
had spread propaganda against him, his Foreign Minister, in Ger-
many after Espinosa's recall. E[spinosa] had even gone so far as to
burst out with insults against him at a function attended by a dozen
1 This message was filed in the State Secretary file which indicates that it was
received in Berlin. The signature is typed, yet the document lacks the usual
identification marks of a telegram. It is not clear how it was transmitted and
there is no date of receipt
* Document No. 226.
8 Hitler's remarks to Ambassador Espinosa de los Monteros at the Wolfschanze
on Tuesday, Aug. 12, are recorded in a memorandum by Counselor Steengraeht
(P3/0316-0308).
No record has been found of another visit by Espinosa at Hitler's headquarters.
358 DOCUMENTS ON GEHMAN FOREIGN POLICY
or two Germans and in the presence of members of the Spanish
Embassy. He had even gone so far as to declare that he would have
his revenge against the Foreign Minister for his recall from Germany.
The most unheard of thing, however, was that E. spread it about
that he was recalled by the Spanish Foreign Minister because he was
too much pro-German. He [Serrano Sufier] was certain of the
friendliness and reliability of the new Ambassador Mayalde; but
there were well-grounded doubts in regard to the honesty of the Ger-
man sympathies of the former Ambassador.
The Minister concluded that he felt compelled to tell me these
painful things in strict confidence and to ask me to recommend the
reception of Count Mayalde at the earliest possible time. 1
Stohrer
'in telegram No. 1961 of Aug. 28 (95/107047-48) Ribbentrop instructed
Stohrer to reply in a conversational way to Serrano Suner that the reception of
the new Ambassador by Hitler would take place within a short time. ™«her-
more Stohrer was to point out that Mayalde had no reas onto be i ^patient for
other Chiefs of Mission, Danish and Portuguese, bad . *^*f Jf.fg.Z ipri!l«SS
a longer time. Hitler, it was explained, was preoccupied with military decisions
at the front and other matters which were not so urgent had to be P«cpo n «>;
In any case Connt Mayalde had been told that there was no obstacle to bis
performance of his functions.
No. 230
65/45240X-42X
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Iran *
Telegram
top secret Westfalen, August 18, 1941.
[No. 884 of August 22 from the Special Train] 2
[Sent from the Special Train, August 22—12 : 00 midnight.]
[Received Berlin, August 23^£ : 30 a. m.]
No. 589 from the Foreign Ministry Sent August 23.
RAM 361/R
For the Minister personally.
I request you to ask for a personal reception by the Shah and to
tell him the following on instructions from the Fiihrer :
The Reich Government has observed with satisfaction that, in
accordance with the directives of the Shah, the Iranian Government
1 Marginal notes :
"[For] F[uhrer]."
"Shown to the Fiihrer."
"The Fiihrer agrees to the dispatch of this telegram if account is taken of
the revision which he himself wrote on page 2 (middle). Hewel, Aug. 22.
See footnote 3. .,..«.
a The information within brackets has been supplied from another copy
(65/45831-32).
AUGUST 1941
359
is resolved to continue its present policy of neutrality and to defen d
Iran's sovereignty against all attempts to encroach upon it. It has
faith that the wisdom of the Shah will find ways and means to safe-
guard, in the future, his sovereignty over the entire territory ot the
Iranian state against any encroachment from the outside, until the
present period will have passed, in which the. powers at war with
Germany are trying to bring pressure to bear upon the decisions ot
the Iranian Government.
The Reich Government believes that this period can only be ot
short duration. In their struggle against the Soviet Russian armed
forces the German troops, as the Shah is aware, have penetrated tar
into the Ukraine and in their victorious advance have today reached
the area north of the Crimean Peninsula. The Reich Government
is firmly resolved to occupy further territories of the Soviet Union
in the course of this autumn, 3 a scheme which will be facilitated by
the now plainly * perceptible ebbing of Russian powers of resistance.
Any attempts of the English perhaps to set up a new front against
us in the Caucasus are doomed to failure from the outset, because of
the superiority of German troops. The Reich Government trusts
that until this brief period of danger will have passed away the
Shah will resist with all means at his disposal any such attempt on the
part of the English, which would carry the devastations of war also
into Iranian territory. You are instructed to inform the Shah of
these intentions and views of the Reich Government and to convey to
him the expression of the Fiihrer's sentiments of sincere friendship for
the Shah.
Report by wire on the course of the interview. 5 Avoid, if possible,
letting the fact of your reception by the Shah become known to the
outside in any way. 8
RlBBENTROP
' The passage after the word "occupy" was revised in Hitler's handwriting and
originally read : "the entire southern territories of the Soviet Union in the course
of this summer."
* The word "plainly" (stark) was added in Ribbentrop's handwriting.
'Document No. 240.
8 Marginal note : "Approved by the Foreign Minister and to be dispatched. Rin-
telen, Aug. 22."
360 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 231
95/107039
An Official of the Embassy m Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
urgent Madrid, August 23, 1941 — 12: 00 noon.
No. 2921 of August 23 Received August 23—2 : 30 p. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 1884 of August 19. 1
The agreement concerning employment of Spanish workers in Ger-
many was signed yesterday evening. 2 Thanks to the great accom-
modating spirit of the Spaniards, especially in regard to the transfer
question (which in large measure can be traced to the repeated per-
sonal intervention of the Foreign Minister) the negotiations of the
last days could be brought to a final conclusion in a relatively short
time. The quick termination of the negotiations which ran counter
to all expectations can be traced, aside from Spanish accommodations,
also to the skillfulness of the German leader of the delegation. He
could get the Spaniards to adopt plenary and committee sessions
which followed each other in much quicker succession than is suitable
to the usually much slower method of negotiations of the Spaniards.
The members of the delegation returned to Berlin in the last few
days. The leader of the delegation, Geheimrat Roediger, who will
bring the signed text, departed this morning with a scheduled Luft-
hansa plane, and will arrive at Tempelhof this afternoon.
Regarding press communique, see special teletype message of the
press division. 3
Heyden-Rynsch
1 In this telegram (3882/E047807) Clodius accepted the proposal of the Spanish
Minister of Trade, transmitted to Berlin in Madrid telegram No. 2836 of Aug. 18
(95/107016), according to which the Spanish Government would make available
the necessary amount of pesetas for the Spanish workers in Germany and this
amount would be deducted from the Spanish Civil War debt to Germany.
' The test of this agreement has been filmed on 5103/E295251-263.
* Madrid telegram No. 2928 of Aug. 23 (95/107038-39). See, further, document
No. 453.
AUGUST 1941 361
No. 232
4037/E2 64159
An Official of Political Division II to the Consulate at Tetudn 1
Berlin, August 23, 1941.
Pol. II 2004/1.
With reference to your report No. 899 of July 21. 2
For your information: Our Moroccan policy has to adjust itself to
the necessities of the conduct of war by the allied Axis Powers and to
our specific relationship to the other Powers interested in Morocco.
The previous declaration of the Axis Powers regarding our attitude
to the Arabic peoples 3 had no relevance to Morocco.
In this situation it will not be expedient in conversations to go into
our Moroccan policy.'*
By order:
Dr. Koester
1 Sent through the Embassy in Madrid.
'Not found.
* See vol. xr of this series, document No. 190 and footnote 4, document No. 496,
and document No. 596 and footnote 6.
*The same instruction was sent to the Consulate at Tangier (4937/E264158) .
No. 233
2123/462504-06
Memorandum oy an Official of the Economic Policy Department
Berlin, August 25, 1941.
e.o. Ha. Pol. 5597 g. I.
Record or the Interministerial Conference on Iraq at the
Foreign Ministrt on August 23
Present :
Counselor Dr. Ripken Foreign Ministry
Senior Counselor Dr. Davidsen Foreign Ministry
Minister Grobba Foreign Ministry
Dr. Seydel Foreign Ministry
Herr Kellermeier Foreign Ministry
Dr. Esser Foreign Ministry
Ministerialrat Freiherr von Siis-
kind-Schwendi Reich Ministry of Economics
Regierungsrat Lahr Reich Ministry of Economics
Ministerialrat Dr. Reichmann Reich Food Ministry
Regierungsrat Dr. Strathmann Reich Food Ministry
Ministerialrat Dr. Scherer Reich Ministry of Finance
Major Dr. Zinnemann OKW-War Economy and
Armaments Office
Captain Wiesner OKW-War Economy, VII
[Wi VII]
Herr von Hesse Reichsbank
362 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOHEIGN POLICY
Herr Ripken announced that new discussions aiming at military,
political and economic cooperation between Germany and Iraq were
going to be held with Minister President Gaylani, who was expected
in Germany shortly. 1 General assurances providing, for instance,
that Iraq would place at Germany's disposal all the raw materials
that could be spared, in return for which Germany would supply
Iraq to the same extent with industrial products, were insufficient.
Rather it was necessary, although the time might seem a good deal
premature, to submit to Gaylani the completed draft, subject to
negotiation of details, of an agreement designed to run for four or
five years, which Gaylani upon his return could submit for ratifica-
tion to the government appointed by him; this draft could possi-
bly also serve as a model for other agreements between Germany and
the states of the Near East and Middle East.
It was the consensus that the agreement should be developed on
the following basic principles :
1. Abolition of the present Iraq currency linked to the sterling and
its substitution by a currency based on German gold credit. To this
end, Germany is to supply one million sterling (gold), to be shipped
to Baghdad in monthly instalments of about £80,000. The paper
currency emitted should be about three and a half times the value
of this amount.
2. German economic advisers for the following fields are to be
dispatched :
a) Industry and commerce
b) Agriculture
c) Finance (customs, taxes, credit)
d) Iraq State bank of issue
e) Communications and transport
The respective ministries are requested to designate suitable can-
didates for the different posts. As a result of earlier discussions,
Bank Director Lebrecht, presently economic adviser to the German
Embassy at Ankara, and Dr. Wrede, of the Reichsbank, have been
nominated for c) and/or d) ,
3. The ministries are also requested to furnish the Foreign Min-
istry with lists of the major commodities, taking into account Iraq's
wishes communicated to the Ministry of Economics last May. 2
4. The question whether war material to be supplied to Iraq should
be placed at Iraq's disposal in the form of military aid or be set off
against deliveries of commodities from Iraq, especially petroleum,
will be studied by the OKW.
5. The OKW also will undertake to supply a more powerful broad-
casting station for Baghdad, possibly from Russian stocks.
1 See document No. 180 and footnote 2.
! See document No. 180 and footnote 3.
AUGUST 1941 363
6. Whether the existing agreements between Germany and Italy
which stipulate that in joint economic activities of the Axis Powers,
each country is to share in the exploitation in the ratio of 50 percent,
should be applied to this agreement, remains reserved for later decision
on a higher level.
7. Minister Grobba stated that the treaty concluded between Iraq
and England 3 would be made available upon request for inspection by
the interested ministries.
Davidsen
"It Is not clear whether this refers to the Anglo-Iraq Treaty, signed at
Baghdad June 30, 1930; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol.
cxisii, p. 363.
No. 234
F17/064 ;
FIT/047-052
Memorandum by SS-Standartenfuhrer V eesenmayer
Berlin, August 24, 1941.
Attention Counselor of Legation Weber, Foreign Minister's Sec-
retariat "Westfalen."
In accordance with the Foreign Minister's directive of August 17 1
I herewith transmit attached a proposal for the Ireland operation
which I have prepared with the request that it be submitted to the
Foreign Minister as promptly as possible.
Veesenmayer
[Enclosure]
Proposal foe the Ireland Operation 2
Berlin, August 24, 1941.
The latest possible date for this operation appears to be the time
from September 15 to 25, 1941. Prerequisites are dark, clear nights
before the autumn gales begin.
A thoroughgoing personal discussion on July 11 in Lorient with
Lieutenant Colonel von Harlinghausen, bearer of the Knight's In-
signia of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves, brought out that he is
willing to transport by airplane the three men who are to go on this
mission. He does not anticipate particular difficulties for this opera-
tion ; he has prepared a well-adapted Heinkel 59 (especially seaworthy
and noiseless) and assigned an experienced aircraft pilot who has
1 Not found.
a A note by Ribbentrop at the top of this document indicates that it was put
into the special portfolio where the Foreign Minister kept documents which he
intended to show Hitler (Fiihrermappe) .
364 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
repeatedly carried out undertakings of this sort with success. The
over-all responsibility is in his own hands.
The landing will take place only if the landing place can be defi-
nitely identified and no particular risks are present. The descent will
be made by gliding in from a great height and the debarkation by
rubber boat. Each of the three men will receive an English folding
bicycle to take along so as to have greater mobility on land.
After careful examination and by common agreement Brandon
Bay was chosen as the landing place ; it is a bay of Dingle Peninsula
which is favored for the following reasons :
1. Favorable air approach from Brest, where the start is to take
place.
2. Sheltered location and hence good prospects of safe debarkation.
3. The men who are to be landed will have available to them numer-
ous safe hiding places on Dingle Peninsula which, as a result of the
short distances, can all be reached within an hour's march.
4. There is a possibility of quickly crossing over to the Valencia
Peninsula [island] with the help of friendly fishermen.
5. Lough Gill, an inland lake near the landing place, offers espe-
cially favorable facilities for hiding the luggage to be taken along
(radio equipment and money). The Dingle Peninsula is further-
more much favored by tourists, which will make our men less
conspicuous.
Participants in the enterprise are the Irishman Frank Ryan and
two men who, up to this time, were members of the training regiment
Brandenburg, 3 Sergeant Clissmann and Private First Class Reiger.
Frank Ryan participated in the enterprise with Sean Russell and
after the latter's death on the U-boat he returned here as directed. 4
He is one of the leading Irish nationalists, has been for many years a
member of the leaders' council of the Irish Republican Army, and a
participant in numerous fights against England. In 1929 the Secret
Service carried out an unsuccessful assassination attempt against him,
and he has often been in jail since. He has extensive connections with
the Irish republican circles up to de Valera's closest entourage and to
de Valera himself, as well as to the Irish regular army, the nationalist
* A special formation for commando warfare.
* Nothing more on this matter has been found in German Foreign Ministry files.
For earlier contacts of German agencies with Sean Russell, Chief of Staff of the
Irish Republican Army (IRA), a secret, militant nationalist organization, see
vol. vin of this series, documents Nos. 562 and 605. According to a published
account by a former German Abwebr official Sean Russell died of natural causes
on board a German submarine which was to take him to Ireland. See Paul
Leverkuebn, German Military Intelligence (London, 1954), pp. 104-105.
AUGUST 1941 365
Irishmen in Northern Ireland, and especially to leading Irishmen in
America. 5
Clissmann lived for over 5 years in Ireland (1983-34 and 1936-39),
married the daughter of a well-known Irish nationalist, and has
been on close terms of friendship with Frank Ryan ever since 1930.
He has undergone military training, has already participated in an
operation against England, speaks perfect English with an Irish
accent, and has extensive connections in Ireland.
Rieger, who also had military training, speaks English perfectly
and is a specially trained radio operator.
The operation was initiated and prepared in cooperation with the
High Command of the Wehrmacht, Department II of the Abwehr,
and by joint agreement is submitted for approval.
The military objectives assigned to Clissmann, according to a letter
of August 23 from the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the
Foreign Ministry (enclosure I fl ), are as follows:
(1) Establishing liaison with the Irish Republican Army and ac-
tivating the sabotage operations of the Irish Republican Army, on the
English island, and at the same time bringing the Irish Republican
Army the sum of money which it is expecting.
(2) Establishing radio communications l>y means of a radio set
[Afu Geraf] which is to be taken along.
(3) Transmitting military information, including weather reports,
since at de Valera/s demand radio traffic of the Eegation with the
Foreign Ministry had to be cut down to the very minimum. 7
(4) Preparation of underground resistance in the event of Ireland's
occupation by the English or Americans.
Supplementing item (3) a telegram of August 22 from Operational
Staff 1 C to the Foreign Ministry is also attached (enclosure II) . s
References in the files of the Foreign Ministry appear in radiogram
No. 207 from Dublin, No. 2800 from Washington. 9
° Further accounts of Ryan's activities are found in Veesenmayer's memoran-
dum to Woermann of Nov. 24 (91/101409-17) and Cllssmann's memorandum to
Woermann of Dec. 5 (91/101391-97) . These documents discuss the policies and
personalities of the Irish Republican Army and that organization's relations with
the Irish Government and with Germany.
•Not printed (F17/053).
* Hempel had reported such requests by the Irish Government in telegrams Nos.
318 of Apr. 11 (91/100886-88) and 383 of May 9 (91/100703).
' This telegram expressed the interest of the Luftwaffe in obtaining weather re-
ports from Ireland (F17/054).
In this telegram of Aug. 12 (91/100772-73) which was transmitted via Wash-
ington Hempel reported de Valera's urgent request that radio transmissions from
the Legation be limited to exceptional cases. In view of de Valera's statements
Hempel strongly recommended that the Embassy transmitter cease broadcasting
weather reports.
366 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
In addition to the foregoing military tasks there are the following
political tasks for Frank Ryan and Clissmann :
(1) To establish a generally effective liaison with the Irish Re-
publican Army. . .
(2) To transmit an urgently needed financial subsidy to the Insn
Republican Army, for which purpose the Foreign Minister has made
available 40,000 pounds sterling.
(3) If expedient, to attempt bringing about an understanding be-
tween the Irish Republican Army and de Valera, which the latter
has so far tried in vain. That is the very task for which Frank Ryan
has the most promising qualifications. Politically this could promote
the strengthening of the all-Irish policy of neutrality and, if necessary,
of the Irish national will to resist. From the point of view of propa-
ganda Frank Ryan has a particularly marked influence with the Irish
in America which, if skillfully mobilized, can be politically useful.
(4) The possibility of influencing through Clissmann the attitude
and policies of the Irish nationalist activitists.
(5) To furnish the Reich with a clear picture of Ireland's domestic
and external situation through objective reporting
(6) To observe carefully English and American efforts in southern
and northern Ireland.
(7) In the event of Ireland's occupation by England or America,
to organize the resistance, thereby to tie down enemy forces to the
greatest possible extent.
To carry out this operation later than the middle of September
1941 is, aside from the weather, not advisable for the following
reasons :
(1) With the progress of the war in the east, Ireland is becoming
more and more a focal point of English-American interests. That
involves intensified surveillance and accordingly slimmer chances of
success for the proposed operation.
(2) After the landing has been accomplished, at least 4 to 8 weeks
are required for the start of operations.
(3) It appears inadvisable to restrain Frank Ryan any longer
because being a confirmed activist, his powers of resistance and will-
ingness for action are beginning to slacken after a forced stay in
Germany of over a year's duration; and in the event of too long an
absence from Ireland the effectiveness of his influence is bound to
suffer there, too. 10
Veesenmaye-r
10 Marginal notes :
In Ribbentrop's handwriting : "September, 1-2 months. ^
In Sonnleithner's handwriting : "October, or November, or December.
"U.St.S Woermann arrange whatever is necessary. Submit again after o
days. R[intelen], Sept. 6."
Through a minute of Sept. 6 (91/101448) Woermann informed Clissmann that
Ribbentrop, after consultation with Hitler, had decided to postpone the Project.
In the absence of Veesenmayer the Foreign Ministry would consult with the
W'ehrmacnt if the project could be undertaken at the end of October, in Novem-
ber, or December.
AUGUST 1941 367
No. 235
1007/307662-64
Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter
Westfalen, August 2d, 1941.
Enclosed is a noteworthy report from the Naval Attache in Tokyo 1
on the situation in Japan.
The report agrees in the main with the Embassy's telegram No.
1607 of August 22. 2
KlTTER
[Enclosure]
Teletype of August 22, 19^,1, From Naval Attache, Tokyo, to Navy,
Berlin
Result of a Discussion With Naval Officers in
Important Positions
1. Japan will not attack Russia. A collapse is expected during the
winter at the latest, and there is no inclination to sacrifice forces for
an operation whose success is not assured and which, even if successful,
will not solve the urgent problem of providing raw materials.
Besides, a war would undoubtedly bring about a conflict with
England and the United States. Japan would then be confronted
with the necessity of conducting offensive operations to the north
and at the same time, in order to obtain raw materials, to the south —
which, however, would be impossible. The Navy hopes to overcome
the strong preference of the Army for action in the north.
2. The impression is that the United States is doing all it can to
involve Japan in a war with Russia and, in order to avoid incidents,
there will probably be no interference with the transportation of
gasoline to Vladivostok. For the present it is also believed that the
widely heralded departure of the gasoline ships is only a bluff.
3. After the air bases in Indochina have been consolidated and suf-
ficient army units have been transported there, Japan will occupy
Thailand before the year is over. The reasons are: eliminating the
threat to the flanks, naval control of the Gulf of Siam and the eastern
ports of the Isthmus, especially Singora, safeguarding the supplies of
rice, rubber and tin, and advancing the base of attack against Burma
and Singapore. A peaceful solution is hoped for. It is not expected
that Russia will take any action. It is assumed that England and the
United States will remain passive. The risk of a conflict with the
latter is being accepted.
1 Rear Admiral Paul Wenneker,
3 Document No. 225.
368 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
4. The next step planned is occupation of the Dutch oil fields, simul-
taneously with an attack on Manila, and the blockading of Singapore
by cutting off all access routes.
5. Concluding remark : I wish to emphasize that these are the views
of the Navy. Whether the Government and the Army are of the
same mind is doubtful.
No. 236
61/40185-88
Memora/ndvm by an Official of the Political Department
Berlin, August 24, 1941.
Minister Kroll on whom I called August 24 as instructed, expressed
his complete satisfaction over his visit in the Special Train, He was
able to fulfill completely the purpose of his trip * and hopes only that
it will be made possible for him to come to Berlin every 3 or 4 months
for a short period. In this connection, Herr Kroll is especially hope-
ful that Under State Secretary Woermann will call him to Berlin for
a report whenever the situation requires it.
In the Special Train he lunched with the Foreign Minister, and in
the evening he had a discussion with Ambassador Hitter who had him
stay for an additional day in order that he might have a detailed con-
versation with General Jodl. This conversation took place without
Ambassador Hitter's asking the Foreign Minister about the matter.
Minister Kroll described the results of his discussions approximately
as follows :
The Turkish problem was not acute at the moment, and it was diffi-
cult to judge when this condition would change.
General Jodl explained that we did not have nearly sufficient forces
at this time for a large campaign such as a war against Turkey would
require.
The Foreign Minister shared this opinion.
Ambassador Hitter was of the opinion that the Turkish problem
was bound to become acute in any case. The people from the OKH
believed that complications with Turkey would develop faster if the
English were to enter Iran. The Foreign Minister also pointed out
the possibility of the Turkish problem's arising more quickly in the
event the English entered Iran.
All the officials with whom he [Kroll] had spoken agreed moreover
that the English would occupy at least the southern part of Iran.
He himself believed that this would only force Turkey further toward
our side.
With respect to the question of restoring the bridges over the
Maritsa, General Jodl told him that there was no conceivable military
1 No documents have been found which indicate what was involved.
AUGUST 1941 369
interest in reopening them to traffic before the scheduled date
(December) .
He [Kroll] had set forth a program for our policy in the event
that the problem should arise, which was fully approved by all
concerned.
In no case must a date be chosen for this which preceded the de-
struction of Russian power; that is to say, Russia must then be
weakened to such a degree that the bulk of the German Army could
be released.
Our requests must in no circumstance take the form of an ulti-
matum, because in that case the Turks would reply by armed force,
even without having any prospects of victory. Instead, a carefully
prepared, friendly discussion must be conducted. In this connection
one should consider inviting Saracoglu to Berlin. In contrast with
Saracoglu's trip to Moscow 2 one must not press but rather allow
things to develop organically.
In this context Turkey must be offered great prospects and must
be persuaded that we do not want to assign her a second-class position
in the new Europe, but rather important and honorable duties, pos-
sibly as the "factor of stabilization" in the Near East and eastern
Mediterranean, in place of England, who will be forced out; in this
way a certain balance with Italy would be established.
In order to prove to Turkey that we are sincere and that we wish
to work with her on a long-range basis, we must help her in obtaining
her wishes with regard to her security. These are with respect to :
1. Edirne.
2. Creation of buffer states under Turkish influence in the
Caucasus region.
3. Rectifications on the Turkish-Syrian frontier (Baghdad
Railway and Aleppo) as well as on the Turkish-Iraq frontier
(Mosul).
4. Solution to the question of the [Aegean] islands in order
to give Turkey security against Italy after removal of the Rus-
sian threat. To do this one could quietly proceed to relieve the
German occupation troops on Mytilene and Chios by Italian
forces, something which had been requested by the OICW, but
was repeatedly rejected by the Foreign Ministry; because the
wish of the Turks to get rid of the Italians again would make the
solution of these problems more pressing.
The Foreign Minister had asked him [Kroll] whether actually
anything could still be done with Turkey. He had given a very
definite, affirmative reply. The friendship pact 3 was just a beginning.
Matters were not likely to develop suddenly. Turkey would have to
be pried loose from her alliance with England by using the Anglo-
Russian alliance as a lever. Naturally, he [Kroll] could not guarantee
that the passage of troops could be obtained through the plan which
he proposed. But if one wanted to obtain anything at all then this,
* Apparently a reference to Saracoglu's visit to Moscow, Sept. 25-Oct. 17, 1939.
See vol. vni of this series, documents Nos. 81, 116, 211, and 268.
' German-Turkish Treaty of June 18, 1941, printed as document No. 648 in vol.
xn of this series.
682^905—64 29
370 DOCUMENTS OK GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
in his opinion, was the only course to be taken. He questioned the
Foreign Minister's remark that everyone in Turkey could be bought,
pointing out that Ismet Inonii, the man who, in his opinion, was the
one who alone mattered (this was also the opinion of the Foreign
Minister) could not be bought in any way.
During the conversation which lasted 1 hour, General Jodl had
remarked that after conclusion of the war with Russia the Turkish
business would perhaps not even be necessary. As he did not go into
this question further, it was arranged with Ambassador Ritter that
the latter would ask him sometime in confidence what he had. meant
by this remark.
Minister Kroll will send a memorandum of his discussions * with
the next courier. Ambassador Ritter has already asked that this
memorandum be sent to all offices and Missions concerned for their
information.
Minister Kroll asks Under State Secretary Woermann to consider
these matters as intended solely for his own information and not to
discuss them with Ambassador Papen either.
Herewith submitted to Under State Secretary Woermann in ac-
cordance with instructions.
Smbnd
' Not found.
No. 237
843/199827-30
Memorandum by Counselor of Embassy HUger
Westfaijbn, August 24, 1941.
D IX 171.
Subject: Draft for "Supplementary Instructions for the Handling
of Propaganda against the Soviet Union,"
With reference to your D IX 143 of August 19, 1941, 1 D IX 144
of August 20, 1941. 2
'Not printed (343/199890-97) , a memorandum by Grosskopf criticizing
propaganda directives regarding the kolkhoz system. These had been forwarded
by the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories and had been discussed
in an interdepartmental conference of Aug. 19.
'Not printed (343/196883-84; 343/199875-78), a memorandum by Grosskopf
commenting critically on a draft for "Supplementary Directives for handling
the propaganda against the Soviet Union." The draft had been worked out by
the Wehrmacht Propaganda Department in accord with Rosenberg and then
forwarded by the Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the OKW by
letter of Aug. 18.
Grosskopffs memorandum expressed "the strongest possible objection" to
certain sections of the directives which in his opinion meant that the system
of collective farms would be maintained. He requested that the matter be taken
up In the Russia Committee and presented to the Foreign Minister.
AUGUST 1941 371
On the basis of the enclosed memorandum I reported to the Foreign
Minister today about the further handling of propaganda with respect
to the abolition of the collective system. In view of the position taken
by State Secretary Backe and the situation created by it, I proposed
to the Foreign Minister, in agreement with the other members of the
Russia Committee [Bussland-Oremwni] present here, that the com-
promise solution be accepted and that the contents of the "Supple-
mentary Directives for Handling the Propaganda Against the Soviet
Union" drawn up by the OKW be approved.
The Foreign Minister approved the proposal of the Russia Com-
mittee and stated that he agreed with the instructions mentioned above.
Furthermore, he ordered that the leaflets drafted earlier by the Russia
Committee be changed correspondingly and then printed, if need be.
Further details in this connection should be agreed upon between
Minister Grosskopf and me during my impending stay in Berlin.
In this connection the Foreign Minister repeated his instructions
that I should go to Berlin on August 26 in order to discuss current
questions with Minister Grosskopf and Colonel von Wedel. 3
The letter, No. 12/41, of August 18 of the Representative of the
Foreign Ministry with the OKW is being sent back as an enclosure,*
as requested.
Herewith submitted to Minister Grosskopf.
IIlLGER
[Enclosure]
Westfalen, August 22, 1941.
Memorandum
Subject: The position of the members of the Russia Committee
(Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg, Counselor of Embassy
Hilger, Referent Rost) at Westfalen with respect to the question
of propaganda regarding the abolition of the collective system.
The Russia Committee — including Senior Counselor Grosskopf —
unanimously takes the position that the German propaganda aimed
at the Soviet hinterland and the Red Army must emphasize the aboli-
tion of the collective system, rejected by the overwhelming majority
of the rural population of the USSR, and the re-establishment of
private peasant enterprise as this slogan, above all, seems capable of
introducing insecurity and disintegration into the ranks of the Red
Army. It is not without good reason that, in all the reports of the
representatives of the Foreign Ministry with the Army headquarters,
it is pointed out time and again that the great mass of the Soviet
' Of the Propaganda Department of the OKW.
1 See footnote 2.
372 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
people are only interested in one question — collective system or private
enterprise — and that therefore the promise to abolish the collective
system represents the most effective means of propaganda.
The Committee, however, realized from the very beginning that the
abolition of the collective system could not be permitted to lead to an
immediate, unauthorized partition of the collective land, since such an
elemental movement would now and later jeopardize the harvest.
Consequently the leaflets drawn up by the Committee expressly point
out that a transition from the collective system to private ownership
may take place only after the restoration of order, and in an organized
manner.
In opposition to this view of the Committee, regarding which a
number of experts on Russia had expressed their agreement in an oral
exchange of views, the Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture
(State Secretary Backe) holds the view that the principle of the col-
lective system must not be tampered with, because this system offers
the only sure guaranty that the harvest will not be scattered to the four
winds but will benefit the German food supply. State Secretary
Backe fears that German interests will be seriously imperiled by the
proclamation of the principle of the abolition of the collective system,
particularly since he considers it unavoidable that there will be a re-
percussion upon, the rural population of the territories that are al-
ready occupied.
In a discussion with Ministerialdirektor Riecke of the Ministry for
Food and Agriculture on August 21, 1941, the idea was expressed by
us repeatedly and emphatically that propaganda and practical execu-
tion are two different things. From the standpoint of the necessity
of supporting military actions one need not forgo the propaganda
effect of the most attractive slogan. The question of how the promise
regarding the abolition of the hated collective system would later be
redeemed is, at the moment, not so acute in view of the urgency of an
effective propaganda.
According to reports from Berlin the conflicting opinions came to a
head in an interdepartmental conference on August 19, 1941. s At
that time it was not possible to put through a decision to have the com-
plete abolition of the collective enterprises placed in the foreground
of the propaganda. After hours of negotiation the decision was made
that the OKW should issue the leaflet forming enclosure 1) 6 on
August 19, 1941. In accordance with this the OKW requests early
approval by the Foreign Ministry of the enclosed draft of "Supple-
mentary Directives for the Handling of Propaganda Against the
Soviet Union" together with guidelines."
" See footnote 1.
' Not printed ( 543/109831-32 ) .
'Not printed {343/199833-38).
AUGUST 1941 373
The contents of these directives represent a compromise between the
point of view of the Russia Committee and that of the Ministry for
Food and Agriculture. In view of the fact that more extensive con-
cessions cannot be obtained from the Ministry for Food and Agricul-
ture at the present time and that the leaflet (enclosure 1) has already
been issued by the OKW, the Committee respectfully proposes to the
Foreign Minister, while adhering to its fundamental point of view,
that existing objections be put aside for the time being and that ap-
proval be given to the directives submitted by the OKW.
No. 238
26D/173180-82
The Foreign Minister to tlie Embassy in Turkey
Telegram
URGENT
top secret Special Train, August 25, 1941 — 12 : 45 a. m.
No. 888 of August 24
from the Special Train Received Berlin, August 25 — 3 : 00 a. m.
No. 1205 of August 25
from the Foreign Ministry Sent August 25 — 7 : 10 a. m.
For the Ambassador personally.
I am telling you the following for your information :
On August 19 I received Ambassador Gerede here at Headquarters
and first explained to him the military situation in the east, where
Russian losses already amounted to about 6 million. 1 In the next few
weeks the remainder of the Red Army would probably be destroyed
and the greater part of European Russia would be occupied, whereby
Russia's power of resistance would be smashed. In any case Stalin
would be unable to rebuild the Red Army to any appreciable extent
after such blows. German losses in Russia, in contrast, were not even
so great as in a single big battle of the World War.
With regard to the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting 2 I told the Am-
bassador that Roosevelt had evidently turned down flatly Churchill's
demand for America's entry into the war, because he no doubt realized
that a two- front war against Europe and Japan, which would then
result, could not be carried on by the United States, for these reasons :
1. the antiwar sentiment of the people;
2. totally inadequate armament.
Roosevelt was doing everything just to keep England fighting, con-
stantly promising mass deliveries of material — which was a big bluff.
'A memorandum of Aug, 20 by Schmidt (67/47031-46) records this conver-
sation with considerable detail.
* See document No. 209 and footnote 2.
374 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The German-English war would continue until England finally sued
for peace. After the collapse of Russia, Germany would turn against
England with full force.
In discussing the points relating to Turkey I told Gerede that the
Anglo-Russian guarantee 3 appeared to me like effrontery toward
Turkey. It would be respected only so long as Turkey was important
to Russia. Later, as a result of the guarantee, demands would surely
be made for air bases on the Dardanelles, permission for Russian
divisions to enter Turkish territory, etc. ; we even had definite reports
that the English had promised the Russians that at the proper time
they would not oppose such Russian aspirations. In this connection
I showed Gerede the original of Count Schulenburg's telegram of
November 25, 1940, from Moscow,* which quoted Molotov's statements
on the question of Russia's accession to the Tripartite Pact and accord-
ing to which Russia, as a condition for her accession, demanded in
addition to a Russian-Bulgarian mutual assistance pact the "estab-
lishment of a base for land and naval forces of the USSR within
range of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term
lease." I pointed out to Gerede that our rejection of this demand
had been a basic cause of the German-Russian enmity, precisely be-
cause the Fiihrer did not want to let the monster, Bolshevik Russia,
advance any farther. If M. Numan believed, as I had heard, that
Germany had followed this policy only because of her own interest, it
might be said in reply that this stand had been only 10 percent in the
interest of Germany and 90 percent in the interest of Turkey.
In reply to my question about Turkey's attitude toward the Turk-
ish peoples near the border in the Caucasus and east of the Caspian
Sea, Gerede stated emphatically that his country had no ambitions
outside its present boundaries, at least none based on official policy.
The Pan-Turanian idea was no longer alive in Turkey. When I
asked him further what position Turkey would take if England
should wish to establish a new front in the Caucasus, the Ambassador
replied evasively that Turkey would be on her guard. Gerede also
gave vague and. evasive answers to my further questions whether the
present official policy might not change, how the situation was in
Syria, and whether a closer alignment of Turkey with Germany might
not be possible after the collapse of Russia. Evidently he had instruc-
* A reference to notes handed to the Turkish Foreign Minister by the Ambas-
sadors of Great Britain and the Soviet Union on Aug. 10. These notes contained
declarations by the two Governments couched in identical terms assuring Turkey
that they had no aggressive intentions with regard to the Straits; that they
would respect scrupulously Turkey's territorial integrity; and that they were
prepared to assist Turkey in the event of an attack by any European power.
For text, see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. in, pp. 891-892.
* Vol. ii of this series, document No. 404.
AUGUST 1941 375
tions not to enter into such discussions. After his return to Berlin he
again emphasized to Herr von "Weizsacker that Turkey had no ambi-
tions and that his conversation with me had not been of an official
nature. As Herr von Weizsacker has further reported, Gerede's
visit to me gave rise to rumors in the Berlin diplomatic corps about
pressure on Turkey to permit the passage of German troops, which
the State Secretary of course denied immediately. 5 I ask you accord-
ingly to deny any false versions of the subject of the conversation
that you may encounter there, for the rest, however, not to give any
indication of its content but merely use my statements to Gerede also
at your post.
RlBBENTKOP
"In a memorandum of Aug. 22, St.S. 545, (265/173166) Weizsacker recorded
having teen informed by Alfieri that such rumors were circulating in the diplo-
matic corps.
No. 239
82/60520-25
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Telegram
HAM 364/R Special Train, August 25, 1941—1 : 25 a. m.
No. 890 from the
Special Train Received Berlin, August 25 — 3 : 00 a. m.
No. 1383 from the Foreign Ministry Sent August 25 — 10 : 15 a. m.
The attitude of certain Japanese circles set forth in your telegram
No. 1607 of August 22 x is incomprehensible. It shows that these
circles, misjudging the situation with regard to power and the mili-
tary aspect, are unaware of Japan's own strength and the weakness
of the United States and England.
I request that you counter the irresolution there with the following
arguments in your conversations with the Prime Minister and the
Foreign Minister and all other circles accessible to you :
1. The German "Wehrmacht has up to now captured 1.3 million
Russian prisoners. The number of Russians killed, according to ob-
servations on the battlefields and careful estimates, far exceeds twice
that figure. As regards the total number of wounded Russians it is
impossible to make any exact determination. On the basis of general
experience, however, they too may be estimated at more than a million.
Consequently, the losses of the Red Army up to the present amount to
about 6 million men.
This number is verified and corroborated by the observations made
with regard to the Russian divisions thus far committed and destroyed
on the German-Russian front. Of the 260 Russian divisions known to
1 Document No. 225.
376 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
have been committed thus far on the German front, 200 have been
completely destroyed ; the remaining 60 divisions are badly battered.
At present 40 new Russian divisions are being organized behind the
front, consisting of men 16 to 45 years old, with no previous service.
These new divisions have no General Staff officers at all and only a
small percentage of active front line officers. Their equipment in
heavy weapons is quite inadequate. Some troop units have fewer
rifles than men. Many troops were found to have only one or two
machine guns per battalion. Some of them no longer have any Rus-
sian rifles at all but are equipped with captured Polish rifles.
In connection with these figures and observations two facts are of
paramount importance : One is that the nucleus of the Red Army on
the German-Russian front is destroyed. The Red divisions still re-
maining on this front are no longer up to full fighting strength. The
second fact is the following : If one takes into account the divisions
stationed and tied down in other parts of Russia, such as East Asia,
Siberia, the Caucasus, etc., and if one judges from the recruitment
capacity in its ratio to the total population, which experience shows
to be about the same in all countries, it is evident that Russia no longer
even has any manpower reserves worth mentioning, to say nothing of
the total lack of material which cannot be replaced.
This leads to the conclusion, as far as Japan is concerned, that a mili-
tary intervention against Russia in the east in these circumstances will
not constitute any risk for an army like the Japanese, especially since
the army in Siberia consists of only a few hundred thousand men.
2. The fact that the United States has reacted to Japan's occupa-
tion of Indochina only with economic sanctions, 2 which moreover cut
both ways, the fact that the Roosevelt^Churchill meeting 3 produced
only words, and the fact that the United States has made the hopeless
and almost desperate attempt to keep Japan out by means of insincere
negotiations are clear signs of weaknesses on the part of the United
States, proving that it will not risk any serious military action against
Japan. This is no news to the military expert, for he has long known
that the Army and the Air Force of the United States are not yet
ready and that its Navy is still inferior to the Japanese Navy. More-
over, a large majority of the American people are opposed to war.
The propaganda speeches of a few politicians and the propaganda ar-
ticles of the Jewish newspapers give a completely false picture of the
real attitude of the American people.
3 Japanese as well as Chinese assets in the United States were frozen by Ex-
ecutive Order No. 8832, signed July 26, On Aug. 1, President Roosevelt issued
an order prohibiting exports to destinations other than the Western Hemisphere,
the British Empire, and unoccupied countries of petroleum products, and also of
certain materials such as wood pulp, metals, machinery, vehicles, rubber and
chemicals. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 19-il, vol. iv, pp. 842-855.
' See document No. 209 and footnote 2.
AUGUST 1941 377
3. It follows from this that Japan still has freedom of choice. The
longer she waits the more the ratio of forces might change to her dis-
advantage. Japan therefore runs the risk of missing the unique
chance offered by the present situation to secure her rear and thereby
to assume a quite different position with respect to the Anglo-Saxon
world, of not achieving her objectives with respect to a Greater East
Asia, and of later being exposed, in an unfavorable position, to an
attack from the United States, which would in the meantime have be-
come stronger militarily.
There should, therefore, be but one decision for Japan, namely to
eliminate quickly the Russian opponent in East Asia and thereby se-
cure her rear position in the north, and then to realize her Greater East
Asian goals in the south. 4 The earlier elimination of Russia in East
Asia resulting from this would also release the German forces sooner
for renewed action against England. England will then be even less
able to risk opposing Japan in the pursuit of her goals by transferring
new forces to East Asia.
4. The nightmare of encirclement will not be eliminated by a hesi-
tant policy and by inactivity. The threatening encirclement will be
broken only by activity and by a decision to act quickly, just as Ger-
many at one time broke the encirclement that threatened her.
5. If Japan permitted unhindered passage even of a single ship-
ment of war material from the United States to Vladivostok, a trouble-
some precedent would be created. For the present it seems that the
United States intends to begin only with an isolated shipload and with
only the relatively harmless delivery of engine fuel in order to probe
the situation and determine the attitude of Japan. This first ship-
ment of fuel will soon be followed by larger quantities of fuel, and be-
fore long, guns, airplanes, and armament of all kinds will follow.
How will Japan later justify stopping the fifth or sixth shipload if she
has permitted the first shipments to pass without objection ? It would
be childish to believe Russian or American assurances that the fuel or
the guns will be used exclusively in the West against Germany. Even
if that were true, Germany would have to expect Japan, in the spirit
of the Tripartite Pact, to block such direct military support of an
enemy of Germany. Actually, however, every such shipment will
strengthen the war potential of the Russian Army of the East against
* The record of a conference of Hitler's with his military and naval advisers,
held on Aug. 22, contains the following statement by Hitler in reply to a question
regarding Japan's political intentions :
"The Fiihrer is convinced that Japan will carry out the attack on Vladivos-
tok as soon as forces have been assembled. The present aloofness can be ex-
plained by the fact that the assembling of forces is to be accomplished
undisturbed, and the attack is to come as a surprise move." See U.S. Navy
Department, ONI, "Fiihrer Conferences on Matters Dealing With the German
Navy. 1941," vol. n, p. 27.
378 DOCTTMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Japan. Japanese soldiers would later have to fight against the weap-
ons for which Japan would now permit unhindered passage; or in
any event the threat to Japan in the rear would be increased if she
should later decide to advance southward. Japan should therefore
be seriously warned of the dangers to which she will expose herself if
she permits passage for war material of any kind from the United
States to Kussia. If Japan wants to avoid as far as possible any
provocation of the United States, she can still do so by refraining from
sinking American ships or seizing them permanently as prizes. It
would be enough to bring North American ships to Japanese ports, to
unload them there, and then release them again. In this connection it
would be announced from the very outset that the North American flag
would be respected and the ships therefore released, and that only the
war material destined for Russia would be confiscated or held.
Another more common procedure with a similar objective would be
for Japan to follow the Pan-American example and proclaim a secu-
rity zone around East Asia, perhaps in conjunction with the Govern-
ments of Manchukuo, North China, and Indochina. The Pan-Ameri-
can provisions for the American security zone 5 could to a large extent
be copied. In any case it would have to be stipulated that no war
material of any kind might be transported to belligerent powers
through this security zone. 8 In this way Japan would beat the United
States with its own arguments and deprive it of the possibility of
raising objections. 8 The establishment of such a security zone in East
Asia would at the same time strongly emphasize the idea of a Greater
Asia, in the same way as Roosevelt is pursuing a Pan-American
hemispheric policy. However, even if Japan should simply con-
fiscate or destroy such ships carrying war material, the Americans
will not in our opinion dare to carry things too far. 7
6. Now that the "Wehrmacht has penetrated deep into Russian terri-
tory in two great jumps, we are entering the third phase of this cam-
paign. It should be borne in mind in this connection that in the opera-
tions carried out thus far the guiding idea of our tactics has not been
to gain territory or successes enhancing our prestige, nor merely to
push our enemy back, but as a matter of principle, and always the idea
was the battle of encirclement and thereby destruction of the enemy
and his material. In a vast number of pockets, large and small, the
Soviet Army has been systematically destroyed in this manner. The
same thing will be done in the future to remaining units of the Rus-
sian Army still fit for combat. Our objective, namely the definitive
* See vol. vrn of this series, document No. 306 and footnotes 1 and 3.
" Marginal note in Weisssftcker's handwriting : "?".
7 Marginal note in Weizsacker's handwriting : " !".
AUGUST 1941 379
destruction of the army inasmuch as it is still able to fight and the
occupation of the important centers of grain-raising, raw materials,
and industry and production in the Soviet Union will be achieved in
the course of this year. We still have at least a couple of months, if
not more, for this task. After completion of these operations there
will no longer be any possibility of a regeneration on any large scale
for the Soviet Union, either in manpower or material, so that as a re-
sult of the campaign of this summer and autumn Russia will be
eliminated, at least as a potential and significant ally of England.
Next spring we will engage any Russian forces that may still turn up
in a definitive combat with smaller units of the German Army that we
will leave in the east.
For Germany victory over Russia is of particular importance
because :
1. As a result of the seizure of the Ukrainian territories there will
no longer be any food problem for all the future;
2. Because of the seizure of the rich raw materials areas and the in-
dustrial centers the German raw materials problem will likewise in the
main no longer be any problem, and the German war potential will be
tremendously increased ;
3. And, above all, Germany will now be free in the rear as a result
of the elimination of the threat in the east. She will be able to with-
draw a large portion of her army from the east and to release part of
it for work on airplane and submarine construction and part of it for
other theaters of war and to turn with the full weight of her national
strength against her last enemy, England.
I request regular radio reports about further developments.
Ribbentkop
No. 240
65/48853-54
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Tehran, August 25, 1941.
top secret Received August 25,11:25p.m.
Unnumbered
I just returned from an audience with the Shah to whom I conveyed
the Fuhrer's message 1 in accordance with instructions. After the
Shah had expressed his sincere thanks for the message, he described
the events of the day. According to this, at 4 : 30 a. m. the Soviet Am-
' See document No. 230.
380 DOCUMENTS ON" GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
bassador* and the British Minister 3 handed to the Minister Presi-
dent at his private home a note informing him that Russian and
British troops had begun to enter Iranian territory at that time and
that military operations had started. These measures had become
necessary because the Iranian Government had not replied to the de-
mand for the removal of the Eeich Germans. The Shah continued
that the English and the Russians had begun the operation all of a
sudden from Palehvi to Bandar Abbas. The Iranian ports of the
Gulf had been occupied, Iranian warships sunk, open cities, even
villages, bombed. More than 1,000 tanks and several hundred air-
planes had been used for the operation. The Iranian Army was not
able to conduct a successful war on two fronts against this powerful
enemy. He [the Shah] didn't want to ask Germany for military aid
because it could not be rendered at this time. He urgently requested,
however, that steps be taken with the Turkish Government so that
the latter would bring influence to bear upon the English and Russians
that they cease hostilities against Iran and at the same time grant
safe conduct for the return voyage of the Germans from Iran by a
route which would be arranged through diplomatic channels. 4
In conclusion the Shah stated that he knew very well that the
accusations against the Reich Germans were nothing but a pretext.
The Shah obviously is so impressed by the sudden attack by the
English and Russians which took place today that he is no longer
seriously determined to offer resistance in this war on two fronts.
Today's statement by the Minister President before Parliament also
points to this. In this declaration he gives a historic description of
the British-Soviet pressure upon the Iranian Government and of the
attitude of the Iranian Government. Simultaneously an account of
' Alexey Tchernikh.
5 Sir Reader W. Billiard.
'In a memorandum of Aug. 26 (65/45278X-80X) Weizsacker commented on
Ettel's conversation with tbe Shah and proposed the following with regard to
. these particular points raised by the Shah :
' "It would be out of the question for us to approach our enemies through Turkey
in this manner, in the role of supplicants, as it were ; but a friendly talk could
be held with the Turkish Government to the end that it should on its own motion
and on the strength of its treaty obligations do everything which is possible.
"It is suggested that Ambassador von Papen be instructed to undertake such
a demarche, and that we also talk with the Turkish Ambassador here to this
effect.
". . . The Shah has suggested to Minister Ettel that he should endeavor through
the intermediary of Turkey to obtain a safe conduct from England and Soviet
Russia for the Germans in Iran by a route to be arranged through diplomatic
channels.
"It is suggested that Ambassador von Papen be instructed to undertake such
a demarche with the Turkish Government. Since occupation of Tehran is to
be expected soon, it is primarily the Russians from whom safe conduct will have
to be obtained."
In telegram No. 904 of Aug. 27, forwarded to Therapia as No. 1229 of Aug. 28
(05/45894-06) Ribbentrop instructed Papen to convey these requests by the Shah
to the Turkish Government
AUGUST 1941 381
today's British-Soviet attack on Iran is given. The enemy was every-
where engaged in hostilities with Iran's Army. 5 The Iranian Govern-
ment had started discussions to explore the reason for this attack;
the Government would communicate the result of this discussion at
the proper time. At the end the Minister President asked the popula-
tion to show sang-froid, firmness, and calm. 8
Ettel
5 In the copy of this document in the Foreign Minister's file (65/45276X-77X;
45304) this sentence reads: "The enemy nowhere bad a motive for involving
Iran's Army In hostilities." In the copy here printed the sentence has been
corrected in longhand.
° The copy in the Foreign Minister's file hears the notation : "Shown to the
Fuhrer. Hew [el], Aug. 26."
No. 241
635/240000-03
The State Secretary to the Embassy to the Holy See
Berlin, August 25, 1941.
Pol. HI 1642.
In the opinion of the Reich Government, the provisions of the
Reich Concordat 1 — in so far as they are still applicable at all — can
be applied only in the Eeich area as it existed at the time the Con-
cordat was concluded in the year 1933. They are not applicable, on
the other hand, in the so-called "new Reich area", which comprises
the Ostmark, the Sudeten German areas, the Protectorate Bohemia
and Moravia, the Memel area, and the incorporated eastern areas and
Eupen-Malmedy. Nor are they applicable in the General Govern-
ment, in Alsace, in Lorraine, Luxembourg, and in the liberated areas
of Lower Styria, Carinthia and Carniola.
In the absence of a contractual agreement the Vatican does not
consider itself obligated to get in touch with governmental author-
ities before filling the higher offices in the Catholic Church in these
new areas. On the contrary, it claims here the right of free and
unrestricted appointment to office. This claim, which for example
led to undesirable consequences with the appointment of the Apostolic
Administrator in Innsbruck, 2 cannot be recognized by the State. The
Reich Government has therefore resolved to demand of the Vatican
that in all cases of appointments to higher Church offices in the new
Reich areas it get in touch with the Reich Government in advance.
This demand also includes the appointments of apostolic adminis-
trators, permanent chapter vicars and other substitute bishops, which
1 See Series O, vol. i, document No. 371.
" Bishop Paul Rusci. Material on this controversy is to be found in serial 3068.
382 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
were not regulated in the Reich Concordat, In order to close this gap
in the Reich Concordat and create uniform conditions for the entire
Reich area, the Reich Government attaches the greatest importance
to the Vatican's being willing to make a prior inquiry as to the politi-
cal suitability of the candidates also in case of filling these officers in
the Old Reich.
I therefore request that you transmit to the Cardinal Secretary of
State a note verbale worded as shown in the enclosure. I should like
to point out that the text -was agreed upon with the Chief of the Party
Chancellery, approved by the Foreign Minister, and can therefore not
be changed. 3 Should the Holy See wish to discuss the matter orally,
please request that a written reply be made first. Please report on
the execution of your instructions.*
Freiherr von Weizsacker
enclosure — draft
Note Verbale
zu Pol. Ill 1642 II.
The recent appointments by the Holy See of several Apostolic Ad-
ministrators for the administration of episcopal offices in the areas
under German sovereignty gives the Reich Government occasion to
make the following communication :
Considering the importance which adheres to the occupation of all
the higher offices of the Roman Catholic Church, the Reich Govern-
ment does not wish to waive its right, based on its sovereignty, to be
consulted before occupation of these offices. On the contrary, it must
stress the importance of being given the possibility to register objec-
tions of a general political nature before occupation of the offices of
an archbishop, a bishop, a coadjutor with the right of succession, as
well as an independent prelate (praelatus nullius) in the entire new
Reich area together with Alsace, Lorraine, Luxembourg, and the
liberated areas of Lower Styria, Carinthia and Carniola, as well as
the General Government. It must also claim this right in those cases
in which the administration of the above-mentioned Church offices is
to be exercised by an apostolic administrator or, beyond a certain
period, by a chapter vicar or some other substitute bishop.
In the interest of a uniform procedure for the entire sovereign
area of the Reich, the Reich Government must also stress the impor-
tance of there being in like manner a confidential consultation with
* See document No. 148 and footnote 6.
' In telegram No. 54 of Aug. 29 (535/240031) Menshausen reported that ho had
handed the note to Under State Secretary Monsignor Pardinl (Tardini).
Tardini had remarked that the note needed to he studied carefully hecause it
contained new aspects which could be considered as precedents by other states.
AUGUST 1941 383
the Reich Government also within the area of the Old Reich before
appointment of Church dignitaries of the last-mentioned kind
(apostolic administrators, chapter vicars and other substitute bish-
ops), in order to give it the opportunity to express any objections of
a general political nature against the proposed candidates.
The Reich Government therefore requests the Holy See to give it,
in the future by means of an appropriate communication, the oppor-
tunity before appointment to all Church offices of the above-men-
tioned sort to bring forward any existing objections of a general
political nature.
No. 242
Record of the Duce's Conversation With the Fiihrer x
The Fuhrer's Headquarters, August 25, 1951/XIX.
I
In his first conversation with the Duce immediately after the lat-
ter's arrival at Headquarters, 2 the Fiihrer gave the Duce a general
outline of the situation, together with a detailed account of the mili-
tary developments.
The Fiihrer began by acknowledging to the Duce that it had been
a wise decision to liquidate Greece along with Yugoslavia before
launching the Russian campaign. Greece and Yugoslavia were in
reality two potential and active enemies of the Axis, and eliminating
them in time proved a great advantage at the moment when it became
necessary to take action against Soviet Russia in order to eliminate
the grave Bolshevik menace and to achieve effective control of
Europe.
The Fiihrer then made a special point of acknowledging that for
the first time since the beginning of the conflict, the German military
intelligence service had failed. It had in fact not reported that Russia
had a very well armed and equipped army composed for the most
part of men imbued with a veritable fanaticism who, despite their
1 This document is translated from a photostatic copy of an Italian version
found In a collection of Italian Foreign Ministry documents brought to Lisbon
during World War II. The originals were later returned to the Italian Gov-
ernment. No German text of this document has been found. The Italian rec-
ord here translated is the same as is printed in Galeazzo Ciano, L'Europa verso
la castastrofe (Milan, 1948), pp. 669-675.
*In telegram No. 1952 of Aug. 3 (B12/B001143) Ribbentrop directed Macken-
sen to invite Mussolini for the period Aug. 14-17. In telegram No. 1744 of
Aug. 4 (B12/B001145) Mackensen reported Mussolini's acceptance of the time
and program, and that General Cavallero would come along although Ciano'a
attendance was uncertain because of his ill health. Further messages regarding
the postponement and final, definitive arrangements of the meeting are to be
found in serial B12.
384 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
racial heterogeneity, were now fighting with blind fury. The Bol-
shevik army as a whole could be viewed as made up of two large
masses : one, the larger, consisting of peasants who fought with un-
reasoning obstinancy, and the other made up in the main of industrial
/ workers who strongly believed in the words of Marx and fought with
fanaticism. For opposite reasons, both were fighting to the last man ;
the former out of primitive ignorance, the latter because they were
bewitched by the mystique of Communism.
The Fuhrer added that he would not let himself be ensnared by the
Soviets into continuing the battle inside cities by street fighting, for
which the Russians were exceptionally well prepared. He had no
- intention of destroying the large cities, but would leave them to fall
by themselves after he had won the battle of annihilation against the
Soviet military forces emplaeed around them. That was his plan for
Leningrad, which had an urban area comprising about 4 million in-
habitants. It would fall as soon as the total destruction of the Soviet
forces ringing the city was accomplished. By avoiding street fighting,
which yields no useful results, he would above all be able to save im-
portant forces.
' The Fiihrer had no doubt whatsoever as to the outcome of the
struggle. He thought there was no point at the moment in dwelling
on a consideration of what might at some future date become a line
of resistance set up by the Soviets; he was inclined to believe that the
Eed military strength would inevitably collapse not later than October
under the incessant blows that were being, and would be, inflicted
upon them. A contributing factor, as time went on, would be the
conquest, already begun and soon to be completed, of the major Soviet
industrial centers and mining regions, for example the Don river basin.
Whether this collapse would come soon, within a few months, or next
spring, could be considered of secondary importance because already
the means of victory were in Germany's hands. Inasmuch as the Ger-
man losses to date, despite the fierceness of the struggle, had not ex-
ceeded the low figure of 68,000 men, and the war booty that had fallen
into German hands was so immense, far exceeding the needs of the
armed forces of the Reich, the Fiihrer had decided to concentrate the
production effort from now on exclusively on the construction of sub-
marines, tanks, and antiaircraft artillery.
Regarding military plans for the future, the Fiihrer told the Duce —
in absolute secrecy—that after completion of the Russian campaign
he intended to deal England the final blow by invading the island.
To that end he was now marshaling the necessary resources by pre-
paring the appropriate naval and land material needed for the land-
ing. In the opinion of the Fiihrer, that would mark the final act of
the conflict.
AUGUST 1941 385
Concerning France. The Fiihrer held that there would be no point
m dealing with that problem while the battle was stiil in progress in
Russia. He had found justification for his feeling of distrust of the
French, whom he was watching carefully and with respect to whom
he intended to maintain a negative attitude. The French question
would be taken up again at the end of the war.
Eeverting to the Russian campaign, the Fiihrer stated that the
grain harvest in the Ukraine had in large part fallen into German
hands. It should be borne in mind, however, that next year's Russian
harvest must be used chiefly to supply the occupied countries. The
Fuhrer repeated his praise of the Finnish troops, who had fought
admirably, and he had words of praise also for the Rumanians, the
Hungarians, and the Italians. Referring to these last, he said they
had acquitted themselves in brilliant fashion in their first engagements.
The Fuhrer 's remarks were delivered in an orderly and precise
manner, which conveyed an impression of absolute calm and serenity.
It was for this reason, among others, that the Duce thought it appro-
priate to let the Fuhrer develop his thoughts without interruption,
and postpone to a subsequent conversation the specific questions he
wanted to ask concerning the progress of the military operations and
certain_territoriaI problems.
II
In the course of the second conversation which the Duce had with
the Fuhrer on the evening of August 25, the Duce set forth his views
on certain questions of major importance.
Turkey: Turkey, the Duce noted, was continuing to pursue a waver-
ing policy between the Axis and England, and that policy was being
closely watched. It might be profitable, he said, to make some new
efforts to win Turkey over to our side by offering her some compensa-
tion and by using as a lever Turkey's sensitiveness about her military
position. The Fuhrer agreed with the Duce's thought. The attitude
of Turkey naturally was influenced directly by the developments in
the Russian campaign. Consideration might be given, however, to
offering her perhaps a minor boundary rectification in Bulgarian ter-
ritory and some future concession in Syria at the end of the war. The
possibility of offering German armored forces could also be considered.
Crete: The Fuhrer expressed to the Duce his desire to have an Italian
division transferred to Crete to take the place of the German Alpine
Corps, which he wished to send to the Russian front preparatory to
operations in the Caucasus. The Duce gave his assent.
Spain: The Fuhrer spoke in bitter terms about Spain, expressing his
genuine and profound disappointment with that country.
A mountain formation similar to the Rock of Gibraltar had been
found in the French Jura, on which German specialized detachments
682-905— Si 30
386 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
had undergone prolonged training carried out with great enthusiasm
and effectiveness. If Franco could have made up his mind in January
or February, the big special 620 [ram.] heavy mortars (of which the
Duce had seen two examples, the Thor and the Odm on his visit today
to Brest Litovsk) would have been extremely effective against Gi-
braltar thanks to the crushing force of their 2,000 kg. projectiles.
The Duce, while concurring with the Fiihrer's thought, observed
that for all practical purposes and given Spain's particular situation
and special circumstances, it was pointless to bring further pressure to
bear to induce her to take an active part. There was no question that
she was already, and would increasingly be, impelled by her interests
to support the Axis, and that therefore it would be useful to keep her
in reserve at present and until the time came when the Spanish trump
card could and would have to be played in our game.
France: With respect to France, the Duce outlined to the Fiihrer
the anomaly of the situation which had developed in the relations
with that country. These were governed at present by the Armistice
Agreement, 3 but the Agreement no longer performed its function be-
cause its powers had been canceled by the development of events. It
would therefore be necessary to talk to the French at a given moment,
profiting incidentally from the fact that Petain was in deep water as
a result of the unending domestic and external difficulties with which
he had to contend.
The Fuhrer repeated to the Duce that the feelings he entertained
toward the French were those of antipathy and distrust, and that he
was fully aware of what the Duce had said concerning the anomaly
of the relations between that country and the Axis Powers. He
thought it advisable, however, to postpone any substantial and serious
talks because it was essential, in order to strip the French of any hopes
and illusions, to bring the campaign in Russia to a definitive
conclusion.
Sweden: The Fuhrer spoke in rather harsh terms about the Swedes,
calling them cowards. Sweden maintained a treacherously hostile
attitude toward Germany and raised endless difficulties to German
requests for troop transit .*
Switzerland: The Fuhrer spoke in adverse terms also about Switzer-
land, which, while moving with great circumspection, entertained
feelings of unadulterated aversion toward the Axis.
Japan: The Duce expressed his point of view concerning Japan,
observing that that country had a complex and difficult domestic
political situation which was at the bottom of the uncertainty in her
foreign policy. There was no question, however, that Japan was
' See vol. ix of this series, document No. 523.
* See document No. 172.
AUGUST 1941 387
strongly animated by a nationalistic dynamism that caused her to
gravitate toward the Axis; in a certain sense, her policy followed a
straighter line than did that of Spain. It was fairly probable that
one day she would fully align herself with the Axis. It was therefore
necessary to appraise her capabilities realistically and judge her pres-
ent and future attitude.
United States: The Duce pointed out that the "Potomao meeting" s
had, in the last analysis, not caused Roosevelt's political stock to rise,
and that, rather, it had even dropped somewhat since the declaration
in question. However that might be, the attitude of the United States
was now clear enough and, as matters stood, it was preferable to avoid
any useless polemics.
The Fiihrer gave a detailed analysis of the Jewish clique surround-
ing Roosevelt and exploiting the American people. He stated that
he would not for anything in the world live in a country like the
United States, which had a concept of life inspired by the most vulgar
commercialism and had no feeling for any of the most sublime expres-
sions of the human spirit, such as music.
The Mediterranean: The Fiihrer stated that he was satisfied with
the situation in the Mediterranean. The Duce agreed, noting that
the new front opened up against Great Britain in Iran had relieved
English pressure in the Mediterranean.
Italian participation in the campaign in Russia: The Duce ex-
pressed to the Fiihrer his ardent desire for the Italian Armed Forces
to participate in the operations against the Soviets on a larger scale.
Italy, the Duce stated, has an abundance of manpower and could
send an additional six, nine, and even more divisions. The Fiihrer
replied that he greatly appreciated that offer and thanked the Duce
heartily. He added, however, that the great distance of the Russian
front from Italy and the logistical difficulties would cause a serious
problem with respect to transportation and the proper functioning
of large masses of military forces. The Duce affirmed on his part that
Italy could render a major contribution to the war effort against
Russia, and suggested that further contingents of Italian troops be
used to take the place of German troops sent on leave. The Fiihrer
took note of this proposal, which would be given further study, and
touched upon the possibility of employing the Italian troops in the
Ukraine, where the average winter temperature as a rule does not
go lower than six degrees below zero [centigrade] .
The Fiihrer finally drove home once more the point he had already
made in his preceding conversation, namely, that he did not intend to
5 This is most likely a reference to the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting at
Argentia, Newfoundland, Aug. 9-12, which produced the Atlantic Charter.
To get to Argentia, President Roosevelt had embarked on the U.S.S. Potomac at
New London on Aug. 3.
388 DOCUMENTS ON GEBMAN FOREIGN" POLICY
wage a war of destruction or of prestige ; but a war of annihilation,
of the enemy armed forces in order to liberate Germany and Europe
from the recurrent threat of conflict and create the necessary basis
for constructing the new European order. He concluded by express-
ing his very keen desire, once the war was ended, to come to Italy
and spend some time in Florence, the city he preferred above all others
for the harmony of its art and the beauty of its natural surroundings.
This project was enthusiastically received by the Duce, who im-
mediately invited the Fiihrer to come to Florence, once the war was
over, and assured him of the affection and friendship with which the
Italian people would welcome him again as their most honored guest. 8
'Hitler's appointment book indicates that the visit lasted over the 4 days,
Aug. 25 to Aug. 28, when the Italian delegation started homeward at 8:00 p.m.
("Fiihrer's Tagebueh 1934-1943," p. 77, deposited in the Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C., Manuscripts Division, captured German documents).
No. 243
65/45265X-66X
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Berlin, August 25, 1941.
According to similar reports of foreign broadcasting stations, the
English and Russians have invaded Iran.
I propose the following program for immediate action :
1. Renewed encouragement to the Iranian Government to offer re-
sistance, both through Minister Ettel with reference to the instruction
sent him from the special train on August 22, 1 and through the Iranian
Minister in Berlin, 2 likewise in accordance with the foregoing instruc-
tion adapted to the new situation.
2. The demand of Turkey that she show her true colors, first by
publicly expressing disapproval of the Anglo-Soviet action and by
refraining from giving any indirect or direct support to the Anglo-
Russian action. This is to be done both through Ambassador von
Papen and through the Turkish Ambassador 3 here,
3. Corresponding steps with the Government of Afghanistan, both
in Kabul and in Berlin,
4. Immediate cessation of all German arms deliveries to Iran.*
5. Facilities have already been organized in Turkey for receiving
Reich Germans leaving Iran. Whether departures can still succeed
on any substantial scale, appears doubtful.
6. A decision must be taken whether a declaration on free India and
a new declaration on the Arab countries are to be made at this junc-
1 Document No. 230.
* Moussa Noury-Esfandiary.
* Hiisrev R. Gerede.
* Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting : "Yes."
AUGUST 1941 389
ture. This appears to be an especially opportune moment. A fitting
occasion like this will be hard to come by again. Final proposals
would be submitted at once if the decision is in the affirmative.
7. Extensive propaganda exploitation of the Anglo-Russian
invasion*
Weizsacker
' Marginal note in Bibbentrop's handwriting : "Yes."
No. 244
105/113886-90
Circular of the Foreign Minister 1
Telegram
No. 891 of August 25 Special Train, August 26, 1941—12 : 15 a.m.
from the Special Train Received Berlin, August 26 — 1 : 15 a.m.
Multex No. 660
from the Foreign Ministry Sent August 27 [26] . 2
RAM 365/R
For your information and guidance of your conversation I inform
you as follows :
1. The campaign against Soviet Russia as it has so far progressed
has already led to the destruction of the core of the Red Army standing
on the German-Russian front. Up to now the Wehrmacht has taken
1.3 million Russian prisoners. According to the observations at the
battlefields and careful estimates, the number of Russians killed
amounts to well over double this number. Exact figures concerning
the total number of Russians wounded are not possible. However, on
the basis of general experience these may also be estimated as mount-
ing to over a million. From this it is evident that the losses of the
Red Army so far amount to about 6 million men.
This figure is confirmed by our observations concerning the Russian
divisions so far committed and destroyed on the German-Russian
front, from which it is evident that approximately four-fifths of the
Russian forces have already been entirely destroyed, while the re-
mainder are badly battered. Only a very limited number of new
Russian units can still be organized. Russian divisions consisting of
16 to 45-year-olds that have appeared at the front of late, composed
mainly of untrained men and with only a few officers, very badly
equipped with heavy arms (some troops have only one or two machine
guns per battalion), and in part no longer with Russian rifles but
Polish ones captured earlier, indicate that there are not even human
" This circular was sent to all Missions except the Embassy in Japan. See
document No. 239.
' The dispatch date of Aug. 27 found on this copy of the document is clearly an
error. The copy from the files of the Embassy in Italy (2281/482357-61) indi-
cates that the circular was dispatched on Aug. 26, 10 : 30 a.m.
390 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOHEIGN POLICY
reserves worth mentioning in Russia any longer, not to mention the
total lack of material that is absolutely impossible to replace.
2. Now that the Wehrmacht in two great jumps has penetrated far
into Russian territory we are entering the third stage of this campaign.
In this connection it should be remembered that in the operations thus
far the main idea of our tactics was not to gain territory or successes
for the sake of prestige, or merely to push back the foe, but as a
matter of principle, and always the main idea was the battle of en-
circlement and thus the destruction of the foe and his material. In
an endless number of pockets, large and small, the Soviet Army has
been systematically destroyed in this manner. The fate of the remain-
ing portions of the Russian Army still able to fight will not be different.
Our objective, namely the definitive destruction of the Army inas-
much as it is still able to fight and the occupation of the important
centers of grain, raw materials, industry, and production of the Soviet
Union will he attained in the course of this year. After completion
of these operations there will no longer be any possibility of large-
scale recovery for the Soviet Union, whether as regards persons or
material, so that as a result of this campaign Russia will be eliminated
as an ally of any consequence for England.
For Germany the victory over Russia is of particular importance,
because :
(1) As a result of the capture of the Ukrainian territories there
will no longer be any food problem for all the future.
(2) As a _ result of the capture of the rich raw material areas
and industrial centers, the German raw material question will on
the whole likewise no longer be a problem and the German war
potential will be tremendously increased.
(3) And in particular, as a result of the elimination of the
threat in the east, Germany will now be unhampered in the rear.
She will now be able to turn against her last opponent, England,
with the full force of her entire national strength.
3. In recognition of this danger threatening England, Churchill has
recently urged increasingly the quick entry of the United States into
the war. This question presumably also supplied the main subject
of the demonstrative meeting in the Atlantic, which Roosevelt and
Churchill brought about in the first half of August 3 and which led to
the subsequent proclamation of a joint peace program.* The whole
thing represents merely a big propaganda bluff which, contrary to the
intentions of those who brought it about, clearly reveals the limits
placed on Roosevelt's will to fight. In actuality it is impossible for
Roosevelt to wage a war on two fronts, which is something he must
definitely reckon, with in case of America's entry into the war in view
of Japanese determination to adhere to the policy of the Tripartite
Pact. The American policy toward Japan, which is restricted to eco-
nomic sanctions and verbal threats, while attempting on the other
' See document No. 209.
" For text of the Atlantic Charter contained In President Roosevelt's message
of Aug, 21 to the Congress see Department of State, Peace and War: United
States Foreign Policy, 19S1-1941 (Washington, Government Printing Office,
1943), p. T17.
AUGUST 1941 391
hand to lure Japan toward the slippery path of insincere negotiations
in order to eliminate the danger of her intervention, clearly betrays
the weakness of the American position. The truth is that no part of
the American armed forces is armed or ready for entry into a war on
two fronts, the less so as the twofold task of having to arm themselves
and at the same time supply the whole world with weapons and other
war material far exceeds American capacities. In addition there is
the public mood in the United States, in view of which there can be
no question of a reliable majority of the American people being in
favor of the Roosevelt policy and entry into the war at the present
time. In this situation it is natural that Roosevelt had to reject flatly
Churchill's wish for an immediate entry of the United States in the
war.
4. In order nevertheless to deceive the world with a picture of reso-
lution and strength, Roosevelt and Churchill announced their program
for peace, which represents nothing more than a bad plagiarism of the
Wilson points, in the hope that they can set the conquered nations
against their governments with this swindle. But even today it is
clear that the world will not fall for this deception. The truth is that
Roosevelt and Churchill, the main culprits in the present war, simply
have nothing to offer the world except prolonging and extending the
war; on top of this, through the war alliance with Bolshevism they
have entirely and conclusively compromised the cause for which they
are fighting.
5. In her situation which is constantly becoming more hopeless
England is now trying, together with the Soviets, to build up a new
front against Germany in the Caucasus, while crudely violating the
neutrality and sovereignty of Iran with the most threadbare justifica-
tion. This unscrupulous rape of a small state is the best conceivable
illustration of the slogan "fight against the aggressors," upon which
the peace program of Roosevelt and Churchill is built. Probably
decisive for this action was the intention to aid the Bolshevists in this
manner in order to delay their final collapse as long as possible and
to destroy Baku while there is still time. At the same time this entry
of English troops into Iran shows in particular how greatly England
already feels threatened in the central positions of the British Empire
from Suez to Singapore. She increasingly feels the fateful hour ap-
proaching and therefore grasps at every means possible for holding
these central positions, upon which England's riches depend. It could
not be more clearly evident that it is the success of our arms that dic-
tates the course of action to our opponent, and that he himself is
slowly realizing what is involved in this struggle, which only 2 years
ago people in London and Washington imagined to be so easy.
Please express the foregoing viewpoints and ideas in a suitable
manner with the means available to you. 5
The same text to all Missions.
RlBBENTROF
'Multex telegram No. 663 of Aug. 26 (105/113991) to Klntelen forwarded the
following additional instructions with regard to the document printed :
"In order to avoid misunderstandings it is pointed out that the foregoing
circular may be made use of orally only."
392 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 245
1517/3T2640-43
The Charge d' 'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
urgent Rome, August 26, 1941—3 : 00 p. m.
secret Received August 26—5 : 30 p. m.
No. 1980 of August 26
Today the Director of the Commercial Policy Division of the Italian
Ministry of Foreign Trade, 1 by direction of Riccardi, the Minister
of Foreign Trade, handed to Counselor of Legation Graeff , a letter of
this day's date addressed by the Minister to Minister Clodius, which,
in translation, reads as follows :
_ "Dear Clodius : I refer to the many negotiations which for some
time have taken place within the framework of the meetings of the
governmental committees on the question of our imports from Ger-
many— -negotiations which have clearly revealed the fears that Italy
entertains with regard to the schedule or these imports. 2
Despite the assurances given on the German side, the situation
shows no improvement ; in fact, it is getting worse. Therefore with
reference to our recent conversations, 3 I consider it appropriate to
explain to you, who have always been especially accessible on all prob-
lems affecting the economic relations between our two countries, the
seriousness of the problem and the need for expediting remedial
action.
Apart from the sufficiently well known and delicate situation that
developed some time ago in regard to coal, 4 one may say that in all
important sectors of imports the Italian purchasing organizations,
despite their exertions, have been in a position to realize only in part
the provisions of the governmental agreements. That is the case,
among other things (to mention only a few of the most significant
areas) with iron and steel, scrap, cast iron, manganese ore, chromium
ore, paraffin, glycerine, naphthalene, caustic soda, etc., while in the
field of deliveries of machinery the deplorable difficulties are well
known.
I consider it useful to send you herewith a survey showing the status
of the imports of the most important products at the end of last July,
from which you may get a good idea of the situation. The gravity of
this situation is apparent if one considers at present that, in general,
deliveries are involved which directly or indirectly affect the conduct
of the war itself, and for which, precisely in view of their absolute
necessity, your Government has assumed a formal obligation to carry
them out. You are familiar, on the other hand, with the efforts that
were made by the Italians in the sphere of our exports, efforts which
in the case of various products contained in the agreements of Com-
1 G. Dall'Ogiio.
' See vol. 5ii of this series, document No. 652 and footnote 1.
* Clodius bad been in Rome at the beginning of August for economic and finan-
cial negotiations. The complete record of these negotiations has not been found.
A German-Italian protocol and exchange of notes of Aug. 5 and 6, concerning
economic measures in Greece has been filmed on 2033/445548-63.
4 See vol. xii of this series, document No. 641 and footnote 1.
AUGUST 1941
393
mittee A, 6 represent a great sacrifice with respect to the most urgent
requirements of the domestic supply situation. Moreover, in many
'other fields {for example, garden products, potatoes, processed fruits
and vegetables, canned foods, textile products in general) we have
exceeded the contractual obligations resulting from the agreements in
the certainty that we, too, for our part, could surely count on the im-
ports that our Governments have considered absolutely necessary.
The alarming situation that has developed in the field of our imports
from Germany and from the areas controlled by Germany, demands
the immediate resort to all means that would tend to bring about a
rapid improvement. Therefore I would ask that, independent of the
conversations we will have on this matter on the occasion of our next
meeting in Home or in Germany, 6 you press the authorities in question
with your customary energy to the end that the deliveries be made at
the rate required by the present incessant needs. Meanwhile I send
you my best regards. Yours sincerely, Eiccardi."
End of translation.
In the survey attached to the foregoing letter, there are given for a
number of products the quotas agreed upon for the year 1941, the
resulting quantities to be delivered for the first 7 months of 1941,
the actual imports in the first 7 months of 1941, and the corresponding
deficiencies. There are for these 7 months the following deficiencies
in tons :
Coal 674,713
Iron and steel 154, 877
Iron and steel scrap 35, 900
Cast iron 26,400
Aluminum 6, 306
Copper 1, 890
Nickel 140
Manganese ore 3, 194
Chrome ore 3,495
Vanadium 10
Bismuth 2
Antimony 140
Manganese bioxide 100
Pitch coke 4, 875
Paraffin 2, 563
Turpentine 1, 065
In a talk with the expert from the Embassy, Director General
Dall'Oglio further clarified the above statements of Minister Eic-
cardi, and pointed out especially the extent to which Italian shipments
Caustic soda
3,830
Buna
286
Pulpwood
5,063
Cellulose
25, 063
Benzol
2,059
Toluol
1,511
Acetone
175
Cresylic acid
50
Propyl alcohol
92
Phtnalic acid anhydride
242
Centralite
455
Magnesium
291
Glycerine
897
Naphthalene
2,624
Nitro-cellulose
2,264
Ehodium
kg. 2
5 No record of these agreements have been found. In Rome telegram No. 1738 of
Aug. 3 (2033/445546) Clodius refers to conversations with Kiceardi and Fava-
grossa regarding mutual deliveries of raw materials and mentions complaints by
both parties regarding the schedule and quantities of deliveries.
" Clodius was again in Rome at the end of October. See document No. 440.
394 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
had been made to Germany, and that, in the fields of foods and tex-
tiles, they had been made with jeopardy to the Italian internal supply
situation.
Bismahck
No. 246
142/127681
The Foreign Minister to the Reich Plenipotentiary in Greece
Telegram
No. 894 from the Special Train, August 26, 1941.
Special Train Received Berlin, August 26 — 4 : 40 p. ra.
No. 1092 from the Foreign Ministry Sent August 26 — 6 : 50 p. m.
RAM 366/Tt
With reference to your telegram No. 1152 of August 21. 1
In the question of a reorganization of the Greek Government please
maintain complete reserve and leave every initiative in this respect
wholly to your Italian colleague. It appears doubtful to me whether
it would serve our purpose to bring to power there a cabinet made up
of energetic personalities who would possibly make nothing but dif-
ficulties for us. At the time we brought the Tsolakoglou Govern-
ment into existence it was mainly in order to take the wind out of the
sails of the then Greek Government on Crete. 8 Tsolakoglou has in-
deed fulfilled this task. As long as the Tsolakoglou Cabinet serves
the purpose of keeping the Greek administrative machinery going,
we can be quite glad, as we look at it from here, to have General
Tsolakoglou at the head of this Cabinet.
RlBBENTHOP
'In this telegram (142/127678) Altenburg reported that the Italian Pleni-
potentiary hod received authorization to negotiate regarding a reorganization of
the Greek Government.
1 See vol. xxi of this series, document No. 410.
AUGUST 1941 395
No. 247
2281/432355-56
Circular of the Foreign Ministry 1
Berlin, August 26, 1941.
Pol. V 4552 g.
In view of the developments in the east emigres of all sorts (Rus-
sian, Ukrainian, White Eussian, Caucasian, Latvian, Lithuanian,
Estonian, etc.) have offered the Foreign Ministry and German Mis-
sions abroad their services in the new organization of Russia. For
your confidential information I wish to make the following remarks
with regard to this :
For the present on grounds of principle we have no interest in the
cooperation of these emigres in establishing a new order in Russia,
so that, in general, reserve is advisable with respect to these groups ;
above all political promises are to be avoided. The forwarding of
offers to the Foreign Ministry is to he limited to special cases. As
a rule it will probably be sufficient to thank the applicants and reply
to them that note has been taken of their wishes.
It remains desirable as before to maintain contact with emigres in
whom we are interested for the sake of information.
I suggest that the consular offices under your authority be notified.
By order :
WOERMANN
1 This circular was sent to the Embassies in Turkey, Spain, Italy, and Paris,
to the Legations in Croatia, Switzerland, Hungary, Rumania, Finland, Denmark,
Portugal, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Sweden, to the offices of the Foreign Min-
istry in Athens, Belgrade, Brussels, The Hague, Prague, and Krakow and to the
Consulate at Tangier.
No. 248
911/294612-16
Field Marshal Mannerheim to Field Marshal Keitel 1
TOP SECRET MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, August 26, 1941.
Abt.L I H Op.
No. 441451/41 gk
Commander in Chief of the Finnish Armed Forces.
Your Excellency : I am very grateful to you, dear Field Marshal,
for your letter 2 and especially for the message that you sent to the
Finnish Army and to the Finnish people.
'The document printed here is a copy from the files of Ambassador Ritter.
It carries an OKW file number and the date Aug. 29 from Hitler's Headquarters.
'Document No. 228.
396 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
An exchange of views, in the sense that you have in mind, is cer-
tainly of the greatest importance for the execution of joint operations
and I should like to present to you, dear Field Marshal, quite openly,
the difficulties and the limits that I see at present for the continuation
of operations.
To accomplish the job given to the Finnish armed forces, the
country's reserves, even at the very beginning, had to be used witliout
regard for maintaining life on the home front (agriculture and
industry).
Thus, at the outset of the war, about 500,000 men were under arms
although the wounds of the winter war had still not healed over.
Aside from these workers employed in the war industry, about 30,000
construction workers for bridge and road construction and 80,000
Lottos (women volunteer workers of the defense corps organization)
are being employed for maintenance, air raid protection, and com-
munications in the army forces. This means that about 16% of the
population is engaged in war activities.
Monthly casualties are now considerably higher than during the
winter war and, since the middle of August, it has no longer been pos-
sible to maintain the military potential that has been diminishing
through casualties. It will not be successful either although the class
of 1922 has already been called up.
Thus in the middle of August the fourth platoon of the infantry
companies was disbanded and the disbandment, in September, of a
division has been scheduled as a possibility in order to provide for
replacements for the fighting troops.
Kegarding the wishes expressed and the possibilities of satisfying
them, I shall give my views in the sequence given in your letter.
1) The cutting off of the Karelian Isthmus from the north began
on July 30, 1941, with the offensive west of Lake Ladoga. The ad-
vance seems to be proceeding satisfactorily until now and the troops
have already reached the eastern bank of the Vuoksi to the shore of
Lake Ladoga. I have also launched an attack in a south eastern direc-
tion from Vyborg.
The enemy seems to be digging in south of the eastern Vuoksi and
has organized the defense there, according to intercepted radio
messages.
A further advance will probably run into greater resistance.
To the south, close to the old boundary, the enemy had already com-
pleted in peace time a deep zone of fortifications which, in case the
enemy had to some degree organized his defense, will apparently he
very difficult to cross due to a lack of armored forces, heavy artillery
and dive bombing. The fortifications that were confirmed by our
AUGUST 1941 397
agents up to November 1939 are entered on the enclosed map. 3 This
contains only a portion of the structures, however, and the ones
that were built after the winter war and which, after the idea in
Russia that Finland was to serve as a base of attack for a German
Army had won ground, are wholly lacking; those certainly constitute
a considerable number.
In my opinion, an advance from the south to take these fortifica-
tions from the rear would thus be easier. It would also be very diffi-
cult for me to convince the Government to permit a crossing of the
old boundary west of Ladoga.* The forces of the Finnish Armed
Forces will nevertheless pin down the enemy troops that would cling
to these fortifications.
2) The operation to get rid of the threat to the flank from the
Suvilakhti-Suojarvi region has now been ended and in the next few
days I shall renew the advance against the Svir by way of Olonets and
Petrozavodsk,
Even though it will be possible to reach the Svir with the troops
available, a crossing of this river would, according to what has hitherto
been experienced with the enemy's resistance, present great difficulties
and can hardly be carried out without the support of German fighter
squadrons. The possibility of providing a mobile group that should
advance south of the Lake of Ladoga in order to unite with the Ger-
man troops cannot as yet be considered because the engagements near
Petrozavodsk and around the crossing points could turn out to be
very hard.
3) I understand the reasons mentioned by the Field Marshal about
maintaining the 14th Regiment; the unit replacement of my troops is,
however, getting more difficult from day to day and I ask that, if at
all possible, the regiment be returned to me again by the middle of
September.
4) I stated already during the negotiations through my authorized
officers that an attack on Hanko with the troops at my disposal could
not be carried out. 8 I had also proposed that the Hanko sector should
5 Not found. A map showing some of the Russian fortifications was attached
to Erf urth's report No. 441468 of Sept. 1 (911/294602-04) .
•With his letter of transmittal of Aug. 27 (911/294617-21) General Erfurth
included some confidential statements which Lt. Gen. Hanoi], Mannerheim's
Chief of Staff, made in connection with Mannerheim's letter to Keltel. In the
case of the border crossing, the Finnish Constitution stipulated that the
Commander in Chief obtain prior assent of the Government.
In his report No. 441468 of Sept. 1, Erfurth mentioned that Mannerheim had
conceded his, Erf urth's, arguments regarding German-Finnish operations around
Leningrad and, as a result, had obtained permission from President Ryti to cross
the old border on both sides of the Leningrad-Vyborg road. See also docu-
ment No. 264.
5 See vol. sit of this series, document No. 554.
398 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
be left to German troops so that the offensive in. the East might be
carried out successfully. In the middle of July I was forced to
transfer the only unit suited to attack in this sector to the Karelian
Army.
Before the successful conclusion of operations in the East, I see no
possibility of attacking Hanko unless the enemy's morale collapses.
So far there are no recognizable signs of this happening. If troops
were later to be released for the attack on Hanko, this attack would,
in my opinion, not be successful without considerable use of German
fighter units.
In line with the outcome of the negotiations I had ordered the
Army's strategic concentration in such a way that an advance would
have been possible either west or east of Lake Ladoga.
At the end of June the request was expressed on the part of the Ger-
mans that the Finnish Army should advance east of Lake Ladoga in
order to meet the German troops on the Svir near Lodeynoye Pole.
The offensive was started on the day agreed upon.
In order to fulfill the request that the Finnish forces should attack
also on the Karelian Isthmus, an offensive was launched at the end of
July west of Lake Ladoga, which as cited in paragraph 1 is still going
on. .
A simultaneous advance on both sides of Lake Ladoga, which is
dominated by the enemy, demands sufficient reserves because of the
great depth of the operations. A joint reserve for both directions
would have no meaning because fast transport facilities do not exist
in sufficient quantities. .
In line with ^vhat has been agreed upon, the Finnish division which
was placed under Army Headquarters, Norway for the Salla-Kanda-
laksha operation, should be brought back after Kandalaksha has been
reached at the latest. Because it could be assumed that this operation
would be concluded very rapidly, I had counted on the return of this
division as a reserve for the operation against the Svir. Now, how-
ever, because the difficulties have turned out to be very great, it ap-
pears to me that I cannot count on these reinforcements in the imme-
diate future.
It is to be expected that the resistance during the advance against the
Svir will be considerably greater, in case an advance of the German
troops from the South against the Svir must be abandoned.
The demands that were made of the Finnish armed forces have
been considerably increased because of the changed situation and I
bear them in mind when I consider how to satisfy them successfully.
The difficulties that have turned out to be much greater everywhere
than could have been assumed, make me cautious in promises about
. the future operations of the Finnish Army.
AUGUST 1941 399
My intention is to continue the offensive on the Karelian Isthmus
to the old boundary and there to pin down the enemy with the strong-
est possible forces. As soon as the situation on the Karelian Isthmus
had cleared up to some degree, as far as I can see in the next few days,
I shall take up the offensive that has already been started against the
Svir.
The danger of Bolshevism for all of Europe has only become clear
in this war and gratitude for what Germany has done has grown
deeply in every Finn. I should like to express to you, dear Field Mar-
shal, my admiration for the deeds of the Wehrmacht and I am con-
vinced that the war against Bolshevism will lead to a prosperous fu-
ture for the entire world.
Yours, etc. Mannerheim
No. 249
1543/375684
The Charge d* Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
top secret Washington, August 27, 1941—8 : 35 p. m.
No. 2935 of August 27 Eeceived August 28—8 : 05 a.m.
With reference to your telegram No. 1633 of August 26.*
If Japanese naval circles should seriously consider taking Manila
in the course of a southern operation, such an act of aggression would
undoubtedly be answered with an American declaration of war on
Japan. In this connection it should be borne in mind that a war on
Japan would, in such circumstances, be extremely popular and might
at one stroke overcome the reluctance of the American people for war;
this would naturally affect the war situation in general, as soon as
our obligations arising out of the Tripartite Pact became effective.
The assertion of the Japanese Navy that there is danger of a flank
attack from Manila is not valid under present conditions, since there
are in the Philippines no modern bases for the American fleet. Japa-
nese expansionist policy in the southern area, if pursued gradually and
if it avoids American sovereign territory, will in my opinion, be tol-
erated by the United States of America, although the Americans will
lose face in the process. As the numerous American attempts at ap-
peasement show, the American Goverment does not want a war with
Japan because it is not prepared for a two-front war, and it can, there-
fore, under existing conditions, make no decisions that could stop
1 Document No. 225.
400 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the systematic advance of the Japanese in the southern area. An at-
tack on Manila, however, would force the Americans to make a decision
which, as we see it from here, cannot be in our interest.
Thomsen
No. 250
230/153341-42
The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military
Comanander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry
■ Telegram
urgent Belgrade, August 27, 1941 — 10 : 45 p. in.
top secret Received August 28 — 1 : 30 a.m.
No. 557 of August 27
With reference to your telegram No. 1092 of August 18. 1
Since my telegram of August 12 2 the situation has become more
acute. The communist movement is spreading and is operating with
nationalist slogans which begin to meet with a response. The misery
of the Serbian refugees expelled from Croatia and Hungary and their
stories keep adding to the fuel. Contacts with Communists and other
rebels in Macedonia, Croatia, Montenegro, etc., are growing closer.
Isolated successes that have undoubtedly been attained in combatting
the rebels, as well as the arrest of a number of leaders and raids on
centers have not brought any improvement in the over- all situation.
Even though conditions are not the same in all parts of the country,
the attacks on transportation installations, municipal offices and min-
ing installations are increasing. Municipal archives are being system-
atically destroyed, and delivery of harvests and collection of taxes
are impeded by terror. German troops can move about in the country
either by car or by train practically only in convoys. In Belgrade
the situation is relatively quiet.
The provisionally appointed government is in the process of dis-
solution. The Finance Minister has resigned for the reason that he
could not raise the sum of 6.5 million reichsmarks per month fixed by
the Military Commander for occupation costs. The installment due
on August 15 was not paid. Furthermore, two days ago two ministers
of the Ljotic group, namely the Minister of Economics and the Min-
ister for Social Welfare, asked to be relieved of their offices ; as did the
Minister of Labor, for reasons of health. The installation of the new
Serbian government body of popular men who are willing to fight
'Not printed (230/153331). In this telegram Bibbentrop informed Benzler
that his reports on the situation in Belgrade had been discussed with Veesen-
mayer who would inform him about Rlbbentrop's views in the matter.
: Document No. 195.
AUGUST 1941 401
communism vigorously encounters difficulties but is nevertheless being
attempted. Negotiations are in process.
Benzlek
No. 251
233/156706-07
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 550 Beeun, August 27, 1941.
I asked the Argentine Ambassador to call on me today in order that
I might, in continuation of the conversation begun by Under State
Secretary Wbermann, 1 give him a talking-to and point out to him the
dangers which as a result of the intrigues of third parties threaten our
previously excellent relations.
In my conversation with the Argentinean I went far back. 2 I wag
not sparing in my praise of the earlier Argentine policy, which had
been so irreproachable and self-reliant. Then I described the in-
trigues in the Patagonian s and Missiones cases, 4 which had finally
ended with the complete rehabilitation of the German defendants.
All this could have been avoided if the promptings of malevolent, non-
Argentine elements had not been followed.
After some further general remarks I took up the incidents of re-
cent date.
When I criticized the Taborda Commission, 5 the Ambassador dis-
avowed this commission in no uncertain terms, just as he had done to
Woermann. We were in complete agreement, however, that the Ar-
gentine Government could not throw off its full responsibility for the
evil effect of the Taborda Commission.
I then took up successively the confiscation of the German courier
pouch and of German parcel post packages to our Embassy and the
arrest of numerous Germans on flimsy pretexts. 6 I also talked to the
1 A record of this conversation of Aug. 25 has been filmed on 233/156693-94.
a A memorandum of Aug. 26 by Senior Counselor Freytag (2048/447047-50)
listed and explained the points to be taken up by Weizs&elier.
"See vol. ix of this series, document No. 203, footnote 1.
* See vol. xn of this series, document No. 38.
" In telegram No. 962 of June 20 (233/156543) Tbermann reported that the
Argentine Chamber had approved a commission of investigation under the chair-
manship of Damonte Taborda, In telegram No. 1048 of July 2 (233/156548-49)
he reported that this commission was investigating German citizens and insti-
tutions in Argentina for unauthorized political activities and dissemination of
Nazi propaganda, which were supposedly supported by funds from official Ger-
man agencies.
*In telegram No. 1193 of July 26 (233/156572-73) Thermann reported the
seizure of three diplomatic pouches by order of the investigation commission of
the Argentine Chamber of Representatives. In telegram No. 1306 of Aug. 9
(233/156639-40) he reported the detention of 73 parcels by Argentine customs
authorities. In telegrams Nos. 1401 of Aug. 22 (233/150684) and 1405 of Aug. 23
(233/156686) he reported the arrests of numerous Germans.
683-905— 64 31
402 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Ambassador with the utmost urgency about the systematic destruc-
tion of the German school system in Buenos Aires. 7 On that point too
I found that the Ambassador showed understanding for our view. He
was well aware of the significance of these institutions, which had been
in operation for half a eentury. I furthermore remonstrated with the
Ambassador about the press attacks on Herr von Thermann and his
staff. I sharply criticized the interrogation of Consul General Baran-
don by the Taborda Commission. 8 In conclusion I also brought up
the discrimination and vexation to which the DNB was subjected in
Buenos Aires.
I used sharp words but a calm manner in bringing all this to the
attention of the Argentinean, who, contrary to his former custom,
became rather meek.
In order to give still more effect to the whole conversation I re-
quested the Ambassador to make a personal appeal in my name to his
Foreign Minister, a close acquaintance and friend of mine, who un-
doubtedly would understand perfectly well that these goings on had
to be stopped.
Weizsackee
' This was reported by Thermann in telegram No. 1393 of Aug. 21 (233/156G82-
83).
' Thermann reported this incident which involved the German Consul General
in Valparaiso, Chile, in telegram No. 1406 of Aug. 23 (233/156687).
No. 252
65/45905
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most ukgent Tehean, August 28, 1941.
No. 895 of August 28 Received August 28—8 : 50 a. m.
Minister President Foroughi has just made a brief declaration of the
Government in the Parliament. 1 According to this, in order to pre-
vent further bloodshed, the Shah has ordered the Iranian troops to
make no further use of arms. There were no additional remarks. Ac-
cordingly there exists now a unilateral state of truce.
Ettel
'In telegram No. 886 of Aug. 27 (65/45289) Ettel had reported the resigna-
tion of the Iranian Cabinet, and in telegram No. 892 of Aug. 28 (65/45892) the
formation of a new government under Minister President Ali Foroughi and with
AH Soheyli as Foreign Minister.
AUGUST 1941 403
No. 253
265/173196-98
Ambassador Bitter to the Embassy in Turkey
Telegram
top secret Westfalen, August 26, 1941.
No. 1241 Sent August 28.
[Pol.IM2620gRs. 1 ]
I. Regarding point 5 of your telegram No. 1096 of August 23. 2
The Foreign Minister requests you to make every effort to bring
about at this time the change in the Turkish position which you con-
sider possible later on as regards the question of the passage of
Russian merchant vessels. Perhaps the Foreign Minister's conversa-
tion with the Turkish Ambassador, reported in our telegram No. 888
of August 24," will furnish the internal occasion and the invasion of
Iran by Russian and English troops the external occasion for the
Turkish Government to renounce openly the commitments of the Mon-
treux Convention and to impose a general ban for the time being on
the passage of merchant vessels through the Dardanelles or at least
to subject such passage to extensive surveillance combined with
licensing in. individual cases. If, as we assume, the Turkish Govern-
ment expects a modification of the provisions of the Montreux Con-
vention in favor of Turkey, as a result of the present military events
and the change in the political power situation in the Black Sea,
Turkey herself must also take timely action to initiate such a develop-
ment. The best way of doing so would be for Turkey herself to
cancel those commitments now. Reasons or pretexts for doing so
could be found, given a positive readiness on the part of Turkey. For
example, it might be pointed out that the Montreux Convention was
concluded under quite different military and political conditions and
that the present military and political configuration could not then be
foreseen, as is evident from the very fact that Germany was not a
signatory to the Montreux Convention, whereas she has now become
1 The file number is supplied from the reply telegram (see footnote 4) .
'This telegram (265/173177) reported the results of a demarche by Papen in
the matter of possible passage of Soviet ships through Turkish waters (ef.
documents Nos. 2 and 227). According to this telegram the Turkish Govern-
ment would not permit the passage of Russian warships and would meet with
armed resistance any attempt to force passage through the Straits. Ships
escaping into Turkish territorial waters would be interned although the Turks
considered it more likely that they would be scuttled. Point 5 of this telegram
read as follows :
"With respect to merchant vessels the Government does not believe that it has
a basis for refusing them passage. It considers that the latter is hardly likely
In view of our presence off the Dardanelles. It is my view that Turkey will
take a different position in this matter too as soon as there are clearer indications
of the Russian defeat."
1 Document No. 238.
404 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the dominant power in the Black Sea area. Furthermore, it could be
asserted that in the present circumstances the passage of merchant
vessels may be misused for the through transport of crews and of war
material thus compromising Turkey's neutral position. If Turkey
should not close the Dardanelles to merchant vessels until later and
if the Russian merchant fleet should have succeeded earlier in escaping
to the Mediterranean, the subsequent closing would then be pointless
and Turkey would have contributed to strengthening the means of
combat of the Russo-English side, whereas it must be Turkey's interest
for the future that Russia succumb in the present struggle.
If Turkey should decide on a general closing of the Dardanelles, we
must of course expect that when exceptions are granted such transit
as is absolutely essential to Germany, especially petroleum ship-
ments, for example, will secretly be approved in each individual case.
If Turkey should not decide on the closing of the Dardanelles to
merchant vessels, we must at least expect her to use the possibil-
ities of surveillance given under the Montreux Convention in such
a way that passage will be rendered difficult and delayed. I assume
that the Embassy and the Consulate General have taken all necessary
steps, in consultation with the Naval Attache, so that the passage of
Russian merchant ships can be detected immediately in every case
and will be reported by the promptest means to the Admiral,
Southeast.
There are reports here that negotiations about the sale of Russian
merchant ships are pending between the Turkish and Russian Gov-
ernments. Fourteen merchant steamers and 12 tankers are said to be
involved. It is impossible to determine here whether these reports are
well founded. I request that you find out as far as possible whether
such negotiations are actually taking place. If we could rely on Tur-
key's not turning these merchant vessels over to England or in some
other way permitting them to sail in the interest of England, a sale to
Turkey might be the means of keeping the Russian merchant vessels
out of the clutches of the English. In such a case, however, the
Turkish Government would have to speak frankly with the Reich
Government and come to an agreement with us on the conditions for
recognition of the change of flags. If, however, there is a danger
that Turkey thereby intends to do England a favor, the Turkish Gov-
ernment should be warned against such a purchase. The Reich
Government and the armed forces of Germany and her allies would not
recognize the change of flags if the purchase is made without the
knowledge and approval of the Reich Government.
II. With regard to the Russian warships there are likewise reports
here which indicate that manipulations are being planned for the
purpose of getting the Russian warships through the Dardanelles,
AUGUST 1941 405
contrary to law and contrary to the assurances of the Turkish Gov-
ernment. According to these reports the intention is first to place
the Russian warships in the Black Sea under the English war flag.
If in the subsequent negotiations the Turkish Government also refuses
to let the warships under the British flag pass through the Darda-
nelles, they are to be interned in Turkey for the time being as a
matter of form, in the hope that some way will later be found to
escape from internment and reach the Mediterranean. I request that
you keep such possibilities in mind.*
Ritter
4 In telegram No. 1124 of Aug. 30 (265/173208) Papen reported having dis-
cussed the problem of the Russian Black Sea fleet with Saracoglu and InOnii.
In the opinion of the Turks the problem would not become acute until the ports
of Novorossisk and Batum were in German hands.
No. 254
319/192418-20
Minute by the Head of Division W V of the Economic
Policy Department
Regarding the Discussion at Ministerialdirektor Wiehl's Office
on August 28, 1941, Concerning Economic Negotiations With
Sweden
e.o. Ha. Pol. 5691 g.
Present:
Ministerialdirektor Wiehl, Minister Schnurre, Counselor van
Scherpenberg (Foreign Ministry)
Ministerialdirektor Walter (Reich Ministry of Food and Agi'i-
culture — Chairman of the Government Committee for
Sweden)
Major General Becker, Major Radtke (High Command of the
Wehrmacht — Military Economy and Armaments Office)
Minister ialrat Ludwig (Reich Ministry of Economics).
At the opening of the discussion Ministerialdirektor Walter gave
a survey of the subject and purpose of the impending economic negoti-
ations with Sweden. 1 He pointed out that in view of the trend of
German exports on the one hand and of the program of imports from
Sweden on the other, a current clearing deficit had to be reckoned with,
estimated roughly and subject to change at about 200 million Swedish
kronor. In order to prevent this from interfering with our imports
from Sweden, negotiations had to be conducted with the Swedisli Gov-
ernment for a clearing credit at least equal to that amount. It should
1 See document No. 347 and footnote 2.
406 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOHEIGN POLICY
be noted that such a credit could be obtained from Sweden only on the
basis of an amendment of existing laws, i.e., through action by the
Riksdag.
In order that such an arrangement may be obtained without detri-
ment to our hitherto favorable access to imports of strategic raw ma-
terials, semifinished and finished products, the following conditions
are essential :
(a) a guarantee that our exports in the civilian sector will be main-
tained at an adequate level ;
(J) a central control of Wehrmacht purchases in Sweden for sup-
ply purposes ;
(o) a relaxation of exports of war material to Sweden (possibly in
connection with additional German purchases of strategic finished
products) .
Ministerialrat Ludwig gave a survey of the extremely unfavorable
trend of German exports to Sweden and pointed out the direct harm
to German import interests in strategic areas resulting from shortages
in deliveries from Germany. Such harmful effects are already evi-
dent on a considerable scale, especially in the lumber and cellulose
sectors, in the production of high-grade steel, and in the execution of
our shipbuilding program in Swedish shipyards.
He mentioned the present threat of further retrenchments in
Germany, which would now be possible only at the expense of the ex-
port industry and would thus inevitably lead to a further reduction
of our exports, including those to Sweden.
On the question of control of German "Wehrmacht purchases, Major
Radtke stated that OKW had already, on the basis of a recent dis-
cussion in the Ministry of Economics, issued the pertinent orders, and
this matter was thereby presumably settled.
On the question of war-material deliveries Major General Becker
pointed out the great difficulties involved, which were well known. 3
In the case of captured Russian material the transportation problem
was still insoluble. The problem will, however, be re-examined by
the competent military authorities s in the light of the known list of
items that the Swedes want, 4 and particularly from the viewpoint of
how far we might still be able to go in offering captured material ;
collection on the spot would, for example, have to be left to the Swedes.
It was agreed that the crucial question was that of German exports
' See document Nos. 92 and 98.
* See document No. 98 and footnote 7.
* See document No. 59.
AUGUST 1941 407
to Sweden. In order to be able to take full advantage of the -war-
economy potentials offered to us by Sweden through her sources of
raw materials and her highly developed industry, Sweden's industry
and economy must be kept intact. This is possible only if we supply
them with sufficient goods.
The only way to ensure such a flow of supplies, it is believed, is to
place exports to Sweden in a preferred category, as was done at one
time in the case of exports to the Soviet Union by an order of the
Reichsmarsohall. In the case of Sweden this should be so much easier,
since, in contrast to Russia, Swedish imports from Germany consist
mainly of articles of daily use and include only a very small quantity
of critical material. Moreover, the total volume of these exports is
considerably smaller than was the case with Soviet Eussia, although
in the opinion of the Ministry of Economics it is very difficult to give
any concrete figures for the German industrial capacity that would be
monopolized by such preferred treatment of exports to Sweden.
On the basis of the study of the situation that had been undertaken
it was agreed that in the interest of the German war economy a meas-
ure such as described above was urgent and desirable.
It was therefore arranged that Minister Schnurre, in. carrying out
the instruction already given him some time ago by the Foreign Min-
ister, should first of all, in a conversation with State Secretary
Landfried, 5 obtain the general approval of the Ministry of Eco-
nomics. In addition, the matter should also be brought within the
purview of the Minister of Armaments and Munitions, Dr. Todt, in
order, finally, to obtain the decision of the Eeichsmarschall. Major
General Becker promises that General Thomas, who is expected to
have conversations with the Reichsmarschall and Field Marshal Keitel
on Saturday, August 30, will be informed by him in time about the
result of the foregoing discussions.
VAN SOHEEPENEERG
5 A minute by Schnurre of Sept. 2 (2116/460504) noted that in the discussions
on the German exports to Sweden, a letter addressed by Keitel on Aug. 17 to the
Minister ot Economics had played a role. The letter indicated that the totality
of German exports would have to be scrutinized to determine if any could be
justified In the present circumstances. A future export, Keitel stated, could
be permitted only if it assured the importation of critical raw materials essential
for the war. State Secretary liandf ried on the basis of this letter took a nega-
tive view toward all requests for exports.
408 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 255
535/240020-23
Note Verbale From the Apostolic Nunciature
No. 41804 Berlin, August 28, 1941.
[zuSt.S.No. 560]. 1
The Apostolic Nunciature has the honor to confirm the receipt of the
note verbale No. Pol. ITI 960 of the Foreign Ministry of May 19, 1941. 2
In regard to the confiscation of various properties, the note denies the
right of the Church to dispose over temporal goods in the incorporated
eastern areas, namely to possess and to administer them. Furthermore,
approximately in the middle of this note verbale the following remark
is added: "Furthermore, it is also of no importance whether the
Catholic Church as a whole has a right of supreme ownership over
the property of the corporate bodies belonging to its organization,
since under canon law this is a matter of internal church law that has
no application here."
The Apostolic Nunciature considers it its duty to make the follow-
ing remarks in reply to this statement :
1. The right of the Church to church property is expressed clearly
and distinctly in Canon 1499 with the following words: "Section 1.
The Church, like other persons, has the right to acquire property on
the basis of all forms of acquisition recognised by natural law or by
Eositive law. Section 2. The right of ownership of these goods
elongs, under the supreme authority of the Apostolic See, to the
juridical person who has acqiiired them legally."
This right exists with the constitution of the Church itself ; thus it
has a general character resulting from the nature and the mission of
the Church. Owing to its high origin this right remains in forceat
all times and in all places. This the Church has steadfastly main-
tained and it has defended this right whenever it was violated, in that
it always stigmati2;ed every forcible expropriation of Church property
and protested against it until compensation was made.
2. This right of the Church is not based on any contractual agree-
ments with the states ; it exists independent of them. The Concordat
with the Keich, as well as the one with Prussia or the one with Bavaria
and the other agreements serve only for expressly recognizing these
rights and underpinning them by means of a contractual obligation
1 St.S. No. 560 : In this memorandum of Aug. 29 (535/240019) Weizs&cker noted
that the Nuncio had handed him the note verbale. "After a quick glance, in the
presence of the Nuncio, I called his attention to the last paragraph of the note,
the wording of which was misleading, inasmuch as the Foreign Ministry had
never admitted a violation of existing legal principles. As to the contents of the
note, I remarked that the legal theory expressed in it was by no means accepted
everywhere or at all times."
1 See vol. xh of this series, document No. 567.
AUGUST 1941 409
on the part of the Government concerned; by no means, however, is
this right created or even only conceded through them.
3. This right of the Church exists also in full force in the occupied
areas and must be respected by the occupying power. This is a prin-
ciple of international law which was expressly stated at the Second
Peace Conference in The Hague (October 18, 1907) in the Fourth
Convention. Indeed one reads in the annex to this convention with
regard to the laws and usages of land warfare the following articles,
the French text of which is as follows :
"Article 46. Family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and
private property, as well as religious convictions and practice,
must be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated.
"Article 47. Pillage is formally forbidden.
"Article 55. The occupying State shall be regarded only as
administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate,
forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State,
and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the
capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance
with the rules of usufruct.
"Article 56. The property of municipalities, that of institu-
tions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and
sciences, even when State property, shall be treated as private
property.
All seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institu-
tions of this character, historic monuments, works of art and
science, is forbidden, and should be made the subject of legal
proceedings."
Inasmuch as is also stated in the above-mentioned note verbale, the
Haupttreuhandstelle-Ost has violated these principles by the express
confiscation of the property of the Catholic Church as well as of
Catholic foundations, orders and associations, the Apostolic Nuncio in
agreement with the position taken by the Church in similar cases
registers due protest and demands that this confiscation be rescinded
in the sense that the arbitrarily confiscated property be recognized as
belonging to the legal owners and, as soon as the urgent necessities of
war permit, also the free use of the real estate and premises belonging
to them be returned to them. We cannot doubt that in the meantime
they will have been granted a suitable compensation. 3
* On Aug. 29 the Nuncio handed Weizsacker another note verbale (535/240025-
28) which enlarged upon the arguments of the previous note and which cited
specific examples of confiscation of church property.
See, further, document No. 260.
410 DOCUMENTS ON" GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 256
82/60541-42
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most tjbgent Tokto, August 29, 1941 — 12 : 10 a. m., summer time.
No. 1664 of August 28 Received August 29—11 : 30 p. m.
With reference to my telegram No. 1657 of August 29. 1
The Foreign Minister, 2 with whom I had made an appointment,
sent word to me that he was to have an audience in the Imperial
Palace today and therefore asked rae to call on Deputy Foreign Min-
ister Amau.
The Deputy Foreign Minister told me that Konoye had sent the
message to Roosevelt because of the impression that the Government
of the United States wished to clear the atmosphere in the Pacific. 3
Prince Konoye had consequently sent Roosevelt a message of a general
nature motivated by the aim of relaxing tension in the Pacific. Japa-
nese-American negotiations had been broken off after the occupation
of Indochina. A number of factors, such as the freezing measure 4
etc., had then worsened relations considerably and brought up prob-
lems which needed to be settled. It was an objective of the Tripartite
Pact to keep America from entering the war. Japan had served this
purpose first by trying to deter Roosevelt by sharp language. How-
ever, these tactics had not been successful ; on the contrary, Roosevelt's
attitude had stiffened still further as a result of the language used by
Japan. Germany, on the other hand, had ignored Roosevelt's provoca-
tion and in an admirable manner had refrained from giving him any
pretext for entering the war even on the occasion of the closing of
the Consulates. 5 Roosevelt's game had thereby been rendered con-
siderably more difficult. Japan thought it tactically advisable at the
moment to adopt the same method as Germany. In reply to my ques-
tion Amau said that Konoye's step did not aim at continuing nego-
tiations within the framework established before the occupation of
Indochina ; in the meantime new problems had arisen, which had to
^his telegram (82/60540) reported that following a special meeting of the
Japanese Cabinet an announcement was issued according to which Ambassador
Nomura had presented to President Roosevelt on Aug. 28 a message from Prime
Minister Konoye "regarding the problems of the Pacific pending between Japan
and the United States."
'Admiral Teijiro Toyoda.
* For the text of Konoye's message and the account of its presentation to Presi-
dent Roosevelt by Ambassador Nomura, see Foreign, Relations of the United
States, Japan, lSSl-19^1, vol. u, pp. 571-573.
4 This refers to the order freezing Japanese assets in the United States. See
document No. 239, footnote 2.
' See vol. xii of this series, document No. 634.
AUGUST 1941 411
be settled if peace in the Pacific was to be maintained. Japan would
of course do nothing in this connection that was incompatible with
the Tripartite Pact. The Japanese Government still stood by its
[offer of] cooperation of July 2. 6 The object of Konoye's action was
merely to prevent the entry of the United States into the war.
I told Amau that although I had no instructions from my Govern-
ment I could state at this time that my Government attached the
greatest importance to learning the exact contents of Konoye's mes-
sage. I could not hide the fact that I had serious doubts about the
advisability of a conciliatory gesture by Japan in the face of the
American provocation, which had found expression only recently
in the dispatch of an American military mission to Chungking. 7
It is to be feared that the Japanese step will give Roosevelt the
additional time he wants on account of the incomplete state of Amer-
ican armaments. I rejected Amau's comparison with the policy
toward America followed by Germany.
In view of the importance of the questions raised I again asked to
be received by the Foreign Minister as soon as possible.
The Deputy Foreign Minister promised to forward my request to
be given the contents of the Konoye message and to be received by
the Foreign Minister.
A further telegraphic report will follow. 8
Ott
" See documents Nos. 63 and 64.
T Announced by the White House on Aug. 26. See Department of State, Bulle-
tin, 1941, vol. v, p. 166.
s Document No. 259.
No. 257
230/153346-46
The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military
Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Belgeade, August 29, 1941 — 4 : 55 p. m.
No. 562 of August 29 Received August 29—5 : 40 p. m.
1. It having become increasingly apparent that the locally avail-
able German military and police forces, despite their most intensive
efforts and not inconsiderable losses, are insufficient for suppressing
the mounting Communist activity, while on the other hand requests
for reinforcements were rejected, an attempt had to be made to have
the Serbs themselves crush this Communist activity so as to prevent
the union of Communist and nationalist elements which is developing.
412 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The provisionally appointed government, as previously reported, 1
was no longer in a position to do this.
2. The Military Commander has therefore decided to entrust the
popular former War Minister General Milan Nedic, who is known as
a vigorous adversary of the Communists, with the formation of a gov-
ernment. He left him a free hand in selecting his collaborators and
will hold him alone responsible for the prompt suppression of the
rebellion in the country. Today Nedic submitted the list of his col-
laborators. According to this Acimovic will retain the Ministry of the
Interior. The Ljotic group is represented by three ministers. Other-
wise, the list comprises for the most part colorless personalities, with
the exception of General Josip Kostec, the Minister of Posts and
Transportation, who enjoys a reputation for efficiency. While not all
the names are satisfactory, Nedic's proposal was accepted so that the
struggle against the Communist terror can be vigorously taken up
without delay. Formation of the new government will be announced
on Saturday morning. 2
3. In order to enhance General Nedid's authority with respect to
his colleagues in the Ministry and in the country, he will bear the
title Minister President and his collaborators will be designated as
Ministers.
It has been made sure, however, that the de facto new government
body will be given no substantive powers exceeding those given to the
old provisionally appointed government. The reorganization, in ad-
dition, deals a blow to the shadow government of Simovic in London,
which will have the ground cut out from under its feet.
4. The Military Commander has made General Nedi6 no promises
in recompense for suppression of the Communist rebellion. What is
being considered is merely increasing the strength of the gendarmerie
from 5,000 to 10,000, and the formation of local auxiliary combat
units for home defense purposes, up to a total strength of 5,000. With
this Nedic expects to restore order, but the essential condition for this
is that the population should be solidly in back of him. As the gov-
ernment on the whole is not any stronger than the previous govern-
ment, all will depend on whether Nedic's personality will have the
anticipated attraction. Should he fail, the only alternative left to the
Military Commander will be administering the country without Ser-
bian assistance and undertaking the military suppression of the rebel-
lion with German forces alone.
5. I recommend that formation of the government be treated in
the German press as an internal Serbian matter and only briefly, with
1 See document No. 250.
'In telegram No. 567 of Aug. 29 (230/153348-49) Benzler supplied a list of tne
members of the Neclie government.
AUGUST 1941 413
the possible mention that this would give the Serbian people one more
chance of freeing themselves from the communist scourge by their
own efforts. 3
Benzler
* Kasche reported from Zagreb In telegram No. 1096 of Sept 1 (230/153402-03)
that "the establishment of the Serbian Government of Nedic has aroused
concern here." Marshal Kvaternik termed Nedic a former foe of Germany
and considered the establishment of the NediS government as an action whose
effects would be disadvantageous for Croatia,
No. 258
4881/E253249-50
The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister 1
Teletype
secret Berlin, August 29, 1941.
To the Special Train
In the economic negotiations with Turkey, scheduled to begin in
Ankara on September 8, one of the most essential questions for Ger-
many is whether it will be possible to obtain from the Turkish Gov-
ernment the resumption of chromium ore and copper deliveries. In
view of the attitude assumed by the Turkish Government in this re-
spect even in the last few years before the war, it is out of the ques-
tion that it should consent to such deliveries, unless Turkey in turn
obtains war material from Germany. 2
In view of the importance of chromium ore and copper the High
Command of the Wehrmacht has approved the delivery of war
material up to 20 million reichsmarks. The terms of delivery for this,
as far as possible, will be arranged in such a way that at least the
larger portion of the deliveries will not be made until a later date so
that there is no direct strengthening of Turkey ; in view of the small,
quantities involved this would occur, moreover, only to a very slight
extent even in the event of immediate delivery of the full amount.
Herewith to be submitted to the Foreign Minister with the request
for his approval that Herr Clodius, if he obtains appropriate counter-
concessions, may make an agreement with the Turkish Government
* It appears that this document was originally drafted as a memorandum by
Clodius which was submitted to Weizsacker through Wiehl. The memorandum
as printed here was dispatched over Weizskcker's signature with a paragraph
added by him (cf . footnote 3) .
' A Weizsacker memorandum submitted to Ribbentrop on July 19 (2109/456541-
44) had pointed out that the forthcoming economic negotiations would attempt
to settle German-Turkish trade on the basis of a clearing agreement as it ex-
isted prior to September 1, 1039. This memorandum also discussed in greater
detail the respective needs of Germany and Turkey with regard to chromium
and war material.
414 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
also for delivery of war material within the modest limits mentioned
in the foregoing. 3
Weizsaoker
"In a memorandum of Sept. 6 (2109/456321) Woermann recorded that Rin-
telen had asked him to inform Wiehl as follows :
"1. The Foreign Minister agrees to the Clodius memorandum of Aug. 29 signed
by the State Secretary regarding the German-Turkish negotiations. Thus
Clodius can offer also war material In return for corresponding concessions.
2. Without referring to the Foreign Minister, Clodius is to be given telegraphic
instructions that the negotiations should be conducted within the framework of
sober, economic negotiations and not be treated as a political issue."
A draft telegram of Sept. 7 by Wiehl (265/173228) transmitting these instruc-
tions to Clodius is in the files.
No. 259
82/60848-49
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Tokyo, August 30, 1941 — 10: 00 a. m.
No. 1660 of August 30 Received August 30—8 :15 p.m.
[Pol. VIII 4774 g.] 1
With reference to my telegram No. 1657 of August 29. 2
The Foreign Minister received me this afternoon in the presence of
an interpreter. In accordance with your telegram No. 1383 of
August 25 , 3 1 first gave him a picture of the general situation, empha-
sized the military weakening which the Soviet Union has in the mean-
time undergone, and pointed out the incomplete state of American
armaments. In view of this situation Japan was free, without run-
ning any risk, to make the decisions necessary to safeguard her posi-
tion and her prestige.
I asked the Foreign Minister for particulars about Konoye's mes-
sage to President Roosevelt. I feared that this step might create the
impression in the United States that Japan was prepared to renounce
any forceful action in the Pacific and I repeated our well-known argu-
ments about the conclusions which the Americans might all too readily
draw from that. Toyoda replied that he could only confirm the state-
ments made by Deputy Foreign Minister Amau on the previous day 4
about the nature of Konoye's message and avoided entering into a dis-
cussion of the advisability of the Japanese step. [He said that] Japan
merely aimed to keep the United States from entering the war, in
accordance with the objective of the Tripartite Pact. In reply to
1 The file number is supplied from another copy (1680/395792-93) .
' See document No. 2o6, footnote 1.
a Document No. 239.
' See document No. 256.
AUGUST 1941 415
my question about the first impression produced by Konoye's message,
he stated that the first discussion had only been a brief one and in view
of the general nature of the message it had undoubtedly not yet
brought about any statement of the American Government's position.
No report had yet been received from Ambassador Nomura; he would,
however, inform me about any reply from the United States, as I had
urgently requested in view of the importance of the matter, as soon
as a reply was received, Toyoda did not comply with my request to
let me have the text of Konoye's message.
During the conversation Toyoda was, in keeping with his nature,
very reserved. I am told that the advisability of Konoye's message
is vigorously debated in army and navy circles. Although, in view of
the attitude of Konoye's Government, it was to be expected that
attempts would be made to establish a modus vivendi with the United
States, even if it were only temporary, the news of a message from
the Prime Minister to Roosevelt came nevertheless as a surprise. The
prominence given to this step by the American press made an embar-
rassing impression here and left the uneasy feeling also in government
circles that the reaction might possibly be different from what was
hoped for. The Government tried to keep the treatment of the event
by the press within restricted limits.
Otx
No. 260
535/240035
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 565 Berlin, August 30, 1941.
With reference to St.S. No. 560 of August 29, 1941. 1
In regard to the Nuncio's note transmitted to me yesterday concern-
ing the claims of the Catholic Church to ownership of Church prop-
erty in the incorporated eastern territories, I told him today that in
this note he treated the formerly Polish area as "occupied territory."
This error aside, however, the Nuncio himself would hardly have the
hope of prevailing with us with his legal theory, namely, that canon
law was effective even where there are no contractual agreements with
the State. 2
Weizsacker
1 Document No. 255, footnote 1.
"Marginal note apparently in the handwriting of Dr. Herbert Siegfried:
"Pol. Ill is waiting for a statement of Dept. R (Sept 11) ."
416 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 261
116/67021-22
The Director of the Department for German Internal Affairs to the
Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Com-
mander in Serbia
Telegram
Berlin, August 30 s 1941.
zu D VIII 18T4. 1
Drafting officer : Regierungsrat Dr. Goeken.
The Zagreb Legation wires as follows : 2
"The Military Commander in Serbia had State Councilor Turner
make the communication that further resettlement in Serbia of Serbs
from Croatia was no longer supportable. 3 Turner's statements that
the resettlement quota for Serbs from Croatia is already exhausted
are by no means accurate. Turner's earlier statement to Veesenmayer
proves that some arbitrary calculation is being made there."
Please report by wire especially concerning how many Serbs have
so far been deported from Croatia to Serbia. 1
Luther
Minute :
Sturmbannfiihrer Eichmann of the Reich Security Main Office
stated upon inquiry that at the suggestion of Minister Todt last week
the current resettlement transports of Slovenes were halted by order
of the Reichsf uhrer-SS for strategic reasons. Since no directive had
been issued by the Reichsfiihrer-SS to halt the preparations for admit-
ting the Volksdeutsche from the Val Canale, the Val di Gardena,
Ljubljana and Kocevje, who are to be settled in the areas of Lower
Styria and Southern Carinthia evacuated by Slovenes, the Reich
Security Main Office and the Reich Commissariat for the consolida-
tion of the German National Community had submitted a proposal
to the Reichsfiihrer-SS that the evacuation of Slovenes in Lower
Styria should be continued to the extent necessary for accommodating
the Volksdeutsche mentioned. A decision had not yet been made by
the Reichsfiihrer-SS.
')) VI II 1874: Not found. ,„„,*. «,
"The following are excerpts from Zagreb telegram No. 1064 of Aug. 27
(116/67020).
' On the resettlement of Serbs ana Slovenes see vol. in, of this series, docu-
ment No. 589 and document No. 116 in this volume.
For an account of the transfers of population in the territory of Yugoslavia,
based on German and Croatian documents cf. Andrija-Ljubomir Lisac, "Deport-
acije Srba iz Hrvatske," SistorijsU Ziornih (IX), Nos. 1-4 (Zagreb, 1956),
pp. 125-145.
* No reply found.
SEPTEMBER 1941 417
Sturmbannfiihrer Eichmann supplied the following data regarding
the evacuation of Slovenes from Lower Styria and Southern Carinthia
thus far :
About 7,000 Slovenes (wave 1 : intellectuals) have been deported
to Serbia from these two areas. 7,000 to 8,000 Slovenes have been
deported to Croatia from Lower Styria from wave 2 (those who had
moved in after 1914) . That is thus a total of about 15,000 Slovenes,
who have so far been pushed out of these two areas. Because the num-
ber of Volksdeutsche mentioned must certainly amount to more than
20,000, and because in the opinion of the Reich Security Main office
at least twice the number of Slovenes must be deported so as to take
them [the Volksdeutsche] into the Reich, this would result in a num-
ber of at least 40,000 to 50,000 Slovenes in all to be evacuated. In the
Zagreb agreements 5 the transfer of 170,000 Slovenes had been
envisaged.
Regarding the deportation of Serbs from Croatia to Serbia, Sturm-
bannfiihrer Eichmann stated that according to his information about
12,000 Serbs had been deported in the regular way. The number of
Serbs deported illegally, which was far higher, was not known to him
at the moment.
1 Of June 4. See volume xii of this series, document No. 589.
No. 262
260/170152-58
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Helsinki, September 1, 1941—2 : 15 p. m.
top secret Received September 1 — 2 : 55 p. m.
No. 865 of September 1
In considering the situation in Finland, the following must be
taken into account :
1) According to the official version, Finland is waging a defensive
war against Soviet Russia because of the Russian attack on Finnish
territory on June 25. 1 Finland's war against Russia is not connected
"genetically" with the German-Russian war but since then it has been
connected operationally with it.
2) Finland's army is putting up a first-rate fight in close harmony
with German troops and has so far been waging a defensive war in
the offensive form.
1 See document No. 15.
682-905—64 32
418 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
3) The Finnish people do not wish to be drawn into a European
struggle aside from the Finnish-Russian conflict, and especially with
regard to England, do not wish to go beyond a break in diplomatic
relations. 2 Finland attaches great importance to having good rela-
tions with the United States.
4) Finland has 16 (sixteen) percent of her population under arms.
The economy cannot be sustained by the population remaining behind.
5) Feeding of the population could be ensured with difficulty dur-
ing the summer by additional supplies from abroad but will cause
great difficulty in the future.
6) The losses sustained by Finland in the field are higher than
could be estimated and are detrimental to morale; the latter improved
under the influence of the latest military successes.
7) The official war aims have so far not been announced by the
Government, The recovery of former territory is considered the ob-
vious minimum claim that is also compatible with a strict interpreta-
tion of the defensive war. The Officers' Corps, rightist circles with
the exception of the Finns of Swedish origin, 3 a large part of the
Agrarian Party and the Right-wing Socialists hope to acquire Eastern
Karelia as far as the Svir border. 4 Open discussions of this war aim
are still, at the moment, causing opposition, the strength of which
must not be underestimated.
8) Strong forces among the people and in the army imagine that
the military advance will go only as far as their war aims. Whether
the military and political leadership can divorce itself from this in
its decisions, will depend on the war situation, losses, and morale in
the country.
9) Some prominent men clearly see that Finland needs not only
territorial expansion but also security, which is only obtainable
through the defeat of Russia.
Bluchee
3 See document No. 160.
3 The German reads "von Schweden" which usually would mean "of Sweden."
There is a marginal note at this point: "so received." Wipert von Bliicher,
Gesandter zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie (Wiesbaden, 1951) , p. 245, renders
the passage "der Schweden."
* See vol. xii of this series, document No. 592 and footnote 3, and document
No. 636 and footnote 3.
SEPTEMBER 1941 419
No. 263
1062/383613-15
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Tehran, September 1, 1941.
No. 922 of September 1 Received September 1—3 : 25 p. m.
At 11 :30 a.m. I had a talk with, the Foreign Minister, 1 during which
I expounded to him in very serious words the view of the Reich Gov-
ernment regarding the responsibility of the Iranian Government for
the fate of the German colony. My question whether he had anything
definitive to tell me concerning the discussions with the Russians and
the English about the German colony was answered by the Foreign
Minister in the negative. He had spoken to the British Minister along
the line of the statement I had made to him several days before that
the German colony would make the journey to Turkey through Iraq
and Syria. 2 The British Minister had replied that the British Govern-
ment was prepared to receive the Germans in Ahwaz. The Foreign
Minister gave a negative reply to my specific question whether the
British Minister had given any guarantees that the Reich Germans
would be sent on to Turkey. The Foreign Minister was likewise unable
to answer my further question as to what the English intended to do
with the German colony in Ahwaz. I then told the Foreign Minister
that the situation was entirely clear to me now. The English intended
to intern the German colony in any event. If the Iranian Government
were to expel the Reich Germans, it would amount to delivering them
into the hands of the enemy. This would not only indicate the com-
plete impatience of the Iranian Government but also arouse a storm
of indignation among right-minded people the world over. I had to
warn him most urgently against any such expulsion without first
making sure of safe conduct because the consequences for the Iranian
Government would be very grave. The Foreign Minister was unable
to reply to this but said that the Minister President 3 was in the next
room and that he would ask him to join the talk. I repeated to the
Minister President what I had told the Foreign Minister. The sub-
'All Soheyli.
3 In telegram No. 904 of Aug. 29 (65/45300-01) Ettel reported having told the
Iranian Foreign Minister that Germany preferred to have the German residents
travel from Iran to Turkey through Iraq rather than through Russian-occupied
territory,
3 Ali Foroughi.
420 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POMCY
sequent conversation with the Minister President brought out that
the English had avoided so far making any definite statements about
their intentions regarding the German colony. The Iranian Govern-
ment had not yet had any talks with the Russians at all about free
passage to Turkey through the occupied territory. My question
whether the Iranian Government had at least been in touch -with the
Turkish Charge d'Affaires to obtain backing against England and
Russia in the question of the truce was answered in the negative by
the Minister President. He said he would immediately telegraph
Ankara and would request the support of the Turkish Government in
the question of safe conduct through the areas occupied by the British
or the Russians. He would also get in touch at once with the Russian
Embassy to ascertain the Russian position. In the further course of
the conversation the Minister President expressed the view that nego-
tiations might be greatly aided if I were able to offer a guarantee
that no German would remain in hiding in the country. I replied to
him that I would take all measures calculated to enable me to give such
a guarantee with a clear conscience, provided however that the oppo-
site side granted safe conduct through the occupied territory. If the
Reich Germans were to be expelled without there being granted a
safe conduct to Turkey, I would not be able to assume any guarantee
whatever that Reich Germans, who did not care to fall into enemy
hands, might not go their own ways.
The conversation with the two men who are at present the responsi-
ble figures of the Iranian Government proved unsatisfactory m the
utmost degree. I am no longer in any doubt that the Iranian Govern-
ment is prepared to throw the German colony to the wolves if Tehran
is threatened with enemy occupation. I have not yet been informed of
the official terms of the truce. Apparently the signature will take
place this afternoon and an announcement will be made tomorrow at
the session of the Parliament. If I should become definitely convinced
that the conditions stipulate expulsion of the Germans without safe
conduct to Turkey, no other course would be left but to transfer the
German colony to the grounds of the Turkish Embassy. 4 The fate of
the German colony will then depend on the pressure the Turkish Gov-
<ln a subsequent telegram of Sept. 2 which also bore the number «22
(65/45325), Ettel stated that he had abandoned the Idea of moving the ) German
colony to the Turkish Embassy after having been told by the Turkish Charge
d'Affaires that the Turkish Government no longer saw a necessity fox assuming
the protection of the Germans because there would be no entry of British and
Soviet troops into Tehran.
SEPTEMBER 1941 421
ernment is able to bring to bear on the English and the Russians in the
matter of the safe conduct.
Ettel
No. 264
260/170154-55
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most ukgeht Helsinki, September 1, 1941 — 9 : 24 p. m.
top secret Received September 1 — 10 : 50 p. m.
No. 866 of September 1
1) Yesterday the President visited Field Marshal Mannerheim at
his headquarters. According to a report from a German military
source, the President requested of the Field Marshal that, in view of
the heavy casualties, the old boundary on the Karelian Isthmus not to
be crossed and that plans for an offensive in Farther Karelia should
also be restricted.
2) The Foreign Minister, -whom I then asked whether there was
any change in the Finnish strategy, denied this and remarked that the
Finnish officers were observing the agreements concluded earlier with
the German officers. 1
3) A member of the Finnish Cabinet remarked that there were
differences in the Government regarding future strategy. The For-
eign Minister, the Minister of Public Instruction, 8 and the Minister of
the Interior 3 were for the continuation of current strategy. The
Minister of War * and the socialist members of the Cabinet were for
defensive strategy, now that Vyborg had been taken, the old boundary
reached at most points or crossed, and that Hanko would fall automati-
cally. The President had agreed with the latter point of view.
4) The situation quickly came to a head after the fall of Vyborg
inasmuch as the question of crossing the old border became urgent.
I should like to propose, as the first eountermeasure, that a high Ger-
man officer fly here to (group missing) [present the?] Knight's Cross
1 See vol. xn of this series, document No. 554.
1 Antti Kukkonen.
* Ernst Friherre von Born.
1 Mai. Gen. Rudolf Walden.
422 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
to Field Marshal Mannerheim and, on the return trip, visit the Presi-
dent in Helsinki. 8
5) I am assured that those persons now thinking about a defensive
strategy have not the slightest thought of concluding a separate peace
or of demobilizing.
6) Further report will follow.
Blucher
"In a teletype message of Sept. 2 to Ribbentrop (260/170158) Weizsaeker en-
dorsed Bltlcher's suggestion that a high ranking German officer confer a German
decoration on Mannerheim and also visit President Rytt.
The suggestion of honoring Mannerheim by a visit and a decoration had already
been put forward by the Chief of the Liaison Staff with. Field Marshal Man-
nerheim, General HSrfurth, in his letter of Aug. 27 to OKW. See document No.
248, footnote 4.
General Jodl came by air to Finnish General Headquarters on Sept, 4 and on
behalf of Hitler conferred on Mannerheim all three classes of the Iron Cross.
Jodl also brought assurances that Germany would deliver to Finland 15,000 tons
of rye. See Waldemar Erfurtn, Der ftnniache Krieg 1941-l$4b (Wiesbaden,
1950), p. 68.
No. 265
P6/P00322-45
The Chief of the Sigh Command of the Wehrmacht to the Reichsmar-
. schall and Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, to the Commander
in Chief of the Navy, to the Commander in Chief of the Army, and
to the Reich Minister of Foreign A fairs
Fuhrer's Headquarters, September 1, 1941.
TOP SECRET MXUTART
The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht
"Wehrmacht Operations Staff
Department of National Defense
No. 44 1465/41 g.Kdos Chefs.
By officer only
The attached memorandum of the High Command of the Wehr-
macht "The Strategic Situation in Late Summer 1941 as Basis for
Further Political and Military Plans" was presented to the Fiihrer
and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht.
The Fiihrer has approved the memorandum and ordered its circu-
lation for personal information to the Commanders in Chief of the
branches of the Wehrmacht and to the Reich Foreign Minister.
A further circulation or duplication of the memorandum is, how-
ever, at the express wish of the Fiihrer not to be made.
Keitel
SEPTEMBER 1941 423
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of the High Command of the Wehrmacht
Fuhrer's Headquarters, August 27, 1941.
TOP SECRET MILITARY
High Command of the Wehrmacht
W F St/L, No. 441465/41 g.K.Ch.
By officer only
Six copies
Copy No. 2 *
The Strategic Situation" in Late Summer 1941 as Basis for
Further Political and Military Plans
I
The Probable Military and Military-Political Situation in Late
Autumn 19Jfl '.*
1. In the east in a campaign of only 8 weeks mighty successes have
been achieved. Even if Soviet Russia can numerically cover her losses
in prisoners, dead, and wounded from her enormous reserves of man-
power, the losses in officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, in
well-trained soldiers, and above all in material are in any case irre-
placeable. The enemy's resistance is still not completely broken, al-
though a surprising collapse comes within the realm of possibilities.
At the moment, then, one cannot say definitely how many forces
can be made free in the east at the onset of winter and how many will
still be necessary for the further conduct of operations next year.
In case the campaign in the east should not yet lead in the year
1941 to the complete destruction of Soviet Russia's capacity for re-
sistance — a case with which the Supreme Command has always reck-
oned — then the military and political reactions for the over-all
situation could be the following:
The intervention of Japan against Russia can be delayed. This
would be all the more urgent the longer a lengthening of the campaign
* Copy No. 2 was received by the High Command of the Navy. According to
the distribution, list (F6/P00346) copy No. 4 was sent to the Foreign Minister
but this copy has not been found. The Navy's copy has numerous marginal com-
ments but no attempt has been made to reproduce them fnasmuch as they do not
reflect opinions or views of the Foreign Ministry.
"The memorandum was based on a shorter memorandum of Aug. 6 (P6/-
P00312-21) drawn up by Warlimont, Chief of the Department of National Defense
of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff and entitled "Brief Strategic Survey on the
Continuation of the War after the Eastern Campaign."
Cf. Walter Warlimont, Itn Hauptquartier tier deutschen Wehrmacht 1989-19^5
(Frankfurt am Main, 1962) , pp. 206-207.
The Haider Diary in the entry for Sept. 13 contains extensive excerpts from
the memorandum.
424 DOCUMENTS ON" GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
in the east offers the Anglo-Saxon powers the possibility of rendering
help even by way of Vladivostok.
On the other hand, however, such an attempt on the part of America
that is recognizable can be the occasion for Japan to intervene.
In Iraq and in Syria an English base has developed from which at
this time a juncture with Soviet Russia is being sought on Iranian
territory : we cannot prevent this without the cooperation of Turkey.
Turkey will view this development with great displeasure. Despite
this there are no indications that Turkey will step out from her wait-
ing neutral attitude before she is convinced of the definitive collapse
of Russia.
A military action against Turkey — who certainly will no longer
enter into the war against us unless we attack her — would militarily
bring only disadvantages. The desired political success is not to be
achieved even by military pressure.
The only way that possibly would promise success is to win Turkey
through purely political means supported by further successes, par-
ticularly in the southern part of the eastern front.
2. In the Mediterranean area and in the west there are no signs in-
dicating an essential change of the military situation. It is doubtful
whether the English forces are now strong enough to undertake a re-
newed attack against the Solium front with a simultaneous sortie
from Tobruk.
Without a serious German threat from the direction of Syria-Iraq
the English position on the Sues Canal will constantly get firmer.
Supported by the inflowing American reinforcements, coming for
the most part over French Equatorial Africa and around the Gape,
the build-up of strong offensive forces against Libya will be able to
proceed almost undisturbed.
On the other hand we must reckon with an increasingly hard
pressed situation for the German-Italian forces in Libya if we do not
succeed in placing their supply over the Mediterranean on an essen-
tially broader basis, or in taking Tobruk before a new English of-
fensive. The German-Italian preparations for attack will, however,
take up to the beginning of October.
Spain will not weaken in her moral support for the German con-
duct of the war : she will, however, not make the decision for her own
entrance into the war until she considers the German-Italian power
position in the Mediterranean as fully assured or until she herself i3
attacked.
France, divided as she is among her politicians, her soldiers, and in
her public opinion as to the way in which she can mitigate or remove
the consequences of her severe defeat, is waiting and is endeavoring to
SEPTEMBER 1941 425
improve her own situation depending on the development of the mili-
tary and political situation of the Axis.
3. As for the English and the Americans, something along the fol-
lowing lines of thought may be assumed to be their evaluation of the
situation :
Now and in the future it is no longer possible to defeat Germany on
the Continent. The aim must therefore be to increase the difficulties
of supply in Europe, particularly in the occupied areas, and thereby,
in conjunction with heavier air attacks, gradually to weaken the ex-
ternal and internal political position of the Axis Powers.
The danger of invasion can be regarded as removed for the time
being. The fleet has made up its losses in fair measure by new con-
struction and by purchase in America and it has carried out essential
organizational and technical improvements for attack and for defense.
The superiority of the Luftwaffe, weakened as it is by the eastern
campaign, can be overtaken by the increased Anglo-Saxon production
of 1942 ; the English Air Force will be able ever more effectively to
strike the larger cities and industries, particularly in the western part
of the Reich.
The strategic situation in the Mediterranean and, beyond that, the
over-all strategic position can, however, only he fundamentally
changed if, by preventing German-French cooperation, they suc-
ceed in :
a. removing the German-Italian bridgehead in North Africa;
b. thereby gaining possesssion of the entire North African coast;
c. in this fashion gaining the sea and air mastery in the Mediter-
ranean;
d. opening the way to the Americans for an invited entrance into
the theater of war in French Morocco (Casablanca) and French West
Africa (Dakar) ;
e. critically hemming in the strategic possibilities of the German-
Italian conduct of war by sea and in the air ;
/. drawing the blockade of Central Europe tighter and thereby
g. placing Italy under a military and economic pressure of such
strength that she collapses.
Along with this Russia's will to resist must be upheld by establish-
ing the connection with Russia over Iranian territory and Germany
must be prevented from seizing the Caucasus oil region. So much
for the probable line of thought of the two Anglo-Saxon opponents.
II
Our Own Decisions for the Future Conduct of the War.
1. The aim remains to defeat England and to force her to make
peace.
The terror attacks of the Luftwaffe and aerial attacks on industry
have proved to be insufficient for this. The former have been endured
426 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
by the English people in gloomy resignation ; the latter have indeed
damaged production but they have not in great measure forced it to
cease. Our own experience, which, to be sure has been with mani-
foldly weaker hostile attacks, confirms this judgment.
As means of striking the English island, the heart of the hostile
resistance, in such fashion as to decide the war there remain : invasion,
or investment.
2. Invasion, if it succeeds in full measure, is undoubtedly the surest
means of ending the war quickly, at least in Europe.
The prerequisites for such a decision are:
a. Domination of the air, at least over the Channel and the sur-
rounding zone.
b. The mass commitment of those means of warfare which hitherto
have been most successful (dive bomber units, naval warfare by small-
scale instruments) against the English fleet so that it can be beaten
back in the attack which it is sure to make in the Channel, or at the
least so that it can be prevented from effecting enduring great successes
against our transport fleet.
c. Mass production of highly effective, self-propelled naval craft,
which could, in accordance with the varying landing conditions of the
individual sectors of the coast, land troops and material on a broad
front* doing this, if possible, without re-transfer into smaller craft.
d. The creation of a strong parachute and glider force with ap-
propriate air transport space.
Such preparations demand a considerable sector of the German
armament industry and in part can be carried out only at the cost of
other armament commitments. They would probably require the
period up to the late summer of 1942.
The attack against the English island itself by the landing of
troops already represents a great risk and one which constantly in-
creases with the passing of time. Furthermore one cannot prepare
such an attack in a short period, but one ought to have in view even
with regard to the further armament production, particularly for the
Luftwaffe but also for the Navy, the choice of objectives which one
wishes to make for continuing the war against England after Russia's
defeat. There are two courses:
a) To leave it to the English to attack the great European area
dominated by the Axis Powers, but on our own part to conduct
the attack further on the periphery only and to continue the siege
of England with all means; or
b) Ourselves to land in England.
The first course requires, as far as aerial armament is concerned,
only the fighter planes necessary for defense, but on the other
hand requires a great number of long range aircraft for attacks
against ships.
The second course is not to be entered upon except with a power-
ful number of fighters and very strong dive bomber units.
SEPTEMBER 1941 427
For these reasons a definitive decision regarding the course to be
followed in the further struggle against England is desirable even
at this time.
In spite of this one must, with full recognition of this situation,
declare that this decision cannot yet be taken. One thing is certain
and that is that England, for as long as she continues to struggle,
must never be allowed to believe that the danger of an invasion has
been removed. Otherwise the strong armies which are now tied down
in England could be made available for the struggle on the periphery
in so far as shipping space permits or else made available for her
war industry, either of which consequences would be only disadvan-
tageous for us.
The German aviation industry must, in spite of the disadvantages
connected therewith, choose a course which for the time being takes
into account both possibilities.
3. Independent of the decision which can only later be taken
whether or not the invasion is seriously to be prepared, the siege of
England by the Navy and the Luftwaffe must continue to be con-
ducted by every possible means as being the best tested kind of
campaign according to our experience up to now and which in the
long run can have a deadly effect.
According to the calculations of the Navy it is necessary for this
to bring the figure of sinkings from a monthly average of 800,000
BRT up to 1 million BKT.
The armament industry's prerequisites for this have been ordered.
There are further possibilities in the matter of operations and in
organisation in order to concentrate the missions of the Navy and of
the Luftwaffe more sharply on this important aim. The proposals
now on hand from the Naval "War Staff aim at :
The formation of long range reconnaissance squadrons with the
greatest possible range for the submarine warfare;
Concentration of the strongest aerial forces {Atlantic air squad-
rons) for the conduct of the campaign against England's supplies
along her coasts and on the Atlantic ;
Large-scale employment of the new aerial mines and torpedoes;
Continuation of systematically conducted attacks against the Eng-
lish harbors including their wharves and against the English warships
with the main effort against the aircraft carriers and destroyers,
especially the newly constructed ones.
These proposals of the Naval War Staff which in part proceed
from the introduction of a new model of reconnaissance and bombard-
ment airplane (He-177) will not yet be fully carried out in 1942
because :
428 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The new model will make its appearance at the front in significant
numbers only in the summer of 1942 and even then not in sufficient
quantity. The siege of England can therefore only be begun with
sufficient aerial forces when the Eastern campaign is essentially termi-
nated and the Luftwaffe is again rested up and expanded. According
to the conception of the Navy it would therefore be all the more neces-
sary to improve the prospects for successful continuation of the battle
of the Atlantic by means of new, strategically located bases. As such
bases are to be considered :
Bizerte, as the North African harbor most capable of discharging
cargo and the one to be reached with the least danger. The Spanish
mainland and possibly also the Canary Islands as air bases.
El Ferrol, Cadiz, and Gibraltar as bases for naval surface craft.
Casablanca as an air and naval base.
Dakar predominantly as a submarine base with aerial defenses.
The value of these bases for the continuation of the German war
operations is very great. Demonstration in detail is superfluous. It
suffices to point out that at the time we have at our disposal no base
for surface craft which opens the way for us into the Atlantic, for
Brest is open to effective attacks of the English Air Force; the pas-
sage through the Denmark Strait between Greenland and Iceland is
scarcely possible in the summer and is possible in the winter only at
great risk.
El Ferrol, Cadiz, Gibraltar, and Casablanca offer in this regard
quite different possibilities whereas Dakar again lies within the range
of hostile aircraft based on Freetown and is therefore suitable more as
a base for submarines.
All of these bases have in common the fact that in order to gain
them we need the political agreement of Spain or France.
It may be that Spain would possibly bow to a strong military pres-
sure although the value of an alliance achieved by compulsion could
not be very great. All military measures will be of no avail with
respect to the French colonial .empire. To be sure we could occupy all
of metropolitan France after the defection of the colonies, and then
by the employment of much harsher methods than before we could
exploit the French population and resources to the very last ounce for
German purposes and thereby, in view of her scanty biological re-
serves, gradually extinguish France. We could also occupy the
French Mediterranean harbors. But for the further conduct of the
war we could not by a long way make up for the transfer of the French
African colonies and of the French fleet to the enemy, quite apart
from the enormous political advantage which America would draw
from this possibility of a disintegration of European solidarity which
is beginning to develop. With the recognition that the enemy has
SEPTEMBER 1941 429
available for this same purpose a wealth of military and political
means, and that the possession of these French bases could be of suf-
ficient importance to decide the war, a great political commitment
would be necessary and would be justified, it being understood that
the political success would be militarily exploited. Whether such a
political commitment can be undertaken depends less upon our good
will than on the French Government.
The Navy in its memorandum 3 speaks only of the battle of the At-
lantic, but for forcing England under it is of almost as great signifi-
cance to win the battle of the Mediterranean. The prerequisite for
each is the defeat of Soviet Eussia.
If England after our victory in the east is still not ready to give in,
her situation will nevertheless be completely hopeless if we should
succeed in overcoming the political differences of France, of Spain,
and of Turkey among themselves and with respect to Italy to such a
degree that all three states would take part in the war on the side of
the Axis. This highest aim is perhaps not to be achieved in its full
scope. In considering the political alternatives, whether to win over
the one or the other state, it is the military value of the three states
for us which is to be compared :
a. If Turkey were on our side, English and Eussian forces to begin
with would be tied down along her borders. This would permit us
the more rapid seizure of the Caucasus oil region and put us in posi-
tion in the year 1942 by way of Trans Jordan to attack Egypt from
the east. In such a case we would have to support Turkey with muni-
tions and material.
&. If Spain were in the war against England, she would in any case
be a heavy burden for us as regards material. She would bringus
the naval bases of El Ferrol and Cadiz, the elimination of the English
base at Gibraltar, and perhaps even the seizure of the Rock itself and
therewith the domination of the entrance into the Mediterranean. As
long as the Eock is not taken we do not ourselves dominate the Strait
in a positive sense although we would close it for the enemy.
The military value is thus very great but only if at the same time
the French colonial empire in Africa does not shift its attitude. _
The concept of subduing the French colonial empire in Africa with
the aid of the Spanish bridgehead represents something very difficult to
achieve. Spanish Morocco would very probably be lost through joint
Anglo-French operations before German forces could get in there.
The possession of Gibraltar would, however, have lost its essential
significance if North Africa fell into Anglo-French hands.
The cooperation of the Spanish fleet in the struggle against Eng-
land is to be estimated as of slight importance.
o. France. The entrance of France into the war against England
would immediately result in an easing of our situation in North
Africa.
"Cf. U.S. Navy Department, ONI, "Ftmrer Conferences on Matters Dealing
With the German Navy, 1941," vol. n, pp. 13-18.
430 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The domination over the North African coast in its full extension
westward from Egypt would thereby fall to the Axis. The threat to
the German Africa Corps and to Italy would be removed; Malta
would lose its importance; the bases of Casablanca and Dakar could
be utilized by the German Navy.
The commitment of the French fleet on our side, however, would
mean an increase of power which cannot be estimated too highly. On
the other hand the forces of the French, especially in West Africa, are
limited, while to the south of them in Gambia, the Gold Coast, Nigeria,
and Sierra Leone an even stronger center of English power is being
built up.
If then France takes this step on her own, or if she gets forced into
the war against England by concessions to Germany (making the har-
bor of Bizerte available) , then she must in advance obtain and exploit
the possibilities for reinforcing her position in West Africa and we
must be in position to intervene in her support where it is necessary.
The possibilities on our part to intervene in the struggle for Dakar,
even if we had available air strength, still remain slight.
From these considerations it follows :
The entrance of Turkey into the war is for us at any time, but the
earlier the better, of great military advantage. Even without Ger-
man help she is strong enough to stand off the Anglo-Russian forces
now available on land, at sea, and in the air and she can offer valuable
help for the domination of the Black Sea. Even by assuming a
threatening attitude she will tie down strong English and Soviet Rus-
sian forces and give relief to our conduct of the war in Southern
Russia.
It is otherwise with France and with Spain. Unless German
ground forces and air forces stand available to be able to reinforce
the French and Spanish positions or to exploit them offensively, the
value of the entrance into the war by either of these countries, but
especially by Spain, remains problematical. The fact that it would
be possible for the Navy to make immediate use of Spanish and French
naval bases does not change matters very much.
As against the advantage of being able to place the supply of the
Italian theater of war on a broader basis and to protect it better, there
stands the danger of the loss of Dakar to the English, especially be-
cause the French air forces around Dakar are inadequate in strength
and in respect to maintenance.
Ill
Summary.
Militarily and politically England pursues two great aims: by
means of the connection established with Soviet Russia over Iran to
uphold Russia's will to resist and to prevent Germany from seizing
SEPTEMBER 1941 431
the Caucasus oil fields; sooner or later to gain the whole of West and
North Africa as a zone of operations.
Spain and Turkey are at the least to be held as non-belligerents.
Large-scale landing attempts against the European area are not to
be expected. The bulk of the English reinforcements are at this time
flowing not toward Egypt but toward Haifa and Basra.
For our own further conduct of the war, therefore, the following is
submitted:
1. The collapse of Russia is the next and most decisive war aim
which must be forced by the employment of all forces that can be
spared from the other fronts. In so far as this will not be fully
achieved in 1941, the continuation of the eastern campaign in 1942
occupies the first place.
The conquering of territory on the southern wing will have great
political and economic effects.
We must strive to achieve a change in our favor of the political
attitude of Turkey. The military situation in the southeast would
thereby be significantly improved.
2. Only after the elimination of Russia as a power factor is the
battle against England in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean to be
taken up in full measure, if possible with the help of French and
Spanish positions.
Even if Russia is in large measure crushed this year the forces of
the Army and of the Luftwaffe will scarcely be available before the
spring of 1942 for decisive operations in the Mediterranean, in the
Atlantic, and on the Spanish mainland. Meanwhile, however, in
order to relieve the strained situation in the Mediterranean, and to
impede the English sea transport toward Haifa and toward Tobnik,
German minesweepers, motor torpedo boats, and submarines are to be
transferred to the Mediterranean.
3. It is important, at least until next spring: not to let the political
and military relations with France and Spain be severed, but, on the
contrary, to increase them ; to keep France on the leash ; and beyond
that to influence her to make such reinforcements of West Africa as
to be capable of meeting any English-American attack. For this pur-
pose it should be our aim to disseminate the belief among the French
people and soldiers that France will not face destruction with the
victory of the Axis. This is the essential psychological prerequisite
for a will for battle of the French colonial armed forces against Eng-
land. The difficulty of this task lies in the consideration of the justi-
fied interests of our Italian ally.
432 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
From the military point of view, however, this is absolutely neces-
sary for defeating England within a reasonable time and therefore it
must be attempted.*
4. On this widened basis we can then only by next spring allot the
support of the Luftwaffe in larger measure to the expanding com-
mitment of submarines in order to continue the investment of England
with greater success than in recent months.
5. Operations in the eastern Mediterranean theater are possible only
when we have reached Transcaucasia.
6. The invasion of England can be earnestly considered only if in
spite of the collapse of Kussia all means should fail to induce Spain
or France to participate in the war on the side of the Axis, and if
thereby the battle in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean should
4 On Aug. 18 the OKW authorized resumption of German-French military
discussions for implementation of the Paris Protocols.
In its directive W St. K (M) 3641/41 g Kdos of Sept. 8 (8589/603016-19) the
OKW laid down supplementary principles to apply in such discussions :
"1. The negotiations are to be so conducted that military relations with
France are not broken off, but France for the time being is not to be urged into
the war against England. The principal psychological prerequisite for the will
in the French colonial armed forces to fight England, and at the same time the
surest guarantee that German military concessions will not be misused, is to
drive home the fact that only through German-French military collaboration
can France preserve her colonial empire and that only an Axis victory can save
her from destruction.
"2. The military reinforcement of French West Africa, especially as regards
the air and air defense arms, and the supply situation, must be brought to the
forefront of the discussions. The measures envisaged to that end in the French
reorganization plan, which go beyond the Paris Protocols, can be approved
in so far as they can be carried into effect with the resources on hand. Without
allowing the purpose to be recognized at this time, mobile forces are to be
released to the extent that they would be helpful, if the occasion arises, in
securing West Africa offensively by seizure of Gambia. Furthermore, develop-
ment of the Sahara trails for limited overland traffic would be useful in case
the sea routes might be interrupted. The setting of a date for bringing Dakar
into use as a German base is to be left open for the time being.
"3. Reinforcement of North Africa is to be restricted for the time being to
certain improved provisions for the weapons at hand, that is in ammunition,
replacement parts, fuel and lubrication, etc., and to the most necessary increases
in stationary, defensive weapons. Further military concessions, even though
within the framework of the submitted reorganization plan, cannot be con-
sidered until there is further clarification of the general military-political situ-
ation and the positions of military command in North Africa are filled with
absolutely reliable pro-Axis personnel.
"Otherwise there is no change in the directive of August 18, 1941, pursuant to
which the approval of the Chief of OKW must be obtained before any reinforce-
ments for North Africa are authorized and the respective proposals must be
accompanied either by the approval of the Italians or, in any case, their
comments.
"The date for putting Bizerte into use remains open.
"4. Account must be taken of Italy's legitimate interests. The general agenda
for the discussions must accordingly be established in cooperation with Italy.
The results, as prearranged, must be submitted to the OKW for approval prior
to the opening of the German-French negotiations."
SEPTEMBER 1941 433
not produce such successes as to enable us to reckon with the conquest
of England in this fashion.
Kettel
Three Appendices B
1. General map of Atlantic bases.
2. Range of penetration of German airplanes from European and
West African 'bases.
3. Distribution of forces in the Mediterranean and in Africa.
° Not found.
No. 266
765/270488-89
Memorandum hy Minister Eisenlohr
Berlin, September 1, 1941.
PoIIM2320gRs.IL
Drafting officer : Counselor von Grote.
Subject : Germans arrested in the U.S.A. under suspicion of espionage.
The Foreign Minister by teletype message No. 673 [637] of July 11 x
from Special Train, Westfalen, gave instructions that a report be
submitted -with reference to Washington telegram No. 2110 of July 5 a
on the question as to who of those arrested worked with the Abwehr
and who with the SD.
There was a delay in carrying out the instruction because the OKW,
in connection with the investigation, objected to the criticism of the
activity of the Abwehr in the U.S.A. made by the Embassy Wash-
ington in telegram No. 2110. Clarifying the matter required numer-
ous consultations between the Foreign Ministry and the Abwehr as
well as a joint discussion of all cases known to us between the officials
of the Consulate General in New York and the Abwehr. The follow-
ing can now be reported in conclusion :
(1) Of the 17 persons arrested whose names became known from
reports of the Embassy in Washington and also from press reports,
four worked for the Abwehr. Only one of those arrested is known
to the SD and that person did not have instructions nor did he submit
reports on his own.
(2) The substantive work of the four who had been active on in-
structions of the Abwehr has produced militarily valuable results and
cannot be criticized. Criticism with respect to other individual cases
was recognized as justified by the Abwehr.
1 See document No. 81, footnote 3.
'Document No. 81.
682-905 — 64 33
434 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
(3) The generalizations and the sharpness of the criticism ex-
pressed especially in the penultimate paragraph of telegram No. 2110
does not appear to be justified on the basis of the result of the dis-
cussions.
The matter can be considered as closed. 3
Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Sec-
retary in accordance with instructions.
ElSENLOHR
■Instructions substantially on the lines of this memorandum were sent by
Eisenlohr to the Embassy in the United States in telegrams Nos. 1646(765/270495-
96) and 1647(765/270497) of Aug, 28. Additional material on this espionage
case is filmed on serial 765.
No. 267
230/153*06-07
The Foreign Minister to the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry
With the Military Commander in Serbia
Telegram
top secret Special Train, September 2, 1941 — 2 : 35 a. m.
No. 930 of September 2 from the Special Train
E«ceived Berlin September 2 — 3 : 15 a. m.
No. 1159 from the Foreign Ministry Sent September 2.
With reference to your telegrams Nos. 562 of August 29 x and 569
of August 30.*
In the given circumstances the establishment of a new Serbian gov-
ernment appears to me, too, to be expedient and I have no substantive
objections to it. However, your reports impel me to make the follow-
ing comments :
1. The installation of a new government doubtless belongs among
the matters in which the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry
should participate in accordance with points 2 and 3 of the Fiihrer's
decree of April 28. 3 Although it is not expressly mentioned in your
reports that you participated, I assume that this was the case, and re-
quest that you confirm this to me. Otherwise please wire why this was
not done.
2. Much as I value independence and willingness to assume respon-
sibility in my officials, I nevertheless desire that I be informed in
advance in such important matters, and that my decision be obtained.
Only in cases of special urgency can there be a departure from this by
1 Document No. 257.
1 Not printed (230/153347). This telegram reported the favorable impression
made in Belgrade by the formation of the Nedifi government.
a See vol. xii of this series, document No. 365, footnote 1.
SEPTEMBER 1941 435
way of exception. No such special urgency obtained here. In the
future please report in. advance in such cases.
3. If the new government lias the inner strength expected of it for
crushing the communist forces, it is to be expected and feared that it
will afterwards use this strength to make troublesome demands of one
sort or another of the Reich Government. Please therefore watch
this jointly with the Military Commander, and prevent the new gov-
ernment from turning against Germany in its mental attitude and
conduct. We must retain the possibility at all times of imposing the
necessary limits on the new government or of recalling it.
4. The most important thing seems to me to be to carry out the
total disarmament of the population. Please send a written report
on what has been done in this regard since the armistice agreement,
and furthermore, in consultation with the Military Commander and
Veesenmayer, what else must be done with this end in view. 4
Ribbentrop
'Replying to this instruction in telegram No. 581 of Sept. 2 (230/153404-05)
Benzler assured Ribbentrop that he had been fully consulted by the Military
Commander regarding the establishment of the Nedifi government and that no
promises had been made to the latter which would give it the right to make
troublesome demands of the German Government. The written report about
the disarmament of the Serbian population requested in point 4 of the instruc-
tion would follow. Such a report has not been found.
No. 268
1017/372682-63
The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
secret Rome, September 2, 1941 — 8 : 55 a. m.
No. 2060 of September 1 Received September 2 — 11 : 10 a. m.
Del. No. 15
On the basis of the complaints made recently by Minister Riccardi
and General Favagrossa 1 concerning German deliveries of raw mate-
rials which are overdue, 2 this question was discussed in detail with
Giannini and the Ministers concerned. We pointed out in this connec-
tion that these arrearages were relatively small in comparison with the
great performances of the German economy and the German trans-
portation system, even during the Russian campaign. If Germany
had stated at the beginning of the Russian campaign that, in con-
sequence of this special situation, she could temporarily not keep the
promises she had previously made, the Italian Government would
1 General Carlo Favagrossa, Under State Secretary for War Production.
2 See document No. 245.
436 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
surely have found this justified. If we had decided not to issue such
a statement and had tried, despite the new situation, to honor the old
commitments 8 with all the means at our command, we should not
now be reproached for relatively small arrearages. The Italians have
in general recognized this point of view. To be sure, General Fava-
grossa is obviously still very uneasy about the future deliveries of
items of military importance. For this reason we have, for our part,
pointed out that the Italians, too, are in arrears with a number of
essential military deliveries. An exhaustive report concerning the
details of these conversations is being sent at the same time by courier.
I would mention in regard to this matter that the German attitude
above described was in accordance with the attempt to justify our
behavior to Italy. We must not fail to realize, however, that there
are actually considerable arrearages, and that for political and mili-
tary reasons, it is necessary in the future to do our utmost to see that
the obligations we have assumed are fulfilled. There is no doubt
that the frequently hesitant attitude of the authorities charged with
the implementation of the German-Italian agreement has actually in
many cases resulted in our failure to a considerable extent to meet our
obligations. _
Clodius
Mackeksen
• See vol. XII of this series, document No. 652 and footnote 1.
* Not found.
No. 269
2077/480407-09
The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
8ECEEr Rome, September 2, 1941-9 : 04 a. m.
No. 2061 of September 1 Received September 2—11 : 10 a. m.
Del. No. 16
We took the occasion of the letter that Minister Riccardi addressed
to me a few days ago 1 on the basic development of German-Italian
trade and payments to discuss this matter for our part in detail with
Giannini, Riccardi, and Favagrossa. I took the following stand, espe-
cially in speaking to Riccardi: The Italian view that our trade bal-
ance with Italy was very passive in the past half year, was incorrect.
In the first 7 months of 1941 we shipped goods of the value of approxi-
mately 690 million reichsmarks, and received goods of the value of
1 See document No. 245.
SEPTEMBER 1941
437
only 580 million reichsmarks. The mistake in the Italian figures is
explained by the fact that -war material is not included, because it is
carried in special accounts. It just shows that the settlement made on
June 19 2 at Italy's request to the effect that war material was not to
be paid for in clearing, to which we agreed for political reasons, was
not permanently tenable. We now had to insist that the deliveries
out of German military stores again be paid for in clearing. Another
gap in payments resulted from the fact that approximately 135 mil-
lion reichsmarks in deliveries of war material had not yet been paid
for at all because no agreement could be reached on the prices. More-
over, large sums for deliveries of war material had erroneously not
been paid for through clearing, although orders to private German
firms were involved. Another reason for the unfavorable status of
clearing was that Italy had increased her prices quite dispropor-
tionately in the last half year. It was incomprehensible, moreover,
that Italy should still be making difficulties in connection with the
importation of German goods through the import license system,
although in view of the situation today, it was precisely in the interest
of Italy to admit German goods. The German economy today had to
balance about 350 million a year in remittances by Italian laborers
from Germany with German shipments. Such a great special service
could only be possible if Italy, for her part, created all the conditions
for it. I have accordingly requested :
1. The re-inclusion in clearing of the payments for war material
out of German military stores.
2. Agreement on a general price freeze after a prior suitable ad-
vance in German coal prices, which have remained too low as a result
of the price commitment made to Italy in January of this year. 3
3. Liberal handling of import regulations by Italy-
Minister Riccardi stated that these demands were justified. He
would this very week obtain a decision from the Italian Ministers in
question and then present the matter to the Duce for a decision. He
promised a reply within 10 days.
The Italians were somewhat surprised that Kiccardi's letter had
touched off such a counteroffensive. I believe, however, that from the
psychological point of view, it was very advantageous to take this
occasion to emphasize our position and Germany's considerable
achievements.
I also informed Count Ciano through Anfuso, requesting that the
Duce be informed of this state of affairs.
Clodius
Mackensen
1 See vol. xu of this series, document No. 652 and footnote 1.
" Not found.
438 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 270
205/142943
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 1325 of September 2 Stockholm, September 2, 1941 — 5 : 55 p. m.
Received September 2 — 8 : 20 p. m.
With reference to my telegram No. 1318 of September l. 1
The ban on the recruitment of Swedish volunteers for foreign armies
was announced today through, the Swedish press and radio in the
following form :
"The Ministry of Defense announces that applications for the
permit required for entry into foreign military service will not be
granted. This does not involve any change in the previously regulated
handling of applications for joining the Finnish Armed Forces as
volunteers."
Social Demokraten and Dagens Nyheter express their views on the
matter in short articles. Social Demokraten stresses that the Swed-
ish public will welcome the measure. Strict neutrality is thereby
observed. The only exception is Finland. Dagens Nyheter says that
the World War tactic by which volunteers were allowed to join for-
eign armies has been changed. Recruiting activities are not abolished
by a government declaration. The public, it says, is awaiting with
suspense the answer to the pending questions. 2
Weed
'In this telegram (205/14283&) Wied reported a discussion with Soderblom,
Head of the Political Department of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, who ex-
plained that the initial intention of the Swedish Government had been to refrain
from any official pronouncement regarding volunteers. The Government sub-
sequently learned that interested parties intended to apply for permission to
volunteer for armies hostile to Germany whereupon the Government decided to
permit no entrance into foreign armies with the exception of Finland's.
'In telegram No. 1348 of Sept. 5 (205/142946-48) Wied reported a conversation
with Colonel Kellgren, Chief of the Swedish National Defense Staff, who ex-
pressed his own personal disapproval and regret and that of the Swedish High
Command of the Armed Forces regarding the decision of the Government.
Wied reported that the conversation indicated a strong feeling among the
majority of the Swedish officer corps against the position taken by the
Government.
On the other hand the conversation brought out that there was more feeling
among the population against the transport by rail of German soldiers, and a
distinct decline of interest in Germany's conduct of the war and in the
Wehrmacht.
SEPTEMBER 1941 439
No. 271
129/121187-58
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
U. St.S. Pol. No. 824 Berlin, September 2, 1941.
Recently in a talk with the Portuguese Minister, I mentioned in
passing the reports that the United States wished to use Brazil as a
front for occupying the Portuguese islands in the Atlantic Ocean. 1
The Minister told me today that he could positively state that these
reports were false. No step whatever along these lines had been
taken by the United States with Brazil. If any should be taken, it
would be foredoomed to certain failure.
I tried to keep alive in the Minister a feeling of distrust and told him
that such a step need not, after all, have been taken through official
channels.
Count Tovar then said that he was very well satisfied with the new
adjustment of Portuguese-Brazilian relations. The commission sent
to Brazil had been a complete success. 2 The United States was ob-
viously following the policy of isolating the entire American con-
tinent not only from the Axis Powers but from Europe as a whole.
Portugal was following all the more the policy of maintaining rela-
tions not only with Brazil but also with the rest of Latin America. In
this respect one can consider it as a success that the Portuguese Chief of
Propaganda, Eerro, who had made a successful trip through Brazil,
had now been invited by the Argentine Government to go there too.
The Minister stated that Spain, unfortunately, did not wish to un-
derstand the situation. Spain had treated the friendly gestures made
by the South American states with coolness and, for its part, was not
doing enough to promote relations. I replied that this was at present
partly a result of the support that many Latin American states had
given to the Reds in the Spanish Civil War and also a result of the
reception of Red emigres in Latin American countries.
Count Tovar confirmed this but felt that Spain had to see the mat-
ter from a broader political point of view and to carry on a more
active policy of friendship with the Latin American states in the in-
terest of all of Europe.
WOEHMANN
1 See document No. 168.
'In telegram No. 1556 of Aug. li (235/157255-56) Priifer reported that the
Portuguese commission which had departed from Bio de Janeiro the previous
day did not seem to have had any great political success.
440 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 272
B35/240033-34
The Apostolic Nuncio to the Foreign Minister
No. 42000 Berlin, September 2, 1941.
Herr Reichminister:
Your Excellency: Several serious occurrences, not of recent date
but which came to my knowledge only now, impel me to add a sup-
plement to my letter No. 41650 of August 14, 1941, 1 namely, at the
point where I said: "several cathedrals, as for example the one at
Posen, have been permanently closed since the start of the Polish
war."
Unfortunately that is not the only case. A number of other
churches, most of them parish churches, were the subjects of such
police procedure. Contrary to all popular Catholic feeling, not only
among the Poles but also among the German Catholics, the police
ordered the closing of the cathedrals at Gnesen, Leslau (formerly
Wloclawek) and Pelplin. The parish church at Lissa was likewise
closed, the only Catholic place of worship for this large town com-
prising 20,000 Catholics; moreover, in the city of Posen alone no
fewer than ten churches were closed, including the Church of the
Resurrection, the largest parish church in this city. Of the ten
closed churches the Bernardine Church is serving as a storehouse
for theater scenery, and the Dominican Church is being used as a
storehouse and sales place for old furniture.
It has also been reported to me that in the rural part of the Warthe-
gau still more parish churches have been closed, but as yet I do not
have exact data on this. I believe that it is not necessary to add
comments to this; they are obvious not only for religious but also
for social and local reasons and also in consideration of the contempo-
rary events.
I most urgently ask Your Excellency to intercede with the com-
petent authorities so that these incidents will not be repeated and the
closed churches will be reopened for the religious use of the faithful.
I use this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance
of my high consideration. Yours, etc.
Cesare Oesenigo
Archbishop of Ptolemais
Apostolic Nuncio
'In this letter (1551/376839-841) Orsenigo complained about the religious
restrictions in the Warttaegau.
SEPTEMBER 1941 441
No. 273
492/233030-44
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Cipher Letter
top secret Madrid, September 2, 1941.
No. 2425 gEs.
In the enclosure I am transmitting a copy of the report by the
Military Attache 1 concerning a conversation with the Chief of the
Spanish Army General Staff, General Asensio. 2
A few months ago I reported that "a number of Spanish heads were
haunted by the idea" of one day carrying out the Gibraltar operation
independently and without foreign assistance. However, up to now
this idea has never been supported by persons to be taken seriously.
General Asensio, formerly the High Commissioner in Morocco, is
a decent character, a good officer, reliable pro-German, but not inde-
pendent toward his superiors. I have no doubt that the idea that
Spain should carry out the Gibraltar operation alone, which he ad-
vocated toward the Military Attache, does not originate with him
himself but was advocated by him by order of Minister of War
Varela. 3
Varela, as reported at various times, is probably the only important
Spanish general who is to be considered our enemy; he leans strongly
toward England, and holds the opinion that the war will not be won
by us. V[arela] is on the point of marrying into a rich Bilbao family
that is strongly Anglophile and which, like many other Spanish finan-
ciers and industrialists, fears that with a German victory our principle
of the common good before individual profit will be applied, and thus
their material interests will be reduced. Varela owes his position more
to the great courage he demonstrated in various wars (he twice pos-
sesses the highest Spanish war decoration, the Laureada) than to
special qualities otherwise needed for his office; nevertheless I cannot
assume that he really believes in the possibility of a successful, purely
Spanish operation against Gibraltar. Rather, I consider the cue he
has given to be nothing else than an attempt to sabotage the measures
instituted by the German military authorities for the German action
to be carried out with Spanish participation, and therewith Spain's
entry into the war.
"Dated Aug. 27, not printed (492/233045-47).
a ,Gen. Carlos Asensio.
" J7 E. Varela Igleslas.
442 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
As is known, Varela belonged among the Spanish military men who
at the beginning of the year, in opposition to the Spanish Foreign
Minister, spoke out against Spain's immediate participation in the
war because of inadequate military and economic preparation of Spain,
and won Franco over to this view.* From the Military Attache's
report it is clear that V. continues to hold this view, although in the
meantime, as reported, understanding for the necessity of Spain's
entry into the war has increased in Spanish military circles.
The view already held in the winter by the Spanish Foreign Minis-
ter, that Spain must participate in the war, has remained the same. 5
Senor Serrano Sufier has only further acknowledged to me this view
of his in recent months through occasional but unmistakable remarks.
However, as a result of the instruction issued me in February 6 1 have
no longer taken up the question of Spain's possible later entry into
the war. However, up to very recently the Foreign Minister has re-
peatedly gone into the question of Spain's entry into the war with
my Italian colleague, 7 who, as is known, 2 months ago by order of
Ciano had to sound him out concerning Spain's possible accession to
the Tripartite Pact. 8 He repeatedly stated most energetically that
Spanish unity could he restored only by a resolute entry into the
war; that the regime could be saved and the Spanish national aspira-
tions be fulfilled only in this way. From these conversations the
Italian Ambassador gained the impression that Spain will no longer
make any special difficulties if she is again approached by the Axis
in regard to participation in the war or permission for German troops
to carry out the Gibraltar or Portugal operations (a prerequisite for
this, however, is that Serrano Sufier remain at the helm in spite of
strong opposition from military circles, in particular, and that Spain
be asked to enter the war at a time when the Spanish people have
enough to eat).
Thus the attempt at interference originating with Varela can only
be regarded as a special excursion on the part of the Minister of the
Army. This can, nevertheless, cause considerable disruption to our
preparations. The three armed forces Attaches fear quite correctly
that the present comradely willingness and helpfulness of subordinate
Spanish authorities will be prejudiced by the attitude of the Army
Minister and therewith the tasks in question, which they are being
currently assigned by the various German military authorities, and
the investigations by the various commissions and experts sent from
Germany will be impeded and handicapped, unless some counterac-
tion ensues. This could be undertaken without further ado by appro-
* See vol. xi of this series, document No. 470, and vol. in of this series, docu-
ments Nos. 28 and 46.
* See document No. 34.
* See vol. xn of this series, document No. 78.
* Francesco Lequio.
■ See document No. 156.
SEPTEMBER 1041 443
priate representations with the Spanish Foreign Minister. I even
consider it probable that Seiior Serrano Sufier would greatly welcome
a complaint about Varela, since recently he has repeatedly made
critical remarks to me about the Army Minister and his Anglophile
attitude. Sefior Serrano Sufier will therefore certainly be glad to
complain to the Generalissimo in our sense, all the more since the latter
has several times expressly spoken out in favor of advancement of
the preparations for the operation. However, we should remember
that Franco thinks a great deal of Varela.
Considering the above-mentioned instruction issued me at the be-
ginning of the year and maintained in effect during the Konigsberg
discussions until replaced by other instructions, however, I believe
that I should not undertake such a demarche with the Spanish For-
eign Minister without prior express authorization, since it must lead
to discussion of the question of the Spanish entry into the war and
our possible renewed interest in this.
I therefore request instructions. 9
Quite independent of the question of the political advancement of
the military preparations for an operation on the Iberian Peninsula,
however, it appears desirable both to me and to the three armed forces
Attaches that these preparations be instituted by one office in Ger-
many, so that there be no overlapping and duplication, and that too
much German activity not occur in Spain which, of course, would
have to become known to our enemies.
Authoritative participation and information of the Foreign Min-
istry concerning all military preparatory measures in Spain is natu-
rally to be taken for granted. 10
Stohres
* See document No. 467.
™ See documents Nos. 302 and 314.
No. 274
203/164976
The Am&assador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
fKGENT Buenos Aires, September 3, 1941—5 : 07 p. m.
secret Received September 4—3 : 30 a. m.
T^o. 1477 of September 3
The radical deputy, Manubens Calvet, made a motion in the Cham-
ber of Deputies for interpellation of the Foreign Minister on the
following questions :
How much does the Foreign Minister know about use made by the
German Ambassador of Reich Germans residing in Argentina for
444 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
activity hostile to the state* To what extent does th© Foreign Min-
istry hold the German Ambassador responsible for this activity*
Does the Government consider that the time has come for declaring
the Ambassador persona non grata 3
I am trying to find out how the Government will answer the inter-
pellation, especially the last point. If, as a result of internal political
weakness and external political pressure, the Government should
decide to give in and issue the desired declaration against me, I should
like to request urgently that in one way or another I first be recalled,
in order that no action like that of Bolivia, 1 so damaging to our
reputation, may be repeated here.
A telegraphic report on the result of the inquiries which I imme-
diately started will follow. 2
Thermann
1 See documents Noa 135 and 158.
"In a memorandum of Sept. 6 (253/164973) Woermann recorded a telephone
message from Rintelen forwarding the Foreign Minister's view on telegram
1477 : a premature recall of Thermann under pressure from Argentina was out
of the question; in such a case the Argentine Ambassador in Germany would
he expelled.
See, further, document No. 293.
No. 275
95/107067-69
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department
Beblin, September 3, 1941.
Dir. Ha. Pol. 188.
The Spanish Minister of Commerce, Carceller, in two talks held
with me, 1 barely went into any specific economic questions. Instead,
he dwelt on the possible political repercussions of the general eco-
nomic situation in Spain. He made the following statements, ob-
viously well prepared in advance :
During the last few months the Spanish Government, partly as
a reflection of its own feelings, in part also through German-inspired
newspapers and radio accounts has displayed an increasingly pro-
nounced pro-German attitude as reflected in the attitude of its per-
sonnel toward the English and American Missions in Madrid. Every-
day now Spanish newspapers carry sharp attacks and frequent
villifications of England and the United States. As a result, Spain
was not obtaining any goods from overseas due to the denial of
American export licenses and British navicerts. There was a grow-
iWiehl'a memorandum Ha. Pol. 189 of Sept. 3 (2174/471462-63) i^rds tte
second discussion with Carceller which largely covered the same ground as
thefirat
SEPTEMBER 1941 445
ing shortage of fertilizers, coal, copper, tin for canning purposes,
rubber, and textile fibers so that a breakdown of Spanish industry
may be expected in about 2 to 3 months. He did not wish to make
complaints or to repeat Spain's "wishes for deliveries which could not
be fulfilled by us. 2 What he did feel was important, however, was
to present the situation here frankly, so that we may take it into
account in our estimates.
Germany, he said, was fighting for Europe's liberation and re-
construction. Spain's policy to align herself in this with Germany
was established beyond question and would be followed loyally. It
was now up to us to mark out the guidelines for Spain's attitude, and
Spain would follow them, even if it lead to war. Spain was ready
to continue the present policy, although the consequence thereof was
a deterioration of her relations with England and America and an
increasingly critical weakening of its economic resources. It would
still be possible, however, that a certain modification of these policies
would be more in line with German intentions for the immediate
future. If Germany felt it was important to keep Spain in a some-
what viable and fighting condition over the next 2 to 3 months, an
attempt would have to be made to restore the flow of imports from
overseas. This, however, could only be done if the overtly hostile
attitude of Spain toward England and America were somewhat toned
down. Such a course might also be useful to Germany's own economic
interests in that some Spanish imports from overseas, for instance
leather goods, tin, textile fibers, etc., could be surreptitiously passed
on in manufactured form to Germany, 8 something which the economic
section of the German Embassy was constantly advocating.
On the other hand, the press section of the Embassy was bringing
more and more influence to bear on the Spanish Government in a way
that of necessity would cut off these imports. There was thus a
certain contradiction in Germany's attitude toward Spain, and his
frank exposition might perhaps inspire the putting of an end to this.
I expressed doubt that England and America would be induced to
cooperate in the matter of overseas imports by a certain moderation
on the part of Spain. The blockade of continental Europe was the
principal weapon of England and also of North America. The
enemy powers would hardly be disposed to lift this blockade in
Spain's favor because of such moderation, but would act only because
of some convincing change in Spanish policy. Senor Carceller did
not agree with this. He declared emphatically that there would of
course be no question of a change in Spanish policy. He was con-
' See vol. xn of this series, document No. 46.
* For Carceller's conversation on that subject with Mr. Willard li. Beaulac,
Counselor of the United States Embassy in Madrid, on Aug. 6, see Foreign Rela-
tions of the United States, 1941, vol. n, pp. 911-913.
446 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN" FOREIGN POLICY
vinced, however, that a certain moderation could bring about a re-
sumption of imports. Naturally the Spanish press would be bound
to continue supporting the German side as before, only there would
have to be a halt for the time being to sharp attacks, insults and
vituperation against Germany's enemies. It would also be highly
effective (and Carceller mentioned this point several times) if the
American Ambassador in Madrid would finally be granted his wish
for a personal audience with the Caudillo, something which had
been denied him for months.* If Franco would see the Ambassador
for only 15 minutes, it could be assumed that the American Govern-
ment would, for instance, issue export clearance for six Spanish
tankers which are lying in American ports ready to sail, loaded with
paid-for gasoline. When this seemed to me to be an overly opti-
mistic view, Carceller said that all Franco would have to tell the
Ambassador was that the Spanish Government intended to continue
in its present policy. Each party could then interpret this in its
own way, the Americans as a continuation of Spanish neutrality, the
Spaniards as a continued policy of unlimited support of Germany.
In the end I promised Seiior Carceller to bring his remarks to the
attention of higher authorities and to review his economic wishes
(listed in a special memorandum 5 ) with the responsible agencies.
Submitted through the State Secretary to the Foreign Minister.
Wiehl 6
* Cf. Foreign Relations of the Uratea States, 1941, vol. n, pp. 902-908, 923.
* This memorandum has not been found. There are, however, two minutes by
Counselor Schffller of the Economic Policy Department of Aug. 29 (3882/E047794-
98) listing various items that might be discussed with Carceller.
* For a final report by Wiehl on his conversation with Carceller see document
No. 285.
No. 276
82/60572-T8
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Tokto, September 4, 1941 — 10:50 a. m.
No. 1713 of September & Eeceived September 5 — 5 : 05 a. m.
Prince Konoye's attempt to avoid a conflict with the ABCD [Amer-
ican-British-Chinese-Dutch] coalition and possibly the Soviet Union
by means of a direct message to President Roosevelt l resulted from
the following situation.
Even after the ouster of Matsuoka the third Konoye Cabinet was
committed by the decision of July 2 2 taken in the presence of the
1 See document No. 256, footnote 3.
2 See document No, 63, footnote 6.
SEPTEMBER 1941 447
Emperor to an extensive mobilization, which by its nature was aimed
at the Soviet Union. Konoye therefore has greatly strengthened the
obstructionist elements in the hands of the new Cabinet [in die Hamde
des neuen Kabmetts die retardierenden Eleinente] and placed a large
share of responsibility upon the Navy. Covering the rear to the
north was thereby greatly impeded. As reported, the Army leaders
according to the most recent inquiries have also become more re-
strained with regard to a conflict with the Soviet Union. It is argued
that the Japanese Army, tied down and weakened by the China war,
cannot afford a winter campaign against the Soviet Union. In view
of the resistance put up by the Russian Army against an army such
as Germany's, the Japanese General Staff is apparently doubtful of
being able to achieve decisive successes against Russia before winter
sets in, being influenced presumably also by the thought of Nomonhan,"
which is vividly remembered especially by the Kwantung Army. The
exaggerated view of Russia's strength is supported partly by the
mistaken argument that even in the face of the collapse of the
Ukrainian front the Soviet Union still had sufficient armed forces for
offensive action against Iran on the nearby Caucasus front.
In view of this appraisal of the situation the Kwantung Army is
said to have pressed for a decision from Imperial headquarters. I
am told by a generally reliable source that in the last few days the
Imperial headquarters has reached the decision to postpone any action
against the Soviet Union. Another decision is envisaged as soon as
there is clear evidence of disintegration in the Far East army or when
it is definite that the Japanese Army has great numerical superiority.
While the Army, therefore, is for the foreseeable future following
a policy of wait-and-see in the north, the activist elements of the Navy
have again been demanding with a little more insistence an advance
in the south. I have reported about the plans of these circles (occu-
pation of Thailand, then a blockade of Singapore, an attack on
Borneo, and neutralization of Manila) .* The younger naval officer
corps cherishes the hope that the recent reshuffling of the Naval Com-
mand, especially the assumption of an important combat command by
the activist Viviani[?] Kondo, heretofore Chief of the Naval Staff,
and his replacement by the likewise activist Rear Admiral Ito, will
promote these plans. The reasons advanced by this group for an early
advance in the south are weighty. The Navy still has oil reserves to
- meet requirements for 2 years. Imports from the Netherlands Indies
Thave stopped without any prospect of their being resumed. These
a This refers to the fighting along the Manchukuo-Mongolian border in which
Soviet and Japanese as well as local forces were engaged throughout the summer
of 1939. The fighting was ended by an armistice agreement of Sept. 15, 1939,
between Molotov and the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union. See Degree,
Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, vol. m, pp. 373-374.
* See document No. 225.
448 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
supplies must not be used up, unless Japan is willing to submit with-
out defense to the dictation of the Anglo-Saxons. The activists in the
Navy are convinced that the United States will probably oppose an
operation against Borneo immediately and will certainly not permit
Japan to engage in a peaceful exploitation. Any attempt to drive a
wedge between the United States and England is doomed to fail from
the outset. After the beginning of the German-Russian war the
neighboring states have psychologically speaking grown into a united
structure opposed to isolated Japan. Such was also the opinion ex-
pressed by the Press Chief of Imperial Headquarters, Colonel
Mabuchi (cf. DNB Nos. 212-216 of September 1), and Admiral
Kondo. The conclusion is that if Japan has to fight the coalition, she
will have to open hostilities at once with the United States. The im-
possibility of maintaining the present state of tension with the United
States psychologically and materially without coming to a clash in-
duced the circles influencing Konoye to make the primitive attempt of
making a direct approach to Roosevelt. I have been reliably informed
that Konoye at first wished to conduct the negotiations secretly. How-
ever, when Nomura's visit to Roosevelt was announced by the Ameri-
can press on the very same day, Konoye quickly summoned the Cab-
inet to a special meeting and had to admit that despite American
provocation Japan had taken the initiative toward an exchange of
views. From similar statements made during the last few days I have
been able to learn that the Navy and the other activist circles were
given to understand that Konoye's message represented a final step,
not even seriously intended, to convince the Japanese people that a
peaceful settlement was impossible. It is obvious, however, that this
is not the aim of the circles around Konoye ; their aim is rather to
reach a modus vivendi with the United States, though only tempo-
rarily. I am of the opinion, however, that in view of the real and
deep-seated conflicts of interest this attempt to achieve a more than
transitory detente cannot succeed either. During the last few weeks
the domestic political situation has become increasingly grave, so that
a crisis must be expected to break out at any moment. As I reported,
the third Konoye Cabinet has been unable to give the Japanese people
clear leadership in the face of the difficult questions of domestic and
foreign policy awaiting solution. The Cabinet is rather inclined to
avoid any decision, play the activist groups off against each other,
and thereby paralyze them. The attempted assassination of Hi-
ranuma, 5 the demonstrations of nationalist organizations, the resigna-
tion of the well-known nationalist leader, Admiral Suetsugu, from the
leadership of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association established by
* Extremists attempted to assassinate Minister without Portfolio Hiranuma on
Aug. 14.
SEPTEMBER 1941 449
Konoye, must be viewed as signs of crisis. The negotiations with the
United States may drag on for some time yet; a settlement which
could be obtained only by the most far-reaching Japanese concessions
would immediately lead to serious internal upheavals. This is con-
firmed to me by all circles on which the Embassy exerts constant in-
fluence in accordance with your telegram No. 1383 of August 25. 6
Ott
" Document No. 239.
No. 277
84/24843-44
The State Secretary to the Permanent Deputy of the Reich Minister
for the Occupied Eastern Territories
Berlin, September 4, 1941.
Pursuant to the letters exchanged between our departments and
our discussions on the participation of the Foreign Ministry in the
treatment of the questions of the occupied eastern territories * I am
sending you the enclosed memorandum concerning the questions of
competence that have so far remained open (cf . letter Pers. 2658 g. of
July 15, 1941 from the Foreign Ministry} ? I confirm to you that the
Foreign Minister has agreed to the arrangement recorded in the en-
closure and would like to ask you to confirm to me for your part, too,
the concurrence of Minister Rosenberg. 3
After receipt of this confirmation the Foreign Ministry will again
get in touch with you concerning the appointment of representatives
with the Reich Commissars.
Weizsacker
[Enclosure]
a. The appointment of representatives of the Foreign Ministry
with the Reich Commissars in the occupied eastern territories will be
made according to the following procedure :
The representatives of the Foreign Ministry with the Reich Com-
missars will continue to be carried in the budget of the Foreign Min-
istry. They will be appointed by the Foreign Minister. Their ap-
pointments will be made in accord with the Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories.
1 See document No. Ill and footnote 3.
* Document No. 111.
* No such document has been found.
682-905—64 34
450 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
J. The representatives of the Foreign Ministry with the Reich Com-
missars will be expressly obligated to give the Reich Commissar to
whom they are assigned a carbon copy of each of their reports.
c. With regard to having the Foreign Minister regularly informed
by the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories concerning the
developments in these territories because of their connection with the
over-all formation of German foreign policy as mentioned under 1)
of the Foreign Ministry's letter Pers. 2658 of July 15, 1941, or with
regard to having the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories in-
formed by the Foreign Minister. This will in general be done on the
level of the Ministers themselves, if necessary between their perma-
nent deputies.
d. The Foreign Ministry representatives with the Eeich Commis-
sar (No. 2 of the letter mentioned above) will receive the following
instructions :
"II. The function of the Foreign Ministry representatives with
the Reich Commissars is advisory. The representatives will assist the
Reich Commissars in dealing with foreign policy problems which af-
fect the Reich Commissariat concerned. They will handle propaganda
measures with respect to third countries. They will report to the For-
eign Minister and will refrain from exerting any influence of their
own upon the organization of the Reich Commissariats. Problems
which affect the foreign policy of the Reich will be dealt with directly
by the Foreign Minister and the Reich Minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories."
No. 278
82/60587
Memorandum iy the State Secretary
St.S. No. 579 Berlin, September 4, 1941.
I asked the Japanese Ambassador to call on me today in order to ex-
plain to him and impress upon him our view regarding the German-
Japanese negotiations with regard to supplies of rubber and raw
materials.* In order that there should be no misunderstanding re-
maining between the Ambassador and me I gave him what I had to
say in the form of the appended memorandum," telling him, however,
that this was not a note, but an oral expression of opinion by me,
which I gave him for his convenience.
I illustrated the content of these rather technical economic state-
ments for the Ambassador from the political standpoint and asked
him to do what he could to make them understand in Tokyo, too, that
1 See document No. 216 and footnote 1.
*Not printed.
SEPTEMBER 1941 451
these important economic questions cannot be decided by a depart-
mental particularism detached, as it were, from our joint policy. I
asked Oshima whether the specialists working on these questions in
Tokyo were really entirely aware of the extent to which we were the
protagonists of the struggle and of the wishes of Japan in the political
sphere.
I believe that Oshima, who usually approaches such problems only
hesitantly, understood my statements and that he will probably pass
them on accurately to his Government. 8
Weizsacker
*In a telegram of Sept. 5 (4684/E225196) WiGhl notified Ott of the discussion
between Weizsacker and Oshima and indicated that the Ambassador would
probably forward the memorandum to Tokyo.
No. 279
233/150728-29
Memorandum, by the Director of the Political Department
TJ. St.S. Pol. 835 Berlin, September 4, 1941.
The Argentine Ambassador saw me today and asked on instructions
from his Government about the meaning of the arrest of eleven Argen-
tine citizens in Paris. 1
I did not admit to the Ambassador, as had been considered to begin
with, that this was a matter of reprisals because of the arrests of
German citizens in Argentina. 2 I rather stated that we had re-
ceived information from Paris that there were a number of foreigners,
the arrested Argentineans among them, who were under suspicion
of having acted against the security of the state. The arrests had
taken place for this reason. Sefior Olivera said he would, as a result,
report to his Government that the arrests had not taken place because
the arrested were Argentineans but rather because of specific reasons
for suspicion. He must add that the possibility had been considered
in Argentina that it was a matter of reprisals. To this I replied that
the given offices had received information for some time about anti-
government machinations of foreigners in occupied France and that
up to now we had not investigated these matters. Now the moment
, had arrived, however, when we considered it necessary to act. The
^Ambassador obviously understood the meaning of this, but did not
think it appropriate to discuss this point at length. He added that he
*In an undated directive (253/165014-15), probably sent Aug. 21, Albrecht,
the Deputy Director of the Legal Department, advised the Embassy in Paris that
because of the arrest of Germans in Argentina, ten Argentineans should be
arrested there. In a memorandum of Sept 1 (233/156722) Albrecht recorded
that the Argentineans had been arrested.
* See document No. 251 and footnote 6.
452 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
had learned the names of those arrested. They all were P™iment
members of the Argentine colony. He could say off hand that the
suspicion would not be borne out. The Ambassador asked how long
the arrest would last. I replied that each case would be examined
and treated individually and that the decision would be made by the
competent authorities according to objective principles.
Senor Olivera conducted the conversation m his usual verbose
politeness. I have the impression that he understood what was in-
volved but that he considered it sensible to appear as if he believed
that this was an entirely normal action against foreigners
WOERMANN
No. 280
65/45385-57
Memoranda hy an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff.
Fubrer's Headquarters, September 4, 1941.
Subject : Disbandment of the Legation in Tehran.
With reference to my telephone conversation last night with the
Foreign Minister 1 1 wish to record the following as the result of my
latest conversation with the Fuhrer.
The Fuhrer expressed the wish that Hrst every effort be made to
get the Germans out of Iran and also that the Legation be disbanded
and withdrawn. I confirmed to the Fuhrer that everything was
being done to repatriate the Germans. When I inquired whether a
disbandment of the Legation was to be in connection with breaking
off diplomatic relations, the Fuhrer said that m this case there was
no need to adhere to international usage. The personnel of the Lega-
tion, he said, should be gradually withdrawn until no one was left.
It did not matter what the Iranians would then do. The reason why
the Fuhrer is giving orders to pull all Germans out of Iran is, apart
from political motives, his desire to have complete freedom of action
inlranwhenourtroopswillhaveadvancedfurther. He wou ldhketo
prevent having his military freedom of action restricted by the pres-
ence of Germans in Iran. In accordance with ^f™^ 3 *
pointed out to the Fuhrer that it was for the moment not feasible on
technical grounds for us to initiate a withdrawal of the Germans and
that we had to depend on negotiation for this. Because of the
refusal of Turkey to serve any longer as a protective power
the problem had become more difficult. What held out most promise
at the moment was to negotiate directly with the Iranian Government
1 No record found.
' See document No. 263, footnote 4.
SEPTEMBER 1041 453
and in doing so, to exploit a conflict between Britain and Russia which
very likely existed. In their efforts to prevent as much as possible
a Russian penetration of the country the English apparently are
willing to leave to the Iranian Government the greatest possible degree
of sovereignty. By emphasizing that internment of the Germans
in obedience to English pressure and contrary to the promise of the
Iranian Government represented a fundamental infringement of Iran's
sovereignty, it may be possible to induce the Iranian Government to
take a firmer stand against the English and the Russians in this
matter. Moreover — and this may well be our best card — various
forms of reprisals are open to us, chief among which would be taking
action against the population of the Jersey Islands. The Foreign
Minister would therefore make the suggestion that the German Lega-
tion in Tehran be left until the fate of the Germans was decided one
way or another. The Legation should remain as long as there was
still any prospect for exerting any influence on the fate of the Ger-
mans. As soon as a decision had been made, the Foreign Minister
would disband the Legation and withdraw it, a measure which prob-
ably would be more easily carried out than the withdrawal of the
German civilians. The Fiihrer declared himself in agreement with
this proposal. 3
Hewel
*In telegram No. 978 of Sept. 7 (65/45373-76) Ettel reported that the Iranian
Foreign Minister had informed him and the Italian Minister that notes had
been presented by the British and Russian Envoys demanding the departure
of the German, Italian, Hungarian, and Rumanian Legations from Iran. Ac-
cording to Ettel he had vigorously protested and stated that a departure of
the legation could not even be considered until safe conduct had been assured
for the departure of the German colony.
No. 281
4865/249331-32
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
secret Rome, September 5, 1941.
No. 148g.
Minister Anfuso, upon his return to the Foreign Ministry, after re-
. porting to the Duce, today informed Minister Prince Bismarck, who
—was visiting him, that the Duce had been very painfully affected by
jkhe following confidential report he had received from one of the
Italian officials who have to do with the employment of Italian laborers
in Germany. 1
1 For a previous Italian complaint about the treatment of Italian workers in
Germany, see vol. in of thiH series, document No. 71.
454 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The report was to the effect that the Italian official in question had
had a talk with the Kreisleiter of Recklinghausen with regard to an
incident involving a German woman who, according to a report in
the possession of the Kreisleiter, had had intimate relations with an
Italian laborer, and whose hair had been cut off and her face smeared
with asphalt.
The attitude of the said Kreisleiter in regard to the race problem
and interbreeding between members of various nations was evident
from the following circular, signed by him personally :
"A mixture is undesirable in any case, but the mixture of the
blood of a German girl with a foreigner of related blood, such
as workers from occupied territories (Norwegians, Danes, etc.)
and even enemy nations (Englishmen) is preferable to mixture
with foreigners of alien blood (the Italians are to be included in
this category ) . Goldbeck." 2
After communicating this report as given above and again pointing
out how very much the Duce had been agitated about its contents,
Signor Anfuso asked that the German Government be informed in
strict confidence about the incident.
In view of the growing difficulties in connection with the employ-
ment of Italian labor in Germany, I would appreciate it if this report
could be looked into and if I might be informed of the result of the
investigation. 8
Mackensen
* A memorandum by Weizsacker of Oct. 3. St.S.No, 665 (1517/372725) records
that Alfleri that day submitted' a formal statement of complaint dated Sept 27
(1517/372726-27) regarding the disparagement of the Italian race implied in the
German treatment of incidents in the relations of Italian workers with German
women. The same statement attributed to Kreisleiter Goldbeck and dated Aug.
15 was included in the Italian complaint. ,,.,,.
•in telegram No. 987 of Sept. 13 (1517/372688) the Reich Foreign Minister
through Rintelen directed that Mackensen's report be sent to Reichsleiter
Bormann for investigation.
See, further, document No. 397.
No. 282
16*3/375746-48
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United States
Telegram
most urgent Special Train, September 6, 1941 — 6 : 30 p. m.
No. 960 from the Special Train
Eeceived Berlin, September 6, 1941—6 : 50 p. m.
No. 1738 from the Foreign Ministry Sent September 6.
We are transmitting to you below the announcement concerning
the incident involving a German submarine and apparently an
American destroyer, which will appear in the morning papers on
September 7 :
SEPTEMBER 1941 455
The American and British, news services published a report to the
effect that in an encounter of the American destroyer Greer with a
German submarine on the morning of September 4, the submarine
had attacked the destroyer with torpedoes. The torpedoes had missed
their mark. The destroyer had then by way of counter-attack pursued
the submarine with depth charges.
As against this Germany now officially states :
On September i, at 62 degrees 31 minutes north and 27 degrees
6 minutes west, a German submarine was at 12 : 30 p.m. attacked by
depth bombs in the German blockade area 1 and pursued. The Ger-
man submarine was not in a position to determine the nationality of
the attacking destroyer. In justified self-defense it thereupon, at 2 : 39
p.m., fired a double salvo, which missed. The destroyer continued the
pursuit with depth bombs until around midnight.
If an official American agency, namely, the United States Navy
Department, asserts that the attack was started by the German sub-
marine, this can only have the purpose to give at least an appearance
of justice for the attack of an American destroyer on the German
submarine in violation of neutrality. The attack itself is proof that
Mr. Koosevelt, contrary to his assertions, has previously given the
American destroyers, in violation of neutrality, the general order not
only to report the position of German ships and submarines, but, what
is more, to attack them.
Mr. Koosevelt is in this way trying with all the means at his dis-
posal to provoke incidents in order to incite the American people
into war against Germany. End of the announcement.
Please, through the channels at your disposal, immediately upon
the receipt of this telegram, get in touch with the leading isolationist
members of Congress and try in a suitable confidential manner to
make it clear to these members of Congress that there is a unique
opportunity here to expose Koosevelt's war-mongering policy and
deal it a decisive blow to the advantage of the isolationists. It might
be conceivable, for example, that one or more of the most influential
isolationist members of Congress would now refer, in a way that had
best be left to the judgment of those on the spot, to the official German
communique concerning the incident, which is diametrically opposed
to the Koosevelt announcement, and make the following motion in
the interest of instructing the American public in accordance with
the truth :
1) Immediate recall of the destroyer and the interrogation of its
crew before an investigating committee of Congress concerning the
incident of the German submarine, and
'See vol. x of this series, document No. 281 and vol. xn of this series,
document No. 210.
456 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
2) In the event that it is established that the American destroyer
attacked the German submarine, the issuance of a statement by the
Government as to who gave to this destroyer or to the American naval
forces the order to shoot.
The following should also be noted in this connection : There is no
doubt that the statements from the German submarine are absolutely
true. This is a matter of an official report by the captain of the sub-
marine. According to this, there must be an order in effect among
the American naval forces at once to attack German naval forces or
submarines upon their appearing, because it is quite clear from the
report of the captain that the submarine, without for its part having
made any preparations for the attack, was deliberately attacked by
the American destroyer. 2 There is therefore, as I have said, a unique
chance here to deal a decisive blow to the Messrs. Koosevelt, Knox and
Stimson, who, as we well know, have not up to now risked admitting
to the American public the existence of any such orders, and to expose
them as those who, against the will of the American people, want
in any event to provoke an incident with Germany and thus to drive
America into the war against Germany.
There is especial interest in the case here at the highest level, and
I ask you to make every effort to induce the isolationists to proceed
in Congress in such a manner.
Please send a report at once by telegram. 3
UlBBENTROP
"in a letter of Sept. 9 (1543/375766) Minister Eisenlobr asked the > Naval
War Staff to instruct the Commander of the German submarine to report &aai-
£onal particulars about the encounter with the Greer as soon as £* » rgort
could be sent without endangering the submarine Bisenlohr listed sev eral
specific questions regarding the circumstances of the encounter to which an
answer was requested. On Sept. 14, Counselor Grote of Pol^a W-jM
recorded (1543/375808) that the Naval War Staff had transmitted the following
st a ?ement ( ftom tte Commander of the Submarine Aim : "Adequate .reply through
radio channels to very detailed questions not advisable JD-65 2 due l»iac in
approximately one week. Suggest waiting for oral report. of the Commander.
'Document No. 292.
No. 283
S589/E603000-13
Fuhrer's Directive
chefsache Fuhber's Headquarters, September 6, 1941.
TOP SECRET MILITARY
The Fiihrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.) No. 441492/41 g.Kods. Chefs.
By officer only
Directive No. 35
The initial successes against the enemy forces in the area between
the inner wings of Army Groups South and Center, have, with a
SEPTEMBER 1941 457
view to the progressive encirclement of the Leningrad area, created
the basis for a decisive operation against Army Group Timoshenko,
which is now tied down on the central front by offensive fighting.
Army Group Timoshenko must be beaten and annihilated within the
limited period of time left before winter weather sets in. To attain
this it is essential to concentrate all Army and Luftwaffe forces that
become available on the wings and that can be transferred in time.
In accordance with the presentation of the Commander in Chief
of the Army, I order for the preparation and execution of these
operations :
1. On the southern half of the front, it must be the objective of
the forces of Army Group South advancing northward across the
Dnieper, in coordination with the attack of the southern wing of
Army Group Center, to annihilate the enemy lodged in the Kre-
menehug-Kiev-Konotop triangle. As soon as execution of this mis-
sion permits, the elements of Second and Sixth Armies and Second
Panzer Group no longer needed must be regrouped for new operations.
Army Group South, as of about September 10 at the latest, must
launch a surprise push of the mobile units reinforced by infantry
divisions and supported by Fourth Air Force concentrated for massive
blows, out of the bridgehead won by Seventeenth Army in a north-
westerly direction via Lubny, while Seventeenth Army gains room in
the direction of Poltava and Kharkov.
On the lower Dnieper, the offensive against the Crimea must be
continued with the support of Fourth Air Force, as must also the
offensive out of the Dnepropetrovsk bridgehead if forces are avail-
able for that purpose. A drive by mobile units south of the lower
Dnieper in the direction of Melitopol would bring substantial advan-
tages for the mission of Eleventh Army.
2. In the Army Center, the preparations for the operation against
Army Group Timoshenko must be carried forward in such manner as
to permit at the earliest possible date (end of September) the launch-
ing of the attack which would have as its object the annihilation of
the enemy in the area east of Smolensk by a double envelopment — with
strong, massed armored forces on the wings — aimed in the general
direction of Vyazma.
To this end, heavy concentrations of mobile forces must be formed :
On the southern wing — probably in the area southeast of Eoslavl
and with a northeastern direction of thrust — out of the available
forces of Army Group Center together with 5th and 2nd Armored
Divisions released for the purpose.
In the sector of Ninth Army — probably with direction of thrust
via Byeloy — by transferring the strongest elements that can be ob-
tained from Army Group North.
458 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Only after the bulk of Army Group Timoshenko has been beaten
in this tightly contained operation of annihilation by close-in envelop-
ment, will the army center be required to launch the pursuit m direc-
tion of Moscow, resting on the Oka on the left, and on the upper Volga
on the right. . . « i . ■ -r-
The Luftwaffe is to support the attack with Second Air Force,
which is to receive timely reinforcements especially from the north-
eastern sector, providing for main concentration on the wings and
committing the bulk of the divebombing units (VIII Air Corps) with
the mobile units on both attacking wings.
3 On the northeastern front, encirclement of the enemy forces
fighting in the Leningrad area (which also requires seizure of
Schlusselburg) must be carried through in cooperation with the Finn-
ish Corps attacking on the Karelian Isthmus in such a manner as to
permit release to Army Center, on September 15 at the latest, of sub-
stantial portions of the mobile troops and of First Air Force, espe-
cially VIII Air Corps. Previous to that, a tighter encirclement of
Leningrad to the east at least must be sought and, in addition if the
weather permits, an all-out air attack is to be launched against Lenin-
grad; there the most important objective is destruction of the water
woi*lcs •
In order to help along the Finnish advance through the fortifica-
tions laid out along the old Russo-Finnish frontier, and with a view
to narrowing the combat zone and eliminating enemy air bases it is
necessary as soon as possible to launch forces of Army Group North
across the Neva sector toward the north.
Kronstadt Bay must in cooperation with the Finns be sealed off by
mine fields and artillery so as to prevent any escape of enemy forces
into the Baltic (Hango, Baltic islands).
The battlefield around Leningrad must be screened off to the east
also on the lower Volkhov as soon as troops can be made available tor
the purpose; a link-up with the Karelian Army, in direction of the
Svir, should be sought only after annihilation of the enemy around
Leningrad is assured.
4 With regard to the further development of the operations, prepa-
rations must be made for providing cover for the Moscow offensive
of Army Group Center from the sector of Army Group South by
means of a flank securing force (made up of mobile troops becoming
available there) which is to advance in a general northeastern direc-
tion, and for launching a drive by forces of Army Group North on
both sides of Lake Ilmen for the purpose of securing the northern
flank and linking up with the Finnish Army of Karelia. _
5 Anything that saves time and so speeds up the respective dead-
lines would benefit the over-all operation and the preparations for it.
Adolf Hitler
SEPTEMBER 1941 459
No. 284
-03/104060
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Berlin, September 6, 1941.
Minister von Rintelen has stated the following regarding the
memorandum with respect to the German-Hungarian frontier. 1
1. The Foreign Minister was of the opinion that the question of
■drawing the boundary on the Mur river was so unimportant that
he did not wish to decide it himself.
2. The Foreign Minister agreed to having the conclusion of the
frontier treaty put off because of the frontier with respect to the
JVtedjumurje. 2
WoERMANN
'Woermann's memorandum, U.StS. Pol. 836 of Sept. 5 (93/104047-50) sum-
marized the problem regarding the conclusion of a German-Hungarian boundary
treaty. It explained that the final disposition of the Medjumurje was in
■dispute between Hungary and Croatia and that a German-Hungarian deter-
mination of the frontier in this region might appear to prejudge the issue
in favor of Hungary.
a In his memorandum St.S. 606 of Sept 16 (03/104074) Weizsacker recorded
that SztSjay had handed him a letter with two enclosures (93/104075-082/2)
setting forth the Hungarian position on the question of the Medjumurje,
No. 285
•B5/107071-T2
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department
secret Berlin, September 6, 1941.
Dir.Ha.Pol.192.
The following is to be added to my memorandum No. Dir. Ha. Pol.
188 of September 3 1 regarding my conversations with the Spanish
Minister of Commerce Carceller, which was submitted to the Foreign
Minister by State Secretary von Weizsacker on September 4 with the
recommendation that it be sent to Ambassador von Stohrer for his
information and possible comment: 2
1 Document No. 275.
s In his cover note (95/107070) Weizsacker recorded that Carceller had men-
■A tioned to him the same things he had told Wiehl. It was Weizsacker's
.. impression, however, that "the Minister of Commerce had presented this subject
not in accord with the Spanish Foreign Minister."
Wiehl's telegram No. 2028 of Sept. 4 (2174/471458-60) mentioned the remarks
by Carceller and stated that a memorandum recording them would follow by
courier.
Wiehl's telegram of Sept. 10 (3882/047836) informed Stohrer that the Reich
Foreign Minister wished an expression of Stohrer's views regarding Carceller's
remarks.
Stohrer replied in report No. 2471 of Sept. 16 (2174/471474-80), taking the
position that Carceller's Idea of restricting public expressions in Spain of a
pro-German policy might have undesirable consequences.
460 DOCUMENTS ON GEBMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Carceller stated subsequently that immediately before his depar-
ture from Spain he had been received by the Caudillo for a lengthy
conference and had explained his point of view to him just as clearly
as he had done here. Thus it is to be assumed that he made his
statements by order of Franco. On the other hand Carceller men-
tioned nothing about coordinating his statements with Serrano buner j
rather from the various remarks which he made to Herr Brandau
who was assigned to him as interpreter and guide by the Protocol
Division, it can be deduced that he is in a certain opposition to
S Orfthe evening before flying back to Madrid from Berlin Carceller
invited Herr Brandau to the Hotel Adlon for a meeting of almost
an hour. Herr Brandau reports on this as follows: 3
"In the course of this conversation he told me that he would welcome
it if I could call on Ministerialdirektor W^ on« m^ m«d«rto
underline a few points out of the conversation he had with him. He
said that he haS been especially interested m this ' PJ^gJg^
versation, and that had afso been the reason fy^ffii?
bis visit to Leipzig earlier than intended, in order to come to Berlin,
f "was absoluSTnecessary to bring about a speedy clanficat 10 n of
the situation. It was up to the German Government to do thij l£e
German General Staff had to determine whether i fitted m with its
plans for Spain to enter the war or not, and G™^ 9^ Smm wal
full confidence that Spain was and remained at her side, bpara was
readv for everything, no matter what was planned by the uerman
side Spain would, without further ado, accommodate herself into
?he framework of the all-European policy led by Germany ; but then
Se should not be treated like Cmderella and left iHinotiee L but should
L included in the over-all German economic planning. Only lntnis
way could one g^e the Spanish people an object™, even though [it
were] a distant one."
From this there appears to be no doubt that Carceller expects a
reply to his statements made here. 5
Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the S ate
Secretary with the request for instructions as to whether the patter
should be passed on to Herr von Stohrer for his information and
comment. WlEHL
•Branaau's report of Sept. f^^S^jSS^SVt noted ia
'Carceller had come to ^Germany to visit ^^^^.275, footnote 1.
^t^ZZl^Z^oiltt^mim^^^ Wiehl noted Stohrer^
In view of Ribbentrop's previous decision to exercise restraint to tmsmatrer^
Si™«toSsS?<ft™» ™*«iM t»»«a Sputf.ll «»><»i<= row""-
SEPTEMBER 1941 461
No. 286
216/147755
Minute by the Director of the Political Department
Berlin, September 6, 1941.
Minister von Rintelen telephoned that the Bose matter had been
presented to the Fiihrer. The sense of the decision is that we should
adhere to the operation but postpone it for the time being, for the
reason that an Indian declaration could give the English at the pres-
ent time a pretext for invading Afghanistan. The Foreign Minister
intends to write Bose a reply in this sense. 1
WOERMANN
1 See document No. 296.
No. 287
66/45378-84
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Iran
Telegram
most urgent "Westealen", September 7, 1941—2 : 38 p.m.
No. 671
RAM 386/R
With reference to your telegram No. 967 of Sept. 6. 1
In view of the situation brought on by the negative attitude of
the British Minister the question arises as to what instructions you
should give the German colony there. Inasmuch as you yourself
consider that there is the danger that the British Minister's threat
to have the German colony arrested by the Russians may be put into
effect, it may be more advisable for you not to place any obstacles
in the way of an evacuation of the German colony to Ahwaz, should
the case arise, because:
(1) Transportation from Ahwaz to Turkey is still possible, and
(2) in the event of a final failure of our efforts in this matter, an
internment by the English is still to be preferred to surrendering the
colony to the Bolshevists.
'This telegram (65/45367) reported that the Director of the Central European
Department of the Iranian Foreign Ministry had confirmed an earlier state-
ment regarding the completely negative attitude of the British Minister who
"not only threatened continuation of the war but in addition threatened in
unequivocal terms the arrest of the German colony by the Russians unless
the German colony were put at the disposal of the English at Ahwaz. He
further demanded that the members of the German colony be in Ahwaz 3
days after signature of the armistice which had not yet taken place.
462 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
I mention for your information that in the course of this day we
will have the Swiss Government transmit the following communica-
tion to the British Government: *
"The Iranian Foreign Minister informed the German Minister in
Tehran on September 6 that the British Government had given him
official notice through the British Minister of its refusal to grant the
safe conduct demanded by the Iranian Government for the departure
of the German colony to a neutral country, and informed him that
the British Government insisted on the surrender of the entire German
colony which it wishes to transport to India. 3 In view of this com-
munication the Reich Government sees itself compelled to order the
immediate internment and deportation of all British subjects in the
Channel Islands of Jersey and Guernsey, who came from the United
Kingdom and have heretofore been left at liberty, and who number
several thousand. The Eeich Government would be prepared, how-
ever, to refrain from carrying out this measure if the British Govern-
ment on its part would desist from interning the Germans in Iran and
would promise safe conduct for these to depart for Turkey."
End of communication.*
You will be informed as to the results. Please treat the question of
a continuance of the Legation in Tehran, following the removal of
the German colony, as being still completely open and do not make it
the subject of any communications to the Iranian Government.
UrBBENTROr
a Telegram No. 962 from the Special Train, No. 915 from the Foreign Ministry
(1662/393633-34) embodied the instruction to Bern.
On Sept. 18 the Legation in Bern forwarded the text of a British note (1662/-
393706-08) which insisted that the cases of the German subjects in Iran and of
the British subjects on the Channel Islands were in no way parallel and which
termed the threatened German reprisals "unjustifiable and illegal."
See, further, documents Nos. 306 and 317.
J In telegram No. 962 of Sept. 6 (1062/393631-32) Ettel had first reported
regarding the completely negative attitude of the British Minister who demanded
surrender of all members of the German colony at Ahwaz whence they were to
be transported to India.
*In telegram No. 969 from the Special Train, No. 918 of Sept. 8 from the
Foreign Ministry (1662/393644-45), Ribbentrop somewhat revised the text of
the communication for the British Government, expressing the willingness of
the German Government to refrain from deporting British subjects from the
Channel Islands and also to grant safe conduct for 132 British volunteers from
the Finnish war who were stranded in Sweden, provided that the British Gov-
ernment would refrain from interning the members of the German colony in Iran.
SEPTEMBER 1941 463
No. 288
4S2/2312S7
The Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the
Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
top secret Belgrade, September 8, 1941—10: 45 a. m.
No. 608 of September 8 Received September 8—12 : 30 p. m.
D III 4l7g.
It is evident that Jews have participated in numerous acts of sabo-
tage and rebellion. It is therefore most necessary that steps be taken
speedily for the seizure and removal of at least all male Jews. The
figure under consideration in this connection probably amounts to
about 8,000. A concentration camp is being built at the moment, but
it appears advisable in view of future developments to get these Jews
out of the country as quickly as possible, i.e., on empty freight barges
down the Danube in order to unload them on Rumanian territory
(island in the Danube delta). Please bring about the preliminary
conditions which accordingly are necessary with regard to toleration
by Rumania. 1
Veesenmayer
Benzler
"In a memorandum of Sept. 11 (482/231286) Sonnleithner recorded that
Kibbentrop had commented with regard to this suggestion that "this measure
could not be carried out without the approval of the Rumanians and that pre-
sumably another way would have to be found."
In telegram No. 1207 of Sept. 11, dispatched Sept. 12 (482/231284) Luther
informed the Office of the Plenipotentiary in Belgrade that "a removal of Jews
to the territory of a foreign state could not be approved." He suggested that
the Jews be placed in labor camps and employed on public works. Sonnleith-
ner's memorandum and Luther's telegram are printed in Leon Poliakov-Josef
Wulf, Das Dritte Reich und seine Diener ( Berlin-Grunewald 1956) p 26
No. 289
329/195525-26
The Minister in Afghanistan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
"■top secret Kabul, September 8, 1941—6 : 20 p. m.
No. 328 of September 8 Received September 11—2 : 30 p. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 268 of September 5. *
The hostile feeling against England and Russia on the part of
Governmen t and people produced by the Iranian events still persists.
* This telegram, which is Identified on the margin as Pol. VII 4902 g., has not
been found. A draft telegram of Sept. 3 with Woermann's signature ( 329/195527-
28 J- ^.contents of whi <* are quite closely related to those of the telegram
printed here, may have been the draft of this missing instruction
464 DOCUMENTS ON GEHMAN FOREIGN" POLICY
Although the Government has taken account of this feeling by
sharply criticizing what had happened through public statements in
the newspaper Ante and on the radio, nevertheless it is dominated by
its original fears that the Iranian events could be repeated here. The
King 2 and Cabinet are without a doubt anti -Bolshevist ; their attitude
toward England is opportunistic and therefore they are inclined to
compromise.
The momentary situation is characterized by growing economic
pressure (stoppage of gasoline imports, impeding of transit trade
with the resulting loss of import duties, impediments to the disposal
over dollar assets) , as well as by the fact that the English, of late,
are causing continued unrest among the border tribes. The Kabul
garrison had to intervene in the Mohmand area last week.
Day before yesterday the new English Minister 3 handed the King
his credentials. The Afghan Government has the impression that
English steps against the German element here are to be expected in
the next few days. It stressed anew that it would handle the matter
by diplomatic negotiations while fully preserving its sovereignty, and
stated in this connection that it considered Iran's conduct incompre-
hensible and erroneous.
As the Afghan wishes have so far been treated with reserve by
you (cf . also the closing sentence of telegram No. 219 of July 8) ,*
the present moment does not appear appropriate for making promises
here. I suggest a discussion with Abdul Majid, B who is still to be
considered as the representative of his Government, particularly for
the reason that positive assurances can be given at your end with
greater emphasis on the basis of our military intentions.
Although the strengthening of a neutral and pro-German attitude
is mainly dependent upon the advance of the German front lines, I
suggest that I be authorized to offer the Afghan Government financial
help for influencing the tribes with money in order to put a stop to
the uprisings fomented by England.
Pilger
■Mohammed Zabir Shah.
* Sir Francis Verner Wylie.
'Not printed (617/249971).
" The Afghan Minister of Economics, who had been sojourning in Germany
and Switzerland since the early part of the year. See vol. hi of this series,
documents Nos. 158, 467 and 598. A memorandum by Melchers of Sept. 16
(329/195520) recorded that the Afghan Commercial Attache 1 had hinted that
Abdul Majid who was then In Switzerland was considering "whether he should
turn away from the present Afghan Government."
SEPTEMBER 1941 465
No. 290
205/142954-55
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Stockholm, September 8, 1941 — 6 : 45 p.m.
No. 1369 of September 8 Keceived September 8 — 8 : 40 p. m.
With reference to your telegram No, 2000 of September 6. 1
Accompanied by Counselor of Legation Geffeken this afternoon I
visited Foreign Minister Giinther in accordance with instructions and
conducted the discussion about the Norwegian ships in the form which
was arranged in Berlin. At the start Giinther said that it was out
of the question for the Swedish police to put new crews on board and
to remove the old crews without their having a valid court decision.
He denied that he had ever given consent to anything pointing in
this direction. The question of the validity of the Norwegian decree
of May 18, 1940, 2 must be decided judicially in the last instance be-
fore any executive action would be possible. There has so far been
no such decision in spite of the well-known action of the Chief Bailiff
of Goteborg which was simply a determination to refuse issuance of
a temporary order. To my objection that the matter was not of a
juridical but rather of a political sort, and that an unsatisfactory
solution would have the most severe consequences for German-Swedish
relations, Giinther replied that he had to protest. Sweden had never
been involved in any dealings which could be viewed as being against
Germany or as directed against German interests. All that Sweden
did was to operate in accordance with existing laws. It was com-
pletely incomprehensible to him, Giinther, that Germany did not wish
to permit this and that she uttered such threats. In the further course
of the discussion I indicated that the idea of bringing the ships to
Norway iiad come from the Swedish side. 3 We now wished to follow
this suggestion and we had to expect that in this we would be sup-
ported by Sweden. The judicial procedures consumed too much time
and the danger of sabotage was too great. Giinther finally promised
that he would reexamine the whole complex of questions including
that of prevention of sabotage and indicated that he would have an
v — answer by the end of the week. He stated further that the assertion
■4ras not correct that one of the steamships lying in Goteborg had been
provided with oil (cf. your telegram No. 1985 of September 5) .* All
of the ships had had certain supplies which they had recently ex-
1 Not found.
' See document No. 174, footnote 2.
* See document No. 174.
682-905—64 35
466 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
changed among themselves in such manner that some of them possessed
sufficient oil for a trip. The shipowner Stenersen has been advised
through the consulate at Goteborg not to undertake any further step
until I have had a new discussion with GUnther.*
Weed
* See, further, document No. 300.
No. 291
1247/837754
Extract From the Notes of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry
With the High Command of the Army 1
September 8, 1941.
Japan
1 ) View of State Secretary von Weizsacker :
One should continue to press Japan to attack Vladivostok. (1)
For military reasons, because this will relieve us militarily. (2) For
reasons of foreign policy, because it will prove that Japan has clearly
opted in favor of the Axis and will strengthen the general position
of the latter; if the present state of affairs continues there is danger
that Japan will no longer be able to rouse herself. The risk of a
possible military failure must be accepted.
2) Fiihrer is opposed to putting continuous vigorous pressure on
Japan manifestly because he is concerned that this would be inter-
preted as a sign of weakness (as if we had need of Japan) .
1 These notes in Etzdorf's handwriting are not signed.
Point 3) of this note (1247/337754-56) which deals with Japan is a summary
of Ribbentrop's telegram No. 1383 of Aug. 25 printed as document No. 239, and
of Ott's telegram No. 1713 of Sept 4 printed as No. 276.
[Editors' Note. On September 8 and 9 the Regent of Hungary,
Minister President Bardossy and the new Chief of the Hungarian
General Staff, Field Marshal Szombathelyi, visited Hitler at his field
headquarters in East Prussia. Hitler's invitation to Horthy was
conveyed in Hibbentrop's telegram No. 926 of September 1 from the
Special Train, forwarded to Budapest as No. 1525 of September 1
(93/104001 ) , The details of the visit were arranged in a series of tele-
grams exchanged between the Legation in Hungary and the Foreign
Ministry September 3-6 which are filmed on serial 93. Bintelen's
telegram No. 957 of September 6 from the Special Train, forwarded
to Budapest as No. 1569 (93/104057), instructed Minister Jagow to
make sure that "the strictest secrecy was observed with regard to the
SEPTEMBER 1941 467
journey of Regent Horthy to the Fiihrer's headquarters and all prep-
arations connected with it." The only record of the discussions with
Horthy and his advisers at Hitler's headquarters found in German
Foreign Ministry files is the following entry in an unsigned foreign
policy survey of September 18 prepared by the Foreign Minister's
Secretariat (46/31108-13) :
"The visit of the Regent of Hungary, von Horthy, at Fiihrer's
headquarters has had the result with respect to the participation of
Hungarian troops in the campaign in the east that Hungary will
increase the number of her contingents of troops participating in the
campaign. On the occasion of the visit the Hungarians requested a
rectification of their Carpathian frontier with the part of former
Soviet Kussian eastern Galicia which belongs at present to the General
Government ; this was promised to them. For the rest, the visit of-
fered an opportunity for counteracting the strong influence exerted
on Hungary by Anglo-American propaganda, which can normally
be observed. In view of present and future successes of German arms
we can at any event be sure of Hungary's continued cooperation
with the Axis Powers."
The Haider Diary has the following notations for September 9 :
"Visit of the Regent of Hungary together with the new Chief of
the General Staff : Tour of the headquarters. Debate, somewhat lively
in parts regarding the further participation in the operations by the
Hungarian mobile corps. The new Chief of the General Staff takes
the selfish view that what matters is to preserve Hungary's forces
in consideration of her task in the Balkans. Moreover, the Hungarian
mobile corps seems to take the view that for once other Hungarian
forces should be employed. Naturally the difficulties in replacing
losses in material have to be admitted.
"In the end the concession is made that the mobile corps will be left
until termination of the operations, and in case it should be withdrawn
later a replacement is promised."]
No. 292
1543/375763-64
The Charged? Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
_ most urgent Washington, September 9, 1941 — 8: 45 p. m.
Xtop secret Received September 10—8 : 10 a. m.
"Mo. 3098 of September 9
With reference to your telegram No. 1738 of September 6. 1
The way Germany handled and politically exploited the Greer inci-
dent has evidently not failed to have an effect here, and public opinion
is worried over the possible consequences. The interventionists have
1 Document No. 282.
468 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
not been able to agree on a uniform policy as to how to parry this
German propaganda attack on the other side, and are therefore await-
ing Roosevelt's speech.*
Concerning the importance and effect of his statement, speculation
differs widely. It is assumed that his speech will be especially
aggressive and provocative in tone, while he will actually confine
himself to addressing an appeal to the American people that they
should rouse themselves from their lethargy in order to achieve as
soon as possible the goal of making America the arsenal of democracy
by using every effort and, in addition, to demanding again a financial
plan in accordance with his May speech. 3 The practical result is
expected to be that rearmament will be expedited at the expense of
normal peacetime habits of the American people, and also that the
American lanes of approach will be protected by means of far ad-
vanced American bases in the western part of the Atlantic.
Roosevelt will presumably announce various alleged defense meas-
ures for keeping the forces of the Axis Powers out of the western
Atlantic, with the double aim of protecting lines of communication,
especially with Iceland, and at the same time facilitating the delivery
of military supplies for England, at least up to the German blockade
zone, by American forces. In doing this, Roosevelt will repeatedly
stress the fact that all these measures are designed merely for defense
against German encrochments in the waters of the Western Hemi-
sphere. He hopes thereby to be able to calm the American people
and to delude the isolationist opposition into thinking that it is not
his policy, but Germany's aggressive warfare, that is responsible
for the incidents and their consequences.
In order to demonstrate the danger and the insincerity of Roose-
velt's foreign policy by using the Greer incident, in accordance with
instructions, and through suitable contacts, I got in touch with several
of the leading interested Senators, numerous Congressmen, various
journalists and suitable organizations, some of whom gave me reason
to expect that they would press for a Congressional investigation.
The success of their efforts would, however, in the main depend on
'In telegram No. 3069 of Sept. 6 (1«3^B764^) Thorny r^rt^ teat it
had been announced in connection with the incident involving the Greer that
President Roosevelt would make a radio address "of the greatest possible
»te» o°n Monday evening (Sept. 8). Owing to the death »'*'«£«»
Roosevelt's mother, the address was postponed to Sept. 11. See, further, docu-
m » A^^arentiy a t refCTence to President Roosevelt's recommendation of May 1
to the Chairman of the House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee
that three and one-half billions of additional taxes be levied to help defray
defense expenditures. For text, see Kosenman, The PubUo Papers and Ad-
dresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. s, p. 144,
SEPTEMBER 1941 469
the measures that Roosevelt will announce and on the extent to which
they could be exploited against him politically. My contacts went
to work so circumspectly that one will not be able to see the German
influence.
Thomsen
No. 293
B33/106732-33
The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
tirgent Buenos Aires, September 9, 1941—11 : 21 p. m.
top secret Received September 10—8 : 45 a. m.
No. 1526 of September 9.
With reference to my telegram No. 1525 of September 9. 1
The Foreign Minister then brought up the unpleasant position in
which I personally had been placed by the violent attacks of the Com-
mission and the press agitation. 2 Unfortunately, the Government
was powerless to do anything about this sort of thing, but in its own
interest wished to avoid anything that might encumber or disturb
German-Argentine relations. In particular, the acting President at-
tached the greatest importance to a continuation of the friendly rela-
tions that had hitherto existed with Germany. Unfortunately it was
to be feared that the Commission reports would be approved by the
Chamber and the Senate and would be used as a basis for further agi-
tation against my person, which might in the end lead to serious inci-
dents. He would therefore like to ask in all friendliness and strictly
confidentially whether the German Government could not on its own
initiative take some ameliorating step. My 8-year tour of duty here
was in itself of exceptionally long duration already; a transfer to
another post would therefore seem quite normal ; or, if that were not
feasible, taking an extended home leave after such a long stay in the
unheal thful climate here, or something similar. My departure would,
of course, be attended by every honor; it was merely a matter of
preventing a further deterioration of the whole atmosphere and
the agitation against me personally, which was gradually becoming
x threatening.
I confined myself to listening to the Foreign Minister's state-
ments — prompted by fear of the street crowd and the Commission,
highly tortuous, and permeated with repeated assurances of the high-
1 Not found.
1 See document No. 251.
470 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
est regard for ray work here and regret over the extremely unpleasant
development that had occurred— and merely replied that I could not
take any stand on this question but instead had to leave it to the
Argentine Government to clarify its position to the German Govern-
ment. The Foreign Minister stated that such a step by the Argentine
Ambassador in Berlin had been contemplated. 3
I assume that the demarche will be made within only a few days,
since the Government apparently would like to bring about a decision
before replying to the requested interpellation (cf. telegram No. 1477
of September 3) , 4 which in view of the parliamentary vacations must
in any case come before the end of this month.
With regard to the intensified campaign conducted against me by
the press and even with posters, cf . DNB telegram No. 62. 5
Thermann
'Weizsacker's memorandum, St.S. 584 of Sept. 10 (253/164953-54) records a
conversation with the Argentine Ambassador who P^^f^^^ZmTn order fo
•resting that the German Government recall Ambassador Thermann in order to
Inticipate a debate in the Argentine Parliament regarding his person. Welz-
sacker expressed astonishment at the action of the Ambassador.
4 Document No. 274.
In teffilm No. 1133 of Sept. 13 (253/164930) Woennann informed Thermann
for his plrsonal information that he should not expect that his recall would take
place in response to Argentine pressure.
See, further, document No. 528.
No. 294
2109/456518
The Embassy in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No, i 6 5 Ankara, September 9, 1941—11 : 48 p. m.
of September 9 Received September 10—7 : 45 a, m.
Del. No. 5
The first conversations showed that the Turkish Government is
willing to conclude both a clearing agreement without time limit and
a trade agreement without time limit. Discussion of these agreements
has begun on the basis of the drafts proposed by us. 1 The Turks,
moreover, do not insist on restricting the exchange of commodities,
but rather are prepared to expand it to the largest volume possible
under present-day conditions of production and transportation. Yet
1 Not found.
SEPTEMBER 1941 471
they absolutely insist on not making deliveries in advance and firmly
demand that these should take place item by item on both sides. In
the matter of war material in particular they place great importance
on obtaining at least part of the shipment immediately. My first
impression is that the Turkish attitude will be very stubborn in this
question and that, above all, chrome ore and copper deliveries will
be obtained only in coincident exchange against war material. Apart
from his negative attitude in this one question which, to be sure is
especially important to us, Numan obviously tries to be accommodating
and to see to it that the negotiations take place in a friendly
atmosphere.
Clodius
Keoll
No. 295
«5/45398
The Minister m Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Tehran, September 9 [1941].
No. 991
In the session of Parliament which just ended, and about which a
more detailed report will follow during the afternoon, 1 the Foreign
Minister made public the exchange of notes between the Allies and
the Iranian Government. This reveals that the Allies are no longer
demanding the expulsion of the German colony from Iran, but its
surrender by the Iranian Government to the Russians or the English. 2
Additional demands were : The breaking off of diplomatic relations
between Iran and Germany, Italy, Rumania, and Hungary; finally,
the Allies demanded that the Legations of these countries be forthwith
prohibited from using code or radio transmitters.
Ettel
-x
1 In Tehran telegram No. 2 of Sept. 10 (65/45410-15).
a In telegram No. 15 of Sept. 12 (65/45440) Eittel reported having received
an Iranian note stating that the British and the Soviet Governments intended
to grant safe conduct for the return to Germany of the women and children
of the German colony In Iran.
472 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 296
195/139208
The Dirigent of the Political Department to the Director of the
Political Department
Telegram
No. 973 Special Train, September 10, 1941—3 : 50 a. ra.
Received September 10 — 4 : 10 a. m.
Through the Foreign Minister's Secretariat; with reference to U.
St.S. Pol. Nr. 788 of August 18. 1
The Foreign Minister requests that you summon M. Bose and tell
him approximately the following by way of explanation :
The Foreign Minister continues to have the greatest interest in his
plans, and thanks him sincerely for his letter. If in the past we had
desired, and still desire, that the moment for the publication o± a
declaration regarding a free India should be postponed, it is connected
with the situation as a whole. This made it appear to us advisable
to wait until our operations in the east began to have a stronger impact
on the situation in the Near East and Southern Asia. As matters
stand today, a proclamation of a free India by the Axis powers might
possibly have the effect that England would then occupy Afghanistan
ui order to consolidate her position in India, and that she would
muster still additional forces to the Near East. However, we had to
avoid bringing about such English measures prematurely, lhe
Foreign Minister wanted to discuss orally with M. Bose the opposite
views expressed in his letter; as soon as the Foreign Minister was back
in Berlin he would ask M. Bose to see him. 3
Rintelen
1 Document No. 213.
' See document No. 521.
No. 297
482/231283
The Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the
Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
tf 621 of Belgrade, September 10, 1941—6 : 50 p. m.
' September 10 Received September 11—2 : 40 a. m.
* DIII423g.
With reference to my telegram No. 608 of September 8. 1
A quick and Draconian settlement of the question of the Serbian
Jews is the most urgent and expedient requirement. I request an
1 Document No. 288.
SEPTEMBER 1941 473
appropriate instruction from the Foreign Minister in order to take
up the matter most vigorously with the Military Commander, Serbia.
No resistance of any sort is to be expected on the part of the Serbian
Government and population, all the less so since the partial measures
thus far have proved to be very effective. An order to the same effect
from the Reichsfiihrer SS to the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe of the
Security Police and SD-Standartenf iihrer Fuchs would advance the
matter very essentially. 2
Veesensiatek
Benzler
3 Marginal notes: "Party Comrade Rademacher. Please take over the matter
from Pol. IV. I fail to see proposals from Belgrade. Talking generalities will
Hot advance a solution. Please telephone Minister v. Eintelen, Special Train,
regarding this, Lu[ther], Sept. 11."
No. 298
£65/173234
Memorandum ~by the State Secretary
St.S.No. 590 Berlin, September 10, 1941.
Nuri Pasha, who was recommended to us by the Embassy in
Ankara, 1 paid his visit to me today. He developed his views on the
Pan-Turanian question made familiar to us by Herr von Papen.
I told Nuri Pasha that in the areas in which he was especially
interested the German Reich had no political, but only economic,
interests. What Turkey was striving for there was certain to meet
with German approval from the outset. It seemed to me, however,
that his own (the Turkish) Government was pursuing different ideas
in this respect. I therefore wished to ask whether he should not
first of all exert influence at home. Nuri Pasha conceded this ; actually
he had been trying to do what was necessary in this regard for a long
time.
With regard to his stay here Nuri Pasha commented as follows:
His time was not limited. He thought he could be useful here by
advising the German authorities on all questions concerning the
Caucasus, with which he was throughly acquainted — in its geographic,
ethnographic, military, and economic aspects. Once the German
■* advance toward the Caucasus had penetrated beyond Rostov and
reached the important trunk railroad line in the vicinity of Armavir,
1 Nuri Pasha, a brother of Enver Pasha, young Turk leader and Turkish
Military Commander in World War I, had been mentioned by Papen as one of
the leaders of the Pan-Turanian movement in the report referred to In docu-
ment No. 194, footnote 5. According to a Woermann memorandum of Aug. 22
(265/173167) Ribbentrop had received a letter from Papen announcing that
Nuri Pasha was coming to Germany to attend the Leipzig Fair and would
pay a call at the Foreign Ministry.
474 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the fate of the Soviet troops around the Caucasus would be sealed.
He himself was in a position to bring about an uprising of at least
100,000 men in the Caucasus.
As a precaution I inquired about Nuri Pasha's relations with the
Turkish Ambassador here. It seems that they are in contact with
each other.
I advised Nuri Pasha to get in touch with Under State Secretary
"Woermann with regard to further discussions. 2
Weizsackek
' See document No. 361.
No. 299
1043/S75782
The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Washington, September 11, 1941—3 : 17 p. m.
top secret Eeceived September 12 — 2 : 00 a. m.
No. 3125 of September 11
For the State Secretary.
With reference to my telegram No. 3098 of September 9. 1
On Thursday 2 noon, just a few hours before the Roosevelt
address, 8 Senator Nye, as indicated in the above telegraphic report,
introduced in the Senate a resolution calling upon the Senate Com-
mittee on Naval Affairs to undertake a Congressional investigation
of the Greer incident for a clear determination of the facts. The crew
and officers of the Greer are to be called to testify and the ship's log
is to be examined. Further, the investigating committee is to require
production of all orders which the Naval Operations Staff issued to
the Greer and other vessels en route between Iceland and U.S. ports,
and prepare a report for the Senate. Concurrently, Senator Bennett
C. Clark demanded that the Secretary of the Navy produce for the
document No. 292.
'Sept. 11.
' See document No. 292, footnote 2.
SEPTEMBER 1941 475
investigating committee the log of the Greer for the two days prior
to and following the incident. 4
Introduction of this resolution was purposely so timed as to cause
embarrassment to Roosevelt and give him no time for any countermove.
In addition, immediately following the Roosevelt speech tonight,
Lindbergh, as the first isolationist, is to speak from Iowa over the
radio network of the Mutual Broadcasting Company against the
warmongers.
Thojisen
4 In telegram No. 3153 of Sept 12 (1543/375800) Thomsen reported that the
action by Senators Nye and Clark had "borne fruit" and that Senator Walsh,
Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, had announced that Sec-
retary of the Navy Knox and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark,
would be called before his Committee.
The resolutions introduced by Senator Nye (S. Res. 164) and Senator Clark
(S. Res. 165) were transmitted to the Secretary of the Navy by Senator "Walsh
with the request that the pertinent information, including also a series of
specific questions regarding the Greer incident be furnished to the Committee.
The information was supplied in a letter with enclosure of Sept. 20 from Ad-
miral Stark to Senator Walsh. No hearings were held in the matter. For text
of Admiral Stark's communication see World Peace Foundation, Documents on
American Foreign Relations, vol. iv, pp. 93-95. A summary of Admiral Stark's
statements was published in the New York Times of Oct. 15, 1941 (p. 6, col. 1)
and commented upon by Thomsen in telegram No. 3563 of Oct 15 (1857/422160-
62).
No. 300
205/142960-61
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Stockholm, September 11, 1941, 7 : 20 p. m.
No. 1396 of September 11 Received September 11 — 10 : 50 p. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 2070 of September 11 1 and
to my telegram No. 1389 of September ll. 2
The Foreign Minister asked me to call today in order to give me
the final answer in regard to the Norwegian ships. He explained
that in this matter the Swedish Government could not depart from
the legal course. He hoped that Germany would understand this and
he added that he could assure me on his word of honor that Sweden,
'A *In this telegram (2116/460507-08) Ritter referred to Giinther's assurances
to Schnurre on Aug. 14 that until further notice the ships would not run out,
and that if the de facto situation were to change, Germany would be notified
(cf. document No, 174, footnote 4). The German Government, however, had
Information from Gflteborg and Malmo that surprise runout was being pre-
pared, Germany, Hitter stated, would hold Sweden responsible if there were
any breakout. He pointed out that with a minimum of good will toward
Germany by Sweden the ships would be unable to get the necessary fuel oil
for a breakout.
8 Not found.
476 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
contrary to certain rumors, had never given England any return
services for her permission for the Goteborg overseas traffic. 3 In a
further discussion between State Secretary Boheman and Mimsterial-
direktor Soderblom on the one side and Counselors of Legation
Dankwort and Geffcken on the other side the following procedure,
which had been recommended by the legal advisers of the Swedish
Government, was proposed: The Norwegian shipowner would make
the following motion with the Chief Bailiff in Goteborg (or in
Malmo as the case might be) with reference to his property rights
along with other possible motions:
1) In accordance with paragraph 191 of the law for compulsory
execution [ZwangavoUstrecfatngsgenete] the former crew of the
ship should be removed and the shipowner's own crew should be
brought on board. Possibly a motion should be made for 2) arrest
or for 3) prohibition of disposal of the ship [Verfiigungsverbot].
If the principal motion were not approved but one of the possible
motions were approved, this would take place in the form of a pro-
visional arrest or prohibition of disposal. The shipowner would then
within 30 days have to bring an action in the court [Ratkausgenckf]
in Goteborg, or in Malmo as the case might be. Such action would
have to be directed against the captain. In case the Chief Bailiff
were to refuse all of the motions then appeal would be possible
to the superior court and to the supreme court. Only a week should
pass until a decision by the latter. The actual suit over the right
of disposal over a ship would not last more than a few months. This
procedure would have to be followed for each individual vessel. But
once a precedent were established the decisions in the other cases
would be made rapidly. If there were fear of sabotage the ship-
owners could turn to the police officials and demand a police guard
for the ships. To the question whether the Swedish Government
could give assurances that the ships would not run out before a pos-
sible motion for arrest the Foreign Minister and Boheman answered
in unison that we could reckon on it that no ship would run out
in less than a week. In case an earlier breakout should be planned
the Legation would be notified. The shipowner Stenersen will dis-
cuss the matter tomorrow morning with the attorney here together
with the shipping expert Riensberg. According to the views of
the Legation there are in the present state of affairs only two pos-
sibilities: either to follow the course proposed by the Swedish Gov-
ernment or else to let the ships sail out and be brought in by German
* See document No. 91.
SEPTEMBER 1941 477
naval vessels. 4 The shipowner Stenersen would much rather move
for immediate arrest. I would be grateful for the earliest possible
instruction. 5
Wied
•In a later telegram of Sept. 11, No. 1397 (205/142962-63), the Naval Attache
reported that the Dtcto, the Lionel, and the Rigmor were preparing for a
breakout; that the Lionel had an English captain on board; and that the
Rigmor had 200 tons of bunker oil, that was four times as much as was needed
for the trip to England. Possibly the Montana and the Raila were also pre-
paring to breakout.
"These instructions have not been found. See, further, document No. 329.
No. 301
260/170179-80
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
urgent Helsinki, September 11, 1941—8 : 40 p. m.
top secret Received September 11—10 : 50 p. m.
No. 929 of September 11
Today, after we had dined privately, President Ryti discussed
with me, confidentially the following points :
1 ) Rumors of a separate Finnish peace were a foreign concoction
originating in Moscow. 1
2) The Finnish Army would advance to the points agreed upon
in earlier discussions with the German High Command of the
Army. 2
3) As soon as the military situation permitted it, the Finnish Army
ought to be reduced to approximately 140,000 or 150,000 men so that
the economy could again be revived. Finland could not at present
fulfill her commitments abroad because of the labor shortage and
the clearing settlements are developing adversely.
4) The small Finnish nation with a large territory must lay
emphasis on a short boundary. The Svir boundary with a glacis
before it would fulfill this need. If Leningrad would not continue
as a metropolis, the Neva would form the best boundary on the Kare-
lian Isthmus.
5) Finnish territorial wishes did not only include Farther Karelia
but also the Kola Peninsula.
6 ) Among the Finnish Socialists too the understanding of the
need for adjusting the boundary was growing. He had spoken repeat-
edly and successfully with Tanner, the Socialist leader, about this.
7) It would be most advantageous to Finland if, in the future,
she no longer bordered on Russia. He would be grateful if Germany
annexed th e far less populated areas east of the future Finnish east-
jCf. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. I pp 59-61
Hn -^ T0 !; ? n ° f t th | 3 series - document No. 554 and footnote 10, and document
i\o, o9a and footnote 1.
478 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
ern boundary. They would be of special value to Germany because
of their richness in timber and its readiness to be shipped via the
Svina and Archangel. He had instructed Kmmaki to spread similar
V1 8)' S I? ^politically necessary to destroy Bolshevism this time.
At the same time Leningrad would have to disappear as a metropolis.
I was receptive to these explanations, which were of the most con-
fidential character, but am asking for information on the German
noint of view regarding the problems raised. 3
r Blugher
'A log book entry by Hewel of Sept. 11 (1924/431786-87) shows that the
telegram was suSted to Hitler on Sept. 13 and that the "Fuhrer jants to be
generou" in regard to territorial questions. K 1 ?!\, Pe " 1 „ n r s ^ e X D 's rerly
Wants to receive authoritative Finnish personality." For Ribbentrop s reply,
see document No. 331.
No. 302
95/107081-82
Minister Eisenlohr to the Embassy in Spain
TOP 8ECRET Berlik, [September 11 19U.J »
[No. 2090 of September 11] - P°l. I M 2724 g. Rs.
For the Ambassador personally.
I. For military reasons the following structural changes are neces-
sary in the Irun railroad station:
a. Widening of the existing loading ramp and construction oi a
new loading ramp ; ,.
b. Construction of a connection betwen the two existing loading
platforms;
c. Clearance work. ..
The start of the work, which would require 2 to 3 weeks even if rail-
road troops would be employed, cannot be delayed until the time when
military actions might become necessary. Bather the work must be
done at this time as a precautionary measure. 2 ,,. . .
II Please discuss the matter with the Spanish Foreign Ministry
in an appropriate manner and obtain Spanish consent to the expansion
of the Irun railroad station.
The practical execution of the construction work can, if necessary,
be transferred to a Spanish contractor. The Chief of Transporta-
•The date and number of this telegram are taken from a reference In Madrid
ForrignMinistry's representative with the OKH, one division for Operation
Felix was to be taken from the eastern front.
SEPTEMBER 1941 479
tion 3 suggests that for reasons of camouflage "Sofindus" * be employed
for any negotiations with Spanish authorities, which could presum-
ably also clarify the question of costs. Please give your opinion on
this suggestion.
There is an urgent military interest in speedy positive execution.
"Wire your report. 6
Eisenxohr
*Lt. Gen. Rudolf Gercke.
4 Sociedad Financiera Industrial Ltda. See vol. m of this series, Editors*
Note, p, 1.
"In telegram No. 3188 of Sept. 15 (95/107084) Stohrer pointed out that this
directive seemed to contradict the instructions given to the Naval Attache 1 and
the chief intelligence officer at the Embassy, according to which a policy of
restraint without further military preparations was to be undertaken. In tele-
gram No. 2214 of Sept. 24 (95/107089) Hitter countermanded Eisenlohr'a
instruction.
No. 303
230/153419
The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military
Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
secret Belgrade, September 12, 1941 — 12 : 30 a. m.
No. 633 of
September 11 Keceived September 12 — 1 ; 30 a. m.
As matters stand this evening the Nedic government does not seem
to be able to master the insurrectionary movement with its own forces,
because the newly-organized formations thus far employed are evi-
dently proving to be unreliable. Under the influence of national-
istically camouflaged communist slogans, individual Chetnik groups
are now also taking up positions against the German occupation troops,
although so far there has been no fighting involving them. Minister
President Nedic and Minister of Interior Acimovic, with whom the
situation was thoroughly discussed today and regarding whose sincere
intentions there is no doubt, share this view entirely and have stated
openly that the only remaining solution is to crush the revolt solely
with German forces. The Nedic government is considering resigning.
Whether this will be done or whether the Nedic government will con-
tinue in office in some new form or other is being left open at the
present time and will probably be decided within the next 4-8 hours.
The Military Commander, Serbia will press for the present govern-
ment to remain. Objectively the continuance of the government will
not make any difference, but perhaps would lessen a too sudden shock
effect and thus the danger of a general insurrection throughout the
480 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
whole country. We must now prepare, however, for having to crush
the insurrectionary movement alone. In the opinion of the military
authorities, which I consider to be correct, the maintenance of order
in Belgrade is assured even under the conditions described.
Benzler
No. 304
318/192281-82
The, Charge d? Affaires in the United States to tlie Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most uegent Washington, September 12, 1941—6 : 23 p. m.
No. 3146 of September 12 Keceived September 13—9 : 15 a. m.
For OKM and OKW Ausland.
Save for an isolated hint addressed to Japan that America's tradi-
tional policy of the freedom of the seas applied not only to the At-
lantic but also to the Pacific [and] all oceans, the President's address, 1
which overflowed with distortions, lies, and insults, was primarily
addressed to Germany. It is important from the viewpoint of naval
policy that Roosevelt, while avoiding the expression "customary pro-
tection", gave the order with immediate effect to extend protection
not only to American merchant vessels but also to those of other flags
in all waters essential to the national defense, [and] to open Are on
German-Italian naval forces on sight in such waters. The President
declared. that the mere presence of German-Italian submarines in any
waters essential to America's national defense would be construed as
'' an attack and countered by military means. He gave clear warning
that German-Italian warships would henceforth sail such waters at
1 President Roosevelt's fireside chat, broadcast from the White House on Sept
11 It referred to the attack on the destroyer Greer as an act of "piracy which
had fol owed similar attacks such as thesinkings of the JoMnMoor ■{** : vol.
xir document No. 657), of the Panamanian merchant ship Sessa near Green-
land on ™ 17. and of Ltae United States Merchant Ship Steel Seafarer in the
R RelerrtftoGerman submarines as "rattle snakes of the Atlantic" the Presi-
dent then announced the new American policy in the following terms:
"In the waters which we deem necessary for our defense American naval
vessels and American planes will no longer wait until Axis submarines lurking
under the water, or Axis raiders on the surface of the sea, strike their deadly
bl °«u7ra our naval and air patrol-now operating In large number over a vast
expanse of the Atlantic Ocean-falls the duty of mainta ning the American
poucy of freedom of the seas-now. That means, very simply very clearly
that our patrolling vessels and planes will protect all merchant toV^J*™*
America^ ships but ships of any flag-engaged 1° commerce ■£ o™^™ 1 ™
waters. They will protect them from submarines; they will protect them irom
SU For e the 8 fKxt see Rosenman, The PuUie Papers and Addresses of Franklin
D. Roosevelt, vol. x, pp. 384-392.
SEPTEMBER 1941 481
their own risk. The President advisedly omitted any precise defini-
tion of the waters essential to America's national defense in order to
reserve freedom of action to himself. It would probably not be amiss
if, as Admiral Stirling (Ret.) s and a large section of the press have
done, one were mainly to include in these waters which in the last
analysis could comprise the entire world, the sea lanes to Iceland
marked out for the deliveries under the Lend-Lease Act, and possibly,
in addition, the sea lanes to England and South Africa, that is to
say, a large portion of the north, middle and south Atlantic; further-
more, the sea routes to West African ports, through which American
aircraft for England have lately been flown to the Middle East, and
all other sea routes to South America. Aside from the Red Sea, spe-
cial mention finally was made of the sea routes to Vladivostok and
Rangoon. Thus the envisaged action of sweeping all regions of the
sea essential to America's national defense clear of submarines and
surface merchant- destroyers is technically limited only by the number
of available American naval and air force units. In addition to the
previously publicized incidents, which are supposed to justify his new
measures, the President mentioned that last July a German submarine
had stalked an American battleship over many miles to get into firing
position. For the first time he mentioned an American outpost in
Labrador, without giving any details. While he described the order
to the Navy as not identical with full war measures (shooting war), 3
(group garbled) country did not want, putting the responsibility for
America's entry or for refraining from entering the war upon the
Fiihrer, the President has by this order materially aggravated the
situation in the Atlantic, all the more because it must be expected
that the units of the Atlantic fleet in interpreting these orders will
not merely wait for Axis naval units to appear but rather keep
hunting them down.*
Thomsen
"Admiral Yates Stirling, Jr., former Chief of Staff of the United States fleet.
* In English in the original.
*The strategic and political aspects of President Roosevelt's speech were dealt
with in a report presented to Hitler by the Commander in Chief of the Navy
in a conference at Hitler's headquarters on Sept. 17. In Annex 1 of this report
the Naval War Staff proposed certain changes in the orders issued to German
naval units with the aim of intensifying naval warfare also with respect to
American ships and the American security zone. The record of the decision taken
reads as follows :
"On the basis of a detailed discussion of the situation as a whole, in which
It appears that the end of September will bring the great decision In the Russian
campaign, the Flihrer requests that care be taken to avoid any incidents in the
war on merchant shipping before about the middle of October. Therefore the
Commander in Chief, Navy and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines withdraw
the suggestions made in Annex 1. The submarines are to be informed of the
reason for temporarily keeping to the old orders."
■See U.S. Navy Department, ONI, "Fiihrer Conferences on Matters Dealing
With the German Navy, 1941," vol. n, pp. 33^5.
682-905—64 36
482 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 305
65/46443
Memorandum by the Foreign Minister
September 12, 1941.
The Soviet Government has furnished the Iranian Government a
list of Reich Germans in Iran whose surrender is demanded, appar-
ently for the purpose of interning them in the Soviet Union. The
Soviet Government must realize that within the area under German
control there are sufficient numbers of Soviet citizens who could be
the object of reprisals in the event Reieh Germans should really be
forcibly deported from Iran. On the other hand, if the Soviet Gov-
ernment should refrain from any internment whatsoever of Germans
from Iran, releasing such persons as may have already been interned,
and would be willing to grant the German colony in Iran an un-
hindered departure for Turkey, the Reich Government would for its
part permit 194 Soviet citizens in German hands, with regard to whom
the Soviet Government has expressed an interest, to depart from Reich
territory for Turkey. 1
R[ibbentropJ
i Marginal mote: "Transmitted by telephone to Under State Secretary Woer-
man so that it may be sent on via Sofia by telegraph. Klmte len] , Sept 12
The draft of a telegram (281/180352-53) instructing the Legation in Sofia to
ask tl Bulgarian Government to forward the ten of this ^&™*™S"™
cation to tie Soviet Government is in the files. Sofia telegram No. 1017 of
Sept 13 (281/180351) acknowledging the receipt of this instruction indicates
^ffiJE No^lK St* IK (278/178943) Beetle reported
that the So™et Foreign Commissariat had handed a note to the Bulgarian
Legation in Moscow Itating "that the Soviet Government rejected without
examination the impudent reply of the German Government.
No. 306
65/45477
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff
Fuheer's Headquarters, September 12, 1941.
The Fiihrer told me today in connection with retaliatory acts against
the internment of Germans in Iran that it was his wish that for every
German deported, ten selected Englishmen be deported from the
Jersey Islands a to the Pripet Marshes. He further wishes that the
property of such interned civilians be distributed among the inhabit-
ants of the Jersey Islands who are of Frendi descent. He would
like this deportation to extend also to other prominent British civilians,
among them Churchill's nephew. The important thing to do, he
1 See documents Nos. 280 and 287.
SEPTEMBER 1941 483
said, was that the reason for this deportation be made crystal clear
to the interned Englishmen and also to the world. Steps should
taken to arrange for publication in the press and on the radio. 2
Hewel
"Marginal note: "Not to be transmitted by teletype. W[eber], Sept 14,"
No. 307
535/240038
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St. S. No. 593 Berlin, September 12, 1941.
The Nuncio asked me today how matters stood regarding the con-
fiscation of monasteries in Germany. He wanted to know from me
whether there was a new directive that restraint should be practiced
toward the monasteries. 1 Yesterday, however, he had again heard
of a confiscation that had just occurred of a monastery in Berlin.
The decree for this confiscation bore a prior date, namely August 11.
I acted as if I were not informed in the matter.
WeIZ BACKER
'In a memorandum of Aug. 22 (535/239998) Haidlen reported that Reich-
minister Kerrl had sent a personal tetter to Himmler in which he expressed his
concern over the confiscation of monasteries and that Hitler had issued an
order that further confiscations of monasteries should cease. The text of the
order was not known in the Foreign Ministry. In a memorandum of Sept. 3
(535/240039) Haidlen noted that the Reich Chancellery refused to comment
on the directive. "The Party Chancellery confirmed that further confiscation
of monasteries was being discontinued for the time being. The existing confis-
cations were to remain in force. The directive regarding the suspension of
confiscation was top secret and must not be made known to the outside." For
the text of the directive, see document No. 340.
No. 308
67/47018-30
Memorandum hy an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
RAM 47 g. Rs. Berlin, September 13, 1941.
Record of the Conversation Between the Reich Foreign Minister
and Italian Ambassador Alfieri at General Headquarters on
.a September 12, 1941
Alfieri explained his request to be received by the Foreign Minister
on the ground of his forthcoming visit to Rome, in the course of which
he would also report to the Duce on the position taken by Germany
on the major current issues. The Foreign Minister replied that there
was little new that had happened since the Duce's visit. 1 Generally
1 See document No. 242.
484 DOCUMENTS ON GEEMAN FOREIGN POLICY
speaking one could say that matters were progressing well on the
Russian front; Leningrad was being encircled and the ring was be-
coming tighter from day to day. The artillery had been moved up
so close to the city that the lines of fortifications were already under
mortar bombardment. It could be expected that the food situation
would become critical in the near future because it was impossible to
store enough supplies to sustain a population of several millions for
any prolonged period of time.
In response to the question asked by Alfieri, whether the Russian
resistance continued to be as stubborn as before, the Reich Minister
replied that lately it had greatly diminished and he referred, in that
connection, to a report which he had received both directly from
Turkey as well as by way of Rome 2 to the effect that the British were
much more concerned about Russia's internal situation than about
the situation at the front, which, properly speaking, was already bad
enough. There is talk in English circles that Stalin is getting tired
and might possibly be replaced by a military figure. Although, nat-
urally, the importance of such favorable reports must not be exagger-
ated, it is obvious that Russia's situation is anything but good and
that the English, as is apparent also from another source, are in any
case gravely concerned about the further development of the situation
in Russia.
As the interview continued, the conversation also turned to the
latest Roosevelt address. 8 The Foreign Minister briefly outlined his
personal ideas on a reply to Roosevelt, which he, however, would have
to discuss with the Fiihrer first. For one thing, it would be necessary
to establish the record of the events. It was not the German U-boat
that had attacked the American destroyer, but on the contrary the
destroyer had been tracking the U-boat for hours and attacking it
with depth charges. 4 Only after that had the U-boat fought back
by firing torpedoes. Besides, the order to shoot mentioned now by
Roosevelt in his address had been issued by him to the Navy a long
time ago. That was apparent not only from the destroyer's actions
in the last-mentioned case, but also from remarks made by Knox* in
July. Together with this it would be necessary to state that anything
that might happen from now on would be Roosevelt's responsibility
alone. That would have to be followed by a reply of the Fiihrer to
Roosevelt's challenge, emphasizing once more that any ship entering
'In telegram No. 2139 of Sept. 9 (1517/372682-84) Mackensen transmitted
the text of a telegram from the Turkish Military Attache in Moscow to the
Turkish Foreign Ministry which was given to him by the Italian foreign
Ml ™Thtif 'was the President's fireside chat of Sept. 11, 1941. See document No.
304. footnote 1.
* See document No. 282. ■
'"William FranMin Knox, United States Secretary of the Navy, 1940-1944.
SEPTEMBER 1941 485
the specified zone of operations would do so at its own peril, and that
German naval vessels would defend themselves against American
vessels. 8
Answering a question by Alfieri whether Roosevelt intended any-
thing serious, the Foreign Minister replied that Eoosevelt hated
National Socialist Germany, while the American people, for its part,
had no desire to go to war. For that reason Roosevelt probably hoped
that by provoking an incident he would have a chance to draw the
American people into the war.
The Foreign Minister informed Alfieri confidentially that he had
directed the German Charge d'Affaires in Washington to get the iso-
lationist Senators, through intermediaries, to demand an investigation
of the Greer affair by the Naval Affairs Committee of the American
Senate. 7 If officers and crew members of the destroyer and ranking
officials of the Navy Department were to be interrogated before that
Committee, it is probable that revelations most embarrassing to Roose-
velt would come to light. The Foreign Minister showed Alfieri a press
report which indicated that several isolationist Senators actually were
contemplating introducing a motion in the Senate calling for an in-
vestigation. The Foreign Minister expressed doubt, however, that
this investigation would materialize. The American Government
would probably contrive to suppress it.
Alfieri next came to speak of Japan. The Japanese Ambassador
was constantly away from Berlin and he had theref ore been unable to
get in touch with him. AH he (Alfieri) knew was that the Japanese
held the view that they were acting in the spirit of the Tripartite Pact
if, by practicing a certain amount of duplicity, they kept the United
States from entering the war. The Foreign Minister replied that he
was not clear in his mind about Japan. He had received little infor-
mation on the latest development and within the next days he would
request Ambassador Ott to send him a report in that regard. 8
However, he did not share the view held by the present Japanese
Government, but rather believed that it would be better also for Japan
in her position toward the United States if she were to announce in
plain terms that she was strong enough to back up the new order and,
in faithful fulfillment of the Tripartite Pact, would declare war on
America if Roosevelt were to engage in a conflict with Germany.
< A number of countervailing influences were at work in Japan, how-
ever, so that the picture was not clear. On account of that he (the
Foreign Minister) would, in the previously mentioned directive to
Ambassador Ott, ask the Japanese to give more detailed information
'See U.S. Navy Department, ONI, "Fiihrer Conferences on Matters Dealing
With the German Navy, 1941," vol. n, pp. 33, 37-^5.
7 See document No. 282.
" Document No. S1G.
486 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
on their talks with the United States, and would have the German
viewpoint outlined to them once more by the Ambassador. No one,
however, could in any way alter the fact that the Japanese were in the
same boat with the Axis Powers. They could not leave the Axis in
the lurch if they did not wish to give up their entire territorial con-
quests in China as well as their new order in the Far East. Any
Japanese government which did that would be instantly swept away
by the military.
The Foreign Minister agreed to a suggestion by Alfieri that the 27th
of September, the anniversary of Japan's accession to the Tripartite
Pact, should be given special recognition in some manner. He would
have to think over, however, in what form that should be done.
In response to a question by Alfieri about Turkey, the Foreign
Minister replied that no new developments had occurred there and
that, as a matter of fact, Ambassador von Papen, who was in Berlin,
would come to General Headquarters within the next days to present
a personal report. 9
In that connection, Alfieri mentioned certain misgivings about
Gerede's speech at the Leipzig Fair, 10 which had been expressed to
him in the diplomatic corps and in particular from the Bulgarian
and the Rumanian side. These members of the diplomatic corps
remarked that Gerede had not given sufficient consideration to the
fact that he was speaking in the name of the entire diplomatic corps,
and so had perhaps spoken out too plainly. Alfieri had forcefully
countered these remarks and declared that anything said by Gerede
applied equally to all countries. He had furthermore stressed that,
for his person, Gerede was a friend of Germany's. To this the
Foreign Minister commented that Gerede was a man of good will, but
very cautious.
Answering Alfieri's question about Spain and more particularly
about any contemplated operation against Gibraltar, the Foreign
Minister stated that first the situation in the east had to be resolved
before it would be possible to tackle Gibraltar or to launch an offensive
against the Suez Canal, about which Alfieri had also inquired.
Alfieri then inquired about the status of France. He had heard
that Petain was pressing Germany, if not for a final peace treaty,
then at least for a broader clarification of their mutual relations.
The Foreign Minister replied that there was nothing new to tell
about France. No proposals of any kind had been made by France.
Besides, Ambassador Abetz was to arrive at General Headquarters
Cf. Franz von Papen, Memoir*, pp. 481-482.
"In this speech delivered at a reception for foreign vistors and exhibitors
at the Leipzig Fair on Sept. 1, Gerede emphasized German-Turkish friendship
and the growing importflnee of the German market for foreign countries. For
text, see Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 3, 1941.
SEPTEMBER 1941 487
at an early date to make an oral report." Generally speaking, he (the
Foreign Minister) could say, however, that the development in France
was taking a fairly satisfactory course, although the situation there
was, of course, closely watched by Germany at all times. There were,
however, many Frenchmen still who thought it would be better to wait
a little longer before finally committing themselves to collaboration
with Germany.
In connection with Hungary, where the Foreign Minister had an-
swered a question of Alfieri's by saying again that there was nothing
new to report, Alfieri came to speak about the question of awarding a
decoration to the Duce. He emphasized that he was raising that point
not as the Italian Ambassador, but as a private person. When passing
through Konigsberg on the morning of his arrival, and seeing in the
papers, very prominently displayed, the report of the award of the
Knight's Cross to Horthy, it had occurred to him that Antonescu, too,
had received that decoration 12 while, on the other hand, with Italian
forces also fighting at the Eussian front, no decoration of any kind
had been awarded so far. Such a fact, as he would say strictly as a
personal opinion and in confidence, might give occasion to certain
misinterpretations among the Italian public.
Keplying to a question by the Foreign Minister, Alfieri said that
the King of Italy had conferred on the Duce the Supreme Command
of the Italian Armed Forces for the duration of the war, and in
conclusion stressed once more the absolutely confidential and strictly
personal nature of his remarks on that point.
In connection with the problems arising out of the employment of
large numbers of Italian workers in Germany, which had already
been adjusted in part by Dr. Ley and the Italian delegate, Lombrassa,
Alfieri came to speak of the marriages between Italian workers and
German women. 13 He mentioned a discussion which he had had on
this subject with Dr. Gross of the Race and Settlement Office. Dr.
Gross had taken the position that marriages of that kind were not
to be encouraged, but should rather be discouraged as far as possible.
Generally speaking that was also the attitude taken by the Duce.
In the case of the Italian workers in Germany, however, the situation
was of a particular order and ought to be resolved more tolerantly,
_so as to preclude any misunderstandings from arising among the
'Italians who, if difficulties were to be placed in the way of such mar-
riages, might construe a certain inconsistency between these measures
and the comradeship in arms between the two Axis Powers.
Concerning the rumors current in Germany about discontent of
the Italian people and shortages of food, Alfieri stated that these mat-
ters were being exaggerated. Naturally, the Italian people were
11 See document No. 327.
u See document No. 188.
" See document No. 281.
488 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
feeling the war in their own country, but the Duce was completely
reassured about morale and the food supply situation. He felt con-
cern only in regard to Italy's supply with strategic raw materials,
including petroleum. This question had also played a part in the
Favagrossa-Thomas talks, 1 * but because of the operations in Russia,
Thomas had declined to make any promises before October or Novem-
ber. Thereby a very difficult situation was created for the Italian
Navy. It might perhaps be advisable if either the Foreign Minister
or the Fiihrer gave an intimation to Marshal Keitel about facilitating
these negotiations.
When the Foreign Minister remarked that in his opinion the matter
to be dealt with first was to bring the Russian campaign to a con-
clusion, and that things could only be attended to one after the other,
Alfieri pointed out the difficult position of the Italian fleet in the
Mediterranean. In view of the steadily mounting attacks of English
submarines on the supply lines to North Africa, he thought that some
help had to be given here.
In conclusion, the Foreign Minister asked Alfieri to convey to the
Duce his sincerest regards and to Count Ciano his best wishes for an
early recovery. 19 .
Following the conversation, Ambassador Alfieri was briefed by
Colonel Steinhiiuser with the help of maps on the latest developments
on the Russian front. Special emphasis was given to the fact that the
German troops before Leningrad had at several points broken through
the first line of defense, which is considered the strongest; that
Estonia was completely pacified ; and that the operations against the
islands Dago and Osel would be launched within the next days.
Alfieri was°also informed in detail about the large encirclement com-
pleted in the southern sector of the central front, mention being made
of the possibility of the annihilation of about 35 to 40 divisions en-
circled there. The impending crossing of the Panzer Group over the
three bridges on the lower Dnieper, which had been a little delayed
by adverse weather was also pointed out to him. In addition he was
told of plans for an offensive against Moscow at some later date ; In
the course of the conversation, in response to a question by Alfieri, the
Soviet casualties were estimated to number 6-7 millions m prisoners,
killed, and wounded.
(bCHMIDT)
" No record of these conversations has been found.
" In telegram No. 1695 of July 29 (B12/B001111-12) Maekensen reported that
he had been unable to see Ciano. Anfuso explained in c0 » fl ^ M . e . «?» t 11 1 ' ™J
not a throat infection, as initially stated, but inflammation of the k.dneya which
would require a week of full rest and, after that, a period of recuperation away
fr °In felelram No. 2093 of Sept. 3 (151T/372670-71) Mackensen reported that
Ciano had sufficiently recovered from an operation to take 2 to 3 weeks re 8 t
at Leghorn.
SEPTEMBER 1941 489
No. 309
535/240042-44
Counselor of Embassy Menshausen to State Secretary Wefesacker
secret Rome, September 12, 1941.
Dear Here State Secretary : Supplementing the report A 479 of
August 23 * regarding the Vatican's attitude toward the war against
the Soviet Union, I should like to give you a description of the
atmosphere on the basis of conversations with well-informed and in
part also authoritative persons :
Aside from the arguments repeated in the report, that are more
adjusted to public opinion, the reports at the Vatican concerning the
Church policy in Germany were probably a determining, if not
decisive, factor for the reserve so far observed by the Pope in our
fight against Bolshevist Russia. In a number of conversations with
high Vatican officials it was indicated, when asked about the reasons
for this reserve, that to judge from the development of matters in
Germany and the areas in our possession one had to fear that after
the defeat of Bolshevism the Catholic Church, and indeed all Chris-
tianity, would, so to speak, go from the frying pan into the Are. If
the Pope should now speak against Bolshevism, against which the
Holy See had after all spoken repeatedly in principle, he would
also have to take a position against "the anticlerical measures and
tendencies hostile to Christianity in Germany" ; the reports "contin-
ually received" at the Vatican on this subject provided "overwhelming
material" to justify such a step; the Pope's silence was the best proof
that he would like to avoid everything that could injure Germany.
A highly-placed person familiar with the mood in the Vatican
and close to the Italian Government described, in a confidential
conversation, the reasons for the Pope's reserve in our fight against
Bolshevist Russia in the following terms: When the Church policy
measures in the Reich had become visibly more severe, Pius XII
had believed that he could no longer be responsible for further silence
on the subject. However, when the war against Soviet Russia began
he had refrained from the step considered necessary in order not
to injure Germany and her allies in this phase that was so decisive
for the fate of the world. To go beyond this and to take sides publicly
xand unequivocally in the fight against Soviet Russia had been made
impossible for him by Germany.
In his heart, one is assured time and again, Pius XII stands on the
side of the Axis Powers. In this connection reference is made to the
words which he addressed to Italy in his last radio speech on June 29,
'In this report (535/240045H19) Menshausen discussed the public pronounce-
ments made by the Pope and other Vatican officials regarding the Vatican's
attitude toward the war against the Soviet Union.
490 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
1941 : "With you (Rome) we bless the whole Italian people which,
with the advantage of being able to encompass the central point of
the unity of the Church, unites the manifest signs of its divine mis-
sion." Moreover there were indications enough which characterized
the attitude of the Vatican : The speech of such a prominent person
as the Secretary of the Congregation of the Propagation of the Faith,
Archbishop Constantini (the relevant portions of which are given in
the above-mentioned report) , s was of special importance in this regard
because it could not possibly have been held without the consent of the
Holy See. The demonstrations of the Italian clergy and numerous
■articles which have appeared in the Catholic press all over Italy, in
which the importance of the fight against Bolshevism is illuminated,
could also be attributed to directives given by the Vatican or by the
Catholic Action.
With appropriate compliments and Heil Hitler,
I remain, Yours, etc. Menshausen
'Archbishop Constantini's remarks, according to Italian press reports as
quoted by Menshausen, were as follows : "Yesterday on Spanish soil, today In
Bolshevist Russia herself, In that immense country where Satan seemed to have
found among the heads of the republics his deputies and best co-workers, brave
soldiers also of our fatherland are now fighting the greatest battle. We wish
with our whole hearts that this battle may bring us the final victory and the
fall of Bolshevism which aims at revolution and negation."
No. 310
82/60606-10
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
MOST URGENT
Tokyo, September 13, 1941—11 : 50 a. m. summer time.
No. 1797 of September 13 Received September 14—2 : 50 a. m.
With reference to my telegram No. 1789 of September 12. 1
I have just been, received by the Foreign Minister, as usual in the
presence of an interpreter.
1 In this telegram (82/60602^03) Ott reported that he had inquired of Deputy
Foreign Minister Amau regarding the alleged arrival of a reply from President
Roosevelt to the Konoye message and that he had mentioned certain rumors
with respect to the contents of the reply. Amau admitted that a reply had been
received stating however that "he was not in a position to give me information
about the contents of the reply any more than about the Konoye message itself."
Further ■ statements on the subject by Amau followed closely those which he
had given Ott on an earlier occasion (see document No. 256) .
Ott finally told Amau that he was not satisfied with the information which
he had received so far regarding the Japanese-American relations and that he
was therefore compelled to request to speak to Foreign Minister Toyoda.
SEPTEMBER 1941 491
Toyoda stated first of all that Eoosevelt's speech 2 seemed to him
to show that the President had found that domestic sentiment was not
yet sufficiently prepared for war. To be sure, the armaments industry
and Jewish finance, which controlled many newspapers, favored
participation in the war ; on the other hand Eoosevelt still had to take
into account the opposition of labor, church circles, German- Ameri-
cans, etc. Thus far Roosevelt had not succeeded in overcoming their
opposition.
I replied that in a certain area Roosevelt had already begun war
technically, without officially declaring war. The main obstacle, it
seemed to me, was the American people's fear of a two-ocean war.
The American Government was trying to give the American people the
impression that there was no danger of a two-ocean war. It was using
the present Japanese-American negotiations as an important argu-
ment. I was therefore compelled to {clear text missing) great im-
portance to informing my Government about the exact state of the
negotiations in order to be able to cope with the numerous rumors
circulating about the subject of the negotiations. The American
proposals of which we were informed at one time 3 showed the clear
purpose of causing Japan to withdraw from the Tripartite Pact. The
Japanese Government had emphatically rejected that demand. It
was important for me to know whether the basis of the American
attitude had in the meantime changed. In this connection I repeated
the alleged proposals of Eoosevelt mentioned in the telegram previ-
ously cited.
The Japanese Foreign Minister replied that, as we knew, negotia-
tions had been carried on for a long time between Japan and the
United States. We had been informed at the time of the latest
statement of Japan's position on July 14.* As a consequence of the
subsequent Cabinet change and the Japanese advance into Indochina,
Ambassador Nomura had not carried out this instruction at the time.
The negotiations had been broken off. The substance of Konoye's
. message was the proposal that these old negotiations be resumed. In
a reply of September 5 Eoosevelt had agreed to this and assented to
an exchange of views. 5 The American-Japanese talks were being
conducted in Washington by Ambassador Nomura and the American
' Government; in Tokyo only supplementary talks would be held. He
^had in the meantime seen the American Ambassador only once. The
rumors I had mentioned concerning American help in improving
* See document No. 304, footnote 1.
' See document No. 88 and footnote 6.
* See document No. 123 and footnote 1.
"Pop text of President Roosevelt's reply handed to Ambassador Nomura on
Sept. 3 see Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1981-1941, vol. n,
pp. 591-592. For Hull's record of the Hoosevelt-Nomura conversation on Sept. 3
and for the text of an oral statement which the President read lo Nomura on
that occasion see, itiid., pp. 588-591,
492 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Japanese-Russian relations, extensive American economic concessions,
and a Japanese commitment to refrain from any action in the south
and north, were branded by Toyoda as completely false ; the substance
of the message and of the talks was the same as that of the Japanese
reply of July 14. Ambassador Nomura had made it clear from the
outset that Japan would not assume any commitment contrary to the
Tripartite Pact.
At my request this statement was expressly reconfirmed, and I
repeated my request for the text of the Konoye message and Roose-
velt's reply. Toyoda replied that he could not, unfortunately, grant
my request, since that would require Roosevelt's consent. To my
question whether we assume that Roosevelt had, similarily, not made
the text accessible to Churchill either, Toyoda made no reply. I also
pointed out to Toyoda that obviously the Americans were spreading
the rumor that a personal meeting between Roosevelt and Prince
Konoye was being considered. Toyoda said that this rumor was un-
true and he referred to an American denial. Such a conjecture was
only natural, however, since meetings of statesmen had been a frequent
occurrence recently.
The Japanese Foreign Minister then stated that he had to call my
attention to the extraordinary significance for Japan of cutting the
line of communication through Siberia. As a result of the German-
Russian war and the occupation of Indochina, Japan had for all
practical purposes been cut off from all foreign sources. Japan was
therefore in a very unenviable position. He could inform me, with
the request for strictly confidential treatment, that Foreign Minister
Matsuoka, too, had expressed grave apprehensions about the cutting
off of the Siberian line of communication. When, in the opinion
of the German Government, might one expect a reopening of the
Siberian route? On the basis of certain information the Japanese
had been under the impression that an end to the German-Russian
war might be expected in about 2 months. 8
'In telegram No. 2231 of Sept. 16 (82/60626) Mackensen reported having re-
ceived from Anfuso the texts of two telegrams from the Japanese Ambassador in
Tokyo regarding the conversations which he and Ott had with Foreign Minister
Toyoda about Japanese-American relations. Mackensen stated that the follow-
ing excerpts of one of these telegrams seemed to be significant :
"Toyoda stated to me that the resumption of Japanese-American discussions
was due to the absolute necessity of eliminating in some way or other the crisis
in the Pacific resulting from the interruption of the earlier negotiations and
caused especially by the longer duration of the war between the Soviets and the
Axis Powers. Berlin had stated earlier that this war should not last longer than
2 months. Toyoda added that the Japanese Government was seriously concerned
about the fact, not anticipated at the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, that the
Trans-Siberian Railway, which represented the only safe means of communica-
tion with the allies, was now cut."
SEPTEMBER 1941 493
I replied to the Japanese Foreign Minister in accordance with the
statements of your telegram No. 1383 of August 25 r and said in
summing up that the main force of the Soviet Union in European
Russia would be defeated by the end of this year and would be mopped
up together with the remnants next spring. In my opinion the
opening of the Siberian route depended on the resultant political
effects and on the pressure which Japan on her part would exert on
the Soviet Union. In that connection I asked about the state of
military preparations in Manchuria, to which Toyoda briefly replied
that the preparations were not yet completed. The Japanese people
had been severely disappointed by the closing of the Siberian route;
a reopening would greatly strengthen the bonds between the Axis
Powers and Japan spiritually and materially.
I asked the Japanese Foreign Minister how he could envisage
success for the Japanese- American negotiations in view of the Ameri-
can opposition to the Japanese policy in East Asia. He replied that
an agreement would, to be sure, be extraordinarily difficult ; however,
it was the task of responsible statesmen to try to overcome difficulties.
With regard to the shipment of American oil to Vladivostok, 8
Toyoda stated that Japan was still trying to have it stopped.
In conclusion I again pointed out to Toyoda that I saw great dan-
gers arising for Japan as a result of the American-Russian game and
asked him to keep me regularly informed about any progress in the
Japanese- American discussions, including concrete details. The Jap-
anese Foreign Minister promised to keep me informed.
In view of the subtle game which the Anglo-Saxons and the Jap-
anese clique associated with them are playing, using all sorts of
trickery, it seems to me more important than ever that we bear in
mind the highly formalistic character of the Japanese, in order not
to give our opponents any opening for their cleverness of interpreta-
tion with regard to the Tripartite Pact. In this connection I should
. like to refer to the statements I made in my telegram No. 893 of
June 6, B part II (group garbled) regarding the presumable attitude
of the Cabinet at that time, of which Matsuoka was still a member.
Since a number of further interludes must be expected, I should
appreciate it if I could be informed of any remarks by the Japanese
.^Ambassador in Berlin and of any statement made to him. 10
x Ott
' Document No. 239.
a See document No. 225.
* Vol. sii of this series, document No. 596.
10 Nothing found.
494 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOHEIGN POLICY
No. 311
1682/393874-76
The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most tjkgent Tehran, September 13, 1941.
No. 18 of September 13 Received September 13—12: 15 p. m.
With, reference to my telegram No. 14 of September 12. *
As the Foreign Minister did not keep his promise to cancel military
measures, notably the posting of machine guns directed against the
Legation at Shimran, I broke off the meeting begun at 5 : 00 p. m. for
the purpose of clarifying the list of persons to be surrendered, which
was attended on the Iranian side by Director General Sayah and the
Director of the Central European Department, Entezam, as well as
by two high-ranking police officials, and also by general consent by
the Swedish Charge d'Affaires as neutral party. I declared that
discussions could only be resumed after the machine guns had been
withdrawn.
The negotiations were resumed after an interruption of 1 hour, the
machine guns having been removed.
When the checking of the lists was completed at 10 : 00 p. m., Direc-
tor General Sayah announced to our complete surprise that the persons
clearly identified in the lists would have to be at the Tehran railway
station by midnight.
I pointed out how impossible it was for technical reasons to comply
with his request, and declared that the departure must in the first
place be preceded by due notification from the police to each, person
concerned and secondly, that departure could not take place before
the morning of September 13 at the earliest.
There ensued a discussion in which the representatives of the Iran-
ian Foreign Ministry presented the highly pitiful spectacle of indeci-
sive and despicable officials, lacking any sense of responsibility. The
reason for this was the fact that once again the Iranian Foreign Minis-
ter had made binding promises to the enemy powers which he could
not fulfill. In the present case he had promised that 10 : 00 p. m. of
September 12 would be the final and last time limit for the departure
of the Germans who are to be surrendered. In the course of the
conversation M. Sayah admitted in tearful accents that the British
Minister had baldly stated to the Iranian Foreign Minister that if
this time limit were not observed, the consequence would be the oc-
'In this telegram (1662/393666-67) Ettel reported a talk with the Iranian
Foreign Minister, in the course of which he protested against the surrounding
of the Legation by Iranian soldiers and police, in connection with Iranian
assertions that there were armed men within the Legation building.
SEPTEMBER 1941 495
cupation of Tehran by English and Russian troops who would them-
selves then round up the German colony.
Heated telephone conversations of the two above-named representa-
tives of the Iranian Foreign Ministry with the Foreign Minister and
the Court Minister 3 produced no results. Each person shied away
from making another approach to the British Minister and presenting
to him the true state of affairs with a request for a postponement of the
time limit by a few hours. Inasmuch as the deadline for departure
to which the Iranian Government had committed itself had already
been passed, and preparations for departure at night would require at
least 3 hours, I persisted in my views thereby bringing to an end any
further incredible scenes between the Director General and the Di-
rector of the Central European Division.
After the two, shaking and trembling, had left my office at 10 :45
p.m., I called my staff together and explained to them that the moment
now had come where further delay of the departure of the comrades on
the list would not only be useless but would jeopardize the safe con-
duct promised for women and children. I was forced to assume after
Eden's last speech about Germans in Iran 3 that the English and
Russians would make good their threat that they would themselves
come and get the German colony. I had therefore decided to place
the facts before the menfolk in an assembly at 11 : 30 p. m. and to make
it plain in this connection that in order to avert any jeopardy to women
and children those with respect to whom it had been clearly established
that their names were on the surrender list would have to make their
departure. There was the additional fact that I should not supply the
enemy with any pretext that the Germans were responsible for ex-
ceeding the time limit.
This plan was carried out in the manner described and there was
opportunity during the assembly mentioned above to carry out the
instructions of your telegrams No. 11 * and No. 12 5 of September 12.
Particular praise is due the activity and comradely help of Swedish
Charge d'Affaires Ripa who, after the representatives of the Iranian
Government had failed completely, obtained the British Minister's
* M. Djam.
3 Presumably a reference to the statements made by Eden in the House of
-Commons on Sept. 10 in reply to questions from the floor. Speaking about the
-"dosing of the Legations of Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Humania in Tehran,
Eden then added that "steps are being taken by the Iranian Government to hand
over the German community in Iran to the British and Soviet Governments."
See Parliamentary Debates, fifth series, H of C, vol. 374, col. 159.
*TMs telegram, sent over WeizsRcker's signature (65/45433), instructed Ettel
to see to it that the departure of the German colony, If it eonld be no longer
avoided, was carried out in a disciplined manner and to tell the colony that every-
thing possible would he done to achieve their eventual repatriation or exchange
"for which there are reasonable prospects in view of the objects for a barter
which we have here."
" Not found.
496 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
consent to an extension of the deadline to 5 : 00 a. m., in view of the
circumstances presented to him.
I have reported in telegrams Nos. 16 of September 12" and 17
of September 13 T on the further course of the departure. 8
Ettel
* Not printed (1662/393670) .
'Not printed (65/45445).
* In a memorandum of Sept. 19 (65/45516-21) which was submitted to Hitler on
Sept. 20, Ribbentrop reported on "the fate and conduct of the German colony in
Iran" and highly praised their morale and great loyalty to Germany and to Hitler.
According to the memorandum, Ettel had left Tehran on Sept. 17 accompanied
by 250 women and 140 children, including infants, and was to conduct them to
Turkey where all preparations to receive them had been made. Three hundred
twenty-one German men of military age were to be turned over to the Allied occu-
pation forces by the Iranians, 292 to the British and 29 to the Russians. Approxi-
mately 100 men over 45 years of age were left in Tehran under the care nf the
Swedish Legation, and it had not yet been determined whether they would be
allowed to depart or be interned.
No. 312
MI80/M005728-3O
Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht
Fuheer's Headquarters, September 13, 1941.
TOP SECRET MILITARY
The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht
WFSt/Abt. L (IV/Qu) No. 002034/41 g.Kdos
Keference: Wehrmacht Commander, Norway Sect. la No. 3410/41
g.Kdos of September 3, 1941.
Subject: Situation in Norway.
To the Wehrmacht Commander in Norway, Colonel General von
Falkenhorst ; with copy to Dienststelle Oslo.
According to reports before me, the anti-German attitude of the
Norwegian population has reached intolerable proportions. Any
continuation or indeed aggravation of this situation directly endangers
the German troops and the defense of Norway.
All military commands shall therefore be instructed henceforth
to administer far stricter punishment than before with respect to
all offenses punishable by military authorities. The military propa-
ganda must also make it plain that any offense directed against the
Wehrmacht or the military security of the country will put the life
of the perpetrator in immediate jeopardy.
The Judge Advocates are to be informed that in cases of punish-
able acts by Norwegians, which are committed directly or indirectly
against Germany, the maximum sentence is to be imposed. In the
present situation only the death penalty will really act as a deterrent.
It is to be demanded in all serious cases. In particular, acts of espio-
SEPTEMBER 1941 497
nage, serious acts of sabotage and attempts to enlist in foreign forces,
are in principle to be punished by death. Generally death sentences
will also have to be imposed in serious cases of illicit possession of
arms.
These points of view will have to be taken into account in decisions
■whether to confirm or set aside a judgment. The judge advocates
are to be instructed accordingly.
The conduct of the troops toward the population must conform
with these instructions. In the event of clashes, weapons are to be
used immediately. The greatest reserve must be demanded in contacts
with Norwegians.
The Wehrmacht Commander Norway is requested to keep the
High Command of the Wehrmacht informed about the detailed
measures taken.
A copy of this letter has been transmitted to the Reich Commissar.
The Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht
Keitel
No. 313
482/231280
Memorandum oy an Official of the Department for German
Internal Affairs
Berlin, September 13, 1941.
zu D III 424 g.»
I am unable to see the necessity for the deportation of the 1,200 male
Jews, if not to Rumania then to the General Government or to Russia,
as desired by the office of the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry
■ in Belgrade. Russia, as an area of operations, is entirely unsuited
for the reception of these Jews. If they are already a danger in Serbia,
they will be much more so in Russia. The General Government is
already over-saturated with Jews.
In my opinion it ought to be possible, given the necessary harshness
and determination, to keep the Jews in camps in Serbia. If the Jews
continue to fan disturbances there one should proceed against them
>with intensified martial law. I cannot imagine that the Jews will
'D III 424 g: Belgrade telegram No. 630 of Sept. 12 (482/231281). In this
telegram Benzlcr stated that it was impossible to put Jews into labor camps
under present conditions and requested that the Serbian Jews be deported from
Serbia, possibly to the General Government or Russia, Benzler particularly
requested the immediate evacuation of 1,200 Jews interned in a camp at Sabac.
For a text of this document see Pollakov and Wnlf, Das Dritte Reich und seine
Diener, p. 27.
682-805—64 3T
498 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
continue to conspire after a considerable number of hostages have
been shot.
I therefore propose the attached instruction. 2
Submitted herewith to Under State Secretary Luther with the
request for instructions.
Rademacher
•This instruction was sent to Belgrade as telegram No. 1251 over Luther's
signature o^ Sep? 18 (482/231270). It was along the lines of Rademacher's
suggestions in the document printed.
No. 314
1084/317147
The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the
Foreign Ministry
Fuhrer's Headquarters, September 13, 1941.
TOP SECRET MILITARY
High Command of the Wehrmacht
No. 002014/^1 g.K.WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.)
Fuhrer's Headquarters, September 10, 1941. 1
For Ambassador Ratter.
In the memorandum "The Strategic Situation in the Late Autumn
1941" approved by the Fiihrer and sent to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs 2 it was stated, among other things, that our political and mil-
itary relations with Spain must not break off before next spring, but
on the contrary must be expanded. Military actions on the Iberian
Peninsula are, however, undesirable until the eastern campaign has
been concluded and sufficient German forces are available— in spring
1942 at the earliest.
In order to prevent unrest from developing in Spam because of
military reconnaissances and discussions, which the enemy can exploit
for his purposes, the High Command of the Wehrmacht has issued the
accompanying order. 3 It might be suggested that a similar arrange-
'The copy of this document from the files of the Foreign Ministry which !■
here printed bears the notation that it is a fresh copy (Abschnft). It bears
both dates as indicated,
• OKwJwFBt' Abi 2 lf '(Op) No. 441505/41 g. K Chefs, of Sept. 8, 1941. (This
has been filmed on frame 5508312, serial 781, roll 781, and the film microcopy has
been deposited in the National Archives.) It stipulated :
"The political prerequisites for deepening the military relations with Spain
are not yet given. It is again pointed out that branches of the Wehrmacht are
not authorized to carry out reconnaissances in Spain or to undertake military
discussions with the Spaniards.
"In case reconnaissances should he considered to be absolutely necessary for
Felix in spite of the presumable 3 months' preliminary alert these are to be re-
ported in detail in the OKW/WFSt, Abt. h. Their execution and their camou-
flage is the mission of the Chief of Ausland/Abwehr. ..„.„,
"For the Military Attaches a reserved attitude is also bidden in the question
of Gibraltar."
SEPTEMBER 1941 499
merit be made for economic discussions, too, which can be associated
with military plans.
As soon as the time has come— from the military point of view—to
clear the way for negotiations with the Spanish Armed Forces by
means of political steps, the High Command of the Wehrmacht will
let this be known,*
The Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht
By order :
Warlimont
* See further, document No. 467.
No. 315
2281/4811B2-B8
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
™ p S3ECRET Rome, September 13, 1941.
No. 157
Subject: Report by Italian Ambassador to the Holy See, Attolico,
the C p mng conversation of American Ambassador Taylor with
In the enclosure I submit a German translation l of a report by the
Italian Ambassador to the Holy See concerning his conversation with
Cardinal Secretary of State Maglione, in which the latter gave Signor
Attolico a detailed description of the conversations between the Amer-
ican Ambassador to the Vatican, Mr. Taylor, and the Pope and the
Cardmal Secretary of State. As is known there, Mr. Taylor arrived
here on Tuesday of this week after a lengthy absence, in order to bring
the Pope a message from President Roosevelt, and he will return to
America again in the next few days. 2
Signor Anfuso gave Minister Prince Bismarck the original text of
Ambassador Attohco's report appended in the annex only hesitantly
and at his request, with the remark that this was an exceedingly confi-
\ ^ he i£ aUal ? version ha s been filmed on serial 2281/481159-164
500 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
dential document. I should therefore like to ask that the report men-
tioned also be handled there in strictest confidence. 3
von Mackensen
[Enclosure!
Royal Italian Embassy to the Holy See
strictly confidential Rome, September 11, 1941/XIX.
Subject : Taylor's discussions in the Vatican.
With the knowledge and consent of the Pope the Cardinal Secretary
of State summoned me to the Vatican today at 1 : 00 p. m., immediately
after Ambassador Taylor who, after having already been received
by Cardinal Maglione yesterday morning, and by His Holiness yes-
terday evening, came again this morning to the State Secretariat
almost as if for a farewell visit; whereas he himself goes to Florence
today, the Cardinal Secretary of State also left for Casona at 4:00
p. m. today.
The discussions with Maglione lasted considerably longer than those
with the Pope, because the Cardinal Secretary of State— besides the
fact that he uses an interpreter because of the English language—
also has the habit himself of making a summary at the end of every
interchange that occurs with the aid of such mediation.
The content of the three conversations— the two yesterday evening
amount practically to the same thing— can be summarized as follows :
Ambassador Taylor explained that the main objectives of his visit
were two in particular :
1. To show that the extraordinary mission to the Vatican, con-
ferred on him by the President, had not been interrupted ;
2. To explain to the Holy See America's position with regard to
the war. ,. .
The first point corresponds entirely with what Monsignor lardim
had already told me day before yesterday (my report of Septem-
ber 9). 4 Obvious reasons of an internal nature demanded of the
American President, at a moment when public opinion in America
is still in the process of formation, that he resume contact with the
Hol y See - * .i- * •
Regarding the second point, Roosevelt's envoy stressed that m
America the sympathies are all on the side of the English. They
* in telegram No. 57 of Sept. 12 (535/240050-52) Mensbausen reported Taylor's
visit of that day to the Vatican and that Tlttmann would be left in Rome to rep-
resent Taylor, which was interpreted as an indication that American interven-
tion in the war was not imminent
* Not found.
SEPTEMBER 1941 501
do not hate the German people; "still much less the good Italian
people," but they do not love Hitler.
On the other hand it is the general conviction or rather the general
"feeling" in the United States that Hitler has virtually lost the war
(sic).
All of this, however — Taylor continued — while it creates in public
opinion uniform agreement as regards a war forced by Germany,
i.e., a defensive war, is not sufficient to attain a like unanimity for
a war of initiative, i.e., for an aggressive war.
However, the Ambassador warned, Hitler should be cautious. No
one in America had wanted the war with Spain, either, but the incident
with the "Maine" was sufficient to reverse the situation and lead to
war. All of that will depend on the "German provocations."
After these introductory statements — to which the Cardinal listened
in intentional silence for almost the whole time — Ambassador Taylor
went over to the question of the situation of the Catholics in the United
States; in this he gave the appearance, however, of according it only
secondary importance; basically, even though indirectly, he urged
Rome's intervention in order to alter the present status of things. 6
(Cf. the report of September 9 referred to.)
Here the Cardinal immediately interrupted and stated that actually
the attitude of the Vatican in the matter has always been to recommend
calm and good sense. Making war was the affair of Caesar and not of
God. Therefore the Catholics as such ought not to meddle in it.
This having been said, Maglione gave Taylor a picture of what the
Holy See had already done through Monsignor Cicognani, 8 which I
have already reported. The Cardinal added that the Holy See would
be able to "continue" to work in the same sense through the same
channels and with the same system, but no more.
The above exhausts the content of the conversations yesterday, for
the one which Taylor had with the Pope was the same as that with
Maglione.
The conversation today, however, which was meant .to be a purely
formal visit, almost a duty visit, had particularly interesting moments
although it was shorter than the one yesterday.
After he had spoken of the gift of his villa in Florence to the Pope
and of his desire to complete it (a matter regarding which Maglione
-/at once referred him to Monsignor Montini), the American Ambas-
sador again spoke of the war, whereby he deplored its terrors and
suffering and described the gravity of the problems which the "postwar
"This is most likely a reference to the negative attitude of American Catholics
to lend-lease support for the Soviet Union which, it was hoped, might be changed
through the intervention of the Pope. Cf. Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared
War, 1940-mi, pp. 703-94,
• Amleto Giovanni Cicognani, Apostolic Delegate in the United States.
502 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOHEIGN POLICY
period" would bring. One of the greatest dangers and gravest con-
cerns of the postwar period is considered by the United States to be
the increase in unemployment which will follow the demobilization of
war industries.
The Cardinal remarked to this that unfortunately the destruction
of the war was and would be so great that at least in Europe one would
not have to fear any very great, not to speak of insurmountable, un-
employment. Rather, he added, one of the areas in which the United
States could then help most was precisely that of providing and mak-
ing available the raw materials which were necessary for the re-
sumption of work and for the reconstruction of Europe, However,
Roosevelt's representative immediately showed that he was concerned
only with the problem from its American side and in regard to the
immediate interests of his country. In Europe, he said, they produced
more cheaply and will also continue to produce more cheaply than in
America. The ships (Cardinal Maglione had just mentioned the
tremendous amount of work which was necessary merely to restore
the shipping tonnage for world trade) which are built in Italy will
always be cheaper than those built in America . . . T
Ambassador Taylor then came to what — in Maglione's opinion —
was perhaps meant to form the main subject of this second conversa-
tion. What intentions did the Pope have in regard to the peace?
Was he perhaps thinking of attempting something for this purpose?
For in that case President Roosevelt would like to be informed about
it in advance ...
In response to these feelers which were meant — in their intentions
and in their form — to be very discreet, the Secretary of State — without
even asking the Pope, who was only informed about it today — replied
without further ado that the Pontifex Maximus did not — I say not—
have the intention to undertake any attempt of this sort particularly
at this moment. 8
This is the content of the second conversation, at the conclusion of
which Taylor stated that he intended to depart as quickly as possible,
but that in case his presence were desired for any reason, even after
his return to America, he had no objection to coming across the
Atlantic Ocean once more.
I thanked the Cardinal — and through him the Pope — for the cour-
tesy shown me in informing me of the above. Also considering the
haste he was in (we were still together at 2: 00 p. m. and he had to
* Omissions indicated In the original.
'According to a note of Nov. 3 (1247/337800) taken by Counselor Etsdorf, the
Foreign Ministry's representative with the High Command of the Army, Am-
bassador von Bergen at the Vatican was to be replaced by a more active per-
sonality who was in a better position to spot peace feelers there.
SEPTEMBER 1941 503
leave for Casoria at 4:00 p. m.) I did not feel justified, at least for
the present, in extending the conversation.
I considered it my duty, however, to point out — quite personally—
that it was in the interest of the Holy See to avoid that any "con-
tinuation" of the Vatican activity in regard to the American Catholics
could appear in any way influenced by Roosevelt. Maglione explicitly
agreed to this.
In his last conversation with me the Cardinal had expressed the
opinion that Taylor's return signified a pause in the cycle of Amer-
ican intervention. Referring to this earlier statement, I asked him
whether he was still of the same opinion today.
Maglione replied that certainly his impression on this point was
now no longer entirely the same as it was at the first moment, but that
he nevertheless continued to believe that the intervention of America
was not to be considered immediately imminent and that — in Taylor's
words — very much depended on the occurrence of what in the American
language was termed Hitler's "provocations."
Finally, I asked Maglione whether Taylor had stated how and for
what reason Hitler was considered in America as virtually beaten.
The Cardinal told me that with this statement Taylor had expressed
a "feeling" and perhaps also merely a wish.
I do not know whether other Ambassadors were asked to the Vatican
today for the same purpose. 8
Attolico
* On Sept. 15 Mackensen transmitted a report of Ambassador Attolico of Sept
13 (2281/481165-69) which dealt primarily with President Roosevelt's letter to
the Pope. See, further, document No. 330.
No. 316
82/60611-14
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Telegram
MOST URGENT
top secret Special Train, September 13, 1941 — 7 : 50 p.m.
No. 979 of September 12
from the Special Train Received Berlin, September 13 — 8 : 40 p.m.
No. 1561 of September 14
from the Foreign Ministry Sent September 14.
RAM 397/R
For the Ambassador personally.
In connection with President Roosevelt's speech of yesterday 1 1 re-
1 See document No. 304, footnote 1.
504 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
quest that you call on the Japanese Foreign Minister and make the
following oral statement to him :
1. President Roosevelt's speech did not surprise the German Govern-
ment in the least. E ven before this speech we had noted that the policy
of the United States toward Germany showed an increasingly provoca-
tive character. Obviously Roosevelt is trying by all available means
to precipitate matters, in the realization that in view of the overwhelm-
ing German victory over Russia, which is becoming more evident day
by day, it might be very difficult for him to persuade the American
people, who are not anxious for war, to enter the war against Germany
even at this time. It is obviously his aim, before the American people
are fully aware of the shift in power relations resulting from the
elimination of Russia and, consequently, of the hopelessness of a war
against Germany, to bring about a situation that will make it possible
for him as a result of incidents at sea affecting American prestige to
proclaim that the situation, which will actually have arisen in the
meantime, amounts to a state of war between Germany and America.
It is manifestly his purpose by pettifogging distortion of facts which
unmistakably brand America as the aggressor to represent Germany as
the aggressor, although among those who give some thought to politics
there can hardly be anyone today who does not see that despite all
American provocations German policy toward America shows extreme
restraint. Roosevelt's purpose with this distortion is of course to
obscure the fact of American aggression, which would call forth the
case of alliance provided for under the Tripartite Pact, in the hope of
thereby making it more difficult for the Japanese Government to enter
the war against America ; in other words, he would like to demolish
the Tripartite Pact, because he knows very well that the United States
is far from adequately armed to carry on a war against Europe and
Japan simultaneously and that American public opinion fears nothing
so much as a two-front war.
2. The content of Roosevelt's speech makes it necessary to note first
of all that the alleged cases of German attacks on American shipping
cited by Roosevelt either do not exist or are represented in a totally
false light, such as the Greer case, in which America was clearly the
aggressor.
In the Robin Moor case the German submarine involved acted, as is
well known, according to the generally recognized rules of war against
merchant snipping. In the Steel Seafarer case a ship loaded entirely
with war material for the British armed forces was sunk at night by
an airplane a short distance south of Suez, i.e., in a part of the Red
Sea that had been publicly declared an operational area by Germany
and Italy, while the Sessa case did not mvolve a United States ship
at all but a Panamanian ship. It is therefore a question of totally
different cases, quite arbitrarily selected, which furnish not the slight-
est proof of the allegations made by Roosevelt.
SEPTEMBER 1941
505
Moreover, when Mr. Roosevelt implies in his speech that he has only
now issued the order to fire at German submarines, this is contrary to
the truth. Actually the American Naval Command admitted months
ago that such an order to fire had been given to the American naval
forces, as has long been known from repeated statements made by Sec-
retary of the Navy Knox last July. By publicly announcing this or-
der to fire Mr. Roosevelt has now made known before the whole world
his determination to attack. This proves clearly that President Roose-
velt, in opposition to the will of the American people, intends by every
possible means to drag his country into the war against the Axis
Powers.
3. The German Government will not let itself be deflected from the
policy it has followed thus far even by the new, outrageous provoca-
tion contained in Roosevelt's speech and will continue to act with calm
toward the United States. It goes without saying, of course, that the
German naval forces will, if necessary, defend themselves against
open American acts of aggression. It is expected that an official an-
nouncement will shortly make this quite clear to the world.
4. Various reports have given the Reich Government reason to be-
lieve that the Japanese Government is now carrying on negotiations
with the American Government, which are presumably designed, in
harmony with the basic idea of the Tripartite Pact, to keep America
from entering the war. In view of the recent development in the re-
lations of the United States with Germany and Italy and of the sharp
deterioration of these relations as indicated by Roosevelt's speech, you
have been instructed to point out again to the Japanese Government
that the Reich Government deems nothing better calculated to achieve
the aim sought by the Japanese Government than an unmistakable,
new statement by the Japanese Government to the effect that any fur-
ther act by Roosevelt on the road of aggression against the Axis
Powers will inevitably lead to a state of war between Germany and
Italy on the one hand and America on the other ; and that this will call
forth the case of the alliance provided for in the Tripartite Pact and
immediately lead to Japan's entry into such a war against America.
You are further instructed to ask the Japanese Government for in-
formation about the present state of its negotiations with the United
States and whether it will follow the suggestion given above by trans-
mitting such a statement to the Government in Washington in the
course of the now pending negotiations. We are certain that in such
an event Roosevelt would immediately moderate his provocative atti-
tude and would probably no longer have the courage to draw the
American people into the war.
I request that you report at once as to how your statements are
received by the Japanese Foreign Minister and about the Japanese
506 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Government's position regarding our suggestion. 2 We would welcome
it if your discussion with the Japanese Foreign Minister at the same
time resulted in shedding more light on Japan's purpose in her present
talks with Washington, which seen from here is not entirely clear at
this time. 8
RlBBENTROP
* See document No. 324.
* Rintelen forwarded to Thomsen the text of this instruction to Tokyo "For his
personal and confidential Information" in telegram No. 980 of Sept. 13 from
the Special Train, dispatched to Washington as telegram No. 1786 on Sept. 14
(82/60615).
No. 317
65/45473-74
The Diligent of the Political Department to the Foreign Ministry
Teletype
Westfalest, September 14, 1941 — 12 : 22 a. m,
No. 984 of September 13 Keceived Berlin, September 14—12 : 40 a.m.
To the Minister's Secretariat in Berlin.
For Under State Secretary Woermann.
As was already reported to you by telephone, the countermeasures
which have been prepared against the British Channel Islands in re-
taliation for the internment of Reich Germans from Iran shall be car-
ried out in such a manner, if possible, that for every German in Iran
who is interned, ten British citizens from the mother country living
on the Channel Islands will be interned by Germany. In conformity
with the measures taken by the English, only men are to be affected,
including particularly all the more prominent persons. These Eng-
lishmen are to he taken to a special internment camp in the Pripet
Marshes and their further treatment is to correspond exactly to that
which is meted out to the Germans in Iran. The tangible property of
these persons on the Channel Islands shall be confiscated antl used
ier the benefit ef the population of- Frcnoh o rigin ©» the Channe l
I -s la a ds ; 1 The date for carrying out this measure will be fixed later.
However, everything is to be prepared in such a manner that it can be
1 The words scored through were crossed out in the original. The following
marginal notes comment on this passage :
"To be withheld for the time being. K [ ibbentrop] ."
"Not to be transmitted with the rest Refers to the deleted part of the sen-
tence. R[intelen], Sept. 13."
SEPTEMBER 1941 507
put into effect at a moment's notice. Execution of the measure shall
be followed by an appropriate press release, likewise to be prepared.
The Foreign Minister requests a report as soon as the preparations have
been completed. 2
ElNTELEN
* In a memorandum of Sept. 14, Counselor Albrecht of the Legal Department
(65/45470-72) discussed the conditions of internment with respect to German
citizens In Great Britain and British citizens in Germany expressing the opinion
that : "If the English from the Channel Islands who are now to be placed Into
camps are treated less favorably it Is to be feared that the treatment of German
internees in English hands will grow worse to an equal extent". Albrecht also
suggested that the new British Internees should be brought to Germany and be
moved to the eastern territories only if there should be justified complaints re-
garding the accommodations for the Germans from Iran. The memorandum also
stated that "if the property of the newly interned is taken away and distributed
it would mean the beginning of the liquidation of enemy property and would
furnish the English with the presumably desired pretext for the general liquida-
tion of German property which it has up to now been possible to avoid."
On Nov. 8 Weizsacker instructed the legation in Switzerland (98/109047-49)
to transmit to the British Government a communication in reply to the British
note, transmitted on Sept, 18 (see document No. 287, footnote 2) which asserted
that Germany was fully Justified in interning the British citizens on the Channel
Islands. However, In view of a new German proposal for a general and mutual
exchange of civilian internees, which had been addressed to the British Govern-
ment through the United States Embassy in Berlin, the German Government "had
decided to refrain, for the time being, from carrying out the reprisals mentioned
in the expectation that the British Government will agree to the proposal com-
municated to the American Embassy."
No. 318
230/153421
Ambassador Bitter to ike Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry
With the Military Com/mander in Serbia
top secret Special Train, September 14, 1941 — 10 : 25 a. m.
No. 988 of September 14 from the Special Train
Received Berlin, September 14 — 11 : 00 a. m.
No. 1220 of September 14
from the Foreign Ministry Sent September 14.
Secret for Officer in Charge.
The High Command of the Wehrmacht informs us that in view of
the worsening of the situation in your area the decision has been
made to transfer one division from France to Serbia. 1
Hitter
1 See document No. 195.
508 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 319
10S/'142fl70-71
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
Stockholm, September 15, 1941 — 1 : 10 p. m.
No. 1427 of September 15 Received September 20—3 : 10 p. m. 1
For Air Ministry Attache Group.
The following agreement has been reached with the Swedish Air
Force in conjunction with the Swedish Foreign Ministry, 2 concerning
flights over Swedish territory : 3
(1) The courier route Norway-Hamar-Skellef tea-Finland will be
flown by direct-flying courier planes, in each direction, on a maximum
average of four times a week, and also by ambulance aircraft, which
will be permitted to make intermediate landings at Ostersund.
(2) The courier route Norway-Kongsvinger-Vansbro-Ockelbo-
Norrsundet-Finland will be flown by direct-flying courier planes, in
each direction, on a maximum average of 1% times a day. The planes
that cannot fly directly may fly the route Ostervallskog-Bjurvik
(Graensen radio beacon) Bromma — Orskiir.
(3) The courier route Germany-Hallevik-Vagnharad-Bromma-
Orskar-Finland will be flown only in exceptional cases. Intermediate
landing in Bromma.
(4) The courier route Germany-Malmo-Vernamo-Tranas-Arboga-
Gaevle-Finland will be flown by direct-flying 6 -motored courier and
hospital planes approximately three times a week in each direction.
1 The date of receipt reads Sept. 20. A typed marginal note at the end of
the document reads: "Forwarded by the Telegraph Office to the Reich Air
Ministry, Sept. 15."
* Telegram No. 1232 of Aug. 21 from Stockholm (205/142916-17) lists the
German proposals for expansion of the courier air traffic beyond the concessions
Of the agreement of June 29. See document No. 42.
'The text of the agreement itself was apparently dated Sept. 12. Stockholm
telegram 1753 of Oct. 22 (205/143046-47) states: "German military aerial traffle
over Sweden is regulated by the agreement of September 12, 1941. Cf. Stock-
holm telegram 1427 of September 15, 1941."
The telegram added the comment that the agreement permitted a total of
146 overflights per month including planes from the area of the Reich hut
excluding hospital planes. The Luftwaffe Attache did not believe there were
good prospects for a further expansion of the traffic and recommended maximum
use of the permitted flights. He forwarded the Swedish suggestion that the
Lufthansa course, Oslo-Kongsvinga-Norrsundet-Pori or alternately Oslo-Bjur-
vik ( Graensen )-Bromma-Oerskaer-PoTi, he flown by military planes with civilian
markings (pilots in mufti) to an increasing extent. "English courier planes
likewise fly with civilian markings and crews in mufti."
According to Stockholm telegram No. 1528 of Sept. 25 (205/143014) Boheman
told Dankwort that since the outbreak of the German-Russian war there had
been no flights of British courier planes beyond Stockholm to Russia, and that
the Swedish Government bad turned down a British request for such flights.
Even before the outbreak of the German-Russian war, Boheman said, there was
no English aerial route over Stockholm to Russia.
SEPTEMBEB 1941 509
(5) Transmission of communications in accordance with Telecom-
munications Regulations [Fernmeldebetrieb$ordnung~\ (FBO).
(6) Advance notification by radio at least 2 hours before entry over
Swedish territory.
(7) Germany will provide all the gasoline and oil required for any
tanks that may be needed for intermediate landings in Sweden.
Normal landing stop one hour.
(8) Overnight stops due to some obstacle that has arisen (weather
conditions, engine trouble) by agreement between the air-traffic con-
trol chief at Bromma and the pilot. Otherwise only when notification
is given in sufficient time before the take-off.
(9) Night flights only when notification is given in sufficient time
before the take-off. However, a flight made 40 minutes before sun-
rise or 40 minutes after sunset will not be considered a night flight.
(10) Flying altitude at least 1,000 m., weather conditions per-
mitting. This does not apply, however, to ambulance aircraft.
(11) Deviations from the routes laid down under 1-4, above, will
be permitted only in emergencies or when weather conditions make
it necessary.
(12) All planes must be unarmed.
(13) If on account of special circumstances additional overflights
are desired, it will be necessary to apply for a special permit and
await the decision in each individual case.
(14) The Agreement will go into effect as of September 14. Maps
will be sent to the separate agencies, in so far as this has not already
been done. A radio beacon will be set up by the Swedish air force
north of Gavle for the direct route Oslo-Pori. Further details on
this will follow.*
Air Attache
WlED
'Telegram No. 1928 of Nov. 15 (205/143100-101) reported new Swedish con-
cessions which extended the agreement of Sept. 12 to permit 60 overflights weekly
exclusive of hospital planes, an increase of 106 flights per month.
No. 320
230/153422-23
Ambassador Hitter to the Legation in Bulgaria
Telegram
top secret Special Train, September 15, 1941 — 3 : 05 p. m.
No. 994 of September 15 from the Special Train
Received Berlin, September 15 — 4:30 p.m.
No. 1355 from the Foreign Ministry Sent September 15.
In connection with the rather serious and politically most undesir-
able disorders and armed local uprisings in Serbia it is apparent time
and again that the moving forces, organizers and suppliers of arms
510 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
are located outside the confines of Serbia, and from there keep the
Serbian population stirred up. These are primarily Communist and
Jewish circles. There are indications that the uprisings in Serbia
are being instigated and supported especially from Bulgaria, both
by the native Bulgarian Communists and, more particularly, by
the Russian Legation in Sofia.
The Reich Government has now decided to strengthen the German
military forces in Serbia in such a manner as to make it possible, in
collaboration with loyal Serbian groups, to crush and disarm the
rebels and restore security within a short time. If this accomplish-
ment is to be more than a mere momentary success, it is essential,
in addition, that these connections across the Serbian border be
uncovered, cut off, and rendered harmless for good. This can be
achieved only in close and continuous collaboration with the neigh-
boring states, especially Bulgaria.
The Foreign Minister accordingly asks you to acquaint the Bul-
garian Government with this view and request its active and continu-
ous cooperation with the German Government. The interest in tran-
quillity and undisturbed peaceful work of construction by the people
is so general and unanimous in the countries concerned that the For-
eign Minister entertains no doubt that nothing more than this appeal
is needed to secure the agreement in principle of the Bulgarian Gov-
ernment. An identical request is being addressed to the Italian
Government and the Croatian Government. For the moment what
is involved is only an agreement in principle to cooperate. As soon
as this has been received from all the countries concerned, detailed
proposals will be forthcoming regarding the cooperation of the admin-
istrative agencies concerned. I shall reserve this for a subsequent
telegram at the appropriate time.
I also request the Legation to submit, on its own or in consultation
with the Bulgarian Government, detailed proposals for such collabo-
ration. The necessity of collaborating with the governments outside
Serbia has been particularly stressed by the High Command of the
Wehrmacht. You are therefore requested also to inform the Wehr-
macht attaches of the foregoing and enlist their participation in
dealing further with the matter. It might be possible, in consultation
with the Wehrmacht Attaches, also to enlist the services of other
military organizations operating there, specifically representatives
of the Abwehr. In case officers of the German Police are operating
SEPTEMBER 1941 511
in your area, they are to be informed and their participation is also
requested. Report by wire. 1
Ritter
1 The Embassy in Rome and the Legation in Zagreb were each sent the text of
this instruction on Sept. 15 in telegrams Nos. 2374 and 951, respectively
(230/153423-25). Bach was asked to take the same step with the given
government.
In Sofia telegram No. 1052 of September 18 (278/178929-31) Beekerle stated
that the Bulgarian Government had fought the Communist danger vigorously and
that the idea that the Communist movement in Serbia received support from Bul-
garian territory was absolutely unjustified.
Mackensen replied in telegram No. 2217 of Sept. 16 (230/153426) and reported
Anfuso's statement that the Italian Government was of course prepared to cooper-
ate with Germany and the two other neighboring states in the elimination of this
center of unrest. In telegram No. 2233 of Sept. 17 (230/153427) Mackensen fur-
ther reported that Mussolini fully approved Anfuso's statement and that he would
have the Italian Ministers In Bulgaria and Croatia informed accordingly.
Kasche replied in telegram No. 1173 of Sept 16 (245/161528) that the Croatian
Government had received the suggestion "with joy and complete approval."
No. 321
15*3/375809
The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Washington, September 15, 1941 — 8 :11 p. m.
No. 3193 of September 15 Received September 16 — 9 : 00 a. m.
Following upon the earlier statements by the pro-Administration
Senators Connally and Pepper made to reporters in an effort, appar-
ently inspired, to reassure the public by limiting the term "defensive
war", 1 to which the order to shoot issued to the American Navy ap-
plies, to the waters of the Western Hemisphere patroled by the Amer-
ican Navy, Secretary of the Navy Knox, in an address before the
American Legion convention in Milwaukee today, 2 gave a clear-cut
definition of the concept. He announced that beginning September
16 the American Navy would give protection to ships of all flags
carrying war material under the Lend-Lease Act between the Amer-
ican continent and the waters around Iceland "as completely as it
is possible for us."
This shows that the definition initially left deliberately vague in
Roosevelt's address 3 essentially serves the purpose of complying with
Churchill's wish for active American war aid, and of intimidating us
as well as Japan; further, that the American Navy, while it is not
in a position to exercise effective control of the entire Atlantic includ-
1 In English in the original.
* For text; see the New York Times of Sept. 16, 1941, p. 4, col. 6.
3 See document No. 304.
512 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOBEIGN POLICY
ing the route to Suez around Africa, can provide full protection of
convoys between the American continent and Iceland. Knox's state-
ment is a clear indication of the President's awareness that the Amer-
ican naval forces lack the capacity for commitment outside this
limited scope because of commitments in the Pacific.
At the same time I am cabling the relevant extracts from this ad-
dress by Knox en clair as No. 3194.*
Thomsen
* Not filmed.
No. 322
281/180302
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Berlin, September 15, 1941.
Minister von Rintelen told me today that the Foreign Minister had
been shown the memorandum of the State Secretary, 1 according to
which Gauleiter Bohle has urged that Stalin's son ! and high-ranking
Russian officers taken prisoner be used as bargaining points with the
Soviet Union in the question of the Germans in Iran.
The Foreign Minister was of the following opinion :
At the present advanced stage it was hardljr a matter any more of
offers to the Soviet Union; rather, the question was chiefly one of
reprisals. On grounds of principle, he did not want to mix military
questions of the prisoners of war with questions of the civilian in-
ternees, and he would leave Stalin's son out of the picture.
He asked that the State Secretary tell this to Gauleiter Bohle.
Herewith submitted to the State Secretary.
Woermann
1 Weizsacker memorandum of Sept 14 (65/45476).
1 A memorandum of July 19 by Grote of Political Division I M (105/113766)
had confirmed earlier reports that Stalin's oldest son had been taken prisoner.
No. 323
142/127691-93
Memorandum, by the Director of the Economic Policy Department
Berlin, September 15, 1941.
The Supply of Food for Greece
I. Since, according to an earlier directive by the Fuhrer 1 the
responsibility for supplying Greece is to be Italy's, deliveries of food
1 This seems to refer to FUhrer Directive No. 29 of May 17 (printed as docu-
ment No. 536 in vol. in of this series) which stated that Italy had general
responsibility for the administration and protection of Greece.
SEPTEMBER 1941 513
from Germany had not at first been envisaged. Following reports
by Field Marshal List and the Reich Plenipotentiary in Athens,
Minister Altenburg, a memorandum regarding the food situation of
Greece was submitted to the Foreign Minister on July 25th of this
year. 2 In it it was suggested that 10,000 to 15,000 tons of grain should
be made available on a loan basis and to be returned out of the new
Greek harvest; it was pointed out, however, that the Reich Ministry
of Food had thus far categorically refused any assistance in view of
the German food situation and that it would agree even to a loan
only upon explicit instructions from above. At that time the Foreign
Minister decided that the old instructions would remain in force.
II. Following new reports by the Reich Plenipotentiary and the
military authorities indicating that the situation in Athens was de-
veloping very unfavorably and that German military interests and
interests with regard to the military economy were beginning to suffer,
the following was taken into consideration in an interdepartmental
conference on August 29 with the approval of the Reich Ministry of
Food: 10,000 tons of wheat which otherwise would have gone to
Germany will be supplied from the Banat. Italy will likewise make
available 10,000 tons of wheat at once. Furthermore, it was planned
to arrange matters so that 40,000 tons of grain in the months from
October to December 1941 and 15,000 tons each in the months from
January to June 1942 would be supplied from the countries of south-
eastern Europe. With regard to the deliveries from the countries
of southeastern Europe one considered primarily western Thrace,
which is now Bulgarian, and Turkey; these had so far played no part
in supplying Germany. The deliveries were envisaged with regard
to supplying the urban population, especially in Athens, and the
most important mining enterprises. After Thrace had been ceded,
Greece had indeed become a deficiency area, and it was not possible
to supply the urban areas from the new Greek harvest because of
the lack of means of transportation, particularly, however, because of
the reluctant attitude of the agrarian producers which can be ob-
served everywhere in southeastern Europe and especially in Greece.
According to available reports, the supplies in Athens were sufficient
for a few days only.
In the meantime 5,000 tons were moved out of the Banat, which
will arrive in Athens in the course of these days. Furthermore, 2,800
tons have already arrived from Italy. In addition, 5,000 tons which
we had promised are in the Banat ready to be unloaded and will be
1 Document No. 155.
682-805 — 84 38
514 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
transported during the next few days via Salonika. Minister Alten-
burg has particularly requested to speed up this transfer as much
as possible in view of the present situation in Athens.
HI. Now a new situation has developed as a result of the following
circumstances:
1. The Bulgarian Government has stated that it is not in a position
to supply any grain for Greece, not even from western Thrace, in view
of Bulgaria's own supply situation.
2. According to newspaper reports, which, to be sure, have not yet
been confirmed, an action by the American Bed Cross with English
toleration to supply Greece with food from Turkey is under way.
3. About a week ago, the Foreign Minister again expressed his
opinion that there are no reasons of foreign policy for supplying
Greece with food at the expense of an adequate supply of food for
Germany. 8
4. The Keich Ministry of Food has recently stated again that de-
liveries to Greece from German stocks cannot be made without injury
to Germany's food situation.
IV. Thereupon the commercial policy committee decided on Sep-
tember 12 to postpone for the time being further deliveries in excess
of the 10,000 tons mentioned. The Four Year Plan was asked, after
all harvest results are available, something which is to be expected
toward the end of September, to draw up a plan for the distribution
of the food supplies available for all occupied territories—this in
consultation with the military and civilian authorities concerned and
taking into account Germany's military interests and those relating to
the military economy. The representative of the Four Year Plan has
emphasized even at this time that supplying Belgium and probably
Holland and Norway as well will be more urgent from the standpoint
of military economy than supplying Greece.
Wiehl
"In a telegram of Sept. 19 (4697/E226792) Wiebl informed the Legation in
AthenB of this opinion held by the Foreign Minister. The file copy of this
telegram has no numher but it appears from Athens telegram No. 1565 of Sept 26
(4697/E226797) that this instruction was sent as telegram No. 1251 of Sept. 20.
The instruction also pointed out that Germany, however, might supply Greece
with food in order to assure the flow of necessary Imports from Greece or to
prevent the creation of centers of unrest in the country.
SEPTEMBER 1941 515
No. 324
82/60621-22
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most TniGBNT Tokyo, September 16, 1941—2 :10 a.m., summer time.
secret Eeceived September 16—12 : 45 p. m.
No. 1811 of September 15
With reference to your telegram No. 1561 of September 13 l and
my telegram No. 1797 of September 13.*
As directed, I called on the Japanese Foreign Minister today in
order to carry out the above-mentioned instructions.
Toyoda listened attentively to my remarks and had his interpreter
take detailed notes. With regard to the contents of my statements
he said that he could not give any reply before he had consulted the
Cabinet. As for himself he wished to point out that as Deputy Naval
Minister at the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact he had
had something to do with bringing it into being. There had been no
doubt about Japan's obligation to come to the aid of the Axis Powers
in case of an American attack. However, consultations had to be
held within the Government, as would be the case in every country,
and with the parties to the Tripartite Pact concerning the moment
for intervening and the measures to be taken. He would immediately
submit the suggestions of the German Government to the Cabinet and
inform me about its position.
With regard to the Japanese-American negotiations he could not
tell me anything beyond the statements reported in the previously cited
telegram. Since then, there had been no further development. The
Japanese Government did not intend to send a new message stating
its position regarding Roosevelt's reply, in which he agreed to the re-
sumption of negotiations. Rather, the negotiations were henceforth
to be conducted directly through Ambassador Nomura. The basis
of these discussions was the unchanged text of the Japanese reply of
July 14, of which we had been informed at the time."
As this last point seemed to me to be of special importance, I
requested the Italian Ambassador also to ask Toyoda about this matter.
My Italian colleague received a similar answer, but I believe that
Toyoda was less definite to him regarding the fact that the text of the
basis of negotiations was identical with the Japanese reply of July 14.
Toyoda tried to be friendly and understanding during our talk.
As in the previous talks with him, he was otherwise very reserved,
1 Document No. 818.
' Document No. 810.
* See document No. 123.
516 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
which, may in part be due to a feeling of ineffectiveness. Apart from
the above-mentioned cautious reference to his personal role in the
conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, he tried to avoid committing him-
self in reply to my statements. A telegraphic report will follow.*
Ott
* See document No. 342.
No. 325
1680/395820-21
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Japan
Telegram
secret Berlin, September 16, 1941— 9 : 10 p. m.
No. 1572 e.o. Pol. VIII 5190 g.
Drafting Officer : Minister Boltze.
With reference to your telegram No. 1797 of September 13. 1
For the Ambassador personally.
Ambassador Oshima who is at present on a 12-day journey of infor-
mation through Holland, Belgium, and France was at Headquarters
on August 23 2 where the Eeich Foreign Minister made statements
to him along the lines of the telegraphic instruction RAM 364 of
August 25. 3
I myself informed Oshima on September 4 about the status of the
Japanese- American conversations in as far as we have reports about
them. Oshima was grateful for this because his Foreign Minister has
kept him almost completely in the dark up to now. According to his
account, private information, too, which Oshima used to receive from
his friends in Tokyo, bypassing the Japanese Foreign Ministry, has
almost completely stopped since the beginning of the Russian cam-
paign. On the other hand, Oshima described to me the way in which
he, for his part, had taken a position on the subject Japan- America
through detailed telegraphic reports to Tokyo without having been
requested by his Government to do so. This position taken by Oshima
is entirely in accord with what we desire.
At the conclusion of the conversation I tried further to encourage
the somewhat depressed Ambassador by telling him that I was firmly
convinced that in the last analysis the military instincts would prevail
in the Japanese people and accordingly also in Japanese policy.
Weizsaokeb
1 Document No. 810.
' See document No. 177, footnote S.
'Document No. 239.
SEPTEMBER 1941 517
No. 326
8589/603025-27
Fuhrer's Directive
chefsache Fuhrer's Headquarters, September 16, 1941.
TOP SECRET MILITAET
The Fiihrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.) Nr. 441538/41 g.Kdos. Chefs.
By Officer only
1. I assign to the Wehrmacht Commander in the Southeast, Field
Marshal List, the task of crushing the insurrectionary movement in
the southeastern area.
It is important first to secure in the Serbian area the transportation
routes and the objects important for the German -war economy, and
then for the long run to restore order in the entire area by the most
rigorous methods.
In Croatia (up to the line of demarcation) the measures necessary
against bandits are to be taken in agreement with the Croatian Gov-
ernment through the agency of the German General in Zagreb. 1
2. For the duration of the execution of these tasks all army forces
located in the area of the insurrection or to be brought there are to be
concentrated under the command of the Commanding General of the
XVIII Army Corps, General of Infantry Boehme. He will ex-
ercise executive authority in the area of insurrection itself in accord-
ance with the directives of the Wehrmacht Commander, Southeast.
All military and civilian authorities are subject to his orders to this
extent.
The Wehrmacht Commander, Southeast will regulate the more spe-
cific delimitation of his authority. The requirements of the Four Year
Plan are to be taken into account in principle.
3. The Commander in Chief of the Army will dispatch into Serbian
territory for the time being, in addition to further security forces
(these also for Croatia), an infantry division, 2 armored trained and
captured tanks, and will prepare in case of need the dispatch of a fur-
ther division as soon as one becomes available in the east.
I request that the detailed measures be reported to the High Com-
mand of the Wehrmacht.
4. The Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe will support as here-
tofore the operations in the area of insurrection with the forces avail-
able and will designate to the Wehrmacht Commander, Southeast, a
leader for the tactical cooperation with General of Infantry Boehme.
1 Edmund yon Glalse-Horstenau.
' See document No. 318.
518 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
5. Hungarian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian army and air forces can-
not be included in the operations without the permission of the High
Command of the Wehrmacht; but Hungarian and Rumanian boats
offered for the protection of the Danube traffic may be used in addi-
tion to the Danube flotilla. Their tasks are to be regulated in such
a manner, that their contact with one another is avoided by appro-
priate employment of the German flotilla.
The use of Croatian troops in the Serbian border areas next to
Croatia has been granted by the Croatian Government and can there-
fore take place.
The Italian High Command will be advised of the intended measures
and will be asked to take appropriate action in accord with the
Wehrmacht Commander, Southeast, in the area occupied by the
Italians.
6. The Foreign Ministry will carry out a joint political action ox
the Balkan countries against the communist centers [Leitstellen] in
these countries.
The Wehrmacht Commander, Southeast will receive further infor-
mation in this matter through the representative of the Reich.
Adolf Hitlek
No. 327
1247/337765-68
Unsigned Memorandum 1
Subject: Statements by the Fiihrer to Ambassador Abetz on
September 16, 1941.
The French are a decent people, as he, the Fiihrer, had been able to
observe, especially from the good behavior of the prisoners of war;
consequently they were also to have a part in the "new Europe" and
would then undoubtedly experience great prosperity. This pre-
supposed, however, that the French were sensible enough to adapt
themselves without reservation to the "new order" and would give
up all coalition plans. Unfortunately, there was always the danger
that French chauvinism would be stirred up anew. Could it ever be
overcome ?
He (the Fiihrer) did not want to make any change in the tactical
treatment of the French as long as the campaign in the east was not
"wound up"; for he did not believe in doing two things at the same
'The document printed here is from the personal file of Hasso von Etadorf,
the Representative of the German Foreign Ministry with the High Command of
the Army. The draft, in Etzdorf s handwriting, has been filmed on 1247/33776&-
73. There Is no indication on either copy of where this conversation took place,
but it can be assumed that it was at Hitler's headquarters.
SEPTEMBER 1941 519
time and he had enough patience to watch the French still longer.
In the meantime, however, the thread should not be broken off, and
Senior Counselor Eahn should call on General Dentz at once and
say some friendly words to him because of his courageous resistance
in Syria, in which the Fuhrer would gladly have supported him if
he had been in a position to do so. s He (the Fuhrer) intended in the
course of the winter to increase the occupation troops in France to
about 50 divisions (including several armored divisions) by spring-
time. Then he could and would do some plain talking to the people
in Vichy. Above all, the domestic political situation in France and
Vichy's relations with the United States would then have to be defini-
tively settled; nor could the question of France's participation in the
war against England be ignored.
As for our claims against France, the Fuhrer remarked (leaving
open the question of when and in what sequence he would speak about
them to the French) : He would demand Alsace-Lorraine but no
other "territory", nor any areas yielding raw materials, for we had
enough of them in the east (an ore deposit in the Ukraine occupied
by us had already been found to contain millions of tons at a depth
of 500 m. ; at 1,000 m. it would amount to billions) . One problem over
which he had long been "racking his brains" was the Pas de Calais. 8
He needed the Channel coast as a security zone against England,
which, if it were now to be relinquished, could perhaps not be recon-
quered until after months or years of fighting; for one could not in
the future count on having the same luck as he had had before. In
any case the Pas de Calais had to be kept secured militarily.
Another serious problem was posed by the Italian claims against
France, which the Fuhrer termed excessive. If the Italians had
fought better and had attacked mainly where they were now making
demands, it would have been a different matter. What would be
least painful for the French to give up, the Fuhrer asked Herr
Abetz : Corsica or Tunis ? ( Abetz : Tunis, if there is no other choice.)
The question whether the occupation costs might be reduced was
touched upon only briefly by the Fuhrer. Later, and also today, dis-
cussions about it were held with the Foreign Minister, the outcome of
which is as yet unknown.*
The question whether the militia of the Eassemblement National
may be given uniforms is a matter that the Fuhrer wants to discuss
with Field Marshal Keitel. If a genius should some day assume
leadership of this movement, the Fuhrer said, it might become a center
1 See document No. 165.
"The French departements Pas de Calais and Nord were placed under the
German Military Administration for Belgium. See vol. xi of this series docu-
ment No. 206.
' No record of these discussions has been found.
520 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
of future resistance (militia-SA). As long as he could be safe on
that score, he would use the movement and play it off against other
domestic political factors.
Laval was not for the time heing to return to Vichy. A second
attempt would undoubtedly be made to assassinate him; this time,
however, he would really be shot dead. 6
The Fiihrer also brought up the plans in the east.
The "Petersburg [Leningrad] poison well," from which the Asiatic
poison had been "overflowing" into the Baltic all these years, had
to be obliterated from the face of the earth.* The city was already
encircled ; all that remained to be done now was to blow it to pieces
with artillery and from the air, thereby also destroying the water
pipes, electric power plants, and everything needed by the inhabitants
for their subsistence. The Asiatics and Bolsheviks had to be driven,
out of Europe ; the "episode of 250 years of 'Asiatics' " {Asiatentum,}
had come to an end. The Urals would be the boundary, behind which
Stalin and his ilk could do whatever they pleased. By occasional
incursions beyond the Urals he would see to it, however, that Stalin
would not be left completely undisturbed even there.
Once the Asiatics had been driven out, Europe would no longer be
dependent on any outside power; America, too, could "get lost" as
far as we were concerned. Europe would itself provide all the raw
materials it needed and have its own markets in the Russian area, so
that we would no longer have any need of other world trade. The
new Russia, as far as the Urals, would become "our India," but one
more favorably situated than that of the British. The new Greater
German Reich would comprise 135 million people and rule over an
additional 150 million.
"On the assassination attempt on Laval, see Otto Abetz, Daa offene Problem
<KSln, 1951), p. 207.
8 See document No. 388.
No. 328
1BB1/377130-36
Memorandum ~by the State Secretary
St.S. 609 Berlin, September 16, 1941.
The Hungarian Minister related to me today the contents of a
conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister and M. de Bardossy
concerning the taking over of the Banat by Hungary. Szt6jay's
SEPTEMBER 1941 521
account was correct, I believe, in stating that M. de Bardossy men-
tioned this matter only in the latter course of the Horthy visit, 1
and then just accidentally, as it were. Furthermore, he did not
present Hungarian occupation of the Banat in any way as a matter
of urgency.
A new situation, however, had now developed: The Kumanian
Deputy Minister President had confirmed the fact, already known in
any case, that Rumanian troops had occupied the right bank of the
Danube opposite the Iron Gate. This disposition, which changed
the existing situation, surely had been carried out with approval of
the Government of the German Reich. This prompted the Hun-
garian Government to request the Reich Government to agree that
Hungary carry out similar military security measures in the former
Yugoslav Banat, by occupying points of military importance.* For
several weeks now, the so-called maize war \Kukurutzkrieg'\ had
been going on in the Banat which might easily degenerate into
general anarchy. On that account, the Hungarian Government con-
sidered it absolutely essential to forestall such a development. It
would have postponed this request for a while yet, but now that
military dispositions have been taken by Rumania, surely for similar
purposes, it considered the execution of corresponding measures by
Hungary as justified and timely.
I told Szt6jay that the parallel did not seem quite exact to me be-
cause the Rumanians could not regard the territory on the right bank
of the Danube, which he had mentioned, as territory that would be
awarded to them at a later date. Besides, I still doubted that any
Rumanian troops had crossed the Danube at all. Our information
in this regard was uncertain and contradictory. But if Rumanian
soldiers should have crossed over to the right bank of the Danube,
they were no longer there at this time.
I added that I did not mean by this to dismiss summarily the
instruction which Szt6jay had received from his Government, and
that I would submit it to the Reich Foreign Minister. 3
Herewith submitted to the Reich Foreign Minister.
Weizsacker
1 See Editors' Note, p. 466.
* Marginal note : "State Secretary should summon him this very day. Abso-
lutely not true; we ask that no measure be taken regarding the Banat.
"Transmitted to the State Secretary by telephone. R[intelen], Sept. 18."
■Unsigned marginal note: "Under State Secretary and Dlrigent of the Political
Department: Please clarity once more the facts regarding the crossing of the
Danube by Rumanian troops."
522 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 329
20B/142B77-7S
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most ubgent Stockholm, September 17, 1941 — 9 : 10 p. m.
No. 1456 of September 17 Eeceived September 17 — 11 : 40 p. ra.
For Ambassador Ritter.
(1) Today's conversation with Foreign Minister von Giinther re-
vealed the surprising and previously unkown fact that the Norwegian
ships have been chartered to England by the Norwegian Maritime
Office, so that they are now at England's disposal.
This is also borne out by a letter to the Legation from the ship-
owner Stenersen, stating that English captains are on board the ships
and that the motorship Dicto is lying in the free port to take on a cargo
of war material. This latter assertion by Stenersen has not yet been
verified here but in view of the present control by the English is not
improbable.
(2) I defined the Eeich Government's position to Foreign Minister
von Giinther as follows. "We demand that :
1. The ships be turned over to their rightful owners, i.e., the Nor-
wegian shipowners — immediately and without recourse to judicial
proceedings;
2. Pending actual restoration of the ships to their Norwegian owners
the ships must not in any circumstances be allowed to leave port ;
3. This shall also apply to new Norwegian vessels being built in
Swedish shipyards, which must upon completion be turned over to the
Norwegians who contracted for them.
(3) Foreign Minister von Giinther brought up the old Swedish
counterarguments against the German demands :
Compliance with the German demands would be incompatible with
Sweden's neutrality. Sweden was not waging any trade war with
England and therefore could not on legally valid grounds prohibit
the sailing of the ships to England. Any property rights of the ship-
owners would have to be enforced through judicial proceedings. Only
the regular Swedish courts could render the decision regarding prop:
erty rights. Pending such a decision the ships must and could be de-
tained by arrest. An arrest could be effected by _ the Norwegian
shipowners in a few days. 1 Any ensuing judicial action could be car-
ried to the last instance in not more than six months.
'In telegram No. 1476 of Sept. 19 (205/142988-89) the Legation reported that
Giinther had stated : As regards the Bhip Rigmor a motion for arrest of the cap-
tain had been made by the Norwegian shipowner Stenersen and the arrest had
taken place within 24 hours of the complaint. The ship Rigmor was thereby held
fast.
Edye, the shipping expert of the Keich Commissar for Norway, had been sum-
moned to Stockholm, would arrive by air on the morrow, and would urge the
SEPTEMBER 1941 523
(4) In reply to my serious representations to the effect that the sail-
ing of even a single Norwegian ship to England with an English cap-
tain on board, with the English flag, possibly even carrying a cargo
of war material, would most gravely jeopardize Swedish-German re-
lations, Gunther, who showed some understanding of this aspect of the
matter, stated that he would discuss the German demands again with
his ministerial colleagues. He promised me an early reply.'
schnttrrb
Weed
Reich Commissar to induce the other Norwegian shipowners to proceed in the
same way as Stenersen in order to hold the ships.
Schnurre reported further that he had disputed severely for an hour and a
half with Gunther regarding the negative attitude of Sweden, and had suggested
the inevitable consequences if Sweden persisted, such as the cutting off of the
Goteborg overseas traffic
' See, further, document No. 335.
No. 330
2281/481173-79
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
top secret Rome, September 17, 1941.
No.l57/g. [sic]
Subject: Report of Italian Ambassador to the Holy See, Attolico, con-
cerning a conversation with the Pope.
With reference to my report 157/g. of September 15, 1941. 1
In the enclosure I submit a German translation 2 of a further re-
port by Ambassador Attolico to the Foreign Ministry here concern-
ing his conversation with the Pope. Anfuso gave me this report to-
day. I again point to the necessity of the strictest secrecy.
Our Embassy to the Holy See does not know of this report or of
the previous one.
von Mackensen
1 Document No. 315 of Sept 13.
* The original Italian version has been filmed on serial 2281/481180-184.
[Enclosure]
The Royal Italian Embassy to the Holy See
secret Rome, September 16, 1941/XIX.
Subject : Taylor's conversations at the Vatican.
As reported in today's VOsservatore Romano, I was received by
the Pope this morning. I asked to see him not so much to find out
more than I already knew but, above all, to obtain his confirmation.
524 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
As the Pope is receiving the American Ambassador, it is well not
only that lie should receive the Italian Ambassador but also that the
visit be a matter of public knowledge. In fact, I must say that, al-
though I was received after Mr. Taylor, ISOsservatore reports my
call as having been made first.
I had not seen the Pope for a long time. Thus there was no lack
of material for conversation. But naturally, I did not fail to inquire
once again, by asking him directly, for information about Mr. Taylor's
visit.
I must say at the outset that the Pope told me nothing which I
have not already reported. The words used by the Pontiff were
exactly the same as those used previously by the Secretary of State
and later by Monsignor Tardini. 8 From the multiplicity of the ver-
sions, I received confirmation of what I had been told about Ambas-
sador Taylor's method of holding conversations. He has the custom
of carrying with him a sheet of paper containing a summary of the
points to be taken up and the questions to be asked. He plays the
same record for the Pope, the Cardinal Secretary of State (and today
Monsignor Tardini, also) and carefully jots down the answers.
In essence, I told the Pope that according to the general feeling
Mr. Taylor's trip must have other purposes than merely a resumption
of relations . . . .*
Pius XII smiled and said: I see that you think that this is not
enough. Then he himself proceeded to give me an account of the
interview.
So as not to repeat myself, I give below an outline of the interview
and its objectives:
1) Resumption of relations. Desire to efface the impression of a
break in the relations between the United States and the Holy See.
Hence, a demonstrative purpose par excellence, as proven by the fre-
quent and repeated visits.
(Taylor called on the Pope a second time today and will see him
a third time on Friday, to pay his respects before leaving and to
present his wife, whom the Pope has not yet seen. In short, Taylor
needs to let it be known that he has seen the Pope not once but several
times.)
2) Informative purpose. To acquaint the Holy Father with Amer-
ican public opinion and to try to clarify Eoosevelt's position. There
is absolutely nothing to add, in this connection, to what I have already
reported (my report of the 11th of this month) .'
* Assistant to the Cardinal Secretary of State.
* Omission indicated In the original.
* Document No. 315, enclosure.
SEPTEMBER 1941 525
3) In relation to the first two points, to bring about the Vatican's
intervention with the Catholics of the United States in order to end
the opposition to the President. In this connection, I received from
the Pope explicit confirmation that the Holy See will do nothing
more than it has already done, namely, recommend to the Catholics
as such, and principally to the Bishops, that they keep out of political
controversies as much as possible.
I am unable to say how much this pleased Mr. Roosevelt's envoy.
The impression I received yesterday from one of the Vatican eaves-
droppers — the newly baked Marchese Travaglini — is that on this point,
perhaps the principal one of his visit, Mr. Taylor failed in his
purpose.
4) Secondary objectives. Settlement of the previously announced
gift of the famous villa in Florence to the Vatican.
5) In conjunction with this, also some settling of his own affairs. In
my opinion, Myron Taylor also intends on the eve of the outbreak of
war to take back as many of his personal effects as he can. How far
this purpose was carried out we shall know only after his departure,
from the number of suitcases and trunks that the illustrious Ambassa-
dor and friend of Roosevelt takes with him to America.
These — and none other — were the purposes of the visit. That they
should justify a trip by Clipper is something that must also be con-
sidered in the light of the American spirit of superior snobbery. Mr.
Taylor was eager to repeat to the Pope, again today, that he is ready to
return to Rome. From these statements — which I consider without
substance and due, I repeat, to mere snobbery — the Holy Father saw
fit to infer that after all, if this is true, the United States' entry into
the war must not be so imminent as it seems. On this point the Pope
shares the doubts of Monsignor Montini more than the certainty of
Tardini (my report of the 13th) ,
While conversing with the Pope, I made a point of bringing up the
subject of Bolshevism. But the Pope gave me the same reply as that
of the Cardinal Secretary of State and his assistants, although with
greater emphasis and assuredness. The Holy See, he said, has already
spoken out, in good time, on Bolshevism and has never changed. If
anything, it is the others who have changed. Germany was first in
making every effort to get along with Bolshevism : not the Holy See.
But if I should talk of Bolshevism— and I would be fully prepared
to do so, continued Pius XII, should I then say nothing about Nazism?
The situation in Germany, he told me, has become infinitely worse since
526 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the day of his departure from Berlin. Even if the Fiihrer has ordered
the "suspension" of the persecutions, this does not mean that Christ
has been readmitted to the schools from which He was removed and
that the numerous convents and religious institutions now closed will
be reopened, or that the German children will no longer be made to
recite that parody of the Our Father in which they thank Hitler for
their daily bread.
The Pope dwelt on this point for about thirty minutes. In fact, he
said that he was glad of the opportunity to ask me a question :
"I was told long ago that in Germany they already had it in mind
to do away with the Vatican, because there was no place for it in the
new European order, etc., etc. Now, I am assured that even in his
meeting with Mussolini the Fiihrer stated that it was necessary to
'put an end to' the Vatican. Is that true ?"
In the face of such a question, I could have said that I wished to
investigate the matter before replying. But I preferred to answer
with a vigorous, firm denial which, I must say, seemed to make the
Pope feel glad and almost relieved, thus showing how much his con-
viction, I might almost say his nightmarish fear, of new and more
ruthless persecutions weighs on his mind.
He speaks as though one day he might, manu germanica, be driven
out of Rome. But — mark me — he does not speak of it out of fear.
I have never realized as well as I did this time that the state of the
relations with Germany affects the general attitude of the Vatican,
even to some extent as far as we are concerned, and undoubtedly a
great deal as far as the war is concerned.
Continuing his conversation, the Holy Father said:
"I, too, feel that, in view of the long duration of the war with
Russia, a word from me on Bolshevism would be most beneficial and
timely in Italy and the entire world; but have I said anything or
perhaps published anything in VOtsservatore Romano about the Pas-
toral letter of the Bishop of Miinster or that of the German Bishops?
However, if some day I 'must' speak, I shall speak, but I will say
everything."
The Pope mentioned to me the many years he had spent in Ger-
many and his attachment to the Germans. Even here in Rome, he
receives every day at the Vatican all the Germans who come to see
him, without even requiring them to kneel before him, as do all the
SEPTEMBER 1941 527
others; and at times he even interrupts the daily report of the Sec-
retary of State in order to receive them.
"Oh, if only Germany had left me in peace ■ . . my attitude toward
this war, especially at this time, would have been quite different . . ."
The Pope kept me for more than an hour. He told me to come and
see him whenever I wished.
Attolico
No. 331
200/17O1B4
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland
Telegram
top secret Special Train, September 17, 1941—6 : 10 p. m.
No. 1004 of September 17 from the Special Train
Received Berlin, September 18 — 7:35 p.m.
No. 1174 of September 18
from the Foreign Ministry Sent September 18.
BAM 407/E
For the Minister personally.
With reference to your telegram No. 929 of September ll. 1
For the guidance of your conversation, I am informing you of the
following: The thoughts of President Eyti on Finnish territorial
wishes at the coming peace treaty which he discussed with you were
received here with interest. Our attitude toward such wishes is alto-
gether positive. Details must, of course, be reserved for the future.
With regard to the Kola Peninsula and to the future fate of Mur-
mansk, it should be said that we ourselves are interested in this area
so that we should like to keep future decisions open in this respect.*.
In talks on such questions with members of the Finnish Government,
you can take the attitude, within the framework of the above, that
this is your personal opinion. It can only be desirable for us if the
Finns' wishes now also extend to former Russian territory.
RlBBENTROP
1 Document No. 301.
* See document No. 114.
528 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 332
4S08/E2S7548
The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Rumania
Cipher Letter
Berlin, September 8, 1941.
Sent September 18.
zu D III 421 g. 1
With reference to our telegram No. 2362 of September 2.*
In the matter of the moving of Jews back to Bessarabia, which
was brought up for discussion at your post, the High Command of
the Wehrmacht has issued the following order:
"According to a report of August 16 from the German Legation in
Bucharest General Antonescu has complained that German military
authorities in the Ukraine intend to send back to Bessarabia Jews
who had been taken along by the Bolsheviks. 8 General Antonescu
urgently requested that this be prevented, referring in this connec-
tion to the consent given by the Fiihrer.
There must be no intervention by German authorities in so far as
a transfer of Jews is involved between the territory of the Rumanian
state and the area between Bug and Dniester, which is soon to come
under Rumanian administration. Transfers from these areas into
occupied territories under German administration and vice versa must
be stopped in the future."
By order:
Rademaches
1 D III 421 g. : OKW letter of Aug. 30 (4806/E237550) referred to in document
No. 207, footnote 1. T „ ^ x . „ .
'Not printed (4806/E237560.) This telegram from Luther stated that
Eleventh Army headquarters had not moved any Jews from the Ukraine to
Bessarabia. However, after the Rumanian authorities had moved Jews across
the Dniester into the Ukraine at two places early in August, units of the Ger-
man Army and Security Police moved them back to Bessarabia.
* Document No. 207.
No. 333
83/1040B1-92
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S 617 Berlin, September 18, 1941.
This afternoon I asked the Hungarian Minister to call on rae and
with reference to his demarche of September 16 (St.S. No. 609 *) told
him the following concerning the admission of Hungarian soldiers into
the Banat :
The assumption underlying his demarche, namely the report of a
crossing of the border by Rumanian troops over to the right bank of
1 Document No. 328.
SEPTEMBER 1941 529
the Danube, was due to a misunderstanding. Neither were there any
Rumanian soldiers on the right side of the Danube at the Iron Gate
now, nor had any Rumanian soldiers ever been there. But even if his
statement concerning such a Rumanian step had. been correct, it could
not be involved in behalf of the Hungarian wish regarding the Banat.
I told Szt6jay that we wished to ask the Hungarian Government to
let matters regarding the Banat rest where they stood at the time of
the conversation recently held between the Reich Foreign Minister
and M. de Bardossy, 2 i.e., not to look upon the Banat as an immediate
issue and therefore to refrain from dispatching troops as they wished
to do.
The Minister then tried to put forth once more the idea that at
least certain Hungarian administrative personnel should be admitted
to the Banat. There was a situation now where the Nedic regime
might establish such a foothold in the Banat that some fine day Hun-
gary would have to use force to wrest this territory from the Serbian
Government. One preliminary to that was the so-called maize war
\Kvkwrutzkrieg\ which the Hungarian had mentioned day before
yesterday.
I then asked Sztojay to drop this idea. All required measures had
now been taken by us, relying on our own resources to ensure order in
Serbia, the disturbance of which we had lately viewed with great
patience.
Sztojay thereafter ceased to insist.
Herewith to the Reich Foreign Minister (by teletype).
Weizsacker
* Document No. 328.
No. 334
205/142685-87
Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Sweden
Telegram
secret Special Train, September 19, 1941 — 3:45 p. m.
No. 1013 of September 19 from the Special Train
Received Berlin, September 19 — 4 : 15 p. m.
No. 2170 from the Foreign Ministry Sent September 19.
With reference to your telegram No. 1456 of September It. 1 For
Minister Schnurre.
1 Document No. 329.
682-90S— U 39
530 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
A further decision is to be taken only when the reply promised you
has been received. 2
On the basis of the new facts communicated to you I ask that you
meanwhile state to the Foreign Minister :
1) The facts that the Norwegian ships have apparently been char-
tered to England for a long time, that English captains are on board,
and that, as is being said, war materials for England are being loaded
on individual ships have evoked a most unfavorable impression with.
the Reich Government. These facts were surely known to the Swedish
Foreign Minister and to the Swedish Government for some time.
But despite manifold and urgent negotiations over the question the
Swedish Government said nothing on these points. It follows from
this that the Swedish Government has not dealt openly with us. It
was behind our backs and not only with the knowledge, but also with
the active support of the Swedish Government that the preparations
were made for the Norwegian ships to break out for England. This
active support emerges from paragraphs 2 and 3.
2) The standpoint of the Swedish Foreign Ministry that "compli-
ance with the German demands would be incompatible with Sweden s
neutrality" is decisively rejected by us. On the contrary we must make
the formal complaint to the Swedish Government that it has up to
now taken an unneutral attitude in England's favor in this question
and to the disfavor of Germany and Norway. From the legal
standpoint and from the standpoint of common sense it would have
been natural and obvious for the Swedish officials to have respected
the claims and wishes of the indicated private Norwegian owners. It
cannot now be further questioned that the Norwegian owners wish to
bring the ships which belong to them back to Norway. If against this
clear legal situation third parties, as for example the "Goteborg Ship-
ping Office" of the exiled Norwegian Government, or Englishmen, lay
claim to the Norwegian ships, it would have been the responsibility of
such third parties to prove to the Swedish courts that the claims of the
owners were not valid, or that the decrees of the exiled Norwegian
Government took precedence. If the Swedish Government had ac-
cepted this legal standpoint, this would have been neutral. The Swed-
ish Government has, however, done the opposite. It recognizes the
right of disposition of a third party, it protects charter contracts
which were concluded against the wishes of the owners, and it demands
of the shipowners that they prove their clear and primary legal claims
t)G"forfl t-hft coui'ts
3) As regards the loading of individual ships with war materials
for England, we have been thoroughly aware of the fact that in earlier
negotiations the Swedish Government always declined to make any
pledge that it would grant no export licenses for England. To this
extent we cannot make a formal complaint to the Swedish Govern-
ment. But the fact that it has granted export licenses for war mate-
rial for England precisely for these controversial ships throws a most
* See document No. 329.
SEPTEMBER 1941 531
peculiar light on the attitude of the Swedish Government. It compels
us in the future to judge the attitude and the declarations of the Swed-
ish Government with still greater caution than we have exercised
hitherto.
I ask in this connection that you clarify beyond all doubt whether
a permit by the harbor police is necessary in order to transfer oil from
one ship to another when both lie in Swedish harbors and whether
special approval is connected with this. The reports of the Legation,
No. 1411 of September 12, and No. 1416 of September 13 3 do not fully
clarify this question. The question is not whether there is an absolute
prohibition as was indicated in No. 1416, but whether an official per-
mit is required for transferring fuel oil from one ship to another.
Should such an official approval have been requisite and have been is-
sued, then it would constitute proof of assistance by Swedish officials.
RlTTEK
' Neither found.
No. 335
2116/460514
The Director of the Economic Policy Departinent to the Legation
in Sweden
Telegram
most urgent Berlin, September 19, 1941.
[No. 2171 of September 19] » e.o. Ha. Pol. 6136 g.
For Minister Schnurre.
As a result of the Stockholm Legation's telegram 1456 2 regarding
the attitude of the Swedish Government toward the question of the
Norwegian ships, the Foreign Minister wishes a memorandum on the
present situation of our economic relations with Sweden with special
regard to what possibilities we have for putting the thumbscrews on
the Swedes.
I ask for an immediate statement of your views in outline. 3
Wiehl
1 The telegram number Is taken from the reply, document No. 386.
' Document No. 329.
* See document No. 836.
532 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 336
2116/460516-18
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
kost urgent Stockholm, September 19, 1941—9 : 00 p. m.
No. 1477 of September 19 Received September 19—11 : 35 p. m.
Ha. Pol. 6152 g.
With reference to your telegram No. 2171 of September 19, 1
For Ministerialdirektor Wiehl.
1. Present status of the economic relations with Sweden. Sweden
delivered commodities to Germany to the amount of 540 million KM,
within the last year including about 10 million tons of iron ore valued
at 120 million RM ; cellulose, 40 million RM ; lumber valued at 75 mil-
lion RM; ball bearings, 25 million; iron and steel, especially high-
grade steels, valued at 40 million RM. Other deliveries were m the
form of finished products, especially tools and machines. To this
must be added the delivery of supplies to German troops in Finland
and Norway, the most important of which were barracks, food, and
equipment. Another major item of services performed by Sweden is
in the field of transport, where the entire Swedish merchant fleet m
the Baltic has been brought 100 percent into service for the shipment
of Swedish raw materials and bulk commodities. German contracts
for ship construction placed with Swedish shipyards run to a total
value of 60 million RM.
2. German counterdeliveries are as follows : Coal and coke, about
5 million tons, valued at approximately 100 million RM; chemicals,
especially fertilizer, valued at 60 million RM ; textiles, about 70 million
RM; finished industrial goods, 100 million RM; armaments, 12 mil-
lion RM ; rolling mill products (iron and steel) , 30 million RM.
3. German counterdeliveries are insufficient to compensate for the
steadily increasing Swedish deliveries. The clearing deficit antici-
pated for the year 1941 is 130 million RM. The German demand at
the present economic negotiations is that this deficit be bridged by a
Swedish credit. 2 The Swedish Government has granted this to a
large extent. 8
4. The bulk of the supplies and material to the troops on the Ger-
man fighting front in Finland and to Norway is moved over Swedish
railroads or through Swedish territorial waters under Swedish convoy
escort. The latter method of transportation has gained increasing
1 Document No. 335.
* See document No. 254.
* See Document No. 347.
SEPTEMBER 1941 533
importance in. recent weeks because the sea route to northern Norway
is practicable now only under heavy risk.
5. Possibilities of applying pressure on the Swedes are afforded
by coal and iron deliveries, and deliveries of armaments and other
products essential to the Swedish economy. But by doing this we
would disrupt the German-Swedish trade on which we depend to a
much greater degree than do the Swedes. I would therefore advise
against stopping the shipment of coal and other deliveries to Sweden,
because we would thereby defeat our plan, already realized in a great
measure, of making Sweden the arsenal of Germany. On the other
hand the medium through which reprisals could be applied and to
which Sweden is most sensitive, is the overseas route from and to
Goteborg, which was reopened only recently through my own inter-
vention. 4 True enough, the Goteborg route, by which overseas raw
materials are imported to Sweden, is indirectly beneficial to us. The
Swedish Navy, for instance, which provides convoy escort for German
transports, gets the oil it needs in this way. Other Swedish industries
working for us get the raw materials needed for their production in
this manner. Nevertheless, I believe that prohibiting this traffic is the
only and most effective means of hitting Sweden in a most sensitive
spot without unduly affecting our own interests. 5 Regarding the
status of the question of the Norwegian ships, I refer to my telegram
No. 1476 of this evening. 8
ScHNURRE
WlED
* See document No. 91.
°In forwarding Schnurre's telegram on Sept. 20 to the Foreign Minister's
Secretariat (2116/460515) Wiehl expressed his concurrence In Schnurre's views,
particularly as regards means of exerting pressure on the Swedes.
" See document No. 329 and footnote 1,
No. 337
318/192260
The Charge d? Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
urgent Washington, September 19, 1941 — 10 : 04 p. m.
No. 3261 of September 19 Received September 20—8 : 05 p. m.
Secretary of State Hull sent me today a note in which the American
Government, acting at the same time on behalf of all American citizens
concerned with the ship and its cargo, demands full reparation for the
losses [sustained as a consequence] of "the unlawful sinking of the
American vessel Robin Moor by German submarines on May 21, 1941,
534 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
in the south Atlantic Ocean." ' lam wiring the full text at the same
time en clair under No. 3262. 2
The demand for reparation is made in the form of an offer for a
lump sum settlement by which the American Government is prepared
to accept the amount of 2,967,092 U.S. dollars (in words : two million
nine hundred sixty-seven thousand ninety -two) in satisfaction of all
of its own claims for damages and of those of its citizens ; on condi-
tion, that payment of this amount be effected in Washington by the
German Government within 90 days, that is to say, before December
19.
I limited myself to acknowledging the receipt and to stating that I
would transmit the contents of the note to the Reich Government.
Thohsen
1 See toI. in of this series, document No. 630, footnote 2.
'Of Sept. 19 (4669/E221459) ; for text of the note, see Department of State,
Bulletin, 1941, vol. v, p. 364.
No. 338
011/294600
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in, Paris
Teletype
top secret Westfalen, September 19, 1941.
No. 4477
RAM 412/R
For the Ambassador personally.
An order from the Chief of the OKW 1 will be transmitted within
the next few days to Military Commanders to take vigorous measures
against Communist intrigues. This order will be transmitted to you
for your information. 2 On that basis please give every support to
the measures initiated by the military authorities and do not interfere
from the political standpoint. Relations between Germany and
France and the interests of France, too, are served best by the ruthless
extirpation of Communist centers of disturbances.
Ribbentrop
1 Document No. 344.
* In a memorandum of September 21 (911/294599) Ritter Informed Woermann
of the directive to Abetss and transmitted Ribbentrop's request that identical
instructions be sent to all other Chiefs of Mission and representatives of the
Reich.
SEPTEMBER 1941 535
No. 339
2231/4S2438
The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy
Berlin, September 19, 1941.
PolIM2804IgRs.
Subject: Supression of the insurrectionary movement in the south-
eastern area.
With reference to our telegram No. 2429 of September 18. 1
I am enclosing the text of the FCihrer's directive of September 16 2
for your information.
Field Marshal List will go to Zagreb in the immediate future and use
this visit for discussing with the German and Croatian authorities
concerned a joint procedure for fighting the Communist uprisings in
Serbia and the neighboring countries. 3 It has been decided that a
further German division will be employed in Serbia in order to sup-
press more quickly the Communist unrest there. This division will
probably be employed in the direction of the Sava up to the Croatian
border.
Please inform the Government at your post of Field Marshal List's
tasks and the purpose of his visit in Zagreb. This information is
meant to prevent any possible sensitivity on the part of the Italians,
although as such it is natural that the Wehrmacht Commander, South-
east should inspect the troops placed under his command, and although
contact with the Croatian authorities lies within the framework of
the cooperation agreed upon with the surrounding countries.
By order:
ElSENIjOHR
*Not printed (4865/E249238). This telegram informed the Embassy of the
substance of Hitler's directive of Sept. 16.
1 This text (2281/482439-^10) is a shortened version of document No. 326, omit-
ting points 3 and 4 of this Directive.
* The Legation In Zagreb was informed of Field Marshal List's visit to Zagreb
and of Hitler's directive of Sept. 16 in Bitter's telegram No. 1006 of Sept. 18 from
the Special Train, which was forwarded to Zagreb as No, 993 on Sept. 19
(3579/E024585-86).
No. 340
2165/470687-89
An Official of the Reich Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs to the
State Secretary
Berlin, September 19, 1941.
Dear Herr State Secretary : At your request I am sending you on
instruction of the Minister :
1. A copy of the Fiihrer order of August 6, 1941, concerning the
conduct of the Wehrmacht in religious questions in the eastern areas.
536 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
2. A copy of the Fiihrer directive of July 30, 1941, concerning the
suspension of confiscations of church and monastic property. 1
Heil Hitler!
Yours, etc. Dr. Stahn
[Enclosure 1]
The High Command of the Wehrmacht
Az 31 v AWA/J (la) August 6, 1941.
4798/41
The Fiihrer has issued the following guidelines for the conduct in
religious questions of the Wehrmacht toward the civilian popula-
tion in the newly occupied eastern areas:
1. Religious or church activity of the civilian population is to be
neither promoted nor prevented. Members of the Wehrmacht are
unconditionally to keep away from such activities of the local
inhabitants.
2. The chaplain services of the Wehrmacht are intended exclusively
for the members of the German Armed Forces. The military chap-
lains are to be explicitly forbidden to undertake any sort of official
church activity or religious propaganda as regards the civilian
population.
3. It is likewise forbidden to admit or to summon civilian clergy-
men from the Reich or from abroad into the occupied eastern areas.
4. These regulations do not apply to the Bessarabian area occu-
pied by Rumanian troops nor to the Finnish front.
Keitel
[Enclosure 2]
National Socialist German Workers Party
Party Chancellery
SECRET FUHRER HEADQUARTERS, July 30, 1941.
personal Bo/Kii.
Herr Gauleiter
Honored Party Comrade
The Fiihrer has ordered :
The confiscations of church and monastic property shall be halted
immediately until further notice. Independent measures may not be
taken by the Gauleiters in any circumstances even if special circum-
stances in individual cases urgently require the utilization of church
1 See document No. 307.
SEPTEMBER 1941 537
or monastic property on the basis of the legal regulations. If in a
special case a Gauleiter considers these conditions to obtain, a report
must first be made through me to the Fiihrer.
Heil Hitler!
M. BoRMANN
No. 341
278/178934
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria
Telegram
Special Train, September 20, 1941 — 1 : 20 a. m.
No. 1018 of September 19 from the Special Train
Received Berlin, September 20 — 1 : 35 a. m.
No. 1388 of September 20
from the Foreign Ministry Sent September 20.
RAM 410/R
With reference to your telegram No. 1036 of Sept. 16. *
In the question whether Bulgaria should maintain or break off
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, please take a noncomittal
attitude and do not take a position in either one sense or the other. 8
RlBBENTROP
1 Not found.
"In telegram No. 1098 of Sept. 25 (278/178942) Beckerle reported that he
had been entirely noncomittal when the Bulgarian Minister President In the
course of a conversation told him that Bulgaria would welcome a rupture of
relations with Russia but that "she would not do the Russians the favor of
breaking off relations of her own accord."
No. 342
82/60634-36
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most tntGENT Tokyo, September 20, 1941 — 8 : 30 a. m., summer time.
secret Received September 20 — 5 : 25 p. m.
No. 1850 of September 20
With reference to your telegram No. 1561 of September 14 1 and
my telegram No. 1811 of September 16. 2
Foreign Minister Toyoda, in the presence of (group apparently
missing) [the Deputy?] Foreign Minister, today gave me the reply
1 Document No. 316.
1 Document No. 324.
538 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
of the Japanese Government to the German suggestion regarding a
statement to be addressed to the American Government, the text of
which he handed to me at my request. In translation the text reads
as follows :
"As you know, one of the principal aims of the Tripartite Pact is to
grevent the war from spreading and consequently to keep the United
tates from entering the war. In the negotiations with America thus
far the Japanese Government has tried to impress this point upon
her, so that Japan has fulfilled her task of restraining America from
entering the war. The Japanese Government will carefully study
the points suggested to it by the German Reich and will, as far as
possible, act in accordance with them in its future negotiations with
America. The Japanese Government expresses the wish that the
Reich Government may trust it to conduct the present negotiations
between Japan and America in the spirit of the Tripartite Pact."
I intimated to the Japanese Foreign Minister that this reply struck
me as being far from precise. In order to achieve the result we were
aiming at, namely deterring the United States, in line with the Tri-
partite Pact, from proceeding further on the road of aggression, it
was necessary in our opinion to send to the Government of the United
States a moderate, but at the same time unequivocal, communication
similar in substance to what had been suggested [by] us. I therefore
asked how a statement to the United States was to be worded, since
its effect depended on that. The Japanese tried at first to avoid a
clear answer, but were then persuaded to make a rather unimpressive
attempt in my presence to draft a statement to be sent to the Ameri-
cans. The Foreign Minister finally told me that he would seek a
formulation which he would send me as soon as possible. I replied
that I would so inform my Government immediately, and would appre-
ciate an early transmittal of the promised statement.
In a previous conversation, Deputy Foreign Minister Amau assured
me that since my last talks with the Foreign Minister there had been
no further developments in the negotiations with the United States.
I am told confidentially by sources within the Foreign Ministry that
the United States apparently does not want to consider Japan's at-
tempt at arriving at a general settlement excluding questions of detail,
and that it insists on negotiations about concrete details, especially
in regard to the virtually insoluble China questions. If the nego-
tiations should take such a course, the Konoye Government's attempt
at a settlement would soon be resisted by the entire opposition, rein-
forced by the China Army and the Navy engaged in China.
A telegraphic report will follow.'
Orr
* Document No. 359.
SEPTEMBER 1941 539
No. 343
205/142981-84
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Stockholm, September 20, 1941 — 7 : 45 p. m.
No. 1486 of September 20 Received September 20 — 9 : 55 p. m.
"With reference to our telegram No. 1476 of September 19 l and your
telegram No. 2170 of September 19. 2
To be shown immediately to the Secretariat of the Foreign Min-
ister and to Ambassador Hitter.
I. Foreign Minister von Giinther had me summoned to him again
this noon. He informed me that there had been no change in the po-
sition of the Swedish Government. The Swedish Government, on the
legal grounds which it had adopted, refuses to deliver the ships to the
Norwegian shipowners without resort to legal proceedings. Neither
can it envisage how any particular ship could be prevented from sail-
ing, if it so desired. The Swedish Government hopes that Norwegian
requests to stop sailings would be filed early enough, as was done in
the Rigmor case, to provide the practical means for preventing
departure. 8
II. I delivered to Foreign Minister von Giinther the statement set
forth in the above-cited telegraphic instruction. He protested against
the imputation that the Swedish Government had made preparations
behind our backs for the escape of the Norwegian ships. The Swedish
Government on the contrary had from the outset persisted in the po-
sition, maintained also today, that the ships could depart upon com-
pliance with the normal clearance regulations.* The fact that the
ships were chartered to England was not new but had been known for
a year. War material in the strict sense of the word was not included
in the cargoes, since no export licenses had been issued by the Swedish
Government. Other goods had been bought by the British and Nor-
wegian side and put into warehouses a long time ago, so that it would
be incorrect to say that export licenses for these goods had been issued
in connection with the contemplated departure of Norwegian ships.
Neither had the harbor police issued any permits for the loading of
fuel.
III. Foreign Minister von Giinther followed up these statements
with a forceful analysis of the aims and direction of Sweden's policy.
He recounted all that Sweden had done to meet Germany's demands
1 Document No. 329, footnote 1.
* Document No. 334.
* See document No. 329 and footnote 1.
* See document No. 151.
540 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
in relation to military matters and the war economy, e.g., transporta-
tion of troops now totaling almost 500,000 men through Sweden or
Swedish territorial waters; the transportation of several hundred
thousand tons of war material and supplies for the German forces;
convoy escort for German troop and material transports in the past
and in the future; full compliance with our demands regarding avia-
tion, etc. The Swedish Government is aware that Sweden could re-
main free and independent only on the basis of Germany's friendship.
To preserve that friendship was Giinther's foremost goal. In rela-
tion to England, Sweden maintained the principle of neutrality, hav-
ing no desire to let herself be drawn into the conflict between England
and Germany. Maintaining Sweden's decision not to keep the Nor-
wegian ships from sailing followed from Sweden's principle of neu-
trality toward England. ' He asked that his arguments be conveyed
to the Minister and be taken into account in any judgment regarding
the Swedish Government's decisions.
IV. Since we have exhausted our arguments and threats, it remains
now for us to decide whether we wish to follow up our words with
sanctions. My views on this point may be summarized as follows :
Cutting off Sweden from German deliveries (coal, iron, chemical
products, textiles) would militate against our own interests. The
Swedish economy would be disrupted and disabled from working for
us on a full scale as heretofore. The details were outlined by me in
yesterday's telegraphic report No. 1477/ I would suggest in our own
interest to forego taking any such sanctions. The application of sanc-
tions, however, could be considered respecting the Swedish overseas
traffic from and to Goteborg. 6 The Swedish Government would have
to be informed in that case that our assent to the Goteborg traffic
would be withdrawn the moment the first Norwegian ship escapes.
We could also reserve to ourselves the right, by way of reprisal, to
seize as prizes any Swedish overseas ships en route to Goteborg at
such time. The next three Swedish overseas ships are expected to
arrive at Goteborg on October 5. Three other ships are set to sail
from Goteborg on the same date.
V. I do not expect much of other German sanctions because we must
increasingly depend on Sweden as hinterland and supply base of our
fighting forces. Almost every day big demands for services and de-
liveries are received on which the Swedish Government must be ap-
proached. To cite only one example I may mention the now beginning
transfer of the elements of the 6th Mountain Division in Norway,
which must be shipped to the front through Swedish territorial waters
and under Swedish convoy escort because of the hazards of the sea
" Document No. 336.
* See document No. 91.
SEPTEMBER 1941 541
route around northern Norway. Punitive sanctions leading to a break
with the Swedish Government would cut us off from these resources. 7
VI. The Navy Attache has in agreement with me reported sepa-
rately to OKM. I would request that you ask to be shown his telegram
Embassy No. 1486 of today's date. 8
ScHNURRE
WlED
* See document No. 172 and footnote 8.
8 Thus, but the Legation's telegram No. 1486 is the oue here printed. See, fur-
ther, document No. 371.
No. 344
2281/482441-44
Circular of the Foreign Ministry 1
Berun, September 20, 1941.
Pol I M 2813 gRs.
For your information only :
On September 16, 1941, the Chief of the High Command of the
Wehrmacht issued a basic directive addressed to the Military Com-
manders in the occupied territories regarding the struggle against
and suppresson of insurrectionary movements.
The text of this directive — for your information only — is enclosed.
By order:
ElSENLOHR
[Enclosure]
top secret Fdhrer's Headquarters, September 16, 1941.
The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht
WFSt/Abt. L (IV/Qu)
Nr. 002060/41 g. Kdos.
Subject: Communist insurrections in the occupied areas.
1. Since the start of the campaign against Soviet Russia, Commu-
nist insurrections have broken out everywhere in the areas occupied
by Germany. The forms of the action range from propaganda meas-
ures and attacks against individual members of the Wehrmacht to
open uprisings and widespread guerrilla warfare.
'This circular was sent to the Embassy in Italy, the Embassy in Paris, the
Legations in Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, the Plenipotentiary of the Belch
for Greece, the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry with the Military Com-
mander in Serbia, the Field Office of the Foreign Ministry in Brussels, and to
the Representative of the Foreign Ministry at the staff of the Reich Commissar
for the occupied Netherlands.
542 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
It must be noted that what is involved here is a mass movement,
uniformly directed by Moscow which must be charged with the re-
sponsibility even for separate incidents of seemingly minor importance
in areas heretofore quiet.
In view of the many political and economic tensions in the occupied
areas one must also expect nationalistic and other circles to exploit
this opportunity in order to create difficulties for the German occupy-
ing power by joining the communist uprising.
In this way there is developing to an increasing degree a danger
to the German conduct of the war which is first reflected in a general
insecurity for the occupation forces and which has already led to the
transfer of forces to the main centers of unrest. 2
2. The measures employed so far for dealing with this general com-
munist insurrectionary movement have proved to be inadequate.
The Fiihrer has now ordered that everywhere the harshest methods
are to be used in order to crush the movement within the shortest
possible time.
Only in this manner, which has always been used in the history of
the expansion of the power of great nations, can tranquility be
restored.
3. In this context the following guidelines are to be observed :
«. In every case of rebellion against the German occupying power,
no matter what the individual circumstances may be, communist
origins must be assumed to be present.
b. In order to nip the agitation in the bud the harshest methods must
be employed immediately at the first occasion, so as to make the author-
ity of the occupying power prevail and to prevent any further spread.
It must be kept in mind that a human life is often considered to be of
no value in the countries concerned, and a deterrent effect can be at-
tained only through unusual severity. In these cases in general the
death penalty for 50 to 100 Communists must be considered an appro-
priate atonement for the life of a German soldier. The manner of
execution must intensify the deterrent effect.
The reverse procedure of first employing relatively mild punish-
ments and being satisfied with threatening more stringent measures
as a warning is not in accord with these principles and is therefore not
to be used.
c. The political relations between Germany and the countries con-
cerned are not decisive for the military occupation authorities.
Rather it is to be considered, and also to be pointed up in propa-
ganda, that severe measures also liberate the native population from
the communist criminals and thereby benefit them.
Nor will skillful propaganda of this sort consequently have the
result that the harsh measures against the Communists lead to un-
desirable repercussions among the well-disposed portion of the
population.
1 See document No. 318.
SEPTEMBER 1941
543
d. Native forces of the countries will in general fail in the execu-
tion of such forcible measures. Reinforcing them involves increased
danger to our own troops and must therefore not occur.
On the other hand much use can be made of premiums and rewards
for the population in order to secure their assistance in a suitable
manner. . .
e. In so far as in exceptional instances courts-martial are held m
connections with communist uprisings or other offenses against the
German occupying power, the most severe punishments are ordered.
The only real deterrent here is the death penalty. In particular
acts of espionage, acts of sabotage and attempts to enter foreign armed
forces must be punished with death as a matter of principle. Also m
cases of illicit possession of weapons the death penalty is in general
to be imposed.
4. The Military Commanders in the occupied areas will see that
these principles are immediately made known to every military au-
thority whose task it is to deal with Communist insurrectionary
actions. 3
Keitel
1 See document No. 312.
No. 345
82/60638-39
The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most uhgbnt WASHINGTON, September 21, 1941 — 10 : 50 a. m.
top secret Eeceived September 22 — 9 : 15 a. m.
No. 3285 of September 21
For OKW, Ausland; OKH, Attache Department; RLM, Attache
Group.
The Japanese Military Attache 1 , 1 obviously acting on the basis of
very urgent instructions, discussed with me the possibility of British
or American military intervention in the event of a Japanese attack
on Russia or of Japanese occupation of Thailand or the Netherlands
Indies. He was obviously supposed to ascertain my views in detail
and discuss with me the misgivings of Japan.
I adhered to the views set forth in my reports and reminded him
that at present the British had no offensive power in the Far East
and were glad not to be attacked. The United States of America
would avoid a military intervention in the Far East in view of the
1 Major General Saburo Isoda.
544 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
situation in Russia, the fear of a two-front war, the dispersal of her
naval forces, and the unpreparedness of her land and air armaments
as long as Japan refrained from attacking the Philippines and cut-
ting off American imports of tin and rubber from the Netherlands
Indies. One was a question of honor, the other a question of vital
importance for the United States.
General Isoda, obviously because of new instructions which he
brought with him in a long memorandum, was far more frank and
receptive to my statements than previously. Eeading constantly from
his memorandum he discussed the following problems:
Japan naturally had to be prepared for a military intervention by
the Americans, however unlikely it might be. The Japanese Navy
was confident of victory if the American Navy should push forward
into the western Pacific. The only danger was that the Americans
might confine themselves to war on merchant shipping and privateer-
ing and keep their navy in Hawaii and on the American West Coast.
I (clear text is missing here) that in such a case Japan on her part
would cut off American imports from the Netherlands Indies. The
United States would have to open the route to that area and use its
navy to do so. America did not yet have adequate supplies of rubber
and tin. For that reason she was trying to gain time and put Japan off.
These statements seemed to make a strong impression on Isoda. He
said there was only one worry that still bothered him: Japan's
dependence on maritime trade and the importation of raw materials.
To be sure, America depended on the Far East for tin and rubber, but
Japan was far more vulnerable.
The effect of the well-known American economic measures 2 was
plainly evident.
I drew a comparison with Germany, which, likewise threatened by
economic strangulation, was forcing her way into the open and threat-
ening the enemy. Japan would be able to do likewise. Isoda seemed
to be convinced on this point too. When I pointed out to him that
one also had to discern the weaknesses of the enemy and that behind
the glittering American facade there lay concealed great anxieties and
uncertainty, he replied that he now understood why the central aim
of American policy was to gain time. He now knew all he needed
to know.
Botticher
Thomsen
* See document No. 239, footnote 2.
SEPTEMBER 1941 545
No. 346
129/121172-TS
The Minuter in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 2021 of September 17 Lisbon, September 21, 1941—6 :19 p. m.
Received September 22—2 :45 a. m.
With reference to your telegram of September 13 No, 1465 to my
telegram No. 1967 1 (group missing).
(1) The head of the Portuguese special mission, Julio Dantas,
confirmed to me Salazar's statements 2 as well as those of the other
members of the special mission, 3 according to which no official com-
munication has been transmitted to the Portuguese Government by
Brazil on the question of the Azores. As the member of the mission
had already told me, however, unofficial discussions had been held
repeatedly, from which the mission definitely got the impression that
the Americans had promised the Brazilian Government to get in
touch with it before any active intervention in the Portuguese island
possessions.
(2) From a confidential talk which, at my suggestion, General-
direktor Eltze held with the Under Secretary of War,* who is friendly
with him, the following statements of the Under Secretary are worthy
of attention:
The Portuguese Government is satisfied with the result of the special
mission's trip. The Portuguese are trying to draw the Brazilians to
them and would welcome it if Spain too would do the same thing
with the Latin-American countries which have ties with it, in order to
create in this way a unified Latin America and detach it from the
United States. Unfortunately, Spain is not sufficiently concerned
about Latin America just as she is not sufficiently pursuing a friendly
policy toward Portugal. The relations of military men on the two
sides are good and it is only unfortunate that similar cooperation is
lacking in the political field. Germany can help much here to induce
Spain to adopt a more positive attitude toward Portugal.
1 Neither found.
x. 7* Qt*™ No - 192 ® of Se P t 7 (145&/360798) Huene reported that Salazar
hart told him most emphatically that his Government had no information about
Brazilian intentions to occupy the Azores or about alleged U.S.-Brazllian talks on
that subject.
* See document No. 271 and footnote 2.
' Fernando des Santos Costa.
6S2-B0B — 64— — 4
546 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOHEIGN POLICY
(3) Summing up the observations made in Rio de Janeiro and
Lisbon, the Portuguese-Brazilian-American problem presents itself at
the present time as follows :
The Americans have exchanged notes with Brazil, 5 which has re-
sulted in America's promise to Brazil to inform her in advance of any
active measures to be taken. In return, Brazil, for her part, might
have promised her own intervention in case Portugal wishes it. To
be sure, Portugal has received no official information about these
agreements, but the special mission was at least informed unofficially
of the American promise. In this connection the Brazilians mentioned
their rejection of American pressure and their ties with Portugal.
Huene
*In telegram No. 1642 of Aug. 26 (1543/375678-79) Frufer transmitted Infor-
mation on "U.S. notes" presented to Brazil concerning military cooperation be-
tween the two countries. The text of the agreement has been printed in Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. vi, pp. 506-510.
No. 347
205/1*3002-04
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
urgent Stockholm, September 22, 1941—7 : 10 p. m.
No. 1498 of September 22 Eeceived September 22 — 10 : 50 p. m.
With reference to my unnumbered written report of September
14. 1
The result of the government committee negotiations concluded
today 2 corresponds in the main to the line set forth in my above-
mentioned report. The principal Swedish concession is a willingness
in principle, within the framework of the trade negotiations beginning
in Berlin at the end of October, to negotiate for 1942 about a credit
operation to cover existing and anticipated clearing deficits and in the
meantime help to bridge the acute difficulties by advance payments
on future German deliveries.
The scale of this stop-gap action, which to begin with is limited
to 100 million kronor, does, to be sure, fall short of what we would
like. This ceiling on the amount, which is about 50 million kronor
1 Not printed (2116/460510-13).
* The complex of documents termed the German-Swedish Economic Agreement
of September 1941, signed by Walter on behalf of the German Government and
by HagglSf for Sweden is filmed on 2116/460522-35.
The conclusions of the negotiations of the German and Swedish governmental
committees of June 1941, signed July 1 by Ludwig for Germany and by HagglSf ,
Ha. Pol. VI 2111, are filmed on 319/192482-85.
The agreement of April 9, 1941 : 319/192496.
SEPTEMBER 1941 547
less than what we need, as Sweden herself acknowledges in view of
our further import requirements for 1941, but which from the Swedish
viewpoint is regarded, not without reason, as a special accommodation
is apparently attributable to current foreign-policy considerations.
This is evident especially from the fact that the competent technical
ministers (Minister of Finance and Minister of Commerce) 3 had
not, according to our information, been opposed to raising the amount
to 150 million kronor. Even the Foreign Minister, to whom the Mini-
ster and I had again explained the need of a large-scale solution on
Saturday before the meeting of the Swedish Cabinet, did not in any
way dispute the justification of our standpoint.
Nothing more could be obtained than a promise that a further in-
crease in the advance payments would be discussed again at the
impending negotiations in October, in connection with which the
Swedes did not rule out such an increase.
Even the amount of 100 million kronor does, after all, constitute
a decisive alleviation of the stringent clearing situation, at least for
the next few months. Moreover, the Swedish Government is putting
strong pressure on its lumber industry to offer deferred payment terms
for additional German purchases of wood and cellulose, whereby such
payments would for the most part not become due until the spring
of 1942. The exceptionally stringent year 1941 would thereby be
further relieved of these additional payments, amounting to about
30-40 million kronor.
The other questions negotiated, the most important of which was
an agreement about a procedure for expediting and consolidating war-
economy orders, were satisfactorily settled. The question of an Aus-
trian conversion loan has been deferred.
An oral report is reserved for the beginning of October. Eegard-
ing the subcommittee mentioned in th© written report of September
14, however, the following may be stated even now.
The subcommittee is to facilitate a speedy handling of the addi-
tional war-economy orders to be presented for discussion by the Ger-
mans, on as favorable terms as possible within the framework of the
existing possibilities of payment and of Sweden's productive
capability. The priorities to be established by the Germans for the
individual orders are to be decided in Berlin.
In order to achieve this goal as soon as possible, which is primarily
in the interest of Germany, the subcommittee must be ready to start
work at the earliest possible date. The present situation not only
disturbs the Swedish market but gets the Swedes into the habit of
saying no to irregular requests and by bringing private Swedish firms
into the picture makes it possible for the enemy intelligence service
" Minister of Finance, Dr. E, J. Wigforss ; Minister of Commerce, J. F. Domo.
548 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
to find out where German shortages exist. I therefore consider it
imperative that the subcommittee be appointed at once. In our opin-
ion it must include the following :
(1) A member who has a grasp of the current trade-policy situa-
tion, especially in so far as payment possibilities are concerned. To
fill this need I propose Commercial Attache Behrens. I request that
he also be appointed as a member of the government committee since
Commercial Counselor Vinell of the Swedish Legation in Berlin has
already been a member of the Swedish government committee for a
long time.
(2) Another member, to be appointed by OKW — Military Econ-
omy and Armaments Office — who "would represent the interests of the
military economy. It would be this member's duty, whenever neces-
sary, to call in representatives of the individual branches of the Wehr-
macht as experts representing their interests. I would be pleased if
this membership could be assigned to Colonel Drews. Please inform
me immediately. I am going to Copenhagen this evening for negotia-
tions with the Danes.*
Walter
Wied
* For the special German-Swedish agreement on war materials, see document
No. 565.
For the German-Swedish general economic agreement of December 1941, see
document No. 565 and footnote 4.
No. 348
4669/E2214B8
The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister
Teletype Message
Berlin, September 22, 1941.
I recommend the following telegraphic instruction for Washington
in reply to their telegrams Nos. 3261 * and 3262 2 regarding the Robin
Moor:
Telegraphic instruction to Washington.
For the Charge personally.
Please reply to the Robin Moor note as follows :
"Mr. Secretary of State : On September 19 you sent me a new note with refer-
ence to your communication of June 20 of this year * concerning the American
steamer RoUn Moor. I have the honor to reply that the two communications
addressed to me are In form and tone not such as to lead to an appropriate
reply by my Government. In this regard I refer to my note of June 25 [24 ] *
1 Document No. 337.
* Document No. 337, footnote 2.
1 See vol, sn of this series, document No. 657.
* See ibid., footnote 8.
SEPTEMBER 1941 549
and must also observe tfc t according to existing usage 1 am not the appropriate
office for an American request addressed to my Government.
Accept, ..."
End of note.
As I have rejected American actions in this matter earlier, in no
case should receipt have been acknowledged or a telegram been sent
en clair forwarding the contents of the new American note. Ribben-
trop.
End of telegraphic instruction to Washington. 5
An account of the events, drafted by Minister Eisenlohr, follows
separately. 8
Weizsacker
" The actual Instruction sent to Washington has not been found. The com-
munication sent by Thomsen to the Secretary of State on Sept. 26 dlfiered
slightly from the text proposed in the document printed and did not have the
part of the last sentence which follows the passage "my note of June 25 [&$],"
See Department of State, Bulletin, 1941, vol. v, p. 364.
"This last sentence is omitted from another copy of this draft instruction
which has the date of Sept. 21 (38/26591). It is possible that the account by
Eisenlohr to which reference is made here is identical with an unsigned memo-
randum of Sept. 22 (4669/E221460-62) addressed to the Foreign Minister's
Secretariat, which deals with the background of the American note of Sept. 19.
No. 349
S5S9/E603031-38
Fuhrer's Directive
chefsache Fuhrer's Headquarters, September 22, 1941.
top secret military
The Fiihrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
No. 441578/WFSt/L<I Op.) g.K. Chefs.
By officer only
Directive No. 36
I. Unusual terrain difficulties, inferior communications, and Soviet
reinforcements which were constantly channeled to Karelia and Lap-
land were the reason that the weak forces of Headquarters, Army of
Norway and the Fifth Air Fleet, despite outstanding performance and
unflinching courage, have so far not succeeded in reaching the Mur-
mansk Railway. Interference by the enemy with our sea lines of com-
munication on the Arctic coast has further reduced the prospects of
the Mountain Corps' reaching Murmansk this year.
Yet it was possible to tie down and draw away from the Russian
main front considerable enemy forces, to push the enemy everywhere
over the old Finnish borders and eliminate so far any threat to
northern Finland, especially the nickel mines.
550 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
II The ultimate aim of the operations in northern and central Fin-
land, to destroy tlie enemy forces stationed around Murmansk and
along the Murmansk railway, must be maintained.
The importance of this area is in the nickel mines, which are vital
for the German conduct of the war. The enemy is aware of that im-
portance. One can expect the English to establish themselves around
Murmansk and Kandalaksha with strong air combat forces, perhaps
even to operate with Canadian or Norwegian troops, and to bring to
Murmansk war material on the largest scale. One must also expect
air raids, even during the winter, on the nickel mines and the living
quarters of the miners. Our own efforts must match the extent of this
danger.
III. I therefore order :
( 1) Headquarters, Army of Norway
(a) In the sector of the III (Finnish) Army Corps attacks shall he
discontinued; forces released thereby are to be transferred to the
XXXVI Army Corps. .. +
(o) The XXXVI Army Corps shall [make ; every .preparation to
resume the offensive in the direction of Kandalashka in the first ha f
of October, with the objective at least to cut off Murmansk from its
rail connection before winter comes. Furthermore it should be .ex-
amined whether a continuation of this offensive in winter offers better
prospects for success than in the autumn.
The Finnish High Command will be requested to dispatch the 163rd
Division in good time by rail via Rovamemi to Headquarters, Army
° (c)° r The attack of the Mountain Cor?$ in the direction of Murmansk
is for the time being, to be discontinued, and continued with the
northern wing only so far as is needed to improve the position and
decerve the enemy In view of the tasks of the Navy it is however,
nSIary to seize at least the western part of the Rybachi Penmsu a
before the advent of winter and thereby to eliminate enemy activity
by artillery and patrol craft against the entrance to the port ot
^econnaSsance and deliberations regarding such an attack shall
begin immediately and the result is to be reported as soon as possible
Special weapons ^hich are still to be brought up for use against land
and sea targets and which are suitable for employment, will he
Whether the intentions of the Army Headquarters for the winter
can be realized for leaving two reinforced mountain divisions in the
area around Petsamo and for putting the 2nd Mountain Division into
rest quarters in and around Rovaniemi, can be decided only later ? but
this remains desirable. The later relief of the 3rd Mountain Division
by the 5th Mountain Division or a newly constituted mountain division
is also contemplated. . . „
(d) In order to shift the supply train of the Mountain Corps to
the Arctic Highway, fleets of trucks will be bought and rented m
SEPTEMBER 1941 551
Sweden. 1 If this trucking capacity should not suffice, additional
trucks -will be ordered from the homeland.
(e) I have directed Minister Todt 2 to build as quickly as possible,
with ruthless utilization of Russian prisoners of war, a field railway
from Rovaniemi along the Arctic Highway to Petsamo.
(/) For the resumption of the offensive against Murmansk it is
contemplated to bring in all the modern offensive weapons that are
usable in the tundra.
(2) Navy
Its mission is to attack the enemy supply route to Murmansk even
during the winter, especially in the period when the Luftwaffe is
more or less at a standstill.
For this purpose a suitable auxiliary base is to be established for
light naval craft — preferably in Petsamo Bay — if it is possible to
seize the western portion of the Rybachi Peninsula. The supply serv-
ice by sea to Kirkenes and Petsamo, even if interrupted at times, must
again and again be attempted and reopened.
The coastal defense in Petsamo Fjord and the fjord at Kirkenes
must be reinforced to an extent where it can deal with attacks even
from heavy naval vessels .
(3) Luftwaffe
It is of decisive importance that the Fifth Air Force, with strong
forces that are equipped for action in winter, should remain in the
area of northern Norway.
These forces are to be apportioned in such a way that up to the
beginning of the bad-weather season the intended continuation of
the Kandalaksha operation and the seizure of the western part of the
Rybachi Peninsula can effectively be supported. In the meanwhile
the sea supply route and the rear communications of the enemy, as
well as his supply and storage installations must be constantly
harrassed.
This struggle must be continued during the bad-weather season at
every opportunity and be extended to include interference with enemy
supply trains and construction of fortifications.
To that end our Luftwaffe ground organization must be retained
as far as possible in the north Norwegian and Finnish theater and
effectively made winterproof .
Protection against air raids must be secured for the quarters of our
own troops, for their supply, but especially for the nickel mines and
for the sea base to be established there.
1 See documents Nos. 857 and 418.
* Fritz Todt, Reich Minister of Armaments and Munitions, Inspector General
of German Highways.
552 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The ground organization and supplies shall be replenished to such
an extent that the resumption of the drive upon Murmansk at a given
time can he supported with strongly reinforced air formation.- 8
Adolf Hitler
'In a directive of Oct. 5 (8589/603053-56) Keitel issued special directions
supplementing Directive No. 36 chiefly in regard to supplies and equipment.
No. 350
4828/E241289 ;
482S/E241293-97
The Minister in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry
2458/m September 22, 1941.
Subject : Conference concerning resettlement.
The conference concerning resettlement prescribed by the Foreign
Ministry took place here today. A list of the participants 1 and the
minutes are appended.
Point 4 of the minutes indicates the grave misgivings about con-
tinuing the resettlement at all. As the Fiihrer has ordered the dis-
turbances to be put down, the continuation of the resettlement must
also be reviewed for that reason. Certainly, the resettlement cre-
ates unrest among the population in the Reich and in Croatia which
in the long run -will give a new impetus and new strength to the
disturbances.
I request a decision in this matter, because I myself could not
assume the responsibility for such a decision in view of the facts of
the situation here. 2
Kaschb
[Enclosure]
Zagreb, September 22, 1941.
Minutes of the Conference on the Resettlement From the Reich
to Croatia and From Croatia to Serbia, Held on September 22,
1941, in the German Legation in Zagreb Under the Chairman-
ship of the German Minister
Offices represented : Foreign Ministry, Berlin
Croatian Government
German Legation, Zagreb
Field Office of the Foreign Ministry in Belgrade
'Not printed (4828/E241290-92).
' See, further, document No. 360 and footnote 3.
SEPTEMBER 1941 553
Military Commander in Serbia
Chief of the Civil Administration in Lower
Styria
Chief of the Civil Administration in Southern
Carinthia
Reich Commissar for the Consolidation of the
German National Community
Reich Security Main Office
Einsatzgruppe of the SD in Serbia
Liaison Leader, Zagreb with the Einsatzgruppe,
Serbia
1. It was determined:
The numbers of Serbs and Slovenes resettled from the Reich to
Croatia and from Croatia to Serbia, respectively, can be determined
exactly only in so far as the railroad transports are concerned. The
remaining figures can probably not be determined even subsequently
with anything approaching accuracy. There is mutual agreement on
the following figures:
The following were resettled :
From the Reich to Croatia: persons
In railroad transports 9,343
Voluntarily, probably 17,000
26,343
From Serbia to Croatia:
Croatians, voluntarily, probably 11,800
Slovenes, probably 500
38,643
A good estimate of those from Croatia resettled in
Serbia by June 4, 1941, in the course of the agreed-
upon resettlement 30,000
Serbs to Serbia 30,000
98,643
Serbia has received entrants:
In transports from Croatia up to August 25, 1941 12,436
In transports after August 25 up to September 20 1,674
According to counts in Serbia, probably 104,000
118,110
Furthermore, Serbia has received 6,720 Slovene
resettlers from the Reich.
According to general data, the Croatian Government has reckoned
the influx from Serbia, Macedonia, the Voivodina, Dalmatia, and
the Reich at a figure of 95,000 without transports. Included in this
are the figures recognized by both sides in the tabulation above.
The Military Commander, Serbia, stated that he was willing to
accept in addition 3,200 Serbs who are now in the resettlement camps.
554 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Implementation will be arranged between the Croatian Government
and the Military Commander, Serbia.
The Croatian Government states that it is willing to accept up
to 1,000 Slovene resettlers who are still in camps in the Reich, Im-
plementation will be arranged between the Croatian Government and
the Chief of the Civil Administration in Lower Styria.
Point 2.
The Croatian Government and the Military Commander in Serbia
are in agreement that all shortcomings in regard to the taking along,
and arbitrary removal, of money and valuables from one territory into
the other and vice versa are to be considered as settled. No further
claims will be made on this score by either side.
Point 3.
The Croatian Government and the Military Commander in Serbia
are in agreement that in the future the resettlement of individual
persons or of individual families can be carried out by mutual agree-
ment. The request will be made through the Plenipotentiary of the
Foreign Ministry with the Military Commander in Belgrade and
the German Legation in Zagreb. It will be carried out within the
framework of the ordinary border traffic. The taking along of money
and valuables will be mutually determined in the individual cases.
Point 4.
The third wave of the Slovenes to be resettled from the Reich to
Croatia is estimated at:
from Lower Styria, up to 45,000 persons
from Carinthia, up to 20,000 persons.
Lower Styria points out that this very autumn it must settle up to
20,000 Germans from Kocevje. For this reason it must undertake
the corresponding removals. However, on account of the unrest con-
nected with it, one could not remove this small number alone, but
would have to remove the entire number of persons concerned.
The Croatian Government objects that the present political situa-
tion makes it impossible to receive this number. On the one hand
these difficulties were caused by the special situation of the littoral
under Italian military administration. On the other hand Croatia
had to support a very large number of refugees from insurrectionary
areas. Furthermore, Croatia could not settle any resettlers in these
areas of insurrection. Settling them in Srem and Slavonia, the
supply areas, which have an ethnically very mixed population, was
not possible for the reason that the food supplies for the whole country
would be most seriously endangered thereby.
The representative of the main office of the Reich Commissar for
the Consolidation of the German National Community presented the
views of his office. As matters stood he was of the opinion that in
SEPTEMBER 1941 555
these circumstances the decision could not be made in this conference.
Minister Kasehe stated that he would report this and submit it for
decision by the Reich Government and the Fiihrer.
No. 351
197/88380-81
Memorandmn by tlis Director of the Political Department
most urgent Berlin, September 23, 1941.
U.St.S. Pol. No. 685
The arrests of Chilean nationals in Germany have shown the Chilean
Government and the Chilean public that we know how to react to the
arrests of Reich Germans, and so have not failed of their effect. 1 On
the other hand, the arrests, which are assumed by the Chilean public
to be in the nature of reprisals, have aroused a great storm in Chile,
so that the possibility of counterreprisals is to be reckoned with. At
the same time it is to be remembered that there are some 40,090 a Reich
Germans in Chile, some of whom are in very good positions, while in
Germany and the occupied territories there are only 100 Chileans, who
are mainly students, artists, or tradesmen.
The Chilean Ambassador 3 also pointed out, in discussing the ques-
tion here, that a Chilean national, a woman by the name of Meyer, had
been in jail since January without having been brought to trial, and
the steps taken by the Chilean Embassy had proved unavailing.* The
case is well known here. It involves a Communist who is not to be
released. The Chilean Ambassador also mentioned that in Paris some
Jews of Chilean nationality had been imprisoned for some time, for
whom, contrary to the instructions of his Government, he had not
intervened here. They also should remain in prison.
It seems, in fact, that in view of the present situation, an elastic use
of the reprisal system against Chile is in order, so that our actions do
not lead to a further considerable deterioration in German- Chilean
relations, and thus produce unfavorable effects on the trial of the
Germans in Chile.
It is therefore proposed that the imprisoned Chileans be temporarily
released, not all at once, but in the course of a number of days. Thereby
the fiction will be maintained at the same time that it is not reprisals
1 See document No. 202 and footnote 1. In a memorandum of Sept. 22
(197/88370-71) Woermann recorded a conversation with the Chilean Ambassador
about these arrests and handed him a list of names of the arrested persons.
•The typed figure of 40,000 was crossed out on the original and 9,000 was
inserted in ink.
* Tobias Barros Ortiz.
* WeJzsScker recorded this conversation in a memorandum of Sept. 20, StS. 628
(197/88364).
556 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
that are involved, but that each individual case is being judged on its
merits. It ■will then be necessary before coming to further decisions
to wait and see whether the Chilean Ambassador is right in his opinion,
that the Germans will soon be released on bail or acquitted.
Submitted herewith to the Reich Foreign Minister through the
State Secretary, with the request for a decision. 5
Woermann
' Ribbentrop's decision regarding Woermann's suggestion has not been found.
In a memorandum of Oct 1 (187/83392) Erdmannsdorff recorded Ribbentrop's
instruction that the Chilean Ambassador be told that the German Government
learned with satisfaction of the release of 13 German citizens in Chile and that
the examination of the cases of the Chileans, arrested in France, would be
expedited. In a memorandum of Oct 3 (197/88398-99) Erdmannsdorff recorded
that he had told the Chilean Ambassador that the four Chilean citizens who had
been arrested anew In occupied France would be released.
No. 352
205/173267-63
The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Ankara, September 24, 1941 — 12 : 50 a. m.
No. 233 of September 23 Received September 24 — 12 : 15 p. m.
Del. No. 31
With reference to Del. No. 26. 1
Numan informed us that the Foreign Minister had had a 2-hour
interview with the English Ambassador 2 today. 3 The English firmly
insist that the chrome ore agreement with them be maintained to the
fullest extent.* In this connection Numan informed us of the fact
which was news to us that the chrome ore agreement bound Turkey
not to exceed the production of 250,000 tons yearly and to deliver this
total amount to England. Consequently Turkey would not be able to
1 Ankara telegram No. 221 of Sept. 20 (4888/E253402) ; it Teported an in-
quiry by Menemencioglu whether a German reply regarding the delivery of
heavy guns might be obtained by Sept. 22 when Saracoglu was scheduled to
have a decisive conversation with the British Ambassador in the matter of
chromium deliveries.
Ankara telegram No. 199 of Sept 17 (285/173239-41) had reported Britain's
Insistence that Turkey renew with her the existing chromium ore contract
which would expire in January 1942, and it mentioned the delivery of a
British note on that matter.
* Hughe KnatchbuII-Hugessen.
* Cf , Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. m, pp. 952-953.
4 For the background of the confidential Anglo-French-Turkish Chromium
Agreement of Jan. 8, 1940, and subsequent developments, see Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1940, vol. m, pp. 944-957. With a letter of transmittal
of Dec. 19, 1941 (2361/488835-37) Papen sent a copy of the text of the agree-
ment of Jan. 8, 1940, to the Foreign Ministry "for strictly confidential Informa-
tion."
SEPTEMBER 1941 557
furnish chromium ore to any third power without committing an
overt breach of contract — which she could not do — unless the English
yielded voluntarily part of their contractual rights. In reply to my
question how it was possible at all that Turkey had concluded such an
unusual contract with a limitation on production, Numan said that
England had at that time asked the same terms for the seven most
important Turkish export commodities as for chromium ore. Turkey
had declined this, but later had to yield in the case of chromium ore
for some special reasons.
England's economic performances in return were substantial. In
the last few days another 50 guns had arrived.
Numan suggested that we conclude a treaty while mutually waiving
[the demand for] delivery of chromium ore and of war material. I
declined this and pointed out that I had stated from the very first
day that deliveries of chromium ore were an essential component of
of the entire treaty. Since the German Government regarded it as
impossible that Turkey had really accepted such extensive commit-
ments toward England, I had no definitive instructions whatever in
the event that there should be no chromium ore deliveries at all. How-
ever, from my knowledge of the views of the higher authorities in
Germany, I would assume that in the circumstances the German
Government would probably prefer not to conclude any treaty at all.
Numan listened to this statement without taking a position. He only
remarked that I still owed him the reply from Berlin regarding the
delivery of medium and heavy guns, which had been requested 10
days ago. 5 The conversation terminated on Numan's statement that
the Foreign Minister would continue to put "pressure" on the English.
The English Ambassador, however, seemed to have very strict in-
structions from his Government. The Turkish Government's in-
sistence in this question had already produced considerable tension.
The atmosphere of today's conversation had been quite unfriendly.
When I pressed him, he promised a final reply by Thursday.
I once mors request prompt telegraphic instructions in the matter
of the deliveries of war material. Heavy guns are our last trump card,
which I can make use of in the negotiations. Otherwise, as I predicted
in telegram Del. No. 23 of September 19, a the only possibility is to
break off the negotiations.
For the rest, the situation with regard to the negotiations has
developed in accordance with telegram Del. No. 5 of September 9, T
although the Turkish ability to deliver is on several important fields
stated to be a good deal less than we had assumed.
CtODrcrs
5 See footnote 1.
'Not printed (2109/456509).
T Document No. 294.
558 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 353
260/170199-200
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Helsinki, September 24, 1941 — 3 : 45 p. m.
top secret Received September 24 — 5 : 00 p. m.
No, 997 of September 24
1) The day before yesterday the former Norwegian Minister 1
called on the Finnish Foreign Minister in order that he might, at the
instruction of the Foreign Minister of the Norwegian Government in
exile 2 (group garbled) to transmit a communication of English For-
eign Minister Eden. 3
2) In Eden's communication it is stated that Finland is waging
aggressive war against England's ally, Russia. Since it is impossible
to isolate the various wars from one another England now considers
Finland as a partner of the Axis.
If Finland continues to invade purely Russian territory then Eng-
land could be compelled to treat Finland as an open foe not only for
the duration of the war but also at the peace negotiations.
England has always been friendly toward Finland although Fin-
land (group apparently missing) Englishmen in that she expelled
them from the country. 4 Despite this, England would be satisfied
if Finland would soon again become a good friend. Essential for
this is that Finland stop at the old boundary and end the war. Then
a new relationship could develop between England and Finland with
oversea trade 5 which, however, could not be complete as long as
German troops remained in Finland.
3) In transmitting the communication the Norwegian Minister
referred to the friendship which had always existed between Norway
and Finland as well as to the danger that future operations of war
might bring the possibility that Norwegians and Finns would stand
against each other. Norway asked that the Finns not neglect to
have consideration for the Norwegians. Norway and Finland had
to think of the future and give consideration to the transfer of friend-
ship to the time after the war, In conclusion the Minister emphasized
1 Johan Michelet.
s Trygve Halvdan Lie.
' In telegram No. 1035 of Oct 1 (260/170205-06) Bliicher forwarded the text
in English of the British communication. This note was released to the press
in London on Sept. 24 (see Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1940-1948, p. 4820).
Cf. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941 i vol. i, pp. 71-72.
4 Apparently a reference to Finland's request for the withdrawal of the British
Legation from Finland. See document No. 160.
* See vol. in of this series, document No. 643 arid footnote 1, and document
No. 160 in this yolume.
SEPTEMBER 1941 559
the common Nordic interest. The Minister left an aide-memoire
regarding these accompanying remarks. 8
4) The Foreign Minister informed only the President, the Minister
President, and the Minister of Defense.'
5) The Foreign Minister considers this demarche as a new attempt
of the English Government to reach an understanding with Finland
after the earlier attempts by way of North America 8 and by radio
had failed. The Foreign Minister -will take his time with this matter.
At present he is considering giving an answer and by the same chan-
nel. The answer would naturally be negative and. give the chief
weight to refuting the imputation of aggression and would emphasize
the necessity of being guided in the war by strategic considerations. 9
6) The Foreign Minister further believes that the English de-
marche is to be interpreted as a warning. If the English later were to
undertake an expedition in the North they would be able to claim
that they had warned Finland in time.
Finally the demarche also signifies a threat.
7) The Foreign Minister characterized the accompanying remarks
of the Norwegian Minister as "soft soap" ["Seifen&chatim"].
8) I told the Foreign Minister that the situation of England must
be desperate if in spite of repeated rebuffs she strives to gain the good
graces of small states. Furthermore it was incorrect for the former
Norwegian Minister to have carried out the demarche. I urged that
he decline to undertake an answer or else to make the answer through
another channel.
9) I touched on the sore point that the Norwegian Legation re-
mains here and I reserved the matter of coming back to it.
'In telegram No. 1043 of Oct. 1 (260/170207-08) Blucher forwarded a German
translation of the text of the Norwegian aide-memoire dated Sept. 22.
In telegram No. 1060 of Oct. 4 (260/170212) Bliieher reported that the latest
draft of the Finnish reply was to be submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee
of the Finnish Cabinet ; that the reply for London would be sent by way of the
» m Ish Le ^ ation ! and the text of th e reply would be published next morning.
This is apparently a reference to the conversation which Under Secretary
of State Sumner Welles held with the Minister of Finland, Hjalmar J. Procope
on Aug. 18. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. r, pp. 56-57
Welles' memorandum of the conversation was released to the press in Washing-
ton on Nov. 7. See Department of State, Bulletin, 1941, vol. v, pp. 362-363
In telegram No. 3878 of Nov. 7 (260/170302-04) Thomsen forwarded the text
of the memorandum to the Foreign Ministry.
In telegram No. 810 of Aug. 19 (260/170137) Blucher reported from Helsinki :
"A Finn who has connections with England has heard from his friends there
that If Finland would conclude peace with Russia now she could receive the
boundaries which she demanded. Furthermore these boundaries would be
guaranteed for all time by Russia and England." Bliieher further reported
that President Ryti did not take the matter earnestly, and that it was known
only by him and those immediately concerned.
•In telegram 1064 of Oct. 6 (260/170215-16) Blucher reported that work on
the reply to the English note was continuing but would probably be concluded
that day. In telegram No. 1070 which was sent at 8 : 30 that evening (260/-
170217-10) Bliieher forwarded the English text of the Finnish reply In tele-
gram No. 1071 of Oct. 7 (260/170220-22) he forwarded a German translation
560 DOCUMENTS ON" GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
10) The Foreign Minister reckons strongly that there will shortly
be an English landing in Murmansk. 10
11) I asked for telegraphic instructions in case I should give the
Foreign Minister particular suggestions for his answer. 11
Blucher
"In telegram No. 1111 of Oct. 13 (260/170236-37) Blucher reported the
English text of the British reply, dated Oct. 11, which was delivered by the
American Minister in Helsinki. Among other things it stated:
"The British Government wish to make it clear that their action so far
from being designed merely to provide a pretext for an attack on Finland was
on the contrary sincerely intended to indicate the means by which relations
between Great Britain and Finland might be improved, while pointing out the
very regrettable but inevitable consequences that must ensue, if the Finnish
Government persisted in invading purely Soviet territory."
"■ Such instructions have not been found. See, further, document No. 461.
No. 354
22S1/4S1S25-27
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
secret Home, September 24, 1941.
No. l/41g.
Subject: Memorandum of an informant concerning the views of
Count Ciano on the present situation.
The informant repeatedly mentioned in my reports has sent me a
memorandum dated the 20th of this month which, according to him,
contains the views of Count Ciano on the present situation. Since
the informant has very close ties with the Palazzo Chigi, I have no
doubt that these views are essentially, at any rate, correct. In trans-
lation, the memorandum reads as follows:
"The prospects for the development of the operations in Russia are
better than in the preceding weeks. The war in Russia is, however,
only a chapter in the great drama, and the chief problem is to put an
end to it.
"From the military standpoint, the Germans have brought to an
end in a brilliant manner the campaigns in Poland, in Norway, in
the west, and in the Balkans. The war, however, on the whole, in
addition to being a military matter, is also a political matter, in so far
as it is necessary to fit it into the general situation. It cannot now
be denied that Italy was right when she pointed out after the con-
ference of Salzburg, that England would enter the war and that it
was necessary also to count on the possibility of America's joining
up with Great Britain. 1
"Let us look at the situation as it actually presents itself :
"Today a decisive final victory seems impossible either for the one
side or for the other. In order to conquer Germany and Italy, Eng-
* See vol. vn of this series, document No. 43 and Editors' Note, p. 35.
SEPTEMBER 1941 561
land and America would have to land on the Continent a tremendous
army, which would have to be in a position to defeat the 300 divisions
that the Axis has at its disposal. But neither England nor America
has such an armed force at her disposal, and even if either did,
there is no merchant marine that would be in a position to transport
and supply it. It is also to be considered that, in view of the attacks
of the Xuftwaffe, the landing would not be possible. The English
are relying on subduing Germany with large-scale aerial attacks.
But this is an illusion. It has been shown that the air attacks, ter-
rible as they are, are not enough to subdue a nation that has the
will to resist. Germany has at her disposal, moreover, large reserves
of raw materials and it will not be possible to force her to capitulate
by means of the blockade. It should be considered, furthermore,
that Europe is beginning to tire of the war and that the difficulties
will increase. The English propaganda is very active and is being
conducted with faith in its ability to stir up disorders and revolts in
the occupied territories. On the other hand, in order to win, Germany
would have to land in England. But the prospects for the success of
such an undertaking, which was not attempted in 1940 after Dunkirk,
now appear very dubious, if the whole enterprise is not altogether
impossible.
"Graziani was wrong in not marching against Egypt at the time
when the English had only a small force there. The Germans were
wrong in not attempting a landing in England at a time when a bold
surprise attack might perhaps have ended the war successf ully. Now
the English feel secure because they have American aid. They are
therefore determined to reject any compromise peace. Thus the war
will be long and hard.
"It appears from all this that the war was badly planned politically,
even if Germany has won many military victories. It was in the inter-
est of England to expedite the outbreak of the war in order to sur-
prise Germany at a time when her rearmament at sea was still incom-
plete. It was in the interest of Germany to put off the outbreak
of the war in order to build up the necessary fleet with a sufficient
number of cruisers and submarines. If Germany had entered the
war with 300 or 400 submarines, the situation would have developed
differently.
"These pessimistic thoughts are widely shared. The fortunate de-
velopment of the most recent operations m Russia has, however, lifted
morale considerably.
"Some people mention that it would be necessary to hold a 'pledge'
in one's hand in order to force peace on England. This pledge might
consist in the occupation of Suez and of Egypt, with the result that
the British Empire would be divided into two parts and the British
positions in Asia would be compromised as a result. But because of
the difficulties in the Mediterranean the venture against Egypt could
be attempted only through Turkey. The occupation of Egypt and
the threat to the passage to India would be a sufficient pledge for
682-905— «4-
562 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
forcing peace upon England. The situation would undergo a com-
plete psychological and political transformation as a result." a
v. Mackensen
* Cf . The Oiano Diaries, entry for Nov. 6, 1941 ; Enno yon Rintelen, Mussolini
als Bundesgenosse (Ttlbingen and Stuttgart, 1051), p. 157.
No. 355
1517/372703-04
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
top secret Rome, September 25, 1941 — 3 : 00 p. m.
No. 2315 of September 25 Received September 25 — 3 : 10 p. m.
Count Ciano just asked me to see him and, manifestly impressed,
handed me a carbon copy of a report that arrived here through the
Embassy in Berlin, concerning the treatment of Italian laborers.
This I shall send you, in translation, by closed circuit coded teletype
under No. 2316. 1
Ciano told me in a very friendly manner that he had asked me to
come to see hira in order to request me, for my part, also, to use my
influence in Berlin to the end that the matter be given the most serious
consideration. Alfieri, too, was being informed accordingly and
would make representations in the matter. 2 Ciano added that he had
assumed the responsibility, which, after all, was not a light one, for
withholding the report from the Duce. 8 The latter was, indeed, as I
knew, quite sensitive in all matters affecting laborers employed in the
Reich, and he, Ciano, would not like to trouble the Duce even more
with a report which, as he put it, was really very serious. He could
only express the hope that everything might be done in order that this
sort of thing would not be repeated. If such things became known
among the people, it would seriously prejudice sentiment. When I
remarked that the circumstances perhaps had to be examined more
closely, Ciano brought up the fact that an official report of an agency
was involved.
I thanked Count Ciano for not bringing the matter to the attention
of the Duce, but would consider it a very good thing, provided that the
statements in the report prove to be correct, if I could very soon tell
him something about the measures we have taken .*
Mackensen
1 Document No. 358.
1 See document No. 281, footnote 2, and document No. 375.
* See, however, The Oiano Diaries, entries for Sept. 24 and 25, 1941.
* See, further, document No. 375 and footnote 2.
SEPTEMBER 1»41 563
No. 356
1517/872705-07
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
top secret Eome, September 25, 1941 — 5 : 56 p. m.
No. 2316 of September 25 Received September 25—6 : 50 p. m.
With reference to my telegraphic report No. 2315 of September 25, 1
I transmit to you herewith the text of the report concerning the treat-
ment of Italian laborers, handed to me today by Count Ciano
(translation) :
"We direct your attention to a matter of great importance, regard-
ing disciplinary measures taken against Italian laborers.
"The laborers who are guilty of crimes or misdemeanors of any
kind whatever are arrested by the German police and handed over to
the courts. There can be no objection to this. It is just that our
workers should be punished if they are guilty of anything. It would
be necessary, however, that all cases of arrest be brought to the atten-
tion of our commissioners {delegazione) . The latter would have to
be notified by the Royal Consulates, which, pursuant to the agreement
reached in Rome, through exchange of notes between the Foreign
Ministry and the Germany Embassy (October 31, 1935-January 10,
1936 ), 2 would have to be informed by the police of the arrest. As a
result of this agreement, it was, in fact, made certain that the cases
of arrest of (Italian) countrymen would, be brought to the attention
of the competent Royal Consulates. Accordingly, we recently directed
the attention of our local agents to this matter in order that they
might get in touch with the Royal Consulates, with a view to being
informed in the individual case.
"A serious state of affairs is, however, the existence of concentra-
tion or forced labor camps, at various places in Germany, where,
upon the mere denunciation by the firms or even of the supervisors,
workers are sent, regardless of their nationality, who are guilty or
breaches of discipline, such as leaving their place of work, idling on
the job, attempting without permission to return to their native land,
etc. This fact is serious because it is outside the purview of the
law and therefore creates greater difficulty in learning about the
individual case, in determining the facts, and examining the cir-
cumstances. The existence and the significance of the said condi-
tions strike at the depths of our Latin sense of justice and the dignity
of the civilized nations.
"The workers are sentenced to a forced stay of from 15 to 40 or
45 days, without having the slightest opportunity to offer a defense,
1 Document No. 355.
* Not found.
564 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
and naturally without our local agents' being informed of the
incident.
"Protests of the commissioners to the police agencies, or to the
German Labor Front have proved unavailing. When representa-
tions "were made the reply was given that the German workers were
treated in exactly the same way.
"We report below on some of the incidents reported by the Fifth
Delegation in Wattenstedt, which occurred in the forced labor camp
at Hallendorf (Camp 21). In this camp, the workers, who have
become mere numbers and are clothed like penitentiary inmates, are
employed at forced labor for over 16 hours, after having first been
photographed and subjected to all sorts of physical examinations.
Every pause in the work is punished with clubbings and beatings,
and savage watchdogs are set on the workers, who are reduced to a
pitiable condition by their bites. Laborers who became ill, and who
asked for a medical examination, were beaten black and blue, so
that they need a long period of hospitalization in order to recover.
"A few days ago, after making representations and protests, the
deputy commissioner at Wattenstedt received from the Prefect of
Police in Braunschweig permission to see the 12 Italian laborers
forcibly detained in Camp 21. He succeeded in speaking with them
at the Hallendorf police station and in showing the police officer
what a condition these unfortunate people were in. The police officer
himself could not conceal his indignation. In fact, our workers
were in a pitiful condition as a result of the cudgelings and mis-
treatment they had suffered, and furthermore, they had bloody sores
on their legs, from the bites of the dogs that had been set on them
by the guards. There were also sick and fever-ridden people there,
who were nevertheless compelled to perform labor that was beyond
the strength of a person in ordinary condition.
"In view of what they found, there was nothing else for the Prefect
of Police to do but to intervene personally to have the dogs removed,
the sick put in the hospital, as well as to give the assurance that he
had seen to it that the mistreatment and all abuse of power would
cease and that he would punish the guilty persons.
"The request of the Fifth Delegation was granted, moreover, that
it be informed of every case of commitment to a forced labor camp,
in order that it might intervene in due time.
"We are informing your office of the foregoing in order that you
may take suitable measures, and we would ask that you instruct us
as to the further attitude we should take." s
Maokenseh
•In telegram No. 2326 of Sept. 26 (1517/372709) Mackensen wired that the
Incidents in Germany as reported were so serious that he could not make any
additional requests for Italian laborers ; he would first need to be able to explain
the remedial measures taken in Germany.
SEPTEMBER 1941 565
No. 357
205/143012-13
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Stockholm, September 25, 1941 — 12 : 40 p. m.
No. 1526 of September 25 Received September 25 — 2 : 30 p. m.
With reference to my telegram No. 1521 of September 24. 1
As an indication of the situation on the Swedish truck market I
give you the following details in amplification of the remarks of yes-
terday by the Chief of the Commercial Department of the Swedish
Foreign Ministry. Ministerialdirektor Hagglof pointed out espe-
cially that the Swedish truck factory Volvo was committed for a cer-
tain percentage in work as an assembly plant, that is, the plant was
assigned for producing new trucks from American parts. Unfor-
tunately this important importation by way of Goteborg has been
cut off by the English since August of this year on the grounds that
Sweden delivered 500 trucks to Finland. 2 In other cases also England
has stopped the importation through Goteborg by telegraph as quickly
as Swedish deliveries to Finland became known. Thus for example
a short time ago Sweden gave over to the Finnish Army 20 tons of
chocolate from her own army reserve supplies whereupon the English
immediately canceled the navicerts for chocolate, cocoa, etc. If then
today Sweden would export rubber tires, further English restrictive
measures in the field of rubber would be unavoidable. The Goteborg
traffic, 3 however, is of great significance not only for the internal Swed-
ish supply situation but also for Sweden's capacity to make deliveries
to Germany and Finland. Up to now goods to the value of 117 mil-
lion kronor have been imported by means of the Goteborg traffic and
goods in value of 73 million kronor have been exported. M. Hagglof
at this point added as a personal remark that such figures showed how
little suited a cutting off of the Goteborg traffic would be as a measure
of retortion. 4 As regards the Swedish Army's supply of trucks, M.
Hagglof continued, there were completely inaccurate figures in circu-
lation. It was indeed true that since the outbreak of the war
the military authorities had collected the biggest possible motor
1 In this telegram (205/143009-010) Wied assured the Foreign Ministry that
the Legation was rendering full support to Count Beissel in hia efforts to pur-
chase trucks in Sweden.
See document No. 418 and footnote 1.
* See document No. 41 and footnote 4.
* See document No. 91.
* See documents Noa. 336 and 343.
566 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
vehicle park. But this was a matter of putting into service used
vehicles, of which meanwhile a part had naturally become unusable
or had broken down. Finally Sweden this year was faced with a
completely new and comprehensive problem of transportation be-
cause of the insufficient importation of coal. Sweden on this account
had to bring out from her own forests — often over impossible roads-
wood supplies of hitherto unknown proportions. In the question of
tires the possibility of erecting a buna factory in Sweden was touched
on. M. Hiigglof was interested in this and the Legation would be
grateful if an instruction could be issued as soon as possible in response
to our report C 1325 of September 16. B Sweden is now making a
nation-wide collection of used rubber goods. Possibly Swedish sup-
plies of rubber could be stretched out through buna so that in this
way a delivery of trucks with tires could be examined again on the
Swedish side as a possibility.*
Wied
"Not found.
* See document No. 98, footnote 6.
See, further, document No. 418.
No. 358
365/173281-84
Tlie Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department
to the Foreign Ministry
■ Telegram
most urgent Ankara, September 26, 1941 — 2 : 40 a. m.
No. 238 of September 25 Eeceived September 26—11 : 10 a. m.
Del. No. 32 of July 20 [sic]
[With reference to] Del. No. 31. 1
1. Numan expressed his warm gratitude for the promise to deliver
heavy guns. 2 He would immediately inform the Minister President
and Foreign Minister of this great gesture of friendship on the part of
Germany.
1 Document No. 352.
3 This presumably refers to a preliminary decision by the OKW In the matter
of war material, which was forwarded to Ankara in Foreign Ministry telegram
No. 56 of Sept 23 (4885/E253388) sent over the signature of Counselor Moraht of
the Economic Policy Department. On condition of Turkish deliveries of
chromium the OKW was willing to let Turkey have specific numbers of anti-tank
guns, mountain guns, cannons and howitzers as well as other war material.
SEPTEMBER 1941 567
I told him that the German Government took it as a foregone con-
clusion that in view of this additional sacrifice the chromium ore
question would be solved in our sense. Thereupon Numan, on my
request, reiterated the reasons which made it impossible, without Eng-
land's consent, to make deliveries to a third country, prior to January
8, 1943. The English had in the meanwhile presented another note in
which without any political argument they put forth their incontest-
able legal position. The American Ambassador had also intervened,
without being legally entitled to do so; this was pointed out to him. 3
I repeated that if we should be left with the sole possibility of either
making a treaty without chromium ore and war material, or of not
concluding any treaty, the German Government would presumably
decide to forego the treaty. I, in any case, favored the second alterna-
tive. Numan asked me to explain to my Government once more that
the Turkish Government was in a dead-end street and that, notwith-
standing its urgent desire to arrive at a result with us, it could, in the
face of plain legal provisions, not act otherwise. The Turkish Gov-
ernment was willing to supply us after January 8, 1943, with any de-
sired quantity of chromium ore. It was further willing to stockpile
the quantity earmarked for Germany from the very beginning of the
[present] treaty period, so that after January 8, 1943, it could be
promptly shipped. As Germany — according to his information — was
sufficiently supplied at least until the end of 1942, it would be the
same to us if we received the aggregate quantity for the period of the'
treaty only at the beginning of 1943. (I want to remark in this con-
nection that we have envisaged the duration of the treaty as being
about a year and a half because of the long-term nature of the
German deliveries.)
When I maintained a negative attitude, Numan said the Turkish
Government was finally prepared to conclude with us a treaty for
several years providing for large deliveries of chromium from Jan-
uary 1943 on. I replied that for the sake of fairness, at least to some
extent, we would then, like England, have to get the entire output
over three years. Numan, of course, answered that Turkey would
never enter into such an exclusive treaty. He was, however, willing
to make public the fact that our treaty also provided for substantial
deliveries of chromium ore. Numan further promised to increase in
1942 the deliveries of copper from the previously offered 6,000 tons
* For Ambassador MacMurray's discussion of this matter with the Turkish
Foreign Minister on Sept. 23, see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941,
vol. ni, pp. 050-951.
568 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
to 12,000 tons, as compensation for the omission of chrome ore deliv-
eries. In addition he would do his utmost to comply with the German
demands for increases in olive oil and cotton.
Numan conducted the whole discussion very much with a view to
the political aspects. He pointed out informally how undesirable
it would be for both countries to break off negotiations. We would
in any case gain more if through a generous and friendly attitude we
would continue to win Turkey over. He repeatedly mentioned that
part of the world press would turn the rupture into a vast propaganda
campaign. I replied that I was indifferent to the propaganda aspect
of the matter. The English press would in any circumstances attempt
to minimize the result ; the only thing which mattered in the end was
to maintain a clear and correct line of policy between Turkey and
Germany.
I never before heard Numan insist on any question in such urging,
almost begging, terms. Again and again he reverted to the great
political and psychological importance of the conclusion of the big
agreement precisely at this moment. The Turkish Government
would, if we should want it, play up the significant scope of the agree-
ment entirely as we would want it. But despite its desire to comply
with the German requests it could not sacrifice its honor by breaking
its word. I was aware, he said, how urgently Turkey needed air-
craft, but if Germany tomorrow should deliver 250 military aircraft,
Turkey could still not give a single ton of chromium ore for it at the
moment. I maintained my negative attitude up to the end of the
conversation, but avoided, in accord with the Ambassador, a final
rejection and promised to report again to my Government.
2. Please let me have telegraphic instructions at the earliest.* I
do not consider it right to conclude a treaty of lesser scope without
war material. Hence there remains the possibility of either breaking
off negotiations or of accepting Numan's last offer and securing the
chromium ore supplies at least from January 1943 on, thus excluding
the English to a large extent. Because heavy guns will in any case
not be available for delivery until about that time, the demand of the
OKW for item by item delivery would be observed with regard to this
principal part. To be sure, other war material would have to be sup-
plied as soon as possible in return for copper and guaranteed supplies
of strategic material. The representative of the Reich Ministry of
Economics thinks that from the economic point of view it is preferable
to conclude a treaty that includes war material, even if the chromium
ore will not be available until January 1943.
Cloditjs
4 See document No. 366, footnote 3.
SEPTEMBER 1941 569
NOJ59
1680/39584&-60
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most ubgent Tokyo, September 26, 1941 — 11 : 10 a. m.
secret Received September 26 — 12 : 00 midnight.
No. 1900 of September 26 Pol. VIII 7628 g.
With reference to my telegram No. 1850 of September 24 Iffi]. 1
Deputy Foreign Minister Amau today handed me the statement
which the Japanese Government is planning to send to the American
Government. It reads as follows : 2
"The Imperial Japanese Government have repeatedly affirmed to
the American Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to
contribute towards the prevention of a further extension of the Euro-
pean war. Should, however, the recent tension in the German-
American relations suffer aggravation, there would arise a distinct
danger of a war between the two powers, a state of affairs over which
Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact, naturally can't help to
entertain a grave concern.
"Accordingly, in their sincere desire that not only the American
relations will cease further deterioration but the prevailing tension
will also be alleviated as quickly as possible, the Japanese Government
are now requesting the earnest consideration of the American
Government."
Without going specifically into the involved form of the statement
I told Amau that it seemed doubtful to me whether the intended ob-
jective, namely keeping the United States from further aggressive
action, would be substantially promoted by it. I asked to be in-
formed whether the Japanese Government had decided to send this
statement to the American Government and said I would be grateful
for information about the time and place of transmittal. Amau con-
firmed that the wording was drawn up on the basis of a Government
decision. The time had not yet been set; a suitable occasion would be
used for it. I replied to Amau that a statement would be useful only
if it were delivered immediately, since the situation might change at
any moment. In these circumstances it would perhaps be advisable
1 Document No. 342.
'The following passages enclosed within quotation marks are in English in
ha riT-ifrlnaT
the original.
570 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
to hand it to Ambassador Grew. Amau promised to transmit my
request and indicated that a reply would be made. 3
In reply to my question about the state of American- Japanese nego-
tiations Amau said that they would now be conducted partly in Tokyo,
with Ambassador Grew serving as an intermediary. He could assure
me that since our last talk on September 20 no further development
had occurred and no progress had been made. Unfortunately, he
could not give me any information about details.
In reply to my question whether the United States was aiming at
a detailed solution of the China question but Japan was unwilling
because of existing difficulties to take up that question in detail, he
made the remark that this described the situation rather accurately.
Ott
' Appended to this document is a minute of Oct. 14 (1680/395852) by Counselor
Sonnlel timer of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat which reads as follows :
"The Foreign Minister requests that it be ascertained whether the statement
by the Japanese Government anticipated in telegram No. 1900 of Sept. 26 was
actually given to the American Government."
It appears from intercepts of Japanese messages that the text of the
Japanese statement as printed here was actually sent to Washington in
an instruction which Toyoda sent to Washington on Oct. 16. A parallel
instruction of the same day explained why Japan did not wish to present a
stronger statement for which the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo
were pressing. See Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings before the Joint Committee
on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 12,
Joint Committee Exhibits Nos. 1-6, pp. 71-72; see also Foreign Relations of
the United States, Japan, 1981-1941, vol. n, p. 686, and The Memoirs of Cordell
Hull (New York, 1948), vol. n, p. 1034.
For further German efforts in the matter see document No. 434, and footnote 1.
No. 360
116/87044
SS-0 b ergruppenfuhrer Heydrich to Foreign Minis ter Ribbentrop
Telegram en clair
Unnumbered Berlin, September 26, 1941 — 1 : 25 p. m,
Keceived September 26 — 2 : 45 p. m.
My Dear Foreign Minister : The resettlement work in the south-
east has come to a standstill at the present moment. 1 Croatia has so
far deported 118,110 persons in legal and illegal transports to Serbia,
whereas the Croatians have so far taken only 26,341 persons from the
Reich. In addition there are 12,300 persons from Serbia whom Croa-
tia accepted. In accordance with the order of the Reichsf iihrer SS
[as] Reich Commissar for the Consolidation of the German National
Community, 12,000 Volksdeutsche from Kocevje are supposed to be
' See document No. 350.
SEPTEMBER 1941 571
resettled in Lower Sty ria beginning October 15, 1941. To do this, the
evacuation of about 45,000 Slovenes is absolutely necessary. In con-
sideration of its internal situation the Croatian Government refuses to
accept these people who are to be evacuated. This is jeopardizing the
settlement within the country of the Volksdeutsche from Kocevje as
ordered by the Fiihrer. 2 Please exert influence on the Croatian Gov-
ernment so that this absolutely necessary settlement within the country
of these Volksdeutsche can be concluded before the start of winter. 8
Unfortunately from here I can see no way of avoiding the issue, par-
ticularly since the troublesome inclusion of Croatia in the over-all
work of resettlement in the southeast, which I opposed at the time, was
brought about at the time by Minister Kasche.
Heil Hitler!
Heydrich
" See document No, 187.
'On Oct. 13 Luther informed the Legation in Zagreb in telegram No. 1141
(4828/E241298) that "in accordance with a decision made by the Reichsftihrer
SS it is not necessary at the present moment to urge the Croatian Government to
tafeeinto Croatia 38,000 Slovenes from Lower Styria."
No. 361
265/1T3285-&2
Memorandum by tlie Director of the Political Department
XT.St.S.Pol. Nr. 897 Berlin, September 26, 1941.
I. The person of Nun.
I had talks on September 11, 18, and 25 with Nuri Pasha, the
champion of the Pan-Turanian movement. 1 The second of these talks
took place in the form of a lunch together with Ambassador von
Papen and Counselor of Embassy Hilger.
Regarding the person of Nuri it should be said in advance that he
spent his whole youth under the spell of his brother, Enver Pasha.
The latter was himself a champion of the Pan-Turanian movement.
Enver, after serving Moscow temporarily subsequent to the Turkish
collapse, died in the fight against the Bolshevists in Turkestan in
1921.
Nuri Pasha also fought as an officer in Tripoli against Italy, and
in the World War in the Caucasus against the Russians. He is in
his early fifties and is an obviously prosperous factory owner in
Turkey. His Pan -Turanian ideas have a certain romantic flavor
in memory of Enver Pasha.
1 See document No. 298.
572 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
II. The Pan-Turanian Idea.
The ideas which Nuri Pasha developed are in general known from
the reports of the Embassy in Ankara i and can be summarized as
follows:
1. The Pan-Turanian movement wishes to create independent states
for the Turkic peoples living outside the territory of present-day
Turkey. Thus, these areas are not to be annexed by Turkey, aside
from certain frontier rectifications, but are to receive their political
direction from Turkey.
2. According to Nuri Pasha this involves mainly ethnic groups
residing in the territory of the present Soviet Union. Of present So-
viet territories claim is laid primarily to Azerbaidzhan and Dagestan
north of it, thus not all of Transcaucasia ; also the Crimea, as well as
by and large the area between the Volga and the Urals, stretching
northwards to the Soviet Tatar Republic (capital: Kazan). In this
connection it is recognized that some of these areas have ethnic
Turkic majorities, and that some have minorities. Furthermore, es-
sentially all of ancient Turkestan is included in this area, inclusive
of the western portion of former Eastern Turkestan, now Sinkiang,
which belongs formally to Ohina and is now under Soviet influence.
Furthermore Nuri claims the northwestern portion of Iran down to
Hamadan as being ethnically Turkic, and a border top of the Caspian
Sea along the old Soviet border. Finally, of Iraq territory the area of
Kirkuk and Mosul is included as well as a strip of Syria.
A map sketch 1 regarding the area thus circumscribed is appended. 8
Furthermore I append map 2. showing the gradual annexation of
Turkestan and Transcaucasia by Russia in the nineteenth century. 3
3. In answer to the objection that in accordance with Ataturk's
policy Turkey wanted to remain a purely national state and, aside
from certain frontier rectifications, did not pursue any objectives out-
side her present national territory, Nuri said that this had only been
a policy of expediency in the mind of Ataturk, the motive of which
had been fear of the Soviet Union. [By going] together with Ger-
many and in particular with the present prospect of smashing the
Soviet Union this motive disappeared. Furthermore, as mentioned,
the Turkish ambitions were not of a territorial nature.
4. In reply to the objection that first the Turkish Government and
the Turkish people had to be won over to these ideas a Nuri said that
the entire Turkish people could be won over for this and that at the
proper moment a government would surely come to power which
would adopt these iaeas. For the rest Nuri stressed in response to a
remark to that effect that he was not acting now, either, behind the
back of the Turkish Government; on the contrary, before his de-
parture for Berlin he had informed the Minister President. 4
5. Nuri answered the question about the circle of persons in Tur-
key who are involved, by stating that large portions of the Army
were in favor of these ideas; in particular he mentioned the Com-
1 See document No. 194, footnote 5.
* Not found.
* Reflk Saydam.
SEPTEMBER 1941 573
manding General at the^Caucasus front who is closely related to him,
and who could play a decisive role at the proper time.
III. Evaluation.
In evaluating the question whether support for the Pan-Turanian
ideas is in the German interest one must in my opinion distinguish
between the more tactical interest at the moment and the interest in
a really practical implementation.
As far as the momentary interest is concerned, it is obvious that
Turkey can realize the Pan-Turanian ideas only in an alliance with
Germany, so that a Turkey with a Pan-Turanian orientation would
of necessity have to be a Turkey with pro-German orientation. The
Pan-Turanian ideas at the same time represent a Turkish imperialism
at the expense of the Soviet Union, so that to that extent, too, our
game would be played. All of this speaks in favor of treating the
Pan-Turanian ideas cautiously at least for the moment, giving the nec-
essary consideration to the divergent attitude of the present Turkish
Government.
The creation of new ethnically Turkic states which are satellites
of Turkey must be judged by other criteria. In so doing I shall leave
out of consideration the plans which play a part in the Pan-Turanian
ideas, of an actual enlargement of Turkish territory possibly by
[acquisition] of the oil region of Mosul or of the Transeaucasian
area with Batum and Baku; recovery of the Mosul region should
certainly not be encouraged from the standpoint of our oil interests
but would perhaps be tolerable, whereas it would be entirely out of
the question to give the area of Batum and Baku into Turkish hands.
For the rest there is in my opinion a decisive difference between
the area in the Caucasus and between the Volga and the Urals
intermingled with Turkic peoples, on the one hand, and the area
of Turkestan east of the Caspian Sea. After the defeat of the Soviet
Union large areas of the old Russian Empire ought to come under
German and not foreign influence. It would not be in our interest
if states were created in Transcaucasia and between the Volga and
the Urals which would be politically aligned with Turkey and whose
attitude would thus depend upon the vicissitudes of the policy of
Turkey, who will certainly continue to be wooed by all the powers.
The case of Turkestan is different. If Russia has been decisively
weakened while the English have not been driven out of India, Eng-
lish imperialism will certainly seek to seize these economically prom-
ising areas (cotton) that have only partially been opened up by the
Turko-Siberian railway. These areas will not belong to Germany's
sphere of influence even in the future, if only on account of their
geographic location. Consequently, in my opinion we should
574 DOCUMENTS OK GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
encourage here the creation of ethnically Turkic states aligned with
Turkey.
IV. Immediate program.
Nuri Pasha expressed a few wishes which he felt could be realized
at once:
a. The Russian prisoners of war of Turkic ethnic origin and "in
addition all those who are Mohammedans should be separated out
and brought together in a special camp on the model of the camp
near Wiinstorf in the last World War. Later on, one could examine
whether a separate combat unit for the Pan-Turanian movement could
be formed out of these prisoners of war.
According to information from the Chief of the Prisoner of War
Department of the OKW, Reichsleiter Rosenberg has already
addressed a request of this kind to the OKW. 5 At the moment the
OKW cannot as yet carry out such a separation. However, as soon
as its hands have become somewhat freer, it intends to proceed to
the separation of the Russian prisoners of war according to ethnic
and racial origin. It is to be expected that the OKW will com-
ply in so far as it is possible with a request by the Foreign Ministry
for separation of the ethnically Turkic and Mohammedan Russian
prisoners of war.
Authorization is requested for taking up the matter officially with
the OKW. Doubtless several months will pass before it is carried
through.
5. Nuri Pasha desires that the administration of areas inhabited
by Turkic peoples be given to the indigenous Turkic and Moham-
medan population; whereby in the present situation the Crimea could
be considered the first area of that sort.
It is suggested that this wish be passed on to the OKW in the
form that in enlisting the local population in the administration of
the territories under military occupation the ethnically Turkic and
Mohammedan population be given adequate consideration; and a
decision is requested as to whether we should also get in touch with
Reichsminister Rosenberg in this matter through Senior Counselor
Grosskopf.
A decision in accordance with points a and b would not result in
any commitment to* the Pan-Turanian ideas of Nuri Pasha. The
separation of the Mohammedan prisoners of war and the enlistment
of the Mohammedan population in the occupied eastern territories is
very generally to be recommended on the basis of our policy toward
Islam and the Orient.
8 Albrecht's memorandum of Sept 24 (1047/311680) records that Lt. Col.
Breyer, Chief of the Prisoner of War Department of OKW, bad received from
Rosenberg the request that the ethnic Turkic captives be separated out from
the Russian prisoners of war.
SEPTEMBER 1941 575
c. Nuri Pasha wishes himself to play an active role in the Pan-
Turanian movement.-<fIe visualizes this in such a way that after
establishment of camps for the Mohammedan and ethnically Turkic
prisoners of war he will somehow participate in sifting and orga-
nizing the human material there. He assumes that he could do this
with the tacit toleration of the Turkish Government. Authoriza-
tion is requested first to enter into a nonbinding exchange of ideas
in this respect with the OKW also.
Nuri Pasha furthermore envisages the establishment of a central
office for a Pan-Turanian propaganda in Berlin, in which he and
his friends would participate. This question should be postponed
for the time being.
Nuri Pasha, who is somewhat disappointed that we are not enter-
ing his camp with flying colors, will probably stay in Berlin about
another week and then await further decisions in Turkey.
Maps have for the time being been appended only to the copies
for the Foreign Minister and Political Division VII. 8
Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the State
Secretary. 7
WOERMAKN
* See footnote 3.
' Unsigned marginal note : "I believe that in the case of a further German
advance toward the Caucasus Nuri Pasha would render us good service there."
No. 362
4865/E249552-61
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
secret Eomb, September 27, 1941.
150/41 g.
Subject: Resettlement of the South Tirolese.
With reference to your telegraphic instruction of September 20-
No. 2445. 1
In accordance with instructions I am hereby reporting on the pres-
ent status of the South Tirolese resettlement question and the prob-
lems that will face the German Commissioner, now to be appointed.
Since, pursuant to the orders given, 2 1 have thus far not taken up the
problem of South Tirol in my reports, my statements, except for the
political observations that can be made here in Rome and my frequent
discussions with Minister Bene and SS-Gruppenfiihrer Greifelt, are
1 In this telegram (4865/E249516) BJntelen relayed Ribbentrop's request for a
written report by Mackensen on the status of the resettlement problem.
' These orders have not been found.
576 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOEEIGN POLICY
based in the main on the reports of the former and [those] of
Consul General Miiller, which have been regularly sent to the Embassy
for information. 8
1. The mood in South Tirol.
Among the people of the South Tirol the view has become estab-
lished during the past year or so, especially on account of military
events, that we are no longer seriously pushing the transfer of the
German South Tirolese, particularly so far as the land-owning popu-
lation is concerned, because the region will, after all, return to Ger-
many when the war is over. The view is maintained with great stub-
bornness that, if only out of gratitude for German military aid, the
Duce will give up the South Tirol after the war. Such ideas are also
to a high degree fostered by the Reich Germans entering and passing
through from Germany, including members of the Wehrmacht.
Counterinfluences from responsible German quarters have been prac-
tically without effect.
Among the Italian authorities, up to the Duce, these rumors have
caused an extraordinary amount of ill feeling. I cannot help noting
again and again that here in Rome even the higher authorities, al-
though probably not the Duce as yet, attach an exaggerated impor-
tance to them. That such rumors reach even him, I know from state-
ments by Anfuso, who spoke to me some time ago about such and other
rumors prejudicial to our relations, which are circulating in the Reich
according to the reports of the Italian Missions there. 4
2. Attitude of the Italians.
In the main the attitude of the Italians in the question of the South
Tirol is at present determined by two factors. On the one hand the
Duce, as confirmed only very recently with unmistakable clearness by
Under State Secretary Buffarini, holds firmly to the principle of a
radical ethnic solution, i.e., the resettlement of all racial-German in-
habitants of the South Tirol. In line with that is the attitude of the
central agencies in Rome, which are urging that the resettlement be
expedited. Perhaps they also see herein a means of counteracting the
undesirable effect of the above-mentioned rumors.
On the other hand, it is the wish of the agencies responsible for the
future development of the treaty areas to preserve a suitable economic
basis for the provinces — a wish which on many points cannot be
brought into harmony with the ethnic solution. Italy does, to be sure,
have the necessary number of people who can settle the towns and the
regions suitable for wine and fruit growing in the South Tirol, but
there are almost no people who could replace the emigrating German
* Some of these have teen filmed on serial 4865.
* Of. The Oiano Diaries, entries for June 30, July 6, and July 13, 1941.
SEPTEMBER 1941 577
mountain farmers, who play a very important role in the total econ-
omy of the South Tirol. For that reason there has developed a pow-
erful propaganda, which set in already during the option period 5 for
the purpose of making the people opt for Italy and remain in the
country and which even today is very actively trying to picture to the
German optants their future in the Reich in an unfavorable light but
making golden promises to "stay-putters." The practical effect of this
attitude is seen in the numerous difficulties caused by the local authori-
ties in the implementation of the administrative resettlement meas-
ures. It must fee noted that the orders from Rome looking toward the
carrying out of the radical ethnic solution have thus far caused little
change in this attitude of the provincial authorities. A not inconsid-
erable role in this attitude is played by the still living tradition of the
Irredentist nationality struggle, which has the effect that the Italian
authorities charged with carrying out the resettlement still retain their
dislike for the South Tirolese German community and treat the
interests of the South Tirolese optants in a manner which is far from
friendly or even just.
In the latest discussions which Minister Bene and SS-Gruppen-
fiihrer Greifelt had in Rome with Under State Secretary Buffarini
it was again possible, to be sure, to eliminate a large part of the
individual administrative difficulties for the present; it must be ex-
pected, however, that despite the Italian promises given in these
discussions troubles will come up again and again locally. Some
improvement, however, can be expected from the fact that the Italian
Government now intends to appoint a special high commissioner for
all resettlement questions and that his functions will no longer be
combined with the local Italian interests of the provincial agencies
as they have been in the past in the person of the Prefect of Bolzano. 8
Without doubt, however, the attitude of the local Italian agencies of
the South Tirol, which aims to delay the resettlement, will continue to
encumber political relations in general between Germany and Italy.
As things are now, this could be most effectively counteracted if the
German side would seriously and vigorously carry out the principle
of the radical ethnic solution, i.e., if the German side would constantly
do everything in order actually to get a substantial number of South
Tirolese optants out of the South Tirol regularly and settle them in
Reich territory. In view of the fact that the future settlement area
cannot yet be designated this, to begin with, will be possible only
within certain limits. 7
* Regarding the option see vol. vin of this series, document No. 382, footnote 5.
* See document No. 175, footnote 7.
7 See vol. xi of this series, document No. 291 and footnote 1.
682-90(5—64 42
578 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
3. Carrying out of the resettlement.
Because of numerous technical difficulties the agencies concerned
have not been able during the last few months to transfer to Germany
more than 500 persons a month permanently. Since the head of the
Repatriation Agency, Dr. Luig, in his audience with the Duce about 2
years ago mentioned the figure 250 persons per day, i.e., about 7,500
per month, as the average figure for the resettlement, all the Italian
agencies, which constantly revert to this number, have received the
impression that the German side is deliberately delaying the execution
of the resettlement. In connection with the above-mentioned rumors
the intermediate and lower Italian agencies therefore formed the opin-
ion — erroneous but much exploited by propaganda — that Germany
thereby aims to have as many South Tirolese in the country as possible
at the end of the war in order to facilitate a transfer of the country to
Germany.
The tension in this respect has been somewhat relaxed for the time
being by the promise made to the Italians in the discussions held in
August between Minister Bene and SS-Gruppenfiihrer Greifelt on the
one hand and Under State Secretary Buffarini on the other, to the
effect that in the next 6 months about 16,000 persons would be re-
settled. 8 The main contingent is to be formed by the families of the
recalled officials and of those compelled to leave, numbering about
5,000 persons; the separate peasant groups from Luserne, Fersental,
Calantal, and Grodnertal, consisting of about 7,600 persons ; and Reich
Germans, numbering about 1,200 persons.
This program can be carried out if new, separate settlement areas in
Greater Germany can be provided at least for these individual peasant
groups forming the main contingent and the resettlement can be
carried out directly from farm to farm. From what I have heard,
the plan is to find a place for these groups in the Gau of Carinthia.
If it should not be possible to settle these groups permanently in the
Reich in the above-mentioned manner during the nest 6 months,
considerable additional difficulties must be expected. For, in the
opinion of all those concerned, the foregoing groups are suitable only
for direct resettlement in entire units. Quartering them in a recep-
tion camp would, I am told, lead to the most serious friction and make
the other peasant groups of the South Tirol far less willing to leave.
This is all the more so because the considerable propaganda of the
"stay-putters" and of the local Italian agencies, which is still in
evidence, would make extraordinary gains if it should not be possible
to carry out smoothly the permanent resettlement of these groups,
which are regarded as a test case. All details, such as, e.g., the
dispatch of advance parties of the peasants to be resettled, the prep-
* See document No. 175.
SEPTEMBER 1941 579
aration of the farms to be occupied, etc., must be handled with special
care, particularly in this part of the resettlement action. The im-
portance of these details is so great — and this cannot be emphasized
often enough — especially because the people of the South Tirol con-
sider the transfer an exceedingly heavy sacrifice and the thought of the
future oppresses the entire country like a nightmare. The peasant
population in particular is imbued to the core with love of the home-
land and its beauties and is attached to its ancestral land with
exceedingly strong bonds.
An organizational difficulty which cannot remain unmentioned in
this connection is the great personnel expansion, described to me by
the Germans and Italians, which has taken place in the German
agencies set up in Bolzano for the implementation of the resettlement.
The South Tirolese as well as the Italians complain that the number
of experts employed in the South Tirol is out of all proportion to the
results of their work. In view of the narrow provincialism of condi-
tions in Bolzano such a defect, which would be insignificant in a
larger framework, acquires a political importance that should not be
underestimated.
Since I am not familiar with details, I am not in a position to make
any useful suggestions for changes. I assume, however, that Consul
General Mayr will take up this question, too, soon after entering upon
the duties of his office. 9
i. Duties of the German Cojnmissioner for the South Tirol.
The German Commissioner in Bolzano, as the central authority
with exclusive power, will have the duty of discussing all the questions
set forth above with his opposite number, the Italian Commissioner, 10
and of finding a solution for them. His duties will, furthermore, in-
clude the handling and solution of all the questions — also those of a
fundamental nature that have been left open in the various German-
Italian agreements on the implementation of the resettlement.
In the treaty area there are still about 150,000 people opting for
Germany; from this it follows that hardly any sphere of state or
communal activity can be without interest to the Commissioner. Men-
tion may be made here of questions like unequal allocation of rationed
goods, inequality in the handling of business and import licenses,
discrimination in the export quotas allocated for fruit and wine, dis-
crimination in tax matters and in public welfare, trespasses by
military, police, and municipal authorities, etc.
The fact that the whole face of the province of Bolzano takes on
a new appearance because of the resettlement has had the further
° See document No. 175, footnote 7.
"In telegram No. 2525 of Oct. 13 (4865/E249580-83) Maclcensep reported that
Agostino Podesta, Prefect of Bolzano, would be nominated as the Italian High
Commissioner.
580 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
result that a number of duties of a purely consular nature have al-
ready, because of their inevitable effect on the work of resettlement,
been transferred from the German Consulate in Bolzano to the
office of Minister Bene. The following, for example, may be men-
tioned; the supervison of tourist trade from Germany, the German
school system, the care of the numerous South Tirolese members of
the German "Wehrmacht, the special questions arising out of the large
number of German military transports, etc.
For the proper solution of these and other problems it is necessary
that the German and Italian Commissioners be empowered by the
German and Italian sides to carry on correspondence and discussions
on all questions connected with the resettlement and have authority
to transfer their negotiating powers for reasons of expediency to
other agencies. This has already been done in the case of the negotia-
tions of the German group of the Property Appraisal Commission
with the Italian group, the correspondence of the Official German
Immigration and Repatriation Office (Amtliche Deutsche Ein- und
Riickwandererstelle) (ADEURST) with the Italian Migration Of-
fice and the Italian municipal, judicial and local military authorities,
and the negotiations between the German Liquidation Trust Com-
pany, Incorporated (Deutsche Abwicklimgs-Treuhand-Gesellsehaft
m.b.H.) (DAT) and the National Agency for the Three Venetias
(Ente Nasionale per le Tre Venezie) .
Experience has shown that simultaneous negotiation by various
German agencies with the Prefecture have led to difficulties which
it would have been better to avoid.
Recognizing this, the Reichsfiihrer SS has already decreed under
par. 1 of the directive of January 1, 1941, a copy of which is enclosed, 11
that only the Reich representative shall be authorized to negotiate
with the Italian authorities. Strictly enforced, the directive will be
a secure basis for the work of the future German Commissioner,
especially if the authority of the Head of the Official German Immi-
gration and Repatriation Office to negotiate, in certain cases, directly
with the Italian Under State Secretary of the Interior, which was
useful at times, is now revoked. Furthermore, I consider it nec-
essary that the vote of the German Commissioner should be decisive
in the formation of the opinion of the German delegation in the
mixed German-Italian committee, which decides about the validity of
doubtful options.
Internally, it would be in keeping with this delimitation of the
external powers of the Special Representative if all the German
agencies concerned with the resettlement were subordinated to the
German Commissioner in so far as they deal with matters requiring
"Not printed (4865/E24&546-51).
SEPTEMBER 1041 581
contact with the Italian agencies. The German agencies involved
are the following:
the German Consulate in Bolzano ;
the Official German Immigration and Repatriation Offices ;
the German Cultural Mission attached to it ;
the German Liquidation Trust Co., Inc., in Bolzano ;
the Special Representative of the Reichsfiihrer SS and Chief of
the German Police in Bolzano.
The German group of the German-Italian Property Appraisal Com-
mission is already completely subordinate to the Reich Representative.
The Working Group of the Optants {ArbeitsgemeinsoTiaft der
Optanten) (A.d.O.) is subordinate to the Head of the Official Ger-
man Immigration and Repatriation Offices. Although the Reich
Representative has in the past been able to communicate directly
with the manager of this working group and vice versa, I still con-
sider it necessary to place particular emphasis on this right in the
delimitation of the powers of the German Commissioner. In order
really to make the German Commissioner the final authority for all
South Tirolese questions it is furthermore necessary to make the
above-mentioned agencies subordinate to him, not only in conducting
negotiations with the Italians but also in reporting to the Foreign
Ministry, to the Reichsfiihrer SS, or to the Reich Commissar for the
Consolidation of the German National Community, in such a way
that this reporting is done under his direction and he is thereby given
the opportunity to express his opinion. At the same time the direc-
tives of the Reichsfiihrer SS and Reich Commissar for the Consolida-
tion of the German National Community to these agencies would
likewise have to go through the hands of the German Commissioner.
This does not, of course, apply to correspondence on administrative
matters.
It is furthermore in the interest of unification of the German rep-
resentation in the South Tirolese question, which past experience has
shown to be urgently necessary, to empower the German Commis-
sioner, in addition, to issue instructions to the various German agen-
cies — without prejudice to their responsibilities to the offices to which
they are subordinated — in so far as he considers it his duty to issue
such instructions in the interest of foreign policy.
I shall report on the rank to be assigned to the future position of
Consul General Dr. Mayr as soon as it is definitely known whom the
Italians will appoint as High Commissioner. 12
v. Mackensen
"In telegram No. 2525 (see footnote 10), Mackensen also suggested that Mayr
be given the rank of Minister as had been the case with Bene in the past and
which would correspond to the rank of Prefect of the Italian Hijrh Commissioner,
Podestil.
582 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 363
482/2312T4-TS
The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military
Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Minister
Telegram
top seoket Belgrade, September 28, 1941 — 2 : 30 p. m.
No. 701 of September 28 Received September 28—3 : 10 p. m.
DIII47lg.
For the Foreign Minister personally.
I have repeatedly (cf. telegrams Nos. 608, 1 621, 2 and 636 s ) requested
the support of the Foreign Ministry with regard to the immediate de-
portation of local male Jews from Serbia, which was however denied
me. Permit me to remind you that in Fuschl you expressly promised
your help * in moving the Jews and also the Freemasons and pro-Eng-
lish Serbs, be it down the Danube or into concentration camps in Ger-
many or in the General Government. The immediate solution of the
Jewish question is the most important political task here at the mo-
ment, and is the prerequisite for a start in eliminating Freemasons and
the intelligentisia which is hostile to us. The military operation in
progress to put down the insurrection has now created a suitable mo-
ment for beginning the action. Furthermore, General Bohme as well
as the Military Commander have again very emphatically asked me to
make an effort on their behalf that the Jews be removed from the coun-
try immediately, if possible. For the time being 8,000 male Jews are
involved, who cannot be accommodated in local camps because these
must be used for accommodating about 20,000 Serbs from insurrection-
ary areas. As a result of the situation created by the insurrection it is
likewise impossible to accommodate them in new camps and outside of
Belgrade. We will have to cope here with the remaining approximate-
ly 20,000 Jews and their families. Deportation to an island in the
Danube delta seems the simplest solution from the standpoint of trans-
portation, since empty freight barges are immediately available. Ac-
cording to my information this procedure was also already used suc-
cessfully in the deportation of Jews from Czechia.
I most urgently request, jointly with Veesenmayer, your support in
this matter [which is] the first prerequisite for the lasting pacification
we are striving for. 5
Benzler
1 Document No. 288.
' Document No. 297.
' See document No. 313, footnote 1.
* No record found.
"Marginal notes: "Submit at once. Party Comrade Raderuacher. Please re-
turn. Lu[ther] t Oct. 1."
SEPTEMBER 1941 583
No. 364
2116/460542-48
Memorandum by the Foreign Minister
Berlin, September 28, 1941. 1
RAM 48.
Record of the Reception of the Swedish Charge d' Affaires bt the
Foreign Minister on September 26, 1941 B
The Foreign Minister received the Swedish Charge d'Affaires, Coun-
selor von Post, in the evening of September 26, 1941. The Foreign
Minister stated by way of introduction that originally he intended to
ask the Minister to see him, but with the Minister being absent from
Berlin, he would now ask M. von Post to convey to his Government
several statements dealing with our relationship to Sweden. The
situation was that we had occasion to note continuous violent attacks
on Germany and on the Fiihrer and his policy in the Swedish press 3
and particularly at the proceedings of the Swedish trade unions in
Sweden, 4 and that this occurred at the very time when the Fiihrer was
engaged in a gigantic struggle to relieve the world once and for all of
the Bolshevik threat. The significance of this struggle, which was not
merely a conflict between Germany and Russia but a matter concerning
the whole of Europe, had become apparent to all European nations.
Even our enemies of yesterday, the French, had joined in the battle to
defeat Bolshevism through volunteers now wearing the German uni-
form. 8 Only two countries had excluded themselves from participa-
a The date has been taken from an appended sheet (F4/0329) listing the
officials to whom copies of the memorandum were to be sent.
1 On Sept. 30 a photostatic copy of this record was sent to Prince zu Wled
for his information (F2/01B2).
*In telegram No. 1435 of Sept 15 (205/142972-73) Wled reported that the
proclamation of a state of emergency In Norway had had a very unfavorable
reaction In Sweden, particularly with the pronouncement of two death sen-
tences on the first day, and this in Scandinavia where the death penalty had
been abolished. Pro-German Swedes were forced to silence on this theme.
"The Impression on Sweden of the activity of Quisling had during the last year
unfavorably influenced German-Swedish relations. The most recent events in
Norway have now led to a serious encumbrance to these relations. The Nordic
feeling of belonging together has been significantly strengthened. The typical
Nordic spirit of contradiction has begun to work perniciously against everything
that is German." Wied concluded : "Inasmuch as I have served in Norway and
Sweden for almost 18 years and believe that I have learned to know the
mentality here, I feel myself obliged to submit this report"
Cf. document No. 312.
4 In telegram 1458 of Sept. 18 (205/142976-80) Wied reported a conversation
with Gfinther who emphasized the strong reaction in Sweden against the
German use of the death penalty In Norway. He drew attention to the close
connection between the Swedish Social Democratic party and the Norwegian
trade unions.
5 See document No. 78.
584 DOCUMENTS ON" GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
tion in this struggle: Sweden and Switzerland. Sweden had even
gone so far as to forbid Swedish volunteers wishing to join the German
colors to carry out their intent. 8 Instead of participation by Sweden
in the struggle we were confronted with ever new instances of un-
friendliness and insults on her part. He, the Foreign Minister, on the
other hand, could not recall that the German press had ever insulted
Sweden. We hoped that the present situation did not constitute the
final stage of the development and that Sweden would eventually
realize on which side she really belonged in the struggle ; for in these
very days, with German troops just having occupied Poltava, we could
not imagine that the spirit of a Charles XII had become entirely ex-
tinct among the Swedish people.
The Foreign Minister then discussed the attitude of the Swedish
Government in the question of the Norwegian ships in Swedish ports/
This attitude amounted to patent favoritism toward England by the
Swedish Government. Germany could not understand this attitude.
If any of the Norwegian ships were actually to depart from a Swedish
port, thus augmenting the tonnage available to the English, the Reich
Government would be compelled to view facilitation of such a de-
parture as an unfriendly act by the Swedish Government. He, the
Foreign Minister, did not know how the Fiihrer would react to
Sweden's action in such a case, but exactly because he was anxious to
preserve the traditionally good relations between Germany and
Sweden, he was constrained to point out in all earnestness the im-
portance of what he had just said.
There were yet other aspects of the German-Swedish relationship,
the Foreign Minister continued, which were unsatisfactory, but he
would not now go into these matters to any length. He would only
reiterate his regret that Sweden had excluded herself from participa-
tion in the battle against Bolshevism and, instead, adopted a position
in the question of the Norwegian ships, which not only did not help
Germany and her Allies, but practically amounted to a stab in the
back. He was saying this in all candor and friendship in order to
enable Stockholm to realize how Sweden's attitude was judged here
in Berlin. As a remark of a more personal character the Foreign
Minister also added that the Fiihrer, more than anyone else, could
not help but feel bitter that in the gigantic struggle which removed
a deadly threat also from Sweden's future he received insults instead
of thanks as a reward from the Swedish side, and that the Swedish
press kept on sniping at Germany in the most unfriendly manner.
Counselor von Post, who had made notes of these remarks, stated on
his part that it was true nevertheless that 2,000 Swedish volunteers
' See document No. 270.
7 See documents Nos. 834 and 343.
SEPTEMBER 1941 585
had joined the fighting in Finland, to which the Foreign Minister re-
plied that Sweden's reputation was not held in high esteem in Fin-
land. He could assure him, on the other hand, that the Finns, as a
courageous people, had won the heart of the German nation for the
future.
M. von Post then stated in regard to the question of the Norwegian
ships in Swedish ports that in this affair the Swedish Government
was doing nothing else but adhere to the letter of the legal provisions,
for which it could not be reproached. 8 The Foreign Minister replied
by asking whether Sweden would persist in this purely legalistic
approach even in the event that this would eventually bring Bolshev-
ism to the country. The situation was such that England was allied
with Bolshevism and that Churchill could only be pleased if
Bolshevism were victorious all along the line and were also to over-
run Sweden. Given such a situation, every action by Sweden favoring
England was something on the order of suicide. We knew from a
reliable source that Eoosevelt and Churchill had agreed at their
meeting 9 that it would be best to employ every resource that would
bring about Germany's defeat by Bolshevism, regardless of whether
or not the other European countries became bolshevized in the process.
What intentions Soviet Russia entertained in regard to Sweden, he,
the Foreign Minister, was able to tell M. von Post from personal
experience. Here, in the air raid cellar of his house, Molotov had
told him on his visit last year 10 that Soviet Russia must treat the
question of the outlets from the Baltic Sea along the Swedish coast
on a level with the question of the exit from the Black Sea. The
Swedes should be able to gather from this the wide range of the goals
pursued by Bolshevism. Despite this and in the midst of the greatest
decisive struggle of world history, in which gigantic battles were
being fought with tremendous tank armies on a scale never witnessed
before, the Swedes were keeping themselves aloof from the struggle
and even forbade Swedish volunteers to join the German troops in
their battle. He, the Foreign Minister, had no intention whatever to
plead with the Swedes that they should how permit the recruiting of
volunteers, but he only mentioned this as an illustration of Sweden's
totally incomprehensible attitude.
M. von Post then added a few remarks on the policy of the Swedish
trade unions, which he characterized as shortsighted, whereupon the
Foreign Minister assured him once more that the pro-English attitude
of the Swedish trade unions was like a fit of blindness, for Churchill
would in icy calm allow all Swedes to be put to death by the Bol-
sheviks if this would benefit the war against Germany. The Foreign
* See document No. 343.
' See document No. 208 and footnote 2.
10 See vol. xi of this series, document No. 329.
586 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Minister concluded his remarks to the Swedish Charge d' Affaires
in a friendly form, adding that he was well aware that the Charge
d'Affaires had rendered many a service to German-Swedish relations,
but just because Sweden had so many friends in Germany he wanted
to tell the Charge" d'Affaires quite openly what the views about
Sweden's attitude were in Germany. 11
B[lBBENTROP]
u In memorandum StS. No. 673 of Oct 7 (205/143038-39) Weizaaeker re-
corded a conversation with the Swedish Minister Richert who had just returned
from an official visit to Stockholm. Richert expressed the appreciation of the
Swedish Foreign Minister for Ribbentrop's views on German-Swedish relations.
At the same time he mentioned that Gilnther strongly objected to Ribbentrop'B
view that Sweden was favoring Britain In the question of Norwegian ships in
Swedish ports, Weizs&cker maintained the views of RIbbentrop.
No. 365
4608/E193836
Minute by the Director of the Political Department
Berlin, September 28, 1941,
e. o.Pol. 1X2523.
The discussion which I was instructed to have regarding the en-
closed memorandum 1 has not been held.
I do not believe that the situation of our Reich citizens in North
and South America would be improved if in accordance with this
proposal reprisals were taken against Jews and Freemasons in
Germany.
Incidentally I have heard that Minister Rosenberg has recently
recommended to the Fiihrer that reprisals should be taken against
Jews in Germany in retaliation for the deportation of Volksdeutsche.
Herewith submitted to the State Secretary, 2
WOEKMANN
1 Memorandum of Sept. 5 (4608/E193837-38), submitted to Bohle by Httbner,
an official of the Auslandsorganisation. It proposed that it be announced that
reprisals against Jews and Freemasons In areas under German control would be
taken in retaliation for the "arrests and mistreatments of our fellow-Germans
in the countries of America". From marginal notes on this memorandum it
appears that on Sept. 6 Bohle passed it on to Weizsacker who in turn forwarded
it to Woermann.
1 Marginal notes :
"Herr Erdmannsdorff. Please discuss with me. W[eizsacker], Sept. 29."
"To Ambassador Dieckhoff with a request for an expression of opinion. Erd-
mannsdorff, Sept. 30."
"In my opinion such reprisals will not improve the situation of our Reich
citizens in America, but worsen it. We shall then probably arouse groups against
us which heretofore had still understanding for Germany. Dfieckhoff], Oct. 1."
"In 6 weeks. B [rdmannsdorff ], Oct. 18."
"Submitted to the Dirigent of the Political Department. The secretariat of
Pol. IX has presented this to me today. Shall any further action be taken?
Freytag, Jan. 6 [1942]".
"No. To the flies. E[rdmannsdorff], Jan. 6."
SEPTEMBER 1941 587
No. 366
265/173297-99
Memorandum by Minister Eisenlohr
Dir. Ha. Pol. 198 Berlin, September 28, 1941.
Subject: Negotiations for a German-Turkish Trade Agreement
(Ankara telegram No. 238 of September 25, 1941 *) .
The Turks, invoking their commitment to the English, have def-
initely declined to supply us with chromium ore during 1942, but on
the other hand, have expressed their willingness to promise in a treaty
now to be concluded to undertake the delivery of substantial quanti-
ties of chromium ore beginning January 8, 1943; to supply in the
meantime 12,000 tons of copper and to do their utmost to comply with
German requests for increased deliveries of olive oil and cotton.
Minister Clodius has now requested prompt instructions whether he
should break off negotiations or accept the latest Turkish offer.
The Economic Policy Committee has expressed itself in favor of
the second alternative. 2 To be sure, the representative of the Min-
istry of Economics has formally reserved his consent because he was
unable to inform his State Secretary yesterday. I shall meet the
latter today, however; and believe that I can count on his consent.
The following considerations were decisive for this positive attitude :
1. The conclusion of a treaty of smaller scope restricted to com-
modities of lesser importance would be interpreted as a German fail-
ure; the rupture of negotiations would be preferable to such a treaty.
2. The prospect of obtaining chromium ore in 1943 is valuable for
the future. Nor is it impossible that if our political relations with
Turkey continue to develop, the Turks, under the impression of our
military successes in Russia, will change their position and supply
us with chromium ore even in 1942. Conversely, an intensification
of our trade relations will also affect the development of the political
relationship.
3. Turkish deliveries of copper, but especially of cotton and oil
promised for 1942, are exceedingly valuable to us.
Regarding the question of war material, the following should be
said : The German armament deliveries, which were to include light
guns with ammunition, technical material from the French booty,
and heavy guns still to be manufactured, with ammunition, and like-
wise their early delivery so far have been promised by the OKW
1 Document No. 358.
' The minutes of this meeting of the Economic Policy Committee of Sept. 27
(2109/456494-96) were recorded on that date by Bisenlobr.
588 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN" FOREIGN POLICY
in return for chromium ore only, on an item by item basis. If the
Turkish proposal is accepted it -would be necessary to get the OKW
to accept that the heavy guns, in -which the Turks are especially
interested, and -whose accelerated completion will take 14 months,
will be reserved for item by item delivery in return for chromium
ore beginning January 1943, but that the delivery of other war mate-
rial to be charged against copper, cotton, and oil, that is, strategic
supplies, should begin as soon as possible, that is to say, that its
major part would, be shipped still in 1942.
If the Foreign Minister approves the acceptance of the Turkish
offer, the War Economy and Armaments Office is prepared to sub-
mit an appropriate proposal to the Chief of the OKW. It would
be advisable to support this proposal by having Ambassador Eitter
intercede with the Wehrmacht Operations Staff.
In accord with the opinion of the chief of delegation I recom-
mend the acceptance of the Turkish proposal and request permission
to take the necessary steps with the War Economy and Armaments
Office to obtain the consent of the Chief of the OKW, for the above-
mentioned modification in the terms which hitherto have been applied
regarding war material, and to inform Minister Clodius
accordingly. 3
Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister in accordance with
instructions.
Eisenlohb
'In telegram No. 71 of Sept. 29 (9903/E693944-45) Eisenlohr informed
Clodius that the Foreign Minister as well as the other offices concerned had
agreed In principle to accept the latest Turkish offer as reported In Del. No. 32
(document No. 358). The approval by the Chief of the OKW was being
requested.
However, in telegram No. 76 of Sept. 30 (9903/E693£>46-47) Eisenlohr informed
Clodtus that Keltel had rejected the idea of supplying Turkey with heavy
guns even at a later date unless Turkey delivered chromium ore as early
as in 1942. In return for Turkish deliveries of other strategic commodities
he was willing to concede merely the delivery of new tubing for gun barrels,
engineering equipment, also mines, explosives, and Hotchkiss machine guns
from booty material. Eisenlohr emphasized that efforts continued to induce
Keltel to change his position.
In telegram No. 266 of Oct. 1 (265/173314-15) Papen called this decision by
the Chief of the OKW "Incomprehensible", stating that Germany would now
hardly be able to obtain vital raw materials such as copper, cotton, and vege-
table oil from Turkey. Accordingly, he urged, it might be better not to con-
clude any commercial treaty at all. Papen also regretted Keltel's decision for
the reason that it "deprived him of the possibility of detaching Turkey from
England." See, further, document No. 374.
SEPTEMBER 1941 589
No. 367
2309/486487-88
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 254 of September 29 Ankara, September 29, 1941.
Received September 29 — 11 : 00 p. m,
For the Foreign Minister.
Today's detailed discussion among Numan, Clodius, and me dealt
with all aspects of the economic and political situation. Numan,
referring to the Anglo-Turkish Treaty 1 which he read to us, told
me once more of the impossibility of chromium deliveries in 1942.
To my objection that Turkey ought to have refused to transfer
France's share to England, he replied that France (group garbled)
had been in arrears with deliveries of war material to a total of 14
million pounds sterling and that England had offered to deliver this
war material herself. His statements confirmed that the Turkish
Government had actually tried everything to make delivery to us of
at least a portion of the chromium for 1942.
With respect to the political situation, Numan replied to my remon-
strations that while Turkey had a vital interest in the defeat of Bol-
shevism, she did not want to declare her true feelings before the
world. The English were fully aware that Turkey had a vital inter-
est in the destruction of Bolshevism. In response to my request to
define this position clearly before the world too, he stated that the
Turkish Government wanted to wait for the moment when the clear
definition of its position could be expected to reap the largest possi-
ble political benefit.
He then dealt in detail with Turkey's position with respect to Eng- .
land, emphasizing that adherence to agreements that had been entered
into was of vital importance to Turkey's prestige, but that the treaty
of alliance as such was no more than an ornament. For the rest
I should discuss with Saracoglu the question of defining the Turkish
position.
In conclusion, Numan again emphasized, as Clodius reported
earlier, 2 that conclusion of a comprehensive trade agreement pro-
viding for chromium deliveries beginning in 1943 would undoubt-
edly create the best possible political impression. Most vigorous
1 See document No. 352, footnote 4.
* Document No. 358.
590 DOCUMENTS ON GBEMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Anglo-American protests were being anticipated. If "we were to limit
ourselves to the status quo, it would unquestionably be exploited by
the opposing side, which would represent that as a serious deteriora-
tion of the German-Turkish relationship.
As your telegram No. 69, 3 point 2, has already stated that with the
acceptance of the Turkish proposal for a comprehensive agreement
chromium deliveries could be expected to begin in 1943, we would now
request that a definitive decision be reached at an early date so that
the negotiations can be concluded.
I shall induce Saracoglu tomorrow to treat the conclusion of the
agreement, when it occurs, as an important event ; Numan has already
promised this.
Papejj
* Not found.
No. 368
535/240060-62
Memorcmcktm by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 650 Berlin, September 29, 1941.
The Nuncio gave me today the appended note verbale with an an-
nex, 1 regarding regulations concerning church policy in the Warthe-
gau. The note verbale refers to an earlier detailed note from the
Nuncio of August 14. 2 It is concerned with the basic question of
the extent to which it is the intention to impede permanently the tra-
ditional functioning ©f the Catholic Church, in the Warthegau.
For the time being I have only accepted the new note verbale of the
Nuncio without expressing myself on particulars, but I consider it
necessary to clarify whether the Reich Government intends to make
the Catholic Church in the Warthegau entirely dependent upon itself
and cut it off from the hierarchy and Rome. To judge from the pres-
ent attitude of the Reichsstatthalter in the Warthegau 8 and from
indications which Minister Kerrl made to me, one can count on the
above procedure. I do not consider it correct, however, to deny the
jurisdiction of the Nuncio for the Warthegau and I also wrote this
a TMs was decree No. 246 of the Reichsstatthalter of the Warthegau, "Decree
concerning religious organizations and societies in the Relchsgau Wartheland,
September 13, 1941" (535/240063-68).
' See document No. 272, footnote 1.
8 Arthur Greiser.
SEPTEMBER 1841 591
recently to the Keichsstatthalter. His answer to my letter has not yet
arrived.*
Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister. 6
Weizsacker
[Enclosure]
Apostolic Nunciature, Germany
No. 42661 Berlin, September 29, 1941.
Note Verbale
Already at an earlier date the Apostolic Nuncio became aware of a
number of symptomatic orders in the field of church policy in the
Warthegau which in an unexpressed manner impeded the traditional
functioning of the hierarchy and the life of the Catholic Church. For
this reason he considered himself obligated by means of a letter of
August 14, 1941 (No. 41650)' and another of September 2 of this
year (No. 42000) T to call the attention of the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the German Eeich to these incidents so that the latter might
contribute with his influential mediation to the restoration of the im-
peded religious freedom in those areas and to the pacification of the
Catholic population there hoth of German and of Polish ethnic origin.
The Holy See tried at the time to contribute to the pacification of
the bilingual population of the Warthegau through special regulations,
in that for example, contrary to the general provisions of Canon 216,
Section 4 of the Church Legal Code, it permitted the establishment of
parishes that were to include exclusively the German Catholics and
others exclusively the Polish Catholics.
Nevertheless the Government of the Warthegau issued a decree
dated September 13 of this year, of which a copy is here appended, 8 in
which the existing Church hierarchy is entirely ignored. The Govern-
ment of the Wartheland passes over the existing dioceses and parishes
* Weizs&eker's letter to Greiser and Greiser's reply have not been fonnd.
By means of a minute Of Oct. 4 signed by Weber (535/240083) Ribbentrop
directed Weizsacker to take up the problem of decrees in regard to religious mat-
ters In the Warthegau with Kerrl, the Reich Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs,
and to ask directly if Kerrl agreed with such decrees.
In a minute of Oct. 6 (535/240083-84) Weizsacker replied that he would not
have communicated directly with Keichsstatthalter Greiser If In religious mat-
ters he were under the authority of Reich Minister Kerrl, However, the Reich
Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs had told him earlier, and had recently con-
firmed, that by order of the Puhrer he was to issue no directives regarding
religious matters In the Warthegau. Weizsacker added that if direct correspond-
ence with the Reichsstatthalter did not clarify the matter he would then turn to
Lammers.
See, further, document No. 647.
'Document No. 272, footnote 1.
T Document No. 272.
■Not printed (535/240063-68).
592 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
and establishes in their place new religious communities which it
declares to be juridical persons under private law.
The Apostolic Nuncio protests most strongly against this decree,
which passes over the existing competent Church hierarchy, as well as
against the arbitrary procedure of publishing the relevant decree of
September 13 without further notice, and requests recision of the
above-mentioned decree.
No. 369
222/150080-82
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 3117 of September 30 Bucharest, September 30, 1941.
Received September 30 — 8 : 00 p. m.
[Deputy] Minister President Mihai Antonescu made the following
statement today to the deputy of the Special Representative for
Economic Questions :
Rumania had undertaken three obligations toward Germany :
1. To make available all petroleum supplies and reserves;
2. To supply Germany with Rumanian grain in so far as it was not
needed for supplying the Rumanian population ;
3. To provision the German troops in Rumania and to finance their
requirements.
The petroleum reserves are used up. They were being unsparingly
exhausted and given to the German Army.
Germany had received all of the grain which could be exported. It
was only through a mistake in the statistics of the Minister of Supply,
which the latter had had to pay for at once with the loss of his position,
that in the agreement of May 29 1 the Marshal, 2 in indicating the
maize supplies, had proceeded on the basis of figures which had not
turned out to be true. Rumania herself was suffering badly from the
scarcity of maize.
As regards the provisioning of the German troops and the financing
of the needs of the Wehrmacht, Rumania had already gone to the
limits of what was possible,, and would also continue to do everything
she could. He knew that m making further payments to the Wehr-
macht Rumania was ruining not only her currency system but also
her national budget, her price structure, and her taxes. 3 Rumania
was ready to make this sacrifice too. So far she had had 90,000 dead
and wounded. The operation against Odessa had had to be halted,
1 This apparently refers to the "Confidential Protocol Regarding the Result
or the Tenth Joint Session of the German and Rumanian Government I Com-
mittees, May 9-29, 1941," which was signed In Bucharest May 29
(M209/M006829-19).
' By royal decree of Aug. 23, General Antonescu had been appointed Marshal
of Rumania.
* Eisenlohr's memorandum of Oct. 5 (222/130098-101) records that Rumanian
complaints that purchases by the Wehrmacht were raising prices and jeopardiz-
ing the currency began to be made toward the end of August.
SEPTEMBER 1941 593
however, because the ammunition was lacking which Eumania had
shared with the German troops. The Russians were bringing up new
divisions from the Caucasus to Odessa; this city was now better for-
tified than before. 4 He therefore had to fear that the sacrifice of the
56,000 soldiers that Rumania had so far lost before Odessa would be
in vain, unless Germany rendered decisive help through deliveries of
materials for the manufacture of ammunition and also for the rest of
the economy as well; which alone would be able to remedy the im-
balance between money and goods. AH around Rumania communist
fires were flaring up; if disturbances should break out in Rumania,
this could not be in Germany's interest nor could she wish this to
happen in the face of the wavering attitude of Turkey. 5 Germany
therefore had to reduce the requirements of her Army in Rumania,
and on the other hand make increased deliveries. In answer to the
objection that Rumania herself had through her import restrictions
kept German goods away until a few months ago, the [Deputy] Minis-
ter President said that the Marshal had given him the task of work-
ing out a plan with us for German deliveries which would approxi-
mately correspond to the Rumanian services for Germany. Up to
April of next year this would amount for the German troops in
Rumania to 18 (eighteen) billion lei for oil and 15 (fifteen) billion for
gram exports totalling 33 billion lei. In reply to the question what
concrete wishes Rumania had, Antonescu stated first that instead of
deliveries being made from Germany merely in return for the Ruma-
nian expenditures for war purposes and in order to increase the war
potential, the Hermann Goring Reichswerke in taking over the legal
contract of the Malaxa plant had now refused to make even minor
deliveries of raw materials. 6 The negotiations with Minister Clodius
on the delivery of armament equipment had also been broken off. His
urgent request for deliveries of ammunition from Finland had been
in vain. He therefore asked in the interest of the common cause that
the German attitude toward Rumania in the economic field be
changed, and that she be supplied with the urgently needed raw
materials and ammunition. 7
VON KlLLINGER
'In telegram No. 2768 of Sept. 1 (222/149949) Killings had stated that
Rumanian casualties sustained in the heavy fighting around Odessa and the
successful resistance of the Red Army had weakened Antonescu's prestige and
had encouraged all those opposed to any Rumanian operations beyond the
Dniester.
B In telegram No. 2882 of Sept. 9, forwarded to the Special Train as No. 3064
(222/149965-67), Killinger reported that General Antonescu was concerned about
the attitude of Turkey and was convinced that Turkey's entry Into the war
against the Axis Powers would result in heavy attacks upon the Rumanian
oil fields. In this context Antonescu complained that the protection for this
petroleum region was "absolutely insufficient" at the present.
"The earlier part of this sentence was somewhat garbled in transmission
The text printed represents an attempt to establish the intended meaning of
this passage.
' In telegram No. 1075 of Oct. 7 from the Special Train, forwarded to Bucharest
as No. 2737 (222/150104-05), Ritter instructed Killinger to assure the Rumanian
Government that the German Government and High Command would do every-
thing possible to comply with Rumanian wishes and complaints. Keitel had
already given strict instructions that no purchases be made in Rumania for
German troops employed outside Rumania. Furthermore, the OKW had di-
rected the War Economy and Armaments Office that Rumania be more ade-
quately supplied with ammunition for guns of German origin.
682-905—64 43
594 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 370
129/121174
Memorandum, by an Ojjieial of Political Division IM
Berlin, September 30, 1941.
Pol.I.M. (Att)9275g.
The Air Attache in Lisbon l reported in dispatch 66/41 g. of Sep-
tember 20 2 regarding the statements of the State Secretary in the
Ministry of War, Santos Costa. Costa's most interesting ideas are
given below in extracts :
1. In contrast with her earlier position, Portugal no longer intended
to strengthen her armed forces to any substantial degree.
2. The task of the Portuguese armed forces was, first of all, to pro-
tect the islands and the colonies until a greater military power could
come to the aid of Portugal. The troops on the Atlantic islands
could hold the islands from 3 to 4 days against the attack of a major
power.
3. Portugal intended to maintain strict neutrality. In case o± an
attempt to land by English or American troops, she would call on
Germany for help. In case of an invasion by Germany or Spain on
the other hand she would call on England for help. 3
4. The Portuguese Government was endeavoring, together with
Spain, to induce the Latin- American countries to strengthen the
political and economic ties with the Iberian Peninsula and with it to
Europe. _
Grote
1 Major General Krahmer.
• In wSrt No. 11454 of Oct. 25 (4865/E248&44-945) Huene stated that Salazar
would most likely not leave Portugal in case of a German occupation. President
Carmona would stay only in case of a British or American landing in .the Azores
and would leave the country in case of an unprovoked occupation of Portugal
by Germany.
No. 371
205/143033-34
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most TfBGENT Stockholm, October 1, 1941—10 : 30 a. m.
No. 1588 of October 1 Received October 1—12 : 15 p. m.
With reference to our telegram No. 1574 of September 29. 1
The Chief of the Legal Department of the Swedish Foreign Min-
istry informed the Legation as follows regarding the current status of
the motions for arrest brought against the Norwegian ships.
1 Not found.
OCTOBER 1941 595
1) In the case of the Rigmor* the Court of Appeal canceled the
negative decision of the Chief Bailiff of Goteborg, 3 which he had
rendered in consequence of the English Government's objection of im-
munity, and approved the arrest. Thereby a precedent has been set
which is favorable to our view.
2) In all the other cases the Chief Bailiff first called the opposing
parties for statements regarding our motion for arrest but without at
the same time ordering a provisional seizure of the ships.
Our attorney immediately introduced an appeal without awaiting
the definitive decision in the first instance. In consequence of this
the Court of Appeal on procedural grounds had to refer the matter
to the Chief Bailiff for decision in the first instance. The further
treatment of the matter by the Chief Bailiff will consist of his taking
the statements of the opposing parties and then rendering his decision. 4
3) In the Foreign Ministry here the state of the matter as a whole
is viewed thus : that the Chief Bailiff, in accordance with the precedent
of the decision in the case of the Rigtnor, which our attorney will
cite, will approve the arrests. But should this not occur in the first
instance then the Court of Appeal will in all probability make the
same decision as in the case of the Rigmor.
4) M. Engzell mentioned further that up to now none of the ships
had asked for clearance so that within the next 8 days there could
' For the beginnings of the Rigmor ease see document No. 329 and footnote 1
In telegram 192 of Sept 25 (205/143022-23) it was reported from GHteborg
that the Chief Bailiff had initially canceled the order for arrest in the case of the
Rigmor, accepting the English contention that the English Government had ac-
quired the ship as its property from the Norwegian Government in London.
It was also reported that the papers relating to six other ships had come from
Norway and that actions of arrest had been refused by the Chief Bailiff in these
cases also on the same grounds as in the case of the Rigmor.
'In telegram No. 1896 of Nov. 7 (205/143086-87) Dankwort reported that the
Chief Bailiff had the day before rendered his decision in the first instance. He
refused the motions for arrest and for the removal of the captains from the ships
on the grounds that by the Norwegian law of May 18, 1940, the right to dispose of
the ships was transferred to the Norwegian Government. The Norwegian ship-
owners therefore had no right to the ships. On the appeal of the attorney for
the German Government the court at G6ta overruled the Chief Bailiff and ap-
proved the provisional arrests. At the suggestion of the Swedish Foreign Min-
istry the Germans got the services of an additional attorney. At the suggestion
of the GHteborg police, bail of 10,000 kronor was set for each case, and key parts
of the engine of each snip were removed In order to prevent any escape.
596 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
be no question of a ship's leaving with the knowledge of the Swedish
authorities. 5
Wied
5 In telegram No 1921 of Nov. 13 (205/143096) Dankwort reported that the
State Secretary of the Swedish Foreign Ministry had informed him that the
English Minister had delivered a note protesting against the favoring of the
German claims regarding the Norwegian ships. The protest was directed particu-
larly against the issuance by the Swedish Government of an ad hoc law which
concerned legal action regarding the ships after provisional arrest had been
T ^f 11 so d
Telegram No. 1922 of Nov, 14 (205/143099) reported that the first session of
the court of Goteborg on the suit against the captains of the Norwegian ships
took place the day before. The motion of the opposing side for countermanding
the arrests was denied. The next session of the court was set for Dec. 4.
The matter was still before the court at the end of the year 1941.
No. 372
5083/E29281T-19
Memorandum by the Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Berlin, October 1, 1941.
Rk. 14392 B.
Subject: Occupied eastern territories.
1. On September 29, 1941, Minister Rosenberg reported to the
Fiihrer in my presence as well as in the presence of Reichsleiter
Bormann concerning the political situation in the occupied eastern
territories. Individual points of this report and the remarks made
by the Fiihrer are recorded in the following :
a. Gathering the harvest in the Ukraine:
Eosenberg reported that about 60 percent of the harvest found by
the German troops, i.e., not destroyed as a result of military opera-
tions had been gathered in. The sowing, however, had not proceeded
very favorably at the present time; because the winter grain could
not be entirely sown we would have to sow a great deal of summer
grain in the spring.
h. Rosenberg reported on the question of abolishing the kolkhozes
and returning the rural farms to private property. The Fiihrer
expressed himself in favor of considering a step by step return of the
kolkhozes to private property, but only to a limited degree and to such
rural inhabitants as gave assurance through their industry and accom-
plishments that they would manage the land properly. Also such
a return of the kolkhozes to private property could not take place
everywhere, that is to say, not where it appeared advisable for reasons
relating to the food supply to establish large agricultural enter-
prises, nor where land had to be vacated for the settlement of German
peasants.
OCTOBER 1941 597
c. In the opinion of the Fiihrer, an independent Ukraine is out
of the question for the next decades. The Fiihrer is thinking in terms
of a German protectorate over the Ukraine for roughly 25 years.
d. We should contemplate an indigenous secondary local ad/minis-
tration under German supervision.
e. Rosenberg reported about getting people hack into work.
The Fiihrer spoke in favor of an extensive release of Ukrainian pris-
oners of war, especially such as were willing to start immediately
working in agriculture. He was of the opinion that the release of
such prisoners was not a danger, since they would not consider a fur-
ther participation in the war. Also such prisoners should be told that
they would be freed of compulsory military service under the German
rule.
/. Rosenberg reported on the Volga Germans and said that one must
consider resettling them in the Caucasus or the Crimea. The Fiihrer
did not take a position with regard to this. He said we should wait
and see how many Volga Germans we still found there and what con-
dition these Volga Germans were in.
g. The Fiihrer, in accord with Rosenberg, is of the opinion that in
principle there should not be any return of Russian emigres. The
emigres had done nothing for Russia ; Russia had been conquered with
German blood for the protection of Europe against Russia.
h. The Fiihrer expressed himself to the effect that the Neva should
become the border of the Ostland against Leningrad.
i. According to a remark by the Fiihrer, the designations Lithuania,
Latvia, Livonia, Ostland, etc., can be retained as geographical terms.
j. Rosenberg stated that he wanted later to give the title of "Land
President" [Landesprasident] to the General Commissars in the Ost-
land. He had abandoned the designation "Land Captain" [Landes-
hauptmann] because in the Reich this term was used for a lower-grade
official. The Fiihrer expressed no objections.
k. Rosenberg complained insistently to the Fiihrer about offices of
the Wehrmacht and offices concerned with the economy which had re-
fused him the requisite deliveries and coupons for the most necessary
equipment for his officials (clothing, boots, blankets, weapons, auto-
mobiles, fuel, safes). Rosenberg gave the Fiihrer a memorandum on
this, which the Fiihrer said he would discuss with Field Marshal
Keitel.
I. All other matters regarding which Rosenberg reported to the
Fiihrer and on which the Fiihrer made decisions are recorded in other
documents. 1
L[ammers1
' None found.
598 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 373
173/84449-55
The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Reich Commis-
sar for the Occupied Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry
confidential The Hague, October 1, 1941.
Pol. 3 Pol. II 2750.
Subject : The visit of Eeich Commissar, Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart,
and Commissar General on Special Duty Oberdienstleiter
Schmidt with the Fuhrer on September 26, 1941. *
From the statements which the Eeich Commissar made to the Com-
missar General and to me after his return and yesterday to the provin-
cial deputies, and from the statements which Commissar General on
Special Duty Schmidt made to his staff and the press officials, the
following can be reported regarding the visit with the Fuhrer :
Also present during the report, made by the Reich Commissar, and
the subsequent conference were, besides the Fuhrer himself, the Reich
Commissar, Commissar General Schmidt, Reich Minister Lammers,
and Reichsleiter Bormann,
The Reich Commissar gave the Fuhrer an unvarnished account of
the actual situation in the occupied Netherlands territories, mention-
ing both the bright and the dark sides equally and by no means avoid-
ing the negative facts.
In the first place, economic and administrative matters were dis-
cussed, and the following developed :
1. The Fuhrer decided that we should refrain from the projected
compulsory transfer of Dutch workers to the Reich, because there
would be no satisfactory results from such a measure in any case.
2. The Fuhrer approved the dissolution of the denominational
trade unions, associations, and parties. 2
3. The Fuhrer expressed his satisfaction with the figures given him
regarding the Netherlander who have joined in the fight against
Bolshevism (2,500 in the Standarte Westland, 3,000 in the Standarte
Northwest, 4,000 to 5,000 with the NSKK) .
4. The planned establishment of a Netherlands Reichsnahrstand
and a Netherlands Labor Front, to be organized as purely Dutch orga-
nizations, was approved by the Fuhrer. In discussing these ideas the
Fuhrer stressed that placing the Netherlands on an equal footing with
Belgium or France was out of the question, and he confirmed the
assurances in favor of the Netherlands given earlier in this regard
by the Reichsmarschall.
1 Unidentified marginal note: "An additional report of Oct. 2, 1941 [la] in file
"Russia."
See document No. 377.
* See document No. 75, footnote 5.
OCTOBER 1941 599
5. Contrary to the tendencies existing with the Wehrmacht, the
Fiihrer ordered that nothing more was to be exported from the occu-
pied Netherlands areas, so that the agricultural products produced
in the Netherlands will be available for the feeding of the people in
the occupied Netherlands areas and the Netherlands will thus be able
to support themselves. The Reich Commissar can naturally permit
exceptions. This measure will have a favorable effect on the general
morale.
6. After the Reich Commissar had reported on the unfavorable
effect of the general ban on exports suddenly instituted during the
recent Leipzig Fair, the Fiihrer ordered that export goods for the
occupied Netherlands areas be released again and instructed Eeich
Minister Lammers to take the necessary steps.
1. The question was also discussed whether it was useful or neces-
sary to confiscate the radio receivers of large segments of the Nether-
lands population. The Fiihrer accepted the argument that the pos-
session of radio receivers of their own familiarized the Netherlanders
with the German language to a large extent and thus made them
receptive to German propaganda, too, and he left the further treatment
of this question to the Reich Commissar.
8. In discussing the Jewish question the Fiihrer indicated his satis-
faction at the effects of the measures taken in the occupied Nether-
lands areas, which have resulted in the economic and personal separa-
tion of the Jews from the Netherlanders. 8 For the immediate
future it is intended to remove the approximately 15,000 Jewish
emigres from Germany living in the occupied Netherlands territories.
9. In order to combat the small acts of sabotage that have been on
the increase during the past weeks also in the Netherlands, the most
drastic measures have been ordered such as the taking of hostages and,
if necessary, executions.
10. In discussing the economic situation the Fiihrer expressed his
great satisfaction that so far it has been possible to organize the
Netherlands as a self-sufficient area; he stressed in this connection
that with the satisfactory functioning of the administration and the
economy the present unfavorable mood in the occupied Netherlands
areas could be taken in stride.
Following the conversations on economic and administrative mat-
ters there was a very detailed discussion of the present political situa-
tion in the occupied Netherlands areas; in this connection the Reich
Commissar, as he himself said, described the situation with meticu-
lous thoroughness and objectivity, and especially the attitude of the
NSB in general and particularly with respect to the NSNAP. The
*Cf. Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. xivii, document No. 1726-PS
f U.S. Exhibit 195) , pp. 531-37.
600 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Fiihrer approved the NSB course taken heretofore and termed it
expedient, and he warned against reliance on any but National So-
cialist groups, even if, as is presently the case with the NSB, this
National Socialist group is not yet consolidated ideologically. It
was then the task of the German authorities to gain such a strong
influence on the NSB and the individual persons that the National
Socialist front could be held with them. Any working against each
other by National Socialist groups was undesirable and should be
stopped. In the existing circumstances it was necessary to remove
the NSNAP from the political arena. This removal has in the mean-
time been accomplished in that the leader of the NSNAP, M. van
Rappard, has prohibited the members of his party from any sort of
political activity until further notice. Thus the responsibility now
rests solely with the NSB, and Mussert and his people will have to
demonstrate whether they will be in a position to win the Dutch
people over to National Socialism.
The Reich Commissar added the following comment to his state-
ment about his conference with the Fiihrer :
The Fiihrer had stated that he was entirely satisfied with the report
on the situation in the occupied Netherlands territories and had ex-
pressed to him in warm words his approval, appreciation and thanks
for what had so far been accomplished. The appreciation and thanks
of the Fiihrer also extended to his co-workers and should spur him
and all of them to further accomplishment.
The most important task was now the development of the domestic
situation in the occupied Netherlands territory in such a way that
the aim of creating a National Socialist Netherlands would be at-
tained. There was no doubt that the course which Mussert now had
to take with the NSB was very difficult. He now had, however, a
unique opportunity to show who he was and what he could do.
Now that all obstacles had been cleared away he no longer had any
excuses either. The task of the German authorities was to support
Mussert and the NSB even more than before. There was no possi-
bility of reaching the objective with other groups. It was necessary
to increase the controlling influence on the NSB and the various indi-
viduals so that there would be no possibility of failure. Naturally
the influence exerted should not be apparent to the outside, because
this would probably make the work of Mussert and the NSB among
the population even more difficult than before.
The manner in which Mussert had attacked the NSNAP in' his
proclamation and editorial (see my report Pol. 3 of September 30,
1941)* should be condemned and rejected. All the more gratifying
' Not found.
OCTOBER 1941 601
was the attitude shown by van Rappard when he decided, without con-
sulting German authorities, to forbid his party to operate politically
until further notice in order to give Mussert and the NSNAP [NiSB]
the opportunity to win the Netherlands for himself and National
Socialism. The directive for the guidance of conversations is as
follows :
The Fuhrer is content with the NSB course.
The NSB has the prospect of becoming the predominant political
movement in the Netherlands.
The political task in the immediate future was also difficult for the
German authorities ; it had to be accomplished successfully, however,
so that an autonomous administration controlled by us and stabilized
conditions might be achieved prior to the organic integration into the
Germanic Reich. The predominant political movement in the Nether-
lands ought to take over the power and leadership in the Netherlands ;
whether it was called NSB or something else was immaterial.
In confidence the Reich Commissar reported that the Fuhrer was
willing, in principle, to accept Mussert's oath of allegiance to the
Fuhrer as the Germanic Fiihrer. It had been considered previously
that Mussert wanted to swear allegiance to the Fuhrer. But this
had not been accomplished. The oath of allegiance to the Fuhrer
would be a strong, irrevocable bond for Mussert. When and in what
form this oath would take place would develop later. 8 The leaders
and members of the NSNAP are to be employed usefully in the
administration and the economy so that they are not lost as National
Socialists.
The NSB should do a great deal of work within itself in order to
overcome the particularism which is expressed in the Netherlands
in the many parties, sects, and denominations and which can naturally
be found in the NSB too. The task assigned to the NSB was larger,
and its completion depended upon Mussert and the NSB themselves.
What is most noteworthy in these statements seems to me to be that
what is desired is not the annexation of the Netherlands, but an inde-
pendent Netherlands state in the Germanic Reich. This has estab-
lished much needed clarity, the effect of which among the Dutch
people should be favorable and win over many persons who have here-
tofore kept aloof. To what extent the people will become reconciled
to Mussert and the NSB cannot be predicted today. To judge from
past experience it is possible that the rejection of Mussert and the NSB
will become even stronger, particularly because now the possibility of
an assumption of power by Mussert and the NSB will be considered
imminent. An increased and still more accentuated rejection of
Mussert and the NSB by the population can entirely frustrate their
* In a memorandum of Jan. 3, 1942 (173/84459) Luther noted that Mussert had
taken an oath of allegiance to Hitler "the Germanic leader." This took place on
Dee. 12, 1941. See Kijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdoeumentatie, Het Prooes Munsert
(VGravenhage, 1948), pp. 319-322.
602 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
purpose or their task and in several months the situation could he
such that Mussert, possibly also the NSB, will have to retire from the
political stage in order to make way for others.
We must wait and on the German side must give Mussert and the
NSB every possible help.
Bene
No. 374
2615/173319-23
Ambassador Bitter to the Embassy in Turkey
Telegram
MOST URGENT
top secret Special Train, October 2, 1941—6 :00 p. m.
Unnumbered from
the Special Train Received Berlin, October 2—8 :10 p. m.
No. 99 from the Foreign Ministry Sent October 2.
For Clodius.
With reference to our telegram No. 76 of September 30 * and to your
telegram No. 258 of September 29. 2
I. The fact that the Turkish Government admitted to us only in
the final stage of the negotiations that the delivery of chromium in
1942 is impossible has produced vivid disappointment here and created
a difficult situation. Please leave no doubt regarding this disappoint-
ment in the further course of your discussions. In spite of this, all
authorities concerned, in accordance with our positive political atti-
tude toward Turkey, have done everything to make possible the con-
clusion of a treaty which has substance and which saves the face of
both parties toward the outside. For this purpose German armament
deliveries were divided into three groups ; whereby, however, the prin-
ciple had to be adhered to that valuable armament material will be
delivered only in return for chromium.
The first group consists of: French anti-tank mines, explosives and
detonators for engineers, 500 Hotchkiss 8 mm. machine guns with
ammunition, one set of bridge-building equipment for engineers
(German construction).
With regard to this group we are prepared to forego the delivery
of chromium in return and instead to accept copper or cotton. We
1 See document No. 366, footnote 3. . '
"Not printed (4886/E253403-05). This telegram commented on the informa-
tion transmitted in Foreign Ministry telegram No. 68 of Sept. 27 (4881/E253236-
37) regarding the terms for the delivery of war material according to tlie deci-
sions of the OKW.
OCTOBER 1941 603
reserve for ourselves the right to determine in what proportion copper
and/or cotton should be delivered.
The second group consists of: 20 7.5-cm. anti-tank field cannons
(Krupp) with 100,000 rounds of ammunition, 40 rebored gun barrels
(Bochumer Verein), 120-m. engineer bridge-building equipment, 64
7.5-cm. mountain guns (Bochumer Verein).
After the Turkish Government has now stated that it is unable to
supply chromium in the year 1942 we should really draw the con-
clusion that we would decline making deliveries in this second group.
However, we do not want to draw this negative conclusion but rather
to propose a compromise. We want to give Turkey an option with
regard to these deliveries in the event that it should turn out in the
future that chromium can be delivered in the year 1942. In that case
this group can be delivered item by item in return for chromium in the
order in which the individual items are listed above, that is to say
the mountain guns last. With regard to the 100,000 rounds of am-
munition the demand must also be made that the amounts of copper
required for this will be specially ordered and delivered above and
beyond the other deliveries of copper.
The third group consists of :
(a) Ten 24 cm. howitzers L-28 (Skoda) with ammunition and
fire-control equipment.
(b) 18 15 cm. cannons L-55 (Krupp) with ammunition and fire-
control equipment.
(c) Fire-control equipment for the two guns in (a) and (b) which
have already been delivered.
These deliveries can be definitely promised item by item in return
for chromium after January 8, 1943. As is known, it is a con-
siderable sacrifice for us to make production facilities available for
this. We can make this sacrifice only if the delivery of chromium
is obsolutely assured. Therefore, simultaneously with the conclusion
of the private delivery contracts regarding the three items of this
group, a private purchase contract regarding the corresponding quan-
tities of chromium in return is necessary and prerequisite in addition
to the agreements from government to government.
II. With regard to the terms for delivery they remain as stated
in our telegram No. 68 of September 27. 3 With regard to the moun-
tain guns the terms for delivery are for about a year after the order
has been placed.
III. I ask that you now make this final proposal to the Turkish
Government. In case the Turkish Government accepts it you are
authorized to conclude the agreement on this basis. In case the Turk-
ish Government does not accept it there are practically no prospects
" See footnote 2.
604 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
that this proposal can still be altered in favor of the Turks. Never-
theless, in this negative ease, I ask you to report once more prior to
breaking off negotiations.
IV. Only for your own strictly confidential information the follow-
ing is also communicated :
There is no absolute assurance that the fire-control equipment can
be delivered simultaneously with the guns to which it belongs. The
manufacturing of this fire-control equipment is in competition with
the manufacturing of fire-control equipment for our own urgent pur-
poses. It is not impossible that the decision will have to be made
further on that the fire-control equipment for our own requirements
must have precedence. Nevertheless we are prepared to assume the
risk of promising now in a treaty to deliver the fire-control equipment
simultaneously. If it should develop later on that this promise can-
not be kept completely, we must leave to the future the settlement of
difficulties resulting from it. In this context I should add in case
that it is important for the text of your agreement that this difficulty
exists less with respect to the fire-control equipment belonging to the
howitzers and more in the case of the fire-control equipment belong-
ing to the cannons.
V. I see from your telegram No. 258 of September 29 that the treaty
is to run until March 31, 1943. If it is not possible to extend the dura-
tion of the treaty in general, it must be taken into account and assured
that the deliveries in the third group begin only after January 8,
1943, and that the counter deliveries of chromium item by item will
be carried out even after March 31, 1943, if, for reasons of transporta-
tion or for other reasons not previously anticipated, the deliveries
have not been completely carried out by March 31, 1943. We cannot
make the sacrifice of putting off production facilities for our own pur-
poses without obtaining complete assurance of counterdeliveries of
chromium in the year 1943.
VI. Here in "Westfalen" I cannot determine whether the German
authorities concerned have already determined what amounts of
chromium should be demanded as deliveries in return. If this has
not been done it should be settled from your end with the responsible
authorities in Berlin.*
Hitter
' In telegram No. 289 of Oct. 3 (265/173327-28) Clodius reported that he had
come to an agreement with Menemenctoglu regarding the basis of the economic
agreement in accordance with the document printed.
In Ankara telegram No. 301 of Oct. 6 (265/173331-32) Clodius reported that
the signing was to take place on Oct. 9 and submitted the draft of a press
communique. See, further, document No. 390.
OCTOBER 1941 605
No. 375
IB 17/372720
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Sfc.S. No. 661 Berlin, October 2, 1941.
The Italian Ambassador spoke to me at length again today about the
complaints of the Italian laborers in Germany. 1 He had heard about
new complaints again. Signor Alfieri will probably get in touch "with
Under State Secretary Luther soon and perhaps propose that Signor
Lombrassa be summoned here from Italy some time so that he may
form an opinion about the situation on the spot. 2 Alfieri was toying
with the idea today of recalling all the Italian laborers from Germany.
I told him that this was not only an economic problem in which our
countries were both interested but also a political matter. A measure
so extreme as the transportation back to Italy of some 100,000 Italian
laborers would undoubtedly be observed abroad and be exploited to the
limit by our enemies.
Weizsacker
1 See document No. 281, footnotes 1 and 2.
'According to a memorandum by Luther of Oct, 6 (1917/372737-39) Alfieri
agreed to nominate a special official in the Italian Embassy who would cooperate
with an expert of Luther's office on all matters concerning the care of Italian
laborers in Germany. Furthermore Alfieri reported to Rome that the problem
was being thoroughly discussed between htm and Luther.
No. 376
482/231272-73
Memorandum by the Director of the Department for German Internal
Affairs
secret Berlin, October 2, 1941.
. Regarding the attached telegram from Minister Benzler of Sep-
tember 29 [&?], 1941, in Belgrade 1 (the previous papers have already
been requested through the Foreign Minister's Secretariat) I take
the following position :
1. Benzler makes the removal of 8,000 Jews from the territory
of Old Serbia the prerequisite for tackling the elimination of Free-
masons and the intelligentsia which is hostile to us.
2. Benzler considers it to be incompatible with the action of pacifi-
cation planned by us that these 8,000 Jews should remain, but he
states that he would have to put up with the remaining approximately
20,000 Jews and their families.
3. Benzler requests approval for the deportation of the 8,000 Jews
mentioned to an island in the Danube delta, i.e., to Rumanian
territory.
1 Document No. 363.
606 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
If the Military Commander agrees with Benzler to the extent
that it is these 8,000 Jews who primarily are preventing the action
of pacification in Old Serbia, then in my opinion, the Military Com-
mander must see to it that these 8,000 Jews are removed at once.
In other areas other military commanders have been able to cope with
a substantially larger number of Jews without even talking about it.
In my opinion we cannot suggest to the Leader of the Rumanian
state, who has anyway sufficient trouble with removing his own
Jews, that he should accept 8,000 additional Jews from foreign ter-
ritory. Moreover, it can be assumed with certainty that these 8,000
Jews a few days after their arrival at the island in the Danube
delta would disappear and then would make their appearance in
Rumania itself.
Therefore, I request authorization to discuss this question with
Obergruppenfiihrer Heydrich, who will come from Prague to Berlin
within the next few days for a short stay. I am convinced that in
consultation with him we will very soon be able to arrive at a clear
solution of this question. 2
Luther
"In telegram No. 1060 of Oct. 2 from the Special Train (482/231266) Luther
was informed of Ribbentrop's request that he take steps "to get at once in
touch with the Reichsfiihrer SS and to clarify the question whether the latter
might not take over 8,000 Jews in order to transport them to eastern Poland
or any other place."
In a memorandum of Oct. 3 (482/231267) Luther asked Rademacher to explore
the possibility of a discussion of this matter between Luther and Heydrich or
a representative of the latter within the next few days.
In telegram No. 1364 of Oct. 5 (482/231265) Luther informed Benzler of
an agreement reached with Heydrich that a special representative of the Reich
Main Security Office would go to Belgrade in iorder to settle the questions
raised in Belgrade telegram No. 701 (document No. 363).
In telegram No. 1413 of Oct. 15 (482/231262-63) Luther further informed
Benzler that two representatives of the Reich Main Security Office accom-
panied by Counselor Rademacher would arrive in Belgrade on Oct. 18. See
document No. 425.
No. 377
105/114120-32
The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Reich Oom-
•missar for the Occupied Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry 1
confidential The Hague, October 2, 1941.
Pol. 3 Received October 6.
Pol. II 2762.
With reference to my report Pol. 3 of October 1, 1941 — Subject:
Visit of Reich Commissar, Minister Seyss-Inquart, and General Com-
'By a cover note of Oct. 21 (105/114119) Counselor Lohmann of the Foreign
Minister's Secretariat submitted this report to Weizsftcker, for his information.
OCTOBER 1941 607
missar on special assignment Oberdienstleiter Schmidt with the
Fiihrer on September 26, 1941. 2
Continuing my report of yesterday I am passing on in the follow-
ing the reports which General Commissar Schmidt made in broad
outline to his collaborators concerning the considerations which guide
the Fiihrer in shaping his over- all policy :
"It was necessary for us very consciously to pursue a policy with
reference to the European area. The present German foreign policy
could in the main be only a European policy, but not a world policy,
for the latter was impossible for the reason that outside the European
area the instruments of power necessary for the realization of definite
objectives are lacking. It was all the more necessary, however, that
the policy with reference to the European area was carried out as
intensively and purposefully as was possible. In the past it had
really been an absurdity that a great empire should have existed in
the east of the European Continent with almost inexhaustible mineral
resources and raw materials, which furthermore was only sparsely
settled, whereas in the thickly-settled central and western European
countries there existed a scarcity of raw materials and this need had
to be filled in far-distant overseas areas. For this reason the areas
in the European east, rich in raw materials, had to be entirely opened
up for the thickly-populated areas of the west. If this was done
successfully one could also in the main do without the overseas trans-
ports, which were time-consuming, complicated, and dangerous at
times of warlike complications. On the other hand such a develop-
ment had the advantage that after this war the German and also
the European industry would no longer need any overseas markets,
for the 130,000,000 persons in the European east are living at the
present time in such frugality or at least at such a low standard of
living that one could dispose of practically every sort of industrial
product there, from the simple water glass on up. The almost
f righteningly low cultural level which the Fiihrer and his Wehrmacht
had encountered among the people in the Soviet Union was in con-
trast to the great possibilities that were offered in these vast spaces
in the fields of agricultural production and natural resources. Thus,
for example, it had turned out that even at this time large quantities
of rubber of good quality were being produced in the Kharkov area.
The Fiihrer had said in this connection that the samples presented
to him made an excellent impression, and that by intensifying the
cultivation of rubber there one could hope to make Greater Germany
and if possible all of Europe independent of rubber deliveries from
overseas in the future. With regard to the production of petroleum
the case was similar. The large-scale enterprise had to be considered
the best system of agricultural management in the east. The giant
farms introduced by Stalin would offer the best possibility in the fu-
ture, too, probably the only one, for intensive cultivation, since the
real Russian intelligentsia was to be considered as having been de-
stroyed and the people, to a large extent were used to living and
being treated like animals. In any case, as far as intellectual ma-
'Document No. 373.
608 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
turity was concerned, there existed a mile of difference between the
Russian peoples of the present time and the German people.
"In summary it had to be stressed that in the opinion of the Fiihrer
the new eastern colonies were to be considered safest and most useful
from the German standpoint, because it was not necessary to travel
over long water routes to rule them; it was sufficient to employ the
power of the German Army. For this reason, also, the question how
long the war in the east had to be continued would not matter. Once
the vital European territory of the Soviet Union had been occupied
and secured, the war east of the Urals could last another 100 years if
necessary. It was important, however, that the bulk of the Russian
industrial plants be moved to western Europe, so that in the future
the western European industrial areas and eastern European agri-
cultural and raw material areas could complement one another in a
healthy manner." 3
Bene
"In the files of the German Foreign Ministry there is a memorandum of
Nov. 23 by Clodlus (34/24867-82) which discusses at length the way in which
the various European states could participate in the economic exploitation of
the occupied Russian territories.
No. 378
S2/60675-79
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most ttcgent Tokyo, October 4, 1941—2 : 57 a. m., summer time.
No. 1974 of October 4 Received October 4—1 : 25 p. m. 1
For the Foreign Minister.
"With reference to my telegram No. 1 960 of October 2. 2
As stated in the previous report, the Japanese- American negotia-
tions are apparently not making any headway, unless the United
States should radically alter its attitude on the China question, which
it would find difficult to do. However, even after failure a certain
feeling of being at a loss regarding what policy to pursue persists in
Japan. For the first time in her history Japan feels physically isolated
and surrounded by enemies. With optimism and aggressiveness, she
has tried her strength against a militarily inferior China and despite
brilliant individual successes has the impression of not being able to
conclude this conflict successfully by military means. Even more
than this feeling in the homeland, the many years of service in the zone
' Marginal note : "Forwarded to the Special Train as No. 3351 Oct 4 "
This telegram (82/60669-71) reported that there was still complete' official
silence regarding the current Japanese-American negotiations, yet it discussed
k ,.? r T 1 ? ab e ^ urse of the ne « oti atlons on the basis of "information received
by the Embassy through confidential channels."
OCTOBER 1941 609
of the interior [Etappendiensi] by the army in China may be responsi-
ble for having lessened Japan's striking power and will to action.
One cannot avoid the impression that the mobilization begun in July
added to the feeling of weakness by revealing the numerous economic
and material deficiencies.
Nevertheless, in the last few weeks the realization has grown that
mere passive waiting will not promote Japan's goals or safeguard her
existence. From close contacts with the leaders of the Army (Minister
of War, Chief of the General Staff, Heads of the Political Department,
and the Department of Foreign Armies) the following picture of
their position emerges :
The inherent aim of the Tripartite Pact is to help bring about a
redistribution of power in Europe and in the Far East by defeat of
the British Empire. Warding off the United States and eliminating
the Soviet Union can only be means toward this end. Since Germany
has gone to war with the Soviet Union and to a large extent has been
militarily successful in waging it, the important thing is to restore
communications between the Tripartite Pact Powers through Siberia
as soon as possible and to concentrate all efforts on fighting England
in the Near and Far East, as well as in the British Isles. The opera-
tions in European Russia have shown that while the armies of the
Soviet Union were defeated the political collapse of the regime did
not automatically follow. Japan cannot before next spring under-
take military operations against the Far Eastern Army, which is still
considered to be capable of fighting, unless there should be a moral
collapse of the regime. The toughness which the Soviet Union lias
demonstrated against Germany indicates that the route through
Siberia could not be opened this year even by a Japanese attack in
August or September. There are two ways by which this goal may
be achieved in the future: either to exploit the heavy losses of the
Soviet regime anticipated after the capture of Moscow in order to
persuade the remnant of Russia to collaborate voluntarily (Japan
could help here even this winter by exerting pressure at the right
time on Russian supply lines in the Far East) ; or else to attack
Siberia next spring from the west and the east, something which
Japan will then be able to do despite the burden of the China conflict
in the latter case, however, the areas to be covered would still be
immense and joint operations would not be easy, so that even then a
political solution would be advisable after a certain time A military
operation by Japan against the Anglo-Saxon position in the soutn
would not be dependent on the time of the year. Combining this
with a German operation against the Anglo-Saxon position in the
Near East would be desirable, but it is not absolutely necessary to
wait for it. Victory over the British Empire will not be complete
however, until the Indian position is shaken by our joint actions
610 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
I am reporting these statements made by the Minister of War in the
presence of the Chief of the General Staff as they were presented to
me, with the request that they be (group apparently missing) con-
fidentially. They clearly show by their frank oddity how the leaders
feel about a Russian campaign. The statements also showed that the
plans aimed at the south, which must be carried out chiefly by the
Navy, have not been very carefully thought out and prepared. Like
the armed forces Attaches, I have gotten the impression that the think-
ing, at least of the Army, is superficial and that the state of the prepa-
rations do not ensure the success of a thrust to the south, beyond initial
conquests. Reports agree that in French (one group garbled) very
little has as yet been done in the way of putting up military installa-
tions. The comparatively scant equipment of the troops with modern
material, the length of the lines of communication, but above all
the feeling of not having any unified, strong-willed leadership robs
the Japanese armed forces of the confidence necessary for success, it
may therefore be assumed that the present government will try to post-
pone still further an operation in the south. ,
Activating Japan in the sense of the Tripartite Pact can most easily
be achieved by holding before her, technically and politically, the pos-
sibility of operations having a tangible common aim (Siberian route
or combined attack in the Near or Far East) . For example, it would
probably make a strong impression here if a long-range flight were
made from the Russian front to Manchouli, as soon as this is technical-
ly possible. In view of the formalists character of the Japanese 1
should like to raise again for favorable consideration the question
whether an attempt should not be made after appropriate preparation
to entrust the commission provided for in the Tripartite Pact 3 at the
instance of the Japanese with consultation on common military, eco-
nomic, and political problems. The feeling of not being consulted de-
presses those who otherwise are prepared to collaborate and hits them
where they are most sensitive— in their self-esteem. _
In the statements of the army leaders set forth above nothing is said
about an entry into the war by the United States. I could see that in
their military plans they almost completely disregarded or ignored the
possible intervention of the United States and always spoke of the
British Empire as the enemy. This is doubtless due in part to the
desire not to give any clue as to the f ar-f rom-impressive progress o±
the Japanese-American negotiations. Still stronger, however, is the
oft-reported atavistic fear of getting into a conflict with the United
States the outcome of which would possibly be unforeseeable. The
'For the commissions of the Tripartite Pact, see vol. xi of this series, document
No. 270 and footnote 3 ; vol. xii of this series, document No. 304.
OCTOBER 1941 611
leaders of the Japanese Government would want to wage such a con-
flict only in case of the most extreme necessity and would want to set
the moment for it themselves or at least have a voice in the matter.
This is in accordance not only with the character of the Japanese but
also with the view of the leaders of the Japanese government that the
question whether an attack in the sense of article III of the Pact has
occurred must be determined by joint consultation of the three powers.
I wish to point out that even in the negotiations about the Tripartite
Pact which were conducted here with Ambassador Stahmer as leader
of the negotiations and with me, Foreign Minister Matsuoka insisted
on a concrete statement on this point. 4
The feeling of not being able to avoid a conflict with the United
States is growing; for us, however, it is of the greatest importance that
Japan have a voice in deciding when, in such a contingency, it is to
be jointly waged.
I need not make any special mention of the fact that I have argued
in accordance with the instructions given to me and a guiding directive
for conversations issued in Berlin with respect to the continuation of
the fight against the Soviet Union and the military and political weak-
nesses of the Anglo-Saxons. Given the existing relationship between
the forces within Japan, however, the attitude described above must at
present be taken into account, especially since the view of the Navy
largely corresponds to the statements of the Army leaders.
I shall report later about the attitude of political circles.*
Ott
* There is no mention of thia in the available German records of these discus-
sions. Cf. vol. xi of this series, document No. 44, footnote 2.
s Ott's telegram No. 2059 of Oct. 11 (82/60693-07) which refers back to the
telegram which is printed here deals only with the Japanese Navy. No further
report on the attitude of political circles prior to the Cabinet change of Oct 18
has been found.
No. 379
195/139223
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
secret Rome, October 4, 1941 — 2 : 05 p. m.
No. 2413 of October 4 Received October 4 — 2 : BO p. m.
The Italian Foreign Ministry communicated today officially that
Count Ciano had ordered the establishment of a special office in which,
under the direction of the Indian, Schedai, all official, semi-official,
and private activities connected with Indian liberation movement
612 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
are to be coordinated. 1 The office, which will be located on one floor
of an office building, is being placed under the Foreign Ministry,
which will detail to this office a liaison official with the rank of a
secretary of legation.
The Foreign Ministry stated that the Embassy would be regularly
informed about the activity of the office, and asked for its part to be
informed on the activity of the Berlin India office. 2
Mackensen
1 In a letter of Sept. 21 (4757/E233877-83) addressed to Counselor Doertenbach
of the German Embassy in Rome, Schedai gave a detailed account of his recent
conversations in Germany whither he had gone at Woermann's request because
"my presence was needed in Berlin for consultation regarding Indian work."
In this account Schedai stressed repeatedly that he was urged by his principal
Foreign Ministry contact, Trott zu Solz, as well as by Bose that he should
stay in Berlin and work with them.
1 In telegram No. 2641 of Oct. 8 (4757/E233911) Keppler informed Mackensen
that it was the intention, as he knew, to set up an office for Bose in Berlin.
He added: "However, the opening of the office and the strengthening of the
India propaganda has been put off until a later, suitable moment."
No. 380
95/107110
Memorandum by the State Secretary 1
St.S. No. 667 Berlin, October 4, 1941.
The Spanish Ambassador told me today by instruction of the
Caudillo and Sufier that they required of him, May aide, that he im-
mediately take up personal contact with the "Blue Division." The
problem was that no news has been received from the Division for
a long time. There was no communication at all, so to speak; that-
had to be changed. They were not informed about the activity of
the Division and its fate. British propaganda was sowing the wildest
atrocity stories about the Division in Spain. 2 The Government in
Madrid was helpless in the face of this since it knew nothing itself. 3
1 There is no indication of a signature on the copy here printed. Another
copy (95/107161~62) bears the pencil notation: "Signed Weizsacker."
1 In a report dated Oct. 21 and registered in the Embassy in Madrid as No.
4753 (4894/E253933) the Consulate at Badajoz reported on rumors which were
spread in Badajoz Province regarding the Blue Division. Along with reports
that the Division had been destroyed or captured there was also a propaganda
warning laborers not to go to Germany because the contracts would not be
kept ; that the workers would not be sent to the factories but to the front, and
their dependents would not be paid. Such reports were spread by dependents
of members of the Division who had not received the soldiers' pay but had been
sent in vain from one office to another. Some 20 to 30 dependents had appealed
to the Consulate for help.
5 In a minute of Oct. 17 (95/107113) Bitter noted that all information con-
cerning foreign volunteer units was made available to the Military Attaches
concerned. The Spanish Military Attache' was known to show little interest
for this information and his Ambassador was therefore uninformed about these
matters. At present the Blue Division was deployed in such a way that a visit
by the Spanish Ambassador was not feasible.
OCTOBER 1941 613
Mayalde believes that the Spanish Division was at the moment en
route by train.
I myself referred the Ambassador to the Fuhrer's words, in his
speech yesterday, where it was stated that the Spaniards were now
going into battle.* In these circumstances a visit with the Division
would perhaps not be very easy. Possibly one could consider a rendez-
vous between the Ambassador and General Munos Grande at a half-
way point; however, the High Command of the Wehrmacht would of
course have to be asked. I would see what could be done.
The Ambassador recognized the existing difficulties, but again re-
quested that the matter be accelerated in accordance with the thought
of the Caudillo.
Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister. 5
* Hitler's speech in Berlin, Oct. 3, to open the Winter Belief Fund. A sum-
mary is given in Bulletin of International News, vol. xvm (1941), pp. 1741-1743.
* In a memorandum of Oct. 30, St.S No. 712 (95/107166) Weizsacker recorded
a brief conversation with the Spanish Ambassador who expressed his thanks for
the courtesies shown to him on his visit with the Blue Division at the front.
No. 381
82/60680-82
The Embassy in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
secret Tokyo, October 6, 1941 — 1 : 26 a. m., summer time.
No. 1994 of October 4 Received October 6—11 : 30 a. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 1654 of September 24. 1
For economic as well as political reasons it is advisable to be consid-
erate of Japan and to comply with Japanese wishes.
1. Economically we are entirely dependent on Japan for natural
rubber, and we are dependent on her to a large degree for other stra-
tegic goods such as, for example, tungsten, tin, oils and fats, mica,
shellac and tea. Japan likewise demands goods in return. Since the
Anglo-Saxon freeze [of assets] there is hardly any foreign exchange
1 From a draft in the files (4684/E225216) it appears that this instruction stated
that deliveries earmarked for Japan and Manchukuo would be stored in Germany
"for a period of time not yet to be determined." The instruction explained
that this chiefly involved scarce and urgently needed strategic goods and it
pointed out that further production for Japan and Manchukuo could only be
justified for urgent political reasons.
614 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
that Japan could use. A halt in the production or a confiscation of
goods ordered by Japan would therefore unavoidably result in a cessa-
tion of Japanese deliveries and assistance in transportation.
The cessation of trade with America, with the [British] Empire,
and the Netherlands Indies, eliminating over 60 percent of Japanese
foreign trade, has placed Japan under the strongest economic pres-
sure. The interruption of the Siberian route deprived Japan of the
connection with the only friendly, large industrial power in whose
help, especially in the field of armaments, Japan had placed the
greatest hopes. This development took Japan by surprise and sud-
denly made her conscious of her isolation and the weakness of her
economic bases. As Japan does not feel strong enough to fight alone
and without a route of secure communication with Germany, she is
trying to gain time and is therefore negotiating with America. We
can counteract this tendency only by active economic aid and by main-
taining the belief in the reopening of the Siberian route. If we halt
production of goods or confiscate them, the hopes of German aid and
economic cooperation in the spirit of the Tripartite Pact will be frus-
trated and the danger of a Japanese- American detente will grow,
which, even if it should only be temporary, would weaken Japan's
readiness to cooperate with Germany in the field of the war economy.
It is therefore in the German interest to treat Japanese wishes in such
a way that an impression of our resolute and unreserved cooperation is
created. (Cf. our telegram No. 765 of May 19 2 on lending rubber;
No. 1589 of August 21 3 on pesos ; No. 1691 of September 3 3 on coal
hydration ; No. 1670 of August 30 3 on the airplane factory ; No. 1938
of October 1 4 on the Lurgi distilling plant.)
The treatment of the projects regarding coal hydration and the
aviation industry in particular are considered a touchstone in Japan,
the more so, as with respect to the latter project the Air Office of the
Japanese Army refers to a promise by the Reichsmarschall. 8 I there-
fore request that this telegraphic report be discussed with the office of
the Keichsmarschall. Furthermore, the arrival of the ships with stra-
tegic cargoes promised in your telegram No. 1539 of September ll, 3
sections A to I 5, would influence Japanese sentiment very favorably
by the evidence that strategic goods are not shipped in the direction of
'Not printed (177/85109-10).
'Not found.
4 Not printed (4684/E225224).
5 A memorandum of Sept. 22 by Wiehl (82/60640-46) deals at some length with
the Japanese wishes referred to in the foregoing. '
OCTOBER 1941 615
Germany only. Notwithstanding the basic attitude expressed here, the
possibility may exist, according to observations here, that indi-
vidual orders may be canceled. This should be done, however, only at
the wish of the Japanese and in agreement with those Japanese who
placed the orders.
WOHLTHAT
Supplement by the Embassy:
The political situation makes our continued economic help for the
Japanese partner in the Tripartite Pact urgently necessary. As re-
ported time and again, the Government at Washington has been trying
in vain for months to induce Japan to abandon the Tripartite Pact so
as to free the strong American and British forces, which so far have
been tied up in the Pacific, for employment against the Axis Powers.
The Japanese circles cooperating with the American efforts are oper-
ating with the argument of the few possibilities for economic aid
which Japan can expect on the part of the Axis partner, and of late are
exploiting the interruption of the Siberian route in a dangerous
manner, as the Foreign Minister has indicated to me." As opposed to
this the expectations of the circles adhering to the Tripartite Pact,
especially the Armed Forces, are directed toward gaining again a
usable trade route with Germany in the near future. A German de-
cision to halt production of goods for Japan could not remain secret
here, would be welcomed by friends of a compromise and would further
disappoint the hopes of the friends of the Pact, thus increasing the
danger of the detachment of Japan from the Tripartite Pact. 7
Ott
' See document No. 310.
'A memorandum of Oct. 15 by Eisenlohr (83/60720-21) explained that the
points made by the Tokyo Embassy in the telegram printed here were brought
about by a statement of the Reich Minister of Economics saying that Japanese
wishes for delivery of war material and vital technical equipment could be met
only if Justified "by an urgent political interest" in view of the demands of
Germany's own armament program. The memorandum then stated the
following :
"To be sure, the ministries concerned had raised considerable objections on
account of the secrecy with respect to certain arms and deliveries, out of concern
over giving valuable German inventions to a competitor, and also on account of
the demands of our rearmament on German production. However, they have
adopted a more accommodating attitude in the meantime. Now the Reicbs-
marschall, too, has agreed that the construction of an airplane factory by the
Junkers firm mentioned among the Japanese wishes should be dealt with In a
positive way.
"Moreover, the Embassy in Tokyo has been authorized in a telegraphic instruc-
tion of Oct. 8 to communicate to the Japanese even at this time that 'their wishes
will be complied with in every possible way as a proof of German-Japanese
cooperation in accordance with the Tripartite Pact.' "
616 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 382
216/147758
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram en clair
No. 3081 of October 6 Paris, October 6, 1941—8 : 45 p. m.
Received October 6 — 11 : 30 p. ra.
State Secretary Benoist-Mechin told me today in a conversation
that difficulties with. Japan are increasing in Indochina every day.
Japan, while observing, with some exceptions, the military clauses
of the agreement 1 was increasingly infringing upon the economic and
political sovereignty of France. Darlan originally had given very
strong personal support to the settlement desired by Japan in Indo-
china because he was afraid that any other policy might give the
Anglo-Saxon armed forces a pretext for intervening and also because
he wanted to establish good relations with a state that was a signatory
of the Tripartite Pact. Japan's aggressive action with respect to
France's sovereignty in Indochina had given rise to expressions of
doubt within the French Government regarding the correctness of
Darlan 's policy; it was to be feared, moreover, that the opposition
to his policy might stiffen in French military and administrative
circles in Indochina.
I took a noncommittal attitude toward Benoist-Mechin's statement
which obviously was aimed at German intervention in Tokyo. 2
Abetz
1 See document No. 146 and footnote 2.
1 In telegram No. 3062 of Oct. 8 (216/147759-60) Abetz reported that the
French Foreign Ministry had handed a memorandum to the Embassy's represen-
tative in Vichy, Consul General Krug von Nidda, protesting the Japanese actions
in Indochina and stating that France had informed the Japanese Foreign Minis-
ter that France would "resist by every possible means attempts by the Japanese
military to exceed the limits of the agreements concluded." The French
Government asked that these statements be conveyed to Berlin.
According to an unnumbered draft telegram of Oct. 8 (217/147762) Weiz-
sacker instructed the Embassy In Paris that a reply to the memorandum handed
to Krng von Nidda was not necessary.
OCTOBER 1941 617
No. 383
95/107127
State Secretary Weizsacker to Ambassador Stohrer
Berlin, October 6, 1941.
Dear Stohrer : Yesterday I received your letter of the 2nd of this
month 1 and I brought it up in today's staff meeting of directors lest
Mayalde be hindered by careless inattention from getting accustomed
here. 2
I myself find Mayalde pleasant and I have no cause for complaint.
I try to treat him well. My first impression of him was that he ap-
peared almost too unassuming for his position here. I have no doubt
that he will accustom himself to things here for no one here has any-
thing against him personally. As you yourself say his linguistic
shortcomings are an encumbrance.
In my view the kernel of the matter is that Mayalde and many
other Chiefs of Mission here, as things now are, scarcely get to see
the Foreign Minister or the Fiihrer. With the exception of 48 hours
Herr von Ribbentrop has had to stay away from Berlin for the last
3y 2 months. Thus it is that the Chiefs of Mission never see the respon-
sible conductor of our foreign policy unless they are called to head-
quarters and they often complain about this among themselves. I
myself am naturally always available to the gentlemen if they wish
to talk to me, but I have the reputation for taciturnity which to me is
incomprehensible.
Heil Hitler !
Yours, etc. Weizsacker
'In this letter (124/123158-61) Stohrer stated: that Mayalde had come back
to Madrid on the instruction of Serrano Sufier in order to report on his first im-
pressions of Berlin ; that Mayalde had expressed himself as very well satisfied
with his reception by Hitler (ef. document No. 226, footnote 2) ; but that be
(Stohrer) had heard indirectly that Mayalde did not feel at all happy in Berlin.
2 See document No. 229.
No. 384
5111/B205432
Minute by the State Secretary
Berlin, October 6, 1941.
Press Department :
The use of uranium for blasting purposes must have been dealt with
recently in the foreign press, especially the American press. I would
618 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
be grateful if material of this kind, which your office may possibly
note, could be sent to me. 1
Weizsacker
1 Minister Schmidt, the Director of the News Service and Press Department,
informed Weizsacker in a memorandum of Oct. T (5111/E295431) that he was
forwarding reports about the manner in which this matter was being treated in
the Swedish Press but that a parallel check on the American Press had produced
so far no results. In a marginal notation of Oct. 9 on the same document
Weizsacker stated that further material would he valuable.
No. 385
2361/4S8717-19
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
top secret Therapia, October 6, 1941.
No. A 5124
Subject: Egyptian efforts at rapprochement.
In the last few days Dr. Samir Zoulfikar Bey of Cairo appeared
here, requesting that he would like to speak to me in confidence. 1
Dr. Zoulfikar is the nephew of the recently deceased Egyptian Min-
ister President Zoulfikar Pasha, and a brother of the Egyptian Min-
ister in Tehran. 2 Officially he has come here in order to ask the Turk-
ish Government for asylum for the Iranian Crown Prince and his
wife (an Egyptian princess), 3 for the reason that the English have
left no doubt that they will exile him from Iran within a short time
because they wish to replace him with a Kha j ar prince.
Dr. Zoulfikar carried on his conversation with me by order of his
King as well as in the name of the three leading Egyptian parties
("Wafd", the fatherland party, "Hisb el Watani", and the liberal-
constitutional "Ahrar Dusturiye"). He is instructed to clarify the
question of what fate Germany envisaged for Egypt, in case the Ger-
man attack in Libya, which the English and Egyptians expected in the
immediate future, should be successful. They desired an assurance
that Egypt would not be allotted to the Italian Lebensraum, but that
she would be recognized as a completely independent state on condi-
tion of her cooperation with the Axis.
l A letter of Sept. 25 from Samir Zoulfikar addressed to Papen (2361/488714-
15) and a memorandum of Oct. 2 by Press Attache Sehmidt-Dumont (3883/-
EO48277-80) regarding a conversation with Samir Zoulfikar are also in the files.
1 See documents Nos. 49 and 66. . .
s Crown Prince Mohammed Riza Pahlevi who was married to Princess i ewzieh,
sister of King Farouk, had actually acceded to the throne of Iran following the
abdication of his father, Riza Shah Pahlevi, on September 16.
OCTOBER 1941 619
Furthermore the circles mentioned above wish to make an agree-
ment with the Axis to the effect that Cairo will no longer be bom-
barded. The latest attack resulted in an exceedingly large number
of casualties among the civilian population, whereas no English sol-
diers had lost their lives. As a result of an agreement with England,
which has so far been kept by the British, Cairo has no factories, plants
or depots of military importance of any sort, with the exception of
the airfield at Heliopolis. The latest attack is being strongly ex-
ploited by the English against the Axis, whereas it is the principal
desire of the circles mentioned to promote a favorable atmosphere for
an occupation by the Axis, and if possible, even to come to the aid
of the Axis troops at the decisive moment.
In this connection it should be noted that the English have made
every preparation to evacuate Egypt. The transshipment port for
English supplies is today Port Sudan. In Ismailia there are still
tremendous troop encampments and supplies, to be sure, and there
is also an aviators' school at Abu Sueir, but otherwise the command
center of the English air force in Egypt has been transferred to Port
Sudan. In Khartum, too, preparations are being made for receiv-
ing large numbers of troops, and the railroad through Berber to
Suakin and Port Sudan is being reinforced.
It would result in an exceedingly favorable propaganda success
for the Axis if it stated that Cairo was an "open city" and would be
treated as such militarily. 4 So far the English had stubbornly re-
fused the request for such a declaration.
In order to establish continuous cooperation Dr. Zoulf ikar or, if he
should no longer receive an exit permit, Dr. Hafiz Eamadan, founder
of the Watani party, will return here by the beginning of December.
Should neither of the two men be permitted to leave, then Dr. Zoulf i-
kar intends if necesary to fly in one of the King's airplanes with the
Egyptian national emblem to a point in southern Libya where he could
make contact with the German troops.
Dr. Zoulfikar will return to Egypt in the next few days. As his
reference, among others, he cites Ambassador von Stohrer. He made
the good and convincing impression on me of being an Egyptian
patriot.
*The Legation in Sweden reported in telegram No. 1391 of Sept. 11
(266/173631) that the Egyptian Foreign Ministry through the good offices of the
Swedish Minister in Cairo had addressed to the German Government a protest
against a recent bombardment of Cairo by German planes in view of the fact that
Cairo was an open city and a holy city for the Moslem world. Woermann there-
upon instructed Minister Wied in telegram No. 2185 of Sept. 20 (266/173632) to
reject any future protests against bombardments of Egyptian cities. He wrote
that demarches in this matter made directly in Berlin would likewise be rejected
as they ought to be addressed to the British Government "which, by its military
measures, has made Egypt and her cities a theater of war."
620 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
I request instructions as to what further action is to be taken here in
the matter. 5
Papen
'The requested instructions, sent by Erdmannsdorff in telegram No. 1509 of
Oct 15 (2361/488727), read as follows :
"There is no intention of going Into the questions touched upon by Zoulflkar.
Please treat the matter in a dilatory fashion at your post."
No. 386
260/170223-24
The Acting Deputy Director in the Political Department to the
Legation in Finland
Telegram
[No. 1242] 1 Berlin-, [October 7, 1941— 4 : 55 p. m.]
[Eeceived October 8.]
Pol. V 4340.
Drafting Officer : Senior Counselor Schliep.
With reference to your telegram No. 1045 of October 2. 2
I. For the guidance of your conversation :
As long as the Eastern campaign lasts, the question of a political
new order in the Baltic countries cannot be discussed. After these
areas have been liberated from Bolshevism it is, first of all, a question
of obliterating traces of the Soviet regime and of introducing an or-
ganized administration. For this, the indigenous element will, to a
large extent, be employed for tasks of self-government in the adminis-
trative, economic, and cultural fields. The Estonian politician Maee
and other reliable Estonians are being employed in positions of trust
as advisors for the civil administration.
II. Strictly confidential information :
We are not interested in discussing the problem with foreigners.
We do intend to bring the Baltic countries into very close association
with the Eeich. Constitutional details have not yet been laid down ;
these will probably only then be worked out in the further course of
the political development, with the experience to be gained in the Reich
Commissariat for the Eastern Territories.
Erdmannsdokff
1 The number of the telegram, dates, and time of dispatch have been supplied
from a copy (6435/H061066) in the Helsinki Legation file.
2 In this telegram (260/170210) Bliicher reported that Witting was very inter-
ested in the administrative reorganization in Estonia and asked for guidance in
possible conversations.
OCTOBER 1941 621
No. 387
1857/422110-12
The Charge d? Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 3462 of October 6 Washington, October 7, 1941—12 : 06 p. m.
Received October 8 — 1 : 50 a. m.
Strong opposition in the Congress against repeal or amendment of
the Neutrality Act 1 compels Koosevelt to proceed with caution and
deliberation. 2 His endeavor is naturally to abolish the Neutrality Act
because it is in conflict with the avowed foreign policy of the American
Government and because its repeal would impress Britain and Japan.
Besides the need to take the parliamentary opposition and public senti-
ment into account, the general war situation also forces him to proceed
step by step. The elimination of Russia and the new military situa-
tion resulting from it would require new decisions in which the repeal
of the Neutrality Act, indicating that the United States is fully ready
for war, might not appear to be a desirable solution. The President
will therefore restrict himself probably to the arming of merchant
vessels, for which there is a majority in the Congress. This step has
more psychological than practical significance because there are not
enough guns and gun crews and the possibilities for defense are prob-
lematical. The frequent emphasis that the American Navy should
take action against "pirates" and that American merchant vessels
ought to defend themselves against "pirates" means that any incidents
1 Joint Resolution by the United States Congress "To preserve the neutrality
and the peace of the United States and to secure the safety of its citizens and
t * e , 1 L i S, terests ' a PP royed N ° T - 4, 1939, and referred to as the "Neutrality Act
of 1939". For text see U. S. Statutes at Large, 1939-1941, vol. 54 p 4
The question of a repeal of the Neutrality Act was discussed among the
American public and press with increasing frequency in the latter part of Sep-
tember 1941. Following a demand for repeal of the Neutrality Act made by
Secretary Knox In an address of Sept 23, Counselor Weber of the Foreign Minis-
ter's Secretariat informed Dieckboff in telegram No. 1032 of Sept 23
(1543/375861) from the Special Train that Ribbentrop requested a report on the
significance of an Immediate repeal of the Neutrality Act as demanded by Secre-
tary Knox. DIeckhoff dispatched the report requested in a teletype message of
Sept. 24 (1543/375862-63). After analyzing in detail how the various provisions
of the Act would be changed, Dieckhofl: summarized his conclusions as follows •
_ "To sum it up, the repeal of the Neutrality Act would have a far-reaching
significance. American citizens and American vessels in future would be able
to move everywhere without being restricted, the tonnage of the American mer-
chant marine would thus be available for shipments from the United States to
Britain, etc. and the crews could be American citizens. Furthermore, the repeal
of the Act would eliminate the existing safeguards against incidents involving
American citizens and American vessels; such incidents would then unavoid-
ably happen, and public sentiment in the United States, which so far has been
overwhelmingly opposed to entering the war, would gradually be eroded to such
an extent that the President could sooner or later induce the Congress to declare
war on Germany."
622 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
that might be provoked by these steps will not be used to declare war
against Germany, but that the President is limiting himself to the
waging of an "undeclared war" with the fleet and leaving it to Ger-
many to declare war. The impression is again confirmed that the
President will be willing to engage in total war only when all the
following prerequisites are met :
1. Japan quits the Tripartite Pact ;
2. Russia successfully continues her fight ;
3. There is a prospect that American participation in the war would
guarantee a quick victory.
In contrast to these prerequisites, the situation today is characterized
by:
1. Defective preparedness of the USA, especially in the event of
a two-front war, difficulties in transportation and in making deliveries;
2. Hopelessness of defeating Germany by military means ;
3. Necessity to take public opinion into account. (The great major-
ity of Roosevelt's followers, especially among the propertyless classes,
adhere to the majority parties because of his social reforms, but not
from enthusiasm about his foreign policy.)
4. Distrust toward Japan. Uncertain feeling that the Japanese
in the last analysis may be engaged in double-dealing.
5. Grave worries about the consequences of Russia's elimination for
Britain's key position in the Middle East.
Roosevelt's foreign policy is therefore as in the past directed at
creating, by gaining time and exploiting the allies to the utmost, a
situation where the aforesaid three prerequisites would enter in. As
I know from reliable sources, Roosevelt and his advisers, especially
Colonel Donovan, 3 the leader of the American Fifth Column, are
dominated by the primitive belief that Germany, if the war is suffi-
ciently prolonged, will crack up under the blockade, the air raids,
and the internal revolt against National Socialism, and that America,
as in 1918, will be able to deal the coup de grace, without this time
withdrawing from, the supervision of Europe's reconstruction.
Although a certain element of surprise can never be ruled out in
the case of Roosevelt, I still believe that the preceding remarks are a
substantially correct statement of the situation as far as it relates to
America's entry into the war. The story is different with regard to
the rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany and her allies ; this
must be anticipated as the gesture of a strong man which entails no
immediate risk and yet impresses the satellites. The time limit of
three months set in the compensation claim for the Robin Moor * and
a William J. Donovan, served as unofficial observer for the Secretary of the
Navy in Southeastern Europe, Dec. 1940-Mar. 1941; appointed Coordinator of
Information, J'uly 11, 1941.
' See document No. 337.
OCTOBER 1941 623
in the suggested mutual exchange of nationals s almost suggests the
date of the break. Yet it is possible that in this respect, too, the out-
come of the war against Russia will have a sobering effect.
Thomsen
11 rn telegram No. 3211 of Sept. 16 (1543/375837-39) Thomsen had reported a
proposal made by Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long according to
which the American Government would help to negotiate the mutual repatriation
of German and British nationals and at the same time bring about the return
of the American citizens from Germany and German-occupied areas.
No. 388
M178/M005694-95
Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht
CHEFSACHE FUHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, October 7, 1941.
TOP SECRET MILITARY
High Command of the Wehrmacht
No. 141675/41 g.K. Chefs. WFSt./Abt. L. (I Op.)
By Officer only
Reference: OKH (Op. Abt.) No. 41 244/g.K. of September 18, 1941.
The Fiihrer has again decided that a capitulation of Leningrad or
later of Moscow is not to be accepted even if the adversary should
offer it. 1
The moral justification of this attitute is plain before the whole
world. Just as in Kiev the gravest hazard arose for the troops from
blasts set with time fuses, the same, and worse, must be expected in
Moscow and Leningrad. The Soviet radio itself has announced that
Leningrad was mined and would be defended to the last man.
A threat of serious epidemics also exists.
No German soldier must therefore enter these cities. Those who
want to leave the city toward our lines, must be repelled by firing.
Smaller, not obstructed gaps which permit an exodus of the popula-
tion toward Russia's interior should therefore be welcome. For all
other cities the word is likewise that before seizure they are to be
ground down by gunfire and air raids and their population induced
to flee.
Risking the lives of German soldiers in order to save Russian cities
from the danger of conflagration, or to feed their population at the
expense of the German homeland cannot be justified.
1 See the record of Hitler's remarks in the conference of July 16, document
No. 114; a minute by the Naval War Stan* (M178/M005a91-^3) on the subject of
the future of Leningrad records this decision on Sept. 29.
624 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The chaos in Russia will get all the worse and our administration
and utilization of the occupied eastern territories will get all the easier,
the more the population of the Soviet cities will nee to the interior
of Russia.
This will of the Fiihrer must be communicated to all commanders.
The Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht
By order :
Jodl
No. 389
105/114085-86
Memorandum, oy the Deputy Director of the Legal Department
Berlin, October 8, 1941.
Counselor von Post of the Swedish Legation today transmitted the
enclosed pro memoria, which reproduced the essential points of a com-
munication which the Soviet Government had asked the Swedish
Government to forward.
The second paragraph of the pro memoria referred to the German
note which was transmitted to the Swedish Legation concerning the
recognition of the application of The Hague Rules of Land Warfare
in the present war in the east. 1 In this note the point was made that
before Germany could reach an agreement with the Soviet Govern-
ment regarding the prisoners of war, the Soviet Government would
have to change thoroughly its treatment of the German prisoners of
war. The Soviet Government wanted to state that in its relations
with Germany in the matter of prisoners of war it merely wished
reciprocal observance of the rules of land warfare and did not intend
to conclude any other agreements.
M. von Post then asked whether progress had been made in the
question of visiting of prisoner of war camps by representatives of the
protective powers. I replied that, as he knew, in July of this year we
had taken a step with the Soviet Government through Bulgaria as the
protective power for Germany, which has so far remained unanswered.
1 See document No, 173, footnote 5.
OCTOBER 1941 625
In this situation it was not for us to undertake anything further. 3
Submitted herewith to the Legal Department, IV.
Da. Albrecht
[Enclosure]
Fro Memoria
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics cate-
gorically denies that it has not acted according to the Rules of Land
Warfare with respect to captured German soldiers ; the German pris-
oners of war have been treated according to the provisions of The
Hague Agreement of October 18, 1907, concerning the rules and usages
of land warfare. 8
The Government of the Union has no intention whatever of con-
cluding any kind of convention with the German Government regard-
ing prisoners of war, and made only the demand {revendication)
of the German Government that the internationally recognized pro-
visions regarding the treatment of prisoners of war and in particular
the principles of The Hague Agreement of 1907 regarding the rules
and usages of land warfare be precisely observed.
1 On Dec. 22 Ribbentrop submitted to Hitler a memorandum {4940/E273019-
21 ) which dealt with the problems of the prisoners of war in the German-Soviet
war. According to this memorandum the International Committee of the Ked
Cross had made proposals to the OKW with respect to arrangements under which
the prisoners of war on both sides would be supplied with food and clothing
from the United States; furthermore, there would be organized a mutual ex-
change of data concerning prisoners of war through the offices of the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva. Ribbentrop recommended ac-
ceptance of these proposals particularly, as the OKW and Propaganda Minister
Goebbels were also favorably disposed toward such a course of action.
On Jan. 9 Ritter recorded (4840/E273018) having been told by Ribbentrop
that Hitler had. rejected these Red Cross proposals. Later on Hewel explained
■to Ritter that in the course of a conference with Keitel and Jodl Hitler had
Tejected the proposal for two reasons :
"One reason was that lie did not wish the troops on the eastern front to get
the wrong idea that in case they were captured they would be treated by the
Russians in accordance with treaties. The second reason was that the Russian
Government, by comparing names could discover that not all Russian soldiers
who had come into German hands were alive."
With respect to the efforts of the International Red Cross in the matter of
the prisoners of war in the first phase of the German-Soviet war, cf. XVIIth
International Red Cross Conference, Report of the International Committee of
the Red Cross on its Activities During the Second World War, vol. I, pp. 408-424.
3 See document No. 173, footnote 2.
682-905 — 64 43
626 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 390
4895/E282528 ;
49B5/E282531-33
German-Turkish Exchanges of Letters 1
The Chairman 1 of the German Economic Delegation to the
Chairman or the Turkish Economic Delegation
confidential Ankara, October 9, 1941.
M. Chairman: I have the honor to confirm the receipt of your
letter of today's date, 2 which reads as follows :
"I have the honor to inform you that the Turkish Government,
agrees to issue licenses for the export of copper, chromium, cotton and
olive oil to Germany in the following amounts :
Copper 12,000 tons
Chromium 45,000 tons
Cotton 7,000 tons
Olive oil 8,000 tons
Any differences that may arise between the values cited in List I ff
and the actual values of these quantities will be compensated for by
an increase or reduction of the values provided in List I for the other
categories."
Accept, M. Chairman, the assurance of my highest consideration.
Clodius.
The Chairman of the German Economic Delegation to the Chair-
man of the Turkish Economic Delegation * t
confidential Ankara, October 9, 1941, '
M. Chairman : I have the honor to confirm to you that the follow-
ing was agreed upon between the German Government and the Turk-
ish Government on the occasion of today's signing of the commercial
agreement between Germany and Turkey : j
During the period of validity of the agreement cited above, i.e., be- 1
fore March 31, 1943, the German Government and the Turkish Gov-
1 These exchanges are part of a series of documents relating to the German-
Turkish Commercial Agreement and Payments Agreement, both signed in f,
Ankara, Oct. 9. The entire complex of agreements, protocols, letters, and con-
fidential letters in German, French, and Turkish is filmed on serial 4995 and a
table of contents is found on 4995/E282453-55. The texts of the Commercial
and Payments Agreements were published in Reichsgesetzblatt, 1941, n, p. 375,.
under date of Nov. 15.
' French text of Menemencioglu's letter is filmed on 4995/E2825G7.
' Annexes of the confidential letter of Oct. 9 from Clodius to Menemenciogtu.
(4995/E282516-18) included List I and List I A.
* The file copy of this letter is not signed. The initials of Clodius and Menemen-
cioglu are found on a French copy of this letter (4995/282585) . i
i
OCTOBER 1941 627
ernment will conclude an agreement on the delivery of chromium ore
by Turkey to Germany until December 31, 1944, on the following
terms :
1. The amount provided for war material in List I A* of the confi-
dential letter which forms an essential part of the commerical agree-
ment concluded today shall be utilized in its entirety by the delivery of
material to Turkey under the terms provided for in the agreement
named.
2. The chromium ore to be exported from Turkey will constitute the
equivalent for further deliveries of war material which are to be
jointly agreed upon between the two Governments.
3. The Turkish Government will then approve the export of an an-
nual amount of 90,000 tons of chromium for the periods from January
15 to December 31, 1943, and from January 1 to December 31, 1944,
thus a total of 180,000 tons for the period from January 15, 1943, to
the end of the year 1944.
Accept, M. Chairman, the assurance of my highest consideration.
The Chairman or the German Economic Delegation to the Chair-
man of the Turkish Economic Delegation a
confidential Ankara, October 9, 1941.
M. Chairman: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your
letter of today's date T which reads as follows:
"I have the honor to transmit to you below a list of the war material
provided for in group 1 of List I A.
Spare parts for trucks and motorcycles (Stoewer, NSU, GKD,
NAG, Magirus, Tempo, Bussing)
Krupp cannon 7.5/60 (with sighting mechanism, altimeter, and
ammunition)
Bochumer Verein cannon 7.5/20 (with ammunition)
Sighting mechanisms ( for Krupp cannon 7.5/42)
Altimeters (for Krupp cannon 7.5/42)
Pontoons, engineer equipment (explosives)
Heavy machineguns
Spare parts for aircraft ( Heinkel , Gotha, Fokke-Wulff )
40 gun barrels ( Bochumer Verein)
2 diesel engines (for U-boats)
4 periscopes (for U-boats)
Or other material to be agreed upon
Miscellaneous material."
Please accept, M. Chairman, the assurances of my highest
consideration. .
. * See footnote 3.
* The file copy of this letter Is not signed. The Initials of Clodius and Mene-
meneloglu are found on a French copy of this letter (4995/282587)
7 French text filmed on 4995/E282586.
628 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 391
9B/107129-32
Ambassador Sitter to the Embassy in Spain
Telegram
top secret Special Train October 9, 1941 — 7 : 45 p. m.
No. 1083 from the Special Train
Keceived Berlin, October 9 — 8 : 35 p. m.
No. 2367 from the Foreign Ministry Sent October 10 — 1 : 30 a. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 3250 of September 19. 1
I. For your own information.
The transfer of the two German ships Oorrientes and Oharlotte
Schliemann from the outer harbor of Las Palmas to the inner harbor is
rather disadvantageous to the effectiveness of the German submarines
in the battle of the Atlantic. The German Navy has, therefore, asked
the Foreign Ministry that every diplomatic effort be made to cancel
these measures of the Spanish Government and to make possible again
in some way or other the supplying of German submarines from these
two ships.
It has been resented here that a protest from the English Govern-
ment sufficed to make the Spanish Government zealously comply with
the English wishes, without even previously consulting with the Ger-
man Government about it. But perhaps this may be excused by the
fact that the Spanish Government wanted to anticipate possible Eng-
lish action by force against the two German ships in the outer harbor.
In the further treatment of this question, however, there is no point
in our criticizing the action of the Spanish Government in the past,
but it is rather for us to make possible that in the future German
submarines be supplied from Las Palmas as before, I request, there-
fore, that you treat the matter in an emphatically friendly but decisive
manner.
II. I ask that you see the Spanish Foreign Minister and discuss
with him the fact that the two ships Oorrientes and Oharlotte Schlie-
mann have been transferred from the outer harbor of Las Palmas to
the inner harbor. This transfer was made because of a one-sided
decree of the Spanish authorities, without prior communication with
the German Government or with the owners of the German ships.
The German Government was only subsequently informed through
"In this telegram (95/107085) Stohrer reported that the British Government,
In an official note to the Spanish Government, had requested the withdrawal
of two German ships into the inner harbor of Las Palmas because the; were
apparently supplying German submarines. The Spanish Minister of the Navy
had agreed to tills request in order to prevent further Incidents. See also
document No. 122,
OCTOBER 1941 629
notification from the Spanish Minister of the Navy 2 to the German
Naval Attache 8 of the fact that the English Government in a note
had demanded the withdrawal of these ships to the inner harbor, be-
cause these ships had "apparently" supplied submarines. The Reich
Government must leave the decision up to the Spanish Government
whether it was politically wise to comply with such an unusual request
of the English Government without further ado. From the German
point of view this is to be regretted, because it might convey acknowl-
edgement of the Spanish Government that the supplying of German
submarines from both German ships actually took place.
Through the interference of the Spanish Government disadvan-
tages in various directions have now arisen for Germany.
1. The two German ships now lie in Las Palmas in full view of
English firms. It is certain that the English naval forces will be im-
mediately informed of a possible departure of the ships. Thus, the
German 'ships would be endangered to the utmost by an eventual de-
parture. The departure has practically been made impossible. There-
fore, it must be requested that different anchorage places be assigned
to the ships, which would assure an unobserved departure.
2. According to reports available here English sabotage is planned
against both ships. The present anchorages favor such sabotage. We
must expect from the Spanish Government that it will protect the
German ships from any sabotage. From this point of view also a
better anchorage would be desirable.
3. The chief disadvantage, however 3 is that the support of German
submarines from this anchorage is impossible. After a thorough
examination, the Head of the Spanish Government had previously
made the promise that Spain would make possible such aid for German
submarines (cf. secret dispatch No, 1119 of November 30, 1939) .* The
Spanish Government will acknowledge that the German Nayy, in using
this privilege, has been most considerate of Spain's position. The
Reich Government considers it understood that the Spanish Govern-
ment stands by its word now as in the past. The objective now is
to make possible again the supplying of German submarines from
these two ships in the future. Technical suggestions on this cannot
be made from Berlin. The German Naval Attache has been commis-
sioned to find such possibilities in confidential collaboration with the
Spanish Navy. Should no other possibilities be found, the two Ger-
man ships must again be transferred to their previous anchorages in
the outer harbor. Should the English Government make renewed
protests, the Spanish Government should reply that investigations in
the meantime have proved that the assertion of the English note was
unfounded. The Spanish Government, therefore, had no occasion to
maintain coercive measures against the German ships. Moreover, the
Spanish Government was surprised that the English Government
derived such demands and protests in view of Spain's neutrality, while
* Rear Acta, S, Moreno Fernandez.
* Cmdr. C. Meyer-Dobner.
*Not printed {1672/394818-24).
630 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the English naval forces as is generally known customarily supplied
themselves in harbors of neutral countries. The Spanish Government
therefore, could not acknowledge the English representations as
basically justified.
III. In agreement with the Navy I request that the Naval Attache
be instructed to carry on the further technical discussions with the
Spanish Navy. I request the Ambassador, however, to intervene
again if the technical discussions of the Naval Attache should not pro-
duce satisfactory results.
IV. In your telegram No. 3250 of September 19, you report that
the English note of protest reads that "apparently" submarines have
been supplied by the two German ships. From the wording "ap-
parently", it would be assumed that the English note does not advance
strict proof for such a supplying. It would be desirable during the
course of your discussions if you could obtain from the Spanish Gov-
ernment the text of the English note of protest.
Not only for further tactical treatment of the affair but also for
judging the attitude of the Spanish Government, it would be desirable
to clarify whether the English Government knows and has advanced
details on the previous supplying operations. 6
EnTEK
* For Stohrer's reply see document No. 403.
No. 392
65/107133-3*
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
top secret Madrid, October 10, 1941 — 8: 00 p. m.
No. 3520 of October 10 Received October 10— -10: 30 p. m.
With reference to my top secret cipher letter 2521 of September 28. 1
The domestic policy crisis, particularly the fight against Foreign
Minister Serrano Sufier, has reached a certain high point in the last
few days 8 and has led to a very thorough and evidently very agitated
conference between the Chief of State and his brother-in-law.
Suner spoke to me today with exceeding frankness and at the same
time great vehemence about the attacks made on him of late, particu-
larly by military quarters. He stated that his opponents were re-
proaching him more and more for having done grave damage to Spain
*In this message (95/107121-23) Stohrer gave a detailed report of Spain's
internal position at that time.
J In telegram No. 2886 of Aug. 21 (95/107023) Stohrer had reported continued
political unrest and discontent.
OCTOBER 1941 631
through his foreign policy line in favor of Germany, because England
and America, which would after all win the war, were now hostile
toward Spain and were damaging Spain economically. General
Aranda 8 had gone furthest. Probably at the instigation of former
Foreign Minister Beigbeder, 4 he had taken up contact with the English
Ambassador and had been close to organizing a military plot to
give a new direction to Spanish foreign policy. He had now sub-
mitted the relevant evidence to the Caudillo and opened his eyes to
the grave danger inherent in this agitation. Not only the military
but also a majority of the Ministers had secretly remonstrated with
Franco in order to discredit him, the Foreign Minister, and his policy.
He had told the Caudillo, and repeated it to me, that he had no hates
and no loves, but that he only pursued a policy in accordance with
Spain's own peculiar interests and this policy went along with Ger-
many through thick and thin ; for only Germany's victory could save
Spain, and he believed firmly in our victory. All of these political
intriguers, generals, and so-called politicians, who today were suing
for England's friendship in expectation of an English victory, would
be destroyed or at best expelled from the country in case of an English
victory, just like the Caudillo and himself, Spain's unity would be
destroyed, a Basque and a Catalonian republic would arise; in brief,
the entire new Spain would be annihilated.
Through a strange accident the Minister (one group missing) to
the telephone in the midst of his statements, where the Spanish Am-
bassador in Berlin passed on to him personally the disclosures about
the great decisive victory in Russia which Reich Press Chief Dietrich
made to the foreign journalists in Berlin.
The Minister congratulated me, then pounded on the table and
said : "There, you see that I am right, and my opponents are wrong
if they believe that I have now been weakened by all of these persecu-
tions ; I shall continue this policy, which is the only right one, with all
the energy at my command. It does not matter to me in the slightest
who is against me."
I had the definite impression that the Minister's statements were
sincere; considering the situation, however, we must wait and see
whether he is really strong enough to overcome once more the ex-
traordinarily great opposition against him and to win out, 9
The state of internal agitation has reached the point today that a
clear decision must be made for or against Suner within the foresee-
* Gen. Mata Antonio Arandn, Director of the Army Staff College.
'Juan Beigbeder y Adienza, Spanish Foreign Minister, Aug. 1939-Oet. 1940.
1 Sir Samuel Hoare.
"In cipher letter No. 2624 g.Rs. of Nov. 6 (498/233903-10) Stohrer reported
that the Internal tension continued, that Seranno SuSer'a foes had not given
up ; but that Franco feared to dismiss him lest such a move favor the monarch-
ists and denote a change In Spain's foreign policy.
632 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
able future. I do not believe that his departure must necessarily mean
such decisive change in the direction of Spanish foreign policy as the
Minister expects.
Stoheer
No. 393
286/173342-44
The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 319 of October 10 Ankara, October 10, 1941.
Del. No. 74 Received October 10—10 : 30 p. m.
For the Reich Foreign Minister.
In the course of my stay the Foreign Minister and Numan spoke
■with me repeatedly about the aims of Turkish foreign policy. In
particular in the last conversations yesterday and today both tried
insistently to explain to me that the Turkish standpoint was justified.
In this connection Numan referred to the conversation which he had
in the summer of 1938 -with the Reich Foreign Minister. 1 The For-
eign Minister asked me to convey his special personal greetings to
the Reich Foreign Minister. He was very sorry that he had not yet
had an opportunity to meet the Reich Foreign Minister personally.
The quintessence of the Turkish presentation is approximately as
follows :
In the struggle against Russia, Turkey is entirely on Germany's side
and hopes for a quick German victory. Turkey had openly told the
English this repeatedly. Turkey did not wish to intervene in the
conflict. She would defend herself to the utmost by every means
against anyone attacking Turkish soil, no matter whether it was Ger-
many, England, or Russia. She would in no case let herself be mis-
used for any kind of operation by England against Germany. On the
other hand her alliance with England also prohibited her, for example,
from permitting German troops to pass through in order to fight in the
Near East. Numan tried time and again to demonstrate that this atti-
tude on the part of Turkey also was in accordance with the German
interests, because precisely through her neutrality Turkey protected
Germany's right flank in the fight against Russia, without Germany's
having to utilize military forces for this. The Foreign Minister said
that it was natural that Turkey could not remain disinterested in the
fate of 40 million people of Turkish origin in Russia. For reasons of
1 Apparently a reference to conversations held in Berlin in July 1938. See vol.
v of this series, document No. 548 and footnote 1.
OCTOBER 1941 633
geography, to be sure, the union of these areas with Turkey in the case
of a reorganization of the Eussian realm was hardly possible; perhaps,
however, the areas could receive administrative autonomy with a
strong cultural affiliation with Turkey. It was necessary in the first
place that thousands of young people from these areas should be sent
to Turkey to study in order to create a feeling of Turkish nationality
among the oppressed population. Numan, who it is my impression is
still the spiritual leader of Turkish foreign policy, seems to deviate
a little in these questions from the somewhat unclear statements of his
Foreign Minister. He stressed repeatedly that Turkey had no aspira-
tions outside her present borders.
With regard to the outcome of the war as a whole the Turks desire
the total defeat of Russia and a compromise peace between Germany
«nd England, which Numan conceives in such a way that Germany
gives England a free hand in Eastern Europe (sic) whereas the new
order in Western Europe is to come about in agreement between Eng-
land and Germany. Numan explains his view by stating that he is
convinced, that Germany, to be sure, cannot be conquered, but that on
the other hand he finds it hard to visualize a German victory over
England.
This evaluation of the situation as a whole results in the effort of
Turkish policy to improve the relationship with Germany, especially
since the start of the Russian campaign, but at the same time not to
let the connections with England break off. The conclusion of yester-
day's economic treaty a is regarded from this point of view mainly as a
political factor by prominent Turkish individuals.
Clodius
1 See document No. 390 and footnote 1.
No. 394
SB/10713T-38
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
secret Madrid, October 10, 1941—9 : 25 p. m., s[ummer] time.
No. 3523 of October 10 Received October 10—11 : 40 p. m.
With reference to my telegram No. 3419 of October 3. 1
The Spanish Foreign Minister has told me the following about the
course of his recent conversation with the U.S.A. Ambassador, which
1 In this telegram (95/107116) Stohrer reported that Sufier had finally consented
to a reception of the Ambassador of the United States by Franco. The Spanish
Government hoped thereby to diminish American economic pressure but would
not make any political concessions to achieve this goal.
634 DOCUMENTS ON" GERMAN" FOREIGN POLICY
after great ill feeling was finally arranged through the Spanish Am-
bassador in Washington, 2 and about the Ambassador's audience with
Franco, which took place in his presence : s
_ The Ambassador had indicated to Franco the prospect of far-reach-
ing American concessions such as he had suggested earlier— loans, de-
liveries of raw materials, etc.— if Spain would stop the present policy
hostile to England and America.* The Minister and Franco had re-
plied that Spain was much more modest; she merely desired the de-
livery of gasoline and other goods for which England had already is-
sued navicerts, and therewith the end of the at least partial blockade
imposed by the U.S.A,
Referring to a statement made by Serrano Suner in the preliminary
conference, according to which America and England, through their
policy of economic thumbscrews, would finally drive Spain into the
war without any influence being exerted by Germany, the Ambassador
asked Franco whether he had to regard this as a threat. Serrano
Suner, who was present at the audience, intervened and stated that his
remark had simply served as a statement of fact, whereupon Franco
expressly identified himself with the statement by the Foreign
Minister.
The Foreign Minister has the impression that America will now
come around to some extent. The American Ambassador intends to
fly to Washington within the next few days.
Stoheer
* Juan F. de Cardenas y Rodriguez.
BWn™ 'fS b p Ssa ^ or J^ell's account of his conversation with Sufier and
Franco, see Foreign Relations of the United States, 191)1, toI.ii pp. 924-929
Smnli ^^\ 3m5 ,? { ? C K 19 ^5/107163-64) Stohrer reported that the
StZflf b6 f n dlr ^ t . ed o by « tlle Foreign Ministry to modify its attacks
V^^SZ&^gftjS^ was done for econoffiic reasons
No. 395
8689/E603060-65
Fuhrer's Directive
CHBFSACHE FuHKER's HEADQUARTERS, October 10, 1941.
TOP SECRET MHJTART
The Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
OKW/WFSt/Abt. L. (I Op.) No, 441969/41 g.K. Chefs.
By officer only
Directive No. 37
The swift, favorable development of the situation in the eastern
theater of war together with the reports from the Headquarters, Army
OCTOBER 1941 635
of Norway concerning the condition of the troops and the future opera-
tional possibilities in Finland prompt me to issue the following
orders :
1. Now that the bulk of Soviet Russia's armed forces in the main
theater of operations has been smashed or destroyed, there is no longer
any compelling reason for conducting offensive operations to tie down
Russian forces in Finland. Seizure of Murmansk or of the Rybachi
Peninsula or cutting through the Murmansk railroad in central Fin-
land before winter sets in can now no longer be accomplished given
the insufficient strength and striking power of the available forces
and the advanced season.
The most urgent task remaining therefore is to hold the gains, to
secure the Petsamo nickel mines against attacks on land, from the
air and from the coast, and to carry out all preparations — starting
already during the winter — for the final capture of Murmansk, of
the Rybachi Peninsula, and the Murmansk railroad in the coming
year.
The timetable shall be as follows :
(a) Shift by the ground forces to the defensive in favorable posi-
tions economical of manpower, improvement of the winter billets, and
changeover to winter warfare.
(b) Relief movements and bringing up new forces.
(c) During the winter, con centrical attacks against the Murmansk
railroad, specifically: with Finnish forces, from the south, against
Belomorsk-Kem and, if possible, also Loukhi; with German forces,
from the Verman sector, against Kandalaksha. 1
(d) At the time most favorable for the purpose, seizure of the
Rybachi Peninsula in its entirety, if possible, and attack against
Murmansk.
These operations must be so timed as to permit at any given moment
concentration of the bulk of attacking forces for main efforts against
single points.
2, The next mission of Headquarters, Army of Norway, while assur-
ing defensive operations in positions sparing of manpower, is to dis-
pose its units in such a manner as to permit the forces which have
been in combat for prolonged periods to be rehabilitated and equipped
for winter warfare or, as may be the case, relieved by newly arriving
reinforcements and withdrawn. Specifically:
{a) In the Mountain Corps, the 2nd and the 3rd Mountain Divi-
sions are to be relieved by the reinforced 6th Mountain Division. One
mountain division is to he left in northern Finland, while the other
shall be moved to the area around and south of Rovaniemi. Its re-
turn to the Zone of Interior is scheduled to coincide with the arrival
of the 5th Mountain Division (approximately January 1942).
'Guidelines for the execution of this directive, particularly regarding
the offensive against Kandalaksha, were issued by Keitel on Nov. 21
(8589/603083-86).
636 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Another newly constituted or reorganized mountain division will
subsequently take the place of the mountain division left in northern
Finland.
(b) XXXVI Army Corps shall be reinforced by the 163rd Infan-
try Division as soon as it is ascertained that the division is no longer
needed for commitment in a concentric operation between the Karelian
Army and Army Group North against the southern shore of Lake
Ladoga.
Efforts are being made to arrange for relieving the personnel of the
169 th and the 163rd Infantry Division in the course of the winter by
divisions from Norway or from the homeland.
3. All relief movements, including those of the mountain divisions,
are to be effected in a manner whereby the bulk of the heavy weapons,
equipment, horses and pack animals are left behind on the spot and
in consequence only the personnel with their light weapons are
exchanged. This will save both time and transport space.
4. As regards the SS units, plans call for relief of the 9th SS Regi-
ment, now attached to the 2nd Mountain Division, by an SS regiment
made up of Norwegians and Finns, and for formation of a mountain
brigade out of SS Battle Group North with the addition of an SS
regiment from Austria. Execution of this measure will be coordinated
by the High Command of the Wehrmacht with the general plan for
exchanges of staffs and troops.
5. Since the Finnish High Command is planning a complete re-
organization of the Army, the German and Finnish forces under com-
mand of III Finnish Corps are to be exchanged (6th Finnish Div.
for SS Battle Group North) . When this has been done, it is pro-
posed to place the front of III Finnish Corps under the command of
Field Marshal Mannerheim.
For the initial stage of the new operations, Field Marshal Man-
nerheim will be requested to reassign at least a few small Finnish
units to the German group attacking Kandalaksha.
6. To the Luftwaffe the following immediate missions in the Finnish
theater of operations are assigned, so far as the weather permits :
(a) To patrol the sea areas along the coasts of northern Norway
and Finland to protect friendly ana to combat enemy sea traffic ;
(b) To assure the air defenses, especially of the Petsamo nickel
mines, the ports of discharge, and the naval bases ;
(o) To fly reconnaissance missions over the areas of future opera-
tions and to carry out sustained attacks against the enemy supply
base of Murmansk and against supply movements to Murmansk by
sea and by railroad ;
(d) To make preparations for the employment of stronger forces
in support of the forthcoming operations.
OCTOBER 1941 637
7. The Navy shall have the mission of attacking enemy supply
movements to Murmansk by sea and of doing its utmost to support
friendly sea traffic in the Arctic Ocean.
In order to accomplish this, it is necessary as soon as possible to
provide reinforcements for the light naval forces as well as to intro-
duce motor torpedo boats.
Kirkenes is to be developed and equipped as an improvised base.
The safety of friendly coastal traffic requires bringing up of addi-
tional coastal batteries. The relevant orders will be issued by the
Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht.
Kirkenes and Petsamo are each to be reinforced over and above
the submitted program by a battery of 21-cm. guns, and a 28-cm. bat-
tery is to be constructed at Vardo. Plans are also to be prepared for
construction of a battery of the heaviest caliber on the Rybachi Penin-
sula when it is captured.
8. The cooperation between Headquarters, Army of Norway, the
Navy, and the Luftwaffe must be very close especially during the com-
ing months in order to check any attacks that might be launched
against the front and the sea flank. To this end, in order to simplify
mutual cooperation, the Navy shall designate a Naval Commander,
North (Marine fiihrer Nord) , and the Luf twaffe — upon withdrawal of
Fifth Air Force Headquarters to Norway — an Aerial Commander,
North (Fliegerfiihrev Nord) .
9. The orders for executing these measures shall be issued by the
Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht. Through him will
be submitted to me :
(a) From Headquarters, Army of Norway :
Timetable for the regrouping movements.
Proposals regarding changes in equipment with a view to enabling
all troops to tight in the tundra and the virgin forests of eastern
Karelia.
Operational proposals and requests for Army headquarters troops.
Proposals for the exchanges of staffs.
(b) From the Navy and the Luftwaffe.
Their intentions in detail.
10. To the extent that Directive No. 36 2 is superseded by this order,
it is annulled.
Adolf Hitler
' See document No. 349.
638 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 396
1857/422124-29
Memorandum Tyy Arriba&sador Dieckhof
By teletype to the Foreign Minister
through the State Secretary
Berlin, October 10, 1941.
Regarding Yesterday's Message of Koosevelt to the Congress
Dealing With the Neutrality Act x
1. Originally Roosevelt had hoped he would by now be able to urge
the repeal of the Neutrality Act * by Congress. But in the last few
weeks his soundings of public opinion showed him that he cannot risk
that, for at this time sentiment in the United States is firmly opposed
to an outright repeal of the Act. He then attempted to eliminate at
least the two principal pieces of the Act (the prohibition of the arm-
ing of merchant vessels aid of their sailing to English ports), but
in conversations with the party leaders held in the last few days he
had to realize that at the moment he can not risk that, either. In
yesterday's message he therefore limited himself to demanding the
repeal of the ban on the arming of merchant vessels, and in other
respects merely expressed the hope that the Congress would sooner
or later also repeal the prohibition for ships to call at English ports.
His representatives in both houses of Congress accordingly last night
introduced merely bills repealing article 6 of the Neutrality Act (pro-
hibits the arming of American merchant ships) .
2. The President obviously wants to wait to see how the vote on this
bill will go, before deciding on further steps.
3. This development is actively 3 favorable to us. In view of the
shortage of guns the arming of merchant vessels will have no im-
mediate effects, but will take quite some time. Besides, by being
armed the American merchant vessels are putting themselves from
the outset in the wrong with respect to our naval forces.
4. The longer American merchant vessels are prohibited from call-
ing at British ports, the longer we avoid the risk of an accumulation
of incidents.
Dieckhoff
1 For text of President Roosevelt's message of Oct. 9, see Department of State,
Bulletin, 1941, vol. v. pp. 257-259. Thomsen's account and Interpretation of
the message was sent with telegram No. 3500 of Oct. 9, dispatched Oct 10
* See document No. 387, footnote 1.
' The word scored through was deleted before the teletype message was sent.
OCTOBER 1941 639
No. 397
1517/372762-83
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 678 Berlin, October 11, 1941.
The Italian Ambassador, whom I had asked to see me today, re-
verted of his own accord to the complaints of the Italian laborers in
Germany. He gave me new material again (see enclosures 1-4 l ).
I countered this allegation by handing Alfieri the detailed memoran-
dum attached hereto * and met with understanding when I remarked
to him that his informant, Minigutti, had gone too far and would
probably do better by returning to Italy.
On the other hand there is still a rather considerable substantive
discrepancy between the findings of the two sides ; for this reason I
repeated that it was necessary that the special expert to be appointed
by Under State Secretary Luther meet with the corresponding mem-
ber of Ambassador Alfieri's staff to clarify the facts thoroughly.
Alfieri was of the opinion that Signor Lombrassa should come here
as soon as possible in order to get in touch with Dr. Ley about the
working conditions of the Italian laborers, which they have already
discussed before. 3
I suggested to Alfieri that Signor Lombrassa's trip be put off for
a while until the discussion between the experts had produced more
tangible results.
Alfieri declared to me repeatedly that he was doing everything on
his part to prevent any undue excitement in Rome. On his visit to
Rome in the near future he would also ask the Duce not always to
read these things himself but rather trust that he, Alfieri, would
intervene at the proper time. He would, however, as Ambassador
have to see to it that complaints of this kind did not reach the Duce
through some other channel and poison the atmosphere before he
himself had a chance to say a word.
1 Filmed on 1517/372773-80. Enclosures 1-3 contain details of mistreatment
of Italian workers in Germany. Enclosure 4 deals with the case of Kreisleiter
Goldbeck (see document No. 281 ) .
"This undated memorandum (1517/372764-72) presents the German position.
It explained that because of the war, camps had to be established where lazy
and recalcitrant workers were being educated and disciplined — not punished.
This was true for all workers, foreign and domestic and, as far as the Italian
workers were concerned, was in accordance with article 2 of the German-Italian
agreement of July 10, 1940.
The methods employed at these camps and the sending of Italian workers to
them had been discussed repeatedly with Italian officials and the latter had
voiced no objections. The memorandum goes on to deal with the individual
cases cited in the note of the Italian Embassy and refutes all of the complaints
mentioned therein.
See document No. 281, footnote 2,
* See document No. 375.
640 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Alfieri reacted sensitively to the letter in enclosure 4 written by
Kreisleiter Goldbeck in Recklinghausen about the association of Ital-
ian laborers with German women. Alfieri said that the original of
this letter was already in Home.*
Unless it is a forgery, this order by the Kreisleiter in question really
is highly objectionable in its wording.
Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister.
Weizsacker
4 See document No. 281,
No. 398
617/250047
The Minister in Afghanistan to the foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Kabul, October 12, 1941—5 : 15 p. nu
top secret Received October 12—6 : 00 p. m..
No. 401 of October 12
The Foreign Minister * informed me today that on October 9 the-
English Minister and on October 11 the Soviet Ambassador s made-
demarches with the Afghan Government on the subject of the Ger-
man and Italian communities. At the Afghan request the English
Minister promised free departure for the entire communities across:
English territory to a neutral place. The Afghan Government would
continue to insist on this request even if this concession should be in?
any way altered by the enemy. The final discussion with the English.
Minister was set for October 14. Regarding the Legations, the Eng-
lish Minister had stated that no objections to their remaining would'
be raised. The Afghans want to agree to the demand of the enemy-
powers in order to avoid a repetition of the Iranian incidents. I
stressed energetically to the Foreign Minister that in all circum-
stances only safe conduct for the entire colony could be the prerequisite-
for German consent. 3 The Minister expressed his full agreement and.
1 All Mohammad Khan.
'Konstantin Mikhailov.
* Marginal note in Weizsacker's handwriting : "Guarantee?"
In the flies there ia a draft instruction of Oct. 13 by Weizsacker (617/250050)'
for a reply. It pointed out that oral assurances for safe conduct through British-
territory were not sufficient and directed Pilger to insist on a written assurance"
from the Afghan Government, also on behalf of the British Government. The-
draft also stated there could be no question of Germany's consent to the Afghan,
action.
OCTOBER 1941 641
promised that everything would be done by Afghanistan to facilitate
the departure of the colony across English territory in so far as pos-
sible. I have heard in this connection from semi-official sources that
the attitude of the Afghan Government is allegedly very firm, doubt-
less influenced by public opinion, so that any enemy demand that,
contrary to expectation, might mean internment and the like would
meet with rejection.*
PlLOER
* In telegram No. 434 of Oct 34 (617/250082) Pilger reported that an Afghan
note had been handed to the German and Italian Legations informing them that
the English Minister had given formal assurances that the German and Italian
nationals would safely travel under British protection to a country whence the
Afghan Government itself could send them on to Germany.
Further details about the agreed route for the departure of the colony, set
for Oct. 29 and 30, were given by Pilger in telegrams Nos. 438 of Oct. 25 (617/-
250088) and 443 of Oct. 27 (617/250090). In telegram No. 451 of Nov. 1
(329/195500) Pilger reported that the only Germans remaining in Afghanistan
were 10 members of the Legation.
No. 399
794/273201
The Charge d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
top secret Eome, October 13, 1941 — 12 : 33 p, m.
No. 2514 of October 13 Received October 13—1 : 05 p. m.
For the Foreign Minister personally.
Anfuso told me yesterday that Count Ciano had asked him to inform
the Eeich Government, through me, with the request for the strictest
secrecy, that the Grand Mufti had arrived in Italy by a secret route a
short while ago. 1 The English, as was known, were making every en-
deavor to get their hands on him. For this reason alone his presence
in Italy should in no circumstances be made known. Even in the
Foreign Ministry only very few officials knew anything about this.
The Italian Government intends to have the Grand Mufti "disappear"
*In telegram No. 963 of Sept. 6 (65/45303) Bttel had reported the presence of
the Grand Mufti in the Japanese Legation at Tehran.
In telegram No. 1279 of Oct. 14 from Tberapia (794/273200) Kroll reported:
"Gaylanl told me that the Italians succeeded in smuggling the Grand Mufti out
with the Italian colony of Iran. The Italians themselves have so far told us
nothing about It."
682-805 — 64 46
642 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
here for a few months and then use him at the proper time for Arab
propaganda.
Bismarck
No. 400
173/84448
Memomndvm by the Deputy Director of the Legal Department
Berlin, October 13, 1941.
The Swedish Minister 1 called on me today to tell me the following :
In February of this year, 430 Jews of Netherlands nationality were
taken from Amsterdam to a German concentration camp near Mau-
thausen. In June of this year another 230 Dutch Jews followed. Ac-
cording to lists which the German police authorities in the Netherlands
transmitted to the Jewish Council in Amsterdam, more than 400 of
these prisoners have died so far. According to the lists it seems that
these deaths occurred always on certain days. The prisoners are al-
most all of them rather young men. The Swedish Legation, which
had to interest itself in the Netherlands nationals as representative of
the protective power, had repeatedly requested that one of its officials
be allowed to visit these prisoners. This request has so far not been
granted, however. Mr. Richert repeated the request regarding a visit
to the camp and asked at the same time that the Foreign Ministry look
after the matter.
I reminded the Swedish Minister that these Jews had been taken
prisoner because of the disturbances which had occurred in Amster-
dam and in which Jewish-Communist elements had been the leading
factors, and I promised further information.
Herewith submitted to E IV* with the request for further action. 8
Albrecht
1 Arvid G. Richert.
* Division IV of the Legal Department dealt with military law, prisoners of
war, and civilian internees.
8 No further documents have been found in the files. However, a document
printed in Poliakov and Wutf, Das Dritte Reich und seine Diener, pp. 100-101,
Indicates that In a letter of Nov. 5 the Foreign Ministry asked the Reich Main
Security Office to examine the matter and make its views known to the Foreign
Ministry.
OCTOBER 1941 643
No. 401
4839/E2449T4 ;
4839/E244976-78
The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Chief of
the Reich Chancellery
top secret Fuhrer's Headquarters, October 13, 1941.
WFSt/Abt.L (IV/Verw.) No. 002362/41 g. Kdos.
RK. 739 BgRs.
Dear Reich Minister: The High Command of the Wehrmacht
has thoroughly investigated the possibility of converting the present
military administration in Belgium into a civil administration under a
Reich commissar. As seen from a purely military point of view the
following important reasons argue against such a step:
1. Military:
At the present time Belgium, as an operational area constantly
threatened by the enemy, is heavily occupied by the Wehrmacht with
troops and High Command staffs. The Army alone has a total of
about 200,000 men with an army headquarters and seven divisional
staffs. The Luftwaffe has transferred one air force administrative
command headquarters, numerous air groups, and one antiaircraft
division with the corresponding air force units to this area. Very
considerable reinforcements can be reckoned with after the conclusion
of the campaign in the east. The Navy, too, is represented by numerous
higher commands and units.
If only by reason of this heavy occupation by the Wehrmacht and
the attendant demands made on all public institutions such as adminis-
tration, transportation, communications, and industry, there would
of necessity be in the restricted Belgian territory constant areas of
friction between the urgent requirements of the Wehrmacht and the
justified needs of a civil administration. This would be even more
true in case of internal unrest or military operations, which are
possible at all times.
It should further be taken into account in this connection that the
military command authority is in the hands of the Commander in
Chief, West, who has his headquarters outside Belgium.
These conditions would create great difficulties in delimiting the
rights and responsibilities even in the purely military sphere. How-
ever, in order to make it possible to put through the necessary mili-
tary measures at all times without regard for the political authorities
and without delay, the basic Fiihrer decree would have to impose on
the Reich commissar and his administrative authorities such restric-
tions, particularly in case of internal or military tensions, that the
civil administration could only function under a great handicap.
A coastal strip separated off as the probably most important opera-
tional area under a military rump administration would not be viable.
644 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
2. Political:
I assume that the civil administration would not be extended to the>
northern French departements now linked with the military adminis-
tration of Belgium, Decause France would of necessity consider this a
further step toward separation of these provinces from the mother
country. If, however, these provinces are joined with the German
military administration in France purely for reasons of reorganiza-
tion in Belgium, the great political effect to be achieved by this move
on France at the proper moment is bound to be entirely lost. A
"political concession" so far denied, and highly valued by France,
would become simply a change in organization.
To the Flemings^ on the other hand, the cession of French Flanders
would necessarily appear as a final renunciation of a large-area Flem-
ish policy and would thereby greatly handicap the Reich commissar
when he enters upon his office.
3. Economic:
Through the measures of the Four Year Plan, especially with regard
to the placement of orders, Belgium and France have of late become
more and more closely intertwined economically; this is equally true
for the fields of nutrition, coal, and exploitation of the other economic
capacities. If a civil administration is introduced we must expect,
considering the different interests and the lack of unified directives
from the high authority common to both at present, that there will
be serious dislocations and the same sort of separation that now exists,
for example, between the Netherlands and Belgium.
4. Personnel:
A transfer to civil administration would have to involve, in addi-
tion to the organizational change, a change in personnel all along
the line, which would also extend to the military authorities. Aside
from the question whether it is possible to find enough suitable per-
sons owing to the constant increase of the areas which have to be
administered, it is inappropriate to complicate the present unstable
political situation in Belgium by such a disturbance of the uniform
administration of the occupation power.
For all these reasons I must urgently advise against a change in
the administration in Belgium.
If, however, my dear Reich Minister, reasons should be known to
you which would make a politically strictly organized regime seem
desirable, I should appreciate information to this effect. 1 It could
then be considered whether, as in France, the objective to be sought
could be achieved through a political representative of the Reich with-
out eliminating the military administration.*
Heil Hitler,
Yours, etc. Keitel
1 In his letter of Oct. 24 (4839/E244979) Lammers informed Keitel that Hitler
had decided to set up a civil administration in Belgium. A similar letter was
sent to State Secretary Stuekart of the Ministry of Interior (4839/E244980-81) .
See document No. 416.
'Marginal note by Kritzinger, an official In the Reich Chancellery: "First sub-
mitted to the Reich Minister. So far I have not known that a civil administra-
tion was being considered in Belgium. Kn, Oct. 12."
OCTOBER 1941 645
No. 402
2109/456462-64
Minister Kroll to Ministerial Director Wiehl
Thekapia, October 13, 1941.
Dear Herr Wiehi,: I assume it will interest you to know my per-
sonal opinion of the economic agreement. 1 As I gathered from incom-
ing telegrams, you, and especially Ambassador Hitter, are somewhat
disappointed with the course of the negotiations. I can understand
that very well, because I too am disappointed. If you were primarily
interested in securing prompt delivery of chromium, there is no deny-
ing that the negotiations have not brought the desired result. For
the prospect of obtaining chromium from Turkey from 1943 onward is
after all merely a somewhat feeble substitute if it is true, as I always
have been told, that our stocks will be exhausted about the end of the
year and that it is unfortunately not possible to replenish them from
other countries to any significant extent.
I also was surprised hy the Turkish attitude in this question. In
the first conversation at the Foreign Ministry which I had with Numan
on the occasion of Clodius' introduction, Numan left the possibility of
immediate deliveries of chromium under the contemplated agreement
entirely open. 2 Not with a single word did he mention that the Turks
had their hands tied to such an extent that deliveries would be impos-
sible for the present. I even recall with certainty that he mentioned
specific figures in that conversation, which were 30,000 to 40,000 tons,
and neither Clodius nor I got the impression that the last word had
been spoken with regard to quantities. Since Numan himself had at
the time concluded the agreement in question with the English, he must
have certainly been aware in that conversation to what extent Turkey's
hands were tied. Accordingly, there is no other explanation for the
completely negative attitude later of the Turks than that Numan was
then still counting on the possibility of arriving at an amiable under-
standing with the English concerning the promise of immediate
chrome deliveries to Germany. I do not doubt in the least that Turkey
made serious efforts to obtain such a concession from the English.
After the treaty has been concluded it is in my opinion futile to
ask whether in the circumstances it would not have been better for
the German side to suspend negotiations in an amiable manner, so as
to enable the delegation to report in Berlin on the situation. At any
rate one could imagine that the resumption of the talks after the con-
clusion of the Eastern Campaign might conceivably have taken place
1 See document No. 390 and footnote 1.
* No report of such a conversation has been found,
646 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
under more favorable auspices. For in almost 6 years of working
with the Turks I have always found that they are skillful enough to
find a loophole in any treaty instrument if this be absolutely neces-
sary because of superior political considerations. This was patently
shown by the fact that at the time when Italy entered the war they
stayed out of the war, despite plain and explicit treaty commitments.
That the Turks themselves do not have an entirely clear conscience
with regard to the treaty concluded is most evident from their efforts
to represent the economic agreement as a great success for both par-
ties. The great splash made in the press which is unusual here is
explained by the same motivation : One wanted to compensate us in
form for what one had to deny us in substance. I also believe, of
course, that for propaganda reasons one ought to adhere in public to
the view that the new agreement represents a success for our economic
policy, as well as for the development of relations between Germany
and Turkey as a whole. Internally, however, one ought to realize
the true state of affairs. I also think it would be a mistake both in
substance and tactics to indicate to the Turks that we are completely
satisfied with the outcome. I should rather consider it expedient that
the Turks should be confirmed in the feeling, which they undoubtedly
harbor, namely, that they have to make amends for something. It
might perhaps be a good thing if you would occasionally hint at this
to the Turkish Ambassador.
From the political and propagandistic point of view I was, of
course, glad about the conclusion of the treaty. In view of the fur-
ther development of our general relations with Turkey we are natu-
rally interested in consistently confirming public opinion and the
influential business circles in their belief in the friendly nature of our
relations, if only to cut the ground from under the strong Anglophile
tendencies which still survive, and also to make it harder for the gov-
ernment circles which tend toward the same direction, to relapse into
the English line of policy. From this point of view I welcome, of
course, every occasion which compels the Turkish officials to emphasize
on their own initiative German-Turkish friendship and the advan-
tages of closer German-Turkish cooperation. The economic result
of the agreement is not, however, affected by that.
Herr Clodius took the position here that in his negotiations the
Chiefs of Mission concerned have no say in their conduct, or regard-
ing the contents of the telegrams of the delegation. He insisted that
the Foreign Ministry was aware of this position. This position was
a new one to me and I regretted it for objective reasons, because it
might have perhaps been quite useful for Herr Clodius, who naturally
cannot know Turkey as well as I do, to make use of my 6 years of
experience. I could not, of course, press it on him, especially as I
OCTOBER 1941 647
must in any case take certain sensibilities into account here. But on
the basis of my acquaintance with conditions here I believe that I am
justified in saying, even after the fact, that the negotiations might
well have taken a somewhat different course if I had had a chance
of influencing them. 3
I should be grateful if you would occasionally inform Ambassador
Eitter, who became involved in the negotiations because of the military
deliveries, of the contents of this letter.*
With kind regards andHeil Hitler,
Yours, etc. Kroll
In his reply of Nov. 8 (2109/456460-61) Wiehl told Kroll that he had dis-
cussed this matter with Clodins who had stated that the Chiefs of Mission were
free to make suggestions to the leader of a delegation but not to give hira in-
structions. In this particular case, however, the issue did not arise according
to Clodius, because Kroll was absent from Ankara during most of the
negotiations,
* In a letter of Oct. 18 (1099/318702) Papen thanked Hitter for his great effort
in overcoming the resistance of the OKW to the provisions of the German-
Turkish commercial agreement. He then added the following comment:
It is quite obvious that the treaty is unsatisfactory from the substantive
point of view nnd that we must cast in the teeth of the Turkish friends time
and again that they took us in with their initial promise of chromium deliveries.
But at the moment it seemed politically more expedient to me to conclude even a
substantively less satisfactory treaty because I assume that the year 1942 with
its inevitable political decisions will also bring about many changes in this
field.
No. 403
9S/107142-44
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
top secret Madrid, October 14, 1941—12 : 30 a. m.
No. 3563 of October 13 Received October 14—3 : 00 a. m.
Secret for officer in charge.
With reference to your telegram No. 2367 of October 9. 1
After a thorough discussion with the Naval Attache 2 and in agree-
ment with his attitude regarding the shifting of the ships Corrientes
and Charlotte Schliemann into the inner harbor of Las Palmas, the
following can be stated :
1. I immediately talked to the Foreign Minister in a friendly but
firm manner about the matter, as has already been reported by tele-
gram No. 3250 on September 19. 3
1 Document No. 391.
'Omdr. C. Meyer-DBhner.
* See document No. 391, footnote 1.
648 DOCUMENTS ON" GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
2. The Spanish Minister of the Navy 4 has expressly favored the
measure, with the request that possible incidents resulting from force-
ful action of the English against German ships in harbors be avoided
(as was likewise reported by telegram No. 3250 on September 19) ;
above all, because the Canary Islands are politically a particularly
sensitive spot.
3. The complete cancellation of the Spanish measure, that is, the
reinstatement of the previous condition, appears impractical :
a. Because removal of the Oorrientes to the former conspicuous
location at the entrance of the harbor would carry with it the danger
of its being torpedoed, as has been threatened by the English;
b. Because this might cause resentment of the Minister of the Navy
and the cooperative conduct of the Spanish Navy with relation to the
remaining extensive supply operation of the Naval Attache on the
Iberian Peninsula might be unfavorably influenced.
As a matter of fact, the Minister of the Navy was already somewhat
disgruntled because of the Foreign Minister's reproaches concerning
his hasty procedures, but in spite of this fact he declared his willing-
ness to continue to protect remaining supply operations in ports of the
Spanish mainland.
4. Removal from the present anchorage will be requested because
of English observation and danger of sabotage. An attempt will be
made to place the ships on the inner side of the closed outer pier,
where, when possible, under later favorable circumstances, new supply
bases may be procured. To request Spanish protection against sabo-
tage would not be feasible because it would be dangerous to place
Spanish guards on shipboard, and thus make later supply activities
impossible, etc.
5. The English note of protest was presented here in the original.
A copy was forwarded immediately by the Naval Attache to the OKM.
6. The Spanish have always stressed their willingness, should the
occasion arise, to undertake official supplying of German warships
in accordance with international law. As was reported confidentially,
they explicitly instructed the English Naval Attache, 6 on the occasion
of the recent call of English warships in Las Palmas, that German
naval forces in a similar situation would be granted similar support
by them. The Spanish have, however, in their own as well as in the
German military interest (preservation of secrecy of the station
points!), preferred, when possible, to supply secretly. Besides, of-
ficial supplying carries the disadvantage that, in accordance with
international agreements, the resupplying [of submarines] with fuel
and food stored on German ships is not permissible and would lead
to justified protests by the other party.
Stohker
4 Rear Adm. S. Moreno Fernandez.
° Cradr. H. D. Owen.
OCTOBER 1941 649
No. 404
195/139234-35
Memorandwm by the Dirigent of the Political Department
top secret Westfalen, October 16, 1941.
To State Secretary Freilierr von Weizsaeker.
The Foreign Minister asks that the following be done :
1. He requests State Secretary Keppler to examine to what extent
there is a possibility of using for propaganda purposes Indian prison-
ers of war who have fallen into our hands, if the need should arise.
Ambassador Hitter has already been asked by the Foreign Minister to
discuss with the OKW the possibility of such use in the Near East,
where Indian troops turn up, and to find out how many Indian prison-
ers we actually have. The Foreign Minister is thinking of using any
suitable people that may have been located for broadcasting purposes
in case of a possible advance into the Caucasus, into Iran, etc.
2. In accordance with the proposal of the Political Department, the
Foreign Minister agrees that Herr von Hen tig should concern himself
with the so-called Pan-Turanian movement as a special assignment. 1
The Foreign Minister asks that Herr von Hentig propose how this
can be organized, and in this connection he has in mind the formation
of a special committee. In case Herr von Hentig is not in Berlin at
the present time he is to be brought back at once."
3. The Foreign Minister asks that Consul General Karlowa s be
asked to submit a memorandum to him on the possibilities which
we may have for calling forth a South African countermovement
against the Smuts Government, or for aiding the opposition against
Smuts (Ossewa Brandag, etc.).* He is also thinking here of the pos-
sibility that if necessary contact can be made with suitable persons
through our Consulate in Lourengo Marques.
In summary, the Foreign Minister remarked with regard to these
separate assignments that he requested the corresponding material
now as soon as possible, but for the rest he considered it important that
in the matter of the Indian activities, the Pan-Turanian movement,
and of exerting influence in South Africa we should be fully ready for
action in about 2 months. In so far as funds were needed for this
he was willing to make them available.
RlNTELEN
1 According to a memorandum by Erdmannsdorfi* of Oct. 10 (1047/311665) Rib-
bentrop had asked the Foreign Ministry to designate a liaison official for the Pan-
Turanian movement whereupon Counselor Melehers had suggested the name of
Hentig and this proposal was submitted to Ribbentrop by Rintelen.
* See document No. 431.
' Of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop.
* A South African nationalist organization along military lines. See vol. x of
this series, document No. 385 and footnote 2 ; vol. xi of this series, documents
Nos. 163 and 382.
650 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 405
2281/482597-98
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy
Telegram
most urgent Behlin, October 17, 1941.
top secret Received October 17—7: 30 a. m.
No. 2747 of October 17
To be decoded only by officers cleared for Top Secret material. To
be submitted to the Chief of Mission in person -without delay. Reply
by courier or secret code.
Please communicate the following to Count Ciano :
Ambassador Ott was recently approached in the Japanese Foreign
Office on the question of extending the Anti-Comintern Pact which
expires on November 25 of this year. 1 The Japanese Government did
not communicate its final position at that time. We are of the opinion
that the idea of an extension of the Pact should be welcomed. Stress-
ing the decision of the states joined together in the Anti-Comintern
Pact to continue their solidarity against the Communist International
would be of useful political effect particularly in the present situation.
Ambassador Ott has therefore been instructed to make a suitable oral
communication at the Japanese Foreign Ministry and to propose as the
simplest form for the extension a uniform protocol which would be
signed by all six member states, Germany, Italy, Japan, Hungary,
Manchukuo, and Spain. 2 We proposed Berlin as the place for signing
this protocol, this being the place where the Treaty was concluded 5
years ago. At the same time we had suggested that the diplomatic
representatives of Germany, Italy, and Japan should jointly approach
the Governments of Hungary, Manchukuo, and Spain in order to ob-
tain the agreement of these governments to the extension.
Please get a statement of the Italian Government as soon as possible
whether it agrees with the above proposals. 3 If so, we would be grate-
ful if the Italian Embassy in Tokyo were instructed to pursue the mat-
ter there further in cooperation with the German Embassy.
Ribbentrop
1 Ott's report on this conversation has not been found. In a minute of Oct. 11
(82/60700) Gaus noted that Oshlma had asked him whether an extension of the
Anti-Comintern Pact had been considered in Berlin.
1 This instruction has not been found.
*In telegram No. 2629 of Oct. 20 (2281/482602) Mackensen reported that Mus-
solini had given his approval to the procedures suggested by Berlin and that
pertinent instructions to the Italian Embassy in Tokyo had been sent.
OCTOBER 1941 651
No. 406
223/150133-35
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most tjhgent Buohaeest, October 17, 1941 — 9 : 30 p. m.
top secret Received October 17 — 10 : 30 p. m.
No. 3346 of October 17
Leader of the State Marshal Antonescu summoned me and spoke
to me in a very grave manner concerning the economic situation of
the country.
"We were carrying on a joint war and had an interest in winning it.
For this reason all efforts had to be made to eliminate the difficulties
and to bring about an even stricter discipline in the economic relations
with the Reich. Two points were involved :
1. Establishment of a plan of requests. He had spoken about this
repeatedly with Minister Clodius and Minister Neubacher.
2. Elimination of all private purchasing organizations, in par-
ticular the middlemen used by them, some of whom were Jews. He
had repeatedly stated that the Rumanian State was selling the amounts
of goods asked by the Reich at the prices fixed by the Government.
He had solemnly pledged to do this, but he could no longer look on
while instead of the fixed prices much higher prices were paid by our
purchasers, whereby the price structure was upset. In this way a
situation arose which was useful only to the enemies of Germany. A
twofold objective was being pursued :
a. to raise the prices and
b. by creating internal tension to overthrow the Antonescu
Government.
He undertook to deliver the goods asked by the Reich at the fixed
K rices, even if he had to requisition them in return for payment. The
[arshal here interjected the question what interest the German Reich
had in buying goods at increased prices when they were offered by
the Rumanian State at the fixed prices.
A special subject which he unfortunately was also compelled to
discuss concerned the purchases by the Wehrmacht. He had only one
wish, that the German troops should consider Rumania as their coun-
try, respecting the laws of Rumania just as they would respect the
German laws. If he came with troops to Germany today in order
to be useful to Germany he would naturally have to be subjected to the
German laws. Under the agreements which he had made at the time
with the Fiihrer and Field Marshal ICeitel, the Wehrmacht in Ru-
mania had no right to make independent purchases. 1 It was to be
supplied with everything which is needed by the Rumanian Com-
missariat at prices fixed by the State, as was done in the case of the
1 It is not clear which agreements are referred to here.
652 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Rumanian Army. Instead, the Wehrmacht itself had made large
purchases, had itself taken large quantities of goods across the fron-
tiers contrary to the agreements and had itself paid prices that were
much higher than those fixed by the State. The Marshal added that
he had complied with the demands of the Wehrmacht which con-
stantly increased far in excess of the agreements. His request that
the transports of goods across the frontier which had been declared as
Wehrmacht transports be supervised had not been granted. He had
now felt compelled to institute such controls at the customs offices.
The Marshal stated further that he would now insist with Minister
Clodius that the amounts of goods requested by the Reich be fixed
•within the framework of a plan that no German economic organiza-
tion any longer make purchases independently, but that only the Ger-
man State should take over the goods to be delivered at the fixed prices.
He had taken the sharpest measures against quantity buying and price
violations, and he reserved the right of appealing to the Fiihrer di-
rectly in the immediate future in case the Germans continued to make
difficulties for him— this so that he might restore the economic order
in the country which was a> basis for the common victory.
I should like to remark here that the economic planning which the
Rumanians have requested for some time in the face of the increasingly
difficult currency and economic situation of the country — regarding
which Reichsbank Direktor Blessing is most accurately informed —
(clear text missing) by Minister Neubacher until the arrival of Min-
ister Clodius, who will arrive here today (clear text missing) no doubt
about it that I will most emphatically support the intention of the
Marshal to restore order in the economic conditions in so far as it
involves the German sector. We have every interest in strengthening
the position of the Marshal, who is our exponent in Rumania, but
we are not anxious, by misunderstanding [our own] interests, to do
the work of our enemies, who have recognized the weak point in the
structure of the Rumanian State and are zealously helping to under-
mine the currency and thereby the economy.
KmJNOER
No. 407
1857/422171
The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Washington, October 17, 1941—12 : 47 p. m.
No. 3575 of October 17 Received October 17—11 : 00 p. m.
The torpedoing of the U.S. destroyer Kearny in the waters around
Iceland * will demonstrate that the American Government, in contrast
1 Tbis was announced by tne Navy Department on Oct. 17.
OCTOBER 1941 653
with Wilson in 1917, does not make the question of war or peace de-
pendent upon incidents on the high seas, but uses these incidents,
which by its policies have become unavoidable, to dramatize its propa-
ganda in order to break down public opposition to its present course
of action. The opposition, after the experiences in the Cheer incident, 8
will not forego this opportunity to call for a full report on the cir-
cumstances of the torpedoing, and in the meantime will continue its
attacks against amendment of the Neutrality Laws.
Thomben
* See documents Nos. 282, 292, and 299.
No. 408
2281/48244T-48
The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy
Berlin, October 17, 1941.
No. 5032 g Es.
Subject : Order of the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht
to take vigorous action against Communist machinations.
With reference to our telegram No. 2521 of September 26, 194 1, 1
a copy of the letter from the OKW to the Foreign Ministry dated
September 24, 1941, is enclosed for your information ; it is requested
that you report to the Foreign Ministry the comments that may be
made from the standpoint of foreign policy with respect to specific
decisions by the military courts, so that they may be passed on to the
High Command of the Wehrmacht or the Keich Ministry for Air.
By order :
Albhecht
'Not printed (2281/482445). This WeizsHcker instruction referred to For-
eign Ministry circular of Sept. 20 (document No. 344) and requested Mackensen
to support actions by the military authorities in this matter in every respect
and not to impede them on political grounds.
No. 409
Fll/0381-404
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
RM 49 Headquarters, October 18, 1941.
Record op the Conversation Between the Foreign Minister and
Ambassador Axjteri at Headquarters on October 17, 1941
After a word of thanks for the granting of an interview, Alfieri
pointed out that his visits to headquarters always coincided with the
654 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
receipt of some good news. Thus he had heard this morning in:
Konigsberg of the fall of Odessa and he was glad that in this way a
good atmosphere had, as it were, been created for his visit.
The Foreign Minister replied that things had in the main developed
as he had predicted in previous conversations with Alfieri. 1 The
Russian campaign was practically won and was coming to an end.
It was now only a matter of destroying certain scattered units of
Russians in the area facing the German military forces. The Rus-
sians could no longer form a strongly cohesive front. By and large,
the future military operations therefore involved simply a mopping
up of the area, which the German troops would also occupy, even if it
was to be expected that now and then pockets of Russian troops
would still have to be cleaned out.
Germany had proceeded in a thoroughly systematic way in her
operations so far. Of the three Russian armies, Voroshilov had been
encircled in Leningrad; Budenny was ground to pieces at Kiev and
Melitopol, while the central army, under Timoshenko, was now going
to its destruction.
At the present moment, when the Russians could neither form a
strong front nor possessed cohesive armies, they could no longer offer
any effective resistance to the German armies, which were advancing
along the entire front. In future battles it would therefore only be
a case of local nests of resistance at important points which would still
have to be overcome.
One thing was certain, however: Germany would, as he (the For-
eign Minister) had predicted to Alfieri previously, fully attain her
goal this very year; that is, obtain possession of the centers of indus-
try and raw materials of the European-Russian area in the broadest
sense.
To a remark by Alfieri to the effect that he had to note with com-
plete admiration that this result had been achieved within the brief
span of 4 months, the Foreign Minister replied that in any case one
felt better now than if nothing had been attempted in 1941.
With the liquidation of Russia the last potential ally of the English
on the European Continent had been eliminated. Even if the regime
of Stalin should stand — nothing final could as yet be said on this,
however — it would no longer be possible for Stalin to raise a new army
in Siberia; for he would no longer have enough people available, if
one considered that in the Siberian area the population was dispro-
portionately smaller than in the European part of Russia. There
would be no possibility, moreover, of the re-provisioning and re-equip-
ping of an Army. It was because this state of affairs was clear to
1 See document No. 308.
OCTOBER 1941 655
the Russians themselves that they were making such efforts to get
English and American material help. Not much was to be expected
of England because, according to the latest reports on hand, the state
of Great Britain's military equipment was so bad that the giving away
of material to others was out of the question. The American rearma-
ment hullabaloo was a big bluff, and the United States was not in a
position to give much material to Russia, But even if American de-
liveries were available, the question of shipping space for the trans-
portation of war materials to the vicinity of Russia would still have
to be solved, and, even if this problem should, contrary to expecta-
tions, be solved, the question would arise whether the material would
reach the Soviet Union itself from the areas near her. Germany
would surely see to it that the supplies to Russia would be blocked.
Practically, then, Stalin could not count on help from abroad. He
would therefore have to try to cover his requirements from the remain-
ing industrial area in the Urals. Here, too, Germany would see to
it that these industrial installations did not remain intact, so that in
this way Russia would, therefore, practically be lost to England as
an ally.
That, too, was why they were having such a headache now in
London. They realized in England that after the defeat of Russia
by the states of the Tripartite Pact, Great Britain would confront in
isolation a large part of the world. Her last hope was the United
States, whose further conduct would be observed clearly and sharply
by Germany. There was no reason, however, to worry about Ameri-
can possibilities. Rearmament would take many years yet. When it
was completed the. material would surely be old and antiquated.
Neither with soldiers nor with the fleet could the United States accom-
plish anything. The only military help that she could give would
be the sending of pilots and planes to England. This was opposed
by the potential of the Axis Powers and their friends, as well as by
that of the conquered enemies, which was infinitely greater than the
potentials of England and America put together. In a renewed air
duel between the British Isles and Europe, England would be in a
much more unfavorable position than formerly.
England and America were now threatening constantly with control
of the seas, but he (the Foreign Minister) thought that the states
of the Tripartite Pact and their friends could so organize themselves
economically in the huge spaces at their disposal that they would feel
the effects of a very long war less than their foes.
Concerning further developments the Foreign Minister remarked
that a small portion of the national forces now committed in the East
would suffice to head off trouble-making by the Bolshevists in the
future. Upon conclusion of the operations, a large portion of the
656 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
German Army would therefore again be withdrawn from the east.
The total energies of the huge European area would accordingly be
devoted to the final battle against England, that is, to the construction
of submarines and the expansion and improvement of the Luftwaffe.
In recapitulation it might be said that the year 1941 has not gone
by unprofitably, because the political and diplomatic importance of
the Powers of the Tripartite Pact has constantly been increasing par-
ticularly as a result of the most recent events. The results were al-
ready noticeable. Thus Japan had formed a new Cabinet, 2 at the
head of which stood the former Minister of War, Tojo. Although
recent news was not available, it seemed quite obvious that the Army
had prevailed in Japan, so that now Japan, too, would take a stiffer
attitude than the compromise Cabinet of Konoye. Here, too, per-
haps, interesting developments were in the offing.
Germany would, in, any case, probably face the winter not only
in a stronger, but in a) completely unassailable position. She could
not be beaten, either militarily or economically. That the peoples
of the victorious Axis would probably be satisfied with their govern-
ments seemed to him (the Foreign Minister) obvious, even if the
population and the soldiers had to endure temporary privation. Thus,
the last and only hope of England would fade away. This com-
pletely false and foolish hope was that the peoples of the victorious
Axis, after having conquered all other countries, would be in an un-
assailable position and would set out to garner the fruits of former
and coming victories, yet would stage a revolution at home and
capitulate abroad.
Alfieri replied that he had listened to the situation report of the
Foreign Minister in its clarity and logic with great admiration and
feeling. He felt constrained at this moment to press the hand of
the Foreign Minister in order to give expression to these emotions.
Alfieri, who had risen at these words, congratulated the Foreign Min-
ister with a handshake and stated further that it must, to be sure,
be a very special satisfaction to him if all the predictions made in
the previous conversations were completely fulfilled in this way.
The Foreign Minister thanked Alfieri and spoke of the great tran-
quillity with which further developments were being awaited in Ger-
many, particularly since Germany knew that victory could no longer
be taken from her. Her foes, too, surely knew this by now. At any
rate, Churchill and Eoosevelt should have known it at their Atlantic
meeting. 8
' See document No. 413.
1 See document No. 209.
OCTOBER 1941 657
In the further course of the conversation, the Foreign Minister
spoke of a matter which he termed delicate and unpleasant and on
the absolute clarification of which he had placed decisive value be-
cause the Duce had taken a personal interest in it.
It concerned the Kecklinghausen matter.* On October 11 the Ita-
lian Embassy had delivered a note verbale in the matter," to which
was attached a copy of an alleged statement by Kreisleiter Goldbeck.
The Foreign Minister quoted some passages in the Italian note and
pointed out that a similar demarche had been made in Rome with the
German Ambassador by Anf uso on September 5," with the comment
that the Duce had been most painfully affected by a circular letter of
Kreisleiter Goldbeck's (which was probably identical with the state-
ment mentioned in the Italian note) .
With regard to this matter, he (the Foreign Minister) had the fol-
lowing to say : He had, of course, had the matter investigated most
thoroughly. Reichsleiter Bormann, Chief of the Party Chancellery,
had summoned Kreisleiter Goldbeck to Berlin for interrogation. The
Foreign Minister handed Alfieri a memorandum concerning the re-
sults of this interrogation, with the comment that the text would also
be delivered in Rome. 7 After the memorandum had been translated
into French for Alfieri, the Foreign Minister stated that he had to say
in all frankness that he had the impression that this was a case of de-
liberate misrepresentation on the part of Palosti, the inspector of the
Italian Syndicates. What the reasons were that caused him to take
this attitude, was not clear. Perhaps he wanted to disrupt German-
Italian relations in some way or other.
The fact was, at any rate, that he himself had composed the notices
in question, and, under false pretenses, had induced the Kreisleiter to
sign his name twice to the document. Palosti had also had the hand-
written notices re- written on a typewriter and subsequently provided
with a date and place, so that the impression was thus created that an
official document was involved. In copying it, moreover, he had also
placed before the name "Goldbeck" the word "signed", in order there-
by to create the impression of a signature. The whole thing had then
been submitted to the Italian Government as a circular of the NSDAP.
Undoubtedly this was a deliberate misrepresentation on the part of
Palosti. In these circumstances, he asked that Palosti be recalled im-
mediately and called to account, and that the Duce be fully enlightened
as to the true state of affairs. He would surely approve of Palosti's
procedure as little as did the Foreign Minister.
* See document No, 281.
8 See document No. 307.
* Document No. 281.
* See document No. 410 and footnote 5.
682^905—64 47
658 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
In the event that Alfieri could not accept the German explanation
forthwith and wished perhaps to consult with his aides once more, the
Foreign Minister suggested having the original document, from which
the typewritten copy was produced, sent to Berlin and, if necessary,
assuring Palosti's confrontation with the Kreisleiter in the presence of
Alfieri and the State Secretary.
Goldbeck was an old party member, holder of the Golden Badge of
Honor, and had made his declarations under oath. He (the Foreign
Minister) therefore had to put absolute faith in his statement.
One wondered from what motives Palosti had acted. Naturally he
was not to be regarded as an enemy agent. But an enemy agent could
not have done better to disrupt German-Italian relations than Palosti
had done through his behavior.
The Fiihrer had ordered, moreover, that no more Italian laborers
be punished in Germany or taken to a training camp. If difficulties
arose with Italian workers, they were to be sent back to Italy. 3
In conclusion the Foreign Minister informed Alfieri of a telegram
from Eome, No. 2528 of October 13," concerning measures of the Con-
federation of Industrial Workers for dealing with the difficulties that
arose in connection with the employment of Italian labor in the Eeich.
It contains, in general, the reproduction of a letter from President
Capoferri to the Duce, of which the Social Attache of the German
Embassy 10 was informed in confidence by the Director of the Con-
federation, Dr. Samotti, acting on instructions of President Capoferri.
After this telegram had been translated into French for Alfieri, the
Foreign Minister remarked that it appeared from this report that the
attitude that was being taken in Rome on these questions was quite
clear and sensible. Capoferri's statements which, according to an-
other report, 11 were shared also by Count Ciano, proved this. He
(the Foreign Minister) therefore asked that the Italian Embassy in
Berlin not dramatize such incidents in the future and not report
everything to Eome at once, but rather have it settled through the
office set up by Under State Secretary Luther. He (the Foreign
Minister) wanted to ask Alfieri not to burden the two Governments
with such things. In view of the presence in Germany of so many
Italian workers, dissatisfaction in individual cases was unavoidable.
By and large, however, it was absolutely wrong to take such matters
up with the Ambassador, the Foreign Minister, and even the Duce
and the Fiihrer. In view of the calm attitude that was being taken
in Eome, he asked that the Italian Embassy in Berlin also dispose
'Hitler's order was contained In a telegram of Oct. 15 (1517/372820-21) from
Luther to Rintelen.
•Not printed (4865/E249343-46).
10 Dr. W. Spakler.
11 Not found.
OCTOBER 1941 659
of such cases within the framework of the organization set up for this
purpose.
Alfieri, who was very much impressed by the statements of the For-
eign Minister, especially, however, by the memorandum about the re-
sults of the interrogation of Goldbeck, declared with some agitation
that he found the behavior of Inspector Palosti so unprecedented that
he would petition the Duce to have him shot, and even went so far as to
say that, if necessary, he would shoot him himself. He regretted,
moreover, that the Foreign Minister had gained the impression that he
(Alfieri) had wished to dramatize things.
The Foreign Minister mentioned in this connection the attitude that
Alfieri had taken at the last conference on this question on the occasion
of the Tripartite Pact ceremonies in the Hotel Adlon. He had at the
time spoken in a very serious manner about the fact that the Duce had
been most disagreeably affected by the report from Berlin.
Alfieri defended himself by saying that the report concerning the
matter had been sent to Rome by Cosmelli in his absence with the
addendum, to be sure, that nothing be done before the results were
received of an investigation which he had at the same time ordered to
be made by the competent Consul. Alfieri then stated very heatedly
that he had, indeed, as Ambassador and in obedience to his own in-
stinct, always done everything to improve relations between Germany
and Italy in every respect. He was therefore averse to dramatizing
things in any way.
The Foreign Minister replied that one had indeed, to view every-
thing in the right proportions. If 100,000 laborers were working in
Germany, it was natural that individual complaints concerning treat-
ment or maintenance would always be received. If the workers were
told, however, about the hardships the German and Italian soldiers
had to endure, they would surely realize that their lot was still an en-
viable one in every respect. In any case, he asked Alfieri to clarify
. the matter fully with the Duce, and he would appreciate it if he would,
at his convenience, send him (the Foreign Minister) word confirming
that this had been done. Alfieri promised to do this and mentioned
with regard to Capof erri's letter that the latter had decided somewhat
late to take a sensible attitude. At a recent conference of Italian Con-
suls in Germany, moreover, it had likewise been stated by all the par-
ticipants that the situation with regard to the Italian laborers was not
a good one.
The Foreign Minister mentioned that undoubtedly the procedure
proposed by the Fiihrer for the return of dissatisfied workers was the
best solution. This too had its surprises, however. Thus, in Pomera-
nia, recently, Italian workers had struck, but had called off the strike
at once when it was explained to them that they could go back to Italy.
660 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
It was a matter of strict Italian control over the workers. It had to
be made clear to them that the Axis was engaged in a life-and-death
struggle and therefore all the workers were soldiers at the same time.
If they got the impression that they could achieve something by ex-
pressing dissatisfaction, the difficulties would become greater and
greater.
In the further course of the conversation, Alfieri also pointed out
that the difficulties were attributable to the fact that:
1. Germany had expressed so strong a desire for Italian workers
that the selection could not be made carefully enough in Italy ; and in
this way possibly 15,000-20,000 unsuitable Italians had come into Ger-
many and had been dispersed throughout all the Gaue ;
2. The camps were unequal to the situation. Of 500 camps, the con-
ditions in 250 were below standards and bad.
3. The sending of Italian workers to so-called training camps, which
was done quite freely, had created considerable resentment.
In reply to a question from the Foreign Minister as to whether Al-
fieri wished to bring up questions aside from the points submitted, the
latter referred to the difficulties in connection with the exchange of
German potatoes for Italian rice and cheese. 1 " It seemed to him that
political pressure was called for here in order that the difficulties might
be overcome. The Foreign Minister said he was not informed on the
question and promised to study it.
Alfieri also mentioned briefly the supply difficulties in Greece, which
he attributed in part to the fact that Bulgaria and Hungary had failed
to keep their delivery promises. 13
Finally he also asked, after submitting a letter, 14 that the Italian
Senator, Barzini, a well-known journalist and writer, be permitted
to be present when the German troops entered Moscow. This request
was seconded by Count Ciano.
Afterwards the Foreign Minister had a private talk with Alfieri.
The Foreign Minister informed the Italian Ambassador of the con-
tents of telegram No. 2530 of October 14, from Rome, 18 concerning
Alfieri's report on the last speech of the Fuhrer. The Foreign Min-
ister remarked that he did not believe, to be sure, that this report about
the Fiihrer's speech had originated with Signor Alfieri, but he wished
nevertheless to inform him of this matter. According to Ambas-
sador von Mackensen's telegram, there was, at any rate, talk in Some
of such a report, which betrayed a clearly defeatist and critical at-
u In telegram No. 2304 of Sept 23 (4879/E25320&-211) Mackensen transmitted
a letter from Riccardi to Clodius suggesting an exchange of German potatoes
for Italian rice and cheese.
a See document No. 323.
" Not found.
"Not printed ( 1517/372810-811 ) .
OCTOBER 1941 661
titude toward the contents of the Fiihrer's speech. Even if he, the
Ambassador, surely had nothing to do with this, it was nevertheless
conceivable that perhaps some member of his Embassy had sent such
a report to Rome, which had then given rise to the rumor of a report
by Alfieri. Alfieri said that that was conceivable. Perhaps enemy
agents had circulated some such thing. The Italian Ambassador was,
moreover, obviously impressed by Herr von Mackensen's telegram and
continued to appear somewhat dejected, 10
Alfieri then spoke, for his part, of a communication that had reached
him from Ciano, according to which a Gauleiter had said aloud, upon
the arrival of the Duce's train, on the occasion of the latter's last visit
to Germany, 17 "Here comes the Fiihrer's Italian Gauleiter," which he
had then denied in a telegram. 18
The Foreign Minister replied that this story surely emanated from
English agents, for, in the first place, when the Duce's train arrived,
no Gauleiter had been present, and, second, no German would say
anything so idiotic. Moreover, the two great leaders of Germany and
Italy towered above such drivel. Since it could only be a matter of
English propaganda, however, which had now, as we knew, made it
the first point in its goal to disrupt German-Italian relations, he
would consider it proper if Count 'Ciano would have his informant
arrested at once in order to find out who had circulated this lie.
Should he be found, he, the Foreign Minister, would recommend that
the Italian Government have him shot at once. If, on the other hand,
the informant would not divulge his source, then it would just be
necessary to have the informant shot at once. If such an example
were once established, it would be the best way once and for all of
destroying the effectiveness of such propaganda. We could make this
propaganda only illusory if, in the first place, the Governments of the
two countries themselves were immune to it, which ought really to be
taken for granted, and if, in the second place, really brutal examples
were set once or twice for the sake of the effect on the people.
Following this, luncheon took place in a small circle. Shortly
before luncheon, Alfieri had his secretary submit to the Foreign Min-
ister the text of a telegram to Ciano, in which he (Alfieri) had denied
the report communicated to him. The Foreign Minister remarked
that he did not quite understand how Count Ciano could have trans-
mitted such a thing at all.
" A rather different version of this part of the conversation Is given in Alfieri's
Duedittatorldifronte (Milan, 1948), pp. 233-234.
" See document No. 242.
" Weizsacker's memorandum St.S. No. 701 of Oct. 21 (1517/372862) records a
subsequent complaint by Alfieri regarding this incident.
See also The Ciano Diaries, entry for Oct. 13, 1941.
662 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
After luncheon a very brief discussion took place, in the course of
which the Foreign Minister pointed out with emphasis to Alfieri that
he should urge Ciano to see to it that the one that had circulated the
reports of his (Alfieri's) attitude should, in all circumstances, be
tracked down.
Alfieri also mentioned in conclusion certain rumors concerning an
alleged return of the South Tirol to Germany. 111 Such things, too,
were naturally a source of annoyance.
The Foreign Minister replied that the main thing was that the
two Governments should not allow themselves to be influenced by
such machinations.
England was obviously intent upon sowing discord between Ger-
many and Italy. Her propaganda was concentrated upon Italy, and
we had confirmation of this through an instruction which became
known to us. "With the partial utilization of the Vatican, false re-
ports were being spread by countless agents throughout Italy for the
advancement of this propaganda aim.
Schmidt
18 See document No. 362.
No. 410
1517/372840-41
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy
Telegram
most tjrgent Special Train, October 18, 1941 — 1 : 37 a. m.
No. 1126 from the
Special Train Received Berlin, October 18 — 3 : 30 a. m.
No. 2765 from the Foreign Ministry
For the Ambassador personally. The matter of the alleged circular
of the Kreisleiter of Recklinghausen, which was the subject of your re-
port 148/41g. of September 5, 1 was again raised here by Ambassador
Alfieri on October 11 .* Meanwhile we have had this matter thoroughly
investigated. 3 I gave Alfieri the report made to me in this matter,*
concerning the outcome of this investigation, the text of which I am
'Document No. 281.
1 See document No. 397.
" Under State Secretary Luther's memorandum (1517/372828-31) records the
results of his questioning of Kreisleiter Goldbeck.
* See document No. 408.
OCTOBER 1941 663
sending you separately. 5 It is clear from this that the Italian Govern-
ment has allowed itself to be misled in this matter as a result of ob-
viously quite dubious machinations of two of its Commissioners m
Germany.
Please also give Count Ciano or Anfuso a copy of this report, and at
the same time ask that we now be given a photostatic copy of the said
document. Since, according to your report of September 5, the matter
has also been taken up with the Duce, I ask you at the same time to
insist that the Duce now also be informed of our report. Please also
have express confirmation sent that the Duce has been informed and
send me a report on the matter. Finally, please also comment as fol-
lows with regard to the matter: Deputy Kreisleiter Gold'beck is a'
party official of subordinate rank, who had no authority at all to issue
official statements concerning the German stand on the race question.
Furthermore, he did not do this, but in a friendly conversation merely
presented his views to the two Italians. The report that they had
made in the matter by no means indicated the true circumstances.
This was comprehensible, since Palozzi's procedure was indeed tanta-
mount to intentional misrepresentation. This would be glaringly
apparent if, for instance, Gold'beck were confronted with the two
Italians. "We would be ready, should Rome consider it important, to
arrange such a confrontation, which could then take place in the
office of the State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, in Alfieri's pres-
ence. At any rate, however, we were requesting the Italian Govern-
ment to recall the two Italians from Germany at once, and to let them
suffer the logical consequences of their behavior.
Wire report. 6
RlBBENTROF
5 Telegram No. 2766 of Oct. 17 (4865/E249346/1-346/4) .
The initial paragraph of the summary of this report reads : "In summary the
following has been established :
"1. The assertion that it is a circular of a German Kreisleiter to the
NSDAP, or that it is in any way an official expression of opinion Is pure
fabrication. The memorandum is a handwritten memorandum by an Italian,
which was written in German. In a very peculiar way the Italian obtained
the signature of the Kreisleiter at the bottom and at the top [of the docu-
ment]. Furthermore, the Italians subsequently put the place and date,
'Recklinghausen, Aug. 15, 1941' on the document"
•In telegram No. 2620 of Oct 19 (1517/372853) Mackensen reported that
through Bismarck he had presented the matter to Anfuso in Oiano's absence.
Anfuso gave assurances that he would take the matter up with Ciano who would
give Mussolini the German report the next day.
In telegram No. 2630 of Oct. 20 (1517/372S45) Mackensen reported that the
matter had been presented to Mussolini who ordered that the two Italian officials
be immediately recalled.
664 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 411
2281/482487-S0
Ambassador Alfieri to Foreign Minister Bibbentrop 1
Berlin, October 19, 1941.
Your Excellency : ! In expressing to you my cordial thanks for
the friendliness that you have always shown me on the visits that
I was permitted to make to you at the Fiihrer's headquarters, 3 I
should like to tell you how very much I thank you for the evidence
of friendship and confidence that you gave me when you communi-
cated to me your confidential information. Although my friendship
for Germany and my devotion to the Fiihrer, which go back to an
earlier time, are far above all suspicion, and have proved them-
selves at difficult moments and can therefore easily triumph over all
intrigue and gossip, it is, a comfort and a consolation to me in my
work to know that you did not, with your authority and your per-
sonal conviction, believe you had to take confidential information
into consideration by giving your attention to things which, even
if reported to you. in good faith, can have no basis and origin in
fact.
For this, I repeat, I am very grateful to you. By invoking now that
attentiveness and frankness which you have very sympathetically
made the basis of our working relations, permit me to tell you that
your reference to the desirability of not dramatizing the situation
surprised me a little. You particularly mentioned in this connection
some episodes affecting Italian laborers.* In accordance with my
natural inclination and with my usual method of operation, I try
to un-dramatize the matters, which I am reducing to their proper
proportions.
In this particular case, I consider it my duty as Ambassador to
straighten out and to attenuate facts and situations as much as pos-
sible. But this procedure of mine has limits which are readily under-
1 The document printed here has been translated from the German. The
original letter in Italian has been filmed on 2281/482484-86.
1 Marginal notes :
In Ribbentrop's handwriting : "[For] F[(ihrer]."
"Shown to the Fuhrer. Hew[el] , Oct. 23."
"See special memorandum. Hew[el]."
There is no identification of the memorandum to which Hewel referred.
"Alfieri had visited Ribbentrop at Hitler's headquarters on Sept. 12 and
Oct. 17. See documents Nos. 308 and 409.
* See document No. 409.
OCTOBER 1941 665
standable. My constant optimism and my firm purpose, from which
I never waver, to proceed in every ease in such a way that the rela-
tions between our two countries may be of the best and friendliest
kind (I believe that everyone in Italy and Germany is convinced of
this) cannot induce me to shut my eyes to situations that were con-
sistently and urgently reported to me. It is an undeniable fact, for
example, that — even apart from the episodes that were discussed dur-
ing those days — the morale of the Italian workers in Germany is
depressed and has produced negative reactions in Italy."
I can also no longer conceal it from myself (for a long time I was
even very discreet in my reports to Borne in this regard) that, as all
Italian Consuls have unanimously told me, the sentiment of the Ger-
man people in general nowadays has not been favorable to Italy.*
I agree with you that all this has no special significance, because in
Germany and Italy public opinion is created by the Fiihrer and
the Duce, and because the German press and all responsible German
political circles have taken an absolutely correct and friendly stand.
I considered it my conscientious duty to call your attention to these
things in order that, in view of your political intuition, your view-
point as Foreign Minister, and with the opportunities at your dis-
posal, you may also, to my satisfaction, review whatever merit there
is in my statements. Please also keep in mind always the sincere
sentiment that prompted me to make my communications.
I also prefer in a delicate and important matter to have given you
a report, for the accuracy of which I cannot absolutely vouch, than
that I should some day have to regret not having given you a report
that was essential. 7
Please accept, Your Excellency, the expression of my sincere and
devoted friendship. 8
Dino Alfieri
"There is a question mark In Ribbentrop's handwriting on the margin at this
point.
•There is an exclamation mark in Ribbentrop's handwriting on the margin
at this point.
' Question mark in Ribbentrop's handwriting opposite this point.
8 For Ribbentrop's reply, see document No. 446.
666 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 412
4839/E246077
The Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to the
Chief of the Beioh Chancellery
Teletype
No. 3262 The Hague, October 20, 1941.
Received Berlin, October 21 — 9 : 15 a.m.
Rk. 15326B
With reference to your letter Rk. 14634 Bo of October 14, 1941. 1
The Dutch hostages will be accommodated in the Netherlands at
the urgent request of the Foreign Ministry, because otherwise the
Swedish Legation will concern itself with the Netherlander^ who are
in German Reich Territory, and thus also with the hostages. 2 In the
opinion of all the German;, police authorities in the Netherlands there
are no objections from the standpoint of security. The preparations
have progressed so far that it will be possible to make the transfer
in November. Considering the numerous deaths last winter I wish to
point out most emphatically that leaving the hostages in German con-
centration camps will have serious consequences for the treatment of
the German hostages in the Netherlands Indies. 3
Please bring about an understanding with the Foreign Minister and
if need be obtain a decision from the highest authority.*
Dk. Seyss-Inquart
"In this letter (4839/E245079-80) Lammers informed the Foreign Ministry
that Himmler, for security reasons, strongly objected to the transfer of the
Dutch hostages from Buchenwald to a camp in the occupied Netherlands.
* This was expressed in a letter of Aug. 23, 1941 (4839/E245089-90) from the
Foreign Ministry to the Reich Chancellery.
"For previous developments regarding German hostages in the Netherlands
East Indies, see vol. xir of this series, document No. 445, footnote 1. In a
memorandum of Oct. 15 (173/84857-62) Albrecht, Deputy Director of the Legal
Department, summarized recent developments with regard to German Internees
in the Netherlands East Indies.
'In a letter of Nov. 3 (4839/245071-72) Lammers informed Seyss-Inquart
that Himmler had agreed to the transfer of the Dutch hostages to camps in
the Netherlands. In a letter of Dec. 5 (4839/E245070) the Chief of the Security
Police informed Lammers that the Dutch hostages had left Buchenwald on
Nov. 15 and arrived without incident in a camp in the Netherlands on Nov. 16.
OCTOBER 1941 667
No. 413
82/60768-71
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Tokyo, October 20, 1941 — 11 : 30 a. m., summer time.
No. 2152 of October 20 Received October 21—5 : 45 a. m.
With, reference to my telegram No. 2137 of October 19. 1
The first statement of the new Prime Minister To jo says "that it is
the unshakable policy of Japan to bring about a successful settlement
of the China problems, create a large Asian co-prosperity sphere and
thereby contribute toward world peace. In view of the situation of
unparalleled difficulty prevailing today the Government intends, ex-
ternally, to strengthen steadfastly its amicable relations with the
friendly powers and, internally, to complete the national defense prep-
arations." From this Government statement and the composition of
the Cabinet it is evident that increased tension with the United States
is to be expected. Under the impact of the failure of the negotia-
tions with the United States the Army, contrary to all forecasts, has
been willing to release the active War Minister in order to form the
new Cabinet. The solidarity with the Army is further demon-
strated by the fact that the new Prime Minister is not leaving the
Army and will at the same time be promoted to full general.
To be sure, placing the burden of responsibility in this way seems
to have been also the aim of the outgoing group, which in the com-
munique on the reasons for the resignation of the Konoye Cabinet
expressed dissatisfaction with the policy of the Army. It is to be
expected that this group will not simply resign itself to defeat but
will try with the numerous means at its disposal to oppose a more
vigorous policy by the new Cabinet, as is already being indicated
in the press organs associated with it (Asahi, Japan Times, etc.).
This group will also undoubtedly try to find support in naval circles,
whose role in the formation of the new Government has been less
prominent. However, the Prime Minister has succeeded in obtaining
a vigorous and strong personality from the Navy, Shigetaro Shimada,
up until now Commander in Chief of the Japanese Navy in China,
for the post of Minister of the Navy.
It is also worth noting that the new Cabinet also includes as Minis-
ter without Portfolio the President of the Planning Board, General
l This telegram (82/6072) reported the composition of the new Japanese
Cabinet of Prime Minister Tojo, formed after the resignation of the Konoye
Cabinet on Oct 16.
668 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Suzuki, who is generally considered one of the ablest leaders of Japa-
nese policy but whose role in foreign policy has not always been
entirely clear.
It is to be regarded as a positive factor that the new Cabinet no
longer includes the representatives of the pronounced conservative
group represented, to begin with, by the Prime Minister, by Baron
Hiranuma, still suffering from the effects of the attempt to assassinate
him, 2 his friend Minister of Interior Tanabe, and the Minister with-
out Portfolio and Vice President of the Imperial Rule Assistance
Society, General Yanagawa. Those no longer in office also include
Finance Minister Ogura, Minister of Commerce and Industry
Admiral Sakonji, and Foreign Minister Admiral Toyoda, who are
closely associated with the large Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Mitsubishi
combines.
Of the other ministers only a few department heads have been,
retained. The newly appointed Foreign Minister and Overseas Min-
ister, Shigenori Togo, is known from his work in Berlin as Secretary,
Counselor of Embassy, and Ambassador. 3 Recently he was often
mentioned as candidate for the Foreign Ministry both by the Army
and by the Navy. Since his recall from Moscow * he has kept him-
self rather in the background but has tried always to maintain
friendly relations with the Embassy.
Kishi has been appointed to the post of Minister of Industry and
Commerce, and Hoshino to the post of State Secretary of the Cabinet.
Both of them were at one time closely associated with the Prime
Minister in the Kwantung Army and are regarded as activists.
The new Finance Minister Kaya occupied the same post once before
in the first Konoye Cabinet and was most recently president of the
North China Development Company. His appointment is welcomed
by business circles which hope that he will avoid experiments in the
financial field.
A former admiral, Ken Terashima, who was most recently presi-
dent of the Urgas Shipyards, has been appointed to the Ministry of
Transport and the Ministry of Railways.
The former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tani, whose for-
eign policy in the past was marked by great vacillation and who can
hardly be considered as an asset, has been appointed successor to the
Chief of the Information Office, Ito, who was promoted to member-
ship in the Upper House.
' See document No. 276, footnote 5.
' Togo was Counselor of Embassy In Geraiany, 1929-1032 ; Ambassador, Janu-
ary-October 1938.
* Togo was Ambassador In the Soviet tfnion November 1938-October 1940.
OCTOBER 1941 669
In summing up it should be stated that in the new Cabinet the
forces working for an understanding with America, particularly the
business elements, have been weakened. It is to be expected that the
new Prime Minister, as guarantor of the Army's interests in China,
will be compelled to take an unyielding position regarding America's
demands. The policy of the new Government may be expected to add
to Japan's value as a creator of tension with respect to the Anglo-
Saxons in the Pacific.
As regards any active operation to the south or the north, however,
the views of the Army and the Navy, on which I have reported, will
probably for the present remain decisive.
Ott
[Editors' Note. On October 20 President Tiso and Minister Presi-
dent Tuka visited Hitler at his headquarters. The invitation was
extended in Ribbentrop's telegram No. 1099 of Oct. 14 from the Special
Train which was forwarded to Bratislava as No. 1137 (610/248686-
87). The visit was to be kept absolutely secret. No records of con-
versations held on that occasion have been found in the files of the
German Foreign Ministry.]
No. 414
222/1501B0-B3
Ambassador Bitter to the Legation in Rumania
Telegram
TOP SECRET
No. 1135 of October 20 Special Train, October 20, 1941—5 : 35 p. m.
from the Special Train Received Berlin, October 20—6 : 35 p m.
No. 2872 of October 21
from the Foreign Ministry Sent October 21.
With reference to your telegram No. 3346 of October 17. 1
As is evident from telegraphic instruction No. 2846 of October 18, 2
the entire problem of German purchases and expenses in Rumania is
under review at the present time. The Foreign Minister requests you
to inform Marshal Antonescu of this and to tell him for the time
being that he can depend upon the matter's being clarified and settled
very quickly. Field Marshal von Keitel has promised the same thing.
1 Document No. 406.
"This presumably refers to telegram No, 2856 of Oct. 18 (222/150140-41).
670 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
You are directed to communicate the following to Marshal Antonescu
in the meantime :
I. On the basis of the earlier communications from Marshal An-
tonescu and [Deputy] Minister President Antonescu and on the basis
of the earlier reports from the Legation, the view had been held here in
the past that the financial difficulties, m particular the difficulties in
obtaining lei, were caused by too extensive purchases of goods and
purchases contrary to regulations on the part of the military authori-
ties in Eumania. The oral report by Herr Wenzel 8 had, however, led
to a somewhat different view, subject to the further discussions with
the experts summoned to Berlin. We were now of the opinion that
these purchases of goods play a relatively minor role in the obtaining
of the lei. The German purchases of goods were on the whole less
extensive than we had so far assumed on the basis of Rumanian claims.
Furthermore, certain complaints were not justified. Thus, for ex-
ample, Herr Wenzel had explained that the shipments mentioned in
telegram No. 3252 of October 9,* which were held up at the border,
and with respect to which Minister President Antonescu had raised
objections, could be explained and should not be objected to. Inde-
pendent of this, however, orders had already been given earlier by the
High Command of the Wehrmacht that all purchases of goods con-
trary to regulations were to be stopped. These orders had been issued
anew by Field Marshal Keitel only a few days ago in the strictest
form.
II. On the basis of the oral reports thus far, the Foreign Ministry
and the OKW were of the opinion that demands for lei, which accord-
ing to the Rumanian statements were excessive, could not be attributed
to such purchases, or only in very small part, but in the main to the
fact that the German troops make expenditures for purely military
tasks in Rumania which go beyond the military tasks and financial
expenditures which could be visualized in the earlier conversations
with Marshal Antonescu. Thus, for example, the considerable ex-
penditure for splinter-proof protection in the petroleum region.
Furthermore, the impression also existed that the German troops
had of their own accord taken over military tasks and financial ex-
penditures which were not the affair of Germany but entirely or
primarily of Rumania. Thus, for example, the antiaircraft defenses
in Bessarabia and Bukovina, or bridge building. All of this will be
clarified this week with the experts summoned to Berlin.
III. After this clarification we will have reliable data for deter-
mining jointly with the Rumanian Government :
1. Which military tasks and financial expeditures will be can-
celed for the German troops, and are therefore either to be elimi-
nated entirely or are to be taken over by the Rumanian troops.
2. Which military tasks and financial expenditures fall to the
German troops in Rumania for the duration of the war, in so
' Gerd Wenzel, specialist of the Reich Ministry of Economics for questions of
foreign exchange, attached to the Legation in Bucharest.
'Not found.
OCTOBER 1941 671
far as that can be predicted today. These expenditures are then
to be considered more or less as regular current outlays.
3. Which military tasks and financial expenditures fall to the
German troops for one time only, as, for example, splinter-proof
bomb shelters in the petroleum region or bridge construction.
These expenditures are then to be considered more or less as one-
time outlays that cease in the future.
4. Which payments in arrears from the past — whether for mili-
tary outlays or for purchases of goods — are still to be made.
5. Whether and to what extent and by what procedure goods
can be purchased in Rumania for [the use by] German troops
outside of Rumania, on the condition of being charged to the com-
mercial policy quotas. Such purchases would be treated like
other exports and settled within the framework of the clearing
system.
Then a financing plan can be set up on a long-term basis, authori-
tative and binding for both parties. In this connection it is our in-
tention that the Rumanian Minister of Finance and the Rumanian
National Bank must know in advance what amounts of lei they have
to count on for each separate month. We know from our own earlier
experience that the worst thing for orderly management of finances
is the uncertainty as to the amount of the demands made on it and
the surprise caused by unexpected demands. We have the same in-
terest in protecting Rumania from the consequence of such disorder.
Once a firm basis for precise proposals has been brought about through
the present investigations, we shall immediately start conversations
on the subject with the Rumanian Government.
RlTTER
No. 415
405/213925-26
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Pakis, October 21, 1941 — 6 : 35 p, m.
top secret Received October 21 — 7 : 10 p. m. 1
No. 3255 of October 21
For the Foreign Minister,
Weygand declared before his departure from Vichy that he was
not ready to hand in his resignation ; he would, however, obey imme-
diately an order of the Marshal to vacate his post in North Africa.
Marshal Petain made the decision for such an order dependent on
establishing whether or not the Reich Government considered the dis-
missal of Weygand indispensable.
1 Marginal note : "Transmitted by telephone from the Foreign Minister's Sec-
retariat to the Special Train on Oct. 21 at 8 : 00 p.m."
672 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Petain has requested Darlan to make an appropriate demarche with
the Embassy. Darlan, in the name of Petain, will ask me tomorrow
morning at 11: 00 o'clock whether:
(1) The Keieh Government attached a decisive importance to the
removal of Weygand from his post in North Africa ;
(2) The Reich Government would agree to a solution by which
the supreme military command in North Africa would be transferred
to General Dentz, and Weygand, on the otJier hand, would remain
m charge of the over-all direction of economic questions between
North Africa and the United States;
(3) In my opinion, the opportunity to get rid of Weygand should
be seized without compronnse, because the United States and Wey-
gand could, through their economic influence, leave the door open
for all sorts of intrigues.
I ask for instructions as to what to reply to Darlan tomorrow. 2
\ Abetz
)
aw^ fiT Ply ' J eI ^ ra . n ;< No - 1144 of 0ct " 21 (405/213927), Ribbentrop instructed
Abetz to say only that "you would consider the matter and consult with your
Government. Please report about your conversation with Darlan by teleeram
Further instructions regarding further handling of this matter will be sent to
Jio aaL 0t further developments in this matter see documents Nos.
■sly QDu 4oo«
No. 416
4S39/E244975
Memorandum by the Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Fuhrer's Headquarters, October 21, 1941,
zuEk.739Bg.Es, 1
1. The Fiihrer had already informed me weeks ago that he had the
intention to set up a civil administration in Belgium. Field Marshal
General Keitel had received the same communication. This was the
reason for his letter to me on October 13, 1941. 1
2. I made a report to the Fiihrer today and gave him briefly the
reasons which the Chief of the OKW advanced against transforming
the present military administration in Belgium to a civil administra-
tion. The Fiihrer refused to read the letter of the Chief of the OKW
with the remark that he was in any case resolved to set up a civil ad-
ministration in Belgium. At the same time the Fiihrer instructed
me to prepare a corresponding decree. The Fiihrer has Gauleiter
Grohe 2 under consideration as Eeich commissar or as chief of the
civil administration, without, however, having definitely committed
himself. The Fiihrer indicated that one should investigate whether
1 Rk. 739 B g. Rs. : Document No. 401.
Joseph Orohe, Gauleiter of Cologne/Aachen.
OCTOBER 1941 673
it might perhaps be expedient to separate the Flemish and Wallonian
areas — to designate a new Keich commissar or chief of civil admin-
istration only for the Wallonian areas and on the other hand to allot
the Flemish areas to the Reich commissar for the occupied
Netherlands. 3
L Jammers]
'In a memorandum of Oct. 30 (4839/E244983) Kritzinger recorded a
conversation with State Secretary Stuckart of the Ministry of Interior whose
informal memorandum (4839/E244984-86) on the civilian administration in
Belgium expressed general misgivings. Kritzinger recorded that he informed
Lammers of this conversation. "He intended first to wait for the letter of the
Minister of Interior and then to present the question in detail to the Fuhrer.
A directive concerning the establishment of a civilian administration in Belgium
will he drafted on the basis of the result of the new presentation."
Additional documents have been filmed on serial 4839.
No. 417
405/213935-36
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
ukgent Paris, October 22, 1941—9 : 00 p. m.
No. 3274 of October 22 Received October 22—10 : 00 p. m.
For the Foreign Minister.
With reference to my telegram No. 3268 of October 22, 1941, 1 there
follows the text of Marshal Petain's letter to the Fuhrer which was
mentioned in the previous telegram under Item II :
Vichy, October 21, 1941.
Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor: The anniversary of the meeting of
Montoire 2 is a date the meaning and import of which I would like to
stress and not only as a matter of record.
There was so much high-mindedness in your gesture of last year that
I feel it my duty to emphasize with words of my own the historical
significance of our talk.
Franco-German collaboration has doubtlessly not produced all the
results that you expected and for which I hoped. It could still not
shed a soothing light upon those dark regions in which the soul of a
wounded people rebels against its misfortune. Our people are suffer-
ing bitterly, and the prisoners of war have not returned. Further-
more an altogether too extensive enemy propaganda is endeavoring to
drive a wedge between the occupying power and the occupied people.
1 In this telegram (405/213932-34) Abetz related Darlan's expression of re-
gret over attempted assassinations of German soldiers; announced Petain's
letter to Hitler; and explained Darlan's attitude on Weygand's probable
retirement.
5 See vol. xi of this series, document No. 227.
682-905 — 64 48
674 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
« J^.ff^members, however, your noble gesture. It knows that
not all its fruits will be lost.
™J?™ ****** ° f ?? Ur arme ? forces over Bolshevism supplies the
motive even more than was the case a year ago, to engage now in' a
peaceful effort for the greatness of a changed Europe. g
«*i ■ £ ma « ^ d ? r u nc ^ people are sure that thev w iU meet each
other in these fields of higher culture and unite their endeavors
■p • I V^ ing T 06 to this dee P and suicere wisl1 1 heg you, Fuhr'er and
Philippe Sb OT> aCC6pt ^ MtanB,CBe of ^ hi rf^ consideration
End of text.
Original of the letter will be sent with tomorrow's courier. 8
Abetz
No' T 46a° ri8lnal leUer haS DOt been f0Und - For Hitler ' s "P 1 ? see document
No. 418
205/143049-50
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Stookholm, October 23, 1941—12 :15am
No. 1764 of October 22 Received October 23-3 : 20 a. m.
The two big unresolved problems concerning the supplying of the
German troops in Finland, namely (1) providing 2,000 tents and
stoves and (2) leasing 300 trucks equipped with tires for transpor-
tation on the Arctic Highway, were today successfully settled. 1
'Wied's telegram No. 1497 of Sept 22 (2116/460540^1) retjortpfl thai- „
certain Count Beissel had appeared at the I^XTon a Son of the
?h7Sr h H a ? d ^tt ^traction, from MajS Genera? SchrtLIn v°ew*f
N^ae!n\^anThv^^v 1 f? d !? g ^ „ SUpplies to the German troopT In
S w ^ 7 J he ° verI """l route he was to purchase or lease 1800
SnT^ gold currency available. At the same time Hitler had directed
nanL on ^^^ * U ** ^ material or tents that ^ eould glfto
„™5 ra ! n N °- "£*\ 0t Sept x (205/143018-19) reported the Swedish initial
?3f%w^ ard t ^ a11 ?' tte requests of both ^«nany and Mnland for
trucks. Sweden could make available: 300 personnel carriers TZmVn
manufacture; 2S0 freight trucks of German m anufacture ™262 trucks ?or tn*
Finnish Army; and could lease 300 additional trucks wthout«res if the^l
wo^d mak» the return trip on the Arctic Highway loaded with nickel o™
Trfl^Tv to «5T?5- AU of ttMe 1102 tnicks were to be without tires
Telegram No. 15o8 of Sept 26 (205/143024-28) forwarded in tran^lari™ n
note of the Swedish Government to the Legation explaining Sweden^ own
^h S J° r *T?' her V** 1 * 1 dependence onthe imS«on f truck parte
C ta?hp ™i*£ ST f &t r ™% 01 W00d and henee ^r trucks wkh the re P str&
OCTOBER 1841 675
(1) Tents: Within 3 days the Swedish army administration will
make available in northern Sweden, at the Swedish-Finnish border,
2,000 Swedish army tents, each accommodating 25 men, and the stoves
that go with them. The inspection of the tents took place this
afternoon in the presence of the Military Attaches and, on the Swedish
side, of the Quartermaster General of the Swedish Army and of
General Holmquist. It was found that the tents were especially
well suited for the far north. If the outside temperature is 30
degrees below zero, the inside temperature can be raised in a short
time to 15 or 18 degrees above zero. The price is 600 kronor per
tent, or 1.2 million kronor in all, which will be paid from the foreign
exchange made available here. 2 In return, Germany will supply flax
in accordance with your instruction. 3
(2) Trucks: This equally difficult problem was also finally solved
today after long-drawn-out negotiations. Sweden is willing to lease
300 trucks equipped with tires, which, among other things, will be
used for the immediate transportation of finished wooden barracks
in Sweden to northern Finland. Part of the return cargo from
northern Finland to Sweden will be the 5,000 tons of nickel ore
from Petsamo, which we have made available to Sweden.* This
solution was made possible only by a promise from the German
side to deliver 50 tons of buna to Sweden to compensate for the wear
on the tires. No agreements have been reached yet on when the
buna is to be delivered. In view of the extreme urgency of an
immediate settlement, Ministerialrat Ludwig, at my request, took
it upon himself to promise this buna without consulting Berlin again,
especially since the buna can be delivered in partial shipments. A
release order was also obtained from the Swedish Government for
30 more Swedish trucks equipped with tires which had already been
leased. These had been detained at Haparanda by the Swedish
authorities on account of the unsettled problem of tires. Today's
solution of these two difficult problems, of vital importance to the
supplying of our troops, is evidence of special cooperativeness on
the part of the Swedish Government, since there is a pronounced
shortage in both sectors in Sweden. Consequently the Swedish
a Eisenlohr's telegram of Oct. 20, zu Ha. Pol. 715 g. Us. (2116/460554-55)
informed the Legation that the sum of 3 million reichsmarks in free exchange
had been made available to Colonel General von Falkenhorst, Commander
of the Army in Norway, for purchases in Sweden of supplies for the German
troops in Finland.
" Not found.
'Eiseniohr's telegram of Oct. 8, zu Ha. Pol. 6554 g. (3607/E 026756-57), stated
that Germany would make 5,000 tons of nickel ore available to Sweden at the
same price as the Finns asked of the Swedes, but only on condition that the
300 trucks under discussion be equipped with tires.
676 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Foreign Ministry had to overcome strong opposition from the central
Swedish agencies concerned with domestic affairs. 5
Addendum, for telegram center; Please forward the foregoing
immediately also to Ambassador Hitter by teletype.
Sohnukke
Dankwort
' Hitter's telegram No. 2653 of Nov. 1 (205/143075) mentioned that the OKW
wished some word of thanks to be expressed toward the Swedes, especially for
the tents. Ribbentrop concurred but did not wish the thanks to be much
emphasized "because otherwise the Swedish Government in case of some refusal
in the future would be able to refer to our earlier appreciation." With General
Jodl's assent it was directed that the Military Attach^ speak a word of
appreciation at the appropriate Swedish office.
No. 419
405/213942 x
The Dirigent of the Political Department to the Embassy in Paris
Telegram
MOST URGENT
top secret Special Train, October 24, 1941 — 12 : 30 a. m.
No. 1150 of October 24 from the Special Train
Received Berlin, October 24 — 12 : 50 a. m.
No. 4838 from the Foreign Ministry Sent October 24.
RAM 453/R
For the Ambassador personally.
With reference to your telegram No. 3268 of October 22. 1
Regarding the inquiry of yesterday, the Foreign Minister requests
that you confirm orally, in his name, to Admiral Darlan, that General
Weygand in no way enjoys our confidence.
RlNTELEN
1 In this telegram (405/213932-34) Abetz reported in detail his conversation
with Darlan, the contents of which he had announced in document No. 415.
No. 420
4697/E226826-28
Memorandum, by Minister Eisenlohr
Dir. Ha Pol No. 208 Berlin, October 24, 1941.
Regarding the Grain Supplies for Greece.
I. According to a telegram from the Reich Plenipotentiary for
Greece dated September 30, 1941, 1 the bread ration had at that time
1 Not printed (4697/E226801) .
OCTOBER 1941
677
to be reduced from 192 grams to 96 grams per day. Even this
arrangement applied only to the capital, Athens ; in many places in
the country no bread had been distributed for weeks. There are no
longer any reserves of food and particularly of bread grains available
in Greece. A definite famine prevails. Infant mortality has risen
fifteen-fold, according to the testimony of Deputy Minister President
Logothetopoulos, who is a physician by profession.
II. The reasons for this distress are to be found in the fact that
the Greek provinces in which there is a grain surplus have been occu-
pied by us and to a much larger extent by the Bulgarians. The
remainder of Greece was always a deficiency area. The small harvest
from this area itself has been used up. Moreover, the German and
Italian occupation troops (the latter allegedly amounting to 200,000
men) have largely satisfied their requirements from the country.
III. In order to prevent the abuses which are with certainty to be
expected from this situation of scarcity, Minister Clodius at the end
of August 1941 had reached an agreement with the Italian Govern-
ment, based on a minimum grain requirement of Greece in the amount
of 150,000 tons which comprised the following elements :
Germany and Italy would each deliver 10,000 tons of grain to cover
the immediate requirements up to October 1. (The German deliver-
ies were to be diverted from quantities of grain which we obtained
from the Banat.) Furthermore, 40,000 tons were to be delivered to
Greece by December 31 and another 90,000 tons between January 1
and June 30, 1942 (i.e., until the beginning of the new harvest), and
in such a manner that all the amounts delivered to Greece would be
charged in equal parts to the German and Italian imports from third
countries. It was planned to obtain these deliveries for Greece pri-
marily from Turkey, and in second place from Bulgaria. 2
This agreement proved to be impossible of execution in so far as
the quantities envisaged or even a major part of them could thus far
not be obtained either from Turkey or from Bulgaria or from any
other third country. Rather, in the course of September and October
only the amounts of 10,000 tons of grain apiece promised by Italy
and Germany could be delivered. A remainder of this is still being
delivered.
IV. Inasmuch as it has proved to be impossible to carry out the
idea of supplying Greece from third countries with Germany and
Italy acting as intermediaries at least at the present time, and thus
the agreement mentioned under point III had in practice become
untenable, we pointed out to the Italian Government through the
Embassy in Rome at the beginning of October that for the future we
would have to leave to the Italian Government the responsibility for
' See document No. 323.
678 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
supplying Greece, because Greece was in the area where Italy exercised
power. 3 This statement was made in order to prevent the Italian
Government from possibly demanding of us that Greece must now
be supplied from our own German stocks. The Italian Government
did not deny its responsibility for supplying Greece, and stated for
its part that Count Ciano at the direction of the Duce had instructed
the Italian Minister in Sofia to induce the Bulgarian Government to
deliver this amount of 100,000 tons of wheat or maize to Italy for the
supply of Greece. At the same time our support was requested for
this diplomatic step. The Italian step was taken in Sofia in the mean-
time with our support; the result is not known, but it will hardly
be any different from that which our own representations had (cf
point V).
V. We for our part had even previously made the most vigorous
efforts in Sofia to obtain Bulgarian deliveries of grain to Greece; *
and in this connection we had pointed out in particular that there was
a German interest in preventing disorders in Greece and that Bulgaria
wa,s under an obligation to help since she had taken the Greek grain
surplus areas under her administration. The Bulgarian Government
recognized this obligation in principle, but, referring to its own supply
situation, stated that it was unable to deliver wheat or maize to Greece
before all of the grain in eastern Macedonia and western Thrace had
been obtained, i.e., before the end of this year. The only thing that
Bulgaria has been willing to do up to now is to promise an immediate
delivery of 5,000 tons of beans, barley, rice, peas, and lentils as well
as 200 tons of eggs. The efforts to increase this promise are being
continued, especially with respect to supplying immediately 5,000 tons
of grain.
VI. In interpreting the well-known decision by high authorities
that certain groups of the Greek population are to receive additional
supplies from German Army commissariats in the areas occupied by
German troops," an agreement was reached between the Eeich Minis-
try of Food and the Four Year Plan during Minister Altenburg's
stay in Berlin stipulating that about 60,000 workers in the mainland
areas occupied by us, also the persons on the Island of Crete per-
forming labor for the military, as well as the landlords of our soldiers
will receive certain modest supplementary allotments. Over and
* In the flies is the draft of an Instruction of October 17 (2203/474090-91)
directing Clodius to take such a position in his economic negotiations with the
Italians.
* Documents relating to these steps taken in Sofia are filmed on serial 4703.
According to a teletype message of Oct. 4 from Eisenlohr to Bitter
(4697/E226807-08) a decision to that effect had been made by Hitler and had
been communicated to the Foreign Ministry by a message of Sept, 17 from the
OKW,
OCTOBER 1941 67&
above this, the Four Year Plan upon the urgent representations of
Field Marshal List has in the meantime pleaded with the Reich
Ministry of Food that up to the end of this year 10,000 to 15,000 tons
of grain per month be delivered to Greece, as an advance on the
deliveries which, it is hoped, Bulgaria will make as of the beginning
of 1942.
VII. As was to be expected, the Italians have used the presence
of Minister Clodius in Rome in order to involve him in the question
of the food situation of Greece (presumably with reference to Italy's
own supply situation). Heir Clodius has for this purpose sum-
moned the experts from the German civil and military administrations
in Athens. There is no news as yet concerning the progress and the
result of his Soman conversations. 8
Submitted herewith through the State Secretary to the Foreign
Minister in accordance with instructions.
Eisenlohr
* According to a draft telegram of Nov. 17 addressed to Altenburg by Clodius
(4697/B228838-43) Germany and Italy had examined the problems relating
to the food supply for Greece. As their joint eSorts to supply Greece with grain
from Bulgaria, Turkey, and Rumania had been unsuccessful, Germany was un-
able to commit herself to a long-term plan of deliveries to Greece. Germany
would, however, supply Greece with 10,000 tons of grain for the rest of the year,
in order to alleviate the worst misery especially in Athens and Piraeus.
No. 421
1317/372877-80
The Legation in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
Budapest, 1 October 25, 1941 — 12 : 10 a. m.
No. 1352 of October 25 Keceived October 25—2 : 35 a.nn
Del. No. 1
Secret for officer in charge.
For the Foreign Minister.
I. I had a lengthy conversation with the Duce today. The latter
first expressed his satisfaction over the course of the visit of Minister
Funk. 2 The visit and the splendidly worded communique 3 had had
'A draft of this telegram (2089/452263-67) was dated Oct. 24 at Budapest.
Nevertheless, Clodius' conversation with Mussolini took place in Rome. See-
document No. 440.
" Minister of Economics Punk had been in Rome for discussions with Minister
of Trade Riccardi from Oct. 19 to 23.
* The text of the press communique had been transmitted by Mackensen tc-
Bibbentrop in telegram No. 2666 of Oct. 23 (1517/372864-66). It was approved
by Ribbentrop and Mackensen was so notified in telegram No. 1153 of Oct. 24
(1517/372867). The text of Punk's speech to the press In Rome about his talks
with Riccardi has been filmed on 4875/E253133-37.
680 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
a good effect on the public. The visit was at the present moment
primarily of political importance because it tended to refute the
rumors which were circulating recently concerning the alleged in-
clination of Italy to leave Germany in the lurch. 4 The Duce added
that he wanted everyone in the world to know that Italy had taken
her definitive stand and that it was clear to every Italian that until
the end of the war Italy would stand at Germany's side. I replied
that none of us had had even the slightest doubt of it.
II. The Duce continued that there was one question of decisive
military importance, concerning which he wished above all to speak
with me, and that was the guaranteeing of Italy's oil supplies. A
■critical situation had arisen for the Navy. I knew, indeed, from our
constant negotiations in recent years " that the supplying of the Navy
had always been only partially possible, and that its activities had
heen considerably curtailed already in the last half year for lack of
oil. 6 But now the moment had come when all reserves were used up
and a large-scale employment of the fleet had become impossible alto-
gether. In October only a fraction of the stipulated quantity had
been delivered from Rumania. If imports were not sharply increased
at once, even convoy guard for the transports to Libya would no
longer be possible. I reminded the Duce that at our last conversations
on this question in January and February, we already found our-
selves facing an approximately similar situation. 7 We had neverthe-
less succeeded in the past 9 months in getting the necessary quantities
of oil for an activity, even though perhaps a somewhat restricted one,
of the Italian Navy. I was firmly convinced that we would succeed
in this again even now.
I had detailed discussions on this question yesterday and this morn-
ing both with the Chief of the General Staff, General Cavallero, and
with the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Riccardi. We were
working with all the means at our command to further increase pro-
duction in Rumania and had made all preparations, in the event of a
further advance in Russia, to proceed at once with the extraction and
the removal of oil.
The Duce then inquired minutely as to the prospects of oil supplies
from Russia, and in this connection also obtained a report on the
*Cf. Leonardo Simoni, Berlino, ambasciata d'lttdia, 19S9-1943 (Home, 1946),
pp. 255-256 ; Dino Alfleri, Due dittatoH di fronte, pp. 227-228 ; The Clano Diaries,
■entries for June 30, July 6, July 13, July 16, July 20, and Sept 24, 1041 ; letter
of Ciano to Allieri, Oct 6, printed in Galeazzo Ciano, L'Europa verso la catastrofe,
■p. 677.
" See vol. xr of thia series, documents Nos. 619 and 726, and vol. xn, documents
Nos. 19, 27, 91, 641, and 652.
* Sec vol. xn of this series, document No. 65.
T See vol. xn of this series, document No. 27.
OCTOBER 1941
681
other prospects for the economic exploitation of Eussia. I promised
the Duce, upon my return from Berlin, together with all the appro-
priate authorities to do everything in our power to maintain the
activity of the Italian Navy.
III. The next point that the Duce dealt with was the Italian food
situation. It had been reported to him that Germany would give
decisive aid in connection with the supplying of Italy from the south-
east. He expressed his thanks for this and was pleased about it. It
was, of course, necessary to assure the Italian people the subsistence
minimum, which was already extremely depressed as it was, particu-
larly in Tegard to bread supplies. But he saw no really serious danger
in the food question. The Italian people were tough and easily satis-
fied and for centuries accustomed to suffering. They could by no
means be subdued by reason of a curtailment of the food supply.
I replied to the Duce that it was evident from my conversations
with Tassinari, the Minister of Agriculture, and Eiccardi, the Min-
ister of Foreign Trade, 8 that the Italian deficit, judged from the
standpoint of over-all European consumption, was gratifyingly rela-
tively small. Together with the Italian ministers concerned, we
would see to it that this deficit were covered to the extent really neces-
sary. The Duce expressed his thanks for this, but repeated that oil
was even more important than bread.
IV. The Duce then asked me to report to him my impressions of
my last trips to and negotiations in southeastern Europe. He was-
particularly interested in the attitude of Turkey and in the situation
in Greece. The latter made him very uneasy. 9 Just today he had
received the report that Athens again had a supply of bread grains-
sufficient for only 2 more days. Yesterday he had again released
800 tons of flour for Greece, but that was only like a drop of water
on a hot stone. So much, at least, had to be done for Greece as to
protect our commercial purchasing interests there and, above all,
to safeguard the position of Greece as a starting point for further
military operations.
V. In the conversations, prior to my discussion with the Duce,.
which I held with General Cavallero and Admiral Eiccardi on the oil
question at their request, Admiral Riccardi in particular, who submit-
ted all the figures, represented the Italian supply situation as an
extremely dangerous one. The reserves of fuel oil for the Navy, which,
at the beginning of the war had amounted to over 1 million tons, had
on October 1 shrunk to 50,000 tons. In October, out of the 55,000 tons
"Clodius reported a discussion with Riccardi, regarding the precarious food
supply situation in Italy, in telegram No. 2636 of Oct. 21 (1517/372846). No-
record of Clodius* conversation with Tassinari has been found.
* See document No. 420.
682 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
promised from Rumania, only 17,000 tons had thus far arrived. The
minimum consumption of the Navy in October would be 75,000 tons,
so that in November only 11,000 tons, that is, practically nothing,
would be available. The Navy was no longer in a position to send out
large units. A few days ago he, Riecardi, had to pass up a very fa-
vorable opportunity for an attack on a large English convoy that was
being escorted by several cruisers. The English had in the last several
days dispatched two units to Malta ; he therefore also had to have the
convoy to Africa escorted by cruisers, should it not be possible to
disperse the English cruisers in the nightly air attacks on Malta. For
the regular transport operations to Africa 35,000 tons of oil were
required ; in addition to this, 19,000 tons were needed for the protec-
tion of the respective harbors. If 54,000 tons were not delivered at
once, transports would have to be suspended during November. At
the same time he had to stress the fact that the Navy, if it had only
54,000 tons, could only perform transport service, but could not, in
addition, undertake any defensive or offensive operations. I replied
to General Cavallero and Admiral Riecardi in the same sense as I had
to the Duce. Count Ciano did not broach the oil question in his
numerous conversations with me.
Cloditts
Jagow
No. 422
-405/213950-58
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most tjbgent Paris, October 25, 1941 — 8 : 25 p. m.
top secret Received October 25 — 9 : 35 p. m.
No. 3825 of October 25
ITor the Foreign Minister.
Subject: Attempts against the lives of members of the Wehrmacht.
Following the instruction received from the Foreign Minister, 1 I
have observed complete reserve in the matter of reprisals for the
attempts against the lives of members of the Wehrmacht and have
taken the position that this is an exclusively military matter. In addi-
tion I have personally expressed the view to the military authorities
that the reprisals ordered * were entirely appropriate if the situation
1 Document No. 338.
* For the text of the orders of Aug. 23 and Sept. 28 of the Military Commander
in France, see Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. XXVII, document No.
1588-PS, pp. 364-73.
OCTOBER 1941 683
reports on France sent to Fiihrer Headquarters by almost all the
German offices in Paris, in contrast to those of the Embassy for the
past year and a half, were true, that is, if the overwhelming majority
of the population were actually de Gaullist and anti-German.
Regarding the presumable assassins and the political repercussions
of the shootings of hostages already carried out and still to come the
following picture appears up to now :
I. Possibly this involves a terrorist group of the association of
young Communists which is directed by agents of the Secret Service.
The assassination in Bordeaux 3 was carried out in the same way as
the one against Marcel Gitton, the former deputy and secretary gen-
eral of the Communist party in France, who defected to Doriot.
Furthermore there are a number of indications that English officers
have been dropped by parachute into France; two such Englishmen
are supposed to have been arrested by the French police in unoccupied
France near the line of demarcation and to have had with them large
supplies of explosives and food. It is also not entirely impossible that
a French nationalist organization and certain circles in the Govern-
ment and the Army are behind the assassinations in order to pre-
vent the danger of good relations between the population and the
occupation power.
II. The French Government's shock at the execution of the host-
ages seems to be more for show than real. This can be explained
on the score that the major part of the hostages are Communists
and with them there disappear elements undesirable to the Govern-
ment. The secret pleasure of a number of Cabinet members can
perhaps also be explained in that an important part of the patriotic
Frenchmen in the occupied area possess more confidence in the Eu-
ropean and socialist objectives of the occupying power than in the
program of their own Government. Through the mass executions
of their countrymen these patriotic Frenchmen can become aware of
their blood relationship with those who were shot, in spite of the con-
tradiction of political convictions, and thus the creation of a morally
united front against the Germans, which is desired by Vichy, can be
facilitated.
III. Last night Minister of the Interior Pucheu brought the text
of a radio appeal apparently planned by Petain which follows in
translation. It reads:
"Fiihrer and Reich Chancellor. I am appealing to you in the most
direct way in order to beg you in the name of the sacred principles
of humanity to cease with the bloody reprisals. Because two Ger-
* In a memorandum of Oct, 24, 1941 (405/213943-44) Grote recorded the as-
sassination of a German officer from the administrative service in Bordeaux
on Oct. 22.
684 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
man officers were just murdered in a cowardly way by unknown per-
sons, with no evidence being present that they were Frenchmen, 100
Frenchmen have already been executed within 2 days and others
are being threatened.
"Both of us are resolved to find and punish the culprits and to
fight with all our might against the foreign influences which put
weapons into their hands, but I cannot let the blood of those be spilled
who had no part in these murders. I should betray my people if
I did not address a solemn protest to you at this hour. If you refuse
to hear my voice and if you need further hostages and victims, then
take me.
"I shall be at the demarcation line in Moulins today at 2 : 00 p.m.,
where I shall consider myself your prisoner while awaiting your
decision."
This plan transmitted to me can be a bluff in order to extort can-
cellation of the 100 executions which are still planned. However,
according to reports received at/the Embassy 4 it could also be a well
conceived intrigue by the chief of the Marshal's civil cabinet, du Mou-
lin de Labarthete, involving the same elements in the Marshal's en-
tourage who already bear the responsibility for December 13. e If
the Fuhrer had accepted such a proposal by P6tain, then, in the opin-
ion of these circles, the prerequisites for the outbreak of unrest in
unoccupied France and in North Africa would have been created,
since France would no longer have possessed a Chief of State. If
Petain's proposal had been rejected by the Fuhrer, then the Marshal
would have found himself in an impossible situation so that then,
too, a crisis in the authority of the state would have been unavoidable.
Marshal Petain himself had not seen through the motives of his in-
triguing advisers and had already accepted the suggestion which
seemed to him chivalrous. Only through the energetic objections of
Darlan and Pucheu had he been held back from it.
IV. In reply to the objection that the number of 50 hostages ex
ecuted for each of the assassinations in Nantes 7 and Bordeaux wor
too high, it can be stated that the usual small number of execution?
in the case of previous assassinations has evidently had the result that
the population and the French authorities condemned the assassina-
tions, to be sure, but were not willing to cooperate to the extent that,
they do now, in apprehending the culprits. The French population
and police have now been so alarmed by the 600 executions that have
already occurred, however, that in the future certainly all that is
humanly possible will be done to avoid further assassinations.
' These reports have not been found.
5 On Plain's plan to give himself up to the German authorities see Eobert
Aron, Histoire de Vichy, 1940-U (Paris, 1956), pp. 458-459.
See vol. si of this series, documents Nos. 510, 517, 521, 530, and 531.
On Oct. 20, 1941, Lt. Ool. Hotz was assassinated in Nantes.
OCTOBER 1941
685
In my opinion it is of decisive importance in the case of assassina-
tions whether they correspond to a hostile attitude on the part of the
population or are committed with the provocative intention of call-
ing forth such an attitude. In the present case it can be considered
established that the attitude of the French population does not provide
any prerequisite for these assassinations of members of the Wehr-
macht; indeed, in recent -weeks there has been a noticeable improve-
ment among the masses in the attitude toward Germany under the
impact of the great German victories in the east and on the eve of the
anniversary of Montoire. 8
The French public is uniform in condemning the murders and the
treacherous manner of their execution. If the remaining 100 host-
ages are executed, however, there exists the danger that the indigna-
tion of the people about the assassinations will be transformed into
indignation at the reprisals which are disproportionately high accord-
ing to local opinion. In this situation it would appear to me to be
politically useful to inform the population in an impressive proclama-
tion that the Fiihrer had decided, in consideration of the willingness
to assist in finding the culprits that has now been demonstrated, to
suspend until further notice the execution of the remaining 100
hostages under arrest.
Abetz
* See vol. ii of this series, document No. 227. .„.,., *
' A marginal note in Weizsacker's handwriting on page one of this document
refers to this paragraph: "Has instruction re page 4 gone out?" The instruc-
tion referred to by Weizsacker was Hitler's decision to postpone the shooting of 50
additional hostages until Oct 29 as reported in the memo of Oct. 27 by Kramarz
(405/213954) and indefinitely as recorded by Grote's memorandum Pol. IM. 7MZB
g of Oct. 28 (405/213957).
No. 423
260/170258-59
The Legation in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
top secret Helsinki, October 25, 1941 — 9 : 40 p. m.
No. 1179 of October 25 Received October 25 — 10 : 35 p. m.
The main preoccupation of the Finnish Government at the discus-
sions during these past days was concerned with the Finnish food
situation in the coming year. State President Byti as well as indi-
vidual Ministers were emphatic in explaining to me these difficulties
686 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOKEIGN POLICY
and their causes. 1 The reasons for Finland's adverse food balance
are, for one thing, the poor crops of the last 2 years together with the
cessation of the extensive imports from non-European and overseas
countries, and, for another, the utmost straining of the Finnish War
effort, which requires larger allocations to the army and the auxiliary
organizations. The prevailing uncertainty regarding how to cover
the deficit in the food situation, is responsible for widespread emer-
gency slaughter, which has already resulted in a critical reduction of
livestock. Checking this reaction among the farmers at once is essen-
tial if further serious impairment of Finland's food base is to be
averted.
The Finnish food balance, according to the figures presented here,
shows a deficit of 175,000 tons of bread grains. Only if this deficit is
covered will the Finnish Government be able to assure availability of
the quantities of fodder grain indispensable to preserve the livestock
herds and to maintain the food ration, which has already been cut to
the limit. Finland's request to the Keich Government would there-
fore be for an assurance that these 175,000 tons of grain would be
supplied over a period between now and the new crop in 1942, that
is, approximately October of next year. The deliveries could be dis-
tributed over that period, but the Finnish Government is anxious to
receive a small portion immediately. Now that the territories lost
under the Moscow peace treaty of March 11, 1940, have been recap-
tured, 2 the Finnish Government believes that the current shortage will
not occur again because the arable land available will henceforth be
sufficient to supply the nation with food, although subject to the ut-
most restrictions.
To judge by the picture which we have gained at the discussions
here, the Finnish demands do not appear excessive. If we wish to sus-
tain the combat power and the resistance of the Finnish people, we
must come to their aid. And that must be done very soon in order to
enable the Finnish Government to do its long-range planning and to
counteract the shaky morale of the farmers.
«ttw wlT^^VVf- ^ 18 ( 26 <>/ 1TO2 ^3) Bltteher reported a conver-
ters w«j£S ^hn?«^ t i, Wh ^ enti0ne<1 tbat the militar r situation In all
ue SSll i^S J.W hlef c ° ncern , was the problem of ftMXtotnffii and
iR™,n«?A?T c * W the countr y c °uld not be maintained, he said, with
16 percent of the population mobilized and Finland consequently would reduce
her army to 150,000 men after the capture of Karhumaki. ^ u ™ uy woula reauce
Meirli^wtttJjiT^Twl 31 ™,^ of tne treafc y sl ^ ed a * Moscow on
Mar. 12, 1940, between the USSR and Finland is printed in Degras Soviet Doni-
££?££ IT? 9 "* i° my > T01 ' m ' PP - 42l - A2i - ^ trZlatlon from £e FtaS*
juLwti igfigrs&fz s« Documents on 8ovu,t poiiov > Maroh is *°-
ParHaSa^rnvfVimH 2 <f VlTOtil) Blucher reported that the Finnish
torleXfo/Sreaty of Moscow!* r ™ rpotati ™ int ° ™»*°* <* the terrl-
OCTOBER 1941 687
I request that a decision on the basis of my telegraphic reporting
be reached immediately if possible. 3 The Finnish Government has
presented a comprehensive memorandum on the Finnish food situa-
tion B which will be transmitted by Ministerialrat Ludwig, who is
leaving by plane today and will arrive in Berlin on Monday.*
ScHNURRE
Bltjcher
* Not found.
'A minute of Oct. 20 (4967/E276777/1) by Weber, an official in the Foreign
Minister's secretariat, indicated that Ribbentrop wanted a sympathetic appraisal
of the Finnish request
A memorandum by Seherpenberg, au Ha Pol. 732 g. Rs. of Nov. 1 (260/170291) ,
stated that the amount of grain in Finland available for 1941-1942 was less
than 500,000 tons whereas the consumption in a normal year ran to 750,000 tons,
and recorded that the Finnish figures and possibilities of delivery were being
examined in the Reich Food Ministry.
See, further, document No. 493.
No. 424
F2/0103-120 ;
M2/440-463
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Fiih. 50 g. Rs. Special Guest Train, October 26, 1941.
Record of the Conversation Between the Fuhrer and Count
Ciano at Headquarters on October 25, 1941 1
After a few words of welcome the Fuhrer expressed his satisfaction
that the great aim of destroying the enemy forces in the east had now
been attained to a great extent and it was merely a question of ex-
ploiting the victory in every direction.
He would send the Duce a description of the over-all situation in
a letter in the immediate future. 2 He hoped that this letter would be
finished in time for General von Rintelen, the German Military At-
tache at Rome, who was at Headquarters for the moment, to hand it
to the Duce in person.
He {the Fuhrer) was not clear about the intentions of the English.
It was certain, however, that Great Britain had lost her strongest ally
on the Continent. In the light of the latest events in Russia, severe
1 Ciano came to Germany at the invitation of Ribbentrop to take part In the
annual hunt at Schimhof. For the arrangements and proposed program see
telegram No. 1109 of Oct. 16 (1517/372827).
In telegram No. 2622 of Oct 20 (100/65306) Mackensen Indicated his wish
to accompany Oiano in order to be able to report orally regarding Minister Mayr
and the South Tirol. Cf . document No. 362. footnote 12.
* Of Oct. 29, document No. 433.
688
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
criticism was being voiced even in England itself regarding the in-
activity of British warfare and British policy. The critics believed
that m recent weeks the time had been favorable for unleashing a two-
front war. The Fiihrer stressed in this connection that Germany was
very well prepared for a two-front war, and Lord Halifax had not
betrayed anything new at all about England's plan when he hinted
at a two-front war. Germany had left strong forces both in Norway
and in h ranee, and was therefore armed for everything
It was not known, however, whether the English were not going to
do somethmg somewhere after all. He (the Fiihrer) would explain
his opinion on this, too, in the letter to the Duce. He would speak
of the danger points where Germany had already made her prepara-
tions, and on the basis of certain considerations would suggest that
Italy undertake a reinforcement of the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean
lt n ;i k ? Furthermore, a new attempt should be made
against Malta and in any case the island should be blockaded as thor-
oughly as possible and cut off from all imports. A long-range night
fighter unit would have to watch over the three airports on Malta and
in the long run they would be able to inflict considerable losses on the
English fighters when they landed there at night. In this regard
Malta m ° St faV ° rabIe P ossi bilities of attack were offered at
Concerning the general situation the Fiihrer remarked that the de-
cision of the war had really been made by the events of the past 4
months, and that m any case there was no longer any possibility for
the enemy to shake this decision. Probably the English could still
try a few local operations; but they could not gain a continental
victory.
They themselves were not in a position to attempt a landing on
the Continent, to say nothing of carrying it through. However, they
were also lacking in support from other quarters in executing such
an operation. To be sure, Russia now could have given them tre-
mendous help in their aggressive intentions, as one now recognized
much more clearly than 5 months ago. By a sudden attack the
Russians would have been in a position to give the war a disastrous
turn, not only as regards Germany and Italy but in respect to all
Europe and civilization.
The Soviet Union had now finally lost this possibility, and not only
for geographical reasons, because the front was 1,500 kilometers from
the eastern frontier of the Reich, but also for military reasons as
regards both personnel and material and likewise for organizational
reasons. In regard to personnel the giant state had sacrificed its most
valuable units. So much material had been lost that the democracies
could not replace it in 5 years, in which connection one should re-
OCTOBER 1941 gog
member that they would then keep nothing for themselves. What was
dec^e, however was the organisational disruption of the kS
fnyCgJ ^ theam0rat - deXtentof -^noonesofarpolse;sS
th J T Z^ f^J^T °! th6 TaASai ^b^dor in Moscow * from
the fame before the battles at Vyazma and Briansk there already
* ™5 A i f d6rShip WaS S0 centra1 ^ that, to e/press
it crassly, even the distribution of toothbrushes-if such things were
used in Russia at all-had to be regulated centrally by Mo owfit wa'
hundrSoTSr" G V^ a ^ «^™ii center ioaTed
of^hr«ur/l v LT "^ *°? the CapitEl ^ Even the establishment
of the purely technical and communications apparatus was entirely
2™ bI : *** *? R ™ «*«"», - that after the abandonment of
wouldl . r ? f 0Vernm S and admin ^ration of the country
would be a practical impossibility.
hrfn,l aS ^T™ 6 ™ a remoTaI ^ industry to the east. Some
branches of industry had already lost Is percent of their raw mate-
tribuTed'in \ " "^ ^ T "^ 25 PerCCnt ™» mai ^-
rail"oads esceedin g!y unfavorable manner in relation to the
^ ™ t& Germa ny, with her highly flexible economic system,
would not be m a position in like circumstances to repair such damage
as Russia had suffered. The same was probably true for other Euro-
pean industrial countries. Therefore France had also surrendered at
a certain moment in the realization of this impossibility.
Now ,t was said that Stalin intended to transfer a million workers
to Siberia. Certainly only a portion of these would arrive at their
destination, and the workers would arrive in the middle of the Si-
berian winter with its temperatures of 45 to 50 degrees below freezing.
They would not find any living quarters, but would have to be accom-
modated in caves m the earth. Thus this winter the fate of Napoleon
would probably overtake Russia rather than Germany and her allies.
hJ ™JT°^ r 6 ^ trans P° rtati °n system was not transverse,
but radial. All lines radiated from Moscow, and the route between
two Pomts in the empire always led through the capital, which, how-
ever, would be under siege from all sides within a few weeks
In southern Russia the further advance of the German and allied
troops was above all a matter of supply. It was extremely important
to repa,r the railroad network as quickly as possible and to change
muniHnn ° Pean f ^ S ° ^ the SUppl y ° f fuel > food > and »m*
munition w as secured as regards transportation. In this respect much
'AH Haydar Aktay.
682-905 — 64 49
690 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
progress can be noted. Today a large railroad bridge across the
Dnieper near Kremenchug will be put into service, so that entire
trains will run through to Stalino. What was decisive for the Ger-
man advance in the south was not the hostile resistance, but the
weather and the supply possibilities. As soon as freezing weather
arrived and the now almost impassable roads had frozen over, the
weather-determined obstacles could be more easily overcome; by cross-
ing the huge barrier of the Dnieper at three bridge points a restoration
of the railroad network and therewith an improvement in the pos-
sibilities of supplies would be attained which would permit the Ger-
man army to accomplish the next jump forward. At the present
distance of 400 to 500 kilometers of the front lines from the supply
bases one had had to call a halt for the time being.
The Fuhrer designated the Caucasus area as the next objective of
the German operations, which was to be cut off together with the al-
ready interrupted pipeline and the railroad lines to the north. He
(the Fuhrer) would be glad if in this manner the German troops
would come up against the first divisions of General Wavell and would
thereby relieve the situation in the Mediterranean area. Such a re-
lief would best be brought about if the Arab world would witness a
really serious threat to the English position, no matter what the
point was from which it was launched. The Caucasus area was a
favorable basis for this in so far as the main center of oil supplies lay
in its immediate vicinity, which could then be put to the service of the
German and allied armies even if the Russians should undertake
large-scale demolitions. Within 6 to 8 months everything could be
repaired again, so that the strongest pressure could then be exerted
on England from, there.
In the further course of the conversation the Fuhrer called to mind
the large-scale strategic and operational plans which he had described
to the Duce at his recent visit.* At that time he had said his aim
was the destruction of Budenny's army, which at that time was still
northwest of Kiev, as well as a break-through and an encirclement of
Timoshenko's army. He had not wanted to write to the Duce before
these plans had been realized. Today he could say that the operation-
al ideas which he had expressed at that time had been carried out in a
splendid manner. The armies of Budenny and Timoshenko had been
destroyed ; far more than iy 2 million Russian prisoners had fallen into
our hands.
As regards men Russia had lost more than 3 million prisoners since
the start of the campaign. If one assumed that one to two dead must
be counted for every prisoner, then one arrived at a total loss of 6
* See document Mo. 242.
OCTOBER 1941 691
million in prisoners and dead. For every dead man one could assume
two to three wounded, of these 60 percent were serious casualties, that
is, soldiers who could not be in service within a short time; 30 to 40
percent could be assumed to be light casualties, but again 50 percent
of these were eliminated because of bad sanitary organization.
From his calculations there emerged a total loss of the Bussians
of a minimum of 10 millions, and this was probably a very cautious
estimate. In reality the figures would probably be higher. Further-
more, almost the entire commissioned and noncommissioned officers'
corps had been lost in this manner, and when an English newspaper
wrote that Stalin intended to set up a new army in the Urals in accord-
ance with the experience gained in the present war, this assertion
could only call for a smile from everyone who knew from his own ex-
perience the difficulties involved in setting up an army. This was
nothing more than a gigantic bluff.
The material losses of the Russians were unimaginable. Only now
had it become clear what tremendous danger had threatened from
Russia. The industrial damages were just as great and were impos-
sible to repair. The removal of machine tools was a very doubtful
undertaking, especially since the railroads were under constant bom-
bardment from the German fliers. As the younger age groups were
needed as industrial workers, the Russians were forced to call up
mainly older age groups and use them for cannon fodder.
In raw materials Russia had already lost 75 percent of her alumi-
num supplies, 65-70 percent of her raw steel supplies, and a large
part of her coal stocks. Within a short time she would no longer be
able to exercise control over more than 90 percent of her oil supplies.
The supply of manganese was completely eliminated, not only for
Russia but also for America, which had gotten supplies from Russian
sources. Molybdenum had likewise been entirely eliminated. The
remaining raw material bases lay so far apart from one another that
a concentrated armament production was no longer possible.
Thus if one applied the present Russian situation to German condi-
tions, one would arrive at the following picture: The Ruhr area and
the Upper Silesian coal basin were lost, as well as the Central German
steel industry; three-fourths of the aluminum industry, 90-95 percent
of the armament factories, and 70 percent of the transportation facili-
ties were eliminated. One no longer possessed an army and intended
in these circumstances to set up a new army. This comparison showed
in all clarity the hopeless situation in which the Soviet Union found
itself. The difficulties were still enhanced by the fact that the thickly
settled areas of Russia were in German hands, whereas of the 150
million total population only 30 million lived in Siberia.
692 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
One could therefore state that the giant empire of the Soviet Union
had reached the end of its strength. Not only the Russians and the
Germans, together with their allies, knew this, but also England and
America. As proof of this the Fiihrer cited the fact that the Ameri-
cans wanted to route their deliveries to Russia neither through Vladi-
vostok nor through Iran, but like typical Shylocks had chosen the
harbor of Archangel because they knew very well that within a few
weeks this would be unusable until next May as a result of ice forma-
tion. Then they could shift the blame onto Russia for the fact that
the deliveries had not come off. For the Anglo-American experts
themselves certainly did not assume that one could keep a channel
open permanently with icebreakers, as was maintained in the Anglo-
Saxon press. There was hardly a better target for air attacks than
an icebreaker which, without any possibility of evasion, led the way
laboriously through the masses of ice at a speed of three knots. Fur-
thermore German troops would, within a few weeks, also cut the rail-
road to Archangel.
In these circumstances the war would be transferred to the west
in the near future, and thereby the period of grace which England
had received because of the Russian events would be ended. What
conclusions the English themselves would draw from this could of
course not be predicted. However, England's internal situation did
not seem to be so firm as it was previously. Within the framework
of the fight against England the English harbors would within 1 to 2
months be bombarded in a way that they had so far not yet expe-
rienced, and the submarines would proceed with renewed vigor in the
dark nights against the English shipping. At the same time an oper-
ation against England was under preparation in the Arab world, in
which connection the problems in the Mediterranean, too, would be
made easier, regarding which he (the Fiihrer) would take a detailed
position in his letter to the Duce. 5
Noteworthy in the fighting in the east was the fact that for the
first time a feeling of European solidarity had developed. This was
of great importance especially for the future. A later generation
would have to cope with the problem of Europe-America. It would
no longer be a matter of Germany or England, of Fascism, of Na-
tional Socialism, or antagonistic systems, but of the common interests
of Pan-Europe within the European economic area with her African
supplements. The feeling of European solidarity, which at the mo-
ment was distinctly tangible, even though only faint against the
background of the fighting in the east, would gradually have to change
generally into a great recognition of the European community.
* Of Oct. 29 ; see document No. 433.
OCTOBER 1941 693
After a remark about Japan, whose hour at the side of the Axis
would surely come, the Fiihrer spoke of the practical possibilities
that existed for America in her fight against the Continent. The
United States was arming itself in order to take over as much as
possible of the English legacy. It masked this intention behind
a holy crusade against Fascism, and National Socialism, a typically
Anglo-Saxon procedure since the Anglo-Saxons always surround the
pursuit of their own interests with an appearance of morality. In this
connection it was significant that an American periodical stated a
few days ago that England was exhausted to such a degree that
America would hare to take over the leadership of the world and
the succession to the British international position. As counterserv-
ices for her deliveries of war material America really seemed to have
made demands on England in this direction, which were evidently
of such a serious nature that the English had so far not yet replied
to them.
Apparently it was a question of the American demand to possess
bases everywhere where the English for their part had bases, as well
as the demand that England give up the economic protectionism
of the British Empire, that is her Ottawa policy.
One often heard the opinion that at the end of the war England
would have lost the fight, to be sure, but that America would step into
her place. To this the observation was to be made that the United
States had so far by no means mastered the problems of internal order
and organization of social conditions that had been solved in Ger-
many and Italy, and therefore at the end of the war would find herself
confronted by great internal difficulties. If in addition Europe, led
and held together by Germany in the north and Italy in the south,
achieved a better cooperation between the European nations than in
the past, it would then represent such a superior factor that even
America could do nothing against a Europe thus unified. Then 500
million Europeans would confront 230 million Americans, whereby one
should remember that there were only 60 million Anglo-Saxons in
America, whereas the remainder was made up of Italians, Germans,
and members of other races.
Central and South America would still provide America with aid
during the war under the influence of Jewish propaganda, to be sure.
As soon as peace had been established, however, such an economic chaos
would arise there that a new orientation would be necessary. Since
the South Americans wanted to sell the same products that the North
Americans produce in great quantities, no healthy economic relations
were possible between the two parts of the Western Hemisphere, par-
ticularly since the South Americans were not in a position to raise
the means of payment for the finished goods to be obtained from North
694 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
America, and one could not after all constantly exchange goods in
return for unproductive gold.
In view of these facts of internal and external chaos in America,
the war and its armaments were simply a period of grace for the
United States, after the passage of which it would experience an eco-
nomic collapse in comparison to which the crisis of 1929 would appear
to be child's play.
Therefore the future did not belong to the ridiculously half-civilized
America, but to the newly arisen Europe that would also definitely pre-
vail with her people, her economy, and her intellectual and cultural
values, on condition that the East were placed in the service of the Eu-
ropean idea and did not work against Europe. Therefore it was also
a fallacy to believe that in the last analysis America would be the bene-
ficiary of England's defeat. The older culture and the higher intel-
lectual level of Europe would in: the end be victorious.
Count Oiano thanked the Eiihrer for his comprehensive state-
ments, and, following that, came to speak of Italy's domestic situation.
As was known, the English and American propaganda, which was
connected with other propagandists that were under Jewish influence,
had some time ago gone over to representing Italy's domestic situation
in the blackest colors. The Duce had commissioned him (Count
Ciano) to state to the Fiihrer in no uncertain terms that this prattle
was absolutely absurd. Italy's domestic situation had not changed by
any means.
At most there was one somewhat delicate and difficult point : This
was the food situation, especially in the area of bread grain. Here
the scarcity of supply was disagreeably noticeable particularly for the
reason that bread and cereals represented the staple of the Italian
people. However, the Duce was convinced that he would be able to
master the difficulties and by means of skillful distribution of the exist-
ing quantities would be able to compensate for the hardships of the
poorer people by giving to the more well-to-do population groups,
who had alternate possibilities, less bread than to the poor. To be
sure, the situation was not exactly splendid. In the Duce's opinion it
would, however, be possible to get through to the next harvest. In any
case no repercussions on domestic policy of any sort had arisen from
these food difficulties. Italy's internal situation was normal and
calm; morale was good. The extent to which the Italian people
understood the necessity to restrict themselves had been shown when
shortly after introduction of the bread rationing the Duce had made
a trip to the political center of Italy (Bologna, Parma, and other
northern Italian cities) and had been welcomed there with great
enthusiasm by the people.
OCTOBER 1941 695
In the further course of the conversation Count Ciano also passed
on a personal request of the Duce's to the Fiihrer : Italy felt uncom-
fortable hecause she had the impression that she contributed too little
to the military efforts in the conduct of the war. Therefore the Duce
wanted Italy to participate in the military effort to a larger extent
than heretofore. 8
In this connection Ciano came to speak of the question of Italian
workers in Germany and admitted without further ado that certain
individual difficulties had been dramatized unnecessarily. 7 One
needed only to go through the pages of newspapers of cities like
Florence and Bologna, whose laboring population numbered about
the same as the Italian workers employed in Germany, in order to find
that there are incidents, fights, and the like every day which no one
got excited about. The incidents in Germany were therefore some-
thing entirely normal and were simply exploited by malevolent people.
In these circumstances the inclination of the Duce could best be
summarized in the words: "fewer workers, more soldiers." Since in
the choice of the workers mistakes had been made, the Duce intended
to undertake a new selection to eliminate unsuitable elements and
reduce the number of workers employed in Germany, but to increase
the number of fighting soldiers. The Duce asked the Fiihrer to per-
mit him to make a larger contribution to the military effort than in the
past if the operations against the Caucasus were to begin in the spring.
The Fiihrer promised this, remarking that for climatic reasons
Italian troops could perhaps do particularly good service in the areas
situated south of the Caucasus.
Continuing, Ciano pointed out that a greater participation by Italy
in the military conduct of the war would exercise a very important
countereffect in relation to the Anglo-Saxon propaganda, which liked
to characterize Italy's position as entirely subordinate.
The Fiihrer repeated his promise and remarked on the question of
the workers that at certain times of scarcity egotistical elements often
played a great role. Every category of worker watched to see that
no one was allotted more than they themselves. Thus, for example,
the German workers, too, had protested when the Italians had been
granted a special allowance of wine.
Furthermore, there were naturally still elements among both the
German and the Italian workers which were not a hundred percent
Fascist or National Socialist. These elements sought to bring about
conflicts which they motivated intentionally in another than an ideo-
logical way, for reasons of camouflage. There simply existed an inter-
' Cf. The Ciano Diaries, entry for Oct. 22, 1941.
* See document No. 410.
696 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
national guild of chatterers and containers who criticized everything
as a matter of principle or because they had too little to do. The
deceive thing, however, in relation to this was that the two revolutions,
The Fascist and the National Socialist, stood alone in the world united
with one another for better or for worse. The real Fascists and
National Socialists had grasped this just as had the two leaders, so
that every attempt at separating the two movements was condemned
to failure from the very start.
Upon (Ws remark that perhaps the Alpini divisions could be
employed for the fighting in the Caucasus, the Fiihrer responded with
words of appreciation for their fighting ability and remarked that
perhaps Italian troops could also participate later in the fighting
against India. In any case he (the Fiihrer) would by spring get the
Enghsh to the point that even if they had not entirely disappeared
from the Mediterranean, they still would have to shift their aim
elsewhere.
There followed the situation report by General JodI and Maior
Christian in the map room in the presence of Count Ciano. This was
in regard to the status of the operations on the eastern front, in the
west and m the area of revolt in the Balkans. When Ciano asked
about the time of the capture of Petersburg or Moscow, the Fiihrer
replied that one could not say anything precise about this, but that
■Su° ^ • entirely encircled an d cut off from all supplies
+ u VT 5 ano f sked about &* attitude of France, the Fiihrer replied
that the French continued their waiting attitude, though they had
RuST C0DSlderably m ° re polite in view of the German victories in
m 1 ^ 1 ?" 86 *° a qU6Stion of Ciano ' s about the situation in French
North Africa the Fiihrer said that the conditions there would be
uncertain as long as Weygand was still at the head of the adminis-
tration there. There was a prospect, however, that he would soon be
recalled. 8
In reply to a question by Ciano regarding Turkey the Fiihrer
pointed out that their attitude would be influenced by an advance in
the Caucasus area.
Regarding Spain the Fiihrer again expressed his lively regret that
the well-prepared Gibraltar operation could not be carried out at
the beginni ng of the year owing to Spain's attitude." After the cap-
* See document No. 415, and footnote 2.
See vol. xi of this series, documents Nos. 323, 707, and 718.
OCTOBER 1941 697
ture of Gibraltar the situation in the Mediterranean would, without a
doubt, have changed fundamentally in favor of the Axis, and the
difficulties in the Balkans would probably never have arisen.
Following this there was lunch in a small circle, after which Ciano
bade the Fiihrer good-bye. 10
Schmidt
" Ciano's report on this meeting is printed in L'Europa verm la catastrofe, pp.
678-686, It is mentioned in The Ciano Diaries, entries for Oct. 25 and 26, 1941.
No. 425
482/231257-61
Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal
Affairs
Berlin, October 25, 1941.
zu D III $U&
Concerning my official trip to Belgrade 2 1 herewith submit to Under
State Secretary Luther the enclosed memorandum.
I have so far refrained from informing State Secretary von Weiz-
sacker and Pol IV because I wish to leave it up to your decision
whether the last paragraph concerning my over-all impression should
also be passed on to these officials.
Rademacher
[Enclosure]
secret Berlin, October 25, 1941.
D III 535 g.
Memorandum on the Outcome op My Official Trip to Belgrade
The purpose of the trip was to investigate on the spot whether the
problem of the 8,000 Jewish agitators whose deportation was de-
manded by the Legation could be solved on the spot.
The first discussion with Minister Benzler and State Councilor
Turner at the office of the Military Commander of Serbia indicated
that more than 2,000 of these Jews had already been shot in reprisal
for attacks on German soldiers. By order of the Military Com-
mander, 100 Serbs are to be shot for every German soldier killed.
In execution of this order, first of all the active communist leaders of
1 D III 535g. : Enclosure.
* See document No. 376, footnote 2.
698 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Serbian nationality-about 50 in number-were shot, and then ™-
larly Jews as communist agitators g
start 2" C ° UrS ! ° f ^ ^^""^ it developed that from the very
whl n0t a m f tBr ° f 8 ' 000 Jews > but only of abou^ 4 000 S
betwee'n^^rdTooo? * ^ "I" 6 Ckrifled W the diff -ence
In this com pi lation a mistake was made in that the W* t
Jews frTIL-5. * ^^ tte M1,uki ™ ° f *• ™™W>*
and old people) as well at ah™,t 1 *nn ' ■ Jews (women, children,
likewise ^hoMreto be wbl& t^ 8168 ' ° n W ^ om themales ™»
the city of Belgrade as a JKc Tt^ fe° ?^ ^^ 1 uarter of
assured in scanty amoSte. ° r the winter ^^ be
In a final discussion at State Councilor Turner'* nffi™ «„, i «
was wil ing to accept such a solution in prin^ Howevt £ his
ing Zi 6 SrT^ ° f , the ^ ° f B ^» «"K£ b'eed
mg ground of epidemics, and must be burned down for hygienic Tea
sons. It could be considered only as an interim station. *
OCTOBER 1941 699
Therefore the Jews and gypsies who are not shot in reprisal at
first are to be assembled in the gypsy quarter and then transported at
night to the Serbian island of Mitrovica. There two separate camps
will be established. In the one the Jews and gypsies are to be kept, and
in the other 60,000 Serbian hostages.
Then, as soon as the technical possibility exists within the frame-
work of the total solution of the Jewish question, the Jews will be
deported by water to the concentration camps [Auffanglager] in the
East.
I should like to summarize my over-all impression in this matter by
stating that under the impression of the insurrection which increased
daily in violence — with the very city of Belgrade being threatened tem-
porarily — the offices in Belgrade saw the whole question too pessi-
mistically at first; furthermore, the Legation and the local Gestapo
offices are not working together as closely as the situation requires.
Minister Benzler, with whom I took up this question, confirmed my
impression. He said that he no longer negotiated with Standarten-
fuhrer Fuchs. The reason for this was that Fuchs had acted toward
him in a disloyal way in the question of the lists of Freemasons. In
the first place he had simply not given him the lists of Freemasons
which he had wanted. Upon his insistence he had then supplied a
list which had been incomplete and inaccurate. Thus wrong names
had been listed, several persons had been listed only by their first
names, and further the Prince Eegent and former Minister of the
Interior Cvetkovic 3 had been included although the Gestapo knew that
the list was supposed to serve as a compilation of the Freemasons who
were considered for reprisals.
Since this time he communicated only with State Councilor Turner
directly, to whom Fuchs is to a certain extent subordinate.
As for myself, Standartenfuhrer Fuchs and his staff were always
helpful to me, permitted me to see their files and cooperated well
with me.
The talk with Sturmbannfuhrer Weimann, who is subordinate to
Turner, indicated that among those immediately concerned with the
matter and in the executive organs a local solution of the whole
question is considered optimistically, in contrast to Turner himself.
It is therefore doubtful to me whether the method of dealing only
with State Councilor Turner was the most expedient one in the present
case.
Rademacher
* Presumably Dragiga CvetkovlC, Yugoslav Minister President and Minister of
Interior to Mar. 27, 1941.
700 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 426
222/150177-80
The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
secret Buchakest, October 27, 1941—2 : 00 p. m.
No. 3475 of October 27 Received October 27—2 : 55 p. m.
The question of how the unstable relationship between the Eu-
maman Government and the Legion would develop under the impact
of the war against Bolshevism could not be clearly evaluated at first,
because the Marshal was at headquarters and therefore primarily
concerned with settling military matters. During this time one could
note, however, that the influence; of the clique of generals which is
absolutely hostile to the Legion grew more and more, and time and
again found expression in measures that were not of a nature to con-
tribute to the internal pacification. I recall the shooting of nine
Legionnaires in July 1941 (cf. telegrams Nos. 2276 of July 24 » and
2365 of July 30 *) , which took place as a result of past facts. Mihai
Antonescu, who was of my opinion, and my repeated interventions
were unable to change anything regarding the shooting which was
justified as such but was politically wrong. Furthermore the generals
tried, successfully, to Mock the path of the Legionnaires who were
anxious to get to the front. Volunteers were not taken, but only the
age groups called up were considered.
Even before his return the Marshal had left it up to the Deputy
Minister President, at the repeated urging of the latter, to negotiate
with the allegedly authorized representative of the Legion, Professor
Gavanescul, on his own responsibility, in order to find a basis for the
cooperation of the Government with the uncompromised elements of
the Legion. The Deputy Prime Minister thought of demanding a
written statement of Gavanescul that would put a period to the events
of January and disavow them and those responsible for them in a
clear manner. Then he wanted to induce Gavanescul to designate to
him the persons m the Legion with whom cooperation was possible
The conversation with Gavanescul took place without leading to any
results Gavanescul did not go into any concrete questions at all,
evidently because at his advanced age he does not feel equal to the
sUuation, and rather believes that the Legionnaires, split up as they
are into numerous groups, cannot in any case be brought under one
roof. How ever, he also stated to the Legation that there was an in-
) Not printed (222/149830).
Not printed (222/149853).
OCTOBEH 1941 701
struction from Sima to him authorizing him to approach the Govern-
ment as the representative of the Legion.
Supposedly there exists a letter along these lines from Horia Sima *
to Gavanescul, which I have not yet seen in spite of my efforts to do
so, so that I do not really believe in it. Thus after the efforts of the
Deputy Minister President to build a bridge to the clear-seeing Legion-
naires, and especially to the youth of the Legion, had been unsuccessful
two incidents happened which led to an increase in the tension between
the Marshal and the Legion. Mihai Antonescu informed me that the
Marshal had ordered the arrest of 60 young Legionnaires about 16
years of age, who had met in the woods at Baneasa and on whom
instructions for propaganda against the Government had been found.
This incident was very regrettable, since it had led to a weakening of
his own (Mihai's) position with respect to the Marshal. He had
always defended the Legion, and in particular had pointed out that the
Legionnaire youth had to be won over. The Marshal had told him
at the time that if he wanted he could do this on his own responsibility
After the incident mentioned above, all the opponents of the Legion
had again been called into the fray. The fact that even under the
impact of the war the young people were beginning to make political
propaganda agamst the Government had made the Marshal extremely
indignant, so that he had ordered that the book March into the Abyss
which had been kept back at the time, should now be published He
had replied to the Marshal that this would perhaps set off new domestic
tensions, but had not been listened to. The meeting of the youth in
Baneasa shows how foolishly a part of the Legion is acting. All
groups of the Legion are permeated with informers, so that reports
concerning the activity of the various groups of Legionnaires, which
are available to me too, are received daily.
M. Antonescu then mentioned a second fact which he was passing
on for our information. The lawyer, Deubal Codreanu, a brother of
the murdered C. Z. Codreanu,* had complied with an invitation from
the former Rumanian Minister in Berlin, Greeianu, to put his signa-
ture under a written statement according to which the Legion rep-
resented a unified organization. According to the statement by the
lawyer Codreanu, M. Greeianu had told the Legionnaires whom he had
convened that these signatures were to be sent to Berlin, evidently in
order to sho w the Eeich Government that the Legion was still a strong
'Leader of the Iron Guard (Legionnaire Movement) and former Detratv Min-
iswT^? Codreanu, Commander of the Iron Guard, was kUIed Nov. 30
™f ;^? ? .P° lice ,eacort while being transported from one prison to another See
vol. v of this series, document No. 260, footnote 1. auotner. »ee
702 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
and unified organization. Antonescu remarked regarding this matter
that several Legionnaires who had given their signatures had after-
wards been frightened by the political implications of their steps and
had the intention of retracting them. However that might be, it was
certain in any case that M. Grecianu had not kept his word. He was
convinced that when the Marshal heard of this he would carry out his
threat of arresting him. This was all the more embarrassing since
M. Grecianu had twice been spared from a court martial by the inter-
vention of the Reich Foreign Minister. 6 Even now he personally
could no longer receive M. Grecianu, since the Marshal had forbidden
him to do this. I, too, am not in a position to intercede once more for
Grecianu, who promised me at the time to remain absolutely quiet.
The statements by the Deputy Prime Minister regarding the rela-
tionship with the Legion were unequivocal. Whereas he had still
tried up to now to take a conciliatory position when talking to me,
I believe that after the incidents described he no longer intends to make
efforts in favor of the Legion with the Marshal, at least for the time
being. On the other hand I consider it to be certain that the Marshal
is entirely deaf in this ear, and intends to carry out the building of
the new state with well-tried front fighters, but without the Legion.
I may send a report on the activity of the Legion and its various
groups.
Stelzer
TON KlLLINGER
" Although there is no record of such steps by Ribbentrop, several documents
in the flies indicate Germany's efforts on behalf of Grecianu following the col-
lapse of the Iron Guard revolt in January 1941 ; such documents are Bucharest
telegrams Nos. 202 of Feb. 1 (201/89303) and 230 of Feb. 4 (201/89319),
Weizsacker telegram No. 420 of Feb. 18 (201/89418) and Woermann memorandum
of Feb. 21 (201/89401) .
No. 427
185T/42242-44
Minute by Ambassador Dieokhoff
Beeun, October 27, 1941.
I received a telephone call yesterday afternoon from the Foreign
Minister's Secretariat asking me to give Herr Hewel by telephone
my analysis of the situation in the Senate (Neutrality Act) . I there-
upon gave the Foreign Minister's Secretariat the four points attached
hereto, for forwarding to Hewel. As of yesterday I had no knowledge
OCTOBER 1941 703
as yet of Thomson's telegram No. 3702 of October 25, 1941. 1 My
estimate of the situation agrees substantially with his; however, the
situation is even more complicated than what Thomsen describes,
because of the position of the isolationists who while desiring to
maintain the neutrality law would like for tactical reasons to bring
about a vote on the entire neutrality legislation.
Herewith submitted to the State Secretary.
DrfiCKHOJFF
[Enclosure]
Berlin, October 26, 1941.
(1) Roosevelt is striving for the repeal of as much of the Neutrality
Act as possible, and chiefly the repeal of the provisions forbidding
the arming of merchant ships and prohibiting vessels from entering
the combat zones.
However, because public opinion in the United States has so far
been overwhelmingly in favor of the ban regarding combat zones,
Roosevelt has confined himself to calling only for repeal of the pro-
hibition on arming of merchant ships. A bill to this effect was sent
to the Congress two weeks ago 2 and the House of Representatives
approved this a week ago 3 by 259 votes to 138. The bill is now before
the Senate.
(2) In the meantime there has been a certain shift in public senti-
ment, partly under the impression of the sinking of American ships,
notably the Lehigh? Sentiment for repealing the prohibition against
entering the combat zones has gained. Willkie has exploited this, and
his followers in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have lately
been demanding the repeal not only of the prohibition against the
arming of merchant ships, but also of the prohibition against entering
the combat zones, thus, of the whole Neutrality Act, practically speak-
ing. As Willkie's followers are strongly represented among the
Republican members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
the Committee yesterday approved a proposal to this effect.
1 In this telegram (1857/422240-41) Thomsen reported that the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee had voted to send to the Senate a bill providing for changes
in the Neutrality Act in addition to the elimination of the ban on the arming
of merchant vessels, which had already been voted by the House of Representa-
tives.
* See document No. 396.
5 The vote was taken on Oct. 17.
4 It was announced on Oct. 21 that the American freighter Lehigh had been
torpedoed and sunk near the western coast of Africa.
704 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
(3) The bill now goes before the full Senate. There, a strange
situation will develop. The Willkie Republicans and the extremist
warmongers among the Democrats will favor repeal of both prohibi-
tions, but very likely the moderate Republicans and the Wheeler
Democrats will move for a vote on the full question of repealing the
Neutrality Act, and not merely the bill on arming merchant ships.
The former ones will do so in order to scuttle the entire Neutrality
Act, the latter ones because they hope that in a vote there will be a
majority against repeal of the Neutrality Act, in other words, against
Eoosevelt's policy. The President himself seems to be still waiting
for developments. He would like most to have the entire law re-
pealed, but does not want Willkie to get the credit for this; and what
he wants even less is a vote against repeal of the Neutrality Act,
which would hamper his policy for war in the future. The deter-
mining factor for Eoosevelt's further tactics will be the development
of public opinion in the country, and on this will also depend the
attitude of those senators who are as yet undecided.
(4) The debate in the Senate will presumably take two weeks.
No. 428
71/50893
The Charge d' Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
secret Rome, October 28, 1941 — 7 : 40 p. m.
No. 2723 of October 28 Received October 28—8 : 30 p. m.
With reference to my telegram No. 2695 of October 25. 1
The report announced in the aforementioned telegram regarding
the Grand Mufti's arrival in Italy was published in yesterday morn-
ing's newspapers. The 1-day delay resulted from the fact that the
Duce, being absent from Rome, was not able to receive the Grand
Mufti the day before yesterday, but received him yesterday morning
in Anf uso's presence.
Anfuso told me that the Grand Mufti's personality had made a
very favorable impression on the Duce. He was a man in his middle
forties, gave the impression of being intelligent and seemed to know
exactly what he wanted. The discussion, which had lasted quite a
*In this telegram (71/50892) Bismarck had reported that on Oct. 26 the
press would publish the news of the Grand Mufti's arrival at an Italian air-
port.
OCTOBER 1941 705
while and was held in French, revolved exclusively around the Arab
problem. The Grand Mufti had told the Duce that his political aim
was the independence of Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. He had further
indicated that at the proper time he would ask the Italian and Ger-
man Governments for a statement in which they would identify
themselves with his political endeavors, to which the Duce had given
his consent.
Anfuso added that the Grand Mufti first wished to wait for the
arrival of Gaylani and would then probably go to Berlin on a visit.
Bismarck
No. 429
260/170260-61
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
top secret Helsinki, October 28, 1941 — 8 : 12 p. m.
No. 1202 of October 27 Received October 28—9 : 45 p. m.
I. I brought up the Petsamo nickel question 1 for discussion in
connection with my conferences here, and proposed the following:
1. The Canadian-English concession, in which as is known there is
also a major American interest, is to be revoked by the Finnish State.
A new concession is to be granted by the Finnish State to a joint
Finnish-German corporation, to be organized and which should have
its seat in Finland. The capital is to be at the ratio of 80 (eighty)
percent German, and 20 (twenty) percent Finnish, the shares in the
nickel production to be in the same proportion, with an upper limit
set for the Finnish share. Management should also be in approxi-
mately the same ratio as capital interest, that is, two representatives
of the German group, one representative of the Finnish group.
2. The newly licensed company is to succeed Petsamo Nickeli O.J.
in the contracts entered into oy the latter with the German syndicate
(/.<?. Farben-Indu8trie> Krupp, Metall-Gesellschaft) .
A memorandum outlining this plan in general terms was presented
to the Finnish side. Ministerialrat Ludwig, who arrived in Berlin
today, took the text with him. 2
II. Because strong opposition in the Petsamo question must be
anticipated from political and industrial quarters, and because Min-
ister of Commerce Tanner in particular is opposed to such an arrange-
1 For previous developments see voL xn, documents Nos. 16, 42, 75, 109, 123,
139, and 305.
'Not found.
682-905— 64 50
706 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
ment, 3 a speedy solution in our favor would depend on a personal
decision of State President Ryti. I have therefore taken up the
question with Ryti, who gave me his approval in principle without
any hesitancy in our very first conversation, and instructed Minister
von Fieandt* to settle the details with me. Inasmuch as Fieandt,
was still reluctant to tackle this difficult complex of questions and
advanced various reservations of a legal nature against the annulment
of the English concession, I once more today turned for assistance
to Ryti who fully reaffirmed his original decision.
III. I have now arranged with the Finnish Government that the
negotiations regarding the Petsamo concession are to be continued in
Berlin in about 3 weeks, both on the governmental level and between
the business groups on both sides, and that the intervening time would
be used by both sides to prepare proposals regarding the by-laws of
the joint German-Finnish company and regarding the proposed con-
cession agreement. Despite the positive and realistieal political atti-
tude of the President, we still must anticipate a great deal of difficulty
and opposition during the negotiation of details, which will increase
the more time elapses before the matter is brought to a final conclusion. 8
Bluoher
'In telegram No. 1285 of Nov. 10(260/170335) Zechlin reported that Colonel
General Falkenhorst had written to Field Marshal Keltel regarding the views
of Tanner who urged that Finnish administration of the nickel mines until
the war's end was best, and pointed out that broad circles of the Finnish people
were displeased to see Germany try during the war emergency to gain such a
controlling interest as had been Russia's aim.
* Rainer von Fieandt, former chairman of the Finnish delegation to the mixed
committee in Moscow to negotiate on the Petsamo nickel mines.
8 For further developments see document No. 460.
No. 430
205/143060
The Charge oV Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry 1
Telegram
secret Stockholm, October 28, 1941 — 9 : 55 p. m.
No. 1810 of October 28 Received October 28, 1941—11 : 45 p.m. 2
For the Foreign Minister and State Secretary.
The King of Sweden asked me to see him today and requested me to
transmit to the Fiihrer the following views concerning Soviet Russia :
Ever since the end of the last World War, the King had realized
what a grave danger Bolshevism had been and still was not only for
1 Wied's name is penciled at the bottom of the telegram which is the copy de-
coded in Berlin.
1 Marginal note : "Forwarded as No. 3594 to Special Train, Oct. 28."
OCTOBER 1941
707
the north, but also for the whole of Europe. Therefore the King
■wished quite frankly to express his warm thanks to the Fiihrer for
having decided to crush this plague. The King asked that his heart-
iest congratulations be conveyed to the Fiihrer on the great success
already achieved.
At the same time the King gave assurances that by far the greater
part of his people shared his views in this matter.
His efforts and his activities would always be aimed at converting
the doubters to his views. The King also added that he was very
anxious for the preservation of good relations between Germany and
Sweden.
The King asked me to treat the foregoing communication in special
confidence so that it would not become known in public.
At the close of the conversation, the King expressed the hope that
his Government would soon dispose favorably on the question of the
ban on the Communist party. 3
Dankwort *
* In telegram No. 1827 of Oct 30 (205/143067) Dankwort reported that the ban
of the Communist party was considered certain in Swedish parliamentary circles.
* In a minute of Nov. 11 (205/143093) Woermann noted that the telegram had
been Bhown to Hitler who had given no further instructions in this matter. The
Foreign Minister had therefore decided that no reply should be made.
See, however, document No. 554.
No. 431
1047/311653-64
Memorandum ly the Director of the Political Department
U.St.S.Pol. No. 920 Berlin, October 28, 1941.
The following action has been taken so far in the Pan-Turanian
question :
1. Minister von Hentig, who was on duty as a representative of the
Foreign Ministry with Eleventh Army Headquarters, has been called
to the Foreign Ministry to attend to Nuri Pasha and to deal with the
Pan-Turanian question. He will arrive here presumably on Octo-
ber 29. It is the intention that a committee to deal with these questions
will be established soon.
2. The OKW has been asked to prepare for the separation of the
ethnically Turkic and Mohammedan prisoners of war.
3. Ambassador von Papen has been asked in accordance with in-
structions what the position of the Turkish Government would be in
708 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the matter of separating out the prisoners of war. Ambassador von
Papen has supplied the following information with regard to this : 1
"With regard to the role of Nuri Pasha in the Pan-Turanian
movement, I recommend the proposal made earlier that Nuri
Pasha participate in organizing the screening of the prisoners
of war and in their indoctrination. I am sure that the Turkish
Government will not have any objection to it because I have al-
ready remarked to M. Saracoglu that we intend to place the
prisoners of war of Turkic ethnic origin in special camps."
4. Ambassador von Papen has furthermore been asked what, in his
opinion, the position of the Turkish Government would be with regard
to the establishment of a Pan-Turanian propaganda office in Berlin
under direction or with participation of Nuri Pasha. The reply to
this is still missing and a reminder has been sent. 2
5. According to information supplied by Ambassador von Papen,
General H. Emir Erkilet, retired, who is participating now in the
journey to the front 3 is a leader of the Pan-Turanian movement. At
the suggestion of von Papen, Erkilet will call on me after the con-
clusion of his journey to the front.
6. Further measures will be taken immediately after the arrival
of Hentig.
Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State
Secretary.
Woermann
'Papen's letter of Oct. 17 to Ertfmannsdorff (2361/488725-26) includes the
paragraph which Is here excerpted,
* Woermann's letter of Oct 24 to Papen (1047/311656-57). In a letter of Oct
31 (1047/311652 ) Papen sent the requested reply and pointed out that the Turkish
Government, which played down Pan-Turanian propaganda in its own country,
would certainly consider such propaganda if carried on from Berlin as very
awkward. Consequently, he urged, the Pan-Turanian propaganda ought to
he limited to the prisoner-of-war camps and to the training of people who
might be sent, if necessary, into the German-occupied areas. He stated : "If the
matter is handled in this way I have no apprehensions that the Turkish
Government will fail to agree to it."
"Of. Documents secrets du MinUtere des Affaires Mrang&res d'AUemagne:
Turquie, document No. 12.
No. 432
2163/470307-08
The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Com-
mander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
top secret Belgrade, October 29, 1941—11 : 25 p. m.
No. 841 of October 29 Received October 29—12 : 00 midnight.
With reference to your instruction R 5032 g. Rs. of October 17 x
and my telegram No. 826 of October 25. 2
1 Document No. 408.
'Not found.
OCTOBER 1941
709
In the past week there have been executions -without trial of a large
number of Serbs, not only in Kraljevo but also in Kragujevac, as
reprisals for the killing of members of the Wehrmacht in the propor-
tion of 100 Serbs for one German. In Kraljevo 1,700 male Serbs were
executed, in Kragujevac 2,300. Furthermore, in the town of Gornji
Milanovac, north of Chakochakok [Cacak P] there have been execu-
tions after the burning down of the buildings.
Mistakes have been made in the executions. Thus confidential
agents, Croats, and the entire personnel of German armament plants
have been shot, and in Milanovac also those who, relying on their
innocence, had remained in contrast to the majority of the population
that had fled. The executions in Kragujevac occurred although there
had been no attacks on members of the "Wehrmacht in this city, for
the reason that not enough hostages could he found elsewhere.
These indiscriminate executions are causing repercussions among the
population which are contrary to our final political objective. They
have also made Prime Minister Nedic uncertain in setting his
objectives.
The Plenipotentiary Commanding General * has thereupon issued
new directives concerning the execution of hostages, which do not
change anything in the ratio of one hundred Serbs for one German, to
be sure, but eliminate as far as possible mistakes such as those men-
tioned above.
I am passing on the above for your information, so that the For-
eign Ministry may be informed about the actual events in case of pos-
sible attacks by the enemy radio.
Benzler
* Gen. Franz Bo'hme. See document No. 326.
No. 433
100/65316-31
Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini
Fuhrer's Headquarters, October 29, 1941. 1
Duce : I am writing you this letter at a moment when I believe I
can justifiably claim that the campaign in the east is not only won but
as such has in the main been brought to a conclusive decision.
When I had the pleasure of welcoming you and your staff members
1 In telegram No. 2767 of Oct 31 (1517/372808-09) Klntelen reported that he
had handed Hitler's letter to Mussolini that day at 7 :45 p.m. In telegram No.
2771 of Nov. 1 (1517/372917-18) Rintelen further reported that he had again
seen Mussolini who said he fully agreed with Hitler's statements, particularly
regarding the protection of transports. Mussolini mentioned that he had re-
ceived reports from Madrid and Lisbon that the English planned a landing on
Corsica. He intended to answer Hitler's letter on the next day (Nov. 2) . See
document No. 454.
710 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
at my headquarters, 2 I informed you about the operations that were
planned or in preparation. Completely misjudging the situation, the
command of the Russian Southern Army Group waited until we had
created the conditions necessary for closing the big arc around Kiev.
This battle led to an outcome that exceeded even my expectations.
For I expected 300,000 to 500,000 prisoners; after the conclusion of the
last mopping-up operations, however, the number came to more than
700,000.
The ensuing penetration by the Kleist armored group to open the
bridgehead around Dnepropetrovsk also gave your divisions, Duce,
their first opportunity to carry out an operation of their own, with
outstanding success, in the framework of a big new battle of
extermination.
As expected, the attack carried forward in the meantime south
of the Dnieper against the Crimea drew like a magnet the last rem-
nants of the left wing of Budenny's army between the Dnieper and
Melitopol with the objective of plunging our Eleventh Army into
a crisis by penetrating our rear communications. We expected that.
The Kleist armored group, which had become free again after the
opening of the bridgehead of Dnepropetrovsk, had been ordered
from the outset, in such an event, to strike the gradually concentrating
Russian divisions in the rear to the east and inflict a new defeat on
them in cooperation with the German, Rumanian, and Hungarian
troops operating from the west. The result of this battle of encircle-
ment was the destruction once again of about 13 Soviet divisions.
On the morning of October 11 the operation could be considered com-
pleted. My Leibstandarte, another SS division, and two armored
divisions thereupon drove forward in the direction of Rostov. They
will be the spearhead of other strong forces that become free.
On October 2 came the enveloping breakthrough into the Timo-
shenko army group, namely at three points along a front more than
500 km. wide. Luftwaffe, armored force, and motorized units, but
especially the infantry, not only proved their mettle again but outdid
themselves. It was possible to encircle about 75 Russian divisions in
three pockets and bring them to inescapable destruction.
Since then, strong units have been advancing against Moscow on a
broad front.
Two other operations are envisaged for the destruction of the
Russian divisions still stationed on the northern front. I hope that
they, too, will lead to great successes. Leningrad itself, Duce, will not
be attacked, since I have no intention of sacrificing one man more
than is absolutely necessary. Besides, we found in Kiev and only
recently in Odessa that the Russians plant mines along whole street
* See document No. 342.
OCTOBER 1941 711
sections and especially in all important buildings, and after a while
these mines either ignite automatically or are detonated by wireless
action. According to statements by the Russians they have some
more, quite special surprises prepared for us precisely in this field
both in Leningrad and in Moscow. The important thing, however,
is not to occupy cities but to destroy the enemy. Leningrad and
Moscow will both fall, possibly without our being forced to put
even a single man in the cities themselves and thereby perhaps sacri-
ficing him. The Finns are of the same opinion and this is important
because they are maintaining the northern investment front against
Leningrad all alone with their own forces.
Bolshevism, moreover, is falling victim to its own treacherous
designs. For only the gigantic concentration of all its means of
attack on the German, Finnish, and Eumanian frontiers, respectively,
forced the Red command to fight where the contest was most favorable
to us. The inconceivable massing of its war material for an attack
on us prevented it from withdrawing to the rear and fighting there,
1,000 or 2,000 km. away from its frontiers. To be sure, the location
of its raw materials area or its large industrial centers made matters
more difficult. All in all, we shall soon have either occupied, or be
in a position to obtain, 70-90 percent of its industrial and raw ma-
terials capacity. In these circumstances, Duce, I do not think I am a
rash prophet when I say that, regardless of what decisions Stalin may
make, the Bolshevik empire is defeated.
With this, however, Duce, the sole and last great continental hope
of the English will collapse.
That they have no illusions about this in London can scarcely be
doubted. It therefore seems possible to me that under the pressure
of public opinion they may perhaps at the last minute attempt some
sort of relief offensive, however stupid this may be.
On this assumption I have already considered all the possibilities
still open to England in such an eventuality.
1. Direct help for Russia.
As regards material, such help is ridiculous and in any case within
a few weeks they will find no way of getting in a sufficient quantity to
where it would be needed.
The same is also true of the so-called American help.
2. Personnel help.
This is completely excluded. Moreover, we would naturally be
gratified if they would somehow bring a few air force wings to
Russia. In view of the difficulty of the position, the severity of the
Russian winter, but especially the lack of any orderly and sure pro-
vision of supplies, they would be eliminated in a short while.
712 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
3. Belief offensive in some other place.
a ) An attack through Turkey.
In view of the great prudence of the responsible men in Ankara I
consider this out of the question, and for that matter also completely
hopeless.
b) An attack through the Caucasus.
From the military point of view this would be extremely welcome
to me. The forces that England would be able to send into action
could only be small because of the supply conditions. But since they
would then meet, not poorly equipped Arabs, but the best battle-
seasoned troops, their annihilation could only be a question of a few
weeks.
c) A landing, that is a landing attempt in Norway.
I have left strong forces in Norway. The country does not, of course,
look as it did on April 9, 1939, s any more. Hundreds of medium and
heavy batteries have been installed. Supplies of food, fodder, and
especially ammunition and fuel have been assured for a whole year.
If the English should nevertheless get a foothold somewhere, I would
consider it advantageous, for they could maintain themselves there
only by a constant employment of troop transports and, to cover them,
also cruisers, destroyers, etc. That would just be a repetition of the
year 1940, with one difference, to be sure. At that time we had a
couple of miserable airfields. Now, however, we have over 50 com-
pleted, first-class, airports with large runways, more than adequately
protected, moreover, from any attempt at a surprise attack from the
air. Furthermore, I have built up an armored force for Norway,
which is being continually reinforced in order to be capable of light-
ning-like intervention with other motorized units wherever the need
might arise. Oslo, Christiansund, Bergen, Trondheim, Narvik,
Tr0ms up to Kirkenes, etc., are, moreover, protected with medium
and heavy batteries, as well as by mine fields, in such a way that I
could not wish for anything better than such an operation. Given the
poor military leadership of the English, as I said before, nothing,
after all, is excluded.
d) A landing in western Europe.
That is, in Denmark, Holland, Belgium, or western France, since
even in the eyes of the English the German coasts can hardly come into
consideration.
In reality, I could only welcome such an attempt, too. These coasts
have been studded at all important points with hundreds and hundreds
of batteries, up to 40.6 cm. in caliber. In addition, the whole area has
been heavily mined and defense installations have been built which are
" The date should read April 9, 1940, the date of Germany's Invasion of Den-
mark and Norway. See vol. ix of this series, documents Nos. 63, 67, and 71.
OCTOBER 1941 713
sufficient to put up an initial, well-nigh insuperable defense immedi-
ately against any such attempt. Apart from that, I have left about
45 divisions in all in the west — that is, in France, Holland and Bel-
gium alone — some of which are among the best that we have. In addi-
tion, there are two armored formations [equipped] with French ma-
terial and two armored divisions with German material. Apart from
• that, however, the first transports are already returning from the east
to the west. And this is no additional burden whatever on our trans-
portation system, because with these transports we can bring food
supplies and ammunition, to the eastern front and take troops back.
So transport trains are already, as stated, uninterruptedly return-
ing with units from the eastern front, some of them to Germany, some
of them directly to the west. The Luftwaffe, too, is beginning its
transfers to the rear. I believe, therefore, that the English will in
only a few weeks have lost all their short-lived gratification at having
been able to bomb some German cities without tenfold retaliation. Not
to mention the fact that a new bomber type is now being produced in
increasingly large series which in carrying capacity, range, and
speed undoubtedly surpasses anything that the English have hereto-
fore even thought possible. Moreover, newly formed armored divi-
sions are also now on their way from the Eeich itself to France and
Norway.
So if the English should try to land anywhere in western Europe,
it would lead to a catastrophe corresponding to the scale of the
experiment.
For the troops that are now in the west and are actually drilling
for such a contingency anyhow, day and night, it would probably even
mean a certain relief. For we have many regiments there which as
yet have had little such opportunity to distinguish themselves as is
now afforded in the east.
I do not then know, Duce, whether the English, in view of their
admittedly unpredictable military leadership, will try something like
that, but I have in any case carefully made all preparations for it.
e) An attack in the Mediterranean, against the coasts of southern
Italy or Sardinia, or against Libya and Cyrenaica.
I do not believe that they would ever attempt anything more than
a demonstration against Sardinia or Sicily, for even in case of initial
success that, too, would lead to a continual destruction of their ship-
ping tonnage, which in a short time would inevitably result not only
in the defeat of such an operation but in the loss of the last margin
which they still have in their tonnage.
If we assume, however, that they intend to achieve a certain ob-
jective with limited forces, then — like the Channel Islands, where
we are prepared for it — Pantelleria in the Mediterranean would be
714 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
involved. This is a possibility that must always be kept in mind,
just like an attack on Corsica or Sardinia.
In these considerations there remains, Duce, the final but likeliest
possibility that they might once more — in order to forestall our at-
tacks — try to advance against Libya, that is, frontally against the for-
ward line at Solium, supported by a flanking thrust from Tobruk. Al-
though your forces, Duce, and also those of the German Africa Corps
have been substantially strengthened recently, I am personally still
of the opinion that more must be done in order to make it plain that
any increase in this threat would have no prospect of success.
The way to achieve this, in my opinion, is twofold :
1) The maxiirwm, safeguarding of our own supply lines.
2) The possible disruption of our enemy's supply lines.
With regard to the first point, Duce, I believe it is advisable to re-
examine from time to time whether everything has been done and what
can still be done to safeguard our own shipments.
On my own initiative I have ordered the X Air Corps to provide
increased convoy protection for all sea shipments from Italy and
Greece, especially to Bengazi-Derna and possibly Bardia, even if
other tasks have to be deferred. The combating of submarines off
Bengazi and Derna is now also to be a prime task of the Corps.*
Since in addition to these safeguards it is also necessary, however, to
protect the Aegean against penetration by the English with its re-
sultant serious disruptions of our vital supply lines in those waters,
it is unfortunately not possible to employ elements of the X Air Corps
constantly for convoy protection along the sea route between southern
Italy and Tripoli via Sicily.
I have, however, ordered that the X Air Corps be made available
from time to time as additional convoy protection for particularly val-
uable shipments by this route as well.
I realize, however, that the main task here can be carried out only
by the Italian Air Force itself and that it is especially important
to prevent any large-scale revival of the English air unit on Malta.
I therefore consider the neutralization of Malta and the safeguarding
of air supremacy and of the sea route two equally important tasks war-
ranting the heaviest commitment of the Italian Air Force.
If it should be possible to speed up and intensify still further the
work for better utilization of the ports of Bengazi and Derna, that
would be very desirable in the interest of shortening the land route
and consequently of saving fuel. It would also be very advantageous
to use field railways, which can be built easily and quickly, for mov-
4 OKW directive, WPSt/Abt. L (I Op) No. 441794/41 g. K Chefs of Oct. 20
{8589/603073-75).
OCTOBER 1941 715
ing the supplies from there closer to the front. I have already heard
of a wish to that effect. I should be highly gratified if it were carried
out, and I will do everything possible, Duce, to make material for that
purpose available to you.
If there should be a shortage of labor for this or similar tasks,
Duce, I could readily supply you with workers from the large num-
bers of Russians now held as prisoners.
In this connection I should like to point out in the interest of a
smoothly functioning supply line to Greece and also to Crete that
it would be especially desirable if the rebuilding of the Bralo bridge
near Lamia, which by agreement is to be done by the Italian Armed
Forces, could be carried out as quickly as possible.
With regard to point 2, that is, the disruption of the enemy supply
lines, I have ordered a quick transfer of submarines and E-boats to
support you in the battle against English shipping and also the com-
mitment of a flotilla of minesweepers. 6
In addition, however, I am willing, if it is agreeable to you, Duce,
to transfer additional forces from the Luftwaffe, especially long-range
night fighters, to Sicily or Sardinia in order to relieve your southern
Italian port cities by eliminating Malta as completely as possible and
to help safeguard our convoys. So if it is agreeable to you, Duce,
the Reichsmarschall will get in touch with your competent authorities
about the matter. 8
Irrespective of that, however, the German Africa Corps will, as
soon as the transportation situation permits, receive extremely effec-
tive and long-range antitank guns, some mounted on armored self-
propelled carriages but some also for stationary mounting. I hope
that it will then be possible to supply the entire front with so many
effective 5 cm. antitank guns and even heavier ones that future attacks
by the English will fail from the outset, with severe losses of material.
I am also anxious — as soon as transportation permits — to send to the
German Africa Corps a larger reserve of tanks III and IV. Finally,
special weapons are to be delivered for the attack on Tobruk. But, to
repeat what I said before, it seems to me most important of all, by a
strong concentration of your own air force, Duce, and the support of
the German as well, not only to ensure absolute air supremacy in Sicily
and in southern Italy in general but also to guarantee protection for
our own transports and to repel attempted enemy attacks or break-
throughs. A systematic collaboration with submarines for starving
Malta should also be inaugurated.
'OKW directive, WFSt./Abt. L. (I Op) No.441794/41 g. K. Chefs of Oct 29
(8589/603073/75).
* See, further, document No. 535. See also Enno von Rlntelen, Mussolini als
Bundesgenosse, pp. 155-156.
716 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
I shall send you, Duce, separate proposals relating thereto for your
examination. 7
In this connection I should like to express to you my most heartfelt
congratulations, Duce, on the great success of your fliers and special
lighters against the English Navy. 8
I was really sad because the battleship Nelson in particular was not
sunk recently. Soldier's bad luck ! But in any case the ship will
undoubtedly be out of commission for many months and those de-
stroyed will remain so forever !
When in all soberness I consider the recent successes, Duce, and
weigh the strength of the two sides, taking into account all economic
difficulties, I am only strengthened more than ever in my unshaken
conviction that this war is won.
I do not know what the English intend to do, but in keeping with
tradition it will in any case he something crazy.
Whatever they may attempt, however, one thing is certain :
They no longer have any continental world power in Europe on
which they can lean for support in the future !
With the collapse of their last continental support, Russia, the
defense of Europe and North Africa is already ensured in any circum-
stances by our joint strength.
And if you should ever get into difficulties, Duce, I will help in so
far as it is humanly possible. 8
I know nothing but joint victory.
Regardless of what England or even America may do, our economic
position in particular cannot get any worse but must rather get bet-
ter after a certain time has elapsed. And militarily no one can
break us.
Permit me, Duce, in concluding this letter to express to you once
more my special thanks for the cordial telegram you sent me after
your departure. 10
With comradely affection and faithfulness,
Ever yours, Adolf Hitler
7 These proposals have not been found in the files of the German Foreign
Ministry.
8 This is apparently a reference to the encounter of British and Italian forces
in the western Mediterranean, Sept. 27-28, 1941. Of. Raymond de Belot, The
Struggle for the Mediterranean, 19S9-45 (Princeton, 1951), pp. 137-138.
'Ciano commented on Hitler's letter in his diary in the entry for Nov. 1, 1041.
"Not found.
OCTOBER 1941 717
No. 434
62/60798-800
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most tjegekt Tokyo, October 31, 1941 — 11 : 10 a.m., summer time.
secret Received November 1 — 1 : 20 p.m.
No. 2301 of October 31
With, reference to my telegram No. 2263 of October 28. 1
In further conversation with Foreign Minister Togo I asked him
whether the Japanese Government had in the meantime made up its
mind to send an intensified warning to the United States. The Foreign
Minister told me that no decision had as yet been taken. The Gov-
ernment was still examining the situation, carefully in order to deter-
mine what policy should now be followed. In this connection the
Japanese Government was particularly interested in knowing how
the German Government visualized the further conduct of the war.
The question whether Germany would turn to the Middle East after
capturing Moscow was of great importance. Was a thrust to be ex-
pected there, especially against the Suez, the Arabic stronghold of
England, and against Iran, and what, in the opinion of the Germans,
would the future attitude of Turkey be?
I replied to the Foreign Minister that these were mainly military
questions, concerning which I had no instructions. As I had already
told his predecessor in August, the German Government believed that
it would crush the main force of the Soviet Union before the end of
the year. Any Russian forces that might still turn up would be dealt
with definitively in the spring by small units of the German Army
that we would leave in the east. After the autumn campaign Ger-
many would release a large part of her army for aircraft and sub-
marine construction, etc., and turn with her total national strength
against her last enemy, England (cf. telegraphic report No. — (num-
ber garbled) 83 of August 25 ). 2 The Wehrmacht's successes in the
east thus far had only confirmed this view of the German Government.
Where and when the attack against the vital points of the British
Empire would be made, I could not say. I believed, however, that we
would choose the time and place for it with the customary care. To
'In this telegram (82/60796-97) Ott had reported about his first conversa-
tion with the new Foreign Minister Togo who told him that the new Government
had not yet taken a decision regarding the policy to be pursued. Togo was
furthermore unable to answer Ott's question whether the statement planned
to be addressed to the United States (see document No. 359) had actually been
delivered.
' This obviously refers to Ribbentrop's telegram No. 1383 printed as document
No. 239.
718 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Togo's question whether in our opinion England could be checkmated
by an air and sea blockade, I replied that undoubtedly the tonnage
problem had already become very difficult for England and would
become far worse still as soon as we had our rear free with respect to
Russia. The possible effect of military events in other parts of the
British Empire had to be taken into account, too, and no doubt it was
also of great importance whether England's position in the Far East
were shaken. Togo took note of my remark with a gesture of interest
but without making any comment. I have the impression that the
Japanese Government is still uncertain about what policy to adopt
and advocate before the Diet on November 15. The Army, which
bears primary responsibility, has not yet been able to make up its
mind to sweep aside the groups opposing a firm policy. For the Prime
Minister, who has the reputation of being a dynamic soldier, there is
the danger that he will lose himself in the petty details of his duties as
Prime Minister, War Minister, and Minister of Interior. Ikeda's 3
appointment to the Privy Council (cf. telegraphic report No. 2281 of
October 30) * and rumors that the Keeper of the Great Seal, Kido,
is trying to bring about the appointment of Hiranuma as Elder States-
man \G&nro\ show that the opposing side is active and intends to
exploit to the full the silencing of the opposition (group garbled)
emanating from the Army. Whether Tojo will overcome the difficul-
ties cannot at present be foreseen. In view of this situation the can-
cellation of the trip of the Asama Maru to England springs from great
caution rather than any decision already taken.
Ott
' Seihin Ikeda, managing director of the Miteui Bank, former Minister of
Finance.
* Not found.
No. 435
27S/178974-TB
Memorandum by the State Secretary
secret Bebun, October 31, 1941.
St.S. 725
I told the Bulgarian Minister the following during his visit today :
The reports which we had received concerning the conduct of the
Bulgarian authorities in suppressing disturbances in Thrace which
was under Bulgarian occupation were of such a nature that the Foreign
Ministry had considered instructing the Minister in Sofia to speak with
the Bulgarian Government. We had refrained from such an instruc-
tion, however, in order not to offend Bulgarian sensibilities. Never-
theless I believed that I owed it to M. Draganov as the Bulgarian
OCTOBER 1941 719
Minister here to keep him informed. From Bulgarian reports, too,
it was evident that there were thousands of victims among the Greeks.
The areas involved were of military and economic importance to us
too.
I did not enter more deeply into the discussion, but in conclusion
merely told M. Draganov that I left it to him whether and what kind
of use he wanted to make of my information.
Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.
Weizsacker
As I see from the Brawns Blatter? Minister Draganov added to his
report on this matter a closing sentence which reads as follows : "He
(Weizsacker) pointed out that in spite of the Greek atrocities toward
German soldiers there was still sympathy in German circles for
Greece, influenced by the memory of Hellas and the opinion of the
Fiihrer."
This paragraph is a pure invention by Draganov.
Weizsacker
1 The so-called "Braune Blatter or "Der Braune Freund" were excerpts from
Intercepted foreign radio messages which had been decoded In the Reich Air
Ministry and were then written down on brown paper. They were made avail-
able only to a small number of high officials.
No. 436
260/170284-90
Memorandum by the Head of Division WIV in the Economic Policy
Department
top secret Stockholm, October 31, 1941.
President Ryti received me the day after my arrival for a talk last-
ing an hour. On the day before my departure, President Ryti had
invited me for luncheon, with Mme. Ryti the only other person pres-
ent, after which we talked for several hours.
Apart from major specific issues, such as the Petsamo nickel con-
cession, 1 grain supply for Finland, 2 the fate of Finnish vessels in over-
seas countries, 3 the following points of the conversation should be
recorded :
/. Finland's territorial war aims
Talking first about the Petsamo question, Ryti spoke of the Kola
Peninsula and mentioned its still untapped mineral resources as a
further opportunity for large-scale German-Finnish collaboration.
1 Document No. 429.
1 Document No. 423.
* Sea Document No. 448.
720 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
When I remarked that to my knowledge Finland had shown no interest
in the Kola Peninsula before (there was no mention of the Kola Penin-
sula in the materials presented by the Finnish Minister in Berlin last
June) ? * Ryti replied that as a result of studies of a military and ethno-
graphical nature since then, the Kola Peninsula should now be added
to Karelia and should be included among the Finnish territorial de-
mands." The coast of the Kola Peninsula was settled by Finns, and
while Russians have settled in the interior of the country, these Rus-
sians are for the most part deportees and prisoners. Ryti then spoke
of Finland's other plans of territorial expansion : East Karelia, with an
eastern boundary following the coast of the White Sea to Onega Bay ;
as possibly its easternmost point he indicated on the mapof the city of
Onega, where the Onega River flows into Onega Bay. From there he
indicated a general line to the southern shore of Lake Onega, then
following the Svir River to the southern shore of Lake Ladoga, and
thence along the Neva, River to its mouth in the Gulf of Finland.
Finland had no use for Leningrad. He followed this up with
the view, often heard also from other Finnish personalities, that Lenin-
grad as an industrial and metropolitan center had to be eliminated
and could be allowed to exist only as a German trading and transit
point in the future. The territory east of such a Finnish boundary
line, i.e., the Government of Arkhangelsk, he recommended to Germany
as a forest colonial area. The Government of Arkhangelsk has a popu-
lation of only about 3 million, composed for the most part of three
tribes, the Mordvinians, the Cheremissians, and the Syryenians.
These peoples belonged to the Finno-Ugric group, were very primitive,
but suited for colonial labor in the vast forest ranges of Arkhangelsk.
His advice would be that sometime in the future all members of these
tribes should be screened out from the Russian war prisoners and sent
home after these territories had been captured. These people were not
Slavs, and they were barely touched by Bolshevik ideas.
The fact to be noted about Ryti's remarks was that he spoke about
these^ Finnish war aims with great assurance, although domestic
Finnish opinion is still rather undecided in view of the cautious at-
titude of the Finnish Social Democrats under the leadership of
Minister Tanner,
II, The Finnish winter campaign
Ryti spoke of the need to reduce the Finnish combat force from
350,000 to 150,000 for the winter campaign. Additional manpower
had to be allocated to the Finnish economy, or Finland would be unable
to sustain the burden of a prolonged war. The reduced Finnish Army
would be well equipped and mobile, and better adapted to execute the
plan of rolling up the Red front from south to north than a larger
force less well equipped. It would be a great gain if Soroka, situated
on the Murmansk railroad, were to be reached by this northward
thrust because it was there that the onlv other railroad coming from
the east, which branched off from the Arkhangelsk-Moscow line, made
a junction with the Murmansk railroad ; in this way the supply of the
* No record of these materials has been found in the files of the German For-
eign Ministry. See, however, Wuorinen, Finland and World War II, 19S&-19U,
pp. 99-100.
5 See document No. 301.
OCTOBER 1841 721
Soviet forces fighting in the north would be impossible. The junction
of German and Finnish forces fighting their way from the west east-
ward would bring the campaign in the north to its conclusion.
///. Attitude toward England
Although Ryti, when he was president of the Bank of Finland, un-
doubtedly had many personal and business connections with England,
his remarks once more conveyed the impression that, in contrast to
other Finns, he had broken his inner ties to England. This time,
England would be unable to emerge from the war as a world power.
England's position within the British Empire rested on belief in her
power and wealth. The wealth was gone, and industry and finance
would never again be able to regain their former dominant positions.
After the war, England would at best lead an existence comparable to
that of Spain or of defeated France. The longer the war continued,
the more complete would be the destruction of England's world domi-
nating power and position. Only America would in any event be the
gainer and the heir of England. Churchill he described as "mad"; s
he had blinded himself to this fatal outcome of the war and had be-
come a prisoner of the war psychosis created by himself. Eyti de-
scribed the Communist propaganda in England and America as very
successful and alarming.
IV. Attitude toward the Fuhrer's European plans
He had only now arrived at a full understanding of the sound logic
of the Fiihrer's European plans. Russia had to be destroyed so that
Europe could live. Germany would have to bring large territories
in the east under her rule in order to prevent any resurgence of a Slavic
and Asiatic threat to Europe. Only in that way could Europe, under
German predominance, maintain itself against the other continents.
England had made the great mistake in opposing Germany in the
east. There had always been some influential persons in England who
wanted to give Germany a free hand in the east, but they could not
prevail against England s old traditional continental policy.
V. Attitude toward Sweden
Ryti gave me a detailed account of the recent visit to Finland by
the Swedish labor union leaders and the talk he had with them. At
their arrival, the Swedish union leaders — he named Lindberg and Kas-
parsson — 'had shown a complete lack of understanding for Finland's
situation. They had urged an accommodation with the Soviet Union,
suggesting that for Finland too there were other threats besides Soviet
Russia. The Swedes had then continued to Soviet Karelia, where
they were able to make a firsthand study of Soviet methods. They
had returned to Sweden quite converted and, after the object lesson
received in Finland, had put aside any thought of a possible accom-
modation with Soviet Russia. Of Sweden, Ryti spoke in a critical
and disparaging tone, especially as regards the determination to fight
for the country's defense proclaimed by the Swedes on every occasion.
He criticized the Swedish Army and rated its combat effectiveness far
below that of the Finnish Army.
According to my other impressions, Ryti's remarks about Sweden do
not altogether coincide with Finland's general attitude toward Sweden.
' In English in the original.
682-903—64 51
722 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Notwithstanding all disapproval and irritation, Finnish resentment
against Sweden does not go so deep as to threaten the basic relation-
ship between the two countries. Personal ties ( Field Marshal Manner-
heim) and historical tradition still carry too much weight for that.
ScHNTJRRE
No. 437
205/148073-74
The Foreign Minister to the Reich Commissar for Occupied Norway
Telegram
Special Train, November 1, 1941 — 12 : 15 a. m.
No. 1186 of October 31 from the Special Train
Received Berlin, November 1 — 12 : 50 a. m.
No. 189 from the Foreign Ministry Sent November 1.
Dear Party Comrade Terboven : In reply to your teletype message
of October 22 about arrangements for Nordic congresses in Sweden, 1
I wish to say that I agree with your view that the Reich would be op-
posed on general political grounds to efforts by the Swedes to promote
such congresses. I also agree with you that in view of the hostile at-
titude of the Swedish public toward our administration in Norway, 2
Norwegian participation in such congresses is out of the question.
It could be useful only if in such a case there were some prospect of
sending a Norwegian personality to Sweden who is prepared to
endorse our policy in Norway unequivocally also in Stockholm.
As for Finland's and Denmark's participation in so-called Nordic
congresses in Sweden, we cannot in general follow the same line in
those countries as that which seems to be called for in Oslo. In par-
ticular, a distinction must be made between political congresses and
congresses of a purely scientific or cultural nature. 8 In the case of
political congresses we have already interposed obstacles, e.g., by
refusing exit permits for Denmark. In the case of nonpolitical con-
gresses, on the other hand, consideration should be given to the feel-
ing of independence, especially Finland's, so that only the circum-
*In this telegram (205/143044-45) Terboven informed Ribbentrop that in
recent times there had been an increase in Swedish efforts to invite Finns, Danes,
and Norwegians to congresses in all sorts of fields in order to evoke the im-
pression abroad of Sweden as the leading power of the north. Terboven urged
that Germany should oppose such efforts, particularly in view of the insolent at-
titude of the Swedish press and public opinion toward developments in Norway,
* See document No. 364 and footnotes 3 and 4.
'A memorandum by Grundherr of Oct. 27 (205/143057-59) developed the dis-
tinction in Germany's policy toward political and nonpolitical congresses.
Grundherr had at hand the telegram of the Legation at Stockholm, No. 1789
of Oct. 26 (205/143055-56) which indicated no increase in Nordic congresses in
Sweden.
NOVEMBER 1941 723
stances in each individual case can determine whether or not inter-
vention by Germany appears advisable and necessary.
Heil Hitler !
RlBBENTROF
No. 438
613/248416-17
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Slovakia
Telegram
MOST URGENT
top secret Special Train, November 1, 1941—2 : 10 a. m
No. 1188 of October 31
from the Special Train Received November 1—2 : 40 a. m
No. 1204 of November 1
from the Foreign Ministry Sent November 1.
For the Minister.
With reference to your telegram No. 1191 of October 27.*
In reply to the Slovak Government's inquiry regarding Tuka's in-
vitation to Rumania, please inform M. Tuka personally that you had
inquired in Berlin about the thinking there concerning such a trip by
the Slovak Minister President. As you had heard, they were of the
opinion in Berlin that in judging this question account had to be taken
of the circumstance that just recently there had been repeated rumors
of Rumanian efforts toward a closer tie between Rumania, Croatia,
and Slovakia. As a result of these rumors a certain concern had
arisen in Hungary. A Slovak visit to Rumania at the present mo-
ment would naturally provide new support to these rumors and pos-
sibly impose again an unnecessary burden on Hungarian-Slovak rela-
tions. You believed that for similar reasons the Croatian Foreign
Minister Lorkovic" had also replied to an invitation to Rumania a
short time ago with the request that such a visit be postponed to a later
time. In these circumstances you suggested to the Minister President
that for his part, too, he find a friendly pretext for postponing the
journey and to inform the Rumanians accordingly.
Finally I request you to ask M. Tuka to consider your communica-
tion as meant purely for him personally, and not to use it in any way
toward the outside.
Wire your report. 2
Ribbbntrop
1 This telegram (610/248702) forwarded an Inquiry from the Slovak Govern-
ment as to the attitude of Germany toward acceptance by Slovakia of an Invita-
tion suggested by Antonescu.
! In telegram No, 1239 of Nov. 6 (618/249422-23) Minister Ludin reported that
Tuka had heeded the German objections and would not travel to Rumania.
724 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOKEIGN POLICY
No. 439
1857/422271-72
Circular of tlie Foreign Minister 1
Telegram
most urgent Special Train, November 1, 1941—1 p. m.
No. 1190 of October 31 from the Special Train
Received Berlin, November 1 — 1:20 p. m.
Multex No. 887 of November 1
from the Foreign Ministry Sent November 1.
RAM457/R
Immediately upon receipt of this telegram please notify the Govern-
ment there by note verbale of the following communication of the
Eeich Government :
"The President of the United States, in a speech on October 28
[#7] a made the following assertions:
(1) The United States Government was in possession of a secret
map drawn up in Germany by the Reich Government. This was
a map of Central and South America as the Ftihrer wanted to
recognize it by forming out of the fourteen countries in this region
five subject states and thereby bringing the entire South American
continent under his rule. One of these five states allegedly included
the Republic of Panama and the Panama Canal,
(2) The United States Government was in possession of a second
document prepared by the Reich Government. This document out-
lined the plan to abolish all religions existing in the world, after
Germany had won the war. The Catholic, Protestant, Mohammedan,
Hindu, Buddhist and Jewish religions were to be abolished in the
same fashion. Church property was to be confiscated, the Cross and
all other religious symbols forbidden, and the clergy silenced under
penalty of the concentration camps. In the place of the churches an
international National Socialist church was to be established, served
by speakers sent out by the National Socialist Reich Government. In
the place of the Bible, words taken from the Fiihrer's Mein Kampf
would be imposed and enforced as Holy Writ, the Cross of Christ
replaced by the Swastika and the naked sword ; finally, the Fiihrer
was to take the place of God,
With regard to this the Reich Government states the following:
(1) There does not exist in Germany any map drawn up by the
Reich Government regarding a partition of Central and South
America, nor any document prepared by the Reich Government con-
cerning abolition of religions in the world. In both instances there-
fore forgeries of the crudest and most brazen kind must be involved.
1 Sent to all Missions with the exception of the Embassy in the United States.
"The reference is to President Roosevelt's Navy Day address of Oct. 27.
Tor text see Rosenman, The Publio Pavers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roose-
velt, vol. s, pp. 43fr-444.
NOVEMBER 1941 725
(2) The allegations as to a German conquest of South America
and to an abolition of religions and churches in the world and their
replacement by a National Socialist church are so ludicrous and
absurd that the Eeich Government sees no need for discussing them." B
End of the communication.
Please report by telegram on how your demarche was received and
confirm receipt.
RlBBENTHOr-
* An undated memorandum by Welzsiicker (1857/422377-79) sent to the Special
Train had reported the result of investigations according to which no official
German quarters had published a map such as had been mentioned by President
Roosevelt. A memorandum by Luther of Oct. 31 <5109/E295398-40O) recorded
negative findings on the basis of inquiries with the Institute of Geopolitics and
other similar institutions. Luther's memorandum also dealt with the alleged
abolition of religions mentioned in the Roosevelt address, stating that "all
points in this speech concerning the religious question were taken from the
program of the alleged National Reich Church of Germany." Material on this
subject which was apparently attached to this memorandum has not been found.
No. 440
1517/372914-16
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy
Department 1
Berlin, November 1, 1941.
During my last stay in Rome from October 19 to 24 I had detailed
conversations with the Italian Government about the division of the
grain surpluses from the southeast between Germany and Italy." The
Italians wanted above all a promise from Germany to let them have
two-thirds of the Rumanian surplus. Pursuant to instructions given
me at the time by the Foreign Ministry, 3 1 refused this and on October
24 came to an understanding with Minister Riccardi that on his im-
pending visit to Bucharest he would, to begin with, conclude a firm
agreement for 50,000 tons of wheat for Italy. The remaining division
between Germany and Italy could be agreed upon only after the de-
finitive figures for the Rumanian exports were known.
Today Minister Riccardi called me from Bucharest and informed
me that, in view of the Italian food situation and the fact that the
exchanges for the payment of the wheat would also have to be agreed
on at once, he would have to conclude an agreement for at least 100,000
tons, for which he requested Germany's consent.
'Typed marginal notes: "[To] the Foreign Minister's Secretariat. Please
transmit by teletype to the Special Train for the Foreign Minister."
* See document No. 420 and footnote 3, and document No. 421, footnote 8.
" These instructions have not been found.
726 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
These are the reasons against granting the Italian request :
1. The Italian food situation is still being studied here in Berlin
with Italian experts;
2. Ambassador Giannini is coming here on Monday, November 3,
for further discussions;
3. The waiver of such large deliveries from Rumania in favor of
Italy is of such grave significance for the German food situation that
Minister Riccardi cannot expect that a decision will be made in a few
hours in response to a telephone call.
After reporting to the State Secretary I therefore informed Minister
Riccardi that unfortunately we could not at the present time take
any other position than that of which I notified him in Rome, namely,
that he could conclude an agreement for 50,000 tons. It was abso-
lutely necessary to wait for the definitive figures before dividing
the Rumanian surpluses. Minister Riccardi then made the further
proposal on the telephone that he would try to get the total Rumanian
exports increased from 150,000 tons to 250,000 tons. In the event
that he succeeded he requested consent to his contracting for 100,000
tons. Since we had counted on far greater surpluses from Rumania
than merely 200,000 tons, I informed him in a third telephone con-
versation that for the present at least we could not agree to this
proposal either.
Signor Riccardi was highly displeased at my message and did not
think he would contract for anything at all in these circumstances,
because 50,000 tons was too small a quantity for Italy in her present
need.
Clodius
No. 441
1857/422286
Circular of the Foreign Minister 1
Telegram
MOST UHGENT
No. 1196 of November 2 Special Train, November 2, 1941 — 2 a. m.
from the Special Train
Received Berlin, November 2 — 2:30 a. m.
Multex No. 892 from the Foreign Ministry Sent November 2.
Roosevelt's speech 2 induced us to issue two official statements which
will appear in the Sunday 3 morning newspapers. The first of these
statements, dealing with the two alleged documents, has already been
1 Sent to all Missions.
" See document No. 439, footnote 2.
' Nov. 2.
NOVEMBER 1941 727
communicated to the Missions so that they may notify the respective
Governments.* There will be no notification or other official steps in
connection with the second statement which refutes the charge that
Germany was the aggressor and clearly sets forth that the United
States was the first to open fire and attack Germany." I request, how-
ever, that this statement, too, be used generally as the basis for the
guidance of your conversations. Even if we should take no further
steps as a result of the actions of the United States, it is of course
particularly important that our position in the question of the ag-
gressor be clearly stated.
Addendum for Tokyo only :
Please do not undertake any official step with the Japanese Gov-
ernment either, but make sure in any manner which seems appro-
priate to you that the Japanese Government pays proper attention
to our statement.
Addendum for Washington only :
The foregoing circular instruction which went to all Missions is
sent to the Embassy in Washington for information.
ElBBENTROP
'Document No. 439.
'This statement (1857/422883-84) dealt with the charges made In President
Roosevelt's address with regard to the incidents involving the destroyers Greer
and Kearny. See documents Nos. 282 and 407, respectively.
No. 442
2281/482610-811
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy
Telegram
most urgent Berlin [November 2, 1941.] 1
No. 2959 of November 2 Keceived November 3—2 : 30 a. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 2748 of October 30. 2
Please communicate to Count Ciano on the question of the Anti-
Comintern Pact also the following :
In connection with the extension of the Pact among the six Powers
which heretofore have been joined in it, the question presents itself
in our opinion as to whether on this occasion it would not be well to
call upon other Powers, which so far have not been members of it, to
join. This would mean primarily Rumania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and
Croatia, which have joined the Tripartite Pact but not the Anti-Com-
1 The document printed here is from the Rome Embassy file and no date or time
of dispatch appears on this copy.
' In this telegram (2281/482606) Bismarck reported that according to reports
in the Italian Foreign Ministry, the Japansese Ambassadors in Rome and Berlin
had received instructions, prior to the Japanese cabinet crisis, to propose the
extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact. The new Japanese Foreign Minister had
not as yet expressed his views on the matter.
728 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
intern Pact. We also feel, in view of the present international situa-
tion, that it might be appropriate to consider the adherence of Finland
and Denmark. In our view it would constitute a political anomaly,
in the event the Atiti- Comintern Pact were now extended, if countries
that are active in the struggle against Bolshevism or at least are
politically on our side would not be afforded the opportunity to join.
It would fit in with the meaning and purpose of the Anti-Comintern
Pact and the present-day situation, and would also have a useful
political effect if all Powers concerned would now clearly attest their
solidarity in the fight against the Communist International.
In the event that the Italian Government and also the Japanese
Government, which we are approaching with this proposal at the same
time, concur in our views, the Reich Government would, for its part,
undertake to approach the governments concerned to sound them out
in a confidential manner at first as to whether they may be ready to
join. If these inquiries lead to a positive result, it would be in order
to have the diplomatic representatives of Germany, Italy, and Japan
make a joint demarche, formally inviting the governments mentioned
to join.
The accession of these Powers would have to be executed by a special
protocol which would be signed in Berlin simultaneously with the
protocol extending the Pact. The protocol of accession should be
formulated in the same manner as the protocols on the previous
accessions.
"We feel that the protocol on the extension of the Pact and also the
protocol covering the new accessions should be signed no later than
November 25, 1941, the date on which the first 5-year term expires.
It is therefore necessary that the diplomatic actions and technical
preparations required for this purpose be undertaken with the greatest
despatch.
RlBBENTEOP
No. 443
2281/482614-16
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy
Telegram
most uegent Berlist [November 3, 1941.] 1
No. 2966 of November 3 Received November 3 — 12 : 00 midnight.
With reference to our telegram No. 295 9. 2
The German Embassy in Tokyo advises under date of November 1 s
that the Japanese Cabinet has agreed to the proposal for extending
1 The document printed here is from the Rome Embassy file and no date or time
of dispatch appears on this copy.
2 Document No. 442.
■ No record of this report has been found.
NOVEMBER 1941 729
the Anti-Comintern Pact. Inasmuch as the Italian Government, too,
has already given its assent,* it would now be in order to undertake
the projected joint demarches on the part of the German, Italian, and
Japanese representatives in Budapest, HsinMng, and Madrid.
The most suitable form in which to do this, in my opinion, would be
as follows :
The three Ambassadors, or Ministers, as the case may be, after con-
sulting together would communicate orally to the Hungarian, Man-
chukuo, and Spanish Governments the decision of the German, Italian,
and Japanese Governments to extend the Anti-Comintern Pact. They
would invite the three governments which have adhered to the Pact to
join in this document of extension and would ask for speedy infor-
mation as to acceptance of this invitation. At the same time they
would indicate that the date and form of the instruments for extend-
ing the Pact would be the subject of a later communication.
In the event the Italian Government and the Japanese Government,
which I am contacting about this at the same time, agree to this proce-
dure, they should see to it that their diplomatic representatives in
Budapest, Hsinking, and Madrid are issued instructions immediately
and have them consult with the diplomatic representatives of Ger-
many and Japan in the respective countries.
As regards the notification of date and form of the instruments
of extension, to be left until later at the time of making the joint
demarche, I should like to propose for the sake of simplicity and dis-
patch that this subsequent communication, being chiefly technical
in nature, be made exclusively by the diplomatic representatives of
Germany. This would be done as soon as Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo
were agreed on the wording of the protocol of extension and on the
date and place of its signature.
I should like to add that we have already transmitted to the Japa-
nese Government a draft of the protocol on extending the Pact, as re-
quested. 5 As soon as we have learned the views of the Japanese
Government on the wording of the protocol, which essentially is for-
mal in content, we shall immediately inform the Italian Government.
Please inform the Italian Government of this and point out that in
the interest of conserving time, we cleared the text with the Japanese
Government first, because in such formal matters this is known to be
particularly complicated.*
Please wire as soon as possible your reply as regards the above pro-
posals and also as regards the proposal transmitted to you by previous
* See document No. 405 and footnote 3.
6 No record of this exchange has been found.
' In telegram No. 2872 of Nov. 4 (2281/482623-26) Ribbentrop transmitted the
draft of the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact, and indicated that it could
be handed to the Italian Government.
730 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
telegram on the invitation to be extended to other states to join the
Pact. T
RlBBENTROP
* In telegram No. 2813 of Nov. 6 (2281/482630-31) Mackensen reported that
the Italian Government agreed to the draft of the Pact and to the procedural
details suggested by Berlin.
No. 444
1 BIT/372928
Memorandum ~by the Director of the Department for German
Internal Affairs
U. St.S. D. No, 4996 Berlin, November 3, 1941.
Last Saturday I discussed with Brigadefiihrer Mttller the matter
of the Italian workers' not being sent in the future to labor training
camps but rather deported to Italy x with a pertinent case record,
which will be delivered to the Italian police liaison chief at the Ital-
ian Embassy in Berlin. By agreement with the Italians, punishment
will be imposed in Italy itself and Germany will be notified simul-
taneously. Brigadefiihrer MiUler has issued the order that all Ital-
ians in labor training camps are to be released from them not later
than Tuesday, November 4, 1941. He estimates that there are about
120 of them in all and believes that the great majority of those re-
leased will voluntarily go back to work in Germany. The rest will
be deported. 2
Luther
1 See document No. 409 and footnote 8.
"In telegram No. 2855 of Nov. 10 (1517/372943-44) Mackensen reported from
Rome that there was no possibility of recruiting in Italy the 30,000 workers
suitable for the German metal industry which were desired. Baron Tucci,
Director of the Italian Commission for Internal Migration and Colonization,
stated that the unemployed workers still left 1n Italy were unsuitable for em-
ployment in Germany. In the interest of precluding further embarrassing po-
litical occurrences, the Commission felt that it should not send to Germany any
of the remaining, unsuited workers.
No. 445
405/213982-35
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Paris, November 4, 1941 — 1 : 30 a. m.
top secret Received November 4 — 3 : 30 a. m.
No. 3431 of November 3
(1) To the Foreign Ministry.
(2) To Aimistice Commission, Wiesbaden, for Minister v. Welck.
NOVEMBER 1941 731
State Secretary Benoist-Mechin, who returned yesterday from
Vichy, and Ambassador de Brinon, who returned this evening, give
the following picture of the present situation regarding the Wey-
gand 1 question :
The Ministerial Council of October 24, at the start of which Mar-
shal Petain announced his decision to apply to the Fiihrer in a radio
appeal and subsequently present himself to the German occupying
power at the demarcation line as a hostage, 2 had as the main point in
its agenda the dismissal of Weygand. It is therefore probable that
Petain's advisers, who were in favor of this radio appeal, were, at the
same time, the passionate advocates of Weygand's continued presence
in North Africa, wanted to prevent this item from being dealt with in
the Ministerial Council, and wanted to create a crisis favorable to their
intentions. The opponents of a dismissal of Weygand point out that
this involves a selfish attack by the Navy in its power struggle against
the Army and an action directed by Darlan's personal hatred of Wey-
gand. Behind Darlan were the Germans, who wanted to gain a mili-
tary foothold in North Africa and to whom Weygand was an unwel-
come obstacle. Against a dismissal of Weygand the argument is also
used that such a step would impel the United States to take a firmer
stand toward Prance. They go as far as to assert that Leahy had
announced the rupture of diplomatic relations in this case. However,
the American Ambassador allegedly only characterized the possible
dismissal of Weygand as a severe strain on America's relations with
France. 3 Although Darlan threatened to resign, Petain had adopted
the arguments of his opponents, and only at the end of last week was it
possible to convince him of the necessity of dismissing Weygand. In a
conversation of several hours with Benoist-Mechin on November 1,
Petain had said he was willing to recall Weygand. Since public opin-
ion under the influence of Anglo-Saxon propaganda would interpret
this measure as a retreat in the face of German pressure, however,
Petain at the same time asked for opportunities to compensate for the
impending loss of prestige. Closest to his heart was the possibility
of a trip to the occupied area and the opportunity to meet with a
leading German personage such as Reichsmarschall Goring.* To the
Army he could justify Weygand's dismissal most effectively if the
military reinforcements for North and West Africa and the transfer
of the Syrian Army requested in Wiesbaden" were approved. In
1 See document No. 415.
* See document No. 422.
3 For treaty's reports on this matter see Foreign Relations of the United
States, 19^1, vol. ir, pp. 45&-4B6.
* See document No. 481.
'Negotiations concerning these requests were being conducted since June.
See document No. 162 and La Delegation franQaise aupris de la Commission
allemande d' Armistice, vol, v, pp. 5-12, 53-56.
732 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
North Africa itself Weygand's dismissal would be made easier if the
native prisoners of war and a contingent of the French prisoners of
war of North African domicile who were in German captivity would
be freed and he could personally bring the news of their speedy return
on the occasion of a trip to North Africa. 8 If he were given an assur-
ance in principle that these three requests would be fulfilled, he was
willing to relieve Weygand of his post as early as the coming week.
In a conversation with the de Brinon on November 2 Marshal
Petain repeated the same ideas, but spoke of the trip to the occupied
area, mentioned the day before in the form of a hope, as if it were
already a definite fact, and went into the details of the travel sched-
ule. De Brinon reported to Petain about his reception by the Reich
Foreign Minister and his visit to the camp of the French Legion. 7
Marshal Petain commissioned de Brinon to deliver to the Foreign
Minister his most cordial thanks for this reception and at the same
time to express how very grateful he would be if he himself could
be given the opportunity of meeting the Foreign Minister. In his
conversations with de Brinon, Petain expressed himself in a dep-
recating manner concerning the United States and Weygand.
Weygand had asked him not to contest his right to hate, and from
an intercepted communication to the United States it could be con-
cluded that the latter considered Weygand to be the representative
of its interests in North Africa. 8 Regarding the three requests whose
fulfillment Petain is asking in connection with the dismissal of Wey-
gand it can be noted that during the past weeks they have already
been frequently advanced by Darlan, Benoist-Mechin and other
members of the Government in the name of Petain. It is therefore
possible that they were only suggested to Petain anew at this time in
order to make the decision to dismiss Weygand more palatable.
Abetz
*In telegram No. 279 of Nov. 8 (898/292246-49) Boehland reportea the views
of the Armistice Commission regarding Petain's desires for German concessions.
It advocated the granting, in principle, of reinforcements for West Africa but
not for North Africa ; a partial transfer of the forces from Syria and some con-
cessions regarding the prisoners of war.
'For de Brinon's account of his meeting with Ribbentrop see Fernand de
Brinon, Menwires (Paris, n.d.) , pp. 82 ff.
* In the film of the files of the Reich Foreign Minister's Secretariat is a memo-
randum of Aug. 12 by "Weizsilcker (Fl/0574) submitting to Ribbentrop German
translations of two intercepts. The first (Fl/0568-0571) is Murphy's telegram
No. 338 of July 21, printed in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol.
ir, pp. 396-398. This intercept is almost complete. The second. (Fl/0575) is a
telegram .numbered 378, dated Aug. 5, and signed by Cole, the United States
Consul General at Algiers. The correct date is Aug. 2. The message tallies
exactly with the third paragraph of telegram No. 378 as printed in Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. n, p. 406.
• For Ribbentrap's reply, see document No. 463.
NOVEMBER 1941 733
No. 446
22S1/482491-503
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Ambassador Alfieri
In the East, November 4, 1941.
Dear Signor Ambassador: You were so kind as to write me on
October 19 * and touch on several questions which had already been
the subject of a conversation between us during your recent presence
here at Fiihrer Headquarters. 2
Now after my return from Schonhof, where Count Ciano's stay in
Germany 3 was concluded by a couple of very successful days of
hunting, I do not wish to fail to revert to your letter. While thanking
Your Excellency sincerely for your frank statements in the letter, I
should like to say in the first place that it was a matter of course
for me to inform you confidentially about a matter which, even though
one should not accord it any too great importance, if continued could
have had repercussions on the cooperation between your Embassy
and the Foreign Ministry, which so far has been exceedingly har-
monious. However, I believe I can be sure that this is a temporary
phenomenon which for lack of inner justification will have no
duration.
As regards the question of the Italian workers, which Your Ex-
cellency again brought up, I gather from your letter that my request
expressed during your presence at Headquarters, that the Italian
Embassy not dramatize such matters in so far as possible, occasioned
a certain amount of surprise on your part. In this regard I should
like to ask Your Excellency in the most friendly way to recall that of
late you have repeatedly spoken to me about the great importance
of this question and have thereby repeatedly pointed out how very
much these complaints of the Italian workers needed to be remedied
in the interest of German-Italian friendship. 4 From this then I drew
the natural conclusion that I should work in every way for a settle-
ment of these matters, and Your Excellency will agree with me that
in the treatment of this question it was always my aim and that of
my co-workers to promote in every way the well-being of the Italian
workers in Germany. But if over and above this I did not accord
any greater significance to the small disagreements which occurred
than was due to them within the framework of the great common
struggle being carried on by our two countries and of the close friend-
ship existing between them, this corresponded with my inner convic-
1 Document No. 411.
3 See document No. 409.
* See document No. 424.
* For Alfieri's complaints to Ribbentrop see documents No. 308 and No. 409.
For his complaints on the same subject to Weizsacker see documents No. 281 and
footnote 2, No. 375, and No. 397.
734 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
tion. It is therefore with particular satisfaction, Signor Ambassador,
that I now believe I can gather from your letter that you, too, share
the opinion that these questions should only be treated in accordance
with their true importance.
Now if Your Excellency nevertheless considers it proper in the
further course of your letter to point out that this way of looking at
things had to have its limits, and that you were not in a position
to close your eyes to situations which you had to regard as undeniable
facts, namely: that the morale of the Italian workers in Germany
was depressed and that this had called forth negative reactions in
Italy, then I had to assume that important reasons and facts have
brought you to this. I have therefore made a point of occupying
myself once more with this problem in detail in order to find out
the reasons for this situation of the Italian workers in Germany which
you have observed and feel to be an encumbrance. As a result of this
investigation permit me to transmit to you the attached compilation
of reports s on incidents involving Italian workers that have taken
place at various plaees of work in Germany, which have arrived
at the central Berlin offices from the various local agencies in Ger-
many, On the basis of these reports and also of other additional in-
quiries which I have instituted, I cannot avoid reaching the clear
conclusion that there is no German responsibility for the fact that, as
has been reported to you, the morale of the Italian workers in Ger-
many may not have been good. It seems to me from these reports
and examples that it is incontestably evident on the one hand that the
performance of the Italian workers has deteriorated here and there,
but on the other hand their demands have increased in almost every
case, and often beyond the point of what Germany is able to fulfill
even with the best will in the world. Thus, for example, the demands
of the Italian -workers often exceeded the standard of the German
worker, so that the German agencies were time and again simply not
in a position to comply with such demands. Your Excellency can
convince yourself of the true state of affairs with the aid of these
examples. I should like to add that the care with which the inves-
tigations have been made in all of these cases is illuminated by noth-
ing so much as by the fact that, for example, in the case of Flozerweg
near Linz, indicated under figure 6, not only Dr. Ley and I but the
Fiihrer himself, whose native city is Linz, as is well known, inter-
vened and had the true facts of the ease as described here reported to
him. In summary I should like to say that considering the available
evidence the Foreign Ministry would rather have had occasion to
turn to Your Excellency for redress because of certain abuses among
the Italian workers. The fact that the German agencies did not do
this, but consistently tried to settle and correct matters on the spot is
"Not printed (2281/482612-25).
NOVEMBER 1941 735
based on the realization that on the one hand such occurrences can
happen in the course of employing several hundred thousand Italian
workers who were recruited in great haste, but that on the other hand
they were never of such significance as to justify the Governments of
the two friendly nations concerning themselves about them at all. For
the future I therefore believe and hope that such friction can be settled
without further ado through the institution for such questions of a
mediation agency agreed upon by the Foreign Ministry and the
Embassy,* without bothering the highest authorities.
In the further course of your letter Your Excellency also stated
that aside from the question of the workers the feeling among the
German people in relation to Italy was in general not good. You
preferred to make this communication to me in order not to have to
regret at some time not having told me this. At the same time you
inform me that your view is based on the unanimous reports of the
Italian Consuls in Germany. Although I cannot judge on what ex-
periences the Italian Consuls in Germany believe they can base their
views, and as I am furthermore, according to the words of Your Ex-
cellency, not very clear about what significance you attach to this
matter, I should like for my part in any case, on the basis of exact
knowledge of the feeling among the German people, to express the fol-
lowing opinion on this question quite clearly.
The feeling of the German people toward Italy is not bad but good.
Naturally in Germany, too, there are still incorrigible elements who do
not want to follow the policy of the Fuhrer. The same, however, is
probably true in reverse for Italy, too, where there will still be circles
who do not want to go along with the Duce's policy. These elements
are incorrigible grumblers, critics, and weaklings who, the less of a
positive nature they do for the state, the more they talk and criticize,
pass on every rumor and every bit of gossip, and even try to trans-
form what is most positive into the negative. I am certain that you
are aware, Your Excellency, that precisely these circles in the two
countries also often have contact with one another and toss the ball
back and forth. It is a regrettable fact that precisely these circles
maintain in almost all countries an especially lively contact with the
diplomatic and consular representations. Hoping to find people of
like mind here, they often — perhaps even against their will — become
tools of Anglo-American agents who, as you doubtless know, have
chosen precisely the neutral Missions as a rewarding field for their
propaganda activity. If, as I naturally do not know, the Italian
Consuls have perhaps also let themselves be influenced in their report-
ing to the Embassy by information from such circles and from this
atmosphere, then this would be bound to result in an entirely erro-
neous picture of Germany's attitude toward Italy. The German
' See document No. 375, footnote 2.
736 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
people think quite differently. They have no time for such prattle;
they fight and work and have contempt for this world of do-nothings
and intriguers. They have the warmest sympathies for Fascist
Italy — I doubtless do not need to give Your Excellency any special
assurance of this — and I am convinced that the reverse is no different.
If the German people were perhaps now and then somewhat sorry if
this or that Italian measure was not immediately crowned with suc-
cess as they had perhaps hoped, this seems to me to be precisely a
sign of how warmly the German people feel in everything that affects
Italy. As in the past, the German people will rejoice most sincerely
and cordially in the future, too, about every Italian success, and I am
certain that you, Signor Ambassador, have yourself been able to note
this repeatedly. I should like to mention only in passing that this
has incidentally also always found public expression in all fields of
journalism. The German people are very well aware that they are
allied with the Italian people in a life and death struggle, and they
are just as ready to march to the end with their Italian friends as, to
use the Duce's historical words, the Italian people are ready to do this
with the Germans. And this end — you know my conviction, Your
Excellency — will be the greatest common victory in the history of our
peoples !
This, Signor Ambassador, is my opinion of the feeling of the
German people toward Italy. I am therefore convinced that no real
German or Italian patriot will let himself be influenced in the long
run by any sort of obstruction by a few obscure elements in his trust
in the Axis and in his will to victory; and I believe that we, the
co-workers of our two great leaders, are called on in first place to
show the way in this respect.
With the assurance of my particular esteem and cordial affection,
I remain, Your Excellency, etc.
ElBBENTROP
P.S. I should be grateful if Your Excellency would also inform
Count Ciano of my above opinion and the attached report on the
question of the Italian workers. 7
'In Weizsileker's letter of Nov. 7 (2281/482483), in telegram No. 1289 of
Nov. 18 (1517/372966-67). and again in telegram No. 3115 of Nor. 18 (2281/-
482547-48) Mackensen was instructed to make sure that Ciano was fully in-
formed regarding Ribbentrop's letter to Alfleri, particularly regarding those
points concerning the Italian workers in Germany and the attitude of the
German people toward Italy.
Weizsacker's memorandum, St.S. No. 767 of Nov. 18 (1517/372971), and his
Instruction of Nov. 20 to Mackensen, telegram No. 3127 (2281/482549-50), record
that Alfleri had forwarded the full text of the letter to Ciano.
In telegram No. 3012 of Nov. 20 (2281/482551-52) Mackensen reported that
Ciano expressed his gratification over the friendship of Germany for Italy and
insisted that the Italian people reciprocated the feeling toward the Germans.
Ciano added that Mussolini was informed about the letter.
Cf. Dino Alfleri, Due dittatori di fronts, pp. 237-239; The Ciano Diaries, entry
for Nov. 14, 1941.
NOVEMBER 1941 737
No. 447
945/300034-37
Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI
Bekun, November 4, 1941.
Pol. VI 7788 g.
Subject : Denmark's attitude toward Germany.
For the Foreign Minister.
I. Any appraisal of the attitude of the Danish Government and the
Danish people toward Germany based on the maxim "By their fruits
ye shall know them" must stress the fact that none of the countries
occupied by us is as peaceful and offers such close and virtually
trouble-free cooperation as Denmark. Cooperation with the Danish
Government which, to be sure, is separated from us by a wide gap
ideologically has been carried out successfully during the past 1%
years since Denmark's occupation by German troops, thanks to close
adherence to the guiding principles given by the Foreign Ministry to
the Plenipotentiary of the Reich, Minister von Renthe-Fink: "To
work with 'diplomatic means', a friendly attitude, patience, calm, tact,
and perseverance, while fully protecting the interests of the Wehr-
macht; the maintenance of law and order."
In the field of internal politics, the Danish Government has enacted
all laws deemed necessary and demanded by us to promote our interests
as regards foreign policy, the Wehrmacht, and the economy. In the
field of foreign policy the Danish Government has severed its diplo-
matic relations with England, France, and the Soviet Union, and
lodged its protest against the so-called Greenland agreement 1 and
the occupation of Iceland by the English and the Americans. 2 Den-
mark has moreover furnished a sizable contingent for the Waffen SS
to fight against the Soviet Union. 3 In the economic field, the readjust-
ment of Denmark's economic life following the cessation of the large
imports from England and the overseas countries was carried out more
successfully than we could have expected, so that delivery of critical
food products to Germany is possible on the largest scale. Denmark's
industry has likewise to a large degree been put to work for our arma-
ments program. This was and still is possible only through the
voluntary and constructive cooperation of all Danish governmental
authorities and the good will of the Danish population.
* See vol. xn of this series, document No. 308, footnote 1.
Documents Nos. 102 and 118.
3 In telegram No. 830 of June 27 (62/42321-22) Renthe-Fink reported about
the recruitment of Danish volunteers into the Waffen SS. They were to form
a separate battalion of 800 to 1000 men within the SS-Division Viking
682-905—64 52
738 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
II. In appraising the sentiments of the Danish people in regard
to Germany, the following must be borne in mind: The Dane is
materialistic, loves the comforts of life, and is a pronounced individu-
alist. The destruction of the Danish fleet by the English in 1807 has
been forgotten, 1864 4 has not. Versailles is being condemned today
as a folly. However, it did give north Schleswig to Denmark, al-
though the Danes are eager to stress that they exercised moderation
in the acquisition of territory, contrary to the wish of the Allies.
Noteworthy in the political development of recent years are the facts
that Danish Foreign Minister Munch abstained from voting in the
League of Nations in the spring of 1935, when Germany was de-
nounced for asserting her sovereign right to rearm, and that Denmark
was the only Scandinavian State to conclude a non-aggression treaty
with Germany in the spring of 1939. B
Until 1940 England provided the principal market for Danish ex-
ports. The shipping and ship-owning interests were inclined toward
England, whose democratic-liberalistic form of government corres-
ponds to that of Denmark. There is little understanding in Den-
mark for the political and strategic necessity for the occupation of
Denmark by German troops on April 9, 1940; but all the more empha-
sis is put on Germany's promise to preserve Denmark's sovereignty
and integrity, and notwithstanding all the admiration for the achieve-
ments and. the conduct of the German armed forces, everyone is
looking forward to the day when the German troops will leave
Denmark.
On the attitude of the Royal Mouse I reported yesterday under
Pol. VI 7768 g. e
Information on the attitude of Stauning, still the most influential
and powerful single individual in Denmark, and the various leaders
of the political parties, is presented in the dispatch of the German
Legation in Copenhagen, of October 31, received today, which is
attached. 7 Of particular interest in this report is the following
statement made by State Minister Stauning: "I regard the occupation
as an element in the gigantic conflict in which Germany is engaged
today in order to establish a new order in Europe. In considering
the situation, the background must not be overlooked. The Danish
Government, as is known, is taking a constructive attitude toward
the problems of our time and has endeavored to solve them in the
measure in which they arose." Regarding the question of Danish
participation in building the new Europe Stauning stated as follows :
*This is a reference to the Danish defeat in the war against Austria and
Prussia over Schleswlg-Holstein in 1864.
• See vol. vi of this series, document No. 461.
"Not found.
' Not printed ( 5109/E295395-39R l\ ) .
NOVEMBER 1941 739
"The changes required will meet with no opposition here. If the
Danish people are allowed to carry them out the Danish way, there
is no doubt in my mind about the attitude of the people and there
will be no cause for conflicts."
Foreign Minister Scavenitts, an experienced, realistic statesman,
has repeatedly given proof of his positive attitude toward Germany,
as has also the former Danish State Secretary Mohr, now Minister
to Berlin, 8 as well as other members of the Danish Government, for
example the young Minister of Transportation, Gunar Larssen, the
general manager of the Danish state railroads, Knutzen (construction
of the railroad line and super-highway Fehmarn-Rb'dby), and Min-
ister of Justice Thune .Tacobsen. The Navy cooperates smoothly with
our Navy, while the Army is keeping somewhat more aloof. The
agricultural circles are aware that they are dependent on the German
market. Many industrial and business circles clearly recognize that
Denmark's interests are and always will be intimately linked with
those of her greater German neighbor. Only recently a Danish com-
mittee was formed with a view to associating Danish business groups
with the German development program in Eastern Europe. 6 Groups
interested in Germany have joined together in a number of German-
Danish associations, whose activities always attract sizable audiences.
The contacts of Danish scholars with Germany are closer than those
with England.
By contrast, the Danish Koyal House, the Danish Government, and
nearly the entire Danish people reject the DNSAP and Clausen, whose
leadership qualifications are not acknowledged. 10 Large segments of
the Danish people are prepared, while not loving us, to accept the
practical consequences of the situation, i.e., to take their place in the
new Europe under the leadership of Germany ; the Danes do so, how-
* Otto Carl Mohr presented his credentials on Sept. 11, 1941
tionof—iH 9, 1 ? 8 £ 0f , „ Ct l ; 2 T «52/42393) Renthe-Fink reported the forma-
™™7„? committee of Danish businessmen for the participation of Danish busi-
ness interests in the development of the eastern areas. Renthe-Fink mentioned
hi t? f I?"' statements made by Hitler, when Minister Mohr presented
™„ et J ^ ° f ^edence, with regard to "the Greater European area, lte develop-
£S?mS£ European cooperation, especially in the east, in connection with it"
Srtrh wX KH ^S. £T l T *? P enmark - M <* r confirmed this In a conversation
S^2 Mrfhr^^^ '^recorded in a memorandum of Nov. 6 (62/-
ornment and thn^ l^if^l^ OP re P orte <* *""<"•'* statements to his Gov-
fT, nnl.,% Scavenius had thereupon Instructed him to inform Germany
"to poi£ ont &SS5* \P° sitive paction to Hitler's ideas. He was told
disnatch of «v?rv^l n V„,T ll K ngn ? SS to , raake deli ™ ri ^ to Germany, to the
of Sh . n«ni5. h2J Tmt numher , of workers to Germany, and to the new plan
an« wlK h Fuhrer"?d~ Unity *° ^^ * * CtMtieS in RuSSla in accord -
serie^do'cumentS^lOl 8 ^^ Nati ° nal S ° CiaUst P&rty See TOl - *" of thla
740 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
ever, in the hope that this can be accomplished while preserving the
Danish Royal House as well as Denmark's sovereignty and integrity,
and with the stipulation that any organic modification of their form
of government, which they are partly prepared to accept, must not
be imposed upon them from the outside. It has to be admitted that
a certainly not inconsiderable segment of the Danish public would
better than anything like the war to end in a draw between Germany
and England in the hope that in that case Denmark would again
be able, together with the other Nordic States, to play a certain role
in the so-called "neutral" Scandinavian group. The more experienced
and thoughtful politicians like Scavenius, and perhaps also Stauning,
are probably aware that this is wishful thinking. But a genuine
change of sentiment in the Danish people must not be expected until
Germany has won the final victory.
Gkundherr
No. 448
260/1 70298-300
Memorandum by Minister Leitner
Berlin, November 4, 1941.
zu Ha. Pol. 7142 g. 1
I. Statements of the Finnish Minister of Supply Ramsay regarding
Finnish tonnage overseas.
1. Before the breach of relations between Finland and England
there were 55 Finnish ships overseas. Of these more than half were
able to get to places under German control and save themselves; some
were sunk or captured by the English ; the remaining 24 ships fled to
American waters where they were to be laid up. 2 Ten of these ships
(including 4 Thorden ships) placed themselves under the Panamanian
flag in order to remain in service. Since England did not recognize
this change of flag, and since the United States began to seize the
laid-up ships, these ships, with American consent, were moved out in
order to escape English or American seizure. For this purpose a
Finnish shipping office was set up in New York which in cooperation
with the USA Maritime Commission chartered the ships for voyages
in the Western Hemisphere and guaranteed their remaining in Amer-
ican waters whereupon the ships received the necessary quantities of
fuel for coastal voyages.
1 Ha. Pol. 7142 g : Not found.
'Helsinki telegram No. 722 of Aug. 2 (260/170110-113) gives a listing of
Finland's Atlantic ships as of July 28.
NOVEMBER 1941 741
2. Finland declined to run the blockade with two ships already
loaded from Rio de Janeiro as we intended, because this would have
led to the immediate seizure of all the rest of the ships.
3. If Finland is in principle ready to ran the blockade she is willing
to do this only with ships which are suitable for it ; and because she
fears jeopardizing her relations with the United States in doing it,
she wishes to undertake it only shortly before a break in Finnish-
American relations.
4. These are in any case to be excluded from running the blockade:
a) the ships Aurora and Olivia which are laid up in the U.S.A. be-
cause they will be ready for traveling only after 2 to 3 months of re-
pairs; and, further, b) 10 small, old, slow ships which offer no pros-
pect for a successful run of the blockade; and also c) the 4 Thorden
ships, because their owner is a Swedish citizen with whom the neces-
sary secrecy could not be arranged.
As much as possible Finland will direct the remaining ships toward
South America whence at the appropriate time they should break out
for Casablanca without regard for loading. The Finns do not con-
sider the chances for running the blockade as very favorable in view
of the strict North American watch.
5. Since a break-out will have as a consequence the seizure of all
the rest of the Finnish ships in America, Finland wishes to sell to
Sweden beforehand the two ships which need repairs {Aurora and
Olivia) as well as the ten small and slow ships which cannot be con-
sidered for running the blockade. At the same time Finland hopes
through the sale to receive the Swedish kronor necessary to make up
the strong passive balance of trade with Sweden. (Ramsay termed
the interest of the shipowners in the sale a secondary matter.)
II. I explained to M. Ramsay that the sale of Finnish ships to
Sweden would have to be refused because it would amount to an in-
direct or a direct employment for England of the tonnage sold. I
have nevertheless reserved a final answer to his proposal to the time
of agreed concluding discussions on November 7.
III. According to the directive of the Reich Foreign Minister of
November 1 apropos of the memorandum No. 709 of the State Secre-
tary, 3 the Finnish wishes regarding sale to Sweden of the ships whieh
are overseas are to be refused. Inasmuch as the present Finnish pro-
posal does not concern the sale of all, 4 but only of individual ships to
"In this memorandum (260/170271) Weizsacker recorded a discussion with
KivlmUki regarding tie Finnish proposal for sale to Sweden of 25 ships with a
total tonnage of 130,000.
*Zechlfn's telegram No. 785 of Aug. 15 (280/170134) reported that there had
been attempts to sell Finland's Atlantic merchant fleet to Switzerland. In
telegram No. 930 of Sept 11 (260/170181) BHicher reported that Finland In-
tended to sell the fleet to Sweden,
742 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Sweden, this proposal is hereby submitted to Ambassador Kitter with
the request for a directive if possible by Friday noon, November 7. 5
Leitnee
5 No record of this decision has been found.
In telegram No. 1299 of Nov. 13 (260/170353) Blucher reported that the Finns
would begin negotiations with Sweden immediately, and that the Finnish ships
in South America had been ordered to remain there as long as possible.
Telegram No. 1462 of Dec. 5 (261/170425) reported that the Finnish Govern-
ment was weighing the problem of running the blockade or of Issuing an order
for the ships to be scuttled.
In telegram No. 1479 of Dec. 8 (261/170429) Blticher reported the status of
Finland's Atlantic merchant fleet of that date, and that he had repeated his
urging that the ships be given an order to run the blockade or to be scuttled.
The difficulty in such an order was the lack of a secure code. The Finnish Lega-
tion had been Instructed to cooperate with Germany's representatives in regard
to the ships.
No. 449
71/50900-01
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Rome, November 5, 1941—10 :30 p. m.
top seceet Received November 5—11 :00 p. m.
No. 2802 of November 5
With reference to my telegram No. 2789 of November 4. 1
Today Anfuso handed Bismarck the text provisionally agreed upon
here between the Duce and Count Ciano, on the one hand, and the
Grand Mufti, on the other, for the declaration which the Grand Mufti
wishes to issue after having obtained Germany's consent.
In the German translation the text reads as follows :
"Amin al-Husayni, the Grand Mufti of Palestine and one of the
leading representatives of the independence movement of the Arab
peoples, has had a frank and cordialexchange of views with the Duce
and the Fiihrer.
"In this conversation he was told the following:
" (1) That the two Axis Powers will give every possible support to
the Arab countries, which are now suffering under British domination
and oppression, in the fight for their freedom.
"(2) That the Axis Powers, supporting the aspirations of the
Arabs, are prepared to recognize the full sovereignty and complete
independence of the Arab countries of the Near East which are now
occupied or controlled by the English. Pursuant thereto, the Axis
Powers are prepared to give their consent to the elimination of the
^his telegram (71/50898-99) reported that Bismarck had called on the
Grand Mufti who, after having expressed his wish to be received by the Reich
Foreign Minister "and if possible, by the Fiihrer," mentioned that he had dis-
cussed with Mussolini and Ciano a declaration which he would issue, "but only
after his Berlin conversations."
NOVEMBER 1941 743
Jewish national home [jiidisch-natiffnalen Lvbensrawnes] in Pales-
tine.*
"Their readiness to do this will be set down in the near future in a
formal agreement that will seal the sincere friendship and close coop-
eration between the Axis Powers and the Arabs in the future. The
negotiations for the conclusion of such an agreement will be started as
soon as possible.
"In the course of the discussions the intention of Italy and Germany,
to respect, as before, to the full extent, the sovereignty and the inde-
pendence of all Arab countries that are now sovereign and inde-
pendent was again confirmed."
End of the declaration.
Mackensen
* In telegram No. 2810 of Nov. 6 (2281/482671) Maekensen sent the Italian
text of this passage according to which this expression read "Focolare Nazionale
Ebraico". A minute by Counselor Flessen on the Embassy copy of this tele-
gram explains that Woermann had requested the Italian text over the telephone,
saying that the Foreign Ministry did not like the expression "Lebensraum" in the
German version.
No. 450
235/157294-9B
The Embassy in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
Kio de Janeiro, November 6, 1941—2 : 36 p. m.
No. 2186 of November 6 Eeceived November 6 — 11 : 25 p. m.
For OKH, Attache Department; for RLM, Attache Group.
"With reference to my telegram No. 1902, Military Attache" 669 g.
of September 29. 1
General Lehmann W. Miller 2 returned on October 24 ; he presented
to the War Minister 3 and Chief of the General Staff * the increased
demands of his Government, particularly regarding the utilization of
harbors in northern Brazil as U.S. naval bases, along with the estab-
lishment of considerable stockpiles of foodstuffs, fuel, ammunition,
etc., as well as docks for repairs with the necessary military personnel
of the U.S.A." When the Minister of War rejected this very sharply,
at once Miller threatened with military occupation in order to be able
to execute and ensure the measures considered necessary by the U.S.A.
1 Not fonnd.
1 Chief of the U.S. military mission in Brazil.
' Gen. Eurico G. Dutra.
4 Gen. Pedro de Goes Monteiro.
1 For the details on U.S.-Brazilian negotiations see Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1941, vol. vi, p. 480-514 ft. The military developments have been
dealt with in Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Framework Of Hemi-
sphere Defense in the series United. States Army in World. War II: The Western
Hemisphere, pp. 265-330.
744 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The Minister of War replied, exceedingly aroused, that the Brazilians
would rather lire under the most primitive conditions than give up
their independence through the establishment of TJ.S.A. bases. In
any case he would give the order to fire if the U.S. A. should land
troops without Brazil's requesting it to do so. Miller added that cer-
tain "pro-Nazi" advisers of the President (this meant War Minister
Dutra, Chief of the General Staff G6es Monteiro, Police Prefect Fe-
linto Miiller) were opposing the demands of the U.S.A., and that in
certain circumstances his Government would demand the removal of
the persons concerned. Moreover, if the TJ.S.A. demands were re-
jected the sharpest economic reprisals would be undertaken within 24
hours; among other things the deliveries of gasoline would be cut
off, etc.
The conference was extraordinarly dramatic. The President, ap-
prised at once by the Minister of War, told the latter in the presence
of the Police Prefect, that he (Vargas) was the one to govern and
make decisions in Brazil and not the North Americans. Thereupon
the President asked the American Ambassador Caffery to call on him,
who told him that General Miller had no authority at all to make such
demands in the name of the American Government. The Military
Attache 8 received the above information from the Police Prefect as
well as from two high-ranking officers, each independent of the other.
In the meantime very rapid progress has been made in the expansion
of the eight airfields reported in Annex 3 of report No. 11/41 of
July 29/ so that the completion of some can still be counted on this
year.
Military Attache 781g.
Prufer
' General Niedenf iihr.
T Not found.
No. 451
82/60810-21
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Tokyo, November 6, 1941 — 10 : 50 p. m.
secret Received November 7 — 2 : 50 p. m.
No. 2354 of November 6
Foreign Minister Togo, to whom I spoke about the sudden dispatch
of Ambassador Kurusu to Washington, 1 told me that the Ambassador,
*It was announced in Tokyo on Nov. 5 that Saburo Kurusu, former Japanese
Ambassador in Belgium and Germany, would be sent to Washington to assist
Ambassador Nomura in the negotiations. Cf. Foreign Relations of the United
States, Id hi, vol. rv, pp. 566-567.
NOVEMBER 1941 745
Admiral Nomura, had asked that an experienced career diplomat be
sent to aid him in the present difficult situation. The press and public
opinion throughout the world had made optimistic comments in con-
nection with it. He did not share this optimism, because the disagree-
ments between Japan and the United States were very great. He
could not, unfortunately, tell me anything at present about the details
of Kurusu's instructions. He would, however, sum up his personal
assumptions above the future by saying that it might soon become
necessary to strengthen the cooperation with Germany and Italy.
I replied to the Japanese Foreign Minister that Ambassador Kurusu
had undoubtedly also received instructions to give a warning, as
promised by the Japanese Government, against any continuation by
Roosevelt on the path of aggression. 2 Togo answered that he had
in the meantime studied the matter and found that his predecessor
had failed to issue the statement in question. (Seven groups garbled
or missing, correction requested) he had taken note of the German
wish but had to take into account the total situation at the moment.
A firm attitude on the part of Japan would be more important than a
mere warning to the Americans, the effect of which appeared to him
to be doubtful, and such an attitude was reflected in the instructions
to Kurusu. This much could be said: for his negotiations with the
United States definite limits had been imposed on him which he
could not exceed.
The dispatch of Kurusu was decided upon only recently, as I
have learned confidentially and as is proved by his precipitate depar-
ture. In the long Cabinet discussions about which I have reported 3
the opinion which prevailed in the end was that an attempt, described
as final, should be made to come to a peaceful agreement with the
United States. In that connection the advocates of an understand-
ing no doubt aimed to gain time, however short, and to obtain an
element of reassurance for the coming session of the Diet.
The fact that Kurusu accepted the mission indicates that he did
not consider the undertaking altogether hopeless from the outset,
although the instructions contained substantive limitations (especially
in the China question) and presumably also time limits for the
leader of the negotiations. The fact that before he was sent, the Privy
Council met for a 20- (twenty-) minute session under the chairman-
ship of the Emperor shows further that the government felt that
need to assure itself of support. The fact that the press emphasizes
that Kurusu is supposed to have played an important role in the con-
clusion of the Tripartite Pact also points in that direction, Since
* See document No. 359.
'In telegram No. 2331 of Nov. 5 (82/60813-14). In this telegram Ott also
forwarded with reservations" various kinds of information from Japanese
Navy circles regarding certain steps included by the Japanese.
746 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the Army and the Navy, as in the past, can hardly accept the demands
of the United States with regard to China, I would view the chances
of this importunate gesture, too, with skepticism. 4
Ott
'This telegram crossed with Rlbbentrop's telegram No. 2029 of Nov. 7 (82/-
60815) directing Ott to inquire at the Japanese Foreign Ministry about the
Kurusu mission and to remind the Japanese Foreign Minister of Germany's Tiew
"that a strong attitude taken by Japan with respect to the United States was the
only correct policy which would certainly not fail to have a sobering effect
on Washington."
Ott replied in telegram No. 2373 of Nov. 8 (82/60823) referring to his report
which Is printed here and stating that he had carried out the instruction
with Deputy Foreign Minister Nishi who assured him that Kurusu had been
instructed "to adopt a firm attitude and not to allow himself to be intimidated
by any threats."
No. 452
71/50902-05
Memorandum ~by Minister Grobba
immediate Berlin-, November 6, 1941.
Subject: Arrival of the Grand Mufti; German-Italian statement on
the independence of the Arab peoples.
The Grand Mufti arrived at 12 : 00 noon today. He was accom-
panied by the Italian Counselor, Alberto Mellini Ponce de Leon, and
the latter's wife. The Grand Mufti's secretary, Dr. Abu Ganime, will
arrive tomorrow and another secretary, Saf wat, will probably arrive
the day after tomorrow.
The Grand Mufti was greeted at the station by Counselor Melchers,
Consul Falkenstein, Secretary of Legation Kutscher (Protocol), Sec-
retary of Legation Dr. Kaspar (Radio Department), and Herr Stef-
f en ( Press) , besides me.
The Grand Mufti, Signor Mellini and his wife, and Herr Falken-
stein are lodged in the Bellevue Castle. Minister Hinrichs waited there
for the Grand Mufti and greeted him on behalf of Minister of State
Merssner, who himself called on him at 1 : 15 p.m.
At the welcoming ceremony I informed the Grand Mufti that the
Foreign Minister would be happy to receive him. The Grand Mufti
expressed his sincere thanks for this message.
The Grand Mufti talked to me about his rather adventurous flight
from Iran and his discussions with Count Ciano and the Duce on the
German-Italian declaration regarding the independence of the Arab
peoples, the German translation of which was transmitted to us by the
Embassy in Rome. 1
Regarding his flight from Iran the Grand Mufti said more than
once that he had at first attempted to leave Iran with German help
1 See document No. 449.
NOVEMBER 1041 747
and a German passport, and that Minister Ettel had gone to much
trouble in connection with his flight. Unfortunately, however, the
Germans in Iran were at that time subject to such strict surveillance
that his flight with a German passport had been impossible. During
the last period Minister Ettel had been very occupied with the care
for his colony. He [the Grand Mufti] had thus felt compelled to ac-
cept help from the Italians. In Italy it had been suggested to him
that the center of his activity be set up there. He had told Count Ciano,
however, that he wanted to have two centers, Borne and Berlin. He
added that he was fully aware that Germany was of greater military
and political importance than Italy and that the misgivings of the
entire Arab world regarding Italian intentions also stood in the way
of close cooperation of Arab circles with Italy.
He made the following points as regards the draft of a German-
Italian declaration transmitted from Home with the enclosed telegram :
Regarding point 1 : He had expressed the wish that, besides "for
their freedom," the statement should also say "and their complete
independence." Count Ciano, however, had objected to that wording.
Regarding point 2 : He had requested that the readiness of the Axis
Powers to bring about the unity of the Arab countries also be ex-
pressed, but Count Ciano had stated that he was not in favor of that
either. However, the last point in particular was extremely important
for propaganda reasons, because the achievement of unity was precisely
the main point of the Arab program.
Signor Mellini then spoke with me regarding the wording of the
declaration and said that he was instructed to report to Rome if Ger-
many concurred in this declaration or desired any changes. As soon
as agreement about the declaration was reached, the Italian Govern-
ment would propose that it be published simultaneously in Rome and
Berlin.
With regard to the changes desired by the Grand Mufti, which he
knew about, he stated the following :
Regarding (1) : The Italian Government would prefer that the pres-
ent wording be retained, since the Egyptians would interpret the
reference to "complete independence" as including them; the Italian
Government did not want this. Nevertheless, should the Grand Mufti
insist on the mention of complete independence, the Italian Govern-
ment would not allow the declaration to fail on that account.
Regarding (2) : The Italian Government had nothing against a
unified Arab state consisting of the countries of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon,
Palestine, and Transjordan. The expression "countries of the Near
East" was understood by it to refer to these five countries only and
not to Egypt and the Sudan. On the assumption that the German
Government concurred with this view, the Italian Government would
748 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
agree to having the "unity of the Arab countries'' mentioned in some
form or other. It would, however, prefer a somewhat vague wording,
because differences of opinion still existed between the individual Arab
leaders with regard to the way this unity is to be worked out. In
reply to my question whether the Italian Government would be pre-
pared to recognize the "right of the Arab countries of the Near East
to obtain a unity in accordance with their wishes," Signor Mellini said
that it would.
The Grand Mufti also agrees to such a wording and proposes that
in the French text " under (2) "le$ Anglais" be followed by a et lew
droit d'avoir ime vmte d'apres lews desirs." Thus, agreement seems
to be possible on this point. 3
The Grand Mufti attaches great importance to being received by
the Fiihrer. Since the statement is based on an exchange of views
between the Duce and the Fiihrer, he would be especially grateful if
the Fiihrer would express his approval of the proposed statement to
him personally, as the Duce had done. Moreover, he hopes that his
reception by the Fiihrer will have a great propaganda effect on the
entire Arab world and, beyond that, the Islamic world. Signor
Mellini strongly recommends that the Grand Mufti be received by the
Fiihrer and points out in that connection that, after the reception of
the Grand Mufti by the Duce, his reception by the Fiihrer would
silence all rumors of differences of opinion between Germany and Italy
on the Arab question.
Submitted herewith through the Dirigent to the Under State Secre-
tary, Political Department, and the State Secretary.
Gkobba
'A complete French text of the declaration (71/50907) as well as a partial
Italian test (71/50906) are attached to this memorandum.
* Further changes in the text of this declaration were discussed by the Foreign
Ministry in Berlin with the Grand Mufti and the Italian Counselor of Legation
Mellini. They are dealt with In the following communications between the
Foreign Ministry and the Embassy In Italy: Woermann telegram No. 3021 of
Nov. 8 (2281/482672) ; Rome telegram No. 2864 of Nov. 10 (2281/482673) ; Rome
telegram No. 2903 of Nov. 13 (2281/482674-79) ; Woermann telegram No. 3131
of Nov. 19 (2281/482683-84) ; Rome telegram No. 3142 of Nov. 20 (2281/482688-
89) ; Rome T 3039 of Nov. 22 (2281/482690) ; Woermann T 3167 of Nov. 22
(2281/482691) . See, further, document No. 494, footnote 4.
No. 453
481/231238
Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in Spain
Madrid, November 6, 1941.
The recruiting of Spanish workers for Germany has come to a com-
plete standstill, because :
NOVEMBER 1941 749
1. The Spanish authority, which under the German-Spanish agree-
ment is to cosign the separate work contracts, has thus far not been
appointed;
2. So far no funds of any sort have been provided by Spanish quar-
ters for financing the trip to Germany, 1 which under the agreement
concluded is to be paid, along with clothing, by the Spanish side. 2
The German commission for recruiting the workers has now been
in Spain for 10 weeks, without a single worker having left for Ger-
many. From various credible sources it has become known that Eng-
lish propaganda has already made appropriate capital out of this
delay. 3
The technical preparations for the recruitment and departure of the
workers have been concluded for several weeks; in particular, the
transportation questions have been regulated up to and including the
'.determination of the travel timetables, which have already been
printed.
Spanish quarters justify the delay on the grounds that a formal reso-
lution by the Ministerial Council sanctioning the preparations made is
still lacking.
I propose that on the occasion of the press luncheon taking place
this noon Serrano Suner be asked once more about the above matter.
Sttlle
1 Marginal note In Stohrer's handwriting : "See my memorandum of yesterday."
In this memorandum (481/231237), actually dated Nov. 4, Stohrer records that
he had emphasized to Serrano SuSer the need of funds for recruiting and cloth-
ing workers for Germany and for the payment of the families who remained in
Spain.
2 See document No. 231 and footnote 2.
3 See document No. 380 and footnote 2.
No. 454
100/65444-54
Benito Mimolini to Adolf Hitler 1
Rome, November 6, 1941/XIX.
Fuhkek: I thank you, Fiihrer, sincerely for the very interesting
letter which you have sent me, 2 and hasten to reply. I, too, believe
that Bolshevism is crushed and incapable of any recovery even if it
should succeed in establishing a "front" on the Ural Mountains or
1 The document printed here is a translation from an Italian copy which has
an unsigned marginal note "Text of final draft." The German translation, which
is not fully legible, has been filmed on F10/175-189,
In telegram No. 2784 of Nov. 4 (1517/372929) Mackensen reported that he
saw Oiano who had Just come from a visit with Mussolini who showed him the
draft of the letter. Mussolini had written the political part of the letter in his
own hand. The military-technical part was based on staff work. A clean copy
of the letter was to be prepared in Oiano's office.
1 Of Oct. 29, document No. 433.
750 DOCUMENTS ON GEBMAN" FOREIGN POLICY
beyond. American and English aid will fail to alter the fact already
accomplished, by which I mean the annihilation of their Bolshevik
ally.
Before proceeding to a review of the military situation in the
Mediterranean in particular, I should like to set forth to you some of
my thoughts.
a) It is my conviction that America will intervene in the war and,
this time again with an expeditionary corps, to be based in Egypt.
This is logical. I am in possession of a cable intercepted by my
service, announcing the arrival at Cairo of a mission headed by Gen-
oral Maxwell. 3 An American news agency, the Associated Press,
states that one of the purposes of the mission is "to study the climatic,
sanitary, and logistical conditions in connection with the possible dis-
patch of an American expeditionary corps to Africa. The mission
will be comprised of several hundred officers and technicians." It is
becoming increasingly evident that the British Empire will either de-
fend itself or be destroyed in Egypt, the backbone of the British
Empire and the link between three continents.
b) Given this situation, the trump card that we must seek to play
has been and still is Turkey. The latest speech of the President of
the Republic 4 could not have been pleasing to the English. It is
obvious that with the control of the Black Sea and with the annihila-
tion of the Bolshevik fleet, Turkey must finally make a decision. It
is only with Turkey as an ally or an associate, I believe, that it would
be possible in 1942 to bring off the pincer movement that would
eliminate England's political and military position in the Middle East.
This too would have far-reaching effects in the Far East.
c) With Russia beaten and thus once and for all ejected from
Europe, the war will shift to the eastern Mediterranean and will
absorb tremendous resources. Let me say at this point, Fiihrer, that
Italy's manpower and industrial plant are not as yet sufficiently
utilized. For lack of raw materials we work only at 40 to 60 percent
of our capacity. That is a negative element in the struggle of the
Axis.
d) Full utilization of our industrial potential would enable us to
participate in the military operations with larger forces. We have
millions of men and it is not just that Italy should wage war on a
scale not proportionate to its demographic resources. I must Ml you,
Fuhrer, that this is distressing to the Italian people. The Italian
people are aware of the objective difficulties due to the enormous dis-
tances of the fronts, but it is equally true that they desire to make a
larger contribution to the war effort. That would be the best means
8 See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. ni, pp. 314-315.
* Papen reported on the speech in telegram No. 1364 of Nov. 1 (265/173370-72) ,
NOVEMBER 1941 751
of cutting short all enemy speculations about a separate peace, etc.,
etc. The nations fighting today at our side cannot sustain a prolonged
effort. Germany should not have to bear almost completely the major
sacrifice, that is the sacrifice of blood. The time is past for partial,
semisymbolical participation. In the operations envisaged in 1942,
Italy has the duty and, I should add, the right to bring a greater effort
to bear. I do believe, Fuhrer, that you will make it possible for us to
do this.
I fully agree with you that the English may attempt some strikes
for the purpose of gaining some local successes, especially with a view
to home propaganda. I have on my part taken all the necessary pre-
cautions in this regard with respect to Pantelleria and also Lampedusa,
which might be attractive objectives for the English because of the fact
that we are now constructing a runway there. I have also taken ap-
propriate measures for Sicily and for Sardinia. In Sicily, forces
and material have been increased; in Sardinia the disposition of troops
and material have been made more efficient, while the air units have
also been reinforced on both islands.
The possiblity of a landing at the Tunisian-Libyan border has also
been envisaged and adequate measures have been taken. As regards
the Bizerte-Tunis area, I believe that any landing in that area would
be possible only with the full consent of the French command, because
the approaches are strongly defended and the greater part of the
Tunisian garrison is concentrated there. If such a landing should
occur, we would have to expect an attack on Tunisia by the combined
English and French North African forces ; this would seriously im-
peril our hold on Tripolitania, where our garrisons are sparse because
of the need of concentrating the maximum of material and forces at the
Cyrenaica front. Adequate reinforcement of Tripolitania is planned
and can be carried out next spring. This depends, of course, on the
availability of transport. I shall presently revert to this problem
which you, Fuhrer, have yourself alluded to in your letter.
Mindful of the persistent rumors of the possible attempt by de Gaulle
to make a landing in Corsica, we have strengthened the countermeas-
ures already taken some time ago. 5 This possibility must be given
close attention, if only by way of precaution, particularly because in
addition to the previously reported presence of special landing
equipment at Gibraltar, intelligence has been received that General
de Gaulle would shortly transfer his headquarters to Gibraltar. The
various reports also mention a possible landing in Morocco ; in any
case, as regards Corsica, I have directed that we will have to proceed
against possible convoys with quickly operating naval forces and with
8 See vol. xii of this series, document No. 65, footnote 4. See further, docu-
ment No. 433, footnote 1 in this volume.
752 DOCUMENTS ON GEHMAN FOREIGN POLICY
powerful air attacks from Sardinia, whereby the air forces in. Sardinia
could also be reinforced from Sicily. In addition, landing forces
with the necessary equipment are also held in readiness. I believe,
however, that a landing should not be resorted to except as an extreme
necessity, if only in consideration of the possible repercussion such
action might have on French North Africa.
This complex of precautionary measures was also necessary to per-
mit us to concentrate all our attention on Libya, which is the main
problem. That problem, as you have so astutely observed, Fuhrer,
is essentially one of transport. It is first of all necessary to have the
required means available for these transports, and in this connection
I can inform you that early nest year we shall have available a certain
number of fast ships which will afford us more freedom of movement
and maneuver while en route. At this time we are still obliged to rely
largely on ships with a speed of eight knots, and this restricts our
movements to the course west of Malta, which is most vulnerable to
enemy naval and aerial attacks. Once the steamers with an average
speed of 16 knots are available, it will be possible to use for the most
part the eastern route, which is farther removed from the range of
enemy attacks by sea and by air and which is better adapted to evasive
movements.
At the present stage of the war it is certain that the English com-
mand has intensified and will continue to intensify the attacks against
our convoys, employing at sea surface vessels in addition to the
submarines, which are in constantly increasing numbers. Four British
naval units are based at Malta at present and we are making efforts to
hit them by aerial attacks. An attack on our shipping made by sur-
face vessels last April succeeded in sinking an entire convoy. This
makes it necessary from now on to protect convoys by increasing sig-
nificantly the naval escorts with cruisers, and even by the employment
of battleships. Shipping operations across the Mediterranean become
in this way a military operation in the fullest sense. Such protection
afforded by substantial naval units can be coordinated on a large scale
with, but not replaced by, aerial protection. This, therefore, brings
into focus with utmost urgency the problem of naphtha.
With respect to this I have taken the liberty, Fuhrer, of forwarding
to you through the intermediary of General von Rintelen, a report
on our situation e and to request your assistance, without which we
would be unable even before the end of November to continue these
shipping operations to Libya. Without your assistance, Fuhrer, we
should within a month have been defenseless against an enemy whose
' This report has not been found.
NOVEMBER 1941 753
aggressiveness and resources are constantly mounting. And so I ex-
press to you my sincere thanks for what you consented to do.
General von Rintelen has informed me that we shall receive 66,000
tons of naphtha during November, 30,000 coming from the reserves
of the German Navy, and 36,000 from Rumania, and that the delivery
will be made during the month of December. General von Rintelen
has also offered the dispatch of some of your chemists for the purpose
of investigating the possibility of reclaiming the oil residues at the
bottoms of storage tanks. I am exceedingly grateful to you also for
this arrangement by which we would be enabled to recover a substan-
tial quantity of combustible oil and which could speed the efforts
which we are ourselves undertaking in that field. As you have so well
observed, Fiihrer, the problem of the war in the Mediterranean is the
problem of naphtha. If we are successful in overcoming this diffi-
culty, which will certainly continue into the late part of next spring,
that is, when we shall be able to obtain larger supplies of this valuable
material, I maintain that there can be no doubt as to the final outcome
of the battles in the Mediterranean.
It is needless to assure you, Fiihrer, that the expenditure of that
naphtha, to be narrowly restricted to the needs of the armed forces,
will be made with the exercise of the greatest economy and vigilance
under the watchful control of the Supreme Command, which concerns
itself directly with this matter.
As regards antiaircraft protection, I appreciate, Fiihrer, what you
have proposed to me. The German X Air Corps, reinforced and em-
ployed for the particular mission which you assign to it, will render
decisive services in the eastern Mediterranean and in Cyrenaica. As to
the operations sector of southern Italy, Sicily, and Tripolitania, the
Italian Air Force is carrying out that mission in an ever more satis-
factory manner, and I am convinced that the dispatch of an additional
German Air Corps to southern Italy and the islands will give us an
overwhelming superiority over the enemy, and will also result in
the neutralization of Malta. I am grateful to you for sending to Italy
the brave Marshal Kesselring; I had the pleasure of making his ac-
quaintance at the eastern front and many of our fliers know him not
only by renown but also in person, by having seen him operating on
the western front.
With respect to the Italian Air Force, I appreciate, Fiihrer, your
commendation by underscoring the success which it has recently won
against the naval and air forces of the enemy.
In compliance with your request I have immediately directed the
Air Force General Staff to get in touch with the Reichsmarschall.
682-905— 64 53
754 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
In the matter of transport vessels we shall soon, as I have told you,
have a certain number of fast ships at our disposal. They are, how-
ever, still of the order of 9,000 to 10,000 tons, while it is advisable
to have ships of a lighter class. I have therefore directed that a
program be initiated for the construction of ships of lesser capacity,
canceling a portion of the program for larger ships, which have not
yet been laid down. Construction of the ships in question can be
started in January or February; they will be built on lines applying
the most rigorous economy and with a minimum use of special ma-
terials. The construction period will be about 6 months. The mate-
rial available for this purpose, however, is exceedingly short; we
shall not be able to commission more than 50,000 tons of shipping
space. A temporary increase of raw materials destined exclusively
for this construction program would be more than desirable, and in
fact absolutely indispensable.
The utilization of the ports and landing places in Libya is a matter
of continuous and careful study by the appropriate agencies. The
German Admiral attached to the Italian Naval Operations Staff 7 is
following these studies and efforts, and participates directly in them.
The construction of narrow-gauge field railroads has been under study
for some time, also in response to the suggestion of your Command
in Cyrenaica, and we are now ready to get it started provided it is
possible to make shipment of the necessary material which you are
making available to us, as you have so kindly informed me, Fiihrer,
and for which I thank you.
I am also very grateful to you, Fiihrer, for having decided to pro-
vide the German Africa Corps with new antitank weapons and a
substantial reserve of III and IV tanks. I have been informed that
the antitank weapons will be transported directly from Germany by
air. As regards the tanks, we shall make every effort to speed then-
shipment by sea.
Also as regards coal we are in a tight situation because the few
reserves at our disposal are exhausted and the insufficient arrival of
naphtha necessitates an increase in the consumption of solid fuel.
But with Hie fuel oil problem about to be solved thanks to your
intervention, we still remain under the necessity of receiving every
month at least the total requirement of coal, set at 1,050,000 tons per
month, plus a minimum of an additional 150,000 tons, according to a
* Ebertiard Weichold.
NOVEMBER 1941 755
standing request which your competent agencies have not been able
to approve before now. 8
Before closing this letter, I should like to give you a sketch of
Italy's internal situation. I know that, especially after my visit to
your General Headquarters — a visit which has left an indelible im-
pression on my mind — currency has been given, also in Germany,
to many rumors which are not only without foundation but simply
ridiculous. The enemy propaganda has once more furnished proof
of its stupidity. The "facts" have an irrefutable eloquence of their
own and the actuality demonstrates that the measure taken by my
Government in recent times have left the entire Italian people in
perfect tranquility. And the measures are very stringent if you
recall that the basic ration of bread is 200 grams a day, that of fats is
at a monthly rate of 400 grams, and that of meat at a monthly rate of
400 grams, but practically nil in thousands of communities ; 500 grams
of sugar a month, and 1,000 grams of potatoes a month. But this
austere food rationing system does not cause me undue concern. The
material living standard of the Italian people has always been more
than modest ; it cannot be otherwise if you recall, Fiihrer, that for
every square kilometer of Italian territory there is a population of 142.
In regard to the question of consumption I feel so reassured that I
have announced that the food ration system will also be continued
after the war and become permanent so as to establish a balance be-
tween consumption and production.
In the political area the party has complete control of the situation.
That in a country of nearly 46 million inhabitants there should be a
few tens of thousands of adversaries is more than understandable, but
these splinters are of practically no account and are of no interest to
political affairs but only to the police.
The thinking majority of the Italian people follows with admira-
tion the feats of your armed forces, is determined to march at the side
of Germany during the war and after, and, as I have told you above,
wishes more than anything else to make a larger contribution to what
will be the common victory.
Accept, Fiihrer, the hearty expression of my comradely friendship
and fidelity, in the hope to meet you as soon as possible on Italian
soil.
Mtjssohni
* In telegram Del. No. 1 of Aug. 31 (4877/E253172-73) the Embassy in Italy
transmitted and supported a request of the Italian Government for an additional
50,000 tons of coal. See also vol. xn of this series, documents Nos. 641 and 652.
In a memorandum of Nov. 18 (1517/372977-80) Clodius reported a conversa-
tion with Alfleri who stressed the requests of the Duce regarding fuel oil and
coal.
In a memorandum of Nov. 29 (1517/373004-08) Clodius lists production and
transport difficulties as reasons why an increase of coal deliveries could not be
accomplished. _.
756 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN" FOREIGN POLICY
No. 455
77/58298-301
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 3890 of November 6 Madhid, November 7, 1941 — 1 : 00 a. m.
Received November 7 — 2 : 50 a. m.
With reference to our telegram No. 3792 of October 30. 1
The presence of General Orgaz, the Spanish High Commissioner
in Morocco, provided an opportunity for a detailed discussion of the
propaganda situation in Morocco. First there was an exchange of
views between the Foreign Minister, General Orgaz, Counselor of
Embassy Lazar, and me, at a dinner at my house; then I called on both
General Orgaz and the Foreign Minister, in order to discuss once more
the whole complex of questions in detail.
The result of this discussion : Orgaz at first took the stand that all
foreign propaganda in the Moroccan area of Spain was undesirable
and had to be prevented. Vigorous objections were expressed against
this tendency of equating German with English propaganda, and these
objections were successful.
Orgaz accordingly agreed to the following proposal :
1. Encouragement of German propaganda activity if it does not
involve propaganda among the natives that is harmful to Spanish
iiit&rBsfcs *
2. The' combating of English propaganda by official and practical
means so far as possible.
Re 1. The Foreign Minister and Orgaz declared themselves in
agreement with the establishment of an agency of the Press Division
of the Embassy at the Consulate in Tangier, and the publication of a
news bulletin in Arabic.
Be 2. General Orgaz, as well as the Foreign Minister, were well
informed about English propaganda methods in the Spanish Zone and
Tangier. The Spanish Government is protesting to the British Em-
bassy against the inadmissible channeling and dissemination of abusive
English propaganda material through English Consulates in Morocco.
Orgaz is trying to fight the distribution of English propaganda ma-
terial with police methods. He also wants to introduce a preliminary
censorship of the sensational English Tangier Gazette.
I received considerable support from the Foreign Minister in
achieving the triumph of our point of view.
'In this telegram (77/58295-97) Stobrer reported about extensive American
and British propaganda efforts In Tangier and Spanish Morocco, his protests to
the Spanish High Commissioner, and the lack of official German propaganda in
this area.
NOVEMBER 1941 757
In reply to the complaint of General Orgaz concerning German
meddling in indigenous policy, and concerning unsupervised German
propaganda activity altogether (see previous telegram), I stated:
I shall completely reject all German propaganda activity that is not
directed or ordered by the representative of the Keich. The Embassy
itself will take all measures to prevent all unauthorized German propa-
fanda. The elimination of any initiative taken from an unauthorized
irection will promote harmonious collaboration between the represen-
tation of the Keich and the Spanish authorities with a view to the de-
velopment of the propaganda in Morocco directed or ordered by the
former.
Even assuming the best will of the Spanish authorities and a system-
atic German propaganda, possibilities for exerting German influence
in Morocco must not be overestimated. Englishmen, with the support
of Americans, are working with a tremendous outlay of money. They
have rich Jewish elements entirely on their side and through bribes
and food deliveries exert extensive influence in international and
indigenous circles.
To supplement our propaganda in Spanish Morocco, it seems to
me — as I have repeatedly reported — ■* that a considerable expansion of
our missions in the Spanish Zone and Tangier is absolutely necessary.
As I reported, Orgaz has at various times pointed out to me (clear
text missing) to which of our Consulates, particularly Tangier, com-
pared to the Missions of other powers, hardly make themselves felt.
In order to remedy this condition, I repeat my request for an increase
in personnel, the assignment of at least one Military Attache or mili-
tary observer to the Consulate in Tangier. The elevation of the
Consulate in Tangier to the rank of a Consulate General is likewise
desirable, because all other countries represented there, even small
ones, maintain Consulates General, whose chiefs moreover have the
title of Minister (the U. S. Mission even calls itself a Legation).
I also consider it absolutely necessary to provide the Consul at Tangier
especially with considerable financial resources in order that he may
be enabled to perform the necessary functions of representation, etc.,
on a par with those of the other Consuls General. Consul General
Noehring at Tangier is in an especially difficult situation, because,
although the former Legation property was returned, the house is
uninhabitable (dilapidated and unfurnished). Noehring would,
therefore, have to receive funds to rent another representative building
and live in the proper style. For the representative of Greater Ger-
many in Tangier to continue in this Cinderella-like existence is, in
my opinion, impossible in this oriental milieu, in which outward
appearances count for so much.
* Stohrer had asked for such an expansion in telegram No. 2571 of July 30
(77/58279) and telegram No. 3187 of Sept. 15 (77/58292).
758 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOEEIGN POLICY
General Orgaz has asked Counselor of Embassy Lazar to come to
Morocco for his personal orientation. He will accept this invitation
as soon as possible.
I should be grateful if, upon submission of the report of Counselor
of Embassy Lazar * concerning press conditions in Morocco, Consul
General Noehring were summoned to Berlin for discussion of further
details.
Stohreh
* This report has not been found.
No. 456
1517/372932-33
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
secret Rome, November 7, 1941 — 9 : 05 p. m.
No. 2828 of November 7 Eeceived November 7 — 12 : 00 midnight.
On my visit today in connection with some other business (cf. my
telegram No. 2824 of today's date *) , Count Ciano received me with
the remark that he had had the intention of summoning me for the
purpose of bringing to the attention of my Government a matter
that was somewhat disturbing to the Duce. It concerned the Mitro-
vica territory which because of its mineral resources had at the time
of the discussions between him and the Reich Foreign Minister in
Vienna 2 been in fact assigned to the future rump Serbia, despite its
purely Albanian character. It was not his intention by any means
to reopen the basic question of that award, the less so because he re-
membered that the Reich Foreign Minister had on that occasion in
Vienna been very firm on the subject. But Ciano could not help
saying, however, that a gesture of the Fiihrer, giving Mitrovica to its
original country, Albania, would make a very profound impression
both over there and here in Italy. I reacted to this remark merely
by saying that it had been my impression in Vienna that the arrange-
ments made at that time were to have definitive character. Count
Ciano then read to me a very long report from the Governor General
of Albania, Jacomini, giving an account to the Government here of
certain developments in the Mitrovica territory, which, if correct,
would fill the Duce's mind with uneasiness. 3 They referred essen-
tially to the fact that the local German military authorities, endeavor-
ing to organize an effective administrative machinery and having no
'Not printed (2281/482633).
' See vol. 3ir of this series, documents Nos. 378 and 385.
" Cf. The Ciano Diaries, entry for Nov. 7, 1941.
NOVEMBEE 1941 759
Serbs available in view of the purely Albanian character of the terri-
tory, -were relying on Albanians and, on top of that, anti-Italian
Albanian emigrants for the most part. They [the emigrants], as the
report related, were supposed to establish some sort of autonomous
political entity under German sovereignty, which was envisioned to
form a rallying point for all of Albania. The government of this
state-like territory would subsequently be turned over to the son of
the ex-Prince of Albania, Prinz Wied. The report further asserted
that the militia, which is composed of Albanians, was to take its oath
to the Fiihrer in the near future, and also related that an official of
the Foreign Ministry, whose name is given as Feninger, had recently
arrived there to put the measures described into appropriate form.
Ciano added to his statement that he was not unduly worried by
these reports and that he had therefore suggested to the Duce that he
discuss them with the Reich Foreign Minister orally at their next
meeting. The Duce had nevertheless instructed him to bring the matter
to my immediate attention.
May I request that I be furnished with instructions.*
Mackensen-
* Document No. 497.
No. 457
1517/372934
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy
Telegram
No. [3013] 1 Berlin, November 7, 1941.
[Sent November 8.]
e.o. Pol TV . . .
The Foreign Ministry is being deluged with mutual accusations
from both Rumanian and Hungarian quarters. The Hungarian Min-
ister has stated here that Rumanian-Hungarian relations have reached
a critical stage. 2 There are statements of the same sort from Bucha-
rest, too. We do not believe, to be sure, that any military action by
Rumania against Hungary, for which there are no indications of any
sort is imminent. Still, the development of Rumanian-Hungarian
relations causes concern. We would be interested in knowing here
whether the Italian Government is also constantly being confronted
1 The file copy of this document is a draft ; the telegram number and the date
of dispatch are supplied from Rome telegram No. 2883 of Nov. 10 (1517/872946-
47) which was the reply to this instruction.
1 Weizsacker's memorandum, StS No. 734, of Not. 6 (93/104353-54) records
a discussion on thia topic with Sztdjay, the Hungarian Minister.
760 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
with mutual Hungarian and Rumanian complaints, and whether it
has any ideas of how a settlement might be brought about. We here
have, of course, adhered firmly to the Vienna Award and have given
both parties clearly to understand that we consider intolerable any
disturbing of the accord between the allies fighting against
Bolshevism.
Wire your report.*
Weizsaoker
'In his reply (see footnote 1) Mackensen stated that, according to Anfuso,
the Italians were Indeed receiving constantly Rumanian and Hungarian com-
plaints ; Ciano had now intimated to Bismarck that he would welcome German
proposals on how to cope with these difficulties. -
No. 458
32^25031-35
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan 1
No. 2047 of November 9 Berlin, November 9, 1941—11 : 30 p.m. 2
Pol. VIII 1630.
Drafting Officer : Counselor Schumburg.
From the reports of the German Embassy in Washington, particu-
larly of the Military Attache" during the last 2 months, the following
appraisal of American- Japanese relations emerges :
1. American propaganda is operating with respect to Japan with
the crude weapons of intimidation or threats, obviously not without
success. For example, the Japanese Embassy in Washington and its
Armed Forces Attaches have reported to Tokyo that in the event Jap-
anese policy in the Far East is activated, armed intervention by the
United States can unquestionably be expected. 3 American propa-
ganda emphasizes Japanese anxieties about raw materials and stresses
American military superiority in the Pacific. Pointing to the arma-
ment capacity of the United States the press there warns the Japanese
against intervening in the conflict on the side of the Axis. The Amer-
ican press studiously avoids carrying reports of Japanese activity
1 It appears from a Woermann minute of Nov. 4 (82/60809) that Bibbentrop
himself had requested that this instruction be drafted, suggesting the use of
reports from Washington, especially from the Military Attache, which made the
point "that the present situation was especially" favorable for the realization of
Japan's political aspirations In the Far East."
! The typed date on the document is Nov. 6. The telegram number and the
time of dispatch are entered on this copy by hand.
"In a memorandum of Nov. 7 (82/60825-26) Counselor Braun recorded that
Ushiba, Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, after communicating the contents
of a recent telegram from Ambassador Nomura in Washington had commented
that "this report from Washington indicated for the first time a change in Ambas-
sador Nomura's appraisal of the American conditions ; heretofore Ambassador
Nomura had always considered America's entry into the war as imminent."
NOVEMBER 1941 761
against Thailand or Indochina, for example, but on the other hand
regularly disseminates reports on the strengthening of the American
or the British position in the Far East.
2. In reality, this big talk merely masks the fear that Japan may
perceive the weak side of the American position and, dropping the re-
strained and compromising attitude of the Konoye Cabinet, proceed
to activate her policy in the Far East. The American Government
is anxiously observing the increasingly plain signs of a Russian col-
lapse, which a Japanese intervention could accelerate to such an extent
that any hope of delaying a direct German attack on the British posi-
tion in the Middle East, possibly in connection with a simultaneous
Japanese attack on Singapore, would become illusory. If the Russian
front should collapse, however, the American-British war potential
would not be able at present to cope with such a concentrated German-
Japanese operation.
3. It is already evident from statistically verified information from
the Embassy that the American armaments industry is totally unable
to furnish the British ally anywhere near the promised quantity of war
material, in addition to supplying the Russian front, and at the same
time to bring the nation's own armaments up to a level that would in
the foreseeable future make a two-front war in the Atlantic and the
Pacific possible. From reliable information it is obvious, for example,
that in the period from March to August America exported only one-
tenth of the war material planned for.
4. The difficulty of transporting by sea these fragmented war de-
liveries to the British and Russian fronts forces the American Govern-
ment to avoid a conflict with Japan in the Pacific at all costs, especially
because the Japanese fleet could also in the event of conflict prevent
the entry of raw materials from India (manganese) vital to the Amer-
ican war industry. As long as Russian resistance had not been broken,
the American Government took an unyielding attitude toward the
Konoye Cabinet. In view of its inability to supply the Russian front
adequately it will now, to be sure, be inclined to make greater conces-
sions to Japan, but these could never meet Japan's needs for living
space.
5. Japan should therefore not fail to act when the moment is favor-
able. Perhaps never in history has a state been so favored by fate as
Japan is at this hour. Japan can now, without the risk of armed
American intervention, hazard any thrust in the area of the East, as
long as American territories (the Philippines) e-p American basis ^e*
«w materials ■ (Nothorkfikkj Indioo) * are not affected by such an
action. The American armaments industry is in the process of devel-
opment and is not in a position to satisfy the requirements of the
* The words scored through were deleted before the telegram was sent
762 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
British, Russian, and Chinese, in addition to the nation's own needs,
on any thing like the necessary scale. The American Navy is already
tied down in the Atlantic to such an extent that no Japanese action
need reckon any longer with the intervention of superior American
naval units. The American naval bases in Hawaii and in the Philip-
pines are not yet built up sufficiently to make a major American naval
operation safe.
I request that you use the above account of the state of American-
Japanese relations in speaking with influential Japanese and transmit
the same instruction also to Ambassador Stahmer upon his arrival. 5
Eibbenteop
"In the telegram forwarded to Tokyo as No. 1856 of Oct. 17 (191/138887)
Ribbentrop had notified Ott that Stahmer was about to depart for" Nanking to
assume his post there as Ambassador to the Japanese-sponsored Chinese Govern-
ment and that he had been instructed to call on Ott and jointly with him get in
touch with the Japanese politicians with whom he was acquainted.
No. 459
62/42403-4
The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Foreign
Minister
Teletype
ukgent Berlin, November 10, 1941.
Dir. Ha. Pol. 216.
Ha. Pol. VI 3267 1 Ang. II.
To the Special Train
Subject : Revaluation of the Danish crown.
The Danish Government has renewed its pressing demand for our
approval of a revaluation of the Danish crown. The same proposal
has several times been unanimously rejected by all interested Minis-
tries, most recently half a year ago. The Danes were told in this
connection that revaluation of the crown could be discussed in the
framework of the plan for a German-Danish customs and currency
union, which we promoted after the occupation of Denmark, but which
the latter rejected. 8
The strain on the Danish economy has meanwhile been so aggravated
by the outlays for the occupation forces and our debt in the clearing
with Denmark that inflationary tendencies, similar to those in the
'Ha. Pol. VI 3267: This was a circular letter of Oct. 28 (3182/695876-80)
from the Chairman of the German Governmental Committee for German-Danish
Trade to the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Economics, and the Reichsbank
regarding past Danish requests for a revaluation of the Danish currency and
subsequent German refusals.
1 See vol. i of this series, document No. 268 and footnote 5, and document No.
382.
NOVEMBER 1841 763
Balkan countries, can now be discerned. To be sure, despite the sharp
rise in prices it has been possible to keep wages on a fairly stable
level, but unless drastic steps are taken to prevent a further decline
in the living standard of the workers, it will be impossible any longer
to prevent also a rise in wages. The proposed revaluation of the
crown is regarded as necessary within the framework of such meas-
ures. If the incipient inflation cannot be checked by such measures,
we must expect social unrest in Denmark and a development similar to
that in Rumania, for example, which would also gravely affect Ger-
man interests {deliveries of essential food products, war contracts
placed in Denmark) .
For these reasons the Ministry of Economics, the Reichsbank, and
also the Ministry of Food, contrary to their earlier position, stated at
the deliberations of the Commercial Policy Committee that they
would approve revaluation of the crown up to 15 percent. z The Office
of the Four Year Plan and the Ministry of Finance on the other
hand raised certain objections and I have reserved stating the position
of the Foreign Ministry until later. Decision of the matter will be
held over until the next conference, which will be held next
Wednesday. 4
In consideration of the arguments in favor of revaluation of the
crown advanced in Germany's interest, and taking into account Den-
mark's internal political development, the Department for German
Internal Affairs of the Foreign Ministry will raise no objection to
the proposal. The Legation in Copenhagen likewise recommends
approval. 8
In the event that the domestic Ministries at the next conference
should unanimously approve revaluation of the crown at a rate that
would have to be negotiated with the Danes, I request authorization
for approving revaluation also on behalf of the Foreign Ministry.
To be submitted herewith through the State Secretary to the For-
eign Minister with the request for approval. 8
Wiehl
3 A record of the meeting of the Commercial Policy Committee of Nov. 8 has
been filmed on 3182/695808-901.
*This was Nov. 12. No record of this meeting has been found.
"In Copenhagen telegram No. 1453 of Nov. 10 (62/42405-08).
•A reply to this request haa not been found. On Jan. 5, 1942 (3182/695963)
the Minister of Finance informed the Foreign Ministry that in a meeting of
the same day an upward revaluation of the Danish crown to the extent of 8
percent had been approved. Of. Beretntng til Folketinget afgivet af den af
Folketinget under 8. Januar 1948 nedmtte (commission i henhold til Qrundlaven*
% 45 (Copenhagen, 1948} , vol. v, Bilag, pp. 515-556.
764 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 460
FV0557-86
Chancellor Hitler to Marshal Petain
At present at Fuhrer's Headquarters,
November 10, 1941.
Dear Marshal: Let me first thank you sincerely for the letter, 1
on the occasion of the anniversary of Montoire, in which you trans-
mitted to me your sentiments which have remained the same. I,
too, recall the moving hour in which I was able to make the acquaint-
ance of Your Excellency, the one-time Marshal of the French sol-
diers of the World War and respected Chief of the present French
State and its Government.
From your letter, M. Marshal, I believe I may deduce a painful
regret that the cooperation instituted a year ago has not led to the
results that one could have expected. I must point out, however,
that in this case there is no fault which lies on my side or in any
way on the German side. The unexpected change of government in
France which occurred only a few weeks later and the motivation
for this step which hurt me personally very much have led to dis-
appointments which are unfortunately not yet entirely overcome
even to this day. In your letter, M. Marshal, you complain of the
fact that there are still French prisoners of war in Germany. How-
ever, you will certainly recall that even more than a year and a half
after the end of the World War German prisoners of war were re-
tained in France. Incidentally, almost 40 percent of the French
soldiers which we took prisoner — including those which we had al-
ready released during the operations — have been restored to their
families. Above all, however, M. Marshal, may I point out one fact :
It was not Germany which had declared war on France, but France
on Germany ! And this without any sort of reason or motive ! Even
after the failure of my numberless offers I personally applied to the
French Ambassador in Berlin a few days before the outbreak of the
war and asked him to try to get the French Government not to
threaten Germany with military measures but to use its great in-
fluence to counsel Poland to reach an understanding with Germany. 2
It was a shock to me and to every German to have to look on while
the strongest military power on the Continent not only had to let
itself be provoked in the most unseemly manner by something which,
militarily speaking, can only be considered a small country, but over
and above that to see also the countries with which we have no serious
quarrels whatsoever, and to which I had always offered German
1 Document No. 417.
' See vol. vn of this series, Editors' Note, p. 284.
NOVEMBER 1941
765
friendship, pushed into war in a truly incomprehensible manner,
having rejected every attempt at an understanding. For without the
guilt of the French Government of that time England, too, could not
have dared, without any reason, simply to seize the first opportunity
for her criminal undertaking of a new world war. Thus through the
complicity of the French Government of that time over a million
Frenchmen are, to be sure, still in German captivity, but over nine
million German soldiers are in a bloody war !
I have learned, M. Marshal, that you have been indignant over
the execution of hostages on the occasion of the murder of German
officers. 8 I believe, M. Marshal, that the only one who has a right to
be indignant about these matters is I, unless it is the victims and the
families of the innocent German officers murdered from ambush.
For : 1. These officers are not in France for pleasure, but the French
declaration of war of September 3, 19S9, brought them into that coun-
try. They would all rather live in Germany among their families
than fulfill their occupation duties in a foreign country.
2. They did not perform in unworthy fashion, let alone abuse, the
mission which regardless of their wishes their duty as soldiers re-
quired of them.
We ourselves have adequate comparisons with the conduct of the
French authorities during the time of the occupation of the Khineland,
when they drove German citizens from the sidewalks with whips, and
not only men but also women and girls; when more than 16,000 Ger-
man women and girls were violated, some of them by blacks, without
the French military authorities in most cases having found it worth
the trouble to take steps against this; when, however, on the other
hand, offenses against the occupation authorities themselves were met
with the most severe punishments, yes, with deportation, and in many
cases with death. In contrast I should like, M. Marshal, to point
out to you that the German occupation authorities, officers and men,
have not acted similarly — not even in one single case, I believe — with
what at that time was so often the order of the day for the French
occupation troops. If however some unworthy person should any-
where have laid violent hands on French property, not to speak of a
French woman or girl — I do not know one single case of the latter-
then the person concerned would have been punished, and very se-
verely punished. You must be aware, M. Marshal, that there is the
death penalty for plundering and robbery, not to mention rape, and
that wherever we have occupation authorities we accord the French
people at least the same legal protection as our own German people.
a See document No. 422.
766 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOBEIGN POLICY
This, in a country whose leadership once left no doubt of their inten-
tion of dismembering Germany in case of victory, depriving us forever
of the Ehineland, evacuating millions of Germans, etc. I am writing
you this, M. Marshal, because I know that you yourself personally
never belonged to these provocateurs against the European peace, and
that you can therefore also evaluate how buondless my indignation is
when as the Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht I
must now see that German officers who are doing nothing but their
duty, and a duty that was imposed on them by France herself against
their own wills, are now. shot from behind by cowards. I have now
ordered that hostages are to be executed. And they will continue to be
executed until either the culprits have been found or these crimes have
stopped. In the case of these hostages they are, however, not just in-
nocent and harmless citizens, but elements all of whom had themselves
already committed offenses against the occupation authorities. Some
acted out of hatred with a Communist inspiration and some for hatred
based on de Gaullist reasons both of which are incomprehensible to us,
but their elimination is also in the highest interest of the French peo-
ple. Furthermore, it is only to be ascribed to the German good nature
that these partly criminal elements were not already sentenced to death
by a court martial because of their past conduct. For no occupation
authority in the world can tolerate having a violent uprising prepared
against it, often with the most abominable methods.
You, M. Marshal, as an old officer must and will understand this;
for immediately after the collapse of France I was willing, in spite
of knowledge of the French war aims, in contrast to the conduct
of France in 1918, to institute an epoch of reasonable reconciliation
and understanding. This also for the reason that I naturally realize
that all Frenchmen cannot be made responsible for the crime of
September 3, 1939. However, when this effort of mine is answered
with attempts against the lives of officers of my occupation power,
then I shall coldly and resolutely apply those methods which, accord-
ing to all past experience, are certain to restore absolute calm and
order within a short time through the destruction of those directly
and indirectly responsible. You must believe me, M. Marshal, that
such a decision is difficult for me, and that I would rather take the
other course which I had proposed to you a year ago in Montoire.*
For in the long run the Germans and the Frenchmen on this con-
tinent will be forced to live with and beside one another, and they
will live in whatever way they manage their lives, either well or
badly. The only ones who can be interested in a bad coexistence are
not the people whose existence is rooted in the Continent, but rather
* See vol. xr of this series, document No. 227.
NOVEMBER 1941 767
those powers which have always seen and always will see their past
and their future in the division of this continent. However, if the
Jewish-Anglo-Saxon world threat continues as heretofore, then their
rapacity will seek and find the objects to satisfy it less in Europe
itself than in the European colonies. Then, M. Marshal, France
will be considerably more threatened and in particular have more
to lose than Germany. I therefore continue to believe that — from
the larger point of view — it would accord with the interests of our
two nations to find the way to a sincere cooperation and to exclude
those who believe for some reasons or other that they cannot cooperate
in this way. In addition I should like to point out, M. Marshal, that
through the outbreak of this war, which was not caused by Germany,
the Wehrmacht and therewith the German people have now had to
assume a further fight which imposes heavy blood sacrifices upon
us once more, and which we are today fighting not only for
Germany but really for all of Europe. For if I had not decided
at the last minute on June 22 to move against the Bolshevist menace,
then it could have happened only too easily that with the collapse
of Germany the French Jews would have triumphed, but the French
people would likewise have been plunged into a horrible catastrophe.
For only the Wehrmacht alone, and this I may state without any
presumption, was capable of mastering this terrible force massing
against Europe. A failure on our part would have meant the end
of this continental culture for the next centuries, indeed perhaps
forever. The Anglo-Saxon warmongers, however, in their bottomless
foolishness would certainly have grasped too late what consequences
the Bolshevization of this continent would have involved not only
for our unhappy peoples but also for their own. I may therefore,
M. Marshal, express the expectation that the French Government for
its part, too, will do everything to counter, and to counter with effec-
tive methods, those elements which are trying just at this moment
to poison the relationship of the occupation authorities with the
French people. This is one of the prerequisites of being able at all
to continue a policy which I tried to introduce a year ago and which
you, M. Marshal, approved at that time.
Let me conclude this letter, M. Marshal, with the assurance of my
personal respect for you, and with the wish that for the advantage
of our two peoples and therewith for that of all of Europe the way
of cooperation will be found after all which will help in ending
successfully a war in whose continuation only the eternal enemies of
Europe can have an interest. Germany at any rate is resolved this
time to reject compromises once and for all. Our will to secure
768 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Europe for the future against the repetition of such a danger is
unalterable.
With the sincerest wishes,
Yours, Adolf Hitler s
6 The letter was banded to Petain by Abetz on Nov. 16 at 11 : 00 a.m. (see
document No. 478).
No. 461
260/170331
Memorandvmi by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 738 Berlin, November 10, 1941.
The Finnish Minister mentioned to me today the new American
memorandum 1 regarding the continuation of the Finnish campaign
against Russia. Mr. Kivimaki said that the answer would be given
within the next few days. 2 It would of course be negative and would
sound quite similar to the reply given to England a month ago, 3 They
had drawn on the Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament for advice,
not because they thought of watering down the reply but rather in
order to deprive the Americans of the chance to say that the reply was
not supported by the entire Finnish people.*
Weizsacker
1 The text of an initial American memorandum of Oct 27 was forwarded to
Berlin in Helsinki telegram No. 1204 of Oct. 28 (260/170267-69). In this memo-
randum the United States Secretary of State urged that Finland make peace
with the Soviet Union on a line corresponding to the border of 1939 between Fin-
land and the Soviet Union. Of. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol.
i, pp. 81-54.
In telegram No. 1211 of Oct. 29 (260/170274) Bllicher reported regarding his
discussion of this initial American memorandum with Witting and the probable
form of the Finnish reply.
In telegram No. 1227 of Oct. 31 (260/170280) Bltleher reported that the Ameri-
can Minister, Schoenfeld, had delivered a new memorandum, longer and some-
what sharper in tone than the first. Witting felt restrained from giving Bllicher
the text of this memorandum.
In telegram No. 1246 of Nov, 4 (260/170294-95) Zechlin was able to report the
text which at his request was given him by Witting. The memorandum stated
that Finnish military operations gave assistance to the cause of Nazi world
aggression and had become a direct threat to the security of the United States
and it urged that Finland immediately discontinue such military operations.
Of. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. i, pp. 84-85.
'On Nov. 8 in telegram No. 1274 (260/170317-319) Zechlin was able to report
from Helsinki that he had been able through a confidential agent to get an outline
of the Finnish answer to the American memorandum. In telegram No. 1291
of Nov. 11 (260/170337-^7) Zechlin forwarded a German translation of the text
of the Finnish reply which had come to him in a confidential manner. Cf.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. i, pp. 91-98.
a See document No. 353.
* In telegram No. 1305 of Nov, 13 (260/170354) Bllicher reported that Witting
was making great effort to give the Finnish memorandum the broadest publicity
in the United States.
NOVEMBER 1941 769
No. 462
263/173383-S4
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey
Telegram
PRIORITY
most urgent Special Train, November 11, 1941 — 11 : 50 p. m.
No. 1246 of November 11 from the Special Train
Received Berlin, November 12 — 12 : 15 a. m.
No. 1627 of November 12
from the Foreign Ministry Sent November 12.
RAM491/B
Secret for officer in charge.
The pact against the Communist International that was concluded
between Germany, Japan and Italy in 1936 and 1937, 1 and acceded to
by Hungary, Manchukuo, and Spain in 1939, 2 will expire on Novem-
ber 25, 1941. The German, Italian, and Japanese Governments have
agreed to extend the Pact. Furthermore, during the preliminary ne-
gotiations on the extension, the three Governments have decided to
approach a number of additional European countries calling on them
to use this opportunity to accede to the pact. 3 For this purpose we will
now first sound out the Eumanian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Slovak, and
Finnish Governments confidentially on whether they would accept
an official invitation to join if such were addressed to them.
I now wonder whether the time may not have arrived to take a fur-
ther step with the Turks also toward closer cooperation in the spirit
of Europe going beyond the trade agreement. The Anti-Comintern
Pact, which does not contain any political conditions of any sort but
merely represents an agreement on joint defense against internal
communist subversive activity, could perhaps provide such a plat-
form. I personally have the feeling, however, that a certain political
element which, after all, is inherent in such an agreement of this sort
could still be too much for the Turks even today, but I would like to
have your personal opinion as Ambassador, who observes matters at
close quarters. I therefore request you to telegraph me your opinion
without reservation. I must, however, exact from you the commit-
ment not in any circumstances to talk about this inquiry and this tele-
gram to anyone at all in your Embassy, not to mention it to any
person on the outside, not even in the most confidential way. You
know how easily very disagreeable repercussions can otherwise occur
1 See vol. i of this series, document No. 463, footnote 2a, and document No. 17.
* See vol. v of this series, document No. 269, footnote 2 and vol. hi of this
series, document No. 768.
' See documents Nos. 405, 442, and 443.
682-905—64 54
770 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
in case of an indiscretion. I should therefore like to ask you to send
me your opinion as soon as possible in a telegram directed exclusively
to me.*
Ribbentrop
* See document No, 464.
No. 463
405/214027
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris
Telegram
Special Train, November 11, 1941.
No. 1249 of November 11 from the Special Train
Received Berlin, November 12 — 2 : 45 a. m.
No. 5060 of November 12
from the Foreign Ministry Sent November 12.
RAM 494
For the Ambassador personally.
With reference to your telegram No. 3431 of November 3. 1
I refer to the communications which, according to your telegram,
were made to you by Benoist-M&min and de Brinon regarding the
recall of General Weygand. Please inform the French Government
through an appropriate oral communication to Benoist-Mechin or
Ambassador de Brinon that the Eeich Government has already in-
formed the French Government, upon its inquiry, that General "Wey-
gand does not in any way enjoy the confidence of the Eeich Govern-
ment. 2 "Whether France wishes to draw the appropriate conclusions
from this the Eeich Government has to leave up to the French Gov-
ernment. The Reich Government is of the opinion that it is erroneous
to connect with this question any sort of French wishes such as were
communicated to you. 8
Wire report on execution of this instruction.*
ElBBENTROP
1 Document No. 445.
* Document No. 419. _ ,_„ m „ , ,
* In telegram No. 282 of Nov. 13 from Wiesbaden (405/214040-42) Welck re-
ported that the German Armistice Commission, while rejecting an uncondi-
tional acceptance of all French military requests, was ready to adopt an
accommodating attitude once Weygand's dismissal had been accomplished.
* Such a report by Abetz haB not been found. See, however, document No. 478.
NOVEMBER 1941 771
No. 464
26B/1T3385-88
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram.
top secret Ankara, November 12, 1941.
No. 1432 of November 12 Keceived November 12—11 : 05 p. m.
For the Foreign Minister personally.
With reference to your telegram No. 1627 of November 12. 1
Your feeling that this question is absolutely a political issue here
is very justified. Since the Bolshevist question never was nor will be
of importance in purely agrarian Turkey, accession by Turkey would
be interpreted everywhere as a pronounced option in favor of the
Axis. However, the moment for such an option is still too early. This
is so in the first place because of the attempt to make the English ready
for a compromise as you can see from my last dispatch. 2 In regard to
this Numan also recently proposed close cooperation with Spain. 3 In
the second place because in case of an option in favor of us Turkey
would have to fear that a part of the ethnically Turkish minorities
in Russia would be liquidated.
^ The evolution of Turkey will proceed with the progress of the opera-
tions. When the situation has become ripe for decision the Turkish
Government, in my opinion, would then opt quite openly and not
choose a detour via the Anti- Comintern Pact. It would then only be
necessary for it to find an explanation for detaching itself from its
English commitments, which would be plausible and defensible be-
fore world opinion. To this extent I consider it valuable that the peace
feelers which the Turkish Government haB put out be sharply re-
jected in England and America.
The foregoing matter will, of course, not be discussed with anyone.
Papen
1 Document No. 462.
* Presumably a reference to Papen's dispatch of Nov. 6 (2361/488747-52) It
reported an account given by Menemencioglu of his conversation with the Am-
bassador of Great Britain and of the United States who had inquired about a
passage In President InSnfl's address on Oct. 29 referring to the possibility of
Turkish mediation for peace.
' See document No. (501, footnote 24.
772 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 465
1857/422347-48
The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
secret Washington-, November 13, 1941 — 5 : 55 p.m.
No. 3938 of November 12 Received November 14 — 6 : 20 a.m.
With reference to my telegrams Nos. 3646 of October 20 1 and 3373 of
September 27. 2
Eoosevelt is ruthlessly continuing to press the drive against the
opposition and its leaders with all available means. Roosevelt's chief
antagonist and obstruction to his foreign policy of intervening is the
America First Committee, now numbering over 15 million members.
Secretary of the Interior Ickes declared open war on it in his speech
of October 20, by calling for an. investigation of the methods of financ-
ing the organization, allegedly supplied by subversive Nazi funds.
Following Lindbergh's attack on the Jews, 3 Baruch 4 was given the
job of undermining the America First Committee from within by
the use of Jewish money. At the same time the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation and the propaganda squads of the Justice Department
are proceeding against the publishers of the well-known magazines
Scrioner's Commentator and Herald as the two principal publicity
media of the America First Committee. 5
The danger exists that many leading members of the Committee
will be so intimidated by these methods that they will resign. In
order that this useful organization not disintegrate, the press officer,
•This telegram (1857/422217-19) reported on the arrest and prosecution of
an American lawyer who had confessed having accepted money from a German
agent for propaganda against the Lend-Lease bill.
"This telegram (1543/375867-68) dealt with the activities of the Federal Gov-
ernment in fighting the opposition.
i Apparently a reference to Lindbergh's speech at Dea Moines on Sept. 11 m
■which he stated that "the three most important groups who have been pressing
this country toward the war are the British, the Jewish, and the Roosevelt
Administration." ■*=,.• -n a
'Bernard M. Baruch, American financier, Chairman, War Industries noara,
1918—1919
' These two publications, the former a monthly, the latter a weekly were pub-
lished in Lake Geneva, Wisconsin. It appears from Tnomsen's telegram No. 3395
of Sept. 30 (1543/375874-75) that the Serald had received financial support
from the Embassy. Regarding German support for Seribner's Commentator, see
the record of the testimony by Counselor of Legation Heribert Strempel printed
in Nazi Conspiracy ana Aggression (Washington, Government Printing Office,
1947) , Supplement A (document 3800-PS), pp. 571-573. For the relationship of
these magazines to the America First Committee, cf. Wayne S. Cole, America
First {Madison, 1953) , pp. 133, 140.
NOVEMBER 1941
773
through his confidential agents, is endeavoring to ensure that should
General Wood, who is the present chairman, resign, Lindbergh
would take over the leadership. Despite all attacks and calumnies on
the part of the interventionists, Lindbergh's prestige and popularity
are on the increase. The negotiations are conducted in such a way
that the Embassy's part in them cannot be discerned.
Part of this campaign of defamation of the opposition is the action
of the Attorney General's office against the leading isolationist Repub-
lican Representative Hamilton Fish and against Viereck 8 for spread-
ing "Nazi propaganda", in other words, accusing leading isolationists
of [abusing] the Congressional franking privilege. 7
Thomsen
" George Sylvester Viereck, an American citizen who was public relations coun-
selor for the German Library of Information in New York and correspondent of
the M Unchner Neuesten Naohrichten.
T Thls seems to refer to Viereck's arrest on Oct 8 which was dealt with in
Thomsen's telegram No. 8502 of Oct. 10 (1857/422138-39) reporting that the
Justice Department had instituted proceedings against Viereck on grounds of
violation of the law concerning registration of agents of a foreign government.
With regard to Representative Hamilton Fish the reference seems to be to news-
paper reports published on Nov. 10 according to which Representative Fish had
received a summons to appear before the federal grand jury investigating
Nazi propaganda.
No. 466
239/154388
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
Bucharest, November 13, 1941 — 9 : 35 p. m.
No. 3726 of November 13 Received November 13 — 11 : 30 p. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 3128 of November 10. 1
M. Antonescu, whom I informed of the contents of the instruction
referred to above, stated to me that the Rumanian Government would
leave it to the Reich Government to deport the Jews with Rumanian
citizenship to the ghettos in the east, together with the German Jews.
The Rumanian Government had no interest in the return of the
Rumanian Jews to Rumania.
VON KlLLINGER
1 A marginal note identifies this as D III 536 : Not found.
774 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 467
498/233930
The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Spain
Cipher Letter
top secret Berlin, November 13, 1941.
No. 2654 g Es. Received November 13.
Pol.III826g.Rs.
Top Secret. To be deciphered only by someone cleared for Top
Secret materials. To be presented immediately to the Chief of Mis-
sion. Answer by courier or secret cipher letter.
With reference to your report No. 2425 g Rs. of September 2. 1
The conditions for a further broadening of our military relations
with Spain do not exist at the present time. The three branches of
the Wehrmacht have been instructed anew by the Chief of the OKW
that they are not authorized to conduct reconnaissances in Spain or
to carry on military discussions with the Spaniards.
Please refrain, as in the past, from discussing with members of the
Spanish Government the preparation of any sort of joint military
actions or the entry of Spain into the war.
WOERMAJW
1 See document No. 273.
No. 468
41/28229-39
Memorandum by the Foreign Minister x
Westfalen, November 13, 1941.
Brief for the Ftjhrer 2
After this year's events in Iraq, Syria, and Iran, England now con-
trols an unbroken stretch of land connecting its position at the Suez
Canal in the west with the Indian realm which forms the keystone
of the Empire in the east. A solid area of English control extends
1 This document is based on a more detailed memorandum in two parts which
Woermann submitted on Nov. 6 (41/28200; 41/28202-14). The first part bore
the title "Questions of the Near Bast", the second part "Special Assignments
for Matters of the Near East". The memorandum was drawn up in compliance
with a request of the Foreign Minister, transmitted by Bruns on Oct. 27 (41/-
28201), for an interim report by Woermann on what had been done so far in
Pan-Arab, Pan-Turanian, and Indian matters.
3 Marginal notes :
"Shown to the Fiihrer".
"See separate memorandum. Hew[el], Nov.15."
The last marginal note apparently refers to document No. 475.
NOVEMBER 1941 775
from the boundaries of Cyrenaica all the way to Singapore. It goes
without saying that as regards this region our policy must first and
foremost be guided by military needs and therefore must serve the
purpose of defeating England. Political propaganda measures must
pave the way for permanently eliminating England from these areas.
To this must be added the problems connected with a future orga-
nization of the territories lying to the north of this belt of countries,
which now are part of the Soviet Union, for example, the Caucasus
and that part of Central Asia heretofore in Russian hands, where
because of the dominant Turkic ethnic element in the population
conditions are ripe for a Pan-Turanian movement. The important
thing, after a collapse of Soviet Russia, is to prevent these regions
from possibly serving England as a cordon sanitaire for her Indian
realm, and to organize them in such a manner as would take into ac-
count the objectives of German policy in the east. Thus, policy and
propaganda are faced with comprehensive tasks in southwest Asia,
and the following steps should be taken for their accomplishment :
I. The Arab Question.
All utterances made by Arab leaders indicate that the alpha and
omega for the Arab world is a new political declaration of the Axis
Powers on independence for the Arab countries. The German declara-
tion broadcast by radio on October 21, 1940, 3 is judged by the Arab
world in general as being inadequate. It confined itself to expressing
the complete sympathy of Germany and Italy with the efforts of the
Arab countries to attain their independence. A new statement of pol-
icy by Germany and Italy in favor of the Arab world appears abso-
lutely indispensable because its absence is an obstacle to loyal coopera-
tion with the Arabs. It seems all the more necessary to issue such a
statement soon, as according to available information, England, too
has begun to make new promises to the Arab states with a view toward
the formation of a Greater Arab federation.
As a basis of such a declaration there is already available the text
proposed by the Grand Mufti and approved by the Duce, which is
attached,* and which would be acceptable to us with minor changes.
The text does not go into details about the organization of the Arab
region, notably it makes no mention of a federal union of Arab states,
but promises them independence. Since this formula also includes
Syria, the statement presumably will not be well received in France,
but this can be disregarded. Ambassador von Papen has been asked
for an opinion as to whether such a declaration might be expected to
* See vol. xi of this series, documents Nos. 190 and footnote 4, 496, and 596.
'Attachment not printed (41/28240-41). This is the text transmitted in
document No. 449.
776 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
have unfavorable repercussions on Turkish policy. 5 Presumably this
is not the case, since the declaration requested by the Mufti would
not rule out the possibility of meeting Turkish wishes for minor
frontier rectifications, as in the region of Aleppo, Before a perma-
nent settlement of the Arab question is undertaken, it will be necessary
to get in touch with the Turkish Government. The moment for such
a discussion, however, has not yet come.
From the standpoint of German policy there would be no objec-
tions if after the war Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and Transjordan were
united into a Greater Arab federation which would then enter into a
relationship of friendship and alliance with Germany and Italy.
Given their military and financial weakness, these countries would
in all circumstance be dependent upon such support by the Axis
Powers.
At present the Grand Mufti is in Berlin and has asked to be re-
ceived by me and, if at all possible, also by the Fiihrer. As he was
received by the Duce promptly after he arrived in Rome, I should like
to propose to the Fiihrer to have him come to Headquarters here, on
a date to be set by the Fiihrer, at which time he could get the
Fiihrer's promise in principle that the declaration intended for the
Arab world, which he had requested, would be issued. It would still
be best if we held back regarding the date for the publication of such
a declaration, with respect to which, in any case, agreement would
have to be reached also with the Italian Government.
The next step then would be the establishment of a council of Arab
leaders in. Berlin. 6 Besides the Grand Mufti and the Syrian pioneer
of Arab independence, Fawzi al-Qawuqchi,' we can draw upon suita-
ble Arab personalities here and in Turkey, who might join such a
council of leaders. There is hope that it will be possible to employ
former Iraqi Minister President Gaylani in this capacity. For the
moment the Turkish Government refuses to issue to him an exit permit,
but attempts are underway to get him out of the country by under-
ground means.
For propaganda into the Near East, radio broadcasting is by far
the most effective weapon. Broadcasts in Arabic are made daily from
Berlin. The Athens radio station has now also been made available
* The relevant Instruction waa sent to Ankara as telegram No. 1638 of Nov. 12
(2361/488761-62). Papen"s reply In Ankara telegram No. 1446 of Nov. 13 (71/-
50940) stated that such a declaration "undoubtedly would cause a certain
amount of annoyance on the part of the Turkish Government unless It were dis-
cussed in advance." Papen thought that it would be sufficient if he were in-
structed to inform Turkey that Germany would issue a declaration in general
terms about the sovereignty and independence of Arab states but that "this
would not prejudice the settlement of certain territorial questions."
* Marginal note in BIbbentrop's handwriting : "In Home."
T See document No. 1G5.
NOVEMBER 1941 777
for this propaganda work. Action "will also be stepped up regarding
other ways of exerting influence by the press, especially periodicals.
Side by side with this go the special military preparations with
which Special Staff Felmy 8 is charged. The Foreign Ministry
maintains close contact with this Special Staff, in order to ensure
coordination of joint programs.
II. British India.
Preparations for stepping up our propaganda with a view to en-
couraging India's independence movement are in the hands of State
Secretary Keppler, who is working closely with the Indian, Bose, in
this matter. At the moment the chief element of this preparatory
work concerns the establishment of an Indian Legion recruited from
Indian prisoners of war in our hands, and the organization of a "free
India" central office under Bose's direction. The point of departure
for our policy with regard to India, similarly to that toward the Arab
question, must be the publication of a declaration by the Axis Powers
concerning a free India. "We know that Bose has been insistently
urging since the spring that such a declaration be issued by the Axis
Powers as early as possible. 9 The moment for such a declaration,
however, will come only when it is clearly discernible that England
does not manifest any willingness to make peace even after the final
collapse of Russia. There is no need for the declaration on a free
India to coincide in time with the one regarding the independence of
the Arab countries ; rather, it would seem preferable to issue the dec-
laration regarding the Arab countries first and to issue the one relat-
ing to India on a separate occasion, so that each measure would carry
its own full effect.
Large-scale propaganda directed at India will become possible only
when the declaration regarding a free India has been published. Such
propaganda effort will have to operate chiefly with radio broadcasts
for which at present the Berlin transmitter has already been made
available. The use of the Zemun transmitter for broadcasts of the
free India central office is being planned. Further intensification of
this propaganda will become possible when, as a result of our troops
advancing into Caucasia, stations located nearer to India, such as
perhaps the transmitter at Tiflis, can be utilized for this, or provision
is made for mobile transmitters.
As may be seen from the enclosed copy of State Secretary Keppler's
memorandum of November 13, 10 an English counterpropaganda action
has recently begun which is intended to discredit Bose with the Indian
population as having gone over to the Axis Powers and to promote
his antagonist, Pandit Nehru, as in accordance with England's intent.
* See vol. sir of this series, documents Nos. 543 and 606, footnote 4.
' See vol. to of tills series, documents Nos. 300, 323, and 553.
" Not printed (41/28242-44).
778 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
In other ways, too, Bose's activities in Germany have already been
made known, as shown by the telegram mentioned in the memorandum
which was sent to Bose by the Indian Independence League in Japan.
I intend to act in accordance with State Secretary Keppler's proposal
that I discuss personally with Bose the resulting new developments in
the situation. 11 Our decision to defer for the time being a declaration
of the Axis Powers concerning a free India will not have to be altered
by us despite the reports circulated by the English. On the contrary,
they confirm that the English camp is already beginning to show
anxiety as a consequence of Bose's presence in Germany.
III. Pan-Turanian Movement.
The Pan-Turanian question is being handled in the Foreign Min-
istry by Minister von Hentig who is particularly familiar with the
Mohammedan countries. 12 For the purpose of forming a special com-
mittee, he is currently gathering together the East-Turkic expellees
who are living in Turkey, France, or Germany and who are par-
ticularly suitable for promoting the Pan-Turanian movement. The
difficulty in the development of any Pan-Turanian movement has been
that such a movement heretofore has been largely limited to small
groups of Turks educated in literature and history, whereas the great
mass of the ethnically Turkic population in the present Soviet Union
really do not have any feeling of Pan-Turanian solidarity. These
people, split up in various tribes such as the Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kirghiz,
Kazaks, Kalmucks, Tartars, etc., fill the entire region from the north-
ern border of Afghanistan to the middle Volga and also a considerable
portion of Caucasia (including Baku). They are solidly Moham-
medan arid are antagonistic to the Eussians. However, these tribes
know very little about one another. Therefore, the first and foremost
task in any attempt to set in motion a Pan-Turanian movement is to
arouse a Pan-Turanian feeling of solidarity directed against the
Eussians. A federation of Turkic states could be taken as the ob-
jective for the future, and it is reasonable to expect that Turkey would
lend sympathetic support to such a movement, even if official Turkish
policy maintains its present attitude of being completely disinterested
in any territorial aspirations.
At present, means for activating a Pan-Turanian movement are
as yet limited. Eadio may afford some means, but its influence should
not be estimated very high, because only commissars and Jews have re-
ceiving sets. A campaign with leaflets, to be scattered by aircraft,
offers more prospects. Of special importance are ethnically Turkic
prisoners of war of Turcoman race. The OKW has issued orders that
" See document No. 521.
u See document No. 404.
NOVEMBER 1941 779
such prisoners be accommodated in separate camps. It remains to be
examined whether persons may be found among them who could be
used as emissaries to stir up partisan movements, etc.
It will not be possible to consider issuing a special declaration in
favor of the Turkic peoples until it has been shown that these can
be roused from their present lethargy and that they are striving to
break away from the Soviet regime. 18
In conclusion may I have instructions as to whether the Fiihrer, as
a first step toward realization of the program outlined, is willing to
receive Amin al-Husayni, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, at Fuhrer's
headquarters, and if so, when the Grand Mufti should arrive for
such a meeting."
R[ibbentbop]
" On Not. 16 Rlbbentrop submitted to Hitler a supplementary memorandum on
the Pan-Turanian question (41/28253-58) with data regarding the numerical
strength and geographic distribution of the eastern Turkic peoples in the
Soviet Union.
14 Marginal note in Hewel's handwriting : "In principle, yes. See special mem-
orandum."
See document No. 475.
[Editors' Note. In a conference at Hitler's headquarters on No-
vember 13, Admiral Eaeder, Commander in Chief, Navy, received Hit-
ler's approval for a set of new "directives for conduct of surface forces
on encountering American forces." The first paragraph of these
directives which are found in annex 2 of the minutes of this confer-
ence defines the general tenor of the directives as follows:
"Engagements with American naval or air forces are not to be sought
deliberately ; they are to be avoided as far as possible. Efforts to avoid
incidents are to be abandoned, however, as soon as the American forces
endanger our naval forces or other ships under our control, as supply
ships or prizes, by shadowing them, for instance. In such a case the
commander has the right to resort to arms in self-defense, and it is
then his duty to be sure he is not too late in using his weapons. He is to
try to destroy the enemy."
In presenting these directives to Hitler the Commander in Chief,
Navy pointed out that their aim was "on the one hand to lessen the
possibility of incidents with American forces, and on the other to
give the commanders clear guidance for their conduct when meeting
U.S. naval forces; guidance which is in keeping with strategic ne-
cessity and which upholds the prestige and honor of the German flag."
See U.S. Navy Department, ONI "Fiihrer Conferences on Matters
Dealing With the German Navy, 1941," vol. n, pp. 54-67.]
780 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 469
260/170357-58
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
top secret Helsinki, November 14, 1941 — 11 : 48 p. m.
No. 1316 of November 14 Received November 14 — 12 : 00 midnight.
1. The Foreign Minister today brought up the subject of the
memorandum on the nickle question, 1 which Minister Schnurre had
presented to M. Fieandt. The Foreign Minister expressed himself
very cautiously, avoiding even mention of the word concession. His
remarks, in substance, were as follows :
The Finns had taken over the mines as trustees and assured Ger-
many of approximately 90 percent of the production. The Finns are
scrupulous about fulfilling such obligations. Any attempt on the
part of Germany to find another solution now would create difficulties
in Parliament and among the public. One representative has already
sought to raise the issue in committee. The question of the nickel
mines must be pursued in a manner that would preclude unfriendly
critics from saying that in the nickel question the Germans were mak-
ing the same demands of the Finns as formerly did the Russians.
Moreover, English propaganda, which apparently had a secret
transmitter in the country, must not be handed material lending itself
to exploitation, and the same held for the United States.
2. The Foreign Minister made a point of saying that this was a
friendly communication, designed to avoid difficulties and not a
means of creating delays.
3. The Foreign Minister apparently is under the impression that
I. G. Farben is satisfied with the present arrangement. He gave me
to understand that progress would be aided by negotiations between
officers of the Finnish Ministry of Economics and representatives of
I. G. Farben. 2
Bluoher
'Not found. See document No. 429.
'In telegram No. 1504 of Dec. 11 (261/170434) Blticher reported that he had
learned from a confidential source that Kivlmfiki had received instructions to
give a negative answer in the question of the nickel concession. Kivlm&ki had
discussed the question with Schnurre who was very dissatisfied and indicated
that President Hyti had expressed different views.
NOVEMBER 1941 781
No. 470
1607/422S3T-3S
Memora/ndvm by Ambassador Dieckkoff
By teletype to the Foreign Minister
through the State Secretary
Berlin, November 14, 1941.
Regarding Yesterday's Vote in thb House of Representatives
on the netitralitt amendment
The House of Representatives voted 212 to 194, thus by a majority
of 18, to repeal the prohibition for United States merchants ships to
enter or pass through combat zones. The bill, which had previously
passed the Senate by 49 to 37 votes * now goes to the President and
after his signature will take effect shortly. 2 The same applies to the
bill repealing the prohibition on arming of merchant ships which
was adopted by the Senate by 50 to 37 votes and which the House of
Representatives had already passed by 259 to 138 votes on October
17. 3
As a result of these Congressional enactments, hardly anything
substantial remains of the Neutrality Act after the cash clause already
rescinded by the Lend-Lease Act * and now that the carry clause and
the prohibition against arming merchant ships are likewise eliminat-
ed.* It will require some time to arm United States merchant vessels
with guns and to muster the required crews for operating them. . On
the other hand, American ships may now begin at once to call at
English ports. 9
The interesting thing is that only 212 Representatives voted yester-
day for amending the Neutrality Act. The House of Representatives
has 435 members, which means that not even one-half of the Repre-
sentatives voted for the measure.
Thus, despite the greatest pressure from the President it was not
possible to mobilize the quorum of the House of Representatives for
1 On Nov. 7.
•Approved Nov. 17, 1941; U.S. Statutes at Large, 1941-1942, vol. 55, p. 784.
Sgg docuniGiit No 427
'Approved Mar. 11, 1941; U.S. Statutes at Large, 1941-1942, vol. 55, p. 31.
'The following is recorded in the minutes of Hitler's conference with the
Commander in Chief, Navy on Nov. 13 (see Editors' Note, p. 779) : "In reply to a
question from the Commander in Chief, Navy regarding the Filhrer's intention
in case Congress repeals the Neutrality Law, the Fiihrer stated that be would let
the order stand that all merchant ships, including American ones, may be
torpedoed without warning in the old blockade area. Further orders will depend
on how the situation develops."
'In telegram No. 3960 of Nov. 15 (1857/422355-57) Thomsen commented on
the expected practical effects of the dangers in the Neutrality Law on the
"battle for the supplies In the Atlantic."
782 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the measure. The President owes his victory solely to the fact that 29
Representatives were absent at the time of the vote. This point is to
be used for propaganda purposes.'
Dieckhoff
7 In Multex telegram No. 972 of Not. 21 (6506/HO70315), sent to all Missions
except Washington, "Woermann pointed out the increased danger of incidents
as a result of the new legislation emphasizing at the same time, however, that
the vote in Congress showed "that there is no united public opinion in these
foreign policy questions" and that the President had suffered "a rather em-
barrassing set-back." The Missions were directed to point out these facts in
conversations.
No. 471
9B/107185
The Enibassy in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
Madrid, November 15, 1941 — 4 : 45 p. m., s[ummer] time.
No. 4039 of November 15 Received November 15 — 6 : 40 p. m.
AJso for Dienststelle Ribbentrop.
According to a well-founded report Franco in a written letter
informed the Pretender to the Throne, Don Juan, in Rome 2 or 3
weeks ago that he considered the restoration of the monarchy in
Spain to be the coronation of the national revolution. 1
Gardemann
Heyden-Rtnsch
1 Typed marginal note :
"This rumor has been making the rounds in Madrid recently. People who
might perhaps know whether it is true have denied it to me.
"The rumor might be the result of the actually existing 'flirt' by Spanish
governmental authorities with Spanish monarchists. Particularly Foreign Min-
ister S. Suffer has recently shown a strong accommodating spirit toward the
monarchists, for whom he — for example — facilitates trips to Rome to see Prince
Juan. I Interpret this as an understandable effort by S. Sutler to ease his posi-
tion, because his sharpest opponents — the military — are almost all monarchists.
"I pointed out this rapprochement of the Spanish Foreign Minister with
the monarchists which Is furthermore only tactical in my last cipher letter
(which must have arrived here about November 11). The matter will be kept
under observation.
"I still retain the opinion of 4 years ago that the restoration of the monarchy
in Spain is the most probable final tolution if we do not give the course of
events a different direction.
Berlin, November 16, 1941. Stohrer."
The cipher letter referred to above has not been found.
NOVEMBER 1941 783
No. 472
B08B/E298019-20
The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland
Telegram
No. H69 of November 15 Berlin [November 15, 1941.] 1
Received November 16 — 6 : 40 p. m.
In reply to your telegram 1315. 2
As already advised by telegram, 8 the accession of additional coun-
tries to the Anti-Comintern Pact, planned on the occasion of the ex-
tension of the Pact and in connection with its extension, shall be
embodied in a single instrument of ratification. This will eloquently
attest to the solidarity of the states in their joint resolve to resist
the danger of Communism for the future. If this ratification will
now be accomplished by the six present member governments of the
Pact, Germany, Italy, Japan, Hungary, Manchukuo, and Spain, and
by a number of additional governments which have since agreed to
join, the absence of Finland especially, would be very conspicuous.
It would be really anomalous if Finland, which is menaced by Com-
munism as no other country is, and which is conspicuously taking
part in the military campaign against Soviet Russia, were to hold
aloof from agreements concerning the ideological defense against the
subversive efforts of the Communist International.
If Finland were to join at a later date, this would not make up for
the anomalous situation. In the relations between Finland and the
United States, too, now that Finland in her note to the United States
of America* has outlined so eloquently the communistic threat to
which it is exposed, she could only act as a self-explanatory and nat-
ural step if Finland now would grasp this opportunity which offers
itself to join with the other states in the defense against communist
machinations. There can be no way in which this would lead to a de-
terioration of relations between Finland and the United States. On
the contrary, world public opinion and even public sentiment in the
United States of America would sense the ambiguity of Finland's
attitude toward communism if Finland were now to hold aloof from
the intended wider cooperation against the Comintern. We believe
that it is just such an attitude which would cause American policy
toward Finland to turn more aggressive. The United States might
be moved, as in the recent American notes, 5 to make new and impos-
1 The document printed here is from the Helsinki Legation file and no date
or time of dispatch appears on this copy.
■ See document No. 474, footnote 1.
• In telegram No. 1433 of Nov. 11 (5085/293024-25) .
* See document No. 461, footnote 2.
" See document No. 461, footnote 1.
784 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
sible demands upon Finland which are incompatible with Finland's
future security, as the entire civilized world uniformly acknowledges,
and which have now been so eloquently refuted by the Finnish note.
The reaction in the United States to the Finnish note has also demon-
strated that in view of the general aversion against communism in
the American public this policy toward Finland is causing concern in
the White House.
Will you please bring these points emphatically to the attention
of the Finnish Foreign Minister in my behalf and ensure that Fin-
land will in all circumstances join in the ratification on November 25.
Following your call on the Foreign Minister please seek imme-
diately an appointment with President Ryti so as to set forth these
considerations in all friendliness but with the greatest of emphasis.
Please wire reply as soon as possible. 6
Ribbbntkop
"In telegram No. 1328 of Nov. 18 (261/170368) Bliicher reported his conver-
sation with Witting. The Foreign Minister seemed to take a positive attitude
toward Finland's accession to the Pact but said that Parliament and the Presi-
dent would have to be consulted. For Bliicher's report on his conversation with
the President, see document No. 477.
No. 473
185T/422366/67
The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Mvnistry
Telegram
most urgent Washington, November 15, 1941 — 10 : 47 p. m.
No. 3971 of November 15 Received November 16—1 : 20 p. m.
For OKW Ausland, OKH Attache Department, and ELM At-
tache Group Military : Information of November 15.
1. With the arrival of the Japanese negotiator Kurusu 1 the asser-
tion is made that failure of Kurusu's mission would surely mean war
The question of war or peace is said to be posed.
In fact the question is how America should block Japanese activity
in the Far East, extricate herself from the dilemma frequently dis-
cussed between megalomania and the actual situation there, and how
she should secure the front in the Pacific by arriving at an under-
standing with Japan or by intimidating the Island Empire.
It is highly amusing to watch the American tactics of bluff, intimi-
dation and deception which, as we have known for years, are not
backed up by the determination to risk or to force a military decision
in the Pacific. One particular item of bluffing was the solemn decla-
ration of Roosevelt's, which coincided with the arrival of the Japanese
1 See document No. 451.
NOVEMBER 1941 785
negotiator, that he would now withdraw the marine garrison from the
Far East. 2 Does any Japanese really believe that by removing this
obsolete garrison which under present conditions could no longer be
maintained, the United States wishes to clear the ground for the
coming war which it considers probable? I refer to my reports of
last year on relations between the "United States and Japan and the
possibility of war, most recently to telegram No. 3941 of Novem-
ber 13, 3 and to the opinion, expressed for a long time that America's
policy with respect to war is dictated by worry and uncertainty and
that she wishes to gain time and to defer decisions.
2. There is extensive propaganda intended for Japan to the effect
that Russia is in many instances successful. Individual incidents are
played up, and the public is skillfully indoctrinated. Since this must
be counteracted by me and my associates, and other propaganda origi-
nating in Germany is largely pushed in the background or treated
with doubt, I ask again that I be provided with the most comprehen-
sive information that is possible.
Botticher
Thomsen
* In his press conference on Nov. 7 President Roosevelt had stated that con-
sideration was being given to the question of withdrawing 970 U.S. Marines
from China.
' Not printed (1857/422349-51).
No. 474
260/170361
The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister
Teletype Message
Berlin, November 15, 1941.
Minister von Grundherr submits the following communication:
"Memorandum.
The Minister of Finland called to see me today. Among other
things he made the following remarks :
On the 12th Minister Zechlin had sounded out the Finnish Foreign
Ministry as to the prospects for a possible accession of Finland to the
Anti-Comintern Pact at an early date. 1 He said that on this matter
he would like to tell me in confidence his strictly personal opinion.
He said that he had consistently advocated to his Government in Hel-
sinki the basic position that Finland should join the Pact. However,
he personally felt that the present moment was quite unsuited. For
one thing he felt that one would have first to wait for the American
1 Zechlin's report has not been found.
In telegram No. 1315 of Nov. 14 (260/170360) Bliicher reported a conversa-
tion with the Finnish Foreign Minister who suggested that Finnish adherence
might not have much significance in the United States.
682-905— fl4 BB
786 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY
reply to the Finnish memorandum.* H& said that he was certain that
the practical concern of the Americans was, first of all, to keep the
Murmansk railroad open, and that they would therefore again request
the Finnish Government to refrain from any operations against the
Murmansk railroad. Once such a demand were received from the
Americans, he felt that the psychological conditions, both in their
foreign and domestic implications, for Finland's joining the Anti-
Comintern Pact would be substantially more favorable. Grundherr."
End of report.
If I receive no other instruction, I shall ask Minister Kivimaki to
see me soon, in order to urge him that Finland adhere to the Anti-
Comintern Pact. 3
Weizsacker
' See document No. 461.
*In a memorandum of Nov. 15 (260/170362), which was sent to Ribbentrop,
Weizsacker recorded that he had seen Kivimiiki and impressed upon him the-
necessity for Finland's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact.
No. 475
41/28246-47
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff
Fuhrer's Headquarters, November 15, 1941.
Brief for the Foreign Minister
The Fiihrer, after having read over the brief for him from the
Foreign Minister regarding the Arab, British-Indian, and Pan-Tura-
nian questions, 1 said that he wanted to talk personally with the Foreign
Minister in the next few days about this set of problems. No final
decisions can be made before that.
He said that he was in principle willing to receive the Grand Mufti
but first it would have to be settled whether the future headquarters
of a council of Arab leaders would be in Berlin or in Rome. In prin-
ciple, he is of the opinion that the Mediterranean region and with this
also the Pan-Arab question must be assigned to the Italian sphere of
influence. When I objected that a council of leaders established at
Berlin would command greater authority in the Arab world than if
it operated out of Rome, the Fiihrer thought that he would have to
think about this question further and then discuss it with the Foreign
Minister.
As regards the statements about the Pan-Turanian movement the
Fiihrer remarked that it would be necessary to work in this matter
very closely with the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories,
1 Document No. 468.
NOVEMBER 1641 787
Rosenberg, first, for the reason that Rosenberg had people who were
fully conversant with the pertinent questions and secondly, that it
was Rosenberg, who, directly after our troops had occupied these
territories, would have to assume responsibility for them and for their
administration. The Fiihrer considers that to arouse a Pan-Turanian
feeling of solidarity directed against the Russians would be contrary
to our interests. Our objective was first to get control there and to
organize the country for our purposes. The last thing we would
therefore want there was a sentiment of national solidarity.
Hewel
No. 476
129/121199-200
Memorandum by the Minister to Portugal
Berlin, November 15, 1941. 1
Ever since the inception of the Anti-Comintern Pact, the problem
of Portugal's possible accession to it has figured in the considerations
of the Portuguese politicians. The problem has been in the air espe-
cially since accession by her friendly neighbor Spain. 2
Portugal's resolute opposition to Bolshevism is well known. Por-
tugal was almost the only country at the time that voted against
Soviet Russia's admission to the League of Nations ; 3 she has never
accepted a Bolshevik diplomatic mission in her country, nor entered
into any agreement with Soviet Russia, and no Soviet Russian has
received permission to enter the country. Thousands of Portuguese
volunteers gave their lives fighting Bolshevism during the Spanish
Civil War.
Portugal's accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact would accordingly
not signify that country's act of profession against Bolshevism, but
merely the documentation by means of a treaty of a position widely
known for a long time.
In this connection the question would be raised for Portugal whether
such an action would outweigh the political risk involved. Portugal
is today a country still dependent on England economically : the coal
she needs comes from England, and no hundredweight of cargo can
come from the colonies to the mother country without the English
navicert. The fact, on the other hand, that despite her old alliance
with England, Portugal strictly adheres to neutrality and, especially,
that she maintains friendly trade relations with Germany and sup-
* Marginal note : "Original submitted to the Foreign Minister. Nov 15 »
Spain joined the Anti-Comintern Pact on Mar. 27, 1939. See vol in of this
series, document No. 768.
' On Sept. 17, 1934.
788 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN" POLICY
plies her with critical raw materials, is annoying to the English in
the highest degree, so that they are looking for any pretext to express
their displeasure to the Portuguese Government and tighten the
thumbscrews. England would immediately brand Portugal's acces-
sion to the Anti- Comintern Pact as a demonstration directed against
herself, and Portugal would then be confronted with economic con-
sequences difficult to calculate.
Several years ago, when the plan was under consideration to orga-
nize in Lisbon an Anti-Comintern Congress under predominantly Ger-
man influence, I was instructed to make unofficial soundings as to
whether the Portuguese Government would give its consent for it.
Salazar let me know at the time that he would urgently request that
such an idea be dropped because things might easily be said from the
platform of such a congress, that went beyond the subject at hand,
and would put a little country like Portugal under severe political
strain.
With the war on, Portugal's situation now is much more delicate.
While the Government, ideologically, would have no hesitation to
place itself by a visible act on the side of the other opponents of
Bolshevism, it has to consider the consequences which such a step might
have. In light of the political considerations outlined above, it must
therefore be assumed that Portugal would decline any formal invita-
tion to join the Anti- Comintern Pact at the present moment.
Submitted herewith to the State Secretary, as instructed.
Huenb
No. 477
261/170370-72
Tlie Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most ukgbnt Helsinki, November 17, 1941 — 7 : 53 p. m.
top secret Eeceived November 17 — 9 : 15 p. m.
No. 1332 of November 17
With reference to your telegram No. 1469. 1
(1) The President, who had spent the week-end in the country,
received me this afternoon in an interview lasting more than one and
a half hours.
(2) After I had carried out my instructions the President, having
particularly requested me to treat his remarks confidentially, drew
1 Document No. 472.
NOVEMBER 1941 789"
a picture of the situation and morale in terms that were gloomier
than my other information would indicate.
The Army was tired out. At the front there had been cases of
insubordination and of men going back home without official leave.
The transportation problem was very unsatisfactory due to heavy
demands on rolling stock for Finnish and Germany military move-
ments. 2
The food situation was much worse than had been expected, due
to early frost, a poor harvest, and a shortage of labor. 3
English radio broadcasts in the Finnish language were exploiting
this and were drumming into the heads of the Finns that they were
fighting and starving for Germany.
In view of the mood prevalent in the country this did not seem to
him to be the right moment for joining the Anti-Comintern Pact.
I replied that I had not come to request Finnish troops for military
operations or Finnish railway cars for German use or Finnish food-
stuffs for the German market, but merely to propose to him accession
to a Pact which had the same content as the Finnish reply to the
United States. 1
The date for joining was fixed by circumstances which we could
not alter.
(i) In discussing the nature of the present Pact and its repercus-
sions on Finland's relations with foreign countries I stressed that this
would not involve Finland in the German-English war, and that Fin-
land would retain her special status, and that the similar anti-Com-
munist attitudes of Germany and Finland would now be put in a
definite contractual framework.
(5) When the President returned to the subject of public sentiment
and intimated that the English radio would depict Finland's acces-
sion as a sign that Finland was completely harnessed to Germany's
chariot, I disputed the existence of any causal relations between ac-
cession and popular feeling. If the latter had to be considered at all,
then it should rather be assumed that the numerically weak Finnish
people would gain relief in the realization that the Pact lessens or
removes the Bolshevist menace.
(6) The President asked which countries had been invited to join
the Pact. I said that I was uninformed on this. The President then
1 In telegram No. 1239 of Nov. 1 (260/170281-83) Blttcher reported a Finnish
memorandum stating the need for 100-150 locomotives, for 4000-8000 railway
ears, and for a great number of automobiles with tires and gasoline if the
crisis in transportation were to be overcome,
* See document No. 423.
' See document No. 461, footnote 2.
790 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
remarked that it would create an especially favorable impression, in
Finland if Norway and Denmark were also invited.
(7) The President then cautiously stated his misgivings that too
much publicity was planned for the signing. I answered that I had no
information about such details, but that I would be glad to pass on
his comment.
(8) In the last phase of the conversation I felt it appropriate to
point out to the President the situation in which Finland would find
herself if, among the countries militarily engaged against the Soviet
Union, she alone declined to sign the Pact. With the ink not yet dry
on the reply sent to the United States this would mean a departure
from the clear-cut anti-Communist policy pursued heretofore, would
cause a major sensation in Russia, England, and America and would
supply the English with radio propaganda material which, would
dwarf anything so far.
The President seemed impressed by this argument.
(9) In conclusion the President said to me that as far as he per-
sonally was concerned he was in principle in favor of joining, but
did not wish to act against the Cabinet. The Cabinet would meet this
very day. The Foreign Minister would sponsor the matter, and he,
the President, planned to attend the meeting. The Foreign Minister
is supposed to let me know the outcome after the meeting.
I refrained from (one group missing) that he alone had the con-
stitutional power to make the decision.
(10) May I add for the sake of completeness that as the conversa-
tion progressed the President managed to find a few brighter sides
to the gloomy picture of the situation which he had sketched at the
beginning. He believed, of course, that Finland could overcome these
difficulties. After that, and especially after the older classes of sol-
diers were discharged, morale would improve of its own accord. For
that matter, the German Army Command had always viewed with
sympathy the necessity of reducing the Finnish army. Opposition to
this had come from naval officers.
Bluoher
" In telegram No. 1336 of Nov. 18 (4963/E276595-96) BlUcher reported that
Witting told him that the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee brought out
views similar to those of the President and the Foreign Minister but that the
general attitude had been positive, A decision would be reached the following
day. In telegram No. 1340 of Nov. 19 (4963/E276503) Blucher reported that the
Foreign Affairs Committee had unanimously approved Finland's accession to the
Anti-Comintern Pact.
NOVEMBER 1641 791
No. 478
405/214059-64
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Paris, November 17, 1941—10 : 20 p. m.
No. 3631 Received November 17—12 : 00 midnight. 1
For the Foreign Minister.
Report on the trip to Vichy November 15-16, 1941.
1. Funeral of General Huntziger. 8
The German and Italian delegations were treated with the greatest
attentiveness under protocol, and their participation was very much
stressed in Admiral Darlan's address as well as in the press and radio.
Marshal Petain, too, asked me several times to transmit to the Fuhrer
his thanks for the honor done to General Huntziger, which had deeply
moved him.
The funeral mass was celebrated by a mission priest in the presence
of the Primate of Gaul, Cardinal Archbishop Gerlier. It was indica-
tive of the inner connection between the French Army and the Church
that themes of French military marches with fanfares and drums were
inserted into the religious music of this mass.
In contrast to the religious portion of the f uneral, which was car-
ried out in grand style in the Church of St. Louis, solidarity was lack-
ing in the subsequent military parade. The march-past of the
infantry, of the artillery, as well as of the motorized formations was
carried out in deficient style. In the case of the cavalry the under-
nourishment and poor care of the horses was noticeable.
Whereas the facial expressions of the officers betrayed a controlled
fanaticism, the majority of the men exhibited total lack of interest
and obvious opposition.
Marshal Petain and Admiral Darlan are said to have had such an
unfavorable impression of the parade that they intend to relieve the
Commanding General of Vichy responsible for it from his post.
2. Political atmosphere in Vichy.
I used the time between the funeral and the arrival of the Fiihrer's
letter to Marshal Petain 3 for conversations with political personages
of the French Government, of the opposition and of other countries.
These conversations confirmed that de Gaullism has greatly receded
in unoccupied France, too, and the animosity against England has
increased. The anti-German circles are today taking shelter all the
more decidedly behind the United States.
1 Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 3835 to Special Train, Nov. 18."
' General Huntziger, French Minister of War, was killed on Nov. 12 when hia
plane crashed in fog at La Vigan, near Nimes.
3 Document No. 460.
792 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Marshal Petain, too, is said to have been won over to the idea of a
possible mediating role for America at the conclusion of the peace and
therefore to the policy of maintaining good relations with the United
States. America's siding with Soviet Russia, however, and the great
German victories in the eastern campaign had made him somewhat
uncertain in this attitude.
Primarily the experts in the economic and nutritional agencies
seem to be speaking against measures and statements which could an-
noy America. Inadequate nutrition is much more prevalent in un-
occupied France than in occupied France and is said to have reached
the lowest point of the German nutritional situation in 1917 and 1918
in several departements. If the ship cargoes that are still arriving
with Anglo-Saxon consent should be stopped, then according to the
Ministries of Food and Economy the nutrition in the unoccupied area
would be reduced by another 15 per cent.
In domestic policy Vichy still offers the picture of small groups
that fight one another less because of conflicting ideology than in the
interest of private power positions. The personal entourage of the
Marshal, which is composed of entirely insignificant but very ambi-
tious intriguers, has still not been changed in spite of a number of
announcements by members of the Government in opposition to it.
In the Veterans' Legion, which should form the basis for a unified
party, a lively fight for the decisive influence has broken out between
Church, Army, and big industry. The circles which are feuding
with one another in the Government, in the entourage of the Mar-
shal, and in the Legion are, however, united in their hostility against
the political groups, the veterans' associations, and the professional
classes in the occupied area ; they are so stubborn in this enmity that
we do not have to fear any reconciliation of the existing antagonisms
within the foreseeable future.
According to a reliable source Cardinal Gerlier, Archbishop of
Lyon, together with the lower clergy, is working for a unification of
the anti-German leftist circles, and for this purpose had taken up
secret connection not only with the head of the Protestant Church,
Pastor Boegner, but also with the Masonic lodges, which were dis-
solved, and the Grand Rabbi of France.
3. The delivery of the Fuhrer's letter to Marshal Petain.
The delivery occurred on Sunday, November 16, at 11 : 00 a. m.
Marshal Petain, who read the letter in my presence, showed himself
to be very much impressed by the Fuhrer's position on the. assassina-
tions of members of the Wehrmacht in occupied France. He stated
that the French Government had spared no attempt and would try
everything to combat these cowardly crimes, which were condemned
unanimously and most strongly by the French population, and to
NOVEMBER 1941 793
punish the culprits with the death sentence which they deserved. In
full appreciation of the measures necessary and taken for the security
of the occupation power, however, he feared very sincerely that the
reprisals ordered could endanger the psychological prerequisites
among the French people for the policy of collaboration with Ger-
many which the French Government was striving for.
Marshal Petain then went over to the question of collaboration
with Germany and said regretfully that the assassinations, which
should perhaps not even be put to the account of the French people,
and the de Gaullist talk of irresponsible circles had received great-
er attention in Germany than the services of the French people and
the French Government which demonstrated their good will. Since
the armistice there was not one single act of the French Government,
from Oran,* Dakar, 5 and Syria 9 up to the admission of Japanese
forces into Indochina 7 and the heroically executed hunger fight in
Djibouti, 8 that had not been directed against England.
In the interior of France, too, in both the occupied and the un-
occupied area, the French Government had done everything to sup-
port the German war effort, the interests of the German occupation
authority, and the German armaments beyond the obligations in-
curred in the Armistice Treaty. He was willing, with the authority
which he possessed among the French people, to support fully the
propaganda for German-French collaboration and as the Chief of
State of France to declare before the world that he voluntarily rec-
ognized Adolf Hitler as the leader of Europe. He asked that it be
understood, however, that he could only justify such far-reaching
willingness before public opinion if he had in his hands at least the
broad outlines of a plan of how Germany as the victor power in-
tended to organize German-French relations.
With the request for such a plan Marshal Petain evidently wanted
to come back to the proposal in the French note of July 14 ° which
was rejected by the Reich Government, and I therefore replied that
in my opinion there existed an entirely clear plan for all of Europe
and thus also for France, namely to conquer as quickly and as com-
pletely as possible the enemies of Europe, Russia, and the Anglo-
Saxon powers. The extent to which the European nations par-
ticipated in the realization of this plan would certainly also determine
their later position and their weight in the new Europe. The ques-
* See vol. x of this series, document No. 93.
6 See vol. xi of this series, document No. 112.
' See document No. 165.
' See document No. 126.
* In July 1641 the French forces in Djibouti had declared their allegiance to
the Vichy Government and in spite of a British blockade, refused to surrender ;
they held out until December 1942.
9 Document No. 113, enclosure.
794 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
tion of a collaboration of Germany with France was a question
of Germany's confidence in France. The Fiihrer's letter permitted
no doubt that the removal of Laval from the Government on Decem-
ber 13, 1940, 10 had very severely endangered this confidence; a re-
moval of Weygand, on the other hand, could contribute to a lessening
in the justified mistrust.
Marshal Petain replied that he well knew the importance of the
Weygand problem for German-French collaboration and had pre-
pared his recall. Owing to the possible repercussions on public opin-
ion in North Africa, however, he wanted to undertake it in two stages.
He wanted first to deprive Weygand of the supreme military command
in North Africa and then, at a later time, relieve him of the mandate
for the economic and political coordination of the North African
areas.
I explained to Marshal Petain that the mistrust on the part of the
German authorities was directed primarily against Weygand's po-
litical and economic arrangements with representatives of the United
States, and consequently the proposed solution was entirely unsatis-
factory even though it was only a temporary one.
At this moment of the conversation Admiral Darlan and State
Secretary Benoist-Mechin, who were present, took a greater part in
the conversation, saying that they would find a solution for the Wey-
gand problem in agreement with Marshal Petain which would be
satisfactory to us. 11 Simultaneously with the recall of Weygand they
want to ask the Reich Government for the institution of military
conversations concerning the defense of North and West Africa.
West Africa in particular could be held in case of an Anglo-Saxon
attack only through offensive measures against the contiguous English
possessions, and, from a certain time on, such operations could not be
carried out successfully without German assistance.
In conclusion Marshal Petain said that he assumed that the Fiihrer
probably did not expect an answer to the letter delivered, since this was
an answer to his, Petain's letter. 12 He therefore asked me to convey
Ms thanks for this letter and to inform the Eeich Government how
moved he was by the respectful terms with which the Fiihrer had re-
ferred to him in the letter.
During the conversation with Marshal Petain and in subsequent
conversations with Admiral Darlan and Benoist-Mechin I gained the
impression that the Fiihrer's letter is a wholesome lesson for the
10 See vol. xi of this series, document No. 510.
a The recall of General Weygand was officially announced by Vichy on Nov. 20,
1941.
"Transmitted in telegram No. 3274 of October 22 (document No. 417).
NOVEMBER 1941 795
French Government, which in the narrow ontlook of Vichy inclines to
overlook the significance of the revolutionary events in Europe and
to lose its sense of reality, in particular when this is disagreeable for
France.
4. The probable reassignment of the military command positions in
the War Ministry and in North Africa.
I found the conjectures expressed in my telegram No. 3556 of No-
vember 13 1S concerning the reassignment of the military command
positions after the death of Huntziger to be confirmed in their essentials
in Vichy. The transfer of the War Ministry to General Juin is said
to be already definite, and General Dentz is designated as his successor
in the military command of Morocco in spite of the resistance of the
Army. Darlan intends to take over personally for the time being the
military command of all of the African territories in his capacity as
Minister for the National Defense, and he believes that Weygand,
disgruntled over the loss of his military position, will also give up his
mandate, left to him temporarily, for the economic and political coordi-
nation of North Africa. 1 *
Abetz
" Not printed ( 405/214035 ) .
" In telegram No. 3682 of Nov. 21 (405/214082-83) Abetz reported that General
Olbry, who was near retirement, would take over as Minister of War and Oeneral
Jufn would become his successor. For the time being Juin assumed the supreme
military command in French North Africa.
No. 479
62/42428-34
Memorandum by the Diligent of the Political Department
top secret Westfalbn, November 17, 1941.
Pol. VI 1212g. Es.
For State Secretary Freiherr von Weizsaeker.
The Foreign Minister has shown to the Fiihrer the attached memo-
randum on the development of the relationship between Germany
and Denmark. The Fiihrer, after studying the memorandum, ex-
pressed his satisfaction with the policy pursued and said he believed
that we should continue along the present course.
The Foreign Minister requests that you inform the interested gen-
tlemen of the Political Department and the Department for German
Internal Affairs as well as Minister von Eenthe-Fink in Copenhagen
of the memorandum and the Fuhrer's comment.
V. KlNTELEN
796 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
[Enclosure]
Westpalen, November 11, 1941.
Memosandtjm for the Fuhrer
The political debate held in the Danish Parliament at the end of
October has prompted a review of the development of the German-
Danish relationship since the country -was occupied last year in April.
Its result is as follows :
1. Results of cooperation with the Danish Government, utterly alien
though it may be to us from an ideological point of view, by and
large, has been satisfactory. None of the countries occupied by us
is as peaceful and is offering so close and virtually trouble-free coop-
eration by its authorities as is Denmark. Maintenance of peace in
the country requires only small German military forces. The Danish
Government has to date always complied with our military demands
and even approved the transfer of a number of Danish torpedo
boats to the German Navy. 1
The results of cooperation with the Danish Government are espe-
cially good, in the economic field. The readjustment of the economic
life of Denmark after cessation of the substantial imports from Eng-
land and the overseas countries was effected more satisfactorily than
could have been anticipated and Denmark is supplying Germany
with food products in the largest possible amounts. Denmark's in-
dustry has been put to work extensively for our armament program,
thanks to the positive cooperation of the Danish Government depart-
ments and the good will of the Danish population.
Regarding the sentiments of the Danish people toward Germany
at this time, their foremost wish today is no doubt that the day would
come when the German troops will leave Denmark again. The
great majority of the Danes entertain the hope that Denmark's in-
tegration in the new Europe headed by Germany will be possible with
the retention of the Danish Royal House, and Denmark's sovereignty
and integrity, and. they would like not to have the adjustment of their
form of government to the new situation imposed from the outside.
2. The Danish National Socialist "Workers party, headed by Clau-
sen, has not succeeded so far in gaining much ground among the
Danish people. It has been able to maintain its membership of
30,000, but has not shown any growth worth mentioning beyond that
point. The Foreign Ministry has done everything in cooperation
with the various party organs and party organizations in Germany
to strengthen Clausen's DNSAP in every respect. 8 Dr. Benemann,
a leader of the Hitler Youth, was attached to the German Legation
in Copenhagen, and he has brought the youth leaders of the DNSAP
together with the Hitler Youth and gave them an opportunity to
study its installations and organization as well as its leadership
schools. The Reich Labor Service sent Labor Service leader Scheif-
farth as adviser to Copenhagen; he has organized a Labor Service
1 See vol. xn of this series, document No. 101, footnote 2.
*In a memorandum of Not. 7 (945/300030-33) Radeniacher recorded in detail
the assistance given t>y the Foreign Ministry to the DNSAP.
NOVEMBER 1941 797
camp where the followers of the Clausen Movement are trained as
leaders of the Danish Labor Service, which is to be organized later.
Young Danish Labor Service leaders are continually sent to the
Labor Service schools in Germany. Attached to the Copenhagen
Legation as adviser on women's questions is Frau Hein of the Reichs-
frauenfuhrung, who is giving the DNSAP advice and practical
guidance for work among women, Sturmbannf iihrer von Loew of the
SS-Reichsfuhrung assures continuing liaison between the DNSAP
and the SS. The young activists of the DNSAP are now serving in
the Waffen SS and the Danish Legion. The German Legation in
Copenhagen has moreover given considerable assistance in building up
the newspaper of the Clausen Movement, Faedrelandet, and provided
for central control of the DNSAP from Copenhagen by setting up the
necessary departmental offices in the city. The subsidies supplied up
to now to the DNSAP by the Legation total 3.3 million crowns (about
1.6 million reichsmarks). Financial assistance during the current
quarter year has been over half a million crowns (about 260,000
reichsmarks).
Politically, the Clausen Movement has received very effective as-
sistance from the Reich Plenipotentiary in Copenhagen as a result
of which the Danish Government had to rescind the ban on meetings
issued against the Clausen Movement, release the National Socialists
arrested in connection with various incidents, and remove the chief
enemies of the Clausen Movement from their position. In this way,
changes in the posts of the Minister of Justice and the Police Presi-
dent of Copenhagen were effected, and the conservative, anti-German
member of Parliament Miller had to lay down his mandate, 3 while
the Social Democrat Hansen had to resign from the leadership of
the labor unions.
A coup d'etat by Clausen is precluded by the opposition of the
great majority of the Danish people to his aims. A legal transfer of
power could not be accomplished owing to the old King's dislike of
Clausen himself. We have hopes, however, that within the foreseeable
future conditions enabling the Danish National Socialists to gain
further ground will greatly improve also in Denmark under the im-
pact of the tremendous successes of National Socialism in Germany.
3. The line of policy pursued to date by the Eeich Plenipotentiary
in Copenhagen, Minister von Renthe-Fink, in accordance with my
instructions, aims at achieving a synthesis of our present-day need for
exploiting all economic resources to the fullest extent possible in Den-
mark, which will be the more effective the better we succeed in main-
taining tranquillity in the country, and the necessity for providing
for the future political evolution of Denmark through effectively
assisting the Clausen Movement. This synthesis has been realized
so far by proceeding with caution and avoiding any hasty action in
supporting the Clausen Movement. The drawback inherent in this
is a development at such a slow rate that a genuine change of senti-
ment in the great mass of the Danish people must await Germany's
final victory.
* On the M011er case see vol. xi of this series, document No. 537 and footnotes
1 and 2.
798 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
I request a directive by the Fiihrer whether he agrees that the
policy pursued in the past and set forth above should be continued or
whether he wishes that the pace be stepped up by more active support
for the National Socialist movement in the country even at this time;
in that case, however, internal political difficulties which are to be
expected and certain repercussions in the economic field and on
matters concerning the occupation forces would have to be accepted. 4
* See, further, document No. 518, footnote 6.
No. 480
B2/6087B-78
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Tokyo, November 18, 1941—11 : 50 a. m., summer time.
No. 2472 of November 18 Received November 19 — 6 :10 a. m.
For the Foreign Minister.
As was to be expected, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minis-
ter speaking before the Diet * indicated a desire not to exclude the pos-
sibility of an agreement with the United States of America. On the
other hand the demands set forth by the Prime Minister show that
unless there is a complete reversal of American policy a change of
direction can hardly be brought about. It is to be expected that the
conflict between the activists and the advocates of peace at any price
will enter a decisive stage.
In my reports I have repeatedly pointed out that after the ex-
periences at Nomonhan 2 and in view of the Russian resistance to an
army such as the German Army, the activists consider participation
in the war against the Soviet Union too risky and also too unprofit-
able. I refer to the statements made at the time by the present Prime
Minister (cf . my telegram No. 1974 of October 4) ." On the other hand
the plans for a push to the south have now been tackled in earnest
by the armed forces, according to reliable reports. Following a re-
cently reported discreet feeler from the Navy concerning a German
promise not to conclude a separate peace or an armistice in the event
of a Japanese- American war (cf. my telegram No. 2331 of Novem-
ber 5) , 4 the Chief of the Department's Foreign Armies, General (here
1 The main sections of an English text of Prime Minister Tojo's address in
the Diet on Nov. 17 were reported by Ott in telegram No. 2462 of Nov. 17
(82/60862-66), the essential points of Foreign Minister Togo's speech in telegram
No. 2459 of Nov. 17 (82/60859-61).
* See document No. 276, footnote 3.
* Document No. 378.
' See document No. 451, footnote 3.
NOVEMBER 1941 799
the name, apparently "Okamoto", is left out), obviously on orders
from above, made the following statement to the Military Attache, 8
with the request that it be transmitted.
The dispatch of Kurusu is a last attempt to settle Japanese-Ameri-
can relations. The Japanese General Staff is not reckoning with the
possibility of a peaceful settlement. The necessity to help herself
that would then arise for Japan will probably lead to entry into the
war by the United States. This fact which is perhaps incomprehen-
sible to Germany at the moment is however actually advantageous
when everything is considered. The Japanese thrust to the south —
there cannot be any question of anything else — will come well before
the Germans shift the main point of their efforts to the eastern Medi-
terranean and the Near East. In view of the geographical separation
of the two theaters of war, the Near and the Far East, direct opera-
tional cooperation is in any case not possible. In the opinion of the
Japanese General Staff the best mutual support for the two states,
Germany and Japan, would be to obligate themselves not to conclude
any armistice or peace separately but only jointly. As yet he could
give no details even to him [the Military Attache] of the planned
Japanese operations in the south.
In my opinion, which coincides with that of the Armed Forces At-
taches, General Okamoto's statement, paralleled by a similar approach
involving the Navy, is to be understood in the sense that an officially
conceived approach has now been made [by the Japanese Armed
Forces — in other words, by the governing factor in Japan.
I have heretofore avoided getting into any discussion of this line of
thinking and, in accordance with the instructions for the guidance of
my conversations which I have received (cf . your telegram No. 2047) , *
have in effect stated in conversations, as have the Armed Forces At-
taches, that Japan can risk any thrust in the East without any danger
of American-English intervention, provided that no American sover-
eign territory (the Philippines) is affected by such an action. The
Japanese to whom I have spoken have always indicated, however, that
in the event of an action in the south it seemed to them impossible for
■ military reasons to leave the Philippines out.
Since an attack against the United States by the Japanese falls out-
side the cases envisaged in the Tripartite Pact and, contrary to the line
heretofore adhered to by the German Government, is apparently sup-
posed to entail an open break by Germany with the United States, I
request basic instructions.' If the Japanese suggestion is accepted, I
should like to propose as a precaution that, among others, the question
B Colonel Kretschmer.
• Document No. 458.
' See document No. 487.
800 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
of future imports of raw materials from the Far East, as well as the
question of imports of war material via Vladivostok, be taken up.
The Military Attache will report in a corresponding telegram about
the Japanese forces available for an operation in the south. 8
Ott
1 Document No. 486.
No. 481
405/214071-72
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris
Telegram
Special Train, November 18, 1941 — 10:45 p. m.
No. 1293 of November 18 from Special Train
Received Berlin, November 18 — 11 : 30 p. m.
No. 5136 of November 18
from the Foreign Ministry Sent November 18.
RAM513/R
For the Ambassador personally.
With reference to your telegram No. 3431 of November 3. 1
Please inform the French Chief of State through Ambassador de
Brinon that we suggest that he meet with Reichsmarschall Goring in
the course of the coming week at a place in the occupied area. The
exact time and place are being left open.
For your information :
It is intended to arrange the meeting between Reichsmarschall
Goring and Marshal Petain in a way similar to the meeting at Mon-
toire. 8 Accordingly the meeting should take place in a small French
railroad station suitably situated, where the Reichsmarschall will
receive the French Chief of State in his train. The meeting point
will be located in such a way that it is not too far distant from the line
of demarcation, so as to facilitate the trip for Marshal Petain.
Please point out to Ambassador de Brinon particularly that the
meeting should be kept secret. 3
RlBBEJSTTROP
1 Document No. 445.
* See vol. xi of this series, document No. 227.
* For an account of the GSring-P6tain meeting see document No. 529.
NOVEMBER 1G41 801
No. 482
2361/488768-70
The Ambassador in Twrhey to the Foreign Ministry
No. A 5881 Ankara, November 18, 1941.
Political Report
Subject : Turkish imports under the "Lend-Lease Law."
As indicated in the appended memorandum, 1 M. Saracoglu informed
me yesterday in the presence of Minister Dr. Schmidt concerning the
fact that for a year Turkey has been receiving goods and war material
contracted for by England out of American deliveries under the Lend-
Lease Law. However, the Americans have now insisted on delivering
these goods directly to Turkey in the future in accordance with the
agreements with England, according to which such goods may not be
re-exported. 2 They intend to release a statement on this in the near
future. 3
I naturally told MM. Saracoglu and Numan that this was a political
matter of the first order. It was to be anticipated that the Anglo-
American bloc would exploit it propagandistically in the biggest pos-
sible way, pointing out that Turkey, too, had now joined the ranks of
countries receiving help and assistance under the Lend-Lease Law for
the defense of the democracies against the aggressor states.
On the occasion of the reception which I gave in the evening in
honor of Minister Dr. Schmidt, Herr Kroll continued the conversa-
tions with M. Numan * and I with M. Saracoglu concerning these
matters. I pointed to the very bad impression which such propaganda
would necessarily and justifiably make on us, as well as to the difficult
situation in which Turkey was involving herself.
Both men admitted this. However, they stressed repeatedly that
there was no other possibility for Turkey to obtain vital materials.
This fact cannot be contested, especially since according to yesterday's
communication from the Naval War Staff, the transports up to now
routed from Trieste through the Aegean are being discontinued
because of the danger in the Aegean, and thus until completion of
the railroad connection there is really no possibility of sending Turkey
the goods which we promised her by treaty.
* Papen memorandum of Nov. 17 (2361/488771-75) .
For United States policy regarding Lend-Lease aid to Turkey, see Foreign
Relattons of the United States, 1941, vol. m, pp. 833-986.
According to a White House release of Dec. 3 the President had found the
defense of Turkey vital to the defense of the United States and had directed
Lend-Lease Administrator B. H. Stettinius, Jr. to see that the Turkish defense
needs were filled as fast as possible. See Rosenman, The Public Papers and
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. x, p. 511.
Kroll recorded these talks in a memorandum of Nov. 18 (2361/488765-67).
682-90S — 64 — -156
802 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The Turkish Government takes the position that it is its national
duty to utilize every possibility of strengthening its military position.
It makes no difference to the Turkish Government whether it receives
these goods as in the past through England, or now directly from the
United States. The repeal of the Neutrality Law* would inciden-
tally make it possible for American steamers to bring these goods to
Istanbul without our being legally able to intervene.
M. Saracoglu emphasized to me several times yesterday evening that
if the United States would try to exploit the fact of the delivery prop-
agandistically by stating that Turkey had thereby practically moved
to the side of the democracies, it would receive an appropriate reply.
I see no practical possibility of changing in any way the fact that
Turkey is consenting to these deliveries, and I believe that I should
propose the following position for the propagandists treatment on
our part:
Any military strengthening of Turkey can only be welcomed by us.
The fact that we ourselves desire this is underlined by the treaty
under which we ourselves deliver war material to Turkey. 8 We know
exactly that even though such deliveries come from America they will
not move Turkey one inch away from the policy which is dictated by
Turkey's own well-understood interest.
For the United States to exploit for propagandists purposes the
fact of such deliveries, which come about only because England herself
is unable to make deliveries, only demonstrates once more Koosevelt's
bellicose intention of extending the war also to countries that have
so far been peaceful.
By such an interpretation we would give the Turkish press a good
cue and would then be in a position to exploit Turkish press comments
in our favor.
I shall report on the further development of the matter. 7
Papen
B See document No. 470 and footnote 2.
* See document No. 390 and footnote 7.
7 In telegram No. 1814 of Dec. 5 (2361/488801-02) Weizsacker pointed out that
an official statement by President Roosevelt had meanwhile been issued (see
footnote 3) regarding the extension of Lend-Lease to Turkey and that great
significance was attributed to the matter in the British and American press.
Papen was therefore instructed to request a Turkish statement confirming the
fact that Turkey did not commit herself to making. any political or economic
concessions in return for Lend-Lease deliveries.
In telegram No. 1617 of Dec. 8 (265/173438-39) Kroll reported having carried
out this demarche with Saracoglu who denied that political considerations had
anv part in the extension of Lend-Lease to Turkey. Saracoglu stated that he
had done his part by insisting on a change in President Roosevelt's statement
and emphasized that Turkey's unequivocal foreign policy position was known
to Germany.
NOVEMBER 1941 803
No. 483
T1/S0952-6S
The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy l
Telegram
Berlin, November 19, 1941.
[No. 3132] s [Received November 20— 8 : 45 a. m.]
Subject: Declaration Regarding Arabia.
For Ambassador von Mackensen.
In order to give manifest expression to the Arab policy of the Axis
Powers, the idea has been considered here, in accordance with the sug-
gestions from various sides, to set up a council of Arab leaders. There
would be available for this purpose, for example, the Grand Mufti
and, after his arrival in Europe, the former Iraq Prime Minister, Gay-
lani, and the well-known Arab freedom fighter, Fawzi al-Qawuqchi,
and others.
The Foreign Minister, however, is of the opinion that Rome rather
than Berlin should be considered for the headquarters of such a coun-
cil of leaders, while perhaps some sort of a Berlin office of this agency
could be visualized.
The Foreign Minister requests that you inform the Italian Govern-
ment confidentially of this view of ours and inquire if it already has
any plans in this regard, and what they are.
Report by wire. 3
WOERMATTN
1 Marginal note : "On the basis of the instruction of the Foreign Minister, for-
warded by Minister von Rintelen."
"The number and the date of receipt of this telegram are supplied from the
copy in the files of the Borne Embassy (2281/482685) .
1 In telegram No. 3013 of Nov. 20 (71/50957) Mackensen reported that he had
carried out the instruction. Ciano stated that the Italians had similar ideas
and that he was in full agreement with Ribbentrop, "i.e., a council of leaders with
headquarters in Rome and an office in Berlin under the former."
No. 484
205/143102-03
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
Stockholm, November 20, 1941 — 1 : 25 p. m.
No. 1956 of November 20 Received November 20 — 1 : 25 p.m.
On the 19th of this month I took occasion to discuss again with the
Swedish Foreign Minister the question of assistance for our troops
fighting in Finland. I pointed out in this connection the unfavorable
804 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
impression that the complete refusal to supply articles of winter
equipment had made, since it was precisely on this point that we had
expected a speedy contribution from Sweden in the fight against Bol-
shevism. Giinther replied that the Swedish Government had had to
refuse to give over wool and leather goods because the British Govern-
ment, to judge from experince, would immediately cut off imports of
the necessary raw materials via Goteborg. 1 In this respect it was im-
material whether the Swedish Government had made available out
of its supplies one piece or 200,000 pieces of the desired woolen goods.
To my objection that the British Government would think it over twice
before stopping the Goteborg traffic, as indicated by the circumstances,
M. Giinther stated that our assumption was incorrect, for the Gote-
borg trade was authorized by the British for a short period, and the
Swedish Government was faced with the necessity of negotiating
repeatedly in London for the continuance of these very vital imports."
Since the Anglo-American threat of war against Finland, 3 the English
attitude on this point had stiffened considerably. It had to be pointed
out that Sweden had deviated from her neutral attitude during this
war only in favor of Germany, and these facts would naturally be
carefully noted in London. The fuel, for instance, that was coming in
via Goteborg was eking out the supplies of the Swedish Navy, which,
since the outbreak, of the German-Soviet war, was rendering continual
convoy service for German troops and goods.
WlED
1 See document No. 357.
* See document No. 91.
1 See documents Noa. 461 and 533.
No. 485
4963/E276591
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most tjhgent [Helsinki, November 20, 1941] 1
TOP SECRET
No. 1352 of November 20
With reference to my telegram No. 1351. 2
(1) The President has decided to empower the Foreign Minister to
take steps necessary for Finland's participation in the international
anti-Comintern program.
1 The document printed here is from the files of the Legation in Helsinki. No
dates or times of dispatch or arrival appear on this copy.
* In this telegram of November 20 (4963/E276592) Bliicher reported that he
had carried out the joint d-marche with the Japanese and Italian Ministers,
inviting Finland formally to join the Anti-CominteTn-Pact.
NOVEMBER 1941 805
This signifies acceptance of the invitation to accede.
(2) The Rumanian Government inquired of the Finnish Govern-
ment as to how it wished to stand on the question of adhering to the
Anti-Comintern Pact. The Rumanian Government added that in
its opinion the proposition came after the event.
(3) The Swedish Minister here 3 learned from Berlin about the
extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact to include Finland. He asked
an official of the Foreign Ministry here about it, but received an
evasive reply.
Bltjcher
'S.E.G.Sahiin.
No. 486
82/60885-86
The Embassy in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Tokyo, November 21, 1941.
No. 2491 of November 20 Received November 21 — 12 : 52 p. m.
For the Foreign Minister.
"With reference to telegram No. 2472 of November 18, 1 last para-
graph, there follows below a report from the Military Attache^ in'
which the Naval Attache 2 and the Air Attache s , concur :
(1) The purpose of any Japanese operations in the south, the
objectives of which are still kept secret as far as the Embassy ia
concerned, are probably
(a) Occupation of important areas for raw materials, especially
for (group missing) and rubber,
(6) Securing their exploitation, including protection against Eng-
lish and American seizure.
(2) The following three operations, carried out successively or
simultaneously, may therefore be expected :
(a) Occupation of Thailand, including the northern approach to
the Malay Peninsula. This will probably not involve any fighting
to speak of, except for clashes with British forces that might likewise
move in. Finally, one may expect steps to guard against British
Burma and the Chinese forces in Yunnan and at least to the cutting off
of the British part of the Malay Peninsula, perhaps even to a land
attack in the direction of Singapore.
(b) Occupation of important oil fields, at least those of British and
Dutch Borneo, against only weak enemy resistance.
(c) In the event of a threatening American attitude, about which
there can hardly be any doubt, a surprise attack on the Philippines,
1 Document No. 480.
* Rear Adm. Paul Wenneker.
s Col. W. von Gronau.
806 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
particularly the Manila base ? possession of which is generally termed
vital in order to secure the gams.
(3) For an estimate of Japan's total forces see telegram No. 2430 of
November 15.' Of these, there are available immediately for an oper-
ation in the south approximately: 15 divisions; 1,500 airplanes; the
bulk of the fleet.
According to rumors the following Japanese land forces are grouped
under the Supreme Command of Terauchi with Tsukada as Chief of
Staff: South Indochina under Homma, North Indochina under Iida,
Canton under Imamura, Formosa and Hainan under Yamashita.
(4) Possible enemy forces are estimated by the Japanese General
Staff, at a maximum, as follows :
(a) Malay Peninsula — 48,000 men, 24 airplanes ;
(b) Burma — 35,000 men, 60 airplanes;
(c) North Borneo — 3500 men;
Id) Hongkong— 13,000 men, 30 airplanes;
(e) Netherlands Indies— 70,000 men, 400 airplanes, both concen-
trated mainly in Java ;
(/) Philippines — 40,000 men, including only 8,000 Americans, 200
airplanes.
(5) Despite the Japanese Navy's superior strength and greater op-
erational possibility, the relative strength of the land forces of the
two sides is such that a quick and decisive Japanese victory can be
expected only if there is complete surprise and a sharp concentration
of forces on the primary targets.
Kretsohmer
Ott
'Not printed (82/60841-42).
No. 487
82/60878
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Telegram
top secret Westfalen, November 21, 1941.
EAM 230
No. 2136
With reference to your telegram No. 2472 of November 18. 1
Please have the head of the Department of Foreign Armies in-
formed orally of the following with respect to his statements, either
by you yourself, or, if you consider it more appropriate, by the Mili-
tary Attache:
You had reported to Berlin regarding this statement and you un-
derstood that the idea that armistice or peace was to be concluded
only jointly, in case Japan or Germany should become involved in a
1 See document No. 480.
NOVEMBER 1941 807
war with the USA, no matter for what reason, was considered a mat-
ter of course in Berlin; and that in Berlin they would be entirely
inclined to lay down the necessary stipulations in an agreement pro-
viding for such a contingency.
Report by telegraph concerning execution. 2
Ribbentrop
1 See document No. 492.
No. 488
82/60804-95
The Ambassador in Japan to ths Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Tokto, November 22, 1941 — 10 : 40 p. m.
No. 2518 of November 22 Received November 23—3 : 30 a. m.
I was received by the Foreign Minister today after the end of the
session of the Diet and the meeting of the Privy Council and I
asked him for information about the status of the negotiations in
Washington.
The Foreign Minister said he had promised at the beginning of
November that the Japanese Government would take a very firm
attitude, 1 and the negotiations were being conducted in accordance
with that attitude. He had also stated this publicly in his speech before
the Diet. He had not been able to give any information in the Diet
about the content of the negotiations, since they were still in progress.
He would give me the following explanatory information, with the
request that it be treated confidentially :
In the negotiations the American Government had since April taken
its stand on certain basic principles which it applied to developments
in the Far East, and in accordance wjftli which it wanted to deal with
Japan. It still adhered to those principles. This made the negotia-
tions difficult and it was impossible to predict future developments.
In reply to my question whether those basic principles meant the Stim-
son doctrine, preservation of the territorial status quo, and the demand
for an open door in China, Togo said that the question could not be
answered in such clear-cut terms. However, it was primarily a ques-
tion, of the Stimson doctrine and principles of the Churchill-Roose-
velt declaration. 2 The American Government had not, since he had
been conducting the negotiations, expressly called the Japanese action,
in China aggression. But it obviously took tliis view. The American
Government apparently had many wishes with regard to the Tri-
1 See document No. 451.
* See document No. 209, footnote 2.
808 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
partite Pact. The Japanese Government had stated, however, that the
Tripartite Pact -was an unalterable fact. Although this caused a cer-
tain dissatisfaction on the part of the American Government, no con-
crete demands had thus far been brought up "with regard to the
Tripartite Pact. At the moment he could not make any further state-
ments. I shall continue trying to get continuous information, making
use of your telegram No. 2135 of November 20. a
Ott
■This instruction by Welzsaeker (82/60887) referred to a report that the
United States was keeping Great Britain informed about the Hull-Kurusu nego-
tiations and pointed out that "this report will make it easier for you to obtain
continuous information from the Japanese Foreign Ministry regarding the pur-
pose and contents of these conversations."
No. 489
516/236144 ;
610/230148-50
The Head of Division W II in the Economic Policy Department
to the Legation in Portugal
Berlin, November 22, 1941.
Ha. Pol. 7566 g.
Subject : The procurement of tungsten from Portugal.
A thorough discussion, regarding the measures to be taken by us,
took place in the Foreign Ministry on November 18 1 ; present were
the Minister [to Portugal], Herr Eltze, 2 and representatives of the
Ministry of Economics and of the High Command of the Wehrmacht
(special staff HWK). The Ministry of Economics has been asked to
carry out the resolutions and it has approached the Commissioner of
the Four Year Plan with a copy of the letter of November 20, which is
enclosed, 3 so as to receive authorization for the export of goods needed
by Portugal, which will have to be given as compensation for the pro-
curement of tungsten. I am transmitting this letter together with
two enclosures,* for your information. 5
By order:
Sabath
1 The records of these meetings have not been found in the flies of the Foreign
Ministry. A memorandum by Sabath of Nov. 13 (516/236150-158) records a dis-
cussion on that day held in the Ministry of Economics.
1 Chief of the Ausfuhrgemeinschaft filr Kriegsgerat.
8 Not printed (516/236145-^7 ) .
* One of the enclosures is printed below. The other, a memorandum by the
Ministry of Economics of Nov. 20 (516/236151-53), dealt with the regulations to
implement the private compensation transaction of tungsten against iron and
nitrogen.
• In telegram No. 2912 of Dee. 22 (516/236155) Huene reported that because of
political developments delays in the negotiations had occurred and that further
discussions had been scheduled for between Christmas and the New Tear.
Additional material on these negotiations has been filmed on serial 516.
NOVEMBER 1941 809
[Enclosure]
November 20, 1941.
zu Ha. Pol. 7566 g.
Subject: Assuring an adequate supply of tungsten from Portugal.
Exchange of Portuguese tungsten concentrate for German
exports.
The heretofore free supply of tungsten from Portugal has been
gravely jeopardized by the decree of the Portuguese Government estab-
lishing a control organ for tungsten mining and trade in Portugal. 8
Herr Eltze (chief of the AGK) has gained the impression in per-
sonal talks with the Portuguese Minister President, Oliveira Salazar,
that Portugal would be prepared to ensure Germany a certain monthly
supply of tungsten concentrate if, in return, certain German articles
urgently needed by Portugal were supplied.'
The internal political reason for the establishment of the control
organ for tungsten production and trade in Portugal lay in the reali-
zation that the enormous increase in the price of tungsten might lead
to heavy damage to Portugal's economic structure and to derangement
of the heretofore stable wage and price level of the population. For
that reason the Portuguese Minister President also emphasized in his
talk with Herr Eltze that he attaches special importance to forcing
down the price of tungsten to a reasonable level, about 15 EM per kg.
of 65 percent ore (the present price is about 50 KM per kg. of 65
percent ore). He (the Portuguese Minister President) could, how-
ever, justify such a reduction in the price before his people only if he
obtained, in return, important goods needed by all of the Portuguese
people at "special prices."
In extensive talks held in the Ministry of Economics and in the For-
eign Ministry 1 on November 14 and 18, 1941, the situation was thor-
oughly discussed in the presence of all the participating departments.
For the time being the following program was set up, subject to a
binding commitment to make available the corresponding deliveries of
German goods:
(1) The exchange of tungsten ore for German goods will be settled
as a closed compensation transaction outside of the German-Portu-
guese clearing.
(2) The German side will be represented by a group formed by the
Otto Wolff, Ferrostaal, Stahlunion, and Krupp firms with the coopera-
* The Legation in Lisbon reported the details of the controls in telegrams Nos.
2477 of Nov. 10 (516/236119-120) and 2505 of Nov. 12 (516/236122). The text
of the government decree was sent with report No. 12907 of Nov. 20 (516/236128).
1 No record of Eltze's conversation with Salazar has been fonnd in the flies
of the Foreign Ministry. A memorandum of the Legation in Portugal of Nov. 12
(516/236113-118) records the changes in the structure of Portugal's foreign
trade since August, and the difficulties arising from the competition of German
firms.
810 DOCUMENTS ON" GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
tion of the nitrogen syndicate. The Gesellschaft fiir Elektrometal-
lurgie in Berlin will act as the receiver and purchaser of the tungsten
concentrate. On the Portuguese side the responsible body is still to be
designated by the Portuguese Government. It probably will be the
Minero Silvicola Ltda., Lisbon, which today is already delivering by
far the greatest share of tungsten to Germany.
(3) The agreements will be countersigned by the German Legation
in Lisbon and by the Portuguese Ministry of Economic Affairs, under
the obligation of seeing to it that the specific delivery commitments
are fulfilled.
(4) Herr Eltze (chief of the AGK), who enjoys the special confi-
dence of the Portuguese Minister President, will be appointed as
authorized representative for the German suppliers and will, in close
cooperation with the German Legation in Lisbon, conduct the negoti-
ations in Portugal.
(5) Germany will undertake to deliver 60,000 tons of iron material
(railway material, shipbuilding material, structural iron) at monthly
rates of at least 5,000 tons; up to 15,000 tons of ammonium sulphate;
300 railway cars; mining machinery, compressed air drills [Bohrham-
Trier], and other mining installations valued at the equivalent of about
24 million RM. The basis for the price structure will be the normal
price which was in effect for exports to Portugal before the outbreak
of this war.
(6) The office designated by the Portuguese Government will de-
liver 250 tons of tungsten concentrate monthly to Germany at the
price of 150 escudos per kg., that is, about 15 RM per kg. of 65 percent
ore, valued at the equivalent of about 3,750,000 RM monthly —
45,000,000 RM yearly.
(7) Herr Eltze will set up a head office in Portugal which will be
charged with supervising the execution of this compensation trans-
action. The representatives of the German firms designated to make
the deliveries under the agreement are to go exclusively by the guide-
lines and directions of the head office in Lisbon in submitting their
offers.
(8) A compensation account will be set up in Germany in favor of
the Portuguese party and in Portugal in favor of the German party.
The difference between the monthly deliveries of Germany and those of
Portugal will be compensated for by Germany through payment in
cash.
(9) The Portuguese Government, through its control organ or
other competent organizations in Portugal, will undertake to make
available in due course all the quantities of tungsten concentrate sched-
uled for export to Germany at the fixed price of 14 RM per kg. of 65
percent ore.
Bethke b
'Head of Division V So (Special assignments) in the Reich Ministry of
Economics.
NOVEMBER 1941 811
No. 490
F5/0309
German-Bulgarian Secret Additional Protocol to the Tripartite
Pact Regarding the Press, News, and Propaganda
[Soma, November 22, 1941.]
In support of the Tripartite Pact of September 27, 1940, 1 concluded
between. Germany, Italy and Japan the Foreign Ministers of Germany
and Bulgaria will take the necessary measures as speedily as possible
to assure a cooperation which is in accordance with the spirit and the
aims of the Pact in the sphere of press, news, and propaganda.
II
For this purpose, each of the two Foreign Ministers will attach to
the Legation of his country in the capital of the other country one or
several particularly experienced specialists who will be in continuous
consultation, in cooperation with the Foreign Ministry concerned,
regarding the appropriate steps in the sphere of press, news and
propaganda in order to promote the policy laid down in the Tripartite
Pact concluded among Germany, Italy and Japan and to counteract
the policy of the enemy powers.
Ill
The Foreign Ministers will support the organizations of journalists
of~their respective countries in their professional cooperation in ac-
cordance with a view of the journalistic profession which is conscious
of its responsibilities.
Signed in duplicate in the German language at Sofia, November 22,
1941.
For the Reich Foreign Minister:
Iv[an] Popov Adolf Heinz Beckerle
Royal Bulgarian Foreign Minister German Minister
1 For text of the Tripartite Pact, see vol. xi of this series, document No. 118.
For Bulgaria's accession to the Pact, see vol, xii of this series, document
No. 114.
812 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 491
482/231268
Memorandwti by the State /Secretary
Berun, November 22, 1941.
To : Department D. 1
"With reference to Memorandum D III 535 g of November 7
[October 86].'
The Fiihrer decree of April 28 last s designates the Plenipotentiary
of the Foreign Ministry as the competent authority for dealing with
all questions of a foreign policy nature arising in Serbia. Specifically
(hence, as a matter within the scope of the Plenipotentiary's activity
with regard to foreign policy) it is his task to forestall any activity by
Serbian political elements that might be detrimental to the interests
oftheEeich.
Consequently, Minister Benzler, and with him the Foreign Ministry,
will have to deal with the matter of the deportation of Jews from
Serbia to other countries. However, it lies outside the responsibility
of Benzler and the Foreign Ministry to do anything actively about
the way the Jewish problem inside Serbia is being handled by the
military and administrative authorities concerned. They receive
their instructions in this matter, as we know, through channels other
than the Foreign Ministry.
I have talked to Minister Benzler about this today. It will be
advisable also to give him the appropriate instructions in writing.*
Weizsacker
* Marginal note : "D III. Please consult. Lu[ther,] Nov. 27."
1 Document No. 425.
1 See vol. xu of this series, document No. 365, footnote 1.
'In a note of Dec. 12 (482/231254-55) Luther commented on Weizsacker's
memorandum by referring to the instructions received from Rlbbentrop (see
document No. S76, footnote 2) and stated the following :
"I must therefore assume that it was In accord with the Foreign Minister
that the Foreign Ministry Intervened in this certainly rather delicate matter.
For this reason, and also because the matter is to be considered as settled any
way, I consider It not advisable to give Minister Benzler appropriate instruc-
tions also In writing." The text of this note by Luther Is printed in full in
Poliakov and "Wulf , Das Drttte Reich und seine Diener, pp. 32-33.
\J
NOVEMBER 1941 813
No. 492
82/60897-98
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Tokyo, November 23, 1941—10 : 00 a. m.
No. 2526 of November 23 Received November 24 — 3 : 00 a. m.
For the Foreign Minister.
With reference to your telegram No. 2136 of November 21. 1
I first had the Military Attache call on General Okamoto to carry
out the foregoing telegraphic instruction orally, adding that I myself
was available at any time for a discussion.
General Okamoto thereupon asked that I receive him and in an
ensuing discussion stated the following :
The Japanese Minister of War extended his most sincere thanks
to me for the statements made by the Military Attache. He, Okamoto,
was highly gratified to be reassured that in any conflict with the
United States Germany would not leave Japan in the lurch. He asked
to be informed whether in my opinion Germany would also consider
herself at war with the United States if Japan should open hostilities
against the latter. I referred to the wording of the foregoing tele-
graphic instruction and to our willingness to conclude a mutual agree-
ment about the matter. . .
Okamoto stated that the Armed Forces assumed that a decision
would soon be taken concerning an operation in the south. However,
the outcome of the Kurusu talks would first have to be awaited. Al-
though no absolute time limit had been fixed for these talks, the Armed
Forces were pressing for speed, because the most favorable time of the
year for an operation in the south was approaching.
Regarding the operational plans, I received the following impres-
sion from the conversation. Apparently a surprise occupation of
Thailand extending about to the Isthmus of Kra is planned. Simul-
taneously, possession is to be taken of the oil fields of northern and
eastern Borneo. It seems that no decision has been taken as yet on
what is to be done about the Philippines. On the basis of previous
instructions I said that if adequate armed forces were in readiness an
attitude of waiting might be possible and advisable considering the
weakness of the Americans, so that the United States may be saddled
with the decision on entering the war which is a difficult one on grounds
of domestic policy. I also called attention to the necessity of blockad-
ing American supply shipments to Vladivostok, which Okamoto
seemed to understand.
1 See document No, 487.
814 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Okamoto thanked me for my statements and said he hoped that he
would soon be able to inform me about the outcome of further delibera-
tions by the Armed Forces. He requested that the conversation be
treated confidentially and be restricted for the time being to Armed
Forces channels.
I received the impression from the talk that the deliberations -within
the Armed Forces have become much more concrete, but that no deci-
sion has as yet been taken on the question of an operation in the south.
Ott
No. 493
261/170378
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
top secret Helsinki, November 23, 1941— 7: 47 p. m.
No. 1371 of November 23 Keceived November 23 — 8 : 20 p. m.
"With reference to your telegram No. 1504 of November 21. 1
The promise has occasioned great joy here. The food supply situa-
tion here looked very critical. Despite the harvest the cities had bread
for a few days only because of the supply difficulties. The Berlin
promise arrived simultaneously with the favorable communication
from Eamsay regarding Swedish help with butter and it appeared to
be sufficient, because, according to a Finnish report, in addition to the
promise of 75,000 tons it was promised in Berlin that in January
Germany would again examine Finland's requirements and would not
leave Finland in the lurch.
On the other hand according to the views of the agricultural experts
the harvest is again judged in the last few days to be poorer. The
former Minister of Agriculture Jannes told me that on the basis of the
threshing results available to him the Finnish deficit would have to be
estimated at 300,000 tons instead of 175,000.*
Bluoher
1 In this telegram (5O85H/E293014-15) Schnurre informed Bltieher that after
discussion with the Beich Food Ministry he had on Nov. 19 informed Kivimaki
that Germany would supply Finland with 75,000 tons of grain during the current
season.
Schnurre's memorandum of Nov, 18 (261/170376) indicates that he gave the
assurances to KivimaM on the day before, i.e., on Nov. 18.
1 See also document No. 507 and footnote 1.
NOVEMBER 1941 815
No. 494
Tl/50959-61
The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Paris, November 23, 1941 — 9 : 30 p. m.
No. 3715 of November 23 Received November 24^1 : 10 a. m.
Delayed by Interference !
Subject : German-Italian declaration on the independence of the Arab
states in the Near East. 1
With reference to your telegram No. 5171, of November 22, 1941. 2
(1) The impression on France made by the brave fight of the Army
of the Levant in Syria, which has been hailed and celebrated as proof
of the will to preserve the empire, is still fresh. The projected declara-
tion would give the impression that France's loyal attitude in this
question is not being appreciated by the Axis Powers and that French
blood was indeed shed in vain.
(2) This would also seriously weaken the will of people and army
to defend North and West Africa, because the suspicion would at once
arise that France would suffer a similar fate in these areas, too.
(3) It is impossible to judge from Paris whether a vigorous French
defense of North and West Africa and of the coastal waters of these
areas is less important for German strategy than the possible military
repercussions of the planned declaration in the Arab world. In so far
^as Ibn Saud's emissary to Vichy, Fuad Hamza, is supposed to be pro-
moting the project for this declaration, it seems to me important to
note in judging him that he is said to have been sent to France origi-
nally upon English instigation and that in several cases he engaged
in a whispering campaign in unoccupied France along cues supplied
by the English.
(4) Before issuing the projected German-Italian declaration I
feel that it is absolutely necessary to inform the French Government
about it and to let the Government know that its economic and finan-
cial interests and even the opportunity to protect these by military
measures, if necessary, would not be affected by granting sovereignty
to Syria and Lebanon.
To be sure, information which is furnished the French Government
solely on a confidential basis would not enable it to justify in a propa-
gandistically effective manner before public opinion the position it has
1 See documents Nos. 449 and 452.
s This telegram which, according to a notation on the margin, had the file num-
ber Pol. VII 7960 g. has not been found.
816 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
heretofore taken in the Syrian question, or the continuance of such a
policy in other overseas areas.
The French Government itself surely realizes that due to the revo-
lutionary events of this war radical changes are taking place also in
the Levant and that France must limit herself in Syria and Lebanon
to looking after her economic and financial interests.
The projected German-Italian declaration, however, would place
those members of the Government who favor a policy of Franco-
German collaboration in a difficult position, especially after having
recently forced the resignation of Weygand a few days ago 3 which
increases the danger of English attacks on North and West Africa,
and would strengthen their opponents in their argument that Wey-
gand had become the victim of a policy running counter to the true
interests of France.
Our interests with respect to France would therefore be better
served if, at ih& least, some later date were chosen for the issuing of
the projected German-Italian declaration.' 1
Abetz
s See document No. 478, footnote 11.
* In memorandum U. St.S. Pol. 1003 of Nov. 26 (71/50962-65) drawn up for the
forthcoming talks with the Grand Mufti, attached to which was a revised text of
the German-Italian declaration on Arab freedom, Woermann made the following
comment regarding the points raised by Abetz in the document printed :
"With regard to the objections in consideration of France, expressed by Am-
bassador Abetz in telegram No. 3715 of Nov. 23 which is again enclosed, it will
be possible to reply that in the treaty of Sept. 9, 1936, which was already signed
but was subsequently not ratified out of consideration for England and for
reasons of domestic policy, the French had already promised to Syria complete
freedom, sovereignty, and independence ; to be sure, this was linked to a commit-
ment that foreign policy would be coordinated with that of France, and to certain
French military rights which were couched in the form of assistance.
"On the other hand it will be possible to comply with the suggestion of Ambas-
sador Abetz that the French be told before the declaration is issued that the
French economic and financial interests in Syria will be taken into account.
"The promise 'to uphold' these interests should not be made as this would
prejudice a settlement of the petroleum question."
With this Woermann memorandum there is in the files a note in Ribbentrop's
handwriting (41/28285) which reads as follows :
"[For] F[(ihrer].
Grand Mufti reception
To promise in principle declaration of this kind
ESr C o^tent^t d o Iater } to be di ~< 1 ^ the Italia -"
w
NOVEMBER 1041 817
No. 495
230/153452-53
The Director of the Political Department to the Plenipotentiary of the
Foreign Ministry "With the Military Commander in Serbia
Telegram
No. 1631 Berlin, November 24, 1941.
zu Pol. IV 6218^ III.
[Pol. IV 1176 g. Us.] *
For the Minister personally.
With reference to your report Kult. 3 No. 2 Albania of November
8 3 and your telegram No. 981 1891'] of November 11.*
It is evident from the first-named report as well as from the report
ethnic expert Dr. Feninger submitted with this that even today there is
an inclination on the part of our military administration in the
Mitrovica area to sympathize with anti-Italian Albanian elements.
It can be seen from the report of Governor General Jacomini to
his Government, which you are familiar with, as well as from the
interest which, as you know, Count Ciano has personally shown in
the matter, that there is a suspicion in Italian quarters that certain
German agencies wanted to bring about an "Irredentist Little Albania"
in the Mitrovica area. We know from a report from our Consulate
General in Tirana that arrived in the last few days 6 that the Italian
High Command in Albania recently by means of a special secret
order warned the Army and police command posts to be on their guard
against certain Albanian leaders of bands because it is suspected that
they were planning a meeting with other leaders of bands from the
Mitrovica area supported by German quarters. In this order it is
supposed to be expressly stated that Germany is interested in en-
couraging unrest in Albania, Similar instructions are supposed to
have been sent to all Italian functionaries in Albania. The demands
of the Albanians for the "flag of Mitrovica" is supposed to play a spe-
cial role in the Italian anger.
It must in all circumstances be prevented that the Mitrovica area
become a source of German-Italian misunderstandings and friction.
1 Pol. IV 6218 g. : Not found.
'This number is taken from the reply, Belgrade telegram No. 976 of Nov. 28
(230/153466) . See footnote 7.
* Not found.
* In this telegram (230/153448-50) Benzler admitted that some members of the
local Arnaut population would be used In the administration and that the Arnaut
element had a greater Albanian point of view and were anti-Italian and pro-
German. But he denied the assertion that Albanians of Mitrovica were con-
spiring with Albanians beyond the border with the agreement of German agen-
cies. He admitted that some members of the Wehrmacht had perhaps been
indiscreet In their remarks about Italians.
6 This is apparently a report of Nov. 18 (1517/372975-76) forwarded through
the Embassy in Rome as No. 2978 on Nov. 19.
682-905-
818 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
I request you therefore to discuss the entire affair once more with
the military commander e and ask him to see that by means of clear
instructions to the local military authorities in the Mitrovica area
nothing more happens in the future that could arouse in the Italians
the justified suspicion of German support for an Albanian Irredentist
movement in the Mitrovica area. In particular it will be advisable in
this sense if possible for the military administration not to use any
political refugees from Old Albania. 7
WOERMANN
•General Franz BShme, Plenipotentiary Commanding General, Serbia, See
document No. 326.
In a telegram of the same date, Nov. 24 (No. 22 of Tirana: 1517/372D92),
Woermann directed the Consul General to withdraw from any connection with
such Albanian groups as were working for annexation of the Mitrovica area to
Albania.
' In telegram No. 076 of Nov. 28 (230/153456) Feine reported that he had taken
up the problem with General BOhme who assured him that he would issue an
appropriate order to the German troops. The General suggested that the Italians
could cooperate by restricting the visits from Albania proper Into the Mitrovica
No. 496
F9/0303
Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department 1
top secret Berlin, November 24, 1941.
Before handing over the note of the Foreign Minister to Ambassa-
dor Oshima concerning the Secret Additional Agreement to the Anti-
Comintern Pact 2 1 asked Mr. Kase about the question of the continued
secrecy of these documents. He said, in agreement witli Secretary of
Legation Ushiba who accompanied him, that it was a matter of course
that this exchange of notes did not affect the mutual obligation to
continue the secrecy of all pertinent documents, even though the ex-
change of notes did not mention this expressly. He asked, however,
not to make any alterations in the exchange of notes itself, as this had
already been placed before the Privy Council in Tokyo. He de-
clared himself very willing, however, to let me have immediately a con-
firmation of his interpretation in form of a letter. After he had ob-
tained the consent of Ambassador Oshima by telephone to this we
exchanged the attached letters B which clarify the matter. Following
this we also exchanged the notes of the Foreign Minister and Ambas-
sador Oshima.
Gatjs
'Marginal note: "Presented to the Foreign Minister. G[aus], Nov. 24."
* See document No. 502 and footnote 2.
•Not printed (F9/0309-10).
NOVEMBER 1941 819
No. 497
1017/372693-94
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy
Telegram
No - 3170 Berlin, November 24, 1941.
Sent November 25 — 1 : 35 a. m.
zuPol.IV1126g.Es. 1
1171 g. Ks. 2
1176 g. Ks. s
Subject : Mitrovica area.
With reference to telegram 2828 of November 7. 4
Please inform Count Giano that we had made the alleged in-
cidents in the territory of Mitrovica, reported by Governor General
Jacomini, the subject of a detailed investigation by our local au-
thorities.
As was to be expected from the beginning, it developed that there
can be no question of an enlistment of anti-Italian Albanian emigrants
or of support for any sort of Albanian Irredentist movement in an-
other form on the part of the local German military administration.
The German interest in the Mitrovica area is limited to maintaining
peace and order and preventing the old antagonisms between the Al-
banian and Serbian population from leading to bloody conflicts in
"view of the present rebellious psychosis. For this purpose members
of the indigenous Arnaut population are also being employed for ad-
ministrative purposes.
If the German military administration permitted the Serbian Gov-
ernment to allow the Albanians of the area a certain local cultural
autonomy by approving the "Albanian People's Association" [Alba-
nischsr Volksbund], this occurred in the interest of the Albanians,
which was surely understood and approved by Italy as the protective
power of Albania and in no way to organize them against Italy.
Upon Count Ciano's intervention we went out of our way and in-
structed the local German military authorities once more in no case
to tolerate anti-Italian Albanian machinations. We for our part be-
lieved all the more that we could count on the local Italian officials
on their part refraining from any promotion of a Greater Albanian
Irredentist movement directed toward the Mitrovica area.
'Telegram No. 891 of Nov. 11 from Belgrade (230/153448-50) indicates that
Pol. IV 1126 is telegram No. 1544 of Nov. 9 which was not filmed. See document
No. 495, footnote 4.
J 1171 g. Us. : Not found.
• 1176 g. Rs. : Document No. 495.
* Document No. 456.
820 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
At the same time we were aware, as the Italians must be too, that
considering the present situation of rebellion and the type of terrain,
connections between the Albanians on the two sides of the border could
never be entirely prevented.
In the meantime Count Pietromarchi 5 proposed on the occasion of
his Berlin visit, 8 that an Italian consul as well as Italian soldiers be
sent to Mitrovica. We do not consider either to be necessary in the
circumstances described above. The Italians already have a special
Albanian expert with the rank of minister at the Italian Legation in
Belgrade which should be sufficient for looking after their interests
in the Albanian border area. An Italian military action is unnecessary
if only for the reason that there is a German military area headquarters
in Mitrovica.
Please react to Count Ciano's remark about incorporating Mitro-
vica into Albania by means of a gesture of the Fiihrer's only if Count
Ciano should revert to it; then, however, in the sense you have already
expressed, that according to the intentions on both sides, something
definitive was to be accomplished at Vienna.
The situation in the Balkans is already fluid enough so that we and
the Italians have no interest in making it still more uncertain by open-
ing up new border problems. 7
Weizsacker
" Luca Pietromarchi, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, as-
signed to the office of the Italian Foreign Minister with the rank of Director
e,n Woerman's memorandum, U.St.S.Pol. No. 953 of Nov. 3 (1517/372927) , records
a discussion with Pietromarchi who said his Government wished to clear out the
nest of agitators (Unruheherd) in Mitrovica. *.-„.,.,.
'In telegram No. 3160 of Dec. 3 (1206/331847) Mackensen reported that he
had talked to Ciano along the lines of Weizsacker's directive. Oiano had said
that he would inform Mussolini ; he had neither mentioned the proposal of
Pietromarchi, nor the idea of giving Mitrovica to Albania. Additional material
on Mitrovica has been filmed on 4865/E249748-S09.
No. 498
2871/D56474S-47
Protocol on the Extension of the Period of Validity of the Agreement
Against the Communist International
The Government of the German Reich, the Eoyal Italian Govern-
ment, and the Imperial Japanese Government, as well as the Royal
Hungarian Government, the Imperial Government of Manchukuo, and
the Spanish Government,
Recognizing that the arrangements which they have made for coun-
teracting the activities of the Communist International have proven
highly successful, and
NOVEMBER 1941 821
Convinced that the coinciding interests of their countries require
their continued close cooperation against the common enemy,
Have decided to extend the period of validity of the above-cited
arrangements, and for this purpose have agreed to the following
provisions :
Article 1
The Pact Against the Communist International, comprising the
Agreement and Supplementary Protocol of November 25, 1936, 1 and
the Protocol of November 6, 1937 , 2 and which Hungary joined by
Protocol of February 24, 1939, Manchukuo by Protocol of February
24, 1939, a and Spain by Protocol of March 27, 1939, 4 will be extended
by a period of five years, beginning with November 25, 1941.
Article 2
The States which upon the invitation of the Government of the
German Reich, the Royal Italian Government, and the Imperial Japa-
nese Government, as the original signatories of the Pact Against the
Communist International, propose to accede to this Pact will com-
municate their declarations of accession in writing to the Government
of the German Reich which in turn will notify the other signatory
States of the receipt of these declarations. 6 Accession shall become
effective on the date on which the declaration of accession is received
by the Government of the German Reich.
Article 3
The present Protocol is drawn up in the German, Italian, and Japa-
nese languages, each deemed to be an original text. 8 The Protocol
shall enter into effect on the date of its signature.
The High Contracting Parties shall communicate with each other in
proper time prior to the expiration of the five-year term provided in
Article 1 with regard to any further modus of cooperation.
In Witness Whereof the Undersigned, being duly and properly
authorized hereto by their respective Governments, have affixed their
hands and seals to this Protocol.
1 See vol. i of this series, document No. 463, footnote 2a.
"Ibid., document No. 17.
8 See vol. v of this series, documents Nos. 268 and 269 and footnote 1.
* See vol. in of this series, document No. 768.
* Written declarations of accession, dated Nov. 25, were made in Berlin by the
following states : Bulgaria (2871/D564636) : Denmark (2871/D564637) ; Finland
(2871/D564638) ; Croatia (2871/D564639) ; Rumania (2871/D564643) ; Slovakia
(2871/D564644).
The Nanking Government made its declaration of accession in somewhat differ-
ent fashion. Dr. Tsumin-Yee, the Foreign Minister, on Nov. 23 handed the
German Minister a note of accession dated Nanking, Nov. 25 (2871/D584645).
"The Italian text has been filmed on 2871/564748-50. The Japanese text on
2871/564751-54.
822 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Done in Berlin, in sextuplicate, on November 25, 1941, in the 20th
year of the Fascist Era, corresponding to the 25th day of the 11th
month of the 16th year of Showa.
v. Ribbenthop
ClANO
OSHIMA
Babdossy, Laszlo
Lti Yi Wen
Ramon Serrano Stjner
No. 499
137/127904-09
MemoT<md>um by the Director of the Information Department
Berlin, November 25, 1941.
The following gentlemen participated in the conference on prop-
aganda in Spanish Morocco that took place in the Cultural Attache's
office of the German Embassy, Madrid, on November 14, 1941 :
Consul General Wiister
Minister von Zechlin ( Press Officer of the Embassy )
3 ) Consul General Nohring ( Tangier)
I)
4) Consul Dr. Richter (Tetuan)
5 ) Counselor of Legation Gardemann
6) Herr Sehooff (Radio Specialist of the German Embassy,
Madrid)
7) W[issenschaftlicher] H[ilfs] A[rbeiter] Richter.
It was agreed that enemy propaganda in Spanish Morocco was
still very active and that the ban placed on propaganda activity by
the High Commissioner is therefore working out in Germany's dis-
favor, because the English through the English Post Office and many
other channels were still conducting propaganda on a sizeable scale. 1
It was decided that Germany should abstain from political polemical
propaganda and work only through factual reports and pamphlets,
which show particularly Germany's strength, and which are, more-
over, to be of a positive and constructive tendency.
At the suggestion of Herren von Zechlin and Nohring, in agree-
ment with the Madrid branch of the Reichsbahn Central Tourist Office,
a branch is to be established in Tangier. In cooperation with the
Consulate General, it is to publish three times a week an illustrated
bulletin in several languages (primarily Arabic). The material for
this will be made available by the Press Division of the German Em-
bassy. It will be printed in Tangier. The colored supplements are,
1 See document No. 455.
NOVEMBER 1941 823
for lack of technical facilities in Spain, to be printed in Berlin. The
Arabic, or other text, would, be printed for this in Tangier, and these
pictures would then be enclosed or incorporated in the bulletin. The
above-mentioned periodical is also to be circulated through the Con-
sulate at Tetuan. The material for the pamphlet will be made avail-
able by the Information Officer of the Madrid Embassy.
Consul General Nohring suggested entrusting Herr Wiedemann,
who is working for the Abwehr at the Consulate at Tangier, with
these special propaganda duties. A suitable arrangement would have
to be made with the Abwehr. In the event that such an agreement
with Abwehr is not possible, the following additional gentlemen were
proposed :
1) Dr. Viczychl, Paris ,-
2) Dr. Seidel, Vice Consul in Tetuan ;
3) Dr. Kajadan (Kaitan ?) , Tripoli.
Herr Nohring considers Herr Wiedemann the proper person how-
ever, because of his many years of experience in the country and his
linguistic qualifications.
Regarding radio broadcasting, Herr Schooff is already negotiating
through Kult R (Kurt Meier) for the purchase of the Tangier radio
station which belongs to a French Jew. (Consideration should be
given to possible payment in French francs.)
Consul General Nohring requests that a special fund of 20,000
reichsmarks annually (in Moroccan francs or pesetas) be placed at
his disposal for these tasks.
Consul Dr. Eichter, Tetuan, asked that he be given for this purpose
a press and information fund in the amount of 10,000 reichsmarks.
Herewith to Counselor Volkers, for further action.
WuBTER
No. 500
F9/0139-45
Memorandum by the Dirigent of the Political Department
RAM 54 g. Es. Berlin, November 26, 1941.
Eecord of the Reception of the Slovak Minister President Tuka
bt the Foreign Minister in Berlin on November 25, 1941
At first the Slovak Minister President presented the Foreign. Minis-
ter with the highest Slovak decoration, together with a chain, and
stated in an address that the Slovak Government actually gave this
rank of decoration only to Heads of State. However, in considera-
tion of the especially great services of the Foreign Minister it had
824 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
felt impelled to make an exception and had awarded him this decora-
tion. Furthermore, M. Tuka stated in his address that being a teach-
er of international law he had to note that the German policy in re-
cent years had brought about a new epoch in international law, and
was striving finally to establish a true legal order, whereas formerly
a policy devoted to interests and exploitation had dominated the life
of nations and had to be presented by the professors to their listeners
as international law. The name of the Foreign Minister was in-
separably connected with this new epoch of international law.
The Foreign Minister thanked M. Tuka warmly and in his reply
pointed out that for every German the name of Tuka had become the
very embodiment of the sincere and militant Slovak element.
In the following discussion M. Tuka first pointed out that the
Slovak people had immediately understood the meaning and the ne-
cessity of the National Socialist movement. To be sure, the intel-
ligentsia still held back and was often uncertain, as he had been able
to observe also among the student youth in the lectures which he was
now giving once more. Thus it was asserted, for example, that Na-
tional Socialism was not entirely Christian, and more of the like, a
critical attitude that was naturally also promoted by church
influences.
To the Foreign Minister's question whether M. Sidor i was still at
the Vatican as Slovak Minister, M. Tuka replied that he had to leave
him there, in the first place in consideration of M. Tiso, and then also
for the reason that he would be compelled to have him imprisoned
at once if he brought him back to Slovakia.
The Foreign Minister then dealt with the participation of the Slo-
vak troops in the struggle in the east, and emphasized how happy we
were about the attitude which Slovakia displayed in this struggle. M.
Tuka had been right when in his address in the morning he had
termed the accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact as being of only
formal significance for Slovakia. For the rest, the situation in the
east was such that Soviet Russia was as good as finished today. To
be sure, bad luck with the weather in recent weeks had prevented us
from advancing more rapidly, but practically speaking we would
have attained our objective in Soviet Eussia by the end of this year.
The Russians could not recover from these blows, and would be en-
tirely finished off next year. In summary, one could therefore be only
exceedingly satisfied with the balance sheet of this year. The battle in
Africa now in progress, regarding which our latest reports were favor-
able, was in no way decisive for the outcome of the war. Once the
Fiihrer had time to occupy himself more intensively with Africa, a
way would be found there, too, to master the situation in accordance
with our wishes. In fact, the war had already been won, and today it
1 Karel Sidor, Slovak Minister at the Vatican, 193&-1945.
NOVEMBER 1941 825
was primarily a question of bringing it to a close with as few losses
as possible.
With regard to a question by the Foreign Minister concerning Slo-
vak-Hungarian relations, M, Tuka stated that the Hungarians were
somewhat nervous and there was constant friction with them. The
people in Slovakia were prejudiced against the Hungarians, and this
fact could not simply be set aside with logical reasons.
The Foreign Minister replied to this that it was at any rate desir-
able that a settlement be reached if possible between Slovakia and
Hungary. In any case there were always rumblings between Hun-
gary and Rumania. We, of course, had an interest that these things
not be stirred up during the present great struggle and that the
awards that had been made be maintained. In Hungary they were
already asserting that the former Little Entente was already be-
ing revived. Germany, however, had an interest in stable conditions.
After the war had been brought to a victorious conclusion, there would
be such great tasks of reconstruction that at that time, too, no questions
should be brought up that could interfere with reconstruction.
Bather, one should let things be consolidated.
M. Tuka stated that he for his part would do everything to bring
about a detente in the relationship with Hungary. Subsequently he
--, spoke briefly of M. Durcansky," remarking that the latter wished to
take over a top position as general manager of a Slovak farmers' bank,
in which he wanted to participate purely financially. Since at the time
he had promised the Foreign Minister to keep an eye on Durcansky, 3
he wanted to ask whether the Foreign Minister had any objections to
this.
The Foreign Minister replied that he had no objections if it was
purely a matter of private business activities. However, Durcansky
must not play again any kind of political note.
To a final question from the Foreign Minister regarding Tuka's re-
lations with Tiso, M. Tuka replied that he and the State President
simply lived in two different worlds, but avoided a conflict with one
another and in any case did not want to fight it out now.
In conclusion the Foreign Minister asked M. Tuka to transmit to
State President Tiso his best thanks for the decoration as well as his
best regards. 4
Eintelen
8 Ferdinand Durcansky, Slovak Foreign Minister and Minister of Interior to
July 1940.
"This promise may have been made in the Salsiburg conversations July 1940
of which there is no record in the archives of the Foreign Ministry. See vol. x of
this series, document No. 263 and footnote 3.
* According to a memorandum of Nov. 30 by Schmidt (67/46942) Hitler had a
conversation with Tuka on Nov. 29 which lasted only a few minutes and had a
purely personal character. "The Fiihrer merely promised Tuka that Germany
would act extremely generously In the matter of equipping the Slovak Army."
826 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 501
87/46976-93
Memorandum, ~by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
RAM 52 Berlin, November 28, 1941.
Record of the Conversation in Berlin on November 25, 1941, Be-
tween the Reich Foreign Minister and the Italian Foreign
Minister in Which the Spanish Foreign Minister Was Later
Asked To Join 1
At the beginning of the conversation, Count Ciano recalled the
request of the Dace that Italian troops be employed in Russia in
larger numbers than heretofore, and he mentioned that he was au-
thorized in his conversation with the Fuhrer to refer once more to this
desire of the Duce's. 2
Politically nothing much that was new had occurred since the last
conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister. 3 Some time ago Ser-
rano Sutler had addressed a letter to him, since there had been no con-
tact between Ciano and the Spanish Foreign Minister since the last
meeting some time back. 4 In this connection, a meeting with Ciano
in Genoa on December 11 and 12 had also been proposed by Serrano
Suner. As a result of the present meeting in Berlin, this meeting of
the two Foreign Ministers might, however, be unnecessary.
Ciano further mentioned that Darlan was obviously seeking contact
with Italy. The Duce had, to be sure, declined to receive him, but had
instructed Count Ciano to meet with Darlan if there was no objection
to this on the German side.
In reply to Ciano's question whether the Reich Foreign Minister
considered such a meeting advantageous, the latter replied that this
might perhaps be the case; at any rate, he had no objection to it.
Moreover, Ambassador de Brinon had also tried, for his part, to bring
about a meeting of the Foreign Minister with Petain. 5 He (the Reich
* Ciano had come to Berlin on Nov. 23 for the signing of a 5-year extension of
and admission of new members to the Anti-Comintern Pact {see document
No. 498).
For Ciano's account of this discussion, see Galeazzo Ciano, L'Europa verso la
eatastrofe, pp. 686-693, and The Ciano Diaries, entries for Nov. 24-26, 1941. A
separate record of the discussion after Serrano Sufier's entrance was made by
Hans Brandau of the Protocol Department, which is filmed on F15/122-132.
* See document No. 454.
■ Ciano had been invited by Eibbentrop for the annual hunt at the end of
October and had talked to Hitler at his headquarters on Oct 25 (see document
No. 424) . No record of the Ciano-Ribbentrop conversation has been found. See
also The Ciano Diaries, entry for Oct. 25-28, 1941.
' Ciano met Serrano Suffer at the Obersalzberg on Nov. 18, 1940, at the occa-
sion of a meeting with Hitler and Ribbentrop. See The Ciano Diaries, entry for
Nov. 18, 1940.
* See document No. 445.
NOVEMBER 1941 827
Foreign Minister) had, however, handled the matter in a dilatory
manner. At the same tim«, however, Benoist-Mechin had made con-
tact with Marshal Goring. It had, to be sure, led to no definite result
thus far, but it was possible that the Marshal would one day meet with
Petain. 8 If, on the other hand, he (the Keich Foreign Minister)
should speak with the French, it might become necessary to go into
things quite deeply. For this, however, the moment had not yet come.
The Reich Foreign Minister continued with the remark that the
French would logically inquire what was to become of them once
peace were restored; that, of course, this could not be answered now,
but that it would be necessary to take a purely noncommittal attitude
toward them.
Ciano stated, and he repeated the remark several times in the course
of the conversation, that he would refrain from meeting with Darlan
if Germany, for her part, had even the slightest objections.
Count Ciano emphasized in this connection that he had nothing at
all to say to France and wished to retain the present armistice regime.
He would, therefore, confine himself to listening to Darlan and pos-
sibly talk to him about economic matters.
In the further course of the conversation, the dismissal of Weygand
was also mentioned. 7 The Reich Foreign Minister then remarked that
the French had the tendency to push things too much. Thus he, the
Reich Foreign Minister, had refused their wish to send an ambassador
to Germany and had merely agreed that M. Scapini 8 should deal with
questions of laborers and prisoners. 9
In itself, the desire of France to learn something about her future
was understandable, but it was not yet possible to discuss it. First the
campaign in the east and some other matters had to be terminated.
Ciano interjected that if anyone was interested in not seeing an im-
provement in relations with France, it was Italy. This was a clear-cut
definition of the Italian attitude.
The Reich Foreign Minister summed up the German stand on
the question of relations with France by saying that all questions of
the future could only be discussed later on, while at present conces-
sions could be made to France in so far as she assisted the Axis in
the fight against England. In this connection Ciano also mentioned
a plan, emanating from the initiative of Riccardi, for a visit of the
French Minister of Production 10 to Rome. Riccardi had the habit
of carrying out such plans on his own initiative at times. Ciano had,
* For a record of the P6tain-Goring meeting, see document No. 529.
* See document No. 478.
" Georges Scapini, delegate of the French Government for prisoners of war.
•In telegram No. 1145 of Oct. 22 (405/218928-39) from the Special Train,
Bintelen transmitted Rlbbentrop's views on this to Weizsacker.
" Francois Lehideur.
828 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
however, forbidden the visit of the French Minister of Production.
The Reich Foreign Minister again emphasized the French tendency
to push things too much, and he mentioned the fact that, after Mon-
toire, 11 the French had acted as if there had been no war at all. Brinon
had told him, the Reich Foreign Minister, that France had really not
been conquered at all ; that the French troops had merely not had the
necessary fighting spirit, and so forth. 12
The Fiihrer had been deeply affected by the dismissal of Laval. 13
Particularly because in the same letter in which he thanked the
Fiihrer for the transfer of the remains of the Duke of Reichstadt,
Petain informed him of the dismissal of the very man who had, in
the last analysis, brought about the policy of Montoire. The Fiihrer
had learned, moreover, that Petain, who was supposed originally to
take part in the interment of the remains in the Dome des Invalides,
had not gone to Paris because he had heeded the suggestions that
the Germans only wanted to lure Petain into the occupied territory
in order to get their hands on him there. The fact that Petain had
apparently believed such a thing of the Fiihrer had grieved the
Fiihrer exceedingly.
When Ciano again declared that he would not meet with Darlan
if the Reich Foreign Minister had even the slightest objection, the lat-
ter replied that he would give further consideration to the question.
He also mentioned in this connection the Fiihrer's letter to Petain,
which again reduced things to the correct denominator. 1 *
To a question from Count Ciano as to the German attitude toward
Croatia, the Reich Foreign Minister replied that, in his opinion, con-
ditions were becoming more and more stable there, as Minister Kasche
also reports. 15 This caused Count Ciano to remark that the Duce was
not satisfied with developments in Croatia. A certain anti-Italian
trend had developed in Croatia. The internal situation was not clari-
fied. Nevertheless he, Ciano, would accept an invitation from Pavelic
and would go to Zagreb in January in order to study matters on the
spot.
When Count Ciano once more inquired as to Germany's views con-
cerning Croatia, the Foreign Minister replied, with reference to the
declaration already made in Vienna, that Germany regarded Croatia
as belonging to Italy's sphere of interest. 16
Count Ciano was evidently pleased with this statement and he
thanked the Reich Foreign Minister for the clear-cut answer that he
" See vol. xi of this series, documents Nos. 212 and 227.
15 No record of this statement has been found.
1S See vol. xi of this series, document No. 564.
14 This is probably a reference to document No. 400,
15 Not found.
" See vol. xii of this series, document No. 385.
NOVEMBER 1941 829
had given him to his reply [sic] . He then hinted that Croatian oppo-
sition elements were trying to create misunderstandings between Ger-
many and Italy. He would therefore consider it appropriate if the
Reich Foreign Minister would also express to the Croatians the view
just set forth, in order in this way to counteract all intrigue. The
Eeich Foreign Minister promised that he would speak with the Croa-
tians accordingly, and he mentioned that he had also given the Ger-
man Minister in Zagreb very clear instructions in this direction. 17 He
knew that Croatian elements who had formerly lived in Germany,
among others, also Minister Benzon, 16 who was now leaving Berlin,
were not averse to intrigues in which Germany and Italy were played
off against each other. He, the Eeich Foreign Minister, would ob-
serve the situation very carefully and suppress any such tendency at
once. Ciano remarked that the situation had to be clarified in such a
way that the Croatians would be given to understand that Croatia
\ would never be the cause of a misunderstanding between Italy and
Germany. The Eeich Foreign Minister replied that this had already
been done and that the Croatians knew that they could not hitch Ger-
many to their wagon.
With regard to Greece, Ciano remarked that the country was suffer-
ing hunger. He criticized the loose local organization of the Italian
and German agencies and advocated a clearer delimitation of the
jurisdictions. Such a double rule led to difficulties. He intended,
moreover, to take a trip to Greece in order to study matters on the
spot and then make suggestions for their settlement.
The food situation in Athens was especially bad. There they were
really at the end of their rope. It would be regrettable if the Italians
were obliged to resort to force in dealing with a possible hunger
revolt. They therefore wanted to try to help out with food, although
they themselves had no surplus. But it was important to avoid dis-
orders in Athens, which would surely be echoed around the world.
In the further course of the conversation, the Spanish Foreign Min-
ister, Serrano Suner, was drawn into the discussion. After a few
words of greeting, the Eeich Foreign Minister expressed his satisfac-
tion over the extension of the Anti- Comintern Pact. 19 The year 1941
was of decisive importance in the battle against Bolshevism, since the
Fiihrer had this year decided to proceed against the stronghold in
Moscow itself.
" Document No. 219.
11 Rranko Benzon, Croatian Minister In Germany, May-November 1941.
"In telegram No. 2773 of Nov. 21 (462/225725) Hibbentrop informed the
Embassy In Spain that the signing of the protocol for the extension of the Anti-
Comintern Pact would take place in Berlin on Nov. 28 and directed that Serrano
Suuer be invited to the ceremony.
830 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The battle had been so successful that the view was entertained in
Germany that through it Bolshevism had today already been dealt
a decisive blow. He, the Reich Foreign Minister, would, in his talk
at the Kaiserhof tomorrow, 20 take a stand on this and other current
questions of foreign policy. Today he only wished to stress the fact
that, in the opinion of Germany, the predictions made at an earlier
date had been fulfilled. By and large, the war was won for the Axis,
and victory could never again be taken from the Axis Powers.
The situation could be summed up as follows: In Russia, Germany
would, by the end of the year, have achieved all the goals that she
wanted to attain this year. By the end of the year she would have
occupied more or less the entire European and Russian area which
was important from the standpoint of human resources, of supplies of
food, and of raw materials. Germany was, moreover, in possession
of almost the entire Russian war industry. Upon conclusion of some
operations that were still in progress in the east, Stalin would have at
his disposal only a small percentage of his industry. In the German
opinion Russia could then put forth no further effort of any impor-
tance. She was faced, moreover, with a terrible winter, in which prob-
ably millions of Russians would starve to death.
If the Stalin regime should remain in power, which was possible
because thus far there was no tangible evidence of a countermovement,
Russia would, in the spring, enter the battle in a considerably weak-
ened condition. Anglo-American aid was pure bluff and would be of
practically no avail to Russia. Next spring Germany would march
further to the east and would crush the remnants of the Russian
Army. These operations could, however, be performed with a frac-
tion of the present troops. From now on Germany was in a position
to release large numbers of troops and to employ them for other
purposes.
With Russia, however, the last ally of England would be eliminated.
The Axis could be assailed neither by England alone nor by England
and America in Europe. The war was practically won. What Eng-
land could do in Africa was an open question. In any case, Africa
was geographically closer to the European Continent than England,
whose communications therewith were difficult. At the moment a big
battle was in progress in Libya, 21 the outcome of which could not yet
be foreseen, although in itself the situation was extremely favorable
for the German-Italian troops.
In any case, in these circumstances, Europe was unassailable, and
that was true also in the economic field. She could wage a perpetual
war.
M For text of this speech delivered on Nov. 26 at a reception on the occasion of
the signing of the protocol extending the Anti-Comintern Pact, see Dokumente
der Deiitschen Politik (1944) , vol. rx, pt. 1, pp. 473-495.
B Battles near Tobruk and Sidi-Rezegta.
NOVEMBER 1941 ™1
With regard to the possibility of an air duel between England and
the Axis, the Keich Foreign Minister remarked that here, too, Eng-
land was at a disadvantage strategically because the Axis could em-
ploy all its power concentrically against the British Isles, while the
English themselves would have to attack excentrically in all direc-
tions. Furthermore air defense was becoming stronger and stronger.
England was suffering increasingly heavy losses as a result, so that
the attacks were becoming more and more difficult. Actually the Eng-
lish had not been to Berlin for many weeks.
Strategically, therefore, the Axis was in a commanding position
with respect to England. Politically, the question arose as to the in-
tentions of America. They were unknown. But even if America
entered the war it would make little change in the situation described
above. Europe's rearmament potential was considerably greater than
that of America and England. In any case, the Fuhrer would beat
n, the English everywhere he met them and would sweep them out of
J our hemisphere. Germany was calmly watching the attitude of Amer-
ica. If this country wanted war, she could have it. Germany would
not allow herself to be disturbed by anything. After Eussia, as stated
above, had suffered her decisive defeat in the course of the year and
received her death-blow the following year and thus no longer pre-
sented a threat any more than did France, the fight against England
would be continued until England realized that she had nothing more
to say in Europe, came to her senses herself and asked for peace; or
until, through employment of the concentrated power resources of the
Axis, the Island of Britain was forced to capitulate in the foreseeable
future. . , . ,
The Keich Government noted with great satisfaction that, beside
the Italian ally, a Spanish division was also fighting against Bolshe-
vism. 22 The Spanish nationalists, whose bravery was proverbial, had
conducted themselves splendidly and contributed their best to final
victory. Many of them still had old accounts to settle from the days
of the struggle in Spain. .
Serrano Sufier expressed his thanks for the words of greeting oi
the Eeich Foreign Minister and the appreciation of the deeds of the
Spanish volunteer division. He had listened with complete interest
to the statements of the Keich Foreign Minister concerning the
general situation.
Serrano Suner inquired in this connection as to the military opera-
tions undertaken against Moscow, the protraction of which exploited
by enemy propaganda had caused a decline in morale among the
friends of the Axis. In all discretion, he wished, therefore, to ask
when Moscow would be taken, so that he might discourage further
propaganda efforts.
■ Doeument No. 70.
832 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The Reich. Foreign Minister replied that it was necessary to realize
that winter was approaching. Germany prepared her military ven-
tures methodically or "scientifically," as Oshima had expressed it.
In the pockets of Briansk and Vyazma, practically the entire army of
Timoshenko had been destroyed. Before these pockets could finally
be cleaned up, however, bad weather had set in and for several weeks
transformed the roads and the country into a morass, which caused
tremendous difficulties for the motorized forces. Therefore the exploi-
tation of the victory over Timoshenko had, unfortunately, not been
possible to the extent that this would have been possible in dry weather
Thus it was possible to advance only slowly. For a week, however,
the country had been frozen, and the German Army was methodically
getting in motion again. It hoped to be able to advance considerably
further in the region of Moscow. In general, it could be said that
the war in the east was no longer a question of soldiers and armaments,
for the Red Army practically no longer existed— it was either dead or
captured. At the present stage, it was exclusively a case of supplies
and channels of communication.
English propaganda, which was geared to this fact and which was
well known in Germany, was poor. The strange thing about it was
only that there were always people who fell for it. The same propa-
ganda mills were at work that the English had been using, first in
Norway, then in Holland, Belgium, France (Dunkirk), Greece, Ser-
bia, and Crete. AH these defeats had been played up as the greatest
victories for England. The same procedure was now being used in
Russia. The German troops would advance slowly and systematically
in the Soviet Union and occupy the areas that were of any importance
at all to the Russians. Even if he, the Reich Foreign Minister, did not
know how far we would get this year, because this was dependent on
the weather, he did know that the entire area, which was important
from the standpoint of population, industry, or agriculture, would be
occupied, so that it would thus become impossible for the Russians to
regenerate themselves.
So far no English or American war material had turned up in Rus-
sia. Probably it would never come. If it did, however, then only in
very small quantities. Germany would cut off these imports, how-
ever, and then dispatch the remnants of the Russian Army.
The word "Blitzkrieg," of which the Fiihrer spoke in his last ad-
dress, 23 had been coined by the Jews and had never been used by Ger-
many. Germany would continue to proceed methodically.
In these circumstances, everyone was well-advised to pay as little
attention as possible to the English propaganda mill. Germany,
" On Nov. 8 Hitler spoke in Munich on the anniversary of the 1923 Putsch.
For text see Frankfurter Zeitung, Nov. 10, 1941.
,)
NOVEMBER 1041 833
moreover, was not taking any risk and not striving to score a prestige
victory. She could long since have conquered Leningrad. Since no
blood was to be spilt unnecessarily, however, we would proceed here,
as in other cases, slowly and methodically, according to a systematic
plan.
One thing was absolutely certain : by and large, Eussia had been
eliminated as an ally of England and would never again become a
European power by which Europe could be threatened.
Serrano Suner then briefly alluded to the sounding-out of the
Spanish Government by Turkey. The Turks, with whom Spain had
never entertained any special relations, had, as Ambassadors von
Papen and Stohrer have also surely reported," approached Spain
with the suggestion that the moment was "interesting" for the resto-
ration of peace. Both countries, which were allegedly in a similar
situation, therefore had to work actively for European peace. Ser-
rano Suner had replied that Spain was not neutral and only con-
sidered desirable a peace that would bring victory to the Axis. He
asked in this connection whether the attitude of Turkey had now
become more friendly and loyal toward the Axis than formerly and
whether the German Government had confidence in the Turks. The
Reich Foreign Minister replied that Turkey was essentially neutral
and wanted to keep out of the war. The Turks had told him that
they had no ambitions of any kind and were very well satisfied with
their present territory. They had an alliance with England that
was, however, like a torso since France had been eliminated. 25 Ger-
many had concluded a political and a commercial pact with Turkey 8S
and had always cherished friendly feelings toward that country,
even if this had been on a rather one-sided basis. For some time,
however, relations with Turkey had been much better. Turkey was
glad to be rid of her worst opponent, Russia. The Reich Foreign
Minister recalled the fact that in the same room Molotov had postu-
lated his demand for the Dardanelles, 27 which had, however, been
rejected by Germany.
Relations with Turkey were becoming more and more close and
friendly. The Duce, too, was favorably disposed, and Turkey was
responding to these sentiments to an ever-increasing extent.
The above-mentioned peace effort was, indeed, traceable to a pet
idea of Turkey's, particularly of State Secretary Numan's, who now
,1 In telegram No. 3863 of Nov. 5 (95/107173) Stohrer reported that the
Turkish Government had suggested to the Spanish Minister that Spain and
Turkey should cooperate to bring about a peace. Serrano Suner told Stohrer
that he would reply that Spain was interested only in a peace on the basis
of victory of the Axis.
* This treaty was signed at Ankara, Oct. 19, 1939. The test in English and
French is published in the League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, pp. 167-175.
" See vol. xn of this series, document No. 648 and footnote 2.
* See vol xi of this series, document No. 328.
€82-905 — 64 58
834 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
and then came forward with this idea. Mostly then, this was inter-
preted by English propaganda as a German peace feeler. Since the
last public peace offer of the Fuhrer in his speech of last year, 28 no
peace feelers of any kind had, however, been put out by Germany.
The Foreign Minister would also speak about this in the talk this
afternoon.
Schmidt
** See vol. x of this series, Editors' Note, p. 249.
No. 502
F9/0320-19
The Japanese Ambassador in Germany to the Foreign Minister *
Berlin, November 25,1941.
Herr Reichminister : On the occasion of the signing today of the
Protocol concerning the extension of the period of validity of the Pact
against the Communist International I have the honor to inform Your
Excellency upon instruction of my Government that the Japanese
Government and the German Government are in full agreement on
the following points:
The Secret Additional Agreement to the Agreement Against the
Communist International, the Annexes thereof and the Protocol con-
cluded on November 25, 1936, s between the Japanese Government and
the German Government shall be considered as no longer in force as
of November 25, 1941, notwithstanding the provisions of Article III
of the Secret Additional Agreement. 3
I would request Your Excellency to be good enough to confirm the
agreement of the German Government to the above interpretation. 4
I take this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances
of my highest consideration.
Hiroshi Oshima
Imperial Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary
'The document here printed is translated from the German translation which
was provided by the Japanese Embassy.
* See Series O, vol. vi, documents Nos. 57 and 58.
8 Article III included the provision : "The Agreement comes into force simul-
taneously with the Agreement against the Communist International signed today
and will remain in force for the same period."
'By letter of Nov. 25 (F9/0316-15) Ribbentrop replied, acknowledging the
receipt of Oshima's letter.
A minute by Gaus of Dec. 5 (F9/0324) records that on Nov. 29 Kase stated
that Rlbbentrop's letter was not textually identical with that which had been
sent by the Japanese Embassy to Tokyo and he asked, therefore, that it be with-
drawn and that a new document replace it. Accordingly on Dec. 4, Gaus records,
a new letter signed by Ribbentrop was delivered to the Japanese.
No copy of this later text has been found.
NOVEMBER 1041 835
No. 503
F9/0148-68
Memorandum oy the Dirigent of the Political Department
RAM 55 g. Rs. Berlin, November 27, 1941.
Record or the Reception of Hungarian Minister President de
Bardossy bt the Foreign Minister in Berlin on November 26,
1941, From 7 : 45 to 8 : 25 p.m.
The Foreign Minister thanked M. de Bardossy once more for the
painting by Makart given him as a gift from the Hungarian Govern-
ment, whereupon M. de Bardossy for his part expressed his thanks for
the historic days -which he had been privileged to experience here.
The Foreign Minister then stated the following :
He considered the Berlin meeting to be very useful, for Europe had
3 to draw closer together now. Perhaps one could see in this Berlin
meeting the early dawn of a new Europe which was drawing together
in unity in the face of the common dangers. This was important
particularly with respect to England who did not hesitate to form an
alliance with Bolshevism against Europe. For one thing was clear :
Churchill was willing even today to hand all of Europe over to
Bolshevism with cold indifference [eiskali]. It was time now that
Europe freed herself entirely from the English tutelage. One had
experienced it earlier that in all the European capitals the given
English Minister played the main role, as it were ; things could not re-
main like that, however, because the European peoples did not want
it any longer. A new status for Europe had to come about which the
peoples of the Continent would have to determine for themselves. It
was certain that Germany and Italy would assume the leading position
in this new Europe as a natural consequence of the fact that the Axis
was also bearing the greatest responsibility for the security of Europe
and had made— and had to make— the greatest sacrifices for this. In
the new Europe even the former foes of Germany would find a place,
although on condition that they would not be able to start new wars
in Europe; that applied to France as well as to Russia. The speech
which he (the Foreign Minister) had given 1 was supposed to show
how we evaluated the present situation. This had had to be said, al-
though as such we did not want to imitate the constant speechifying
of the other side.
In the coming year Soviet Russia would receive the death blow, for
the Fuhrer had made the unalterable decision not to tolerate any longer
anything in Europe that was Communist. Whether somewhere in
1 See document No. 501, footnote 20.
836 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Siberia some insignificant Soviet state could still maintain itself was
of no importance.
As far as England was concerned, Churchill would have to consider
whether he still had prospects of any sort. His latest attempt to deal
the Axis a blow by the attack in Cirenaica did not seem to proceed very
successfully, according to the reports received. These reports were
entirely favorable for us; naturally one had to wait and see how the
fight developed. On the whole, however, England would have to real-
ize that she could no longer win the war. Nor could she any longer
achieve any great effect with air attacks, either, since the effectiveness
of the antiaircraft weapons was constantly growing and the percentage
of losses in air attacks would soon be so large that these could no longer
be carried out. The losses that would then occur could not be replaced
by the U.S. A. either ; in general the United States was constantly being
used with respect to us as a kind of boogeyman where the English
resources themselves failed. And yet, the American propaganda was
nothing more than a continuous offensive by mouth. In contrast to
this, what (the Foreign Minister) had stated in his speech was not
empty propaganda, but really expressed our most sincere conviction.
The Foreign Minister then referred to the importance of the Fuhrer's
decision to proceed against Soviet Russia in June of this year, and
remarked in this connection that he would have been compelled in the
end to negotiate with Stalin regarding every bit of oil that we could
obtain from Russia if this decision had not been taken. In that case,
however, Soviet Russia would have been more or less in a position to
enable Germany to carry on the war or to prevent her from doing so.
This thought, incidentally gave him an opportunity to appeal to
M. de Bardossy that Hungary also should release as much petroleum
as possible for export to Germany. The situation was such that
relatively small quantities, such as an additional delivery of 40,000
tons were of particular importance. In making this request for in-
creased deliveries, which referred likewise to grain, he wished in ad-
vance to express his thanks to M. de Bardossy for the support which
the Hungarian Minister President had so often given Minister Clodius
in his negotiations on the Hungarian deliveries. 2 With other officials
of the Hungarian Government, however, Herr Clodius often en-
countered difficulties. One should regard these deliveries under a
larger aspect. Europe was today engaged in a common struggle in
which the German nation had to assume the main burden and the
largest sacrifices. Germany could surely expect of her friends every
possible help and support in this struggle.
M. de Bardossy answered first that he was very happy with what the
Foreign Minister had said regarding the support which he had given to
* See document No. 208.
NOVEMBER 1941 837
the efforts of Herr Clodius. He could give assurance that Hungary
would be ready in the future, too, to make all deliveries to Germany,
provided there was a material possibility for doing so. After all,
it was often not a case of the Hungarians having this and that and
not wanting to deliver it, but often a case of their really not having
anything to deliver.
The Foreign Minister thereupon cited with the aid of a memorandum
from Minister Clodius a number of [figures] concerning the amount
of the deliveries desired by us, 3 adding that he did not intend to go
into the particulars, but to express very generally the request that the
deliveries be increased in so far as this was possible.
M. de Bardossy stated in this connection that the Hungarian Gov-
ernment was encountering a number of difficulties in its deliveries; in
the first place, heavy floods had been very detrimental to the
harvest and its gathering, and furthermore organization was not so
good in Hungary as it was in Germany. These difficulties also had to
be taken into account. He would do everything, however, to see that
the German wishes for an increase in the deliveries of grain and oil
were complied with in so far as possible.
In conclusion the Foreign Minister remarked with regard to this
subject that we wanted today to rescue old Europe and were bound to
do so ; and for that we simply needed every possible support.
After inquiring about the health of Regent Horthy, which, M. de
Bardossy said, was again good, the Foreign Minister mentioned the
talk which the Hungarian Minister President had had the day before
with the Slovak Minister President * regarding the Hungarian-Slovak
frictions which were best avoided.
M. de Bardossy replied to this that he did not want such quarrels at
all. To be sure the Slovaks and the Rumanians often made matters
quite difficult for the Hungarians. The Rumanians simply refused
to recognize the Vienna Award regarding Transylvania. Marshal
Antonescu had not hesitated to state that he wished to march back to
Bucharest by way of Cluj. The Rumanians had even sent word to
Washington that they would denounce the Award although this could
not be done as the Award was not subject to denunciation. Even
though they had retracted these communications afterwards it was
8 This might possibly refer to a memorandum of Not, 24 by Clodius (2293/-
483591-97) with the title "Brief for the FUhrer's conversation with the other
Foreign Ministers regarding economic questions." This document which sum-
marized Germany's economic relations with Italy, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria,
Finland, Denmark, Croatia, Slovakia, and Spain, emphasized that Hungary was
still able to export to Germany 40,000 additional tons of grain. No other memo-
randum of the kind described has been found.
* In a memorandum of Nov, 29 (93/104403) Woeraarai recorded having been
informed by SzWjay of the substance of two personal conversations between
Bfixdossy and Tuka during their stay in Berlin regarding a recent Hungarian-
Slovak controversy.
838 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
nevertheless clear that one could not take part in building the new
Europe unless one was prepared to accept matters which had been put
so clearly.
The Foreign Minister on the other hand referred to the difficult *"
situation in which the Rumanians had found themselves in Vienna
with the Award. When M. de Bardossy interjected here that it would
have been even much worse for the Rumanians if Hungary at the time
had taken up the challenge, the Foreign Minister vigorously contra-
dicted him by remarking that it was his firm conviction that Hungary
in that case would have been forced very soon to fight against the
Soviet Russian Army. The Soviets at that time had been ready for
intervention as he indeed had told the Rumanians with great insist-
ence." Only today when we knew how strong the Soviets had been at
that time was it possible to realize fully how significant it had been
that the danger of a conflict at that time was settled through the
Vienna Award. Of course the Award had been difficult. The Ru-
manians had reproached him and the then Court Minister, Urdareanu,
had made the assertion that Rumania had been duped. Likewise he
had had an unpleasant controversy with Count Teleki because the latter
did not want to understand fully the situation. Count Csaky, how-
ever, had understood it better. 6 However, the Award had then struck
the Rumanians like a clap of thunder although it had been intimated
to them previously that they had to count with the loss of the Szekler
region.
M. de Bardossy replied to this that the Rumanians really did not
have any kind of genuine claim to Transylvania. That territory had
fallen into their laps in 1918 without their deserving it.
The Foreign Minister countered this by saying that we must not
forget that today we were living in the age of the national idea, and
from this point of view it had been very difficult for the Rumanians
to abandon a part of Transylvania. In the Award Germany had not
emphasized the national idea but had chosen a way which took into
account to a much greater extent historical viewpoints ; in so doing
she did not forget either her former comradeship in arms with Hun-
gary. It was clear, however, that the result was bound to affect Ru-
mania like a cold shower. As far as the present situation was
concerned one must in any event treat matters with the greatest calm.
M. de Bardossy interposed here the remark that he was in agree-
ment with that but that this presupposed that the Rumanians would
Apparently a reference to Ribbentrop's conversation with Mauolloscn, the
Rumanian Foreijm Minister, on Aug. 29, 1940, in Vienna ; see toI. x of this series,
document No. 408.
' Apparently a reference to Ribbentrop's conversation with Hungarian Minis-
ter President Teleki and with Foreign Minister Csaky on Aug. 29 in Vienna ; see
vol. x of this series, document No. 410.
NOVEMBER 1941 839
now accept the settlement which had been made. In that case they
must not engage in open propaganda against the Award. Obviously,
they believed that the time had already come for opening up the entire
question anew.
The Foreign Minister said with regard to this that he would tell
Deputy Minister President Antonescu too that what mattered now
was to win the war and that quarrels within the family had to be
settled. He could merely repeat that dealing with all these matters
required great calm.
M. de Bardossy interjected at this point that there was danger that
the Rumanians would conclude from the admonition that the war had
to be won first, that after the war the moment would come for engaging
in strife on account of Transylvania.
The Foreign Minister countered this by saying that the Rumanians
would have much work to do after the war, above all the rebuilding
of Bessarabia which was completely destroyed and of her other terri-
tories in the east. [One must] not forget that Marshal Antonescu
was an intelligent man; the Rumanian troops had acquitted them-
selves well in the fight against Soviet Russia.
M. de Bardossy on the other hand was sure that the Rumanians
would certainly not build anything ; even if beyond Bessarabia they
should receive Transnistria they would in spite of it continue to talk
only about Transylvania. They would not do anything in the eastern
territories either just as they had not done anything in Bessarabia
for 20 years.
The Foreign Minister then broke off discussion of this subject asking
M. de Bardossy about the role of the American Legation in Budapest
and pointing out to him that the Americans had simply taken over
the English espionage activities in Hungary just as they had in
Finland.
With regard to this M. de Bardossy said that it was possible. Ac-
tually the American Minister in Budapest, Pell, had nothing impor-
tant to do. At the end the Foreign Minister inquired of M. de
Bardossy whether he had thought about the question of prohibiting
in Hungary the listening to foreign broadcasting stations.
M. de Bardossy said in this connection that public listening was
prohibited but that there were considerable objections to a complete
ban on listening; nor did it seem to him to be so necessary as the
enemy propaganda was always refuted by the events.
After the Foreign Minister had drawn the attention of the Hun-
garian Minister President also to the injurious effect which the many
Jews in Hungary could have on public opinion as a result of listening
to enemy broadcasting stations, M. de Bardossy took leave expressing
thanks for the reception which had been granted him.
V. RlNTELEN
840 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 504
FO/0163-6T ;
Fl/0002-06
MemoraTidum by the DiHgent of the Political Department
RAM 56 g. Rs. Berlin, November 27, 1941.
Record of the Reception of the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Popov
by the Foreign Minister in Berlin on November 26, 1941, From
8 : 40 to 9 : 15 p.m.
By way of introduction M. Popov transmitted to the Reich Foreign
Minister the greetings of the Bulgarian King as well as of the Bul-
garian Minister President, and remarked concerning Bulgaria's gen-
eral policy that it was of course, as in the past, a policy on Germany's
side; and in all the more important questions which arose Bulgarian
policy in the future, too, would always request German advice. He
hardly needed to talk about that. Rather he was interested in bringing
up at this opportunity a few minor questions regarding which the
Bulgarian Government wanted to express special wishes.
At the first of these questions M. Popov cited the resumption of
operations of the railroad line Pythion-Dede Agach. 1 The French
Military Attache in Sofia 2 had recently brought up this question
and had stated that the French-Greek company which owned this
line would open it again in the near future. This did not appear
expedient to the Bulgarian Government. Rather, it requested that
this line either be turned over to the Bulgarian railroad administra-
tion or, if it should be put into operation by the German military, that
Bulgarian personnel be used. It did not appear expedient to the Bul-
garian Government for Greek personnel to be employed again in
operating this line. This matter was of no great importance ; never-
theless, the way in which it was settled did have a certain psychological
significance for Bulgarian public opinion.
The Foreign Minister promised M. Popov to examine this question. 3
He then for his part broached the question whether Bulgaria was in
' A Bulgarian request that this railroad line which ran through the German-
occupied part of Greek Thrace be put into operation under German administra-
tion and with Bulgarian personnel was first reported in Sofia telegram No. 1334
of Oct. 29 (2233/476023-24). The same matter was officially raised by Minister
Draganov with Weizsacker who recorded this conversation in a memorandum of
Oct. 31 (278/178973).
'C. deRobien.
'Memoranda of Nov. 27 by Weizsacker (278/179025) and Woermann (278/
178997-99) indicate that the Bulgarian Foreign Minister brought up the question
of the Pythion-Dede Agach railroad in separate conversations which he had with
them on Nov. 27. In the course of his visit with Weizsacker, Popov presented a
memorandum explaining the background of the Bulgarian wishes in this matter
(278/179026-28).
NOVEMBER 1941 841
a position to deliver grain to Germany. 4 One could not simply treat
this question from the standpoint of a transaction involving deliveries,
but as a matter of principle one had to proceed from the fact that
Germany was today carrying on a struggle for freedom for all of
Europe, in which the German people were indeed making the greatest
sacrifices. In this struggle it was surely of a certain significance that
the countries friendly to Germany, each to the extent of its abilities,
contributed to Germany's receiving the necessary deliveries.
M. Popov replied that he knew this and was aware of these necessi-
ties. Unfortunately, however, the situation for Bulgaria herself was
rather difficult. Owing to the excess of rain the harvest had been very
bad, and the Bulgarian estimates indicated that there would hardly
be enough of a surplus to satisfy fully the needs of the Bulgarian
Army and the larger Bulgarian cities.
The Foreign Minister replied to this that he did not want to ask
anything that went beyond the Bulgarian capabilities. However, he
had believed that it would be possible to put through the delivery of
some 10,000 tons of grain.
With regard to this M. Popov said that he hardly believed that the
delivery of grain would be possible; perhaps maize deliveries could
be made. He furthermore stated that the Bulgarian Minister of Trade,
too, would discuss these matters with the German Government and
that one could then see what might be done.
In conclusion the Foreign Minister remarked on this subject that
he asked only that as much as possible be done, and no more. However,
every Bulgarian delivery would be very welcome to us. Whatever
Bulgaria did for us in this connection she would actually be doing for
herself. One should not forget what fate the Bolshevists had intended
for Bulgaria. Here in Berlin M. Molotov had stated only a year
ago that the Russians wanted a pact of assistance with Bulgaria
under which they would be provided with bases in that country ; 8 in
which connection he had added condescendingly that one could easily
let the Bulgarian King remain in the country. One knew indeed the
significance of these wishes from the experience with the pacts of
assistance between Russia and the Baltic countries. Now this danger
was past. However, Germany had to continue her efforts in order
to secure the victory for the whole future. She was pleased with all
her friends that would help her in this.
*In a memorandum of Nov. 23 (4703/E227414-15) which was to serve as a
basis for Ribbentrop's discussion of this matter with Popov, Clodius expressed
the opinion that Bulgaria was capable of supplying Germany with at least 20,000
tons of bread grain and a considerably larger amount of maize, Clodius recom-
mended that the German Government insist on Bulgaria's supplying Germany
with grain and maize "to the limit of her possibilities and accompanied by a
drastic curtailment of her domestic consumption."
5 See vol. xi of this series, document No. 328.
842 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Foreign Minister Popov repeated again that Bulgaria would do
everything possible, for she had not forgotten what Germany had
done for Bulgaria. Bulgaria felt allied with Germany to the bitter
end.
As a further point of the conversation the Bulgarian Foreign
Minister then turned to the uprising in Thrace that occurred some
time ago in the vicinity of Drama, in which 32 Bulgarian officials and
soldiers had been killed or badly wounded. Of course the Bulgarian
authorities had been compelled to take vigorous action against this
uprising, which had been caused by Communist agitation. Now the
Greeks were starting to complain about it and to address written
complaints to the German Government. 6 The Bulgarian Government
would be grateful if it could have this material. It wanted to settle
this matter at once conclusively and not defer it for the future. M.
Popov asked us to believe that nothing had been done by the Bulgarians
that was not necessary for quelling the uprising. If mistakes had
nevertheless been made in individual cases, then they could best be
remedied on the basis of the Greek complaints.
Regarding this the Foreign Minister remarked that such material
had not been submitted to him. 7 He would have the matter investi-
gated.
M. Popov then brought up the matter of the area of Fiorina in west-
ern Macedonia as another point. The Greek administrative authori-
ties there were indulging in anti-Bulgarian agitation. The area was
under German military administration, but there was only a limited
number of German commanders in the cities there and they could not
control everything that occurred in their area. He requested that the
Bulgarians in this area be granted somewhat greater protection.
The German command posts in Salonika seemed to be too skeptical in
regard to the complaints of the Bulgarians from this area, probably
because the complaints that had reached them had been exaggerated
and had not been fully confirmed upon investigation. However, that
did not change the fact that there were too few German supervisory
organs on the spot and the Bulgarian population did not enjoy ade-
quate protection. The Greeks simply wanted to oppress the Bul-
' See document No. 435,
T In a memorandum of Not. 27 (278/179022-24) Weizsacker recorded having
told the Bulgarian Foreign Minister that day that he would be glad to show
Minister Draganov the material relating to accusations against Bulgaria on
account of extremely severe Bulgarian measures taken against Greek insurgents.
The Bulgarian Foreign Minister was anxious to refute these accusations and
for hia part left a memorandum, which is appended to "Weizsacker's record of the
conversation.
NOVEMBER 1941 843
garians there, as they had always wanted to do in the course of
history. One should not forget that Bulgaria had been forced to as-
sert her intellectual fredom from Greece in the same way as she had
been forced to fight for her political freedom against the Turks.
The Foreign Minister promised M. Popov that he would have this
question investigated, too, and would see what could be done in this
regard.
M. Popov finally brought up the difficulties which the Bulgarian
Government encountered in carrying out the laws directed against the
Jews. Quite a number of the Jews living in Bulgaria were not citi-
zens of Bulgaria but of Hungary, Rumania, Spain, and other coun-
tries. These countries, however, claimed the same rights for their
Jewish citizens as for their other citizens, and did not tolerate their
receiving the special treatment provided for in the Jewish legislation.
This was after all a question that had to be settled jointly among
the European countries.
The Reich Foreign Minister replied that he found this question
which M. Popov had brought up to be not without interest. Even at
this time, he could tell him one thing : at the end of the war all Jews
would have to leave Europe. This was an irrevocable decision of the
Fiihrer's, and was also the only way to master this question, because it
could only be solved on a global basis and because individual measures
were of little use. Incidentally, one should not attach too much im-
portance to the protests regarding Jews who were alien nationals. At
any rate we no longer paid attention to such protests from American
quarters. He — the Reich Foreign Minister — would have the problem
brought up by M. Popov examined in the Foreign Ministry.
M. Popov then turned to the Bulgarian wish that, as part of the
great program of opening up new transportation routes which the
Todt Organization was carrying out, provision be also made for a
bridge across the Danube between Bulgaria and Rumania. The lack
of such a bridge had been felt for some time. That it should be built
was of the greatest significance to Bulgaria.
The Foreign Minister termed this wish interesting and worth look-
ing into, too, and in conclusion asked M. Popov to transmit his respects
and regards to the King and also to Minister President Filov. 8
Rintelen
8 In a minute of Nov. 28 (278/179035) Rintelen forwarded to Weizs&eker the
Foreign Minister's request that action be taken with regard to examining the
Individual questions raised by Popov. WeizsSlcker routed this request to the
officials concerned on Nov. 30.
844 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 505
67/46936-41
Unsigned Memorandum 1
November 30, 1941.
Record of the Conversation Between Reichsmarschall Goring
and Deputy Minister President Mihai Antonescu 2
Following the reception of the representatives of the Anti-Comin-
tern powers, 3 the Reichsmarschall had a conversation with the Ruma-
nian Deputy Prime Minister which was also attended by State Secre-
taries Korner and Neumann and Ministerialrat Gornnert.
After a few words of personal welcome the Reichsmarschall ex-
plained to Antonescu that he had invited him to this personal con-
versation because the petroleum problem had assumed unexpected
importance. He was certain, to be sure, that the German and allied
troops would reach the petroleum area of Maikop in the course of
December or January, but he was equally certain that everything
would be destroyed there. Even though all preparations had been
made for an accelerated resumption of the petroleum production, it
still had to he expected that production would get under way again
only after a year. With this, however, the petroleum situation would
be greatly relieved ; but in the year until then the German and allied
armies would use a very great deal of gasoline, for obvious reasons.
Rumania was practically the only source that came into consideration
for this. Germany and Rumania would either win together or lose the
war together ; therefore it was also in Rumania's own interest to do
everything to secure the petroleum supplies necessary for victory.
Next to the blood of her soldiers, the most valuable contribution which
Rumania could make to the common cause was therefore her petro-
leum. Now in recent years Rumania's petroleum production had
decreased to a frightening extent, not only on account of the gradually
decreasing productivity of the wells — a fact that could not be
changed — but also for other reasons that could be removed. He (the
Reichsmarschall) therefore asked Antonescu in the common interest
of the prosecution of the war to increase the Rumanian petroleum
production to the greatest possible extent with all conceivable means.
In so doing he pledged his word as Reichsmarschall to him (An-
' It appears that the text of this memorandum which is from Schmidt's file is
not complete.
2 This memorandum does not indicate when the conversation was held. There
is in the files a memorandum of Nov. 28 by State Secretary Neumann of the Four
Year Plan (2193/473055-60) which was sent to the Foreign Ministry with the
explanation that "it served the Keichsmarsehall as a basis for his conversation
with Minister President Antonescu on Nov. 26 of this year." See footnote 3.
' According to the DNB report this reception took place Nov. 26.
NOVEMBBH 1941 845
tonescu) that with respect to this -wish the idea of a commercial or
shareholding exploitation did not predominate for one second on the
German side. The distribution of shares, the conditions of owner-
ship and the financial interests were a matter of complete indifference
to Germany ; it was merely a question of increasing the production.
The Reichsmarschall repeated the assurance already given Mar-
shal Antonescu at the meeting in Vienna,* that Germany by no means
intended an open or covert seizure of Rumania's oil wells, but simply
desired that German and Rumanian experts would remove all legal
and constitutional obstacles that could stand in the way of greater
production. He was aware that the Finance Ministry or other offices
perhaps had departmental viewpoints to advance, which however had
to be ignored. Only the common interest of Rumania and Germany
as allies should be allowed to count. He did not need to describe in
more detail how urgently the oil was needed at the eastern front,
particularly in the tank battles around Moscow.
All personal financial interests which hampered production had to
be pushed ruthlessly aside. In Germany, too, certain big industrial-
ists had been given very clearly to understand that the general inter-
est had to take precedence. He wanted to inform Antonescu very
candidly that production had to be increased even at the risk of pump-
ing the Rumanian oil wells entirely dry. Rumania would in this
case receive compensation in the future big oil interests in the Mid-
dle East. Any exhaustion of the wells would be compensated by
Rumanian participation in Russian and Iranian petroleum interests.
He (the Reichsmarschall) had already expressed similar thoughts
during his Vienna meeting with Marshal Antonescu. Marshal Anto-
nescu, too, had agreed entirely with this opinion, but it seemed as if
subordinate organs were not following the directives of the Marshal.
Therefore he was turning to the Deputy Minister President as the
present leader of the Cabinet with the request that he proceed in an
absolutely dictatorial manner in these matters and force all interested
parties to adapt themselves to the necessities of the hour.
It would perhaps be good if on the Rumanian as on the German side
only one man were responsible for the further pursuit of this question.
Then the results would have to become satisfactory.
The Reichsmarschall cited in this connection a number of examples
in Germany in order to show how he himself had taken vigorous action
in similar situations.
In particular it was a question of establishing a working community
of the petroleum industry in order to concentrate all energies deci-
sively in one organization that would be directed by one man. Further-
* See vol. in of this series, document No. 126.
846 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
more the obstacles in the mining legislation had to be eliminated and
finally fuel oil had to be largely replaced by coal. Then the allied
armies would be able to continue to advance in Russia up to the Urals,
and, if necessary, to Sverdlovsk, Omsk or Irkutsk.
Deputy Minister President Antoneseu, referring to the statements
already made by Marshal Antonescu in Vienna, replied that Ru-
mania and Germany would hold out together as allies in this war until
the final victory. He repeated Marshal Antonescu's promise that the
petroleum production would be very greatly increased. He himself
was entirely aware of the importance of this question for the continu-
ation of the war, and was willing even to consider a kind of exhaustion
of the wells, while all administrative, financial, or other obstacles
would be removed.
In the further course of the conversation Antonescu then turned
to the financing of the German troops in Rumania and complained
that the burdens resulting therefrom for the Rumanian State were
much too great and were bound to lead to inflation. In the last 8
months 20 billion lei had been spent for this, and another 30 billion
had been requested. Considerable sums would also have to be raised
by Rumania for capital investments in the chemical industry. While
he (Antonescu) was personally entirely in favor of German-Ru-
manian cooperation in the economic field, and for example had him-
self signed a contract with the Hermann- Goring- Werke, these partici-
pations in the chemical [industry] seemed to him to represent too
great a burden.
In this connection Antonescu described the Rumanian plans for in-
dustrialization. He stated that considering her raw material sources
and her cheap labor Rumania could become an auxiliary industrial
center for supplying the Balkan countries, the Near East, and the areas
east of the Balkans. In this respect there emerged for Rumania
from economic cooperation with Germany a new orientation in the
economic field. For this reason he had also gladly signed certain in-
dustrial contracts. However, in the case of the 6 billions which I. G.
Farben was asking in order to make capital investments in the Ru-
manian chemical industry other things were involved that were not
absolutely necessary for the victory, and therefore had to be postponed
until later.
In the further course of the conversation Antonescu summarized his
wishes as follows :
1. There had to be a significant reduction in the German troops in
Rumania in order to avoid the danger of inflation ;
_ 2. Marshal Antonescu would like in this connection to pose the ques-
tion that he had already touched on in his conversations with Field
NOVEMBER 1041 847
Marshal Keitel, 5 whether Rumania could not take over the air de-
fense alone | at the same time she would merely ask for the provision of
technical aids and antiaircraft equipment for the protection of the
petroleum refineries. The 65,000 German troops, plus the 20,000
prisoners, were gradually becoming a burden for the Rumanian
State Bank, far in excess of its possibilities ;
3. He requested that the German economic negotiators be instructed
to waive the demands for capital investment, which also involved a
heavy burden on the Rumanian currency.
In this connection Antonescu also mentioned reproaches that had
allegedly been made by the German side against Marshal Antonescu
on account of the too low petroleum production, and emphasized that
the Marshal was really doing everything that he had promised.
After all, out of a total production of 5,500,000 tons Italy and Ger-
many had received 3,300,000. In the period from July 1 to the pres-
ent moment, i.e., in i months, 1,500,000 tons had been delivered.
Furthermore, Marshal Antonescu had made available to the Luftwaffe
all the reserve stocks of the Rumanian Air Force in high-grade avia-
tion gasoline.
Unfortunately it had been learned in Rumania that the Hungarians
had stockpiled considerable reserves of aviation gasoline, and it was
suspected that part of this was Rumanian gasoline. This was all the
more serious, stated Antonescu with increasing fervor, as it was only
recently stated in an official newspaper in Budapest that the experi-
ence of 1918 would not be repeated in Hungary, but that Hungary
would remain strong and await the auspicious moment I Antonescu
called this an extreme lack of tact on the part of the Hungarians, and
asked for Germany's help in regard to such statements which were
insulting to the dignity of the Rumanian people. In this connection
he also complained vigorously about the bad treatment of the Ru-
manian minority in Hungary, and cited thereby in particular the inci-
dents with the Rumanian students in Cluj B and the halting of the
Rumanian courier communications through Hungary. Stressing his
firm belief in the Fiihrer's sense of justice, he asked for Germany's
support against the Hungarians. The new Rumania had made sac-
rifices most willingly and believed^ that she had thereby won the right
to be protected against the Hungarian excesses.
In his reply the Reichsmarschall took up each of the points brought
up by Antonescu :
He promised that Germany would seriously consider the question
of reducing the occupation troops, since she realized the dangers of
an inflation in Rumania.
"Keitel went to Bucharest Nov. 8 to represent Hitler at a military victory
parade In Bucharest (Ribbentrop telegram No. 3072 of Not. 6: 239/154353),
According to Killinger's telegram No. 3653 of Not. 9 (239/154366-68) Keitel on
that occasion discussed with Marshal Antonescu German-Rumanian economic
relations, especially the reduction of the number of German troops in that
country.
' Erdmannsdorff recorded on Nov. 4 (239/154360-61) that the Rumanian Min-
ister had handed in a list of complaints regarding Hungarian excesses against
the Rumanian minority in Transylvania. One of these complaints referred to an
attack on Rumanian-speaking students at the University of Cluj by their Hun-
garian fellow students.
848 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Likewise he confirmed a statement by State Secretary Neumann
according to which the Reichsbank would come to the aid of the
Rumanian State Bank with gold and foreign exchange in order to
prevent the danger of inflation m this fashion.
Regarding the question of the participations in Rumanian enter-
prises on the part of industrial firms, particularly I. G. Farben, State
Secretary Neumann remarked that these things did not involve offi-
cial negotiations but agreements made by private industry. With
regard to this the Reichsmarschall remarked that all transactions
undertaken for purely private financial interests would be halted.
Regarding the plans for industrialization the Reichsmarschall
warned the Rumanian Deputy Prime Minister against carrying out
such plans rashly. For the time being Rumania had great develop-
mental tasks to perform in the reconquered or newly acquired ter- "")
ritories. In the future she would become a country with tremendous
grain surpluses as well as exportable quantities of maize, oats, and
wheat, and would have to think about selling these export surpluses.
If she industrialized to a large degree, then difficulties would develop
similar to those of the South American countries in their relations
with North America. Having her own industrial production she
would not be in a position to accept the payment in industrial goods
for her agricultural production made by the purchasing countries,
as she herself would also produce industrial articles within the coun-
try. Great difficulties in marketing would result from this. Every-
thing that stood in the way of such an exchange between industrial
products and agricultural products was unfavorable for Rumania's
further development.
Regarding the reduction of the German troops in Rumania the
Reichsmarschall asked the question whether the presence of a strong
German division ready for action in Rumania was not really quite
agreeable to Marshal Antonescu or whether he believed that the in-
ternal situation of Rumania was so consolidated in relation to the
Iron Guard or the generals, . . .
No. 506
64/44875-76
The. Charge oV Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
TelegTam
most urgent Washington, November 27, 1941 — 3 : 28 p. m.
No. 4145 of November 27 Received November 28— 1 : 55 a. m,
American-Japanese relations, as reported by DNB No. 427 from
Washington, have suddenly entered a very critical stage. The presen-
tation yesterday of a note 1 to Nomura and Kurusu demanding the
evacuation of Indochina, acceptance of the principles laid down by
Hull on July 16, 1937, 2 and Japan's withdrawal from the Axis,
1 Cf. Foreign Relations of the United, States, Japan, 1981-1911, vol n, m>.
764-770.
1 Hid., vol, i, pp. 325-326.
NOVEMBER 1941 849
amounts to an ultimatum and might result in the immediate termina-
tion of negotiations. In order to underline the seriousness of the
situation, Hull canceled his regular press conference and called in
the American reporters for a confidential briefing this morning, dur-
ing which he once more stressed the reliability of the information re-
garding a reportedly planned Japanese invasion of Thailand. This
corroborates what I reported about press developments on November
26, a namely, that Roosevelt called the Chinese Ambassador Shih and
the Financial Advisor Soong for the purpose of dispelling their
anxieties and not at all, as asserted by the American press, to induce
China to make concessions to Japan.
The question whether the Americans really intend to make good this
new threat and take military countermeasures in the event of a Japa-
nese advance into Thailand, or whether this is just the continuation of
the past incendiary campaigns, cannot be answered at this time. It
is worth noting, however, that the English apparently were not con-
sulted although Roosevelt is said to have been asked by the English
as well as the Soviet Russians to avoid if possible a (clear text ap-
parently missing) in the Pacific at this time. The extreme limits of
what can be called bluffing would seem to have been reached, in any
event, by the sharp tone and arrogance of the American demands.
Thomsen
a Not found.
No. 507
F9/0120-38
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff
Fiih 53 Fuhrer's Headquarters, November 28, 1941.
Record of the Reception of Finnish Foreign Minister Witting
bt the fijhrer in the presence op the reich foreign minister
on November 27, 1941, From 12 : 00 to 1 : 00 p. m.
After Foreign Minister Witting thanked the Fiihrer for the great
honor of being received by him, the Fiihrer began with his remarks :
He wanted to describe the situation to him briefly as it is :
1. The present situation was not the result of his desire, but the
fault of Russia.
2. The German position toward Bolshevism had always been clear
and unequivocal. He himself had shortly after the World War
founded the party which had taken as its most sacred task the fight
against Bolshevism.
3. The attacks by the western powers had occurred through no fault
of Germany's and contrary to our desire.
882-805—64 59
850 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
For Germany there existed one law: That was to avoid, in all
circumstances, haying to fight two sides at the same time. Many dogs
are the death of the hare ; and the World War had shown how difficult
it was to fight against strong enemies in the west and the east at the
same time. If he, the Ftihrer, had promised Finland his help at the
time during her first fight against Bolshevism, this promise would have
been highly problematical. It would have meant merely a gesture, but
not support capable of fulfillment. He had certainly not been willing
to permit Bolshevism to penetrate further into Europe. But he had
had to wait until he had gained freedom in the rear in 1939-40, Only
when France had been thrown to the ground in 1940 had the moment
arrived when he had been able for the first time to say no to Bolshevism.
He was a soldier and also judged his political possibilities as a
soldier. He had therefore been clear about the fact that at a time
when a two-front war threatened him it would have been very danger-
ous to proceed against Russia. Furthermore, he had needed one more
year in order to set up the 240 divisions that were needed in order to
be able to begin the great fight. During these preparations he had
been aware that this was a matter not only of a fight for Germany but
above all a fight for all of Europe ; for if Germany had not been in a
position to stand up against Bolshevism, then no other country in
Europe could have done it in her place. The wave of Bolshevism
would have swept across the Continent without hindrance. After he
had gained the conviction, however, that Eussia intended to attack
Germany in any case, probably this very summer, he had decided to act
and on June 22 his armies had marched.
One should be clear about the fact that the entire world Jewry stood
on the side of Bolshevism. An objective political point of view was
not possible in any country in which public opinion was controlled and
formed by these forces which in the last analysis had brought about
Bolshevism. He knew these forces from Germany. They were ex-
actly the same that did their mischief in those states which today stood
on the side of Bolshevism.
He saw how the U.S.A. was drifting very fast toward a terrible so-
cial crisis. In England, too, such contests were in the offing. Those
who once employed these forces for their political purposes could no
longer control them. He recalled a report stating that a year ago
Halifax had received numerous letters from all parts of England
demanding peace negotiations. This report had stated further that
Halifax had been "strong enough" not to follow these wishes. This
proved that a great number of Englishmen sought the reasonable
course of a settlement with Germany, but that the forces which worked
for destruction were still predominant. The entire national intelli-
gentsia of England should be against the war, for even a victory could
NOVEMBER 1041 851
not gain anything for England. It was the Bolshevist and Jewish
forces which kept the English from pursuing a reasonable policy.
Europe had already recovered from the worst social crises. She
was better consolidated and, owing to her lengthy historical past, more
stable than America. She had, for example, quickly surmounted the
abuses of the French Revolution, and also in the fight against Bol-
shevism the healthy and strong forces in Europe, as such, had pre-
vailed. We could not have any conception as yet as to how these
contests would develop in the superficial, unconsolidated America.
Thus one had to realize that in the last analysis Europe was en-
tirely dependent upon herself. The most important task was to
utilize for Europe from now on the richest and most fertile portion
of Europe, which had been organized against Europe up to now.
It was impossible, for example, that in Belgium there were 240 persons
to the square kilometer, that there and in many other countries was
great distress in taking care of the unemployed, whereas in the most
fertile areas of Europe, in the Ukraine, there were only 80 persons
to the square kilometer in areas where one could provide living condi-
tions and food for countless people. It would be madness to permit
such a situation. Europe had to mobilize her own resources and this
would be done. Europe could become self-sufficient and he would
make her self-sufficient.
It was an insane situation that those forces which today worked
against Europe in the world did not build up but destroyed, and that
they cut off thriving commerce. It was insane, for example, what
the U.S.A. did with South America. To be sure South America,
which had bought large numbers of machines from us in the past,
could buy these from North America, but North America could not
take the products which South America had so far delivered to Europe
in exchange for the European products. How should South America
pay if the U.S.A. could not use its goods! Gold was only a fiction;
no one could live from it.
It was a tremendous task to develop Europe into a self-sufficient
structure, a task which could be accomplished with relatively minor
corrections. Up to now the most valuable part of Europe had been or-
ganized against Europe. The entire wealth of broad European Rus-
sia had not been utilized for the Europeans, not even for the Russians,
but it had been used exclusively for developing a gigantic armament
against Europe.
If we Germans took over the leadership in this new development of
Europe, it was only for the reason that someone finally had to do it
and because owing to her position, her people, and her capacities Ger-
many was predestined for this. Through the fighting in the past,
Germany had developed into a strong power and had borne a tremen-
dous blood-burden — in the final analysis also for Europe.
852 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
It was easy for some countries that stood outside the battle today
to say that they remained neutral and regarded the developments from
a higher point of view. The Swedes could regard the development
from a higher point of view as long as Finnish soldiers risked their
lives at the front and opposed the enemy in dirt and muc|. If there
had been no Finnish soldiers then Sweden and Norway would soon
have been overrun by Bolshevists, and if the Rumanians had been
beaten, then Bulgaria would have been next in line. It was right for
everyone to fight for himself against Bolshevism, for then they would
all be fighting for Europe. In this respect he could not understand
England, for the English were insane if they believed that once Rus-
sia got to the Channel they could keep out of the conflict and would be
safe from being destroyed by Bolshevism.
It was Germany's task not only to end the war but also to build up
a new Europe. Perhaps in our past we would have fared better had
we been somewhat more egoistical. Since the year 1454 the German
Reich had lost 24 million lives in war and had not won much thereby.
In the same time the English had sacrificed 2.3 million men and with
these had conquered a world empire. In this comparison one could
not reproach Germany with having been especially egoistical. It was
unfortunately the German fate that she always had to fight for Europe
and stand firm against the penetration of alien peoples from the east.
Just as in the past she had preserved Europe from the onslaughts of
the Huns, Turks, and Mongols, today she was again battling against
the onslaught of Bolshevism. And this time Bolshevism had mobi-
lized all of Asia against Europe.
There were certain problems that could only be solved in Europe.
As a soldier, he was in a position to evaluate what a tremendous con-
tribution the Finnish people had made in this battle, and he wanted
to assure him, the Finnish Foreign Minister, of one thing : We did not
have much to give away in Germany, but we would, wider no circum-
stances, leave Finland in the lurch, also not economically?- 'Where 90
million people could live, it was also possible to let another S million
lime with them, too. He would take care that this was made possible;
this he promised, him, even at the risk that certain restrictions had to
be made in Germany.
He was resolved to find a solution for the Russian question once and
for all [grundsatsHchJ. He did not exaggerate when he said that
Europe had been saved through his person. How would Europe have
'Schnurre's memorandum Ha. Pol. 7709/41g of Nor. 27 (261/170384-85)
records a discussion on the evening before with Witting who had discussed the
problem of Finland's food supply with Goring. The Relchsmarscha 11, said
Witting, showed great understanding for Finland's needs and assured Mm that
Germany would make up Finland's deficit not only in grain but also in fats. In
January experts of Finland and of Germany would study Finland s additional
needs.
NOVEMBER 19 41 853
withstood the Russian onslaught if he had not at one time founded his
party, and if the victory of his party had not made it possible for him
to rearm for eight years. This onslaught would have swept across
Europe like a hurricane.
He considered it necessary that the Russian problem be solved rad-
ically, and once and for all. As a historic personality he wanted to
give him the advice also to seek a solution from the Finnish point of
view that was not only meant for 1941-42 but was also of truly histor-
ical dimensions. Finland had to define her borders in a manner which
precluded a repetition of the Russian attack ; otherwise she would have
to mobilize and bleed again after a few years. The borders which she
had to strive for should be determined from the point of view of se-
curity. He, the Fiihrer, had only the desire in this that Finland would
permit us to participate economically in her reconstruction, particu-
larly as regards to products that were scarce with us. These were pri-
marily nickel and lumber. Once we had organized the Ukraine, we
could make available to Finland unlimited quantities of food. Fin-
land should secure a border that stretched from the White Sea to the
Svir and the Neva. It was his irrevocable decision to break the power
of Russia once and for all. Within this framework there was also his
resolve to blot out the significance of Leningrad, so that new fights
would not break out and new blood not have to be shed every 25 years.
For after all, the German people had another mission than to carry
on war.
He himself had been torn away from his peaceful work. This work
had been of great creative value for humanity and its culture. The
Fiihrer then spoke of the reconstruction and cultural work lying
within the framework of his plans. He spoke of social reforms, of
buildings, roads, worker colonies, factories and more of the like.
Turning to the present war situation, the Fiihrer said that it was
not because of the Russians but because of the snow, mud, and cold
that we had not yet attained our objectives. In one area our successes
were not so large, namely in the Finnish theater of war, 2 The Finns
were admittedly better than we on their terrain, for our equipment and
our training had only been meant for the European Continent.
The achievements of the German soldiers were written in the stars.
We had conquered Poland, the west, Yugoslavia and Greece; in the
east we had pushed our front 1500 kilometers forward. In North
Africa an annihilating defeat was awaiting the English. To be sure,
he was not a man to let off a fanfare too early, like the English, but
he was convinced that there, too, a great victory was on the way for us.
Leningrad had to be destroyed, and Moscow, too f he did not want to
' See document No. 349 and No. 395,
* See document No. 388.
854 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN" POLICY
conquer any cities. In the meantime preparations were -being made
in the southern part of the front for the further advance into the
Caucasus. No matter what happened, there was no longer any com-
bination of forces conceivable in the world that could force us out of
Europe.
It gradually became clear that the nations of Europe belonged to-
gether like a great family of nations. France, too, would come to
realize this, and he hoped that England, too, would recognize this ;
it was to be hoped that it would not be too late. England had to realize
that the only group of powers which had an interest in maintaining
the English Empire was Europe and never America.
In the meantime Germany would keep on arming. He followed
American production ; in comparison to what we accomplished it was
ridiculous, and one should not think that what we had at the front
today represented our last possibilities. He always gave out only
what was just needed. Actually, owing to the unprecedented develop-
ment of the anti-tank defenses the tank had passed its high point.
The same thing had happened as with the knights' armor in the Middle
Ages, which had lost its value owing to the invention of fire-arms.
He regarded the future with perfect composure. If the U.S.A. entered
the war, then Japan would also be in the war within the shortest time.
This would be regrettable, however, because the world would thereby
suffer a tremendous upheaval. For Germany, however, this would
no longer signify any danger.
All of us, the Finns, too, had only the one wish at the moment, and
that was for peace. But not a peace in which we knew that we would
have to fight again within a few years.
Germany was very happy to have Finland as her ally, and every
German soldier respected the Finnish soldier. The fact that both are
brave was the best prerequisite for mutual respect. He, the Fiihrer,
hoped that this common war would be the last war, and that at the
same time it would signify the start of a long friendship between
Germany and Finland.
Foreign Minister Witting expressed to the Fiihrer his gratitude for
what he had said and mentioned that Finnish history was similar to
that of Germany inasmuch as Finland had fought against the east for
centuries. Finland realized that for securing her position she had to
go beyond her old borders. The Fuhrer confirmed this and assured
him that in these questions, too, Germany stood 100 percent behind
Finland's aspirations.
Witting then stated that Finland employed her troops according
to the seasons. In the winter it was again predominantly the struggle
of individuals, and thus many soldiers were now being withdrawn from
the front, some to be put in industry and agriculture and some into
NOVEMBER 1941 855
winter quarters. Finland had tried to become self-sufficient, especially
in the matter of grain supplies, and these efforts had been almost
successful. But owing to the attack of the Bolshevists she had again
lost a large portion of territory and the war had done its part in
blocking this development. Now they had too little grain, but the
Reichsmarschall whom he visited yesterday, had told him that the
Fuhrer had promised to help Finland. They hoped to conclude next
spring what had not been possible this winter and to conclude the
fight against Bolshevism.
The Fuhrer confirmed that he would support Finland further in
this fight and that he would send up another division to Finland.*
He also considers it right for Finland to strive for possession of the
Kola Peninsula and to secure this area for herself." He had only the
one wish, namely that Germany, be allowed to participate economically
in the nickel exploitation. Regarded from the political point of
view, Germany would be happy if every state would take its place
in the defense of Europe. For Germany does not wish to scatter her
forces all over Europe, but to concentrate them in her country. Fur-
thermore, Germany had a reconstruction program, for which she
needed every German. This was what annoyed him most about the
numbskull Churchill, that he had frustrated him in his great creative
work of reconstruction and culture. But we humans had to believe
here in a higher dispensation of fate. Perhaps it was just as well
that everything happened as it did. He did not belong to those who
were ready to leave to posterity a very difficult task with which they
had been confronted. The task of bringing together the European
family had to be performed now. With modern military technology
small nations could no longer exist independently. In a time when
600 km could be covered by an airplane in an hour, a great territorial
integration of nations was necessary. In this sense the construction
of a tremendous protective wall toward the east was the first require-
ment for the security of Europe. Since time eternal Russia had
pushed toward the west. Not only under Bolshevism, but as long as
history had existed the east had threatened the west, no matter what
regime had ruled in Russia. This the Finns knew too. Today
Bolshevism had mobilized all of Asia against Europe.
In conclusion the Fuhrer asked the Foreign Minister to convey
greetings to his President and Field Marshal Mannerheim and to
assure them:
1. That the victorious military development could no longer be
diverted by any power. Germany and the German soldiers had not
only the courage to attack but also the toughness to hold out until
the objective has been attained.
* See document No. 395.
* See document No. 331.
856 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
2. That he, the Fiihrer, did not shrink from the rest of the world ;
he was arming to a degree that no one outside could imagine. Just
at the present time new armored divisions were being set up and
equipped with the most modern tanks ever seen as yet. In the west
there were stationed a total of 45 divisions today. He did not need
to have any concern there; on the contrary, he could only wish that
the English would land ; he would toss them into the sea so that Dun-
kirk, by comparison, could be considered child's play.
From a certain moment on, the war was nothing more than a prob-
lem in transportation, and this, too, would be solved. German sub-
marines would now get into the Mediterranean, 6 too, and within a
few weeks or months the English would learn that this puddle would
be very difficult to negotiate. After having related somewhat more
about the successes of the German submarines in the Mediterranean,
the Fuhrer took leave of the Finnish Foreign Minister in a very
cordial manner.
Hewel
• g ee u.S. Navy Department, ONI, "Ftthrer Conferences on Matters Dealing
With the German Navy, 1941," vol. ir, pp. 59, 68, 80.
No. 508
F9/01B&-62
Memorandum hy an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff
Full 55a g.Es Fu'hker's Headquarters, November 28, 1941.
Reception of the Hungarian Minister President and Foreign
Minister de Bardossy by the Fuhrer on Thursday, November 27,
1941, From 1 : 00 to 1 : 30 p.m. in the Presence of the Reich For-
eign Minister
Bardossy transmitted to the Fuhrer the most cordial greetings from
the Regent. The Fuhrer thanked him for this and told him that he
had told the Finn, 1 who had just been with him, that nine-tenths of
the work had actually been done. The advance had bogged down in
dirt and mud, but this meant only a certain loss of time. He still
wanted to finish up a few things this year, but in so doing was fol-
lowing the principle of attaining these objectives with as few sacri-
fices as possible. Sevastopol was now first in line. The artillery had
almost all been brought up, and moreover, he already had reports
that the Russians were apparently evacuating Sevastopol. He then
told the Hungarian of details of the fighting for the Crimea, which
he termed an outstanding heroic feat of the German soldier and an
1 For Hitler's conversation with Finnish Foreign Minister Witting, see docu-
ment No. 507.
NOVEMBER 1941 857
example of brilliant leadership by General von Manstein. 8 These
were accomplishments which in the history of war were simply to be
termed fantastic. He then reported further concerning the war in
the-east and the concentration in the direction of the Caucasus which
was under way at the moment and which had been hampered for a
while by the mud period. He also hoped in the immediate future
to eliminate the last remnants of the Russian fleet from the Black Sea.
The Gulf of Finland was not freezing shut, and the Russian ships
frozen in there would soon become victims of the Stukas. Leningrad
would be starved out. The German troops were now moving up to-
ward Moscow; everything was proceeding according to plan. The
main task at the moment was bringing up supplies, and this too was
functioning. In first place the winter equipment for the troops was
now being brought up to this tremendous front. In North Africa
the English would suffer a great defeat ; he did not want to anticipate
matters, but he could say even at this time, that the English operation
in North Africa, which had been conceived by Churchill, had simply
been stupid. It would go down in the history of wars as the Church-
ill operation. Churchill had evidently wanted to be very daring
for once as he believed the Germans to be. But the difference was
simply that Mr. Churchill had acted very daringly and stupidly,
whereas we German prepared and carried out our operations down
to the smallest detail with a tremendous sense of responsibility. This
time the Italians in Africa, particularly the Ariete Division, had
fought splendidly. Fortunately they had now recovered from the
first shock which they had received at the time from the offensive of
the English for the reason that they had had no tank defenses
available.
The Hungarian unit had fought really splendidly on the eastern
front, and deserved to have first of all a period for rest and recovery.
He would now continue to observe developments calmly. He had
hoped very much that the English would attempt a landing. He now
had eight additional new divisions in the west, and in Germany a tre-
mendous, entirely new tank weapon was being developed. In the
spring Germany would stand ready for the final struggle with numer-
ous weapons of a new kind. He had kept back the entire production
of the last months and had sent almost nothing to the eastern front.
The war could no longer be lost, but it was not only a question of
finishing the European war, but also of organizing the new Europe.
There would not be quiet in the world for a long time, because America
in particular, and England, too, were confronted with the most terrible
'Gen. Erich Manatein, on Sept. 18 succeeded General von Schobert as Com-
manding General of the Eleventh Army. Schobert was killed in an airplane
landing on Sept. 12.
858 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
social crises. It was all the more important to put Europe on her
own feet, and that could and would happen.
After having spoken to the Hungarian with the greatest admira-
tion of the heroic fight of the Finns, he [Hitler] asked him to convey
his greetings to the Regent and to thank him for the excellent help
which he had given the German people. He should tell the Regent
that what he [Hitler] had indicated to him at the time as a military
project had in the meantime become reality.
Hewel
No. 509
Fl/0007-14
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministers Personal Staff
Fuhrer's Headquarters, November 29, 1941.
Fuh. 56a g.Rs.
Reception of the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Popov bt the
Fuhrer on November 27, 1941, From 7:30-8:00 p.m., in the
Presence of the Foreign Minister
The Bulgarian Foreign Minister thanked the Fuhrer for receiving
him and after a few introductory sentences asked him how satisfied he
was with the Bulgarian policy. The Fuhrer replied that Bulgaria's
attitude was very good, especially with respect to Turkey. It was
good that Turkey had kept out of everything, for it was better for
us if Turkey was indifferent than if she pursued a wavering policy.
We simply could not offer Turkey as much as the English, for the
simple reason that we would only offer a government what we were
really able to deliver. The English made things much easier for
themselves, for they would promise the countries which they wanted
to win over for their purposes everything conceivable without think-
ing of ever keeping their promise. That was a very simple policy, at
least temporarily, but it was alien to him, the Fuhrer. To cite an
example, the Fuhrer mentioned his promise to Antonescu that the
latter would get Bessarabia back for Rumania. The Fuhrer had
kept this promise, and he had backed it up with everything, with
the German Army and even with German blood. England was al-
ways looking ]"ust for people who would pull the chestnuts out of the
fire for the sake of her ends. The entire system of the offers of guaran-
tees had had no other purpose than to find fools who would run their
heads against the wall for England. Once she had given her word
Germany backed it not only politically but also militarily. In his
opinion it would not do in the long run to let other nations fight one's
NOVEMBER 1941 859
^own battles. What one wished to secure permanently one had to fight
for with one's own blood. Germany had given the best example of
this, for in this fight Germany, indeed, had again carried the main
blood burden. The English themselves were not worth much; one
saw this again in North Africa. Big England had put only one single
division into the fight down there; everything else that was fighting
down there for England consisted of Empire troops, New Zealanders,
South Africans and even Indians.
It was good for Germany if Turkey did nothing at all. If the word
were spread throughout the world that Germany had the intention
of attacking Turkey, these were stupid lies. However, if Turkey had
turned against us then he, the Fuhrer, would not have remained on
the defensive.
The main objective which he envisaged was the reconstruction of
Europe. With the development of technology and also war technology
the world was shrinking more and more and it had already become a
foolish idea that the many countries in Europe should make war upon
one another. Today one could fly over the largest European country
in an airplane in one and a half hours. The Russians had been saved
temporarily only because they simply had not built any roads. Every
war against any other country in Europe which had a good road net-
work could be ended by the power having superiority within a few
days. He therefore believed that Europe was moving toward a great
period of peace. After all everyone desired peace, Bulgaria too, and
likewise Germany, because with respect to all countries a tremendous
development program was waiting to be started.
He also believed that the end of this struggle would not be fought
between any of the European countries, but that finally England
would have to fight against America, The English would find out
one day that Europe alone could have an interest in preserving Eng-
land and the Empire. America, on the other hand, could only desire
to dissolve the English Empire and inherit it.
The Eiihrer then spoke at some length about the horrible conditions
in Russia, the devilish system of Bolshevism, the gigantic Bolshevist
armament industry and the unscrupulous methods which the Bolshe-
vist and Jewish rulers had used to deprive the Russian worker of his
rights, rob him of his freedom, and impress him into the armament
industry like cattle. Gigantic factories had been built and next to
them the administrative buildings of the ,GPU which had monu-
mental facades in front and from the rear were nothing but great
prisons. The workers had simply been caught and put into the fac-
tories, and then they had been left to their fate and had had to find
shelter in holes in the ground. It had been the same in the construc-
tion of the super highways. In vain did one look for the workers'
860 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
accommodations ; but nothing had been found along the highway but
a concentration camp every 30 kilometers. Here the workers that had
arrived too late or had not fulfilled the demands of the work had been
beaten and tortured or finally shot. The entire wages had consisted
of one pound of bread for the people and some oats for the horses. In
this way one could naturally achieve tremendous things. He himself
had seen areas in the Ukraine flowing with milk and honey, where
the soil was so rich that there was nothing like it anywhere else in
Europe, and still the population had been so miserable and impover-
ished that one could hardly believe it. He had seen thousands of wom-
en, but not a single one had worn even the cheapest jewelry. In the
miserable huts there had been neither dishes nor any other household
objects. And this misery existed in an area whose soil could produce
the biggest harvest that one could imagine. Today a fearful and in-
timidated mass lived there which trembled in fear of their commis-
sars. Only after these pitiable creatures saw with their own eyes
that their commissars had been shot did they slowly turn into human
beings again. Popov said that the same observations had been made
from Bulgaria. The Fuhrer continued that the poor people had no
fear of death, but only of torture and the horrible torments that they
were exposed to by their rulers. He had read countless letters from
Russian prisoners which constantly told of hunger. The notion of
hunger ran like a red thread through all the manifestations of life of
the Russian people. They were simply not human beings any more,
but animals, and one was shocked to compare the present population
with the Russians whom one knew from the World War. At that time
one had encountered the good-natured blond Russians as the pre-
dominant element of the population. Today they had disappeared.
With a devilish methodicalness the Bolshevist regime had increasingly
destroyed these Russians or sent them to Siberia and had systemati-
cally transplanted Mongols from Asia to European Russia in order
to destroy the Russian people racially, too, in this way and saturate
them with Asiatic blood.
He now believed, however, that the danger factors had been over-
come. The fall of Sevastopol was a matter of a few days. He also
had reports that the Russians evidently intended to evacuate Hango.
How badly the Russians were faring could also be seen from Molotov's
statement in which he sketched for the world, but especially for the
Russian soldiers, a horrible picture of the tortures which the Russian
prisoners of war had to undergo at the hands of the German soldiers. 1
1 This presumably refers to a note of Nov. 25 by the Soviet People's Commis-
sariat of Foreign Affairs addressed to all diplomatic missions which protested
the mistreatment of Soviet prisoners of war by the Germans. The text of the
note was published in the Soviet press. For a summary, see Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1941, vol. i, pp. 1016-1017.
NOVEMBER 1941 861
^The main reason for this statement was probably the fact that espe-
cially around Moscow numerous Russian soldiers had again gone over
to the Germans. They had an insane fear of their commissars ; once
these had been exterminated the Russians were in general quiet, usable
and willing.
The Fiihrer concluded the conversation by asking Popov to convey
to the King his very best regards and to tell him one thing : No longer
would anybody be able to change anything in the outcome of the war,
neither England nor America nor any other coalition,
Hewel
No. 510
F20/505-14
Memorandum by an Official of Hfie Foreign Minister's Personal Staff
Fuhrer's Headquarters, November 27, 1941
Fuh 63a g.Rs.
Record op the Reception of Danish Foreign Minister Scavenius
bt the fuhrer in the presence oe the foreign minister on
November 27, 1941, From 8 :00 to 8 :30 p.m.
The Fiihrer mentioned to the Danish Foreign Minister, the events
of the last few days, such as the renewal of the Anti-Comintern Pact,
the adherence of new states, and the meeting of Foreign Ministers
in Berlin, 1 as indications of the new Europe that was slowly emerging.
The European states were gradually getting together in the realization
that Europe had to find the foundations of its existence on the Euro-
pean continent itself. It was madness to say that Europe depended on
the rest of the world. If for once the rich territories of eastern
Europe which hitherto had always been mobilized against Europe
would be organized for Europe, Europe could be made self-sufficient.
Only top quality products could continue to be exchanged with other
economic areas. The policy, especially the trade policy, of North
America was insane and bound to collapse sooner or later, because
it was based only on thoughtless and imperialistic aims and not on
actual realities. North America's fight against German trade in South
America was complete nonsense. True, South America could obtain
from North America all the goods it had so far ordered from Europe,
such as machines, industrial products, chemicals; but with what did
it want to pay for these goods? All the things it could supply to
America, America herself had in abundance. Europe, however,
needed South America's meat and fruit, so that a healthy exchange
1 See document No. 498.
g£}2 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
of goods could flourish between Europe and South America. Nor
could Europe develop any substantial trade -with North America for
long because in the end one could always buy only as much as one
could sell. One could not build an economy on credit or on reserves
which one possessed, but only on mutual performance. America, that
big industrial country, had 13 million unemployed herself. She had
sold the product of the labor of her people not in exchange for com-
modities, but for dead gold. And although she had piled up a great
amount of gold, she was nonetheless at the threshold of inflation. We
could carry on a flourishing trade with South America, but the United
States never could. Nor could England, since she had her empire, in
which she had to develop her own trade. The present policy of the
North American union would lead to the destruction of South
America.
The economic areas in the world were growing and would become
too big to carry on, in addition, a large volume of trade among
themselves. Here was North America, which was a closed economic
entity in itself, next to it the British Empire, then Japan, which was
in the process of conquering a closely knit economic sphere in the
Far East, and finally there was the European bloc, which was like-
wise in a position of becoming self-sufficient. He, the Fuhrer, saw in
front of him the aim of creating this self-sufficient Europe, which
was entirely possible. Countries such as Belgium and Holland with
their dense population could not exist at all. They were living on
their colonies; but how long would they possess them? They were
not in a position to defend these colonies. What one could not de-
fend with the sword, one must not expect to keep for long. The
agglomeration of masses of people in these small countries was a
problem that needed a solution. The situation would become entirely
different once the east was opened up for the benefit of Europe. If
the Ukraine were administered with European methods, three times
as much could be gotten out of her. We could supply Europe on an
unlimited scale with the things that could be produced there. The
east had everything in unlimited quantities : iron, coal, oil, and a soil
in which anything Europe needs could be grown : grain, oil seed, rub-
ber, cotton, and much more.
Europe, however, could produce for 200 years before saturating the
east with the most necessary consumers' goods. Today Europe was
straining to the utmost to sell some trifle somewhere in China or in
distant overseas areas. And here at our borders stretched an im-
mense area that had nothing, beginning with the simplest household
goods, and which was only waiting to be given the possibility of ab-
sorbing European goods.
To solve these problems was a stupendous task and if no one under-
took this task he himself was going to solve it. He was no dilettante
NOVEMBER 1941 863
in this field; after all he had solved the German problems too. He
had caused the production of Germany to flourish anew. If he was
told that he had eliminated the unemployed by engaging in large-
scale rearmament, this was only partially true because in the end he
had enabled the German worker to buy any conceivable goods with
what he earned. In this way he had indeed made the armament in-
dustry productive, but had also accelerated the entire German pro-
duction, and thereby solved the problems of the general increase in
production.
We had better get slowly accustomed to the concept of Europe, be-
cause after all we were all living in one European family. It was
true that there was often bitter quarreling in a family, but that did
not prevent people from getting together nevertheless at a moment of
great danger or at moments when it was a matter of solving vital prob-
lems. In Europe only two races had accomplished something, the
Romanic and the Germanic. All others were only profiteers and
parasites of the values and cultures which the other races had created.
Germany was fighting on the eastern front because she stood there.
If she did not stand there another power would have to fight there.
We had been fighting this tremendous battle against the constantly
onrushmg east for one thousand and a half years. Earlier there were
the Huns, the Tartars, and the Mongolians; today it was Bolshevism
that had mobilized the whole of Asia against Europe. The Finns,
too, were standing on the eastern front of Europe. The Swedes were
making things easy for themselves, which they could do as long as
there were Finns who staked their lives at the front. It was the same
with the Rumanians who were fighting against the Bolsheviks. If
they did not fight, or if they did not exist, it would be the Bulgarians
who would have to undertake this battle.
Germany having borne the greatest blood burden in this struggle
and again bearing it this time was fighting for herself, but at the same
time she was fighting for the whole of Europe. If Germany had not
recovered and prepared herself for this great struggle, these Bol-
shevik-Asiatic hordes would have rolled across Europe like a wave
and would not have halted in front of democratic Switzerland either.
That was why he was glad that Denmark was participating. The
war would pass, but the European problems would remain and had to
be solved. For that it was necessary that the European family of na-
tions stood together and lent a hand. Trading was possible only
where one could protect trade with the sword. Denmark, too, ought
to realize this. England would also one day find the way back to
Europe; he hoped, not too late. The policy which she pursued today
was insane. Europe ought now to stand together, the more so as she
had to realize that the states upon which most of the countries had
864 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
relied up to now, England and America, were standing on the thres-
hold of Tast social revolutions. No nation on earth was more ripe for
social explosions than the USA and England.
The Fiihrer then made a few comments regarding the American
armaments. He knew precisely what America could accomplish. He
was not a man to underestimate the enemy, but he could calmly say
that the one who had underestimated his enemy in this contest was not
he, but the Anglo-Saxon politicians.
Reverting to American policy, the Fuhrer remarked that some
states might embark on a course where, from imperialistic motives,
they would rob territory merely for the sake of robbing, such as
England had done in the last few centuries, that is without necessity
and without relation to social needs. In these matters he was a busi-
nessman, particularly in the colonial question. What use was a colony
to him that supplied him annually with 60 million marks worth of
spices and tropical products, but cost him 200 million marks in
expenses for troops and defense. Germany would always export that
much to be able to buy such things.
No state in Europe could blame him for having approached it on
his own initiative to lure it into this war, or to induce it to fight for
Germany. The states that today stood side by side with us had on
their own part voiced a desire that they be permitted to join in the
fight. Even the Czechs had wanted to set up a legion, but he was
convinced that the Czechs did not like the European new order and
therefore he did not want them to fight for it. Nor did he want to
make the Czechs into Germans. He had a principle that the task which
fate imposed on him should be solved through [Germany's] own blood
sacrifice and at his own commitment. If the German people should
in the future be no longer sufficiently strong and ready to give their
own blood for their existence, they ought to perish and be destroyed
by another, stronger power. They would then no longer deserve the
place that they had conquered today. Europe had passed through a
long history of ups and downs, but today she was well on the way
of growing together into a family. In accordance with this develop-
ment, she had to conduct a common economic policy and jointly take
in hand the economic opening-up of Europe. The main task was first
to make Europe self-sufficient. Big deals with overseas countries
could be handled by anybody the way he wanted. In a hundred
years all of Europe would thank him that he had initiated this
development.
Scavenius took his leave from the Fuhrer stating that Denmark
would participate in this development to the best of her capacity.
Hewel
NOVEMBER 1941 865
No. 511
F20/487-94
Memorandum oy an Official of t/ie Foreign Minister's Personal Staff
Fuh. 62a g.Rs. Fuhrer's Headquarters, November 28, 1941.
Reception or the Croatian Foreign Minister, Lorkovic, by the
FtXHRER IN THE PRESENCE OF THE ReICH FOREIGN MINISTER ON
November 27, 1941, From 8 : 30 to 9 : 00 p.m.
The Croatian Foreign Minister spoke about the establishment and
development of the young Croatian state and expressed the hope that
this state would develop to the benefit of the new Europe. General
Kvaternik had asked him to express his loyalty and his thanks for
Germany's assistance in building up the Croatian armed forces. The
latter had to make up for 25 years in order to become again what they
once were. But Croatia was happy to have an army of her own.
The Fiihrer confirmed that the war, more than any other event,
would stimulate the development of Croatia's armed forces. The fact
that a unit of the Croatian armed forces was fighting alongside the
German troops and thus was participating in a maneuver of tremen-
dous dimensions was certainly a blessing for the young armed forces.
This unit would doubtless at some time provide the nucleus for the
later Croatian army. There was a classic example for this, namely
the 27th Rifle Battalion of the World War, which consisted of Finns.
The whole of the present armed forces of Finland had grown out of
this battalion. The Finnish Army was excellent ; yes, he even had to
admit that they were our teachers in the fighting in the terrain there.
The knowledge of war could not be learned in peacetime. We Ger-
mans had also tried to develop new operational ideas in peacetime with
the aid of the new weapons, but war was a different school. It was
through the practice which we had had, starting with the occupation
of the Rhineland and through the entry into Austria to the great
battles of this war, that we had really developed our great military
ability. The Rumanians, too, had learned a great deal in the war,
and their present army was something quite different from what it
was two years ago.
Lorkovic continued : He could report that the reorganization of the
Croatian state was progressing, that Croatia was today a united na-
tion in which religious denominations played no role. There was
good progress in the areas of foreign and domestic policy. The devel-
opment of the economy was also progressing satisfactorily ; they even
hoped that next year Croatia's harvest would be sufficient to cover her
own needs. They were establishing a kind of Reich Food Estate
682-908—64 60
866 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
[Rewh3nahrstand~\ at the present time. The Fiihrer expressed his
pleasure at this development.
As an Austrian by birth, who in his youth had so often associated
with the people from the close-by southeast, he was particularly inter-
ested in the Croatian state. He had also gotten to know the Moham-
medan Croats as excellent soldiers, and for this reason he was par-
ticularly happy to learn that the Croats were able to shift their
development away from denominations and toward the racial idea, for
after all the Christian and Mohammedan Croats were one race.
Lorkovic replied to a question by the Fiihrer that there were somewhat
fewer than one million Mohammedans in Croatia, which was one-
seventh of the population. AH Croatian soldiers, especially the
Bosnians, remembered the Austrian period with affection.
The Fiihrer mentioned the unsatisfactory conditions in Serbia,
where guerrilla bands consisting mainly of communists were still
causing trouble. These uprisings would be crushed, and today things
had already progressed so far that the majority of the Serbs them-
selves opposed them. One could indeed see from this how everything
had been prepared from Moscow long in advance. He, the Fiihrer,
had never intended to have quarrels with so many states of Europe; he
had always wanted peace only. But one had to recognize from the
development of the war that we humans were subject to the decrees of
fate. To be sure, he was not the man to wait until all problems came
to him, but he seized the initiative as soon as he felt the need to act.
He spoke briefly about the insane act of the perpetrators of the
Yugoslav Putsch, mentioning that the German national groups had
felt quite happy in this country and thus had not caused the Yugo-
slav state the slightest difficulties. He pointed out to the Croatian
Foreign Minister that Croatia could make of the Germans living there
the most faithful and loyal supporters of the state if she treated them
well ; citizens who would remain true in the hour of danger, as well.
He had tried in vain to make this clear to the Hungarians. Prince
Paul of Yugoslavia 1 had recognized this wisdom. The Slovaks, too,
were pursuing this policy with success. The Germans in Slovakia
likewise belonged to the elements which supported the state. He
praised the Slovaks highly and said that Germany was a close friend
of Slovakia and had particularly cordial relations with them. Re-
garding our military bases in Slovakia the Fiihrer said that they were
a logical consequence of the request of the Slovaks for a guarantee, for
one could not assume a guarantee unless one could put it on a military
basis. 2 However, there was no military security down there as long as
1 Regent of Yugoslavia, Oct 9, 1934-Mar. 27, 1941.
1 This is a reference to the German-Slovak Treaty of Protection signed Mar. 18,
1939. For test see vol. vi of this series, document No. 40.
NOVEMBER 1941 867
one stood west of the Carpathians. In the meantime these military
zones had become so well co-ordinated that the Slovaks were very con-
tent with them. 8 They profited from them economically, in the first
place, but then they also learned from them militarily. Today a
Slovak unit stood alongside the German troops on the most advanced
front.
In the case of the Czechs, however, he had not been able to pursue
this policy. To be sure, not all Czechs were enemies, but the majority
of them had a kind of megalomania, and considered Czechia to be a
country that had to engage in world politics with the great powers
of the world, especially with the U.S.A. Furthermore, he did not
want to convert the Czechs into Germans. They were of a race entirely
alien to us, a mixture of Slavs and Mongolians. Their whole history
had been made by Jews and Freemasons, among whom Benes * was
still today pursuing his Utopian ambitions, to the misfortune of his
people.
The Fuhrer then spoke of Europe's fight against the Bolshevist
danger, and contrasted Germany's struggle in which Germany herself
was making the greatest blood sacrifice, to the English lack of char-
acter in always letting other nations fight for her whenever possible.
Germany had an entirely different view in this respect and it was his,
the Fiihrer's, whole ambition that in every attack Germans should be
present, or, even better, be in the lead. We did not let other nations
pull our chestnuts out of the fire for us.
Germany, by being willing to make the greatest blood sacrifices in
this struggle, also acquired certain privileges with respect to leader-
ship and organization. If we were leaders in the fighting we had
also the right to a leading role in the new organization of Europe.
Should the Germans ever become so base as not to want to carry on
their fight with their own blood any longer, but with alien blood
according to the English method, then it would serve the German
people right if they were destroyed by a stronger power. Then he
would not shed any tears for the German people.
The Fuhrer closed the conversation with the remark that Germany
was very content with her allies. He asked the Foreign Minister to
give his regards to the Poglavnik and Marshal Kvaternik after his
return.
Hbwee.
'Article 2 of the German-Slovak Treaty of Mar. 18, 1939 (see footnote 2) had
provided for the establishment of a zone of protection consisting of military
installations set up by the Wehrmacht in Slovakia. A special treaty regarding
this zone of protection was signed by Germany and Slovakia on Aug. 12, 1039.
See vol. vn of this series, Editors' Note, p, 50.
* Eduard Benes, President of Czechoslovakia December 1935-Oetober 1938.
868 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 512
Fl/0025-030
Unsigned Memorandum
RAM 68
Record of the Reception of Japanese Ambassador Oshima by the
Foreign Minister in the Evening of November 28, 1941
Ambassador Oshima remarked by way of a preliminary that he
had telegraphed to Tokyo several days ago and requested full informa-
tion in view of the fact that he was going to see the Fiihrer 1 and the
Foreign Minister in the nest few days. Foreign Minister Togo now
had telegraphed him that Japan would continue in her determined,
unyielding attitude at the conversations in Washington, and would
enter no commitment inconsistent in any way with the Tripartite Pact.
His Foreign Minister's telegram had contained no further details.
According to a Domei report which he had read, Roosevelt and Hull
took their stand on the Nine-Power pact, 2 and that of course was un-
acceptable for Japan. On top of that, the Americans were reported
to have demanded withdrawal of the Japanese forces from China and
Indochina.
The Foreign Minister commented that he did not believe that Japan
could avoid a showdown with the United States, and that the situation
could hardly ever turn more favorable to Japan than it was now. It
was his view that when one was strong, one should take advantage of it.
One should not hesitate tackling the Americans right now. It
seemed better at any rate to bring a problem to a head at the right
moment than to keep on putting it off. Besides, he believed that no
great country like Japan could forever remain dependent on Ameri-
can supplies with respect to such vital raw materials as oil; as the
situation stood today, every great power needed to have oil within its
own sphere of control.
To the Foreign Minister's question why in effect Ambassador Kurusu
had been sent to Washington, Ambassador Oshima replied that
Kurusu surely must have felt confident that he could accomplish some-
thing. The fact was that many people in Japan believed that it was
possible to reach some agreement with America, just because America
1 Oshima was received by Hitler on Nov. 27 together with other representatives
of countries which were signatories to the Anti-Comintern Pact.
3 This refers to the Nine-Power Treaty signed In Washington on Feb. 6, 1922,
between the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal. According to the preamble, this Treaty
was designed "to stablize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and
interests of China, and to promote intercourse between China and the other
Powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity." For text, see Foreign Rela-
tions of the United States, 19S2, vol. I, pp. 276-281.
NOVEMBER 1941 869
was really striving to avoid a -war -with Japan, as was also the case
with England. After the World War, Japan had adopted a funda-
mentally wrong policy in adjusting her entire economy to England
and America, a policy that needed to be changed now. But this was
precisely the reason why all businessmen in Japan found themselves
in a difficult position as a result of present political developments.
Answering the Minister's question whether Japan would be in a
position to deprive the Americans of their rubber and oil imports from
Indochina, Ambassador Oshima replied that as a first step it would be
necessary to seize Dutch Borneo, after which it would be the turn for
Java and Sumatra. Once these had been seized, the shipments of
rubber and oil to America could be cut off.
To the Foreign Minister's next question as to what substance there
was to the report that Japan was preparing to move into Thailand,
Ambassador Oshima replied that he also had no specific information '
on that matter. When the Thai Ambassador here had asked him a
similar question, he had answered him that Japan would march into
Thailand if the country were to work for England or the United
States. Occupation of Thailand would of course be of great impor-
tance in threatening Singapore and Burma. For the rest, he thought
it would not be long before this matter was settled.
The Foreign Minister remarked that all the bowstrings of the
Tripartite Pact community would have to be stretched taut if the full
potential of its power were to be realized. He had known from the
beginning that Germany would accomplish the task she had set for
herself. We would crush Russia for good and all and also drive
England out of her positions in the Mediterranean. If Japan in turn
were to carry a strong policy into effect, we would be impregnable.
Asked by the Foreign Minister whether Prime Minister Tojo was
a strong man, the Ambassador replied that that was the case; how-
ever, his was not the sole decisive voice. Policy changes could be
effectuated in Japan only step by step. Again, it was not possible,
either, to remain simply on one spot.
The conversation then turned to the question of whether Japan
would or would not be able to bypass the Philippines in executing
her southward thrust. Ambassador Oshima replied that in his opin-
ion all preparations had been made to wage war also against the
United States and England if the case should arise, but that would
not be absolutely necessary. In his personal opinion, the first step
should be to occupy Thailand and Dutch Borneo, in order to secure
oil, for one thing, and good strategic bases, in addition, for the next
forward moves. If this resulted in war with England, Singapore
should be seized, if possible. He did not think that the United
States would intervene in the event of a move against Thailand and
870 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN" FOREIGN POLICY
Borneo, but if that were to happen, Japan was determined to go to
war against America at once.
The Foreign Minister commented regarding this that he wondered
whether it would not be for the best if the showdown with the United
States were to come soon. There could not be a moment more favor-
able than the present. If the American Navy then came to the Far
East, that would be fine, and if it stayed away, Japan would be in a
superlatively favorable position for conducting . . . s naval warfare
against America.
The Foreign Minister then raised the further question whether
Japan could not proclaim a security zone covering all Far Eastern
waters, which then would also make it impossible for the Americans
to use the Vladivostok route. To this Ambassador Oshima remarked
that the Americans were no longer using this route as being too
hazardous for them on account of the large number of Russian float-
ing mines off Vladivostok, and because they did not want to run the
risk of having their ships seized by Japan in case war broke out.
In conclusion, the Ambassador inquired how Germany assessed
the situation in the Atlantic and whether America's formal entry
into the war in the Atlantic was to be expected.
The Minister replied that he did not know; moreover, it did not
matter for our policy. What really mattered was that the coalition
of the Axis Powers . . .*
" One word illegible in the original.
4 The German Foreign Ministry record of this conversation is incomplete.
Cf. Oshima's full account of this conversation with Ribbentrop in an inter-
cepted telegram of Nov. 29 to Tokyo, the text of which ia printed in Pearl Harbor
Attack : Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl
Harbor Attack, 79th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 12, Joint Committee Exhibits Nos. 1
through 6, pp. 200-202. According to this account Ribbentrop made the follow-
ing statement toward the end of the conversation :
"Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United States, Germany
of course would join the war immediately. There is absolutely no possibility
of Germany's entering into a separate peace with the United States under such
circumstances. The Fiibrer is determined on that point."
No. 513
67/48980-67
Memorandum "by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
RAM 16 g. Rs. [November 28, 1941.]
Record op the Conversation Between the Reich Foreign Minister
and Rumanian Deputy Minister President Antonesou in Berlin
on November 28, 1941
After a few personal words of greeting the Foreign Minister ex-
pressed his pleasure because Antonescu's visit occurred on such an
NOVEMBER 1941 871
important occasion. The extension and expansion of the Anti-Comin-
tern Pact meant in the final analysis a confirmation of the view of the
FUhrer and Marshal Antonescu, that communism had to be destroyed
once and for all. Even though in time of war when the armed forces
did the talking the value of a diplomatic act ought not to be overesti-
mated, nevertheless the association of 12 nations in the Anti-Comin-
tern Pact was of importance and represented a considerable step
along the path of reconstruction in Europe and the new order of the
world.
In the further course of the conversation the Foreign Minister
gave a description of the present situation. The view of the Keich
Government on this culminated in the conviction that the war was
already won and that it was simply a question of securing the final
victory of Germany, Italy, and their allies over England and Russia
in as short a time as possible and with as few losses as possible.
In this connection the Foreign Minister also spoke in a very appre-
ciative way about the conduct of the Rumanian troops. The reports
from the front confirmed that the Rumanian soldiers had fought very
bravely and had shown themselves to be good and loyal brothers in
arms. The Foreign Minister asked Antonescu to pass this on to the
Marshal, and pointed out that in the meeting with Marshal Antonescu
the Fuhrer had already spoken in a similar manner. 1
As far as the situation between Rumania and Germany in its par-
ticulars was concerned, it was characterized by the fact that the two
countries had no divergent interests, but complemented one another
in an outstanding way, particularly economically. Just as Germany
had tremendous tasks of reconstruction to perform in the east, Ru-
mania was occupied with the restoration of Bessarabia and the devel-
opment of the areas in the direction of the Black Sea and Odessa. Both
countries would perform these tasks, too, in closest harmony and
friendship with one another.
The Foreign Minister recalled how difficult the situation had been
when the Vienna Award had been rendered. If at that time a war
between Hungary and Rumania had broken out, Russia would have
overrun both countries. Germany had precise information that the
Bolsheviks intended to exploit the situation at once in order to inter-
vene. 2 The danger would have been tremendous for all concerned if
the Russians had gained a foothold in the Balkans in this manner.
Russia was now defeated. It was not believed in Germany that
Russia would offer much resistance in the coming year. In any case
Russia had been definitely eliminated as an ally of England. To be
sure, the Russian war still had to be brought to an end in order to
1 See document No. 188.
* See vol. x of this series, document No. 389 and document No. 396, footnote 5.
872 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY
break the last resistance. He (the Foreign Minister) hoped that it
would still be possible before the winter set in to advance into the area
of the Caucasus and to encircle Moscow. He was also convinced that
Leningrad could not hold out much longer.
After that, however, there would be a pause until May. Only then
could the Fiihrer deal the Russians the death blow. In this way they
would be removed from Europe for good. It was a matter of relative
indifference whether Soviet Russian peasant republics would then still
exist in Siberia.
Taking up the situation in Africa, the Foreign Minister remarked
that there were favorable reports concerning the fighting in Libya,
and he pointed out that North Africa and the Near East were con-
siderably closer to continental Europe than to the British Isles. Thus
Germany had the more advantageous position.
On the whole one could summarize the situation to the effect that the
enemies of Germany and of her allies could no longer do much to them.
If the Axis Powers and their allies were resolved to bring the war to a
speedy close, then they all would have to work together in order to
contribute toward attaining this objective. Although in Germany
they greatly appreciated the blood sacrifices of the allies, it was never-
theless a fact that the main burden of the struggle was borne by the
German people. Therefore the struggle ought to be made easier for
the German people in every way. They imposed upon themselves
considerable restrictions : Not a drop of oil or a bit of grain was wasted.
In this respect the German people followed the Fiihrer in absolute
obedience.
Ever since he took over the government, Marshal Antonescu had
preached war against Russia with unprecedented consistency. Reichs-
marschall Goring, in close cooperation with the Foreign Minister, con-
cerned himself with the economic development of Germany and the
European countries. Since the shaping of the relations of the Reich
with foreign countries was the task of the Foreign Minister, he wanted
to express his views also with regard to the economic relations with
Rumania.
It was a matter of fuel oil (Pakura) and of the deliveries of grain.
The allies would need a great deal of oil in the future. Large coun-
tries and large mechanized armies could not get along without oil. For
the time being, one was dependent in the greatest possible degree upon
the Rumanian deliveries. Therefore he (the Foreign Minister)
requested Antonescu to do everything to increase the Rumanian oil
deliveries. Furthermore, the deliveries of maize and wheat had to be
increased very considerably. In the final analysis all of these efforts
were for the benefit of Rumania, too, because she was, after all, in the
same boat with her allies and shared their fate. Without failing to
NOVEMBER 1941
873
recognize the difficulties in Rumania's position, he (the Foreign Minis-
ter) was directing the personal request both to the Deputy Minister
President and to the Marshal to make the greatest efforts in this field.
He knew that Marshal Antonescu was not petty, but had always
cooperated in the most generous manner. However, there were diffi-
culties of an administrative nature in Rumania which had to be elimi-
nated at all events. The Foreign Minister pointed in this connection
to the particular importance of oil for the Italian fleet and the pro-
tection of the convoys in the Mediterranean.
Antonescu thanked the Foreign Minister for the words which he
had found in appreciation of the services of the Marshal and the
Rumanian Army, as well as for the great help which Rumania had
received from Germany in her fight against Russia. Rumania alone
would never have been able to win back the lost territories. He
recalled the words of Marshal Antonescu that Rumania would always
go along with Germany, that the Rumanian people could not be made
responsible for the mistakes of a past generation and would do every-
thing at all times to help Germany. Rumania had kept her word and
already was able to present a long list of services in assistance of
Germany, The alliance which Marshal Antonescu had brought about
with Germany was political and, above all, also ideological. Rumania
considered Germany the leading power in the Europe of the future.
Antonescu then gave the Foreign Minister the assurance that
Rumania would do everything that was humanly possible to increase
her deliveries to Germany. This would be achieved through reducing
consumption and increasing production. Moreover, he pointed out
that Rumania had already placed all of her petroleum supplies at
the disposal of Germany.
In this connection he complained about the inflationary effects of
the costs of the German troops in Rumania, which were enhanced by
the fact that the German military supply services had very gravely
disrupted the internal price structure of Rumania by direct purchases
at very considerably increased prices of supplies stored in Rumania.
Within 2 months the prices had risen more than 100 percent.
In this connection, Antonescu cited figures of the encumbrances
resulting for the Rumanian State from its relations with Germany
amounting to 20 billion lei of unsecured commodity credits, 20 billions
in military costs, and 20 billions in export advances. Since the Ru-
manian Central Bank possessed only insufficient gold coverage, the
situation was rather critical for the Rumanian currency.
In order to remedy these difficulties Antonescu advanced the fol-
lowing wishes:
Reduction of the number of German troops in Rumania. He men-
tioned in this connection that at the moment there were 56,000 Ger-
874 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
man troops and 20,000 prisoners in Rumania. Furthermore he re-
quested three carloads of gold for the Rumanian Central Bank.
The Foreign Minister, referring to a memorandum by Minister
Clodius in which the Rumanian wishes were appended in a particu-
larly detailed form, 3 replied that the present difficulties had naturally
only been called forth by the war. In the long run Rumania would
doubtless be able not only to overcome her economic difficulties on the
basis of her economic cooperation with Germany, but also to attain
great prosperity. For the rest, Germany would do her best in order
to comply with Rumania's economic wishes. The question of the
deliveries of tractors for Rumanian agriculture was being speedily
examined. However, the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern terri-
tories also had considerable demands on German industry in this re-
gard. As far as supplying the Rumanian Central Bank with gold
was concerned, Germany would be able to do something, although
perhaps not on the scale of the Rumanian wish. The Foreign Minis-
ter would speak with the military authorities about the reduction in
the German troops.
Antonescu then turned to the tension with Hungary. When the
Foreign Minister countered that the Hungarian Minister President
had complained very much about the Rumanian propaganda,* An-
tonescu replied that the Transylvanian border represented too great
a burden on Rumania in consideration of her right to demand the
unity of the Rumanian people.
The Foreign Minister interrupted him at once with the remark
that he could not speak about the Vienna Award and that at all events
peace had to be maintained between Rumania and Hungary. He
was well aware of the difficult situation. Rumania was accused of
carrying on a great deal of revisionist propaganda, and Hungary
made mistakes, too. However, peace and order had to reign in Eu-
rope so that the great tasks of reconstruction could be fulfilled. It
would be a crime to want to concern oneself with matters that were
of lesser importance in comparison to the tremendous tasks in the
east. Nor should one forget that the Russians still had to be defini-
tively defeated, that one perhaps would have to pursue them up to
the Urals, and that one would still have an open border toward the
east. Therefore one had to be on guard against everything that might
come out of the "sinister space" in the east. The conquered eastern
territories had to be completely reorganized. Here, too, Rumania
had a great deal to do. As against this, one ought to leave no room
for European family quarrels. One had to look at them coolly and
soberly.
• Clodius memorandum of Nov. 23 (2293/483586-90) .
4 See document No. 503.
NOVEMBER 1941 875
Although Germany understood very well that every country stood
up for the members of its own national group, he (the Foreign Min-
ister) nevertheless wanted to admonish Antonescu to be exceedingly
restrained. Hungary had undertaken commitments in regard to the
treatment of the minorities. Admittedly, the Hungarians unfor-
tunately had a somewhat peculiar view concerning the keeping of
this commitment. Germany too had constantly received complaints
from her own Volksdeutsche in Hungary. However, Germany never
forgot with respect to these matters that every fellow German in Hun-
gary was at the same time also a Hungarian citizen. One could not
knock one's head against the wall in the desire to help members of
one's own national group in other countries, but ought to remember
always the great political line of the European development. He
(the Foreign Minister) knew full well that the Hungarians treated
their citizens of alien ethnic groups badly. One had to see that this
improved, particularly in the case of the Rumanians. On the other
hand, as he had already said, the Hungarians complained about the
Rumanian revisionist propaganda in the press and in public speeches.
In view of this situation he could only urge the greatest calmness and
request that Rumania concentrate upon the problems of development
which awaited her in the east.
At this moment Antonescu handed over a document which contained
details of the Hungarian excesses against members of the Rumanian
minority." The Foreign Minister promised to assign to State Secre-
tary von Weizsacker the task of examining and evaluating the dossier.
He added that the weight of blame was possibly on the side of Hun-
gary, but that one should nevertheless not start up any polemics, for
mastery lay in restraint.
Deputy Minister President Antonescu replied that Rumania relied
on the sense of justice of the Fuhrer, who well knew how to evaluate
biological realities. However, Marshal Antonescu's position with the
Rumanian people was being greatly impaired by the excesses of the
Hungarians against the Rumanian minority, especially since these
excesses were not decreasing but increasing. Furthermore Antonescu
also complained about the speech which Bardossy had given on the
occasion of the extension of the Anti- Comintern Pact, and which he
termed a piece of brazen impudence. 8 Bardossy had stated that Hun-
gary had already fought against the Communists in the year 1919.
In reality this fight had taken place only with the support of the
Rumanians.
" Not found.
" For the text of this speech given on Not. 25 see Dokumente tier Deutsehen
Politik (1944), vol. ix, pt. 1, pp. 356-358.
876 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Minister Clodius was asked to participate in the last part of the con-
versation on account of the economic questions. He characterized the
Rumanian request for gold as too high ; for the rest he expressed will-
ingness to study the question of the tractors and the reduction in troops.
In conclusion the Foreign Minister expressed his pleasure at the
personal acquaintance with Antonescu, and called Germany and Ru-
mania the corner stones in the perpetually open struggle against the
influence of Soviet Russia.
Schmidt
No. 514
F2/0098-100; 102
FIB/092-102
Memorandum "by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
November 28, 1941.
Record op the Conversation of the Grand Mufti With the Foreign
Minister in Berlin on November 28, 1941
After introductory words of thanks for being received by the For-
eign Minister and for the sympathies tendered by the German Gov-
ernment to the Arab peoples in general and Palestine in particular, the
Grand Mufti stressed the fact that the Arabs were naturally friends of
Germany because both were fighting three common foes: the English,
the Jews, and Bolshevism. It had been a great deed on the part of
Germany to have proceeded against these three enemies. The Arabs
hoped that Germany would also help them in their own fight on these
three fronts. They thought that victory in this battle was important
not only for the Axis, but also for their own people.
They were prepared to do everything, and it had, indeed, been un-
derstood in Germany that the cooperation of the Arabs in Palestine,
in Iraq, and in Syria had been contributions to the common cause. The
insurrection in Iraq had not gone off very felicitously, but the Arab
world took the stand that this was not an end but only a beginning.
At least the Iraqis had now understood that England was their foe.
It was their desire, however, not only to render negative assistance,
through insurrection and sabotage, but also to mobilize positive forces.
Consideration was being given to an Arab Legion that might consist
of Arabs from Er Rif and captured Algerians, Tunisians, and Moroc-
cans. Also the Arab community of Palestine was on the best of terms
with the centers of the Moslem faith and it was hoped that this would
influence the Indians. It was also hoped that there would be oppor-
tunity to obtain recruits among the Indian prisoners and to care for
them.
NOVEMBER 1941 877
As is well known . . - 1
. . . history, so often had to suffer from disunity.
It was natural that the Arabs should attach great importance to
collaboration with Germany, both now and later, and in this con-
nection cultural and economic ties were also being considered. They
would like to conclude an agreement with the Axis Powers and de-
sired, first of all, to have a declaration in order that the people might
understand the attitude of the Axis Powers; for, as it was, the Eng-
lish were, unfortunately, planting doubts, while they themselves had
already issued various, though rather unimportant, declarations. Un-
fortunately, as a result of the activity of the English there had already
been some defections among the Arab followers. A declaration would
strengthen the movement, without however causing the people to rise
prematurely.
Nor did he, the Mufti, think that such a declaration would an-
tagonize the Turks, for the Turks preferred to see weak neighbors
on Palestine's borders rather than a strong power; under the mandate
system, this meant France. The French, for their part, had as early
as 1933 contemplated a union of Syria and Iraq [erne Einheit Syrien-
Irak vorgesehen] and later on in 1936 even the independence of Syria. 2
In summary, the Mufti once more referred to the importance of the
declaration and particularly to the fact that it must he issued without
delay. He then expressed his thanks for the support that had been
given by the Axis powers to Rashid Ali's venture.
The Foreign Minister observed that this venture had been prema-
ture and that in German political life something important had been
learned from the English, namely, "timing." 3
After the Mufti had again asked that the declaration be not too
long delayed, the Foreign Minister said that he was very glad to see
the Mufti. Even when he was a child, his imagination had often been
engaged by the concept and person of the Mufti, and in past years, it
was his activities that he had closely observed, because he had now
become a sort of mystic figure. As a nationalist he felt much sym-
pathy for such an undaunted champion of his people, who had also
never abandoned the struggle.
He wished to emphasize what the Mufti had said about the three
common foes of the Arabs and the German people. Russia was now
as good as beaten and the political power of Bolshevism was almost
I Page 3 of the original la missing. „ ,. M
'Apparently a reference to the Franco-Syrian treaty, signed Dec. 2Z, ia<ftS,
which was never ratified by the French Chamber of Deputies. For the test,
see Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Rapport a la SociM6 des Nations sur la
situation de la Syrte et du Liban, 19S6 (Paris, 1937), pp. 201-228.
II In English in the original.
878 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOHEIGN POLICY
broken. The Fiihrer was determined never to let this danger spot
become active again. As a sworn enemy of the Jews, Germany under-
stood the troubles of the Arabs in this field, and finally the war against
England was another bond uniting the Axis and the Arabs.
As far as Iraq was concerned, the Foreign Minister was afraid that
they had begun too early there. Nor had Germany been in a position
to contribute anything there. The sea was controlled by the English
fleet. Air operations were impossible because they were beyond the
range of the fighter planes, and with regard to land, everything had,
to be sure, been attempted with Turkey ; but these attempts had failed
because of Turkey's refusal. Herr von Papen had, to be sure, been
promised that the transit of material would be permitted but, appar-
ently under English pressure, the Turks finally refused permission.*
At this point the Mufti stressed the fact that the English had a
secret treaty with the Turks which had especially as its subject certain
postwar plans.
The Foreign Minister then asked whether the declaration addressed
by the Axis Powers to Iraq in the early summer B had caused Gaylani
to strike. This was denied by the Mufti, who added that the Iraqis
had no obligation but that of defense. The Foreign Minister's ques-
tion as to whether the defense had been directed against the dan-
gerously numerous landings of English troops was answered in the
affirmative by the Mufti, who added that the plan to use Iraq as a
base originated with Wavell 8 and was formulated in 1940, when
Weygand was still chief of the Army of the Levant,
The Foreign Minister then stated that upon the outbreak of the
war, when Minister Grobba was sent to the Near East, the Fiihrer
had been very much occupied with the problem, but it had been im-
possible for him to do anything. He himself, the Foreign Minister,
has asked the Fiihrer in Berchtesgaden, after the occupation of Crete,
whether it would be possible to make a greater effort there, and the
Fiihrer had that very same day consulted the Eeichsmarschall as
leader of the Crete operation about it. The reply had been negative
because a Syrian operation was impossible due to the insufficient range
of fighter planes for this long distance. If it had been possible at the
time to send a dozen trains through Turkey; if the necessary material
as well as a mixed battalion with the necessary tanks had been placed
1 See vol. in of this series, document No. 556.
5 "Frtthsommer" in tbe original Is apparently an error. The reference seems
to be to the German-Italian declaration addressed to the Iraq Government in
April 1941, the text of which is printed in vol. xu of this series, document
No. 322.
•Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell, British Commander-in-Chief, Middle Bast,
February 1940-Jnne 1941-
NOVEMBER 1941 879
in readiness; it would certainly have been possible to ehase the English
out of Iraq, In the case of the Syrian operation, Germany had, to
be sure, gotten the French to shoot, but, for lack of gasoline and, above
all, of facilities for transportation, exactly the same difficulties had
arisen with regard to supplies.
It was clear that it was now necessary to proceed very cautiously
and prudently. One thing, though, he, the Foreign Minister, could
say to the Mufti : his cause would receive support. How this was to
be done, however, was still a matter for careful consideration. There
was one thing he wanted to point out : the Germans were not English-
men and the Fiihrer didn't care for humbug. Thus, if an announce-
ment were made, it had to be backed up by the power to carry it out.
A declaration naturally had to be made at the proper time, but the
Foreign Minister wondered whether the time for this had already
come, or whether it would not be better to wait until the guns did the
talking there. The Fiihrer thought that the latter moment would be
better. To make empty promises was the English way : The Fiihrer
did not wish a declaration to be followed by inaction. He feared that
the Arabs would in that case only lose confidence, and he thought that
the declaration had better be made at a time when we were ready to
strike and expel the English from the Suez Canal.
After the Foreign Minister had once more summed up the argu-
ments with regard to the timing of the declaration, he pointed out that
events in the south of Russia would proceed much more rapidly,
particularly, once the Black Sea had become a German base of opera-
tions, which was to be expected in the near future. When we had
advanced to the areas of the Near East, that would be the right moment
for the declaration.
The Mufti stated that the Iraq venture was not regretted, and it
was very well known that Germany would have liked to help. It
seemed to him that the statement was necessary at the present time
and especially important, for the reason that the English were recruit-
ing volunteers with their promises, and that there was danger that
many of the supporters of the Arab idea would defect.
Here the Foreign Minister interrupted to ask whether the Arabs,
after all the trouble they had had with the Jews and after all that
the English had done to them, still put faith in what the English
said.
The Mufti stated that this was, to be sure, no longer the case in
Palestine, but that in other Arab areas, people still thought differ-
ently. He considered it important for the declaration to be issued
immediately in order that popular support might be retained and con-
fidence bolstered. He wished to prepare the Arabs by such a declara-
880 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
tion for a later operation, so that they would not again be taken by
surprise, as was the case with the Iraq venture.
The Foreign Minister raised the question of the consequences that
the immediate issuance of a declaration would have. For the time
being nothing positive could really be done, and there was danger,
therefore, that the friends of the Mufti might get the impression that
it was again merely a case of an idle promise. Also, and this was
very important, the elements that were now engaged in secret activities
might possibly become careless and thereby appear suspect to the
English.
The Mufti contradicted this view and stated that the declaration
would only bolster the hope of the adherents. He personally would
hold them together and he could assure us that nothing would happen
except by his command. In reply to a question from the Foreign Min-
ister as to what Turkey's position would be in this matter, the Mufti
said that the Turks would be glad to see an Arabic Greater Syria as
such. They were only afraid to have a European great power as a
neighbor, while they could not be unsympathetic to the idea of a
rather small Arab state. He himself had been an officer in the Turkish
Army during the entire World War and had always gotten along
well with the Turks. It was, after all, not a case of the unification
of all Arab countries, but only the union of Syria and Iraq. When the
Foreign Minister indicated that, with respect to Syria, it was neces-
sary to think also of France, the Grand Mufti remarked that the
French had in theory already agreed to such a union in the past,
under Briand. 7
The Foreign Minister expressed the fear that only harm could come
from premature revelation of the matter, particularly since it was
hot a question of years, but could only be a matter of months before
intervention in the Near East was possible. Experience had shown
that once a movement suffered reverses, it could be paralyzed for a long
time to come. This was doubly dangerous because presumably the
people who would have been most important upon the arrival of the
German forces would then be at the mercy of the English.
The Mufti stated that he had no misgivings on this score. His
organization was absolutely steadfast and he would speak on the radio,
commenting on the declaration. He could assume responsibilty for
his followers. The leaders of his movement were, to be sure, entirely
steadfast, but the people needed a psychological boost.
In conclusion, the Foreign Minister asked the Mufti to present these
ideas in detail also in his forthcoming conversation with the Fuhrer, 8
'Arlstide Briand (1862-1932), served frequently as French Minister of
Foreign Affairs and as President of the Council of Ministers.
' See document No. 515.
NOVEMBER 1941 881
and he assured the Mufti, who asked the Foreign Minister to intercede
•with the Fiihrer in the matter of the declaration, of his warmest
sympathies for the Arab people.
VON LOESCH
No. 515
Fl/0018-24
Memorandum, by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Fiih. 57a. g Rs. Berlin, November 30, 1941.
Record of the Conversation Between the Fuhrer and the Grand
Motti of Jerusalem on November 28, 1941, in the Presence oe
Reich Foreign Minister and Minister Grobba in Berlin
The Grand Mufti began by thanking the Fiihrer for the great honor
he had bestowed by receiving him. He wished to seize the opportunity
to convey to the Fiihrer of the Greater German Reich, admired by
the entire Arab world, his thanks for the sympathy which he had
always shown for the Arab and especially the Palestinian cause, and
to which he had given clear expression in his public speeches. The
Arab countries were firmly convinced that Germany would win the
war and that the Arab cause would then prosper. The Arabs were
Germany's natural friends because they had the same enemies as had
Germany, namely the English, the Jews, and the Communists. They
were therefore prepared to cooperate with Germany with all their
hearts and stood ready to participate in the war, not only negatively
by the commission of acts of sabotage and the instigation of revolu-
tions, but also positively by the formation of an Arab Legion. The
Arabs could be more useful to Germany as allies than might be appar-
ent at first glance, both for geographical reasons and because of the
suffering inflicted upon them by the English and the Jews. Further-
more, they had close relations with all Moslem nations, of which
they could make use in behalf of the common cause. The Arab Legion
would be quite easy to raise. An appeal by the Mufti to the Arab
countries and the prisoners of Arab, Algerian, Tunisian, and Moroc-
can nationality in Germany would produce a great number of volun-
teers eager to fight. Of Germany's victory the Arab world was firmly
convinced, not only because the Reich possessed a large army, brave
soldiers, and military leaders of genius, but also because the Almighty
could never award the victory to an unjust cause.
In this struggle, the Arabs were striving for the independence and
unity of Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. They had the fullest confidence
682^905—64 61
882 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
in the Fiihrer and looked to his hand for the balm on their -wounds
which had been inflicted upon them by the enemies of Germany.
The Mufti then mentioned the letter he had received from Ger-
many, which stated that Germany was holding no Arab territories
and understood and recognized the aspirations to independence and
freedom of the Arabs, just as she supported the elimination of the
Jewish national home. 1
A public declaration in this sense would be very useful for its
propagandists effect on the Arab peoples at this moment. It would
rouse the Arabs from their momentary lethargy and give them new
courage. It would also ease the Mufti's work of secretly organizing
the Arabs against the moment when they could strike. At the same
time, he could give the assurance that the Arabs would in strict disci-
pline patiently wait for the right moment and only strike upon an
order from Berlin.
With regard to the events in Iraq, the Mufti observed that the
Arabs in that country certainly had by no means been incited by
Germany to attack England, but solely had acted in reaction to a
direct English assault upon their honor.
The Turks, he believed, would welcome the establishment of an
Arab government in the neighboring territories because they would
prefer weaker Arab to strong European governments in the neighbor-
ing countries, and, being themselves a nation of 7 millions, 2 they had
moreover nothing to fear from the 1,700,000 Arabs inhabiting Syria,
Trans Jordan, Iraq, and Palestine.
France likewise would have no objections to the unification plan
because she had conceded independence to Syria as early as 1936 and
had given her approval to the unification of Iraq and Syria under
King Faisal as early as 1933.
In these circumstances he was renewing his request that the Fiihrer
make a public declaration so that the Arabs would not lose hope, which
is so powerful a force in the life of nations. With such hope in their
hearts the Arabs, as he had said, were willing to wait. They were
not pressing for immediate realization of their aspirations ; they could
easily wait half a year or a whole year. But if they were not inspired
with such a hope by a declaration of this sort, it could be expected
that the English would be the gainers from it.
The Fiihrer replied that Germany's fundamental attitude on these
questions, as the Mufti himself had already stated, was clear. Ger-
many stood for uncompromising war against the Jews. That naturally
included active opposition to the Jewish national home in Palestine,
1 Apparently a reference to tie letter of Apr. 8, 1941, printed in vol. in of this
series, document No. 293.
* Thus In the original. It should read 17 millions.
NOVEMBER 1941 883
which was nothing other than a center, in the form of a state, for the
exercise of destructive influence by Jewish interests. Germany was
also aware that the assertion that the Jews were carrying out the func-
tion of economic pioneers in Palestine was a lie. The work there was
done only by the Arabs, not by the Jews. Germany was resolved,
step by step, to ask one European nation after the other to solve its
Jewish problem, and at the proper time direct a similar appeal to non-
European nations as well.
Germany was at the present time engaged in a life and death struggle
with two citadels of Jewish power: Great Britain and Soviet Kus-
sia. Theoretically there was a difference between England's capitalism
and Soviet Eussia's communism; actually, however, the Jews in both
countries were pursuing a common goal. This was the decisive strug-
gle; on the political plane, it presented itself in the main as a conflict
between Germany and England, but ideologically it was a battle be-
tween National Socialism and the Jews. It went without saying that
Germany would furnish positive and practical aid to the Arabs in-
volved in the same struggle, because platonic promises were useless
m a war for survival or destruction in which the Jews were able to
mobilize all of England's power for their ends.
The aid to the Arabs would have to be material aid. Of how little
help sympathies alone were in such a battle had been demonstrated
plainly by the operation in Iraq, where circumstances had not per-
mitted the rendering of really effective, practical aid. In spite of all
the sympathies, German aid had not been sufficient and Iraq was
overcome by the power of Britain, that is, the guardian of the Jews.
The Mufti could not but be aware, however, that the outcome of the
struggle going on at present would also decide the fate of the Arab
world. The Fiihrer therefore had to think and speak coolly and
deliberately, as a rational man and primarily as a soldier, as the leader
of the German and allied armies. Everything of a nature to help in
this titanic battle for the common cause, and thus also for the Arabs,
would have to be done. Anything, however, that might contribute
to weakening the military situation must be put aside, no matter how
unpopular this move might be.
Germany was now engaged in very severe battles to force the gate-
way to the northern Caucasus region. The difficulties were mainly
with regard to maintaining the supply, which was most difficult as a
result of the destruction of railroads and highways as well as of the
oncoming winter. If at such a moment, the Fiihrer were to raise the
problem of Syria in a declaration, those elements in France which
were under de Gaulle's influence would receive new strength. They
would interpret the Fiihrer's declaration as an intention to break up
France's colonial empire and appeal to their fellow countrymen that
884 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
they should rather make common cause with the English to try to save
what still could be saved. A German declaration regarding Syria
would in France be understood to refer to the French colonies in
general, and that would at the present time create new troubles in
western Europe, which means that a portion of the German armed
forces would be immobilized in the west and no longer be available for
the campaign in the east.
The Fiihrer then made the following statement to the Mufti, enjoin-
ing him to lock it in the uttermost depths of his heart :
1. He (the Fiihrer) would carry on the battle to the total destruc-
tion of the Judeo- Communist empire in Europe.
2. At some moment which was impossible to set exactly today but
which in any event was not distant, the German armies would in the
course of this struggle reach the southern exit from Caucasia.
3. As soon as this had happened, the Fiihrer would on his own give
the Arab world the assurance that its hour of liberation had arrived.
Germany's objective would then be solely the destruction of the Jewish
element residing in the Arab sphere under the protection of British
power. In that hour the Mufti would be the most authoritative spokes-
man for the Arab world. It would then be his task to set off the Arab
operations which he had secretly prepared. When that time had
come, Germany could also be indifferent to French reaction to such a
declaration.
Once Germany had forced open the road to Iran and Iraq through
Rostov, it would be also the beginning of the end of the British world
empire. He (the Fiihrer) hoped that the coming year would make it
possible for Germany to thrust open the Caucasian gate to the Middle
East. For the good of their common cause, it would be better if the
Arab proclamation were put off for a few more months than if Ger-
many were to create difficulties for herself without being able thereby
to help the Arabs.
He (the Fiihrer) fully appreciated the eagerness of the Arabs for
a public declaration of the sort requested by the Grand Mufti. But
he would beg him to consider that he (the Fiihrer) himself was the
Chief of State of the German Keich for 5 long years during which he
was unable to make to his own homeland the announcement of its
liberation. He had to wait with that until the announcement could be
made on the basis of a situation brought about by the force of arms
that the Anschluss had been carried out.
The moment that Germany's tank divisions and air squadrons had
made their appearance south of the Caucasus, the public appeal re-
quested by the Grand Mufti could go out to the Arab world.
The Grand Mufti replied that it was his view that everything would
come to pass just as the Fiihrer had indicated. He was fully re-
assured and satisfied by the words which he had heard from the Chief
of the German State. He asked, however, whether it would not be
NOVEMBER 1941 885
possible, secretly at least, to enter into an agreement with Germany
of the kind he had just outlined for the Fiihrer.
The Fiihrer replied that he had just now given the Grand Mufti
precisely that confidential declaration.
The Grand Mufti thanked him for it and stated in conclusion that
he was taking his leave from the Fiihrer in full confidence and with
reiterated thanks for the interest shown in the Arab cause.
Schmidt
No. 516
71/50970
Memorandum hy the Director of the Political Department
Berlin, November 28, 1941.
Minister von Kintelen informed me by telephone that after the
reception of the Grand Mufti by the Fiihrer, 1 the following decision
was reached :
1) The issuance of a declaration concerning a free Arabia is to be
postponed; .
2) Minister Grobba is to inquire of the Grand Mufti whether he
agrees to a press announcement which would approximately say that
the Fiihrer had received the Grand Mufti and had had a conversation
with him that was significant for the future of the Arab people;
3) After the Grand Mufti gives his consent, before such a statement
is issued, however, an inquiry should first be made in Kome. Since, so
far as is known here, nothing has been published concerning the re-
ception of the Grand Mufti by the Duce, 2 the suggestion should be
made to the Italians that first of all a communiquebe issued stating
that the Duce had some time ago had a conversation with him; this is
to be followed after a while by a corresponding announcement regard-
ing the conversation of the Fiihrer with the Grand Mufti ; 8
4) After Rome has been contacted, the Foreign Minister desires
that first of all the matter be again submitted to him .
WOERMANN
1 See document No. 515.
1 See document No. 428.
'In telegram No. 3244 of Nov. 29 (2281/482692-93) Woermann instructed the
Embassy in Kome along these lines.
In telegram No. 3154 of Dec, 3 (2281/482694-95) Mackensen reported the agree-
ment of the Italian Government to the proposal and forwarded an Italian draft
communique regarding Mussolini's reception of the Grand Mufti.
Woermann's telegram No. 3293 of Dec. 4 (2281/482697) informed Mackensen
of the Grand Mufti's approval of the proposed German and Italian communiques.
On Dec. 6 in telegram No. 3184 (2281/482698) , Mackensen notified the Foreign
Ministry that the Italian communique - would be published the next day.
886 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 517
E20/48S-86
Memorandum by am, Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
RAM 62 g. Rs. Berlin, November 30, 1941.
Record of the Conversation Between the Reich Foreign Minister
and the Croatian Foreign Minister, Lorkovtc, in Berlin on
November 28, 1941
After a few words of greeting the Croatian Foreign Minister stated
that the situation in Croatia had become considerably stabilized.
After temporary difficulties with Italy a rather extensive settlement
had now taken place. 1 The Reich Foreign Minister remarked in this
connection that he would consider it a good idea if the Poglavnik set-
tled all difficulties on a friendly basis with the Duce, who had proved to
be a good friend in a difficult time. For the rest, Croatia always had to
remember that the Fiihrer and the Duce were friends and that Italy
and Germany were allies. Therefore the tendency among certain
people in Croatia to wish at times to put a little sand in the mechanism
of the Axis was entirely misdirected. It was known in Germany that
this was not in accordance with Croatia's official policy, but was merely
the work of some hotheads. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) asked
the Croatian Foreign Minister, however, to carry on a clever and wise
policy with respect to Italy and also to pass on this advice to the
Poglavnik himself.
The Croatian Foreign Minister replied that it was his impression
that the difficulties with Italy were to be attributed to the willful
policy of certain members of the Italian military in Croatia. How-
ever, the situation had improved considerably. Count Ciano would
come to Zagreb in the near future, so that there would be an oppor-
tunity for a candid . discussion. Croatia was suffering under the
presence of 200,000 Italian soldiers on her national territory. She was
not in a position to feed such a large number of troops, and for this
reason had considerable economic difficulties to overcome.
She had made settlements of her frontiers with all neighboring
countries except Hungary. On the occasion of the present Berlin
sojourn he had tried to clarify the frontier question with Bardossy,
but had gained the impression from the conversation that the time had
not yet come for settling the frontier problems with Hungary.
1 Possibly a reference to an Italian-Croatian agreement of Oct. 27 regarding
the determination of the frontier between Croatia and Montenegro ; the text of
the agreement was reported by Kasche in Zagreb telegram No. 1329 of Oct 27
(116/67059-61).
NOVEMBER 1941 887
The internal development in Croatia -was making good progress.
Macek 2 had been assigned a compulsory residence and was keeping
quiet. Aside from communist uprisings in the eastern part of the
country Croatia's cohesion -was perfect. The Croatian Foreign Minis-
ter concluded his remarks by saying that the Axis -would in no case
have any sort of trouble in Croatia.
Schmidt
' Vladko MaCek, President of the Croatian Peasant party and former Yugo-
slav Deputy Minister President.
No. 518
F20/49S-M4
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
RAM No. 63 g. Rs. Berlin, November 30, 1941.
Recokd of the Conversation Between the Reich Foreign Minister
and Danish Foreign Minister Scavenitjs in Berlin on November
28, 1941
After a word of personal welcome, the Keich Foreign Minister
expressed his satisfaction that Denmark's representative was able
to take part in the act of renewal and extension of the Anti-Comintern
Pact, 1 which beyond its strictly formal purpose was also helping the
struggle against the Communist International from the point of view
of all of Europe.
He (the Keich Foreign Minister) knew that Scavenius was taking
a positive attitude toward Germany and toward cooperation between
Germany and Denmark.
In a statement of some length the Reich Foreign Minister described
the situation, with special reference to the struggle against Kussia.
Bolshevism was finished ; that did not mean, however, that the battle
against it did not have to be continued this year or the next. Warfare
against Kussia would go on until her final destruction. Next year,
to be sure, a mere fraction of the troops now employed would suffice.
The war against England would be continued until the English them-
selves realized that the continuation of the war made no sense and
sued for peace, or until everything was laid waste on that island and
the British were thus forced to yield. It was England's bad luck to
have challenged such a man as the Fiihrer. He (the Reich Foreign
Minister) had warned Henderson 2 and Francois-Poncet 3 repeatedly
before the war not to mistake the Germany of today for the Germany
1 Document No. 498.
* Sir Nevile Henderson, British Ambassador in Germany, 1937-1939.
* Andr6 Frangols-Poncet, French Ambassador in. Germany, 1931-1938.
888 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
of the World War. But these gentlemen had merely smiled uncom-
prehendingly and not grasped that the Germany of today was a
united people with the most up to date army and weapons, which
was led by a great military genius. In terms of power Germany would
therefore have to be appraised quite differently from in the past. Ger-
many was three or four times as strong as before. The English and
French had however not seen this, but had regarded National Socialism
simply as an evil invention. Scavenius injected here that such was
the fate of anything new. Continuing, the Reich Foreign Minister
stated that Germany already was an empire when, a thousand years
ago, the English were still living far behind the times. National
Socialism was not an evil invention but the expression of a nation's
will to live. Blindness toward these facts had ruined France and
Poland and would ruin England, too.
Germany's will to live was making use of new methods, but was
not necessarily directed against the old traditions.
Turning to America, the Reich Foreign Minister emphasized the
presumptuousness inherent in the interference of the United States
in European affairs. The way the Finns had been threatened was out-
rageous. Materially, however, America could not do much. Here was
the biggest bluff in history.
Today Germany was fighting for Denmark, too, by keeping Bolshe-
vism out of Europe. England, too, was deceiving herself in believing
that she was safe from communism. The fact of the alliance with
Soviet Russia involved the hazard of great revolutions in America and
England. Although the English were just barely keeping afloat mili-
tarily, the war would inflict further defeats on them and after a
while Churchill would no longer be tolerated by his own compatriots.
The domination of the old ruling class in England was definitely a
thing of the past. The peoples were seeking for new expressions of
their national will. The Reich Foreign Minister declared that no one
could say how long the war would last, but that he was convinced
that Germany and her allies would win it. The Reich was proceed-
ing systematically in its military operations. It did not assume risks
or go after Napoleonic adventures, but advanced to new attacks only
after all preparations had been made and especially after the supplies
had been secured. The English would be assailed wherever they got
too near to the Germans or their allies, or where they touched vital
interests. That was why they had to be eliminated from the Mediter-
ranean area.
The English had for years incomprehendingly confronted Germany
like blind men, and even now did not want to recognize the economic
and military strength of the Reich.
NOVEMBER 1941
889
Anyone who, like the Reich Foreign Minister, knew England and
had many friends there, and to whom London had become a second
home, as it were, was filled with regret over the news about the
destruction of all the well-known places. It was sad that the English
had not pursued a wiser policy. He, the Reich Foreign Minister, had
done what was humanly possible to deal with the insular pigheaded-
ness of the English, but it had been in vain. Now a clear decision had
to be brought about in a struggle against England.
In the further course of the conversation the Reich Foreign Minis-
ter talked about the demonstrations against Denmark's adherence to
the Anti-Comintern Pact which had taken place in Copenhagen in
front of the Foreign Minister's house. From the reports it seemed
clear that these demonstrations had been supported, among others, by
rightist elements in Denmark.* Scavenius interjected here that Den-
mark naturally had its chauvinists too.
The Eeich Foreign Minister replied that he did not take these
events too seriously but that it would be well, nevertheless, if these
chauvinistic tendencies in Denmark would not attain the upper hand
because this would lead to considerable difficulties.
Scavenius remarked that this was only a small insignificant opposi-
tion group. In view of the character of the Danish people one could
not expect that the slow-thinking Danes should all at once under-
stand the new policy of cooperation with Germany. But time would
change that.
The Reich Foreign Minister further mentioned a certain latent
hostility toward Germany which was noticeable in parliamentary
speeches.
Scavenius replied that these speeches were rather expressions of
fear of their powerful neighbor on the part of the small Danish people.
The Reich Foreign Minister thereupon stated that Germany was
trying to avoid any difficulties with Denmark. The Fiihrer viewed
the development of the situation with calm; so far at any rate every-
thing had gone well, except for a few blemishes, such as for instance
the conduct of the Danish Minister in Washington. Envoy von
Renthe-Fink had in any case received instructions to maintain the
present line of policy toward Denmark. 6 The inquiries by the Dan-
ish Government on the occasion of Denmark's adherence to the Anti-
* Details of these demonstrations were reported in Copenhagen telegram No.
1543 of Nov. 26 (62/42417-18).
*TMb is a reference to Minister Kauffmann's negotiation of the Greenland
agreement in Washington in April 1941. See vol. xn of this series, document
No. 308 and footnote 1.
See document No. 479. In a minute of Nov. 27 Renthe-Fink noted : "The Reich
Foreign Minister who remarked that Danish Foreign Minister Scavenius had
made a good impression on him, gave me today at noon the instruction that the
policy conducted in Copenhagen so far should be continued, though care should be
taken that we did not 'slip.' "
890 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Comintern Pact had, however, perhaps mistakenly produced a feel-
ing in Germany as if the Danes were afraid Churchill could take of-
fense at their adherence to this Pact. 7 But one must not forget that
in her fight against Russia Germany was sacrificing her blood for the
whole of Europe, in order to safeguard it against the influx of the
Mongolian hordes. The low level of the Soviet Russians was strik-
ingly illustrated among other things by the fact that in the prison
camps they were devouring each other. To a question by Scavenius,
whether they were doing that from hunger, the Foreign Minister
retorted that Russian prisoners, to be sure, often fell into captivity
in a half-starved condition, because of the disorganization on the
Russian side — especially when they had been surrounded by the Ger-
mans for any length of time — they had often for weeks been receiving,
short rations or none at all.
In explanation of the Danish attitude Scavenius mentioned that
for generations Denmark had pursued a policy of the strictest neu-
trality and therefore had to accustom herself slowly to taking sides.
Besides, this would be much easier if no German troops were in Den-
mark. But everything in the practical field that had been under-
taken with Germany was going well; only with the imponderables
were there some difficulties. Germany had to consider this funda-
mental attitude of Denmark. A dangerous mood would be created if
Denmark were expected to move toward the new alignment too sud-
denly; under certain conditions something like a "suicidal mentality"
could develop from that. He (Scavenius) was advising against
pushing matters too far, because in that case things might develop
as they did in Norway. 8 Denmark had to he given time.
The Reich Foreign Minister then spoke about Sweden. He be-
lieved that fate would never forgive Sweden that in the struggle
against Moscow, in which two great Swedish historic figures had in
the past acted as standardbearers, she had taken her position outside
of Europe. In private exchanges many Swedes, including- very
highly placed people, let it be understood that they were fully on Ger-
many's side, but they did not want to say so openly. Sweden did
not even let volunteers go to Russia for this fight. 9 She had thereby
totally forfeited the sympathies of Europe; but the ties of the
Swedish labor unions with the English Labour party, with Attlee and
Greenwood 10 were probably too strong.
The Foreign Minister remarked in concluding that he was glad that
Denmark by her adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact, had "taken
' Nothing found.
* See document No. 312.
" See document No. 270.
u Arthur Greenwood, Secretary of the Labour party's research and informa-
tion department, member of the British War Cabinet since 1940.
NOVEMBER 1941 891
the first step in joining the European family of nations. For the
rest he hoped that manifestations against Germany would remain
isolated incidents, for otherwise developments might take a very dan-
gerous turn. He hoped that the war would soon come to an end
(Scavenius remarked here that that would indeed be highly de-
sirable) ; in any case Europe would feel the war less and less. The
enemies could no longer land on the Continent. Futile aerial bomb-
ings were the sole means left to the English in their fight against the
Continent, but they would, of course, accomplish nothing with it. 11
Schmidt
11 Some passages in the original of the document printed are barely legible.
They were checked against another copy of the document (67/46943-47) .
No. 519
07/46851-59
M&moramdvm by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Fiih. 61a. g. Rs. Berlin, December 3, 1941.
.Record of the Conversation Between the Fuhrer and the Ru-
manian Deputy Foreign Minister [sic] Mihai Antonescu in
Berlin on November 28, 1941
In the first place Antonescu transmitted to the Fiihrer the sincere
regards of the Rumanian Marshal, who was very sorry not to be able
to take part in the solemn act of extending and broadening the Anti-
Comintern Pact in Berlin and to speak with the Fiihrer on this
occasion. The absence of the King from Rumania, however, 1 required
his (the Marshal's) presence in the country. It was the first time
after the beginning of the Russian campaign that the Rumanian
Government could express through him (Antonescu) its sincere grati-
tude for the genial direction of the Russian campaign. The entire
Rumanian people stood behind Germany in this fight, not only be-
cause they had to defend their rights and their interests, but also
because since time immemorial they had taken an anti-Slav and anti-
Semitic stand and had not forgotten the many injuries that had been
inflicted on them by their enemies.
After Carol's reign the Marshal had again consolidated the morale
of the Rumanian nation and the organization of its army. Without
the German Army, however, the Rumanian nation would never have
According to Bucharest telegrams Noa. 8892 of Nov. 22 {239/154406) and 3908
of Nov. 24 (239/154407-08) King Mihai and Queen Mother Elena were to leave
Bucharest on Nov. 26 for a private visit to Florence, Italy. It was also arranged
that Hitler would receive them on their passage through Berlin on Nov. 28.
892 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
been able to regain, its lost territories. It recognized this fully and
completely and would never forget Germany's role.
He (Antonescu) had already assured the Reichsmarschall and the
Foreign Minister of Rumania's first determination to increase her
oil production and reduce her consumption so that Rumania's would
be in a position to deliver a maximum amount of this important raw
material to Germany." Furthermore in his conversations with those
mentioned above he had also assured them that the Rumanian agri-
cultural surplus would be exported to Germany and that it would be
increased.
Antonescu then cited detailed figures in regard to the Rumanian
petroleum deliveries to Germany thus far and complained, as he had in
the conversations with the Reichsmarschall and the Foreign Minister,
about the financing difficulties which arose for the Rumanian State
as a result of the presence of German troops on Rumanian territory.
He again requested this time, without going into details, that the num-
ber of German troops be reduced. Furthermore he also mentioned
briefly the financial difficulties arising for Rumania as a result of
advancements with regard to exports.
Then he turned to the relations with Hungary and he asked the
Fiihrer to help in bringing about a pacification in the relationship
with Hungary. Pointing to the calm attitude of Rumanian public
opinion and to the file on the Hungarian excesses which he had given
to the Foreign Minister, 3 Antonescu stressed that the continuous in-
cidents brought about by the Hungarians undermined the position
of Marshal Antonescu and were detrimental to an atmosphere of
peace and order in Rumania, Marshal Antonescu had telegraphed
him about the latest incidents only recently, with the instruction to
remonstrate to the Fiihrer. Antonescu stated that a definitive solu-
tion had to be found in the relations with Hungary on a just basis,
which would make it possible for Rumania to continue her peaceful
work. If the incidents with Hungary continued in this manner^ then
this would exceed the power of the Rumanian nation to resist and
would impose an intolerable burden upon its sense of honor.
As a proof of Rumania's peaceful attitude Antonescu cited the fact
that a good understanding had been brought about with Bulgaria
and Croatia, although, after all, areas had been ceded to the Bul-
garians, too. He then referred to the possibility of a closer relation-
ship between Rumania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Croatia and asked
the Fiihrer to advise Rumania whether or not she should enter such
an association.
* See documents Nos. 505 and 513.
* Not found. Cf . document No. 513.
NOVEMBER 1941 893
Then he asked the Fiihrer about the status of the Ukrainian ques-
tion and in this connection expressed his fear that the Slav-Russian
danger in Rumania would take on new shape under influences from
the Ukraine [dass von der Ukraine aus die slavisch-russische Gefdhr
in Rmndnien new Krystallisatiompunkte finden wiirde]. He hoped
that the Fiihrer would find a solution that would prevent a new
Slav nucleus from developing there which could provide the point of
departure for expansionist aspirations.
The Fiihrer replied that he saw from Antonescu's statements that
Eumania had consciously placed herself at the side of Germany,
Italy, and her other allies in the fight for the fate of Europe. If Ger-
many and her allies were defeated, this would signify the end of
European culture. The result would be [like] the Mongolian in-
vasion in Europe or the destruction of the Byzantine Empire by the
onrushing Turks. European culture had been created by the Germans
and Romans, but not by the Slavs. In such a tremendous conflict
which would decide the future of Europe for centuries, the need of
the hour required the greatest possible concentration on the most
pressing problems.
Speaking at length the Fiihrer then gave a survey of the momentary
situation. World Jewry in combination with the Slavs and unfor-
tunately also the Anglo-Saxons was carrying on the fight with em-
bitterment. Germany and her allies confronted real colossi in terms
of space, which possessed all raw materials and fertile land in copious
measure. In addition there was a certain destructive tendency of the
Jews, which found expression in the fight of Bolshevism and Pan-
Slavism.
The Fiihrer then gave a description of the situation of the Balkans
at the time of the Vienna Award. At that time Germany had tried by
this award to prevent the worst for Rumania and for the Balkans.
The Fiihrer called it tragic that ethnographic and historical claims
were often incompatible, so that no delimitation of frontiers could do
justice to all claims. In the east, however, both Rumania and Ger-
many had tremendous areas to colonize. Rumanian and German in-
terests met here and forced one to biological decisions ; i.e., Rumania,
too, would have to give as much of her own ethnic group as possible
in the interest of preserving these newly-acquired territories, and this
to the furthermost frontier of these new areas. The Fiihrer would
understand it entirely if Rumania in addition to restoration of her
old frontier should demand an appropriate glacis, necessary for se-
curity, and Odessa.
Regarding the Ukraine the Fiihrer mentioned that he was, of course,
of the opinion that no points of departure for a reaction must de-
velop here (dass hier Teeine Ansatspvmhte fur eine Bedktion mstehen
diirften]. However, it was not only a question of preventing some-
894 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
thing, but one also ought to make these territories serviceable to Eu-
rope in a positive way. Here, too, the biological structure was of the
greatest importance.
The Fiihrer then explained how with the aid of the Ukrainian ter-
ritories the food basis for all of Europe could be secured. Particu-
larly the Western European industrial countries that were overpopu-
lated, such as Belgium, for example, would now be able to obtain the
necessary food from the Ukraine instead of from overseas, as in the
past. Thereby Europe would be safe from blockades and at the most
she could still be molested from the air, although in this respect, too,
the attacks would become more and more difficult.
For the rest, countries such as Germany and Rumania did not
need any commitments under international law in order to cooperate
with other countries; rather it was sufficient for them to be of one
opinion by virtue of reason and ideology. On this basis, for ex-
ample, the cooperation between Finland, Rumania, and Germany was
complete without any special treaties having been formally concluded.
Regarding Rumania's economic difficulties the Fiihrer remarked
that of course the greatly inflated German organizations in Rumania
would be dismantled although certain elements, as for example the
coastal defense system, would still have to remain^ He likewise in-
tended to reduce the staffs. Furthermore Germany would do every-
thing to help in keeping the Rumanian currency stable, whether by
guaranteeing its purchasing power or by the cooperation of the
Reichsbank. Finally the Rumanian Army should receive everything
which Germany could possibly supply to it.
On the other hand the Fiihrer asked Antonescu to see that Rumania
made the greatest efforts to assure the necessary deliveries of raw
materials and foods. He (the Fiihrer) expected that the war would
last at most another 2 years. Leningrad and Moscow would fall in
the winter. Sevastopol would be in German hands within a few days.
In no case would Rumania be entirely exhausted within the 2 years.
On the other hand she also had to help with grain as much as she
could, for after all, the struggle was a joint one.
Regarding the person of Marshal Antonescu the Fiihrer remarked
that he had decided in favor of him at one certain moment. He had
felt confidence in him when he had seen him for the first time and had
recognized him as a fanatical national leader of the people. He had
grown to like him personally very much.
In summary the Fiihrer remarked that Rumania could regard him
as a sincere friend who desired a strong Rumania that could keep
watch effectively against the east in order to protect Europe, whose
culture had been created jointly by the Rumanians and the Germans,
against her enemies.
Schmidt
NOVEMBER 1041 895
No. 520
235/167330-31
The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
secbet Eio de Janeiro, November 29, 1941 — 1 : 24 a. m.
No. 2362 of November 28 Received November 29—11 : 10 a. m.
Following the dinner to which, at-^the suggestion, of President
Vargas, I invited his brother, Colonel Benjamin Vargas, and some
gentlemen of the Presidential Chancery, as well as close friends of
the President, Colonel Vargas gave me — as he stressed — at the express
direction of his brother, a general confidential statement on the policy
of the President. He had the urgent desire to continue on good
terms with Germany. If he were now forced to make concessions
to the United States of America in many fields, this did not mean
any fundamental change in his policy. He was trying to keep this
as elastic as possible in order to give Americans no cause for unlaw-
ful interference with Brazilian sovereignty. This too explained
Brazil's attitude toward American procedure in Dutch Guiana. 1 The
Americans had requested military participation. A compromise had
been found through an empty gesture of border occupation and the
dispatching of a civilian commission to Paramaribo.
The speeches and interviews of Foreign Minister Aranha during
his last trip were also to be interpreted in the sense of the elasticity of
Brazilian policy. 2 There was a wide gap between words and deeds.
The President once more gave this assurance : He was not thinking of
breaking off relations with Germany, even if America should press
him to it. He was, moreover, not at all convinced that Roosevelt
would risk a war with Germany.
Benjamin Vargas then went on to a discussion of his brother's do-
mestic policy, stressing the fact that the latter had become more and
more convinced that he had to look to youth, particularly the students
and workers, for support. It was precisely the war that had shown
that the spirit of sacrifice and energy of German youth were triumph-
ing over the senility and indolence that prevailed among the enemy
powers. Also the tough resistance of the Bolshevists was only to be
1 In telegram No. 1642 of Aug. 26 (235/157273-74) the Embassy reported that
the United States had requested that Brazil occupy Dutch Guiana and the
Azores. See Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere
Defense in the series United States Army in World War II: The Western
Hemisphere, p. 289.
"In telegrams No. 2270 of Nov. 15 (235/157313) and No. 2317 of Nov. 21
(235/157321) Priifer reported that Aranha in speeches and interviews in Porto
Alegre and Buenos Aires had declared that Brazil would not be neutral if an
American country were involved in war, but that the President had given as-
surances that he would reprimand the Foreign Minister on his return.
896 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
explained by the fanaticism of the soldiers who had come out of the
Comsomol. 3
The conversation closed when Benjamin Vargas, in the name of his
brother, and reiterating his sympathy for Germany, thanked me for
the understanding attitude of German policy with respect to Brazil.
Pkufer
3 Comsomol, the Communist Union of Youth, a branch of the Communist Party.
No. 521
F12/13&-129
Memorandvm by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat l
RAM 59 g. Es. Berlin, November 29, 1941.
Record or the Conversation of M. Bose With the Foreign Minister
on November 29, 1941, in Berlin 2
M. Bose began the conversation with words of thanks for the hos-
pitality he had enjoyed in Germany and the request that his mission
be supported. He congratulated the Foreign Minister on his speech »
and stated that the tone adopted in it had been very precisely attuned
to England and America. In general he termed the situation hopeful,
and believed that he could reckon Germany's prospects of winning the
war at about 80 percent. He did not attribute any particular impor-
tance for the development of the war to America's entry, but said that
Germany now had to take up the Oriental question, particularly as
[action in] the European theater of war would be finished within the
foreseeable future.
The English had prepared a broader base in India. Whereas in
the last war they had in the main procured manpower from India,
the country had now been much more industrialized and especially
adapted to the production of war material, so that all the fronts in
the Orient could be supplied from there. England was so easy to at-
tack in her Empire, and had enemies everywhere (Iraq, Iran, etc.).
He, M. Bose, watched the English propaganda very closely; as an
example he cited Colonel Britten [Colonel Britton], who was carrying
'A draft of this memorandum with handwritten corrections (F1/0O37h16)
which were incorporated in the finished copy printed here is also in the flies.
'According to a memorandum by Woermann of Nov. 22 (195/139258) the
Foreign Minister had promised that he would receive Bose the next time he
would be in Berlin. "The reception appears to be the more necessary as the
Grand Mufti is to be received by the FUhrer in the presence of the Foreign
Minister and as Bose and the Grand Mufti are in continuous contact with one
another."
1 Delivered on Nov. 26 at a banquet celebrating the prolongation of the Anti-
Comintern Pact. For text, see Monatshefte fiir AuswiirUge Politik, December
1944, pp. 1053-1068.
NOVEMBER 1941 897
on particularly realistic propaganda of subversion. Here the German
propaganda ought to start its effort in a similar way; he expected this
to have great success all over the Orient, which would greatly facili-
tate the work of the Wehrmacht.
It was a very important point that Germany should decide in time
which party she wanted to cooperate with in each country. A prompt
decision would then make it possible for the organization concerned
to cooperate effectively.
M. Bose then showed several clippings from the Times, the Daily
Mail, and the Daily Express, which branded him a traitor. He in-
dicated that it was rather necessary to make a reply to this so that
his followers would not defect.
In his reply the Foreign Minister pointed out that the war, as he
had already told him in Vienna, 4 would result in the destruction of the
English possessions everywhere in the world. Churchill knew, to be
sure, that the war was lost, but could not iand would not admit it ; fur-
thermore, there was no leader of stature to replace him. Thus he con-
tinued to make war. True, he could not be termed a great statesman ;
his sole strength lay in the fact that he was willing to take over the
responsibility for continuing the war and that he succeeded in bring-
ing about a certain agreement between the Labour Party and the
Conservatives which others did not feel capable of achieving. It was
improbable that Churchill would be overthrown ; it was conceivable,
however, in case the current operation in North Africa should lead to
an English defeat.
As far as Eussia was concerned, this would still require some effort,
to be sure, but she would fall in the course of the coming year at the
latest. The Eussians had arrived at the point where they could not
themselves replace their armaments adequately, while Anglo-Ameri-
can support was too scanty. In the meantime the English would lose
one position after the other; this time the Fiihrer wanted to have a
clear decision and would no longer consider any compromise. It
seemed that relations between Japan and America would reach a state
of tension in the next few days which would at least result in a serious
situation and perhaps also war.
In England Bevin 6 was important in domestic policy ; actually a
half-Bolshevik, he was something of an English Kerensky. One could
assume it to be certain that the Conservatives would no longer be in
power at the end of the war. The more England lost, the more the
course turned toward the left. America would be the heir to the Eng-
lish possessions in the Western Hemisphere, whereas the Axis would
predominate in Europe. Once Germany had the Eussian space before
* See vol. xii of tbis series, document No. 425.
" Ernest Bevin, British Minister of Labour and National Service.
682-90B — 64 62
898 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
her as an area for colonization, she would hardly need colonies. Cer-
tainly the Russian area would be successfully colonized. In Africa,
where the Duce would have a great influence, the English would be
driven out and the peoples there would be given greater freedom.
He, the Foreign Minister, had just seen the Mufti, 8 who wanted to
create a new Arab world, whereas Japan also Had certain justified
claims in the Far East.
In the question of India it was important to realize that the collapse
of the Empire could no longer be prevented. One important point
had to be taken into account, however : German policy did not think
much of declarations with no force behind them, because it was pos-
sible that the opposite effect from the one desired could occur. As
an example the Foreign Minister pointed to Iraq, where Germany
was unable to help. The result was that the Grand Mufti and Gaylani
were in Germany, the Government was forced into exile, and its
friends were dead or in prison. After that the Syrian venture had oc-
curred, with a similar outcome. Germany wanted to avoid taking a
step which could again induce certain circles to ill-considered actions.
Thus no open action should be taken that could endanger the situation.
When we would be in a position to put pressure behind a declaration,
and this time was no longer very far. off, then we would take action.
For the moment we intended to carry on all sorts of propaganda for
the Arabs, for instance, but not to issue any declaration.
In the case of India matters were not entirely analogous. There,
too, however, one should proceed cautiously and only say something
concrete when a success was in view, for example when German troops
had crossed the Caucasus. Then one might consider setting up an all-
India committee under M. Bose in Tiflis, for example, which would
make propaganda efforts with a large expenditure and with radio
transmitters.
One thing was certain, that propaganda alone would never bring
about a free India or Arabia ; this could only be achieved through the
destruction of the English positions of power by the Wehrmacht. At
the moment England held all of these countries through her prestige ;
once this had been destroyed the Empire would fall.
Here M. Bose interjected that he hoped that this view of the Foreign
Minister's also reflected the Fiihrer's view.
The Foreign Minister said that the Fiihrer believed in the final
defeat of England; it was simply his view, however, that no action
should take place until Germany had the power to support it properly.
One should not risk the possibility of our propaganda's being torn to
shreds by English counterpropaganda.
1 See document No. 514.
\J
NOVEMBER 1941 899
M. Bose pointed out that the Indian question differed from the Arab
question in two points:
1. India was much further away. Therefore the English propa-
ganda was much more effective there, for the Indians had no contact
of any sort with Germany and no conception of Germany.
2. In MeinKampf there were passages in regard to India which had
been exploited in an unfavorable sense by English propaganda. It
was by far the most important thing to let the Indian people know
what the Fuhrer thought about India, because the Indian people did
not know either Germany or the views held there. Technically such
influence could probably be exerted through the radio.
The Foreign Minister stated that he had been thinking about an
audience with the Fuhrer for M. Bose; but at the moment he still
hesitated to suggest this to the Fuhrer because such a visit might be-
come known. At the moment it was probably also too soon to under-
take such decisive steps. At the proper time propaganda would be
started against all the positions of the British Empire, possibly also
including South Africa, so as to proceed with the strongest possible
means against the Empire. However, he wanted to intensify the
broadcasts to India and for this reason asked M. Bose for ideas which
he might suggest.
M. Bose pointed out that there were millions of persons living in
India who were anti-English, to be sure, but not for that reason pro-
German. The great problem lay in the possibility of winning over
these forces.
The Foreign Minister repeated his request for suggestions, and
added that the moment would then have arrived when German troops
were beyond the Caucasus and at Suez, The Axis could speak only
when the military had a firm basis in the Near East, for otherwise
any propaganda effect would come to nought. It was a guiding prin-
ciple of German policy not to promise anything that could not be
carried out later. As far as the English method was concerned, the
Foreign Minister pointed to the concept of "Blitzkrieg", which had
been formulated in England so that one could say in the case of
every German campaign, no matter how short, that it had failed as a
Blitzkrieg. He imagined propaganda for India from this standpoint :
The English oppress all nations, and Germany will help all those
oppressed.
M. Bose asked to consider whether a secret radio transmitter for
India should not be established. 7 He would then direct the propa-
ganda of this transmitter without himself making an appearance.
* An unsigned and undated summary of various points made by Bose in this
conversation (Fl/0047-^9) indicates that Bose proposed to have the trans-
mitter set up in Zeinum near Belgrade.
900 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Following this he asked the Foreign Minister to arrange an audience
with the Fuhrer, nevetheless, so that he -would have the opportunity
of personally presenting his views to him.
The Foreign Minister closed the conversation -with the promise to
consider this question. 3
von Loesch
* Bose was not received by Hitler until May 27, 1942 { Schmidt memorandum
of May 30 : F16/0232-47 ) .
No. 522
Fl 0/01 74-82
F6/0130-38
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Fiih 60a g. Ks. Berlin, November 30, 1941.
Record of the Conversation Between the Fuhrer and Italian
Foreign Minister Count Ciano in Berlin on November 29, 1941 1
At the start of the conversation the Fuhrer developed his ideas con- .
ceming the general situation and came to the conclusion that on the
whole the war was already won. During his last meeting with the
Duce s he had given the latter a picture of the projected operations on
the eastern front. At that time the German objectives had consisted
of breaking the resistance of the Russians on the central and southern
part of the front and then launching a thrust against the center.
These operations had proceeded according to plan. The resistance
that was still being offered in Russia did not come from man but
from nature, that is, the weather and the character of the terrain.
With 6 weeks of good weather Russia would have been liquidated by
Germany.
Now Sevastopol was to be taken. The artillery for the offensive
would be at the spot within the next few days. Then the attack
would begin at once. The speed with which this next task would be
executed was naturally conditioned by the weather. Moscow was
to be encircled. No assault would be opened on the city, but grad-
ually all of its communications with the outside world would be cut
off. An additional task was the destruction of Leningrad.
The recent offensive against the Russians had suffered from the
atmospheric conditions to the extent that bad weather had set in
immediately after completion of the first big rush.
As a whole, however, all of the operations were dependent upon the
supply lines and the rail and road connections. Therefore it was also
1 See document No. 501, footnote 1.
* See document No. 242.
NOVEMBER 1941
901
intended to continue to advance toward the southeast in the direction
of the Caucasus and to destroy the Russian Black Sea fleet, because
easier routes of communication across the Black Sea would simplify
the supply question.
Snow had now fallen along a large part of the front, and the troops
were going into winter quarters. This did not mean, however, that
absolute calm would now reign there throughout the winter.
Moreover, the Wehrmacht would use the time for a reorganization
of its units and for constituting new armored divisions.
Furthermore, we had never lost sight of the precaution of likewise
securing the west in case the English should attempt a landing.
Enough troops had been left not only in the west but also in Norway
in order to frustrate any such attempt from the start.
In summary, then the future tasks were as follows :
1. liquidation of the east,
2. securing of the west,
3. activation of the submarine war, and
4. independent of this, the conquest of the Caucasus.
The Fiihrer illustrated Russia's desperate situation with some fig-
ures. She had lost 65-75 percent of her total industry, 65-70 percent
of her iron resources, 75 percent of her coal resources, 100 percent of
her molybdenum, 75 percent of her manganese, and 75 percent of her
aluminum. Because America obtained some of these resources from
Russia, that country, too, would be affected by the losses. Further-
more, Russia had lost 3.8 million prisoners, 4 million dead, 22,800
tanks, 16,000 airplanes, and 28,000 guns. A recovery from these blows
was impossible. Not only was the material lacking, but also trained
troops. Industries could not be relocated without further ado, espe-
cially not in winter, when owing to the freezing of mortar and cement
the erection of factory buildings and storehouses was impossible. Fur-
thermore, the Luftwaffe was inflicting destruction precisely on indus-
trial construction. Trains with valuable machine tools that were on
the way to the east from a factory to be relocated were destroyed and
the factories themselves bombarded.
In the Mediterranean the heaviest attack was, at the moment, under
way in North Africa. Churchill could not wait any longer. Actually
he should have attacked only at the moment when Germany and
Italy proceeded against Tobruk.
To begin with, Count Ciano expressed his pleasure that he was able
to meet the Fiihrer again so soon after his visit to headquarters. 3 He
had informed the Duce in detail about everything he had learned from
the Fiihrer at his last visit to headquarters. Before his departure for
* Ciano had been at Hitler's headquarters on Oct. 25. See document No. 424.
902 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Germany he had talked to the Duce once more and had ascertained
that at the moment there were really no urgent problems to deal -with
between Germany and Italy.* Concerning Croatia and Greece he had
already talked with the Foreign Minister ; B as a result, the only item
to discuss with the Fiihrer was the renewed request of the Duce to have
the numbers of the Italian divisions fighting at the eastern front in-
creased. Inasmuch as the Duce would like to prepare thoroughly the
troops that might be sent and as a certain length of time would be
necessary to do this, he would naturally like to know, as soon as pos-
sible how his request could be met. Compared to the enormous ex-
ertions of Germany this could naturally mean only a relatively small
contribution by Italy to the common fighting force. The Duce would
like to see, however, that Italy's participation in the eastern campaign
be more in line with its potential than heretofore. He therefore
asked the Fiihrer to let him know how many additional Italian divi-
sions he was counting on and what type these divisions should be.
In his reply, the Fiihrer explained that in this question, as was true
in general for the military operations in the east, it was essentially a
transportation problem and in this connection he explained in detail
the few railroad lines that were available, the road conditions, as well
as the work that had been accomplished on the part of Germany in
reactivating the' Russian transportation system, especially with the
construction of bridges across the Dnieper. It was characteristic for
the conditions of roads, for instance, that during bad weather in the
east the hourly speed of motorized vehicles was, on the average 2-3
kilometers.
The Fiihrer then came to speak of the further German operation
plans, and indicated as one of the aims of the German Army the Cau-
casus, from which Iran and Iraq were to be conquered. During this
advance which would lead through desert areas with a hot climate,
Italy could perhaps make a useful contribution. Mountain troops
would be necessary for the Caucasus. Actually, of course, the conquest
of the Caucasus was not decisive for the war, but one could probably
ascribe such a character to the capture of Iran and Iraq, Syria and
Palestine.
Furthermore, Italy could play a useful role if she made every effort
to hold Africa. It was absolutely necessary for Germany and Italy
not to be pushed out from there. In French North Africa the pressure
had somewhat eased through the departure of Weygand 8 but the sit-
' Of. The Oiano Diaries, entry for Nov. 22, 1941.
* Document No. 601.
* Document No. 478, footnote 11.
NOVEMBER 1941 903
uation could be considered as finally secure only after Germany and
Italy would prevail over the enemy throughout the rest of North
Africa.
None of these problems would have arisen, however, if a year ago
Spain had agreed to the German proposals concerning the capture of
Gibraltar and had cooperated in this. 7 Two German divisions in
Spanish Morocco would have stabilized the entire situation in French
North Africa.
Count Ciano pointed in this connection to the internal difficulties
which actually existed in Spain. The army, the monarchists, and not
least of all the Reds, of which Spain was still full, hampered every
decision.
The Spanish royal family in Italy was a real nest of Anglophile
intrigue. Don Juan, the Pretender to the Throne, was also on the
English side, and the Queen of Spain 8 in a lively exchange of letters
with Sir Samuel Hoare not only developed an activity of an espionage
character, but had also suggested all sorts of political adventures to
the English. In conclusion the Fiihrer spoke about the favorable situ-
ation of the German-Italian troops in North Africa and the consider-
able success which they had achieved in repulsing the English offen-
sive. The Fiihrer analyzed for Count Ciano in more detail the various
phases of this fight as they were known up to now.
Finally, the conversation turned to the domestic situation in Ger-
many and in Italy. The Fiihrer stated that the German people were
acting admirably and that merely a small malicious unteachable
minority in Germany stood apart. Wherever he showed himself in
Germany, he received enthusiastic ovations as never before. This was,
after all, a remarkable fact after 2 years of war.
Count Ciano replied that things were similar in Italy. At his visits
to places like Parma and Bologna, which were considered especially
difficult, the Duce had been received enthusiastically. Every intelli-
gent Italian realized today that it was a matter of existence and the
future of the country.
Moreover, the situation in Japan was similar. There, too, the
great mass of the population was full of enthusiasm for the progres-
sive course.
Schmidt
* See vol. xi of this series, documents Nos. 682, 695, 702, and 707.
Victoria Eugenie Christina, born Ena of Battenberg, widow of Alfonso XIII.
904 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 523
Fl/0031-36
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
top secret Berlin, November 30, 1941.
Fiih58a/1941gRs.
Record op the Conversation Between the Fuhrer and Italian
Foreign Minister Count Ciano, as Well as Spanish Foreign
Minister Serrano Suner, in the Presence of the Reich Foreign
Minister and Ambassador von Stohrer in Berlin on November 29,
1941
The Fuhrer first gave a survey of the general situation from the
military and political point of view whereby he particularly went into
the American policy. Roosevelt hated both the Duce and the Fiihrer,
because in his country he had failed in tasks which the two above-
named persons have solved brilliantly in their own countries. Fur-
thermore, he intended to exploit the war in order to take over the
inheritance of England and France, establish himself firmly in South
America, take possession of or gain control over the islands in the
Atlantic, Greenland, the Azores, the Canary and Cape Verde Islands,
and finally to gain a foothold in Africa. To confront this, sooner or
later a European front would develop quite of its own accord. Fur-
thermore he (the Fuhrer) was convinced that if America should
enter the war Japan for her part would also proceed against America,
for her situation was not dissimilar to that of Germany.
In the light of the latest events, Turkey would in no circumstances
go over to the Anglo-Saxon side. Furthermore, the visible signs of
internal difficulties were increasing both in England and in America.
America in particular did not possess the inner power of resistance
which characterized some European countries.
The eastern part of Europe had to be intensively organized so that
Europe would not only be secure against blockades but also against
crises.
Serrano Sufier thanked the Fuhrer for the interesting statements on
the general situation. Spanish attention was particularly directed to
the events in North Africa, which had caused some concern among the
Spaniards. Ambassador von Stohrer knew how he (Serrano Sufier)
felt about these events. Since he was used to the English propaganda
he was not influenced by it, but there were other people in Spain who
were influenced by England. Therefore if a favorable outcome could
be achieved in North Africa as soon as possible, the psychological effect
would be exceedingly great, especially considering that the English
had evidently great hopes for their advance because after all Sir
NOVEMBER 1941 905
Samuel Hoare had announced repeatedly in Spain a great offensive
in North Africa, of which the English Government and the English
people expected great things.
Regarding the morale in Spain, Serrano Suner remarked that there
was still a large number of Anglophiles in this country.
The Fiihrer was absolutely right when he said that there was no
power and no instrument of power in the world that could conquer
the European Continent militarily. This was so clear that even the
English knew it and even spoke of it, as had Eden recently in London,
who had admitted that England possessed no adequate means of mil-
itary power to be able to conquer. The English hopes were therefore
focused upon economic warfare and internal revolution in the enemy
countries.
In regard to Spain he could state, with particular reference to the
language used by the Spanish press, that the Spaniards were fully
conscious of their obligation of loyalty toward the Fiihrer of a great
country and therefore built up their foreign policy on the basis of
sincere friendship for Germany. Spain also performed every possible
service for the Reich to the modest extent possible to her, whereby
he (Serrano Suher) did not want to conceal that this was not done
without internal difficulties, for Spain was not only in a very bad
situation economically, but the Spaniards also believed that the war
would be very long and difficult. Furthermore, Spain's economic
dependence upon foreign countries was a great obstacle in the way of
a bold foreign policy. Thus, for example, America's reaction to his
(Serrano Suner's) trip to Berlin 1 had been immediately to detain
two petroleum tankers that were to have left the United States for
Spain. 2 The Fiihrer remarked regarding this that precisely such
an action had to lead to a unified front in Europe, and that no country
would be able to avoid the fight in the long run.
Regarding Spain's domestic situation, Serrano Sufier also remarked
that only the Falange was pro-German. There were in the country
numerous enemies of the Government, among them a tremendous num-
ber of Reds who were directed by agents of foreign powers. The
lack of grain and gasoline, moreover, made every thought of partici-
pation in the war unpopular in Spain. Furthermore, Spain did not
have enough antiaircraft artillery and coastal batteries to defend
herself against a possible foe, so that a war would mean great losses.
The Fiihrer put the question what Spain would then do if the
Azores were attacked. Serrano Suner replied that Spain would de-
fend the Azores, whereupon the Fiihrer countered that offense was the
1 Serrano Sufier had come to Berlin in connection with the ceremonies at-
tending extension of the validity of the Anti-Comintern Pact. See document
No. 498.
1 See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. n, pp. 932-934.
906 DOCUMENTS ON GEHMAN FOREIGN POLICY
best defense, and added his regret that the Gibraltar action had not
been carried out owing to the attitude of the Spaniards. 8 The status
of the preparations at that time was such that 6 days would have
been enough to capture Gibraltar. Then one could also have exerted
pressure on France, and the threat to the Mediterranean posfed by
the English Malta would have been eliminated.
In conclusion Serrano Suner proposed that certain Falange mem-
bers, important for the political work at home, who were now at the
eastern front, should be sent back to Spain, because they had more
important services to render at home than at the front, particularly
in regard to promoting friendship for Germany and strengthening
the Government.
The Fiihrer agreed with this idea, and it was arranged that a cer-
tain exchange of Spanish soldiers of the Blue Division should be
made for other volunteers to be sent from Spain.
Schmidt
* For details of the plan for Gibraltar, see vol. si of this series, document No.
323. For Franco's refusal to undertake this operation, see ibid., documents
Nos. 420 and 476.
No. 524
82/80917-19
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most tjkgeiv-t Tokto, November 30, 1941—10 : 10 p. m.
No. 2597 of November 30 Received December 2 — 2 : 40 p. m.
When I called on the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs today,
I took the opportunity in the first instance to present to him the
Japanese translation of the Eeich Foreign Minister's speech 1 prepared
by the Embassy, inviting his special attention to the political remarks.
The Foreign Minister expressed his thanks for furnishing him with
the text of the speech and stated that the Eeich Foreign Minister's
remarks had been of great interest to him. He then inquired about
the military situation in Russia and North Africa, which I explained
to him with the help of some maps which I had brought with me.
The Foreign Minister expressed his deep gratification over the prog-
ress of our defensive operations in North Africa. He also congratu-
lated Germany on the continued favorable development of the east-
ern campaign, but stressed in that connection the very high impor-
tance which Japan attached to restoration of the trans-Siberian route;
1 Presumably a reference to Ribbentrop's address of Nov. 26. See document
No. 501, footnote 20 or document No. 521, footnote 3.
NOVEMBER 1941 907
Japan was closely watching the political developments inside Rus-
sia, and hoped that after the fall of Moscow and the disappearance
of the Stalin regime, it would be possible to come to some political
■ arrangement leading to restoration of the land connection with the
Axis Powers. As instructed, 2 I replied by referring to the Reich
Foreign Minister's explicit remarks.
I then observed that according to press reports the note delivered
by the American Government on November 26 s marked a decisive
phase in the negotiations. I needed not especially to emphasize that
official information from Japan regarding it would be of value to my
Government and would be deemed as being in accordance with our al-
liance. The American Government, according to newspaper reports,
had likewise informed a number of states. The Japanese Minister of
Foreign Affairs replied that the American note was of great impor-
tance indeed. In strict confidence, he would tell me the following
about it :
The course of the conversation to date had confirmed his view that
the differences of opinion between Japan and the United States were
very deep. Since sending Ambassador Kurusu on his mission, the
Japanese Government, as he had told me before, had adopted a firm
attitude. He was convinced that this attitude was in line with our
point of view and that it contributed to making the United States hesi-
tate about joining the European war. The new American proposal
of November 26 indicated a wide divergence of the respective positions.
These differences concerned, for instance, the further handling of the
China question. The largest (one group missing) , however, stemmed
from the American efforts to render the Tripartite Pact inoperative.
America was proposing that Japan conclude a non-aggression pact
with the United States, the British Empire, the Soviet Union and
other states, designed to prevent Japan's entry in the war at the side
of the Axis Powers. Japan insisted, however, upon keeping her
treaty obligations, and the American demand was for that reason
the principal impediment to normalization of American-Japanese re-
lations. He avoided going into the concessions held in prospect by
the Americans, and merely stressed that a grave decision was in-
volved. America was preparing in earnest for a conflict and was
about to arrange for a not unsubstantial portion of her navy to operate
\j from the southern Pacific. The Japanese Government was now en-
gaged in preparing a reply calculated to clarify its position. He was
not yet able to give me particulars at this moment. He considered
(group garbled) the American proposal as a. whole unacceptable.
" Instructions not found.
* For text, see Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 19S1-1941, vol.
n, pp. 768-770.
908 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Japan did not fear rupture of the negotiations and trusted that if the
occasion arose, Germany and Italy would stand by Japan in accord-
ance with the Tripartite Pact. I replied that there could not be any
doubt concerning Germany's future attitude. Upon this the Japanese
Foreign Minister observed that he gathered from what I had said that
Germany would in such a case regard her relationship to Japan as a
bond of common destiny. I replied that in my belief Germany would
assuredly be prepared to enter a mutual agreement on that matter.
To this the Foreign Minister replied that he might possibly come back
to that point before long. The conversation with the Foreign Min-
ister confirmed my impression that the American note was indeed very
unsatisfactory even for the statesmen of this country who are seeking
to reach an understanding. America's attitude, especially in the
China question, is extremely disappointing for these circles. The fact
that he had emphasized the Tripartite Pact as the main obstacle to
success in the negotiations seems to me to indicate that the Japanese
Government has now again become strongly conscious of the need for
close cooperation with the Axis Powers.
Ott
No. 525
1306/346472-473
Memorandum, by the Director of the News Service and Press
Department
Berlin, November 30, 1941.
For the Foreign Minister.
I would like to state the following with respect to the confidential
report by L[ikus] regarding the testament of Peter the Great. 1
The testament of Peter the Great was taken up in the Belgian news-
paper Pays Reel. Subsequently the Fiihrer ordered that the most
extensive propaganda use be made of it. A lecture by Professor
Schiissler discussed the subject. The lecture was reported in the entire
German press. This report of the lecture of Professor Schiissler was
not enough for the Fiihrer. He ordered the widest possible diseussion
in the German press with the theme : the imperialist policy of Tsar
'According to this Likus report of Nov. 28 (1306/346474) stories published in
the German press in connection with a lecture by Professor Schiissler of the
University of Berlin dealing with the testament of Tsar Peter the Great
had aroused great interest in the United States Embassy in Berlin. After it
had been discovered that in authoritative German reference works these docu-
ments were characterized as "crude forgeries" the American correspondents in
Berlin received from their Embassy instructions "to wire the full text of the
judgments in the books of German historians and in German reference works
regarding the forgery of these documents."
DECEMBER 1941 909
Peter the Great has been the guideline of Russian pre-war policy and
of the policy of Stalin. Bolshevist world hegemony and Slav imperial-
ism have joined hands in the policy of Stalin. The Fiihrer rejected
the objection which the Reich Press Chief a had raised with him that
the testament of Peter the Great had been characterized by German
scholars as a forgery already in the last World War, and he stated
in this connection that it didn't matter what some professor or other
had discovered with regard to this testament of Peter the Great.
What mattered rather was that history had demonstrated that Russian
policy was conducted according to these principles as they were laid
down in the testament of Peter the Great. Knowing of this instruction
of the Fiihrer, I together with Herr Fritzsche 3 gave the press a number
of arguments and guidelines for treating this matter. The press there-
upon took up the subject in a big way and treated it to the satisfaction
of the Fiihrer.*
Dr. Schmidt
' Otto Dietrich.
•Hans Fritzsche, Director of tbe German Press Department in the Reich
Ministry for Propaganda.
4 There is in the flies a memorandum of Dec. 1 of the Press Department (3933A
EO52165-80) , apparently drawn up for the use of the German press, which gave
the history and the text of this alleged testament of Peter the Great.
No. 526
195/139265
The Ambassador in ItoHy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
top secret Rome, December 1, 1941 — 8 : 10 p. m.
No. 3135 of December 1 Received December 1—8 : 50 p. m.
With reference to my report No. 61/41 g of November 26. 1
The Indian, Schedai, has stated that the Japanese Counselor of
Embassy 2 here told him, after receiving the corresponding instruction
from Tokyo that the Japanese Government intended to engage in
fruitful cooperation with the Indian liberation movement and was
willing to issue a declaration concerning Indian independence imme-
diately after the outbreak of war between Japan and Great Britain.
Schedai also stated that his cooperation with the Japanese Embassy
here would in particular concern active efforts of the Indian colonies
in East Asia, in which regard he always wanted, of course, to defer
"This report (41/28612) dealt with an offer of support which the Japanese
Counselor of Embassy had made to Schedai, who directed Indian activities In
Rome (see document No. 379).
* Yoshiro Ando.
910 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
to any wishes Germany might have. Schedai added that the Japanese
Counselor of Embassy had told him several times very clearly that
Japan's entry into the war was imminent. 8
Mackemsen
"In the files there Is the draft of a telegram of Dec. 8 (195/139271-72) by
Woermann Informing the Embassy in Japan of the substance of this document
with the instruction to inform the Japanese Government that it seemed most
desirable to Germany "that a Japanese declaration regarding Indian independence
should be coordinated with us and Italy with respect to content as well as time."
No. 527
2281/482390-93
Circular of the Foreign Ministry 1 '
Berlin, December 1, 1941.
Pol. V 6265 g.
With reference to instruction Pol. V 4552 g. of August 26, 1941.*
The information communicated in the instruction indicated above
concerning the question of the emigres from former Russia and the
obstacles in the way of utilizing them for practical cooperation in
the newly-occupied eastern territories remain valid in the future.
The announcement of the appointment of Minister Rosenberg and the
establishment of civil administrations in the occupied eastern area 8
have changed nothing in this.
In explanation of this fact reference may be made to the following.
Although the individual emigre 1 may be well disposed, in general the
appearance and activity of emigres would not make the situation in the
eastern areas easier, but would only complicate it. It would have to be
feared that the familiar antagonisms and controversies which split
the emigration would be carried into the areas which had just been
liberated from B olshevism. This would produce new difficulties there,
particularly since the distrust toward the emigres and the fear of
"White Guardist" acts of reprisal have by no means disappeared as yet
among the population of the liberated territory. ^
Because in the inquiries and petitions originating in emigre circles
the question of Germany's political objectives in the east also often
plays a role, we refer in this matter to the enclosed memorandum.
Woermanst
' Addressed to the Embassies in Turkey, Spain, Italy, and Paris, to the Lega-
tions in Croatia, Switzerland, Hungary, Rumania, Finland, Denmark, Portugal,
Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Sweden, to the Offices of the Foreign Ministry in Athens,
Belgrade, Brussels, The Hague, Prague, and Krakow, and to the Consulate at
Tangier.
* Document No. 247.
* See document No. 119.
DECEMBER 1941 911
[Enclosure]
Bemjn, November 20, 1941.
Memobandum
Subject : Germany and the occupied eastern territories.
The attempt is being made in various interested quarters to induce
German authorities to make statements concerning the war aims and
the constructive political intentions which Germany is planning to
realize in the eastern area liberated or still to be liberated from Bol-
shevism. The establishment of civil administrations in the occupied
eastern area and the announcement of the appointment of Minister
Rosenberg •will probably give a new impetus in this direction. Ques-
tions of this sort often derive from motives for which Germany has
understanding, particularly when members of the nations oppressed
by the Soviet regime up to now wish to learn in what manner their
homeland is to participate in the new order which is developing.
However, these elements which sympathize with the German struggle
for liberation must be told that we also have to reckon with other
undesirable and hostile trends which are often behind the wide-spread
curiosity about the German plans for the eastern area. "We have no
interest in facilitating the work of enemy propaganda, which so far
has been groping in the dark. Concrete statements about the German
political aims would only serve the enemy in his attempt to discredit
and disrupt precisely the form of the work of reconstruction which
is planned in the east by a corresponding campaign operating with
insinuations and distortions. As for the emigre groups of those
eastern nations, who are unfortunately so often quarreling and to
whom the German campaign brings liberation from Bolshevism, a
premature announcement of more specific German objectives would
only have the result that a new, fruitless, quarrel about questions of
the future would arise. Their practical settlement can only be brought
about by a final military decision, a decision which is still being fought
over on the battlefields.
In view of the reasons set forth, statements about the objectives
pursued by Germany in the eastern area can only be of a general
nature. Nevertheless, a reply can be given to inquiries. With refer-
ence to the announcement which appeared in the German press on
November 18 concerning the Eeich Commissariats Ostland and
Ukraine placed under Minister Rosenberg, as well as to the DNB
report which appeared in the papers on November 19 concerning the
reception for the press held by Minister Rosenberg, one can constantly
state with special emphasis that the basic fact of liberation from
Bolshevism has not by any means been grasped and appreciated every-
where in its whole significance. The profound significance of this
912 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
action can be fully recognized only if one clearly visualizes all of the
consequences that have resulted for the internal life of the national
group concerned. These consequences concern in the first place the
personal security of the inhabitants of the country, who were aban-
doned without protection to the arbitrary acts of the Soviet regime
and the persecutions by the GPU. They [the consequences] have to
do with the order in public life by the introduction of an administra-
tion operating according to European principles in place of the parti-
san, inefficient Soviet administrative organs which exploited the popu-
lation. They concern the restoration and revival of a healthy economy
in place of the Soviet "planned economy" built on unrealistic doc-
trines, which led only to a lowering of the living standard and to
pauperization in city and country. They finally concern also the en-
couragement of a national cultural life rooted in the native soil in
place of the past antinational Communist pseudo-culture.
The work of a reawakening of the healthy national forces in the
liberated territory carried out in accordance with these principles must
be in the foreground today. Within the framework of an activity
for these objectives, those elements of the indigenous population who
are qualified to serve their people in responsible posts in the future
can work their way up by efficiency and sustained performance. For
this selection of persons the prerequisites are being created at the pres-
ent time, because even at this time representatives of the local popu-
lation are participating to a large extent in local self-government by
teaching in the educational institutions, by working in the press, the
arts, theater, etc., and in particular by starting the economic life. In
this manner the indigenous national elements in the territories liber-
ated from Bolshevism can first find themselves and work for their own
benefit. They are trying out their powers and by practical work are
creating the foundations upon which their national and cultural life
can develop.
Batjm
No. 528
o
233/156836-38
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Argentina
top seoket Berlin, December 1, 1941.
No. 1434 RAM 2S6 g, Rs.
For the Ambassador personally.
I have carefully studied the question whether it would be advisable
for the purpose of clearing up relations between Germany and Ar-
gentina to make a change in the post of ambassador there, I am still
DECEMBER 1941 913
of the opinion that there is no justification for any Argentine pro-
posal to that effect. 1 Any retreat in the face of the public agitation
that was going on in Argentina some weeks ago was ruled out from
the beginning. 2 Not until now, when this agitation has subsided some-
what after a certain lapse of time, has the necessary condition existed
for discussing this question at all ; the only feasible way out that we
can conceive of would be a simultaneous change of ambassadors both
in Buenos Aires and in Berlin.
I therefore request that in connection with the conversation between
Counselor of Embassy Meynen and the Under State Secretary in the
Foreign Ministry there (your telegram No. 1795 of October 22)* you
-call on the Foreign Minister and make an oral statement to him of
approximately the following content:
(1). The German Government is still of the opinion that the present
deterioration in German-Argentine relations is due to the unjustified,
systematic agitation publicly carried on in Argentina aganst the a£
tivity of the German Embassy in Buenos Aires in general and against
your person in particular. The German Government has learned to
its regret that the Argentine Government has not been able to provide
proper protection from unwarranted public attacks for the Chief of
a foreign Mission and his staff, in accordance with general and ac-
cepted usages between friendly states.
(2) If the Argentine Government now wishes to improve German-
Argentine relations again, a necessary condition for it is now present
m so far as the wholly unjustified agitation against the German
m of S Z A d ^ Wn m the last few weeks and calm ha s set in.
1 6 ) i he Lrerman Government has had no reason basically for taking
up the question of a change in the ambassadorial post in Buenos
Aires. However, once the systematic and unjustified agitation against
tne person of the Ambassador had set in, it was confronted with the
tact that your activity as Ambassador had thereby been subjected to
undesirable handicaps. On the other hand the Argentine Govern-
ment has indicated to us through the Under State Secretary of the
Argentine "Foreign Ministry in his conversation with Counselor of
Embassy Meynen that the Argentine Government would, if necessary,
be prepared for the sake of normalizing mutual relations to recall its
Ambassador from Berlin. In view of this situation the German Gov-
ernment has no objection to replacing you there by some other person,
if there is at the same time a change in Argentina's ambassadorial
pose in iJerlin.
tyu T1 ll G A erman . Government requests a clear and binding state-
ment by the Argentine Government on this solution, which would con-
sist of a replacement of the German Ambassador in Buenos Aires and
of the Argentine Ambassador in Berlin, to be announced simultane-
ously by the two Governments without any comments of their own
I he appointment of the new Ambassadors would also have to be
announced at the same time.
■ lee docnS No." 293* *"* f °° tn ° te 2 ' and documeDt N «" 293 and footnote 3.
'Not printed (253/16522&-27).
682-905—64 63
914 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
( 5 ) In case of agreement the German Government reserves the right
to make a proposal regarding the date of the change of Ambassadors
at the two posts. 4 _
RlBBENTKOP
•In telegram 2039 of Dec. 2 <253/165222) Thermann reported that he had
taken up the problem with the Argentine Foreign Minister who appeared visibly
relieved. He seemed to anticipate no difficulty in the recall of the Argentine
Ambassador from Berlin but felt that there might be difficulty in naming a
successor because this required approval of the Senate which was adjourned
until May 1942. The Argentine Government was expected to make a counter-
proposal.
No. 529
87/46902-35
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
jfo. 60 Paris, December 3, 1941.
Record of the Conversation Between Reichsmarschall Goring and
Marshal Petain in Florentin-Veroigny on December 1, 1941
Marshal Petain by way of introduction explained that he had
cherished the wish for a long time to meet with the Reichsmarschall,
and he had also, as the latter doubtless knew, tried several times to
bring about a conversation with him— not only for reasons of the per-
sonal sympathy which he felt toward the Reichsmarschall, but also
because he was interested in describing his own situation to a soldier.
When someone stood at the head of a country then the fate of the
people was in his hands and took a certain direction according to the
course followed by the state leadership. He (Petain) wanted to come
to an agreement with Germany in so far as possible concerning this
course.
Petain than pointed out that he had prepared a note 1 and wanted
to discuss the content of this note with the Reichsmarschall and in
consultation with Admiral Darlan.
The Reichsmarschall replied that he, too, was happy to meetf^ith
Marshal Petain, even though heretofore this conversation had had
to be postponed time and again owing to his (the Reichsmarschall's)
other military and governmental tasks.
It was known both to the Fiihrer and to other circles in Germany
that already after his first meeting with Marshal Petain he (the
Reichsmarschall) had spoken of him everywhere with great respect.
He even went so far as to say that if Marshal Petain had exerted more
influence on the destinies of his country at a certain critical hour the
war would not have broken out between Germany and France.
'Document No. 531.
DECEMBER 1941 gjc
mfhT whToh 1 ^ ^T rSC ^ U Gdring em P h ^d * 6 sincere sym-
war fi^ al 7 ayS ? ad f0r France even b <*>™ the present
rieflt ° nged . t0 th ° Se CirdeS Which had tried t0 P™™t
^scS^ His (theReich^
SuSch £ m / 7f\ Laval in Krak ™° and with Daladier in
!:i d c aw ' he had aiways been in w ° f a settie -
Ma^LfplnT 11 ^ 6 ° f Vi T b6tWeen ^Wrechall Goring and
Marshal retain concerning the question of further DrocedurP tW
^LS:Ln££T shouId ^ e ^^"V'Z
pZZ ! Z 7 l lf necessar y the Reichsmarschall and Marshal
Petam would have another private conversation thereafter
FWh PnL ! ^Portant points of this memorandum: the
e™l Tl T S entireIy Prepared for collaboration w«
Lrermany. This collaboration so far, however did w fi^ *t
rand™ ^ were ^ nJes'sa^ ?t ^7^°° T ^ * the m ™-
Germany thrt had b»en oonSTL h. fv j """* b "'
916 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
she had won in hard and bloody fighting, brought about by a war
which Germany had not desired but which had been declared on her
by France. Through a single stroke of the pen all of this was sup-
posed to be more or less wiped out again. Things were asked of Ger-
many which would considerably weaken her position, whereas the
French Government offered as a counterservice only the hope that
the French people would agree to collaborate; nothing was said,
however, as to how far this collaboration with Germany was supposed
to go or what positive advantages would result from it for the Reich.
Germany was involved in the most difficult fight for the new order
of Europe and was at the point of destroying the most tremendous
military power of all time. In the midst of this struggle France now
demanded that Germany give up these advantages that were of the
most extreme importance to her in her fight against England, whereby
the Reichsmarschall stressed that almost all of the wishes advanced
by the French side involved positions that primarily had to be held
not at all on account of France but on account of the fight against
England.
If now the French Government did not even offer any positive
counterservices but only spoke vaguely of the agreement of the French
people, then one could just as well have demanded that Germany leave
France entirely and calmly look on while the French Government was
then forced by its people once more to employ its means of power thus
regained in a new war against the Reich under conditions unfavorable
to Germany.
If he (the Reichsmarschall) was willing in spite of this first un-
favorable impression to discuss the note with the French gentlemen,
he did this because he knew that they, like himself, were moved by
the desire for collaboration. He asked the French gentlemen, how-
ever, to keep both feet on the ground. If Admiral Darlan would
think the matter over coolly and soberly, then he would doubtless
realize himself that it would be insane of Germany to comply with
the French demands.
It was true, to be sure, as the French Chief of State had just stat@
that the agreement of the French people to the policy of collabora-
tion was necessary. Even in a state under authoritarian leadership
it was impossible in the long run to pursue a policy without the con-
sent of the people. As a soldier who was speaking to a soldier, how-
ever, he had to ask the question in all frankness what had really been
done thus far by the French Government in order to bring about a
more favorable feeling for this policy among the French people who
rejected collaboration. Germany could already come up with a long
list of French wishes that had been fulfilled and thus with an influenc-
ing of public opinion in favor of collaboration. He (the Reichs-
DECEMBER 1941 917
marschall) would go into the particulars later on. At the moment
he wanted only to point to the fact that Germany had so far already
released 800,000 French prisoners. In order to make the French
people ready for collaboration, the French Government should have
considered its very first task, on the basis of the defeat of France,
which was a fact that did not need to be discussed further, to point
out to the French people the much more favorable and dignified treat-
ment which France had received from the victorious Germany at the
armistice in comparison to what had been imposed on the latter her-
self at the armistice of 1918 and in the Treaty of Versailles. The
French Government should have stressed to its own people that Ger-
many had respected the standpoint of honor of the French people,
had taken account of the history, the value, and the prestige of the
French nation and had spared it every painful or degrading demand
in order to show that Germany had entered this fight only against
her will owing to the declaration of war from other quarters and now
wanted to close this phase as soon as possible. Germany did not have
the intention to torture France or to degrade or dishonor her. If this
had been made clear to the French people by the French Government,
then the understanding of the French nation for the new period would
thereby have been awakened, when the victors were not proceeding
against the honor of conquered France but merely had to make certain
demands out of the necessity of continuing the fight against England.
This would have been the pivot from which one could have guided
the mentality of the French people along new paths. For after all,
two nations such as France and Germany could not always carry on
war against one another.
Furthermore, the French Government should have exploited quite
differently both technically and propagandistically the alleviations
which Germany had granted and the cooperation which she had shown
toward France and which had found its expression in the meetings of
the Fiihrer with Marshal Petain and Admiral Darlan."
For the rest the French people in the occupied area were more for
collaboration than those in the unoccupied area. This was connected
with the fact that the atmosphere in Vichy was generally anti-German.
Of course he did not mean Marshal Petain or Admiral Darlan, but
many of their co-workers and particularly the French ministerial
bureaucracy, which frustrated the orders passed down from above and
hindered their implementation. The German state leaders knew from
experience in their own country how much a ministerial bureauc-
racy that disagreed could interfere with the execution of the govern-
mental decisions, and had needed several years to clean up the situa-
B For Hitler's meeting with Petain see vol. xi of this series, document No. 227;
for that with Darlsui see vol. xn of this series, document No. 491.
918 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN - FOREIGN POLICY
tion entirely. Germany was not blind, and Vichy was not so far
removed from the world that the leadership of the German state did
not know exactly that the lower strata in France were not disinclined
to collaborate with Germany, to be sure, but that the intellectual
circles continued to be opposed to collaboration. Of course the Keich
Government also knew how much Marshal PStain and Admiral
Darlan had worked personally for the policy of collaboration. The
disposal of the Weygand Affair,' too, had strengthened this impres-
sion; but the people had to be won over to collaboration by means of
proper propaganda, in that it was made clear to them that it was a
question of creating a new Europe without future wars, the tendency
of which was characterized by the manner in which Germany had
treated France in the armistice, as well as by the fact that Germany
was dosmg in on Europe's deadly enemy, Bolshevist Russia. The
intellectual group in France had no understanding for this new
Europe. Even if the Eeichsmarschall had the power to sign the
document just submitted in its present form, this would change noth-
ing in this attitude of the intellectuals.
In the further course of the conversation the Reichsmarschall recog-
nized the difficult situation in which Darlan had often found himself
m regard to England, and stressed how glad he had been about
DarJan's order to the French fleet now also to torpedo English ships in
the light of the latest English encroachments. He (the Reichs-
marschall) had seen, in case of good results of this order to shoot, the
possibility for the German side to make a gesture toward France, but
had unfortunately waited in vain for reports of sinkings. Thus it
seemed that the order given by Darlan had simply not been carried
out. Darlan denied this and said that two French submarines in the
vicinity of the Cape of Good Hope had destroyed an English ship.
The French Naval Command had intercepted the SOS signal of an
English freighter and on the basis of the location of this ship had
immediately determined that only a French submarine could be in-
volved in the torpedoing. Naturally, however, they had had to wait
with the official announcement of the report until the submarine com- ^
mander himself, who was en route to Madagascar, submitted an offi- ^
cial report from his port of destination. This had arrived in France
a day and a half ago and confirmed what had just been said.
In the further course of the conversation Goring asked the French-
men repeatedly to tell him specifically what particularly they were
willing to do on their own initiative within the framework of the col- ■
laboration and what thereby would be of a positive advantage for
Germany.
* Document No. 478 and footnote 11.
DECEMBER 1941 919
Moreover the Keichsmarschall pointed out to the French gentlemen
that a stipulation of the armistice, according to which the German
strategic position toward England must not deteriorate in any
circumstances, did not permit anyone who did not want to betray the
Uerman nation to make certain concessions. Hero France had to
understand the difficulties that were based on the fact that the fight-
ing position toward England must not be impaired.
In his reply Marshal Petain pointed out that he was of the same
opinion as Eeichsmarschall Goring concerning the negative attitude
oi the intellectuals in France toward the policy of collaboration with
Germany However, the French Government could gain influence
over intellectual circles only if it had its seat in Paris itself. From
the little provincial town of Vichy it was not possible to influence the
class of scholars and other intellectuals who were concentrated in
i'aris. Besides this, France, by the line of demarcation, was torn into
two parts whereby a uniform position of the French Government was
rendered more difficult.
In this connection Petain also complained about the Paris press
which often criticized the Vichy Government and over which he did
not have the least influence.
Furthermore Petain pointed to the threat to the French colonies by
England, which had already once led to an open attack on Dakar.'
bmce neither France nor Germany had an interest in England's or
Americas taking over the French colonial possessions, particularly in
North and West Africa, France was willing to defend her colonies to
the utmost. For this, however, she had to have permission from
Germany to reinforce her North and West African troops in both men
and material.
In his reply Reichsmarschall Goring agreed with Petain that neither
-trance nor Germany had an interest in letting the English or the
Americans or de Gaulle into Dakar. In order to permit the allevia-
tions of the type mentioned by Petain, however, the leadership of the
German State first had to be told clearly and concisely how the French
visualized the military defense of Dakar.
_ Grand Admiral Raeder, like the Reichsmarschall, had, at a certain
time, greatly supported the defensive intentions of France. Later on,
however, the French themselves had explained that they could bring
only two battalions to Dakar because of bad transportation condi-
tions. In these circumstances, before permitting further alleviations,
Germany had to know precisely just what military plans France had,
for even though Marshal Petain and Admiral Darlan enjoyed absolute
confidence, as already stated, Germany knew on the other hand that
' See vol. xt of this series, document No. 112.
920 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
some of their ministerial colleagues held other views. Germany had
proof at hand, for example, that General Weygand wanted to get con-
cession of the reinforcement of the North African troops only so that
he could establish there a relatively strong force and make it available
to the English at the proper moment. Indeed, he had now with-
drawn ; still, from the conditions described above, there nevertheless
developed the necessity for Germany to approach the question of rein-
forcements very cautiously. The leadership of the State had the re-
sponsibility toward the German people that if Petain and Darlan
should be overthrown by some sort of camarilla the concessions regard-
ing number of troops, stockpiled equipment, pilots, artillery, and
ammunition that had been granted would not be utilized against the
German people by the successors of Petain and Darlan.
Petain replied that he himself, as was known, was a very strong
advocate of the idea of collaboration, but that he did have to say that
so far France had not been informed how she would fit into the new
order of Europe. France was, so to speak, proceeding with closed eyes
into the future. She wanted to know something more about the future
organization of Europe and about the place to be occupied by her. If,
to speak in military terms, one attacked a position, one first had to
define it well and then be clear about the means of attack. Just as for
military procedure, a plan was also necessary for a work of peace such
as the development of the new Europe.
The Reichsmarschall repeated that the French for their part first
had to state exactly just how in detail they envisaged collaboration.
He then gave a short outline of the history of the war, the advanced
position of Poland on the east, the liquidation of the western conti-
nental European position through the elimination of France from the
struggle and the continuation of this fight against England. Perhaps
Germany had spared England too long because she believed the Eng-
lish would possibly still join up. If we had crossed over to England
after Dunkirk, which would have been entirely possible militarily,
since the English did not have any weapons, things would probably
have gone differently. It was certain in any case that England coukk
not hold her European position against Germany.
The Germans had often racked their brains about what hope Eng-
land could really have in continuing the war. American deliveries
had been left out of this because probably England too recognized
what a monstrous bluff these involved. Marshall Petain knew from
his own experience, after all, how unpunc'tual the Americans were
with their deliveries.
Seeking after motives for the continued English resistance it was
discovered in Germany that it was Russia, with which as such there
existed an agreement. The Soviet Union had, however, rearmed to a
DECEMBER 1941 921
really unimaginable extent, which did no't remain concealed from
Germany. The extent of this rearmament, which was now exhibited
in full clarity, was such that if Germany had not marched into Russia
when she did, the Soviet Union would probably have fallen upon
Europe a year later and flattened everything in its path. But Ger-
many had not only learned of the Russian rearmament but had also
obtained knowledge of the Russo-English agreements, according to
which Russia was to be left the eastern part of Europe whereas Great
Britain kept the west as her own domain. From this Germany had
recognized that the Soviet Union represented the greatest danger of
all for the entire European Continent. No military power in the
world, not even the English and French armies of 1939 together with
the American Army would have been in a position to push Russia
back as Germany had done, but they would have been simply run over
by the Russian armored divisions. Only an armed force like the Ger-
man one could dare to take up the fight against the giant, which
proceeded without general staff finesses, to be sure, but was in a position
to put up for every fallen soldier 5 or 10 others at once and for every
lost tank to have 10 new ones on the spot; and which furthermore had
on his side as a main ally the mud and the swamps of the Russian soil.
Germany was now involved in this hard fight, in which America also
supported the Russian side with material; she would fight until she
had gained a complete victory. In this situation she was now sup-
posed to accept certain disadvantages in order to help France defend
her colonies. Where was France's collaboration now? Had the last
man and the last woman in France been brought into production in
order to support Germany at least with material? The French fleet,
most of which was intact, was playing dead. It did not consider
action against England because the French people would not under-
stand this. He (the Reichsmarschall) believed, however, that if their
Government explained to the French people how decently Germany
had acted as an enemy and how indecently England had acted as an
ally in sinking [French] ships and in seizing [French] colonies, they
would be able to understand. The real reason for this lack of support
of Germany by France within the framework of the collaboration was
to be found in the already mentioned fact that the French intelli-
gentsia were hoping for an English victory, still believed in this and
furthermore clung to the fantastic idea that America exercised a de-
cisive influence. Thus it happened that French ships were sunk and
colonies were seized by the English, but even after this France still
maintained the same relations as before with these countries. In
former times France would certainly have replied in quite a different
way to such attacks.
922 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The absurdity to which unilateral collaboration can lead in some
circumstances was demonstrated by the Reichsmarschall -with an
example in connection with the German advance against the Suez
Canal. Germany would reach the Suez Canal in one way or another.
If this were done via the Caucasus and Syria, then according to the
French conception of the collaboration, Syria, which had been con-
quered by the German troops, would be returned without France her-
self having made even the slightest contribution toward regaining it.
When Marshal Petain asked what position France was supposed to
take in the new Europe, then he (the Reichsmarschall) replied that in
the final analysis this would depend on how close the two people came
to one another. He (the Reichsmarschall) had recently spoken, dur-
ing a reception in Berlin, to the delegates of the Anti-Comintern
Powers about a political master book in which Germany would set
down the debits and credits for every country and that he would open
it at the end of the war in order to draw the balance, whereby each
country could see according to the positive treatment of each how
they would be evaluated by Germany. For the rest, Reichsmarschall
Goring concluded his remarks, it was certain that Germany would not
in any circumstances pay for the war. It was in France's interest to
hope that England would be forced to pay. Some country, however,
would certainly have to pay for the war. France, therefore, had a
great interest in the defeat of the Britons and should cooperate
accordingly.
Darlan stated thereupon that he together with Marshal Petain be-
longed to those who recognized that France had lost the war and that
a defeat had to be paid by the defeated. He also recognized that the
armistice conditions had been honorable; otherwise neither he nor the
Marshal would have Stayed in office. He understood too that the war
against England involved certain necessities in the treatment of
France. For a year now collaboration had been established as a pro-
gram by Germany and France. Much of what the Reichsmarschall
had said had already been pointed out in earlier conversations.
France for her part was striving to bring about collaboration with
Germany in the interest of the fight against England.
When, within the framework of these efforts, the note verbale with
the French wishes has been drawn up, this was not so much as to say
that all wishes had to be filled at once and without services in return.
These were rather maximum wishes.
Darlan recalled the conversation at Berchtesgaden 8 after which the
agreement with Warlimont and Abetz had been concluded. 9 He then
spoke at somewhat greater length about the details of the three so-
1 See vol xn of this series, document No. 491.
* See vol xii of this series, docur.ient No. 559.
DECEMBER 1941 923
called Paris Protocols and directed his particular attention to the
final protocol which contains the well-known reservation about
making the harbor of Bizerte available as well as the providing of
escort protection. 10 He stressed thereby that these negotiations laid
down in the above-mentioned protocols were to occur within the
framework of political discussions. The first of these political dis-
cussions had begun only today, however. Nevertheless, France had,
on her own initiative, placed at the disposal of Germany airfields in
Syria for the further flight of the German planes to Iraq," and
through this gesture had clearly oriented French policy toward the
side of collaboration. The result for France had been the loss of
Syria. The French fleet had not been able to leave for Syria because
the secret of the trip had been aired in Wiesbaden, because not enough
fuel could be provided in Greece and because the necessary protec-
tion by the Luftwaffe was lacking, which was too much occupied in
the Russian war." At the moment they were negotiating in Wies-
baden about the providing of harbors in Tunis and the supplying of
the Africa Corps as well as about the chartering of French merchant
ships to Germany. 13 At the same time France knew, however, that
if the harbor of Bizerte were made available to the Germany Army,
the English and Americans would derive from this the right to attack
Dakar, Martinique and Guadaloupe. If reinforcements were to be
permitted for Dakar, then this concession had to be made at least
before the harbor of Bizerte was finally made available to the Wehr-
macht, because otherwise the English would not let any more trans-
ports through to Dakar.
As far as the possibilities of the French fleet were concerned, he
had already explained to General Warlimont that it would rule the
sea for about 8 days, but would then have to yield to the English
who, even though they were much damaged by the Luftwaffe, still
had considerable strength at sea. For the Navy the difficulties
derived from the lack of freedom of movement (in ship transfers the
prior consent of the Armistice Commission had to be obtained), as
well as from the scarcity of fuel, which was gradually making itself
felt after a year of constant readiness.
In the further course of the. conversation Darlan pointed to a trip
through the occupied and unoccupied area of France during which
11 See vol xh of this series, document No. 559.
11 See vol. xir of this series, document No. 475.
™ See documents Nos. 31, footnote 3, and 82, footnote 2.
u In a memorandum of Nov. 29 Pol. I M 3400 g. Rs., Ang. II (898/202160-61)
Grote recorded a message from Wiesbaden according to which military negotia-
tions between Germany and France, on the turning over of French shipping
space for the Axis operations in North Africa, were getting under way. See
La Ditegatton frangaise auprds tfe la Commission allemande d'ArmUtiee, vol v,
pp. 305^306, 329-335, 393-402.
924 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
he had explained to the French population that the only possible
policy for France today consisted in a rapprochement with Germany
and incorporation into the new Europe. He had added that Ger-
many as the most dynamic and numerically strongest nation on the
Continent would naturally lead this new Europe. This idea had
doubtless made progress among the French. When the Reichsmar-
schall complained that the unoccupied area was less favorably inclined
toward collaboration than the occupied area, this was in part owing
to the fact that Germany had deported a lot of Jews into the unoccu-
pied area who could not be sent on from there.
Reichsmarschall Goring replied that when Germany had set down
the armistice conditions of 1940 on a basis honorable for France, this
had not been done so that she could strike a false pose, but because
she wanted to show that hatred and destruction were alien to her
and that she was thinking of a rapprochement with France for the
future, even of a friendship between the two countries. If Germany
had not desired collaboration, then she would have set quite different
conditions. This had to be explained to the French people through
propaganda again and again.
Further, the Reichsmarschall contested Darlan's statement that in
the operation for Syria there had not been any protection provided
for the French fleet by the Luftwaffe. He himself stressed that he
had been in telephone contact with General Dentz for 5 days in
order to declare time and time again his readiness to attack the
English fleet at once wherever it appeared. 11 He had asked only
for airfields or at least landing fields in Syria so that any German
airplanes that had been shot up would not need to go down on the
territory of the English ; inexplicably these airfields had been refused
him by Dentz, and this had naturally and irrefutably resulted in the
impossibility of an intervention by the Luftwaffe.
If Darlan had explained earlier that France, as a result of her
collaboration with Germany in making airfields available to her, had
lost Syria, he could reply to this that England would have attacked
Syria in any case, and only made use of the lie of the apparent presO)
ence of Germans in Syria in order to carry out an attack which had
long been planned.
In Iraq the collapse had come so precipitantly that there was no
longer any time for an effective intervention. Furthermore, in the
land of oil there had surprisingly not been any airplane gasoline
at hand.
"No record of the Goring-Dentz conversation has been found. In telegram
No. 3413 of June 25 from Berlin (386/211121) Abetz informed Schleier that in
a conversation with Goring, the latter had informed him that he was ready to
grant to the French fleet in its operation off Syria all possible protection of the
Luftwaffe.
DECEMBER 1941 925
As regards Martinique and Guadaloupe the Reichsmarschall ad-
vised Darlan to pull out the French ships lying there secretly if at
all possible and have them proceed to Europe or to- Dakar; for,
independently of what France did or did not do there, the Ameri-
cans would in any case occupy the two colonies, whose final fate could
only be decided after the war. 15
The Reichsmarschall returned once more to the question of the
reinforcement of the troops in Dakar, and repeated the remark that
both he and Grand Admiral Raeder had strongly advocated sending
the troops, but learned afterwards that no more than two battalions
could be transported either by ship or overland. Germany had an
interest in the defense of Dakar, and he (the Reichsmarschall) was
willing to help with the Luftwaffe if he was sure that really well-
seasoned troops were fighting in Dakar and not de Gaulle units. As
far as the French fleet was concerned, if employed as a unit it was a
strong element for the security of the African colonial empire, even
against the English fleet, since the latter, which was spread over large
areas, was not so strong as the French evidently assumed.
Regarding Bizerte the Reichsmarschall remarked that he could
understand the French reserve to the extent that he believed that
France could only make a decision in the question of making this
harbor available when it was entirely clear to her that she would,
after all, sooner or later come into warlike entanglements with
England.
Regarding the question of releasing prisoners the Reichsmarschall
remarked that looked at from the propaganda point of view, Germany
could as such do nothing better than to release the French prisoners;
for they were all of them in favor of the collaboration with Germany,
as he had learned in numerous conversations which he had had with
French prisoners. The prisoner question was not to be solved with
sympathies or antipathies, however, but like everything else it had
to be subordinated to the purposes of the war. Only after there
existed a program of industrial deliveries from France could one
speak of the release of prisoners.
After the Reichsmarschall had once more asked the French gentle-
men how they conceived of the details of the defense of Dakar, of
West Africa, and of North Africa, he remarked regarding the last
point that with a failure of the English offensive in Libya the situa-
tion would thereby be considerably alleviated. He remarked that he
would now once more consider at his leisure the document presented
by Darlan in order "to pull the worst teeth," i.e., to strike out the
demands by France which had given him a certain shock. One
jsw 11 A £ ,e , rf , c . ai1 c °ncern about French ships at Martinique and Guadaloupe, see
gomjm Relattons of the United State*. 191,1, vol. ir, pp. 182, 197-198, 1&E&202,
926 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
simply had to proceed a good deal more slowly than the French had
evidently intended.
What was decisive was that the Fuhrer had not sent the Reichs-
marschall to this meeting with Marshal Petain in order to negate col-
laboration. Marshal Petain could see from the fact of this meeting
that Germany was trying to reach a good understanding with France
and was moved by the desire to accord France a worthy place in the
new Europe. The French people, who had created so much that was
great and beautiful, did not need to be concerned that they would not
be accorded the proper place in Europe. Naturally Germany would
take over the leading role in this new Europe ; not so much because
■she would win the present war, but rather because of the basic power
that emitted from a mass of over 100 million Germans who excelled
in organizational talent, courage, and intelligence and were entirely
unified as a nation through National Socialism. Europe was to get a
new appearance, a master's countenance, for it was clear that Europe
with her ancient culture deserved a master's role in the world. In
this new Europe there would be no oppressed, enslaved or partitioned
France.
In conclusion the Reichsmarschall repeated that he for himself
wanted to go through the memorandum once more point for point, but
he asked the French gentlemen to commit themselves to clear, con-
crete matters of collaboration, a collaboration in which Germany could
not onesidedly be the only giving party, but in which each must make
his contribution in the same manner. Above all France also had to
give the assurance that her policy of collaboration was really a con-
tinuing one. For even though Germany had absolute confidence in
Marshal Petain and Admiral Darlan, she still did not know what
attitude possible successors would take.
He (the Reichsmarschall) would now report to the Fuhrer on the
conversation, and he thought it best if the French side would in the
military sector first say exactly how France visualized the particulars
of the defense of her colonial empire. This could be done within the
f ramewrok of a military commission. 16 After that they could take up
other problems.
After the Reichsmarschall had asked about the present whereabouts
of Weygand, and Petain had answered that Weygand was in France
and had been forbidden to return to Africa, the discussion was
concluded.
" In a memorandum of Dec. 4 (898/202127) for Minister Schmidt, Abetz re-
ported a conversation with Darlan in which the latter informed him that
materials relating to the defense of French Africa were being assembled and he
repeated his proposals of German-French military conversations to work oat a
joint plan for the common defense of North and West Africa.
DECEMBEK 1641 927
Following this the Reichsmarschall invited Marshal PStain, Ad-
miral Darlan, and several gentlemen of his entourage to a luncheon.
Schmidt
No. 530
2116/460365-69
Memorandum by the Head of Division WIV of the Eoonomio Policy
Department
Berlin, December 1, 1941.
zu Ha. Pol. 7695^
The Swedish Foreign Ministry, in order to strengthen its negotiat-
ing position toward Germany, recently delivered the enclosed memo-
randum on the services Sweden has rendered so far during the present
war. The compilation shows to what considerable services, particu-
larly in the field of transportation and supplies by water and by
land, it has been possible to press Sweden as a result of the persistent
and difficult negotiations of recent months. Details are given in the
enclosure.
To be submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State
Secretary.
Schnhree
[Enclosure] 5
Stockholm, November 18, 1941.
1) Transportation to and from Norway through Sweden on behalf
of the Wehrmacht applies, as we know, partly to men on leave, partly
and to a lesser extent, to small German troop units for the exchange
of troops between central and northern Norway ("horse-shoe traffic")
and partly to goods of all kinds (war material and other military
equipment) . Since the furlough transports started in July 1940 until
November 1, 1941, a total of about 670,000 members of the Wehrmacht,
that is, an average of about 1,400 men a day, have been transported
through Sweden either to or from Norway or between Trondheim and
Narvik.
At the moment about 30,000 to 40,000 members of the Wehrmacht
(per month) are being transported to Norway and just as many from
Norway, About 1000 to 1500 freight carloads on behalf of the
1 Not found.
"The original was a Swedish document translated into German. The text
printed here is based on the German translation.
928 DOCUMENTS ON GEHMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Wehrmacht are being transported to Norway. A considerable por-
tion of these railroad cars is loaded with military equipment.
2) Transit through Sweden to Finland and back on behalf of the
Wehrmacht applies partly to passengers, partly to goods of all kinds.
For travelers on Wehrmacht missions, special direct cars are being
made available between Storlien and Haparanda via Gallivare twice
a week in either direction. In this way since the outbreak of the
German-Russian war until November 1, 1941, 3,500 German passen-
gers have been transported from Norway through Sweden to Hapar-
anda and 1,600 passengers from Haparanda to Norway.
In the same period 5,000* railroad cars of military material with a
weight of about 75,000 tons, have been routed on behalf of the
Wehrmacht on Swedish railway lines from Germany or Norway to
Haparanda. Of these cars, 2,500 were loaded with war material,
amounting to about 37,000 tons of military equipment shipped'
through Sweden to Haparanda. The shipments of military equip-
ment through Sweden were curtailed only in so far as the capacity
of the Finnish railroads to receive the goods at Tornea made this
necessary.
3) Couriers who travel through Sweden between Norway, Den-
mark, Finland, and Germany on behalf of the Wehrmacht were ac-
corded extensive privileges in passport and visa matters.
4) Since the outbreak of the German-Russian war up to November
10, 1941, 26 German transports with troops and war material, al-
together over 70 German vessels, with a total tonnage of about 420,000
gross tons, have been routed through Swedish territorial waters from
Germany to Finland, under special convoy by Swedish warships and
Swedish planes. The ships were loaded with troops and war ma-
terial and, so far as their safety required it, were conducted through
Swedish inland territorial waters.
5) By special agreement, German military courier planes are flying
across Sweden, both between Norway and Finland and also between
Germany and Finland. In accordance with a special agreement con-
cluded recently,' not fewer than 60 German courier planes per week
may fly over Swedish territory during the winter months. More-
over, German hospital planes fly over Sweden between Finland and
Norway.
6) Since the outbreak of the German-Russian war, approximately
11,000 wounded German soldiers from Northern Finland have been
transported from Haparanda to Oslo on Swedish railroads and partly
on hospital trains made available by Sweden.
7) Sweden has permitted the installation of large transit depots
at Lulea an d the vicinity on behalf of the Wehrmacht. The depots
' See document No. 319 and footnote 4.
DECEMBER 1941 929
consist, among other things, of 6,000 tons of food, as well as fuel, oils,
forage, etc. The German authorities transported goods from these
depots to the German troops in Finland with about 40 trucks.
8) The Swedish Army from its mobilization stocks has placed at
the disposal of the Army of General Dietl 2,000 tents for 25 men each,
with appropriate stoves. 4
9) At the request of the Luftwaffe and the German Army, ap-
proval has been granted for the exportation of 700 trucks and passen-
ger cars and for the hiring of 330 trucks. 4
10) The German-Swedish trade has, as is well known, expanded
considerably since the war. Total sales in German-Swedish clear-
ing amounted in 1938, for example, to 799.7 million kronor; in 1940
to 1,368.1 million kronor, and in 1941 will probably lie between 1,800
and 1,900 million kronor. Since difficulties have arisen in the making
of certain German deliveries in connection with the German-Russian
war, and certain stoppages have occurred in the clearing, the Swedish
Government has approved a clearing credit of 100 million kronor. B
Another consequence of the German-Russian war was the withdrawal
of German tonnage, which normally took care of the major part of
German-Swedish sea shipments, and its utilization elsewhere. In its
place, Swedish tonnage has transported most of the German-Swedish
shipments.
11) During the war in Norway, the harbor of Narvik had been
destroyed quite thoroughly. At the request of Germany, the Swedish
Grangesberg concern repaired in a short time some important sections
of the harbor facilities.
Since it is still difficult to maintain shipping traffic to Narvik on a
sizable scale, the facilitation of ore shipments via Lulea, the second
largest port for the shipment for Lapland ores, was of great impor-
tance. This was made possible on an unexpectedly large scale. Thus
in the current year up to 45,000 tons per day were shipped at times
via Lulea, which was formerly considered impossible.
12) During the year 1941 Sweden delivered the following food
items to Finland : 23,000 tons of grain, 8,400 tons of flour, 3,400 tons
of bread, 6,288 tons of potatoes, 5,264 tons of meat, 1,844 tons of
butter, 460 tons of margarine, 229 tons of sugar, and 500 tons of
molasses.
Finland has also been granted credits, totaling approximately 300
million kronor so far.
13) Since the outbreak of the Finnish-Russian war, Sweden has
delivered the following items of war material to Finland : 8,142,000
* See document No. 418.
" See document No. 347.
882-90B— 64 64
930 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
kroner of ammunition; 2,740,000 kronor of powder; 1,197,000 kronor
of signal equipment, 330,000 kronor of material for the services of
supply and 1,200,000 kronor of other material. 6
' See document No. 41 and footnote 5.
No. 531
852/284539^6
Note Yerbale From, the French Government x
[December 1, 1941.]
1. The French Government has at various times demonstrated its
desire to collaborate with the German Government.
It has taken an unequivocal position :
a. By political actions : Montoire,* Berchtesgaden, 3 and diplomatic
break with Soviet Russia ; *
b. By military actions: Mers-el-Kebir, s Dakar, 6 Nemours, 7 Syria, 8
Djibouti ; B
a. By economic and industrial actions.
2. This policy of Franco-German collaboration has not up to now
met with the unreserved approval of the French people :
a. Because France is suffering from her present lot and is anxious
about her future ;
b. Because up to the present time the French people do not clearly
see the objective toward which they are being led. 10 They have not
been told clearly what they can expect in the future.
'The note was handed to Giiring by Petain when they met at Florentin-
Vergigny on Dee. 1 (document No. 529). Appended to it were ten additional
notes and annexes (852/284547-603) on: Occupation Costa; The Demarcation
Une ; the Ostland Organization ; French Coal Requirements ; French Petroleum
Requirements; Food Deliveries for the Army of Occupation; Previous Deduc-
tions of Vehicles; Transfer of French Railway Rolling Stock to Germany; Pris-
oners of War ; and Reinforcement of French North Africa and of French West
Africa.
The translation of the note verbale is from the French text. A German trans-
lation has been filmed on 852/284444-50.
' See vol. xi of this series, document No. 227.
* See vol. xu of this series, document No. 491.
' Document No. 20 and footnote 3.
' See vol. x of this series, document No. 93.
* See vol. xl of this series, document No. 112.
'A minor naval engagement between French and British forces near Oran
on Mar. 30, 1941, See Zm Delegation frangaise aupres de la Commission alle-
mande A' Armistice, vol. rv, p. 294, footnote 1.
1 See document No. 165.
"In July 1941 the French forces in Djibouti bad declared their allegiance to
the Vichy Government and in spite of a British blockade, refused to surrender ;
tbev held out until December 1942.
"In the German translation (852/284444) there is at this point the extra
sentence : "They have felt no significant improvement in their situation."
DECEMBER 1941 931
To adhere unhesitatingly to the course of collaboration, to stop
"marching in the dark," they have to learn to appreciate through a
number of significant facts that this collaboration will open up new
horizons to them.
. The Fiihrer has told Admiral Darlan that the more he was certain
of the loyal attitude of France toward him, the more he would be
inclined to consent to advantages to our country.
"Give and take," he added, "it isn't haggling but a political
necessity."
Finally, the Fiihrer said, "I have decided to give France an honor-
able place in the European Federation." 1X
3. The Fiihrer on the one hand and the French Government on the
other hand have accordingly agreed to pursue a policy of collaboration.
To implement it in a meaningful way it is necessary to normalize
the present relations between the two countries and to lay the founda-
tions for the future relations.
This implies a far-reaching program, the necessity of which is all
the more imperious in that the risks assumed by France increase day
by day, and after having brought about the loss of Syria the storm
now threatens to engulf Africa.
France wants to defend her empire. But it is necessary for her to
be able to defend it effectively. She will defend it better to the extent
that she is better armed and that she will have the possibility of pro-
viding men, arms, ammunition, fuel, and food for the forces which
will be engaged.
This implies that Germany and Italy will continue to facilitate the
technical reinforcement of our African defenses with our own means,
and then that they will give us the material aid which is indispensa-
ble in order to replace what we have lost in defeat and what the arm-
istice prevents us from producing.
French Africa, through its geographical position, constitutes either
the rear or the flank of the zones of operation of the German Army,
according to the objectives which Germany pursues in Asia or in
Europe.
The maintenance of strategic equilibrium demands that it should
not fall into the hands of the Anglo-Saxons.
The French African Army, reinforced in men and material as will
be specified, will thus find itself in a satisfactory numerical and techni-
cal situation to safeguard French Africa. But it will be necessary
that its action, of prime importance for the destiny of the new Europe,
be sustained by the unanimous spirit of the nation.
In this respect, it would be important that Germany agree to release
the shackles that bind the French Army and that she permit the
11 References to these statements by Hitler have not been found.
932 DOCUMENTS ON" GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
return from captivity of numerous prisoners, in particular the cadres
and troops indigenous to North Africa.
It would likewise be necessary that she consent to a public recogni-
tion of the integrity of the territories of our empire, in accordance
with the declaration made last May 11 by Chancellor Hitler to Ad-
miral Darlan, in the terms of which the Fiihrer declared "that he did
not have any designs on the French colonial empire." 12
4. The necessity of a joint plan appears at least equally important
in order to establish the bases of confidential and stable relations be-
tween Germany and France in the Europe of tomorrow.
France is bold enough to believe that her role in the world will con-
tinue. She feels that in a new Europe she ought to hold the place
which is due to her past, to her influence on certain peoples, and to her
future possibilities.
Germany is about to win the war alone. But she will have to estab-
lish the peace.
The peace can be lost — France herself has had this cruel experi-
ence — if the victor, even though forcing the respect of the other
peoples for his might, and their admiration for the daring nature of
his ideas, does not succeed in obtaining the agreement of their minds
and, in a certain degree, of their ideals.
In approaching Germany and participating willingly in the work
of European reconstruction — in accordance with the spirit of Chancel-
lor Hitler's last letter to the Marshal 13 — France will through her
decision and her example draw along certain reluctant nations of
Europe and America, and at the same time a large part of Africa
and Asia Minor.
This magnificent task, higher and nobler than the simple juxtaposi-
tion of technology and brains, could arouse in our country initiative,
sacrifice, and creative hope.
The prospects which it holds, from the present time, are in any case
such as to counterbalance effectively the opposition which, on the intel-
lectual, sentimental, or material plane would risk keeping the spirit
of collaboration in check for too long.
5. The difficulties of an internal order weigh, however, as heavily
on our immediate future as the external dangers.
And this is why any joint plan must contain for the immediate
future an introduction that is tangible and sensible to all.
The situation would not be well understood if France did not
declare expressly :
" See vol. xii of this series, document No. 491.
M Document No. 460.
DECEMBER 1041 933
a. That she hag the duty to affirm and to confirm the sovereignty
of her Government oyer the entire extent of her territory, 14 which
means : that the line of demarcation is merely the limit of the mili-
tary occupation ; that the prohibited area must return to the general
regulation of the occupied zone; that the organization of the Ost-
land" must be done away with; that the administrative independ-
ence of the French authorities must be expanded in the occupied zone ;
that the organizations not recognized by the Government must no
longer be supported by the occupation authorities.
b. That the liberation of new and important contingents of pris-
oners of war is today indispensable to her ; in particular the farmers,
in whose absence the richest land in western Europe, today cultivated
only by women and children, will not regain its full yield for a
long time.
c. That without irreparable damage to her economy and to her
currency she cannot continue to pay such high occupation costs."
d. That she has the most pressing need of coal and fuel.
e. That she desires a significant reduction in the German advance
claims on her agricultural products in order to permit the minimum
maintenance of her population.
/. That she must obtain the termination of requisitions of motor
vehicles and rolling stock.
6. These requests may appear inconvenient. They are based, how-
ever, upon necessities of the policy which justifies them, and that is
the policy of collaboration.
This policy will not penetrate into the spirit of a population which
has not as yet perceived its results except under the impression of
a splendid revelation of the advantages which it brings.
Solidly applied, the various political, economic, and military meas-
ures which the French Government has the honor to propose to the
German Government will bring about this necessary awakening of
opinion without which everything is rendered difficult, and nothing
useful or decisive can be undertaken.
The grandeur of the decisions at this time must correspond to the
imminence of the dangers which threaten us, as well as to the ampli-
tude of the task which awaits us.
The French Government strongly underlines this necessity.
In requesting a joint plan, both comprehensive and precise, it takes
the liberty of suggesting that this plan be put into eifect as rapidly
and in as practical a manner as possible.
"A separate note on this point was submitted by the French Government;
it has been filmed on 852/284547-*9.
"The Ostland Gesellschaft was a state organization which, under German
direction, expropriated and exploited rural properties in the departements of
Aisne, Nord, Meurthe, Moselle, and Ardennes. The former owners of these
properties were dispossessed and turned into agricultural laborers. See La Dele-
gation frangaise auprda de la Commission allemande d'Armtetice, vol. rv, pp. 188-
193, 332, 342, 345, 361, 386-387.
u On the question of occupation costs see documents Nob. 24 and 222.
934 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
It is entirely ready to study the modalities of it with the least pos-
sible delay."
" In Paris telegram No. 3835 of Dec. 4 (898/292126) Schmidt reported to Rlb-
bentrop that according to Goring, de Brinon had stated that the French Govern-
ment was withdrawing the note which P6tatn had handed to GSring at their
meeting on Dec, 1, See La liiUyatwn francaise aupres de la Commission atle-
mande A' Armistice, vol. v, p. 379.
No. 532
M341/M015341-4S
The Military Attache in Italy to the General Staff of the Army,
AttaohS Department 1
Telegram
chefsache Rome, December 2, 1941 — 2 : 50 a. m.
No. 150113/41 g. Kdos.
By Officer only
The same to Chef OKW; to OKW/L; OKW/Ausland,
The Duce declared to me in. a conversation on the evening of Decem-
ber 1, held in the presence of Colonel General Cavallero, that he
trusted that the battle in the Marmarica would find a favorable out-
come. But no matter how this battle turned out, he had the great-
est fears regarding the further campaign in Libya. The situation
had steadily deteriorated during the last few months so that the send-
ing in of the requisite supplies was scarcely possible. In this situa-
tion he did not know how the losses in personnel and material which
occurred in the battle could be made good, or how new troops could
be transferred. Even the employment of German U-boats, which
in itself was so welcome, and the arrival of the II Air Corps in Sicily *
could not so transform the transport situation that it would be pos-
sible in the long run to keep up the race with the English. He sees
the sole possibility of radically improving the transportation situa-
1 By cover letter ( Abt. L-ZbV No. 442077/41 g. K Chefs, of Dec. 5 : 898/292111)
Genera?. Warlimont sent a copy of this message (898/292112-13) to Ambassador
Bitter in the Foreign Ministry together with Keitel's reply of Dec. 3 to Rintelon
(No. 442051/41 g. Kdos: 898/292114-15) which is summarized in footnote 5.
A copy was also sent of the message (No. 442076/g.K Chefs, of Dec, 5:
898/292116-17) of the German Armistice Commission with France to
OKW/WFSt, Abt. L which is summarized in footnote 4.
Warlimont also forwarded to Ritter a copy of a note of OKW/WFSt., Abt. L,
No. 442079/41 g.K Chefs, dated Dec. 6 (8GS/292118) , recording the receipt of a
message of that date from the German liaison officer in Turin who reported that
a meeting of Ciano with Darlan was scheduled for the next week in Turin.
Oiano intended at that meeting to ask that the Tunisian base be made imme-
diately available.
1 See documents Nos. 433 and 535.
DECEMBER 1041 935
tion only in the free use of the harbor of Bizerte. This question is
so important that one should make significant concessions to the
French for it, 8 such as, for example, the liberation of war prisoners.
This question should be clarified as quickly as possible* because
Bizerte would have to be used even in December. If the French
would not voluntarily concede the use of the harbor of Bizerte, one
would have to take the harbor by force. This is necessary because
the other possibility of decisively influencing the transportation situa-
tion' — the seizure of Malta — is not given. The Duce charged me
expressly to report his view to the Chief of OKW, because he sees
no other possibility to supply Libya and to hold it in the long run
unless as quickly as possible the transport through Tunisia is con-
ceded — at least for trucks with supplies.
After the conversation with the Duce, Colonel General Cavallero
asked me to portray forcibly the necessity of the free transit traffic
over Tunisia as the only solution of the difficult transportation prob-
lem. He added that in his own view the Duce's notion of seizing
Bizerte by force in a given case could not be carried out.
The German General with the Headquarters
of the Italian Armed Forces
* In a supplementary message of Dec. 2, No. 150114/41 g. Kdos. (M341/M015346-
4?) Rintelen reported on Mussolini's political comments which followed his
remarks on the military situation. He suggested it would be appropriate soon
to reach an agreement with France for the future peace. Mussolini stated that
Italy would demand of France only Nice and Corsica, areas which were clearly
inhabited by Italian populations. Tunis and Djibouti were not mentioned in
this connection, Rintelen reported, but it was not clear whether or not Mussolini's
remarks were restricted to the European possessions of France.
4 By a message of Dec. 5, No. 442076/41 g.K Chefs. (898/292116-17) the Ger-
man Armistice Commission with France notified OKW/WFSt, Abt. L of the
receipt that day of a communication from Colonel Manclnelli of the Italian
Armistice Commission with France. Mancinelli explained the urgency of gain-
ing from France the use of the Tunisian base. He stated that the question
was to be taken up In the next few days in a discussion between Ciano and
Admiral Darlan as had been agreed between Kibbentrop and Ciano.
In response the German Armistice Commission informed Colonel Mancinelli of
Keitel's reply to Rintelen, No. 442051/41 g.K Chefs., which is summarized in
footnote 5.
'In a telegram of Dee. 4, No. 442051/41 g.K Chefs. (M341/M015344-45),
Keitel informed Rintelen that the matter had been presented to Hitler. On the
basis of that presentation Rintelen was directed to Inform the Comando
Supremo that the OKW had taken all the measures available to It for securing
the supply traffic between Italy and North Africa. The commitment of the
Second Air Force and increased employment of light ships, it was explained,
was expected gradually to improve the supply situation. Only after the com-
mand of the sea and of the air in the Central Mediterranean had been restored
to the Axis, Rintelen was told, could the French be approached regarding the
use of Bizerte. A premature demand for the harbor, Keitel said, might lead
to English intervention against North Africa without there being adequate
French defensive forces on hand or possibilities of their support by the Axis.
See, further, document No. 557.
936 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 533
261/170408
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Helsinkj, December 2, 1941 — 5 : 25 p. m.
top secret Received December 2—7 : 00 p. m.
No. 1430 of December 2
With reference to my telegram No. 1420. 1
1) The discussions regarding the English ultimatum 2 have been
continued in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Cabinet. Tanner
represented the standpoint that the counterquestions in regard to
Hango, the Rybachi Peninsula, and the further conduct of the Soviets
would have to be brought out in the reply. The majority, however,
were opposed to this. The present draft refers to the last Finnish
answers to England and America 3 and declares at the end that Eng-
land has no political or moral right to declare war on Finland.
2) The Foreign Minister told me that there was no doubt that the
answer to England would be negative but that in view of the feeling
among the Finnish people it would be as mild in its formulation as
possible.*
3) Up to now the American Minister has undertaken no demarche
in support of the English ultimatum."
'In this telegram of Dec. 1 (261/170403) Blucher reported that some of the
nervous members of the Cabinet were worried over the prospect of an English
declaration of war, arguing that the Finnish army for the next few months
would not be in condition for a great offensive. A draft reply had been com-
posed in the Finnish Foreign Ministry but had been rejected by the Foreign
Minister who feared it would be interpreted in the world press as If Finland
sued for a separate peace.
»In telegram No. 1409 of Nov. 29 (261/170387) Blttcher reported that on
Witting's return to Helsinki he was met with the news of a communication from
the English Government in the form of an ultimatum.
In telegram No. 1414 of the same day (261/170388-39) Blucher forwarded
the text In English of the note presented by the American Legation to the
Finnish Government containing the communication from the British Govern-
ment which concluded :
"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in these circumstances
finds it necessary to inform the Finnish Government that unless by December
5th the Finnish Government ceases military operations and further withdraws
from all active participation In hostilities, His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom will have no choice but to declare the existence of a state of
war between the two countries."
Cf. Foreign, Relations of the United States, 19Jfl, vol. i, pp. 108-109.
* See document No. 461 and footnotes 1 and 2.
' See document No. 540 and footnote 5.
' On Dec. 8 in telegram No. 1476 (205/143124) Blucher reported having learned
that the American Under Secretary of State had on the previous aftetnoon told
Proeop6 that Finland's fate would be decided if she were to make further agree-
ments with Germany which was Germany's Intention. Yet Welles stated that
Finland could still save herself if she would quickly conclude operations and
make peace with Russia. In that case, he said, England would be ready to
change her attitude completely.
In telegram 1478 of Dee. 8 (281/170428) Blucher reported that Washington
had brought very strong pressure on Finland in the days preceding the English
declaration of war.
DECEMBER 1941 937
4) Finland has information that according to the views of the
American State Department the leading Finnish circles are divided
on the question of further conduct of the war. 8
5) The Hungarians have told the Finns that Hungary will leave
the English ultimatum unanswered. The Rumanians have explained
that Rumania will reply that there is nothing further to be done in
the matter.'
Blucher
*Cf. Foreign Relations of the United States, 19^1, vol. i, pp. 110-111.
'In telegram No. 3815 of Nov. 4 (260/170296-97) Thomsen had reported from
Washington that it was officially announced in London that the English Govern-
ment was actively discussing with the dominions and with the United States
the Russian demand for an English declaration of war on Finland, Hungary,
and Rumania.
Cf . Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol, i, p. 108.
No. 534
261/170409-10
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 1432 of December 2 Helsinki, December 2, 1941—7 : 45 p. m.
Received December 2 — 8 : 30 p. m.
On the basis of information from Regierungsrat Rieklri, the Foreign
Minister took up with me the matter of Finnish volunteers : 1
1- The volunteers had been told a month and a half ago that their
training was completed and they would how go to the front. Their
departure, however, had been continually postponed. They want to
get out now.
2. At the time a considerable number of Finnish officers and non-
commissioned officers had volunteered, because the impression had
existed that volunteer formations were to have Finnish officers and
non-commissioned officers in part. Now, however, a large number of
the officers were SS officers. The volunteers wanted more Finnish
officers and non-commissioned officers.
3. Four hundred of the volunteers had been ordered to the Viking
Division 2 with the justification that they should obtain war experi-
ence there and then return to the Volunteer Battalion to disseminate
it. Forty of them had been killed in action, 100 wounded. The
remainder now wished to return to the Battalion.
'In telegrams No. 219 of Apr. 4 (260/169932-33) and No. 240 of Apr. 16
(260/169946-47) Blueher reported about the organization of Finnish volunteer
units in the German Army.
•The Wilting Division was the 5th S.S. Panzer Division, organized in January
1940 as a Motorized Division comprising the Germania Regiment of the SS
VerfUgungsdivision and two regiments of Scandinavian, Dutch, and Flemish
volunteers.
938 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The Foreign Minister added that it was desirable that the employ-
ment of the volunteers should not cause dissatisfaction among their
ranks but create a favorable effect like the sharpshooter movement
during the World War. 8
I should like to note that everything that happens in the volunteer
unit influences the morale in the country accordingly. There exists
a political interest in sealing off in time the source of dissatisfaction,
if it is justified.
Please wire instruction. 4
Blucher
* Finnish volunteers served on the German side during the war in so-called
Jaeger battalions.
* No reply to this telegram has been found.
No, 535
8589/E60308T-88
Fiihrer's Directive
chefsache Fuhrer's Headquarters, December 2, 1941.
TOP SECRET MILITARY
The Fiihrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.) No. 441980/41 g.Kdos.
By officer only
Directive No. 38
1. To provide a basis for securing and extending our position in
the Mediterranean and with a view to establishing a center of strength
of the Axis Powers in the central Mediterranean, I herewith, after
consulting with the Duce, order the transfer to southern Italy and
North Africa of contingents of the Luftwaffe units released in the
east, in the strength of one air corps, together with the requisite air
defense elements.
Apart from its immediate effect upon the conduct of operations
in the Mediterranean and in North Africa, the object sought by this
movement is to exert a potent influence on the entire course of future
developments in the Mediterranean theater.
2. I confer command over all the forces to be committed in execu-
tion of this mission to Field Marshal Kesselring, whom I designate
at the same time as Commander in Chief, South [Oberbefehlshaber
Siid'].
His missions are :
To gain air and sea supremacy in the area between southern Italy
and North Africa with a view to establishing secure communications
DECEMBER 1041 939
with Libya and Cyrenaica, and including specifically the neutrali-
zation of Malta.
To cooperate with the German and allied forces committed in
North Africa.
To interdict enemy traffic through the Mediterranean and British
supply movements to Tobruk and Malta, in close cooperation with the
German and Italian naval forces available for that purpose.
3. The Commander in Chief, South is subordinate to the Duce and
receives through the Comando Supremo the Duce's general directives
on the over-all missions. In all matters immediately pertaining to
the Luftwaffe, the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe will com-
municate with the Commander in Chief, South directly, keeping the
High Command of the Wehrmacht informed when questions of basic
importance are involved.
4. The Commander in Chief, South will have under command :
All Luftwaffe forces committed in the Mediterranean and in North
Africa ;
The Italian air force and antiaircraft units made available by the
Italian Armed Forces for the execution of his missions.
5. The German naval forces employed in the central Mediterranean
remain under control of the Commander in Chief of the Navy.
The Commander in Chief, South is authorized, in execution of the
missions assigned to him, to issue directives for the German Admiral
with the High Command of the Italian Navy 1 and also, if the need
arises, to the Navy Group, South (for the eastern Mediterranean).
Orders for action are to be issued by the Navy Headquarters in agree-
ment with the Commander in Chief, South.
The wishes of the Commander in Chief, South for coordination
of joint action with the allied naval forces are to be addressed exclu-
sively to the German Admiral with the High Command of the
Italian Navy.
6. The missions of the Wehrmacht Commander, Southeast 2 and of
the German General with the Headquarters of the Italian Armed
Forces 3 remain unchanged.
Adolf Hitler
1 Eberhard Weichold.
* Field Marshal List. See vol. xn of this series, document No. 609 and docu-
ment No. 326 in this volume.
•General Enno von Eintelen.
940 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 536
83/61463-64
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
U. StS. Pol. No. 1013 Berlin, December 2, 1941.
Brief for Todax'b Visit of Gaylani With the Foreign Minister l
The former Iraq Minister President Kashid Ali al Gaylani called
on me today. It appeared that he has the following principal wishes :
1. He would like to be recognized by us as Minister President and
Foreign Minister of Iraq at once. He does not attach any importance
to having this recognition made public at this time.
It may well be possible to comply with this wish. The only objec-
tion would be that we thereby imitate the English system of the gov-
ernments in exile. This objection, however, could perhaps be put
aside in view of the great importance which Gaylani attaches pre-
cisely to this point. K definite promise ought to be given to Gaylani
certainly only after accord with Italy has been established. 2
2. Gaylani would like to conclude a treaty with us providing for
armed assistance, economic support, participation in the conclusion
of peace, accession to the Tripartite Pact, and a series of similar items
which partly can be fulfilled and partly are incapable of fulfillment.
It is his wish that this treaty be concluded not only with regard to
Iraq but also with regard to Syria and Lebanon as well as Palestine
and Transjordan.* He is also prepared, however, to limit himself to a
German-Iraq treaty. The negotiations concerning such a treaty
would continue the negotiations begun by Minister Grobba in Bagh-
a Therapia telegram No. 126 of Oct. 7 (794/273202) had reported that the
Turkish Government refused to issue an exit visa for Gaylani.
Ankara's telegram No. 1472 of Nov. 17 (83/61953) reported that arrangements
were secretly being -worked out by the Reich Foreign Ministry and the Reich
Main Security Office to get Gaylani out of Turkey by plane.
Telegram No. 330 of Nov. 21 from Istanbul (83/61955) stated that Gaylani
would arrive that afternoon in Berlin but that his arrival was to be kept secret
until Nov. 25 after which "the story is to be circulated that he succeeded by
himself in escaping to Bulgaria via the Black Sea."
According to Grobba's memorandum of Dec. 17 (F7/0291-82) the reception of
Gaylani by Ribbentrop was not until Dec. 16.
*In a letter of Dec. 19 (83/61455) which he handed to Gaylani on Dec. 22,
Ribbentrop expressed the hope that Gaylani would soon be the Minister Presi-
dent and Head of Government of a liberated Iraq. Ribbentrop also stated on
this occasion that the German Government was prepared to discuss with Gaylani
conditions of future cooperation between Germany and Iraq even at this time.
A memorandum by Woermann of Dec. 22 (83/61975) records that the agree-
ment of the Italian Government had been obtained to the text of the letter.
'Gaylani's preliminary draft of such a treaty (71/50972-76) comprised 13
numbered paragraphs.
A memorandum of Dec. 2 by Grobba (71/50971) records that he submitted
the draft to Weizsacker although he found it "technically very clumsy" and In
need of complete revision.
DECEMBER 1941 941
dad in the past. The Foreign Minister has approved earlier that
such negotiations be held and be conducted by Minister Grobba.
3. In the question of an announcement in the press about Gaylam s
presence in Germany, Gaylani wishes to be guided entirely by Ger-
many's wishes. The moment for this presumably has now arrived.
Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State
Secretary. 4
WoERMAHN
'Marginal note In Welasacker's handwriting: "Gaylani made quite similar
statements to me today."
No. 537
2281/482751-67
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
top secret Rome, December 3, 1941 — 2 : 25 p. m.
MOST URGENT
No. 3151 of December 3
For the Foreign Minister personally.
Count Ciano just received me at 12 :30 p. m. and informed me as
follows :
At 11 : 30 a. m., the Duce, in his presence, had received the Japanese
Ambassador 1 who had made the following communication to him :
"At the instruction of my Government 2 1 have the honor to inform
you of the progress of the Japanese-American conversations which
have been under way since the middle of last April. The conversa-
tions have been in progress for about 6 months, during which time
the Japanese Government has always carefully observed the Tripar-
tite Pact, which has become the basis for our unchangeable national
policy, and has made it its task to approach the question of settling
Japanese- American relations in the spirit and according to the stipu-
lations of the Tripartite Pact, making a resolute effort to prevent the
entry of America into the European war.
"Accordingly the present Government has continued the conversa-
tions on thel>asis of justice, thereby preserving the dignity and the
existence of our Empire. Besides certain difficulties, m the course
of which there was also an acute difference of opinion regarding the
question of the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from China and
1 Zenbei Horiklri.
' Cf. Pearl Harbor Attach: Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Inves-
tigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Cong., 1st sess., pt, 12, pp. 204-206.
942 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
from French Indochina, a basic obstacle — if one considers the experi-
ence of the past — is the fundamental and traditional position of the
United States in dealing with international questions. This view
emerged clearly from the Anglo-American conversations in the Atlan-
tic. 8 In other words: America's true intention is to frustrate the
establishment of the new order in Asia and in Europe — which is being
promoted by Japan, Italy and Germany and which is the purpose
of the Tripartite Pact — and to place obstacles in its way; and they
dare to say that friendly relations between Japan and America are
impossible as long as Japan maintains the alliance with Italy and
Germany. With this in view it was proposed to ask Japan to aban-
don the Tripartite Pact. Since this became clear in the last phase
these last few days the Japanese Government is compelled to realize
that further conversations are of no use.
"The proposal which the American Government advanced on
November 26 * revealed its attitude still more clearly, and in particu-
lar it advanced the provision that it should be agreed that the basic
purpose of this agreement was not contradictory to any existing agree-
ment between one of the two Governments and a third state for main-
taining the peace in the entire sphere of the Pacific*
"This had the purpose, in accordance with their intention, of
committing us in regard to the interpretation of the obligations im-
posed on us by the Tripartite Pact and to force Japan to refrain from
accepting the support of Italy and Germany if America should enter
the European war,
"This provision alone, without speaking of other questions, indi- ■
cates to the Japanese Government that the American proposal cannot
be taken as the basis for conversations.
"Moreover, it is clear that in the course of the conversations the
American Government frequently negotiated with Great Britain,
Australia, Holland and China. From this one can be certain that
the American Government, ] ike the countries mentioned above, regards
Japan with the same hostility with which it regards Italy and
Germany."
The Ambassador added ,to these statements that the outbreak of a
conflict of Japan with the United States and thus also with Great
Britain was now to be regarded as possible and imminent. On the
basis of the foregoing statements the Japanese Government, refer-
ring to the relevant clause of the Tripartite Pact, requests that the
Italian declaration of war follow immediately. It requests further
that an agreement be signed on the basis of which the two Govern-
ments obligate themselves not to conclude either an armistice or a
separate peace with the United States and likewise, not with the Brit-
1 See document No. 209, footnote 2.
* See document No. 524, footnote 3.
■For the actual text of that part of the American proposal which Is apparently
referred to, see Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 19Sl~19\l, vol. n,
p. 770.
DECEMBER 1941 94L
ish Empire. The Ambassador added, that a similar request was simul-
taneously being addressed the Reich Government. 8
The Duce replied to the Ambassador that the Japanese communica-
tion did not surprise him in any way, as he had carefully followed the
progress of the Japanese-American conversations conducted through
Admiral Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu. The Italian Ambassador
in Washington, 7 who had followed the conversations on the spot, had
confirmed him in his conviction that as a result of the intransigent
attitude of the United States and Roosevelt's determination to unleash
the war, the negotiations could not come to a good conclusion-
Roosevelt could not recognize Japan's political principles in so far
as that country made it its task to establish a new order in Asia and
had already laid the foundations for this new order, whereas the
American plutocracy was striving to regard Asia as its own area
of exploitation.
The Duce, who knew the pride of the Japanese people, had always
been convinced that all of the attempts of the United States to sep-
arate Japan from the powers of the Tripartite Pact would remain
fruitless. Having said this beforehand the Duce had stated: Italy
will do everything to contribute militarily to the success of that
struggle which Japan is preparing to begin against the United States
and the British Empire, and she will do this particularly by tying
down the largest possible number of British naval units in the Medi-
a No documents concerning this parallel Japanese demarche in Berlin have
been found in German Foreign Ministry files. This gap In the documentation
can partly be filled, however, from testimony and evidence submitted to the
International Military Tribunal for the Far Bast and from intercepted Japanese
telegrams printed in the record of the hearings before the Joint Congressional
Committee investigating the attack on Pearl Harbor,
In his testimony given at the proceedings (International Military Tribunal
for the Far East, Proceedings, pp. 34033-35) Oshima declared that he made his
demarche with Ribbentrop on Dec. 2, thus correcting the date of his demarche
given as Dec. 1 In his telegram to Tokyo (International Military Tribunal for
the Far East, exhibit 605, transcript pp. 6654-56) .
In his testimony at the proceedings Oshima Stated that Ribbentrop asked
him whether there would be a war with the United States. The telegram to
Tokyo does not report such an inquiry by Ribbentrop whiie mentioning that
Gaus, who was also present, asked whether the obligation regarding participa-
tion in the war against the United States was to be mutual, a question which
Oshima answered in the affirmative. The telegram to Tokyo also reports that
Oshima exnressed the view that a joint declaration by Japan, Germany, and
Italy wou'd be more effective politically than a Japanese-German and a Japanese-
Italian declaration issued separately.
The two accounts of Oshima agree in that Ribbentrop stated that, before giv-
ing a reply, he would have to consult Hitler who was at the front and with whom
he could not get in touch at the moment.
In a subsequent meeting In the afternoon of Dec. 3 Ribbentrop again told
Oshima that he had been unable to get in touch with Hitler but that he would
try to reach him at headquarters the next day. While he himself was in agree-
ment with the Japanese proposal and believed that Hitler would be, too, no
official reply could be made until Hitler had given his approval (Pearl Harbor
Attack, pt. 9, p. 4200). See. further, document No. 546.
' Ascanio dei principl Colonna.
944 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY,
terranean. At present about one third of the English naval forces
were being tied down in the Mediterranean by the Italian naval units,
and the organization of a bloc of Italian-German air and naval forces
was in progress which would force the English to increase their naval
forces in this sector even more.
The Duce also says that he is willing to sign the agreement pre-
cluding the conclusion of an armistice or a separate peace. But
regarding this point as well as regarding the declaration of war he
intended to consult with the Reich Government and bring his own
actions into harmony with those of the latter. Nevertheless, he had
added that, as far as Italy was concerned, he had no objection to a
declaration of war on the United States, particularly as that country
was actually in conflict with Italy even at this time; indeed, in the
present battle in the Marmarica a number of American officers who
were with the British troops had been taken prisoner.
Count Ciano asked me to pass on at once to Berlin the foregoing
communications, which I am sending in translation on the basis of
an Italian memorandum given me, 8 and to request your position both
on the question of the declaration of war and of the pact requested
by Japan.
I shall transmit with the next telegram 9 the text of the proposal
for such an agreement handed the Duce by the Japanese Ambassador
here. 10
Mackensen
*Not found in German Foreign Ministry files, Apparently this is the mem-
orandum printed in Galeazzo Ciano, L'Europa verso la catastrofe, pp. 694-697 ;
see also The Ciano Diaries, entry for Dec. 3, 1941.
•No. 3152 of Dee. 3 {2281/482758). The substance of the Japanese proposal
which is in French in the original reads as follows :
"The two Governments agree not, to conclude any armistice or peace either
with the United States of America or with the British Empire, their common
enemies, without complete agreement between themselves."
For a complete text of the Japanese draft proposed, see Galeazzo Ciano,
L'Europa verso la catastrofe, p. 696, footnote 1,
**Cf. the Japanese Ambassador's account of this demarche printed in Pearl
Harbor Attack, pt. 12, pp. 228-229.
No. 538
4927/E25 8372-79
The Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the
Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry
confidential Belgrade, December 3, 1941.
Pol. S No. 2 Pol. IV 6459 g.
Subject : The situation in Serbia.
I. Military
II. Administrative
III. Prospects
DECEMBER 1941 945
The successful conclusion of the operations against the communist
bands operating in the areas of Cacak and TJzice, which had their
main bases in these cities, represents an important stage in the sup-
pression of the insurrection in Serbia. After the Plenipotentiary
Commanding General, 1 as his first action after assuming command,
had deprived the rebels of an important supply base by mopping up
the area around Sabac in the Sava-Drina bend and had further driven
them out of the Cer mountains, the capture of TJzice is a new heavy
blow that has fallen on the actual base of the communist resistance.
The victory, which cost the enemy more than 1,500 dead, was bought
with very few casualties of our own. The operations are being con-
tinued successfully toward the south. Today our troops have al-
ready reached Raska and are advancing on Novi Pazar, so that this
area of unrest, too, is approaching pacification. The impression made
by these successes is strong all over the country. It would be
greater still if a considerable portion of the communist bands had
not slipped out of the threatened encirclement and escaped to Croatia.
The open border toward Croatia is one of the greatest difficulties
with which the fight against the rebellion in the Serbian area has to
cope. Full pacification is possible here only if quiet is restored
everywhere in Croatia, too, and the border between the two coun-
tries is closed off.
While the Plenipotentiary Commanding General was carrying out
the operations in the west, Minister President Nedic, in full accord
with him, contributed very essentially with the Serbian gendarmerie
and the volunteers in numerous small engagements and mopping-up
actions to putting down the uprising in central Serbia and in the
northeastern part of the country. A rough mopping-up operation
was carried out in these areas, too. The Serbian auxiliary forces have
shown themselves to be exceedingly useful and skillful in this respect
and have proved their reliability. What they achieved is to be ap-
preciated all the more since in numbers and in their armament they
cannot, of course, be compared with German troops, and they were
often inferior in this respect even to the rebels. The bloody losses
which they have so far inflicted upon the rebels are probably about
as large as those the German troops have inflicted upon them. On
the. other hand the losses of the Serbian gendarmerie and volunteers
are considerably larger than the German losses.
Although according to the foregoing the military situation in Ser-
bia can be termed satisfactory at the present time, the country is
still far from any real pacification. Up till now only the large com-
1 General Franz Bobme ; see document No. 320.
In November 1941 General Paul Bader succeeded BBhme.
682-905—64 65
946 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
munist bands have been defeated and the main communist bases taken.
However, one cannot speak of an annihilation of the enemy. In
many places there are still small bands roving about, attacking vil-
lages and isolated police units and interfering with the traffic on the
roads and railroads. Furthermore there exists in the person of Colo-
nel Draza Mihailovic a rallying point for all insurgents with national-
ist leanings. This person, who is said to have his headquarters in
the mountains between Cacak and Valjevo in the village of Ravna
Gora, has not many followers any longer, but should nevertheless not
be underestimated, since many nationalistically minded Serbs sympa-
thize with him. Whereas the communist bands get their instructions
from Moscow, with which they are in connection not only by radio but
also by courier via Bulgaria — probably through the Soviet Legation in
Sofia — Colonel Mihailovic" is the exponent of King Peter and the
Simovic Government in London and is being supported particularly
by the radio there and in the one of Boston. True, at the present
moment he does not present any acute danger, particularly as he has
become an enemy of the communists, with whom he at first cooperated,
and is indeed fighting them. In the long run, however, he might
become dangerous.
II
It is evident from what has been said that thorough measures are
Btill needed in order really to pacify Serbia, These measures, to be
sure, will have to be more in the sphere of the police than in the
military field. In particular it is necessary to establish again a dis-
ciplined administration all over the country and to comb through
systematically, thoroughly, and continuously the areas which had
been roughly cleaned up in order to remove all undesirable elements
and force the surrender of arms. What is necessary is demonstrated
by the example of the city of Belgrade, where an energetic police
chief has seen to it that so far tranquillity has never been seriously
disturbed, although at any other time Belgrade has been the focus
of the unrest in the country, and although the population is freezing
and starving. Here, however, it has been possible to maintain tran-
quillity and order through disarmament of the inhabitants, con-
stantly repeated searches for communists, severe actions against Jews,
Freemasons and anti-German elements from the old political parties
of Yugoslavia and through the arrest of numerous hostages. Similar
measures are necessary for the whole country so as to put through
a real pacification and to prevent the insurrection from breaking out
anew in the spring. Certainly much has already been done in this
respect, as is indicated alone by the number of executions which have
probably exceeded 20,000 at the present time. But there is still much
to be done.
DECEMBER 1041 947
The question is who is to do it, Germans or Serbs, It would be in
the interest of the Reich to leave the carrying out of the necessary
operations largely to the Serbs, in order to save her own forces. A
prerequisite for this is that one trust them sufficiently. In this re-
spect it can be said today after General Nedic has been Minister
President for three months that so far he has justified the trust placed
in him. Called upon at the most difficult time, he has proved to be
resolute and of firm character in carrying out the thankless task once
he undertook it. Unperturbed by all the hostility, unshaken by the
abuse that comes from London, this old soldier goes his difficult way.
Today he is so much identified with Germany in the eyes of the Ser-
bian people that it is hardly possible for him any more to abandon
this line. He has shed Serbian blood in fratricidal struggle, and with
this his position is fixed once and for all. In his government there
are men such as Minister of the Interior Acimovic', who is an experi-
enced police expert and for many years has taken entirely the German
line ; also Minister of Economics Olcan, a follower of Dr. Ljotic - , who
as minister has himself often fought successfully at the head of volun-
teer units against the communist bands; and Minister of Education
Professor Jonic, who through the new university law has made an
important contribution to the clean-up of academic life in Serbia
which had been infected for a long time. Furthermore the Nedic
Government can rely upon the support of the Ohetnik leader Pecanac,
who has led a large number of these volunteers to the cause of tran-
quillity and order. Also to be mentioned, and not in the last place
either, is Dr. Ljotic, leader of the "Zbor" movement, who has not joined
the government himself, to be sure, because he is evidently keeping
himself in reserve for a later time, but who has made available a num-
ber of his followers for important ministerial posts and has placed
his authority in the scales in favor of General Nedic. Dr. Ljotic, the
old enemy of the communists, Freemasons and Jews in Serbia,
represents a moral force which must not be underestimated. He is
therefore particularly valuable to the Nedic Government, to which he
has also made available numerous volunteers from his movement.
Ill
If one surveys all of these forces one can say without exaggeration
that they doubtless represent the best that this country possesses in
the way of men in public life. They are the nucleus for the estab-
lishment of a new Serbian nation that has learned from the mistakes
of the past and seeks its course in the direction which the German
Reich has indicated. To be sure, the good elements are still weak in
this country, and it would be desirable to reinforce them from the
ranks of those who are at present sitting idle in German prisoner of
war camps. There are still numerous men there who are indispen-
948 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
sable for the work of reconstruction here. The problem is simply to
choose the right ones.
Although it is hardly possible today to predict how things will
develop here in Serbia, one can nevertheless determine that a begin-
ning has been made in the right direction. The credit for this belongs
to a large extent to Minister President JNedic, and one can therefore
justify giving him the trust which he needs in order to continue his
work successfully. It is self-evident that such trust must not be blind
and that under the existing war conditions a German force capable
of putting down at once any new major attempt at insurrection must
remain in such a restless country as is Serbia. 2
Feine
s Copies of this dispatch were sent on Jan. 12, 1942, for purposes of information
to the Embassy in Italy, to the Legations in Hungary, Rumania, Slovakia,
Bulgaria and Croatia and to the Reich Plenipotentiary in Athens.
No. 539
64/4471 6-17
The Charge d? Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 4242 of December 3 Washington, December 4, 1941 — 2 : 00 a. m.
Received December 4 — 2 : 45 p. m.
At a time when practically the entire American press points out
in alarmist articles every day that the issue of war or peace between
America and Japan is on the knife's edge, it is worth while by con-
trast to recapitulate briefly once more the considerations arguing
against an American-Japanese' war. These considerations have re-
ceived recognition in important quarters ; similarly, it is known that
Japan has no intention of attacking the United States. The continu-
ing press campaign is nevertheless being directed from above with the
two familiar considerations in view, to gain time for one's own prep-
arations and to intimidate Japan.
1. The outbreak of a war between America and Japan would in
all probability also mean war between America and Germany. The
country is unprepared for such a two- front war, Mr. Knox's claim to
the contrary notwithstanding.
2. An American-Japanese war at the present time would be hard
to take for England and Russia from the standpoint of their material
situation. It would mean a drastic cut in lend-lease aid to both na-
tions as a result of the American requirements for carrying on the
war in the widest sense; the closure of the port of Vladivostok to
American supplies; and likewise as a result of disruption of the ship-
DECEMBER 1941 949
ping route to the Persian Gulf. Over against these facts, which are
of vital importance especially to English war operations, the psycho-
logical value of America's entry into the war must take second place.
3. A war with Japan, contrary to the views of frivolous American
"experts", is no walk-over. It might drag on indecisively for years,
especially if America has to fight simultaneously in the Atlantic. The
supply of raw materials essential for armaments, without which
America's industry and economy cannot live and for which ersatz
could not be developed for several years, would be materially handi-
capped or perhaps even endangered.
4. The attitude of the Latin American countries, in the event of
the outbreak of an American-Japanese war, is viewed here as being
uncertain.
It is not believed that in order to please America these countries
would be readily inclined to break off their relations with Japan.
Thomsen
No. 540
261/170418
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Helsinki, December 4, 1941 — 2:05 p.m.
top secret Received December 4 — 2 : 45 p. m.
No. 1450 of December 4
1) Day before yesterday and yesterday the Foreign Minister took
up the English ultimatum * with the Foreign Affairs Committee of
the Cabinet z and with the Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament.
With both bodies he took as his point of departure a report on his
trip to Berlin 8 which quickly created a good atmosphere. Follow-
ing this he discussed the Finnish reply to England. The reply was
approved unanimously.
The Foreign Minister told me that he had never had so good a
hearing and that he had never seen the Parliament so unanimous.
2) According to the information of the Foreign Minister the reply
is very polite in order to take account of feeling in the country and
in order later to be able to place the blame for a declaration of war
on England alone. 4 It takes over a passage from Mannerheim's order
1 See document No. 533 and footnote 2.
' See document No. 533.
* See document No. 507.
' In telegram No. 1480 of Dec. 5 (261/170424) BlUcher reported that Witting,
jn giving him the text of the Finnish reply, let it appear that he would prefer
it if England refrained from a declaration of war.
950 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
of the day of November 30 that the Finnish Army does not hare
much remaining in order to achieve its strategic aim.
The Foreign Minister was rather undecided toward us whether the
passage in the order of the day, which was composed during his
absence, was very happily phrased. He felt, however, that after it
had found acceptance in the order of the day it could scarcely fail
in the reply.
The reply will possibly be handed to the American Minister this
evening" and then given to me tomorrow morning. 8 Please do not
urge that it be given to us earlier because the Foreign Minister wishes
to protect himself against renewal of the assertion that the reply was
not composed in Helsinki but in Berlin. 7
Blucher
6 The American Legation received a note comprising the Finnish reply to the
British Government at 6 : 00 p. m„ Dec. 4. See Foreign Relations of the United
States, 191,1, vol. I, pp. 113-114.
"In telegram No. 1459 of Dec. 5 (261/170422-23) Blucher reported the text
of the note.
* In telegram No. 1467 of Dec. 6 (261/170426) Blucher reported that the Eng-
lish declaration of war on Finland had been received with the state of war
beginning at 12: 01, Dec. 7.
Cf, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. i, pp. 114-115.
In telegram No. 1475 of Dec. 8 (261/170427) Blucher reported that the Fin-
nish people accepted the English declaration of war with a feeling of regret,
yet with equanimity and determination. For several days they had been pre-
pared by the English radio for the declaration but this had now been overshad-
owed by developments In the Far East.
No. 541
64/44723-24
The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Washinqton, December 4, 1941 — 4 : 05 p. m.
No. 4260 of December 4 Received December 5 — 2 : 45 a. m.
The publication on December 4 in the Chicago Tribune and the
leading isolationist Washington newspaper, the Times Herald, of the
secret report of the American High Command to the President about
the preparations and prospects for the defeat of Germany and her
allies, is causing a sensation here.
DECEMBER 1941
951
This secret report is doubtlessly an authentic war plan drawn up
at Roosevelt's request. 1 It probably served as the reason for the
special Cabinet meeting about which I reported in my No. 3545, of
October 14. 2
The report confirms in its essentials the known fact that a full com-
mitment of American combat power is not to be expected before
July 1943.
The view constantly put forth by Lindbergh, Hoover, 3 and the
other leaders of the opposition is now also corroborated by the Ameri- v
can High Command; namely that Germany can be conquered neither
by dollars, American bombers, nor by American subversive propa-
ganda, but at the most only by an American expeditionary force of
several million men; and that activating it, arming and transporting
it, would require enormous sums of money and would be attended by a
serious shock to the American economy.
The Anglo-American thesis that a war of starvation against Ger-
many would suffice, is refuted, and the propaganda theme that Roose-
velt merely wanted to do away with the "Nazi regime" in order to
bestow upon the German people the blessings of the Four Freedoms
is demolished.
Military measures against Japan, in the presentation of the High
Command, would be of a defensive character. Japanese policy is
thus justified in concluding that America will, in the event of a two-
ocean war, make its main offensive effort in the direction of Europe
and Africa.
The elimination of the Soviet Union as a fighting power by the
summer of 1942 at the latest and the collapse of the British Empire
are soberly included in the calculations of the American General
Staff so that the publication of the document will hardly cause any
special rejoicing among the allies. To be sure, the High Command
characterizes the continued preservation of the British Empire as one
of America's most important war aims, an admission which the non-
interventionist opposition will not fail to note.*
Thomsew
1 Of. Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations In
the series United. States Army in World War II: The War Department (Wash-
ington, Government Printing Office, I960), pp. 358-360.
"This telegram (1857/422151-52) reported about a Cabinet meeting on Oct. 10
allegedly convoked by Roosevelt to deal with an inquiry from Churchill on
"whether the U.S.A. would be prepared to support militarily an invasion of the
continent especially by relieving the English fleet operating in the Atlantic."
' Herbert Clark Hoover, President of the United States, 1929-1933.
* A somewhat more detailed account of this matter was given by the Military
Attache in telegram No. 4260 of Dec. 4 (64/44725-27) .
952 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 542
835/240107-08
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry
Berlin, December 4, 1941.
zu Pol. Ill 2415. 1
With reference to St.S. No. 755 of November 11 2 and memorandum
Pol. Ill 2368 of November 28. 3
The competent official in the Eastern Ministry, 4 Herr Dudzus, who
has no deputy, has been absent for several days. However, the fol-
lowing could be ascertained from Herr Schiitte (Eastern Ministry)
and Herr Frank (Dienststelle Kosenberg), who works together with
Herr Dudzus in church matters :
1. The actual reason for the denial to Catholic priests of permission
to enter into the formerly Russian area is the circumstance that the
Catholics in working in the formerly Russian area should not consider
it as new territory.
2. According to a general directive the entry into the formerly
Russian area is prohibited. If nevertheless a few Orthodox priests
have returned or will still return to this area, these are exceptional
cases that cannot provide any claim as precedents.
3. In the formerly Russian area there is a very great scarcity of
Orthodox priests. On the other hand there are relatively a great
many Catholic priests, especially in Lithuania, available for taking
care of the Roman Catholic population. If therefore a few Orthodox
priests are permitted to enter into formerly Russian areas this was
objectively quite justified. Furthermore there were no longer any
Catholics in the old Soviet areas.
4. Herr Frank pointed out that Orthodox and Catholic priests had
been able for a time to enter the occupied Russian area with the per-
mission of Wehrmacht authorities who had, however, not been compe-
tent in this matter. At the instruction of the Eastern Ministry these
priests had been again expelled from these areas.
1 Pol. Ill 2415 : Not found.
' In this memorandum (535/240099) Weizsacker recorded a visit of the Nuncio
who stated that he had learned that some 20 Orthodox priests had been admitted
into occupied eastern territory but that about that same number of Catholic
priests of Latvia and Lithuania had been refused permission to return to the
Russian area.
* In this memorandum (535/240104^-105) Haidlen recorded that according to
the competent official in the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories,
there existed a different policy for the return of Catholic and Orthodox priests.
This was necessary, it was recorded, "in the interest of the general peace."
'Eastern Ministry (Ostministerium) a shortened form for the Reich Ministry
for the Occupied Eastern Territories. See document No. 119.
DECEMBER 1941 953
5. Herr Frank stated that he would see that the question of admis-
sion of Orthodox priests into the eastern area would be reviewed by
the Eastern Ministry.
The question of the reunification of the Eastern Church with Rome
or rather the regaining of the Orthodox Catholics for the Roman
Church has for centuries been one of the most important questions the
solution of which has occupied Vatican policy. The Nuncio will for
this reason probably give the present matter his special attention. It
is therefore advisable not to let the Nuncio see the real reason men-
tioned under (1), but to inform him in the sense of the statements
made under (2) to (4). Furthermore it would probably be well to
tell the Nuncio that the inquiries about the matter have not yet been
concluded.
Submitted herewith to the State Secretary through the Dirigent
of the Political Department and the Under State Secretary.
Fischer
No. 543
S281/482TB9-60
Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Itah/
Rome, December 4, 1941.
During my visit today with Marchese d'Ajeta 1 he brought up the
Japanese Ambassador's demarche with the Duce yesterday, 8 and in-
formed me that according to his information they intended in Berlin
first to review very carefully the reply to be made to Japan. As
Anfuso, whom I met later, told me, a telegram from Alfieri was re-
ceived here according to which the German Government was of the
opinion that a very grave reply was involved which one first had
thoroughly to consider." Marchese d'Ajeta said further that the
Japanese Government, which had so far not yet been handed an
ultimatum by the American side, first intended to obtain the firm
promise of Germany and Italy in order thereby to get carte blanche,
so to speak, for its actions without having precisely defined how it
visualized them. The suddenness of the Japanese step was all the
more remarkable in that the Japanese Government had so far cau-
tiously avoided informing the two Axis Powers about the course of
the Japanese-American negotiations. In his opinion it was neces-
sary to point out to Japan that she should not assume the war guilt
1 Chef de Cabinet to Count Ciano.
3 See document No. 537.
s See document No. 537, footnote 6. Cf . The Ciano Diaries, entry for Dec. 4,
1941.
954 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
by a declaration of war on America on her own initiative; rather,
by a delaying policy on the part of Japan the American Govern-
ment, for its part, should be forced to reveal its true colors. It
seemed very doubtful to him whether America would take the initiative
in declaring war on Japan if the Japanese reply to the American in-
quiry were delayed. He therefore understood very well that Germany
wanted to examine her answer to Japan very carefully.
When I said, somewhat surprised, that the Italian Government after
all, had given its full agreement with the Japanese procedure without
further ado, Marchese d'Ajeta remarked smilingly that this had been
Count Ciano's idea.
Marchese d'Ajeta added that opinions in the Palazzo Chigi were
very divided as to whether it would be more advantageous for us if
a Japanese-American conflict should now develop or whether the
present latent situation should continue. There were many who be-
lieved that the outbreak of the conflict would force America to con-
centrate so much on the Pacific that it would slow down the supply
of the European theaters of war with American war material. He
personally was not of this opinion, however, but believed that Amer-
ica's entry into the war with Japan and subsequently with Germany
and Italy would represent a substantial worsening of conditions in
comparison with the present situation.
Bismarck
No. 544
4865/E249680-82
The High Commissioner of the Reich Government for the South
Tirolese Resettlement to the Ambassador in Italy
Bolzano, December 4, 1941.
Dear Hbrr Ambassador : As you foresaw, Count Ciano, during his
recent visit in Berlin, did not mention anything to the Reich Foreign
Minister about an Italian wish regarding the accelerated resettlement
of the optants from six specified communities of the Alto Adige. 1 M.
Podesta, however, took up the matter again. At his suggestion it was
made the subject of a conversation to which I also invited Dr. Luig *
and Dr. Helm. 8 It developed that for technical reasons the emigra-
1 For Ciano's visit to Germany see document No. 522.
"Dr. Wilhelm Luig, Leader of ADEuRSt (Amtliche Deutsche Etfn-und
Riickwandcrorstclle : Official German Agency for Immigrants and Repatriates)
with its main office in Bolzano.
* Dr. Robert Helm, President of the German-Italian Commission for Evalua-
tions, with its main commission in Bolzano.
DECEMBER 1941 955
tion of the optants can be carried out in the course of a few weeks in
only two of the communities concerned. Signor Podesta finally ob-
stinately insisted on the emigration of the optants from Vadena. He
pointed out that only seven property owners there come into question
for resettlement, and that the appraisal and emigration could proceed
without further ado since the village 5 km. south of Bolzano lies on
the snowless plain. Dr. Luig pointed out that the seven property
owners in Vadena also have a contractual right to be placed as a
group in the resettlement area. He offered, since the resettlement
area is not yet known, to ask the seven property owners whether they
will allow themselves to be settled voluntarily somewhere in Germany.
After the meeting Signor Podesta asked me for a private conversa-
tion. He told me that, as the Vadena case made particularly clear,
the resettlement had arrived at a stalemate. 4 He emphasized that
matters could not continue in this way ; he asked me to bring to the
attention of the Reich Foreign Minister at once, if possible, the neces-
sity of now finally designating a settlement area in the Reich, where
there was really room enough. The radical ethnic solution had to be
carried out and taken in hand energetically in the entire treaty area,
he continued, also with regard to the peasants.
I replied to Signor Podesta that his desire for the implementation
of the radical ethnic solution fully coincided with my instructions and
with my efforts; he was doubtless aware, however, I told him, that
now when the war — e.g., also in North Africa — was still in full swing,
the Reich Government could not designate the settlement area from
one day to the next.
Herr Ambassador, I have been waiting for such language from
Signor Podesta ; what surprised me was that he let the cat out of the
bag this soon. Whether the Italians really desire the radical ethnic
solution as regards the peasants, too, need not be investigated in this
context. What is significant is that Signor Podesta wants to push
the German side to apply for a moratorium in regard to implementing
the resettlement for the duration of the war. What he is doubtless
interested in is in obtaining a temporary solution of the problem
with favorable conditions for the Italians, which the Italians have al-
ready been on the point of proposing on their own initiative a number
of times.
* In telegram No. 2641 of Oct. 21 (4865/E249617-10) Mackensen reported a
discussion with Buffarini on the resettlement of the South Ttrolese. He re-
marked that Mussolini had stated that the resettlement was 2 months behind
the schedule suggested by Grelfelt.
956 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
It is not known whether the impulse to drive matters to a head
originates with Signor Podesta, alone. In any case I thought I should
inform you about this outpost engagement.
I have informed Under State Secretary Woermann by means of
an appropriate letter. 8
With the best regards, etc. Mayk-Falkenberg
5 In his reply of Dec. 8 (4865/E24K682) Mackensen wondered how Woermann
would respond. He felt that Mayr-Falkenberg and he should merely push the
problem to the top authorities.
No. 545
32/25043-44
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Tokyo, December 5, 1941 — 1 : 00 a. m., summer time.
No. 2657 of December 5 Received December 6—12 : 55 p. m.
For the Foreign Minister.
I have learned from the Foreign Ministry strictly confidentially
that the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26 1 is not
supposed to have been sent yet. The reply is expected to be calm but
firm in tone and to state that American principles are not applicable
to the Far East. It is anticipated that the United States will then
break off the negotiations. In reply to Secretary of State Hull's oral
question to the two Japanese Ambassadors about the purpose of the
Japanese preparations in Indochina they have been instructed to say
that the Japanese Government is making preparations necessitated by
Chinese troop concentrations in Yunnan. The preparations, more-
over, do not go beyond the framework of the treaty arrangements
with France, 2 as Vichy, too, has in the meantime stated. My in-
formant remarks with reference to this that a limitation of the number
of troops, namely to 25,000, applies only to northern Indochina,
whereas no upper limit was fixed by treaty with regard to the south.
In the Foreign Ministry they are now trying to impress on us
Japan's determination to take countermeasures against the encircle-
ment. Thus the Italian Embassy, which apparently has not been
1 See document No. 524, footnote 3.
1 See document No. 126, footnote 2 and document No. 146, footnote 2.
DECEMBER 1941 957
informed about the Imperial Conference at the end of last -week, 3
concerning which Oshima has probably reported in Berlin, 4 has been
given to understand that Italy must prepare to decide what other
Power she wishes to take over the protection of her interests in the
future.
A leading officialof the Foreign Ministry said in a talk that Japan
had always been of the opinion, as Matsuoka had stated earlier, that
article 3 of the Tripartite Pact should be considered applicable to
any conflict between one of the three Powers and the United States,
unless one of those states should, for example, attack the American
continent without cause. I took due note of this.
Shiratori 5 told me that in the leading circles of Japan they had
come to the conclusion that Roosevelt now wants to enter the war
by way of conflict in the Far East. At times the view is also ex-
pressed here that the United States is now certain of a coalition
of the ABCD [Araerican-British-Chinese-Dutch] States with Rus-
sia, which has been aimed at for over 10 years. Roosevelt therefore
believes that the time has come for a showdown, as the adherence of
these states in the future is uncertain.
In the Foreign Ministry thought is being given to the manner in
which Japan should open a conflict which is inevitable. The incli-
nation is to take the view that for domestic political reasons a declara-
tion of a state of war or a declaration of war against the United
States simultaneously with or after the beginning of hostilities is
inevitable. In accordance with the directives for the guidance of
my conversations received thus far I have taken the position that if
a direct attack is avoided, the United States can be saddled with
the (clear text missing) for this difficult decision about entering
the war. In view of the important role which this point may play
in the gradual deterioration of the situation and in the conflict be-
tween the groups I have often referred to, I should be grateful for
early instructions. 6
Ott
3 Presumably a reference to the Imperial Conference of Dee. 1 which adopted
the following resolution:
"Our negotiations with the United States regarding the execution of our
national policy adopted on Nov. 5 have finally failed. Japan will declare war
on the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands."
See International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Exhibit 588. For
Prime Minister Tojo's and Foreign Minister Togo's statements at the Imperial
Conference of Dec. 1 see ibid., Exhibits Nos. 2954 and 2955. No record of any
statement regarding this Imperial Conference made by Oshima has been found
in German Foreign Ministry flies.
4 No record found.
'Toshio Shiratori, former Japanese Ambassador in Italy, adviser to the
Japanese Foreign Ministry.
( See document No. 551.
958 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 546
2281/482769-71
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy
Telegram
most urgent Berlin, December 5, 1941.
top secret Received December 5 — 1 : 50 a. m.
No. 3295 of December 5
For the Ambassador personally.
With reference to your telegram No. 3151 of December 3. 1
Please call on Count Ciano and the Duce at once and communicate
to them the following draft text which we intend to hand the Japa-
nese Ambassador here in reply to his demarche 2 as soon as the Duce's
consent has been received here.
The text of the draft follows :
"In view of the increasingly obvious intention of the United States
of America and England with all of the powers [Maehtmittel] at
their command to frustrate a just new order and to cut off the means
of existence of the German, Italian, and Japanese people, the German
Government, the Italian Government, and the Japanese Government
have agreed on the following provisions for the defense against the
dangers threatening the existence of their peoples :
"Article 1.
"In case a state of war should arise between Japan and the United
States of America, Germany and Italy for their part will also imme-
diately consider themselves to be in a state of war with the United
States and will carry on this war with all of the powers at their
command.
"In case a state of war should develop between Germany and Italy
on the one hand and the United States of America on the other, Japan
for her part, too, will immediately consider herself to be in a state
of war with the United States and will carry on this war with all of
the powers at her command.
"Articled
"Germany, Italy and Japan, in case of a war waged jointly by the
three powers in accordance with article 1 of this Agreement against
the United States of America undertake not to conclude any armistice
or peace with the United States except in full mutual agreement.
' They assume the same obligation also in regard to an armistice
or peace with England in case a state of war should arise between
Japan and England.
"Article 3.
"The three Governments are agreed that this agreement shall be
kept most strictly secret. However, they will, in a form yet to be
agreed upon, announce the obligation undertaken by them in article 2
as soon as Germany, Italy, and Japan find themselves jointly in a
1 Document No. 537.
* See document No. 537, footnote 6.
DECEMBER 1941 959
state of war with the United States of America or England or with
both of these powers.
"Article 4.
"This agreement shall enter into force immediately upon its signa-
ture and shall remain valid as long as the Tripartite Pact concluded
on September 27, 1940."
End of the draft.
It is to be added in explanation that importance is being attached
here to setting down in writing not only the promise concerning the
conclusion of an armistice and peace, but also concerning the joint
entry into the war. Please inform us at once of the Duce's position,
since we wish to avoid any delay in issuing the reply to Tokyo. In
case the Government at your post agrees with our draft it will, I
suppose, make an identical proposal to the Japanese Ambassador
there in reply to his demarche.
KlBBENTROP
No. 547
535/240131-32
Memorandum by the State Secretary
S.t.S. No. 800 Berlin, December 5, 1941.
As expected, the Nuncio reverted again today to his two notes in
regard to ecclesiastical conditions in the Warthegau. 1 He has the
instruction from Eome to apply to a higher authority, if need be to
the Fuhrer, if he does not make progress at the Foreign Ministry.
His main points of complaint remain as follows :
1. That doubt was cast on his competence for the Warthegau;
2. That he did not come into contact with the ethnic Polish Cath-
olics in the Warthegau and therefore could not provide for orderly
church administration in this area.
The Nuncio realized that any appeal to the Fuhrer would come back
again to the Foreign Ministry and thus would not advance his cause.
The Nuncio knows from other quarters that the Ministry of Ecclesias-
tical Affairs has been eliminated from the Warthegau. 2 He therefore
hopes that the Foreign Ministry may achieve something in this matter
with the Eeich Chancellery.
I did not inform the Nuncio about the details of our negotiation
with Reichsstatthalter Greiser, etc., and also did not give him any
hope that any direct contact could be brought about between him and
the ethnic Polish Catholics in the Warthegau.
1 Document No. 368, and document No. 272, footnote 1.
s See document No. 368, footnote 5.
960 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The Nuncio then dropped the subject rather soon.
Since Herr Greiser has protested against the Nuncio's competence
for the Warthegau on legal grounds with which the Ministry cannot
agree, and since he is evidently also supported in this by the Party
Chancellery, it will not be possible to achieve much more in practice.
I should therefore like to disillusion the Nuncio gradually in his belief
that he will still receive any substantive reply to his notes. On the
other hand it will be necessary, once more, legally to justify and state
the Foreign Ministry's point of view to Statthalter Greiser and to do
the same with the Reich Chancellery, and through the latter to try
after all to get a step further.
I remain of the opinion that it makes a bad impression toward the
outside if by denying the competence of the Nuncio in the Warthegau
we create doubt that this area is an integral part of the Greater Ger-
man Reich. Today I used the argument with the Nuncio that one
reason we did not particularly welcome his efforts to dispose over
ecclesiastical affairs in the Warthegau was that after all the Holy
See still recognized a diplomatic representative of the former Polish
state.
Weizsacker
No. 548
2281/482761-64
Mernorandvm by the Ambassador in Italy
Rome, December 5, 1941.
Yesterday evening at 9 : 30 p.m. Minister von Rintelen telephoned
me on the instruction of the Reich Foreign Minister and informed me
that in the course of the next hours I would receive telegraphic in-
structions which the Foreign Minister wished to have carried out
with Count Ciano and possibly with the Duce during the night. Herr
von Rintelen asked me to make sure even at this time that Count
Ciano would be available for me at the proper hour, but he was unable
to inform me — even approximately — when the telegraphic instruc-
tions would arrive here.
I thereupon telephoned Chef de Cabinet Marchese Lanza d'Ajeta
and asked him to inform Count Ciano accordingly.
Marchese d'Ajeta informed me shortly afterwards that this had been
done and that he, d'Ajeta, would be expecting my call as soon as it
was determined at what hour I wished to see Count Ciano.
At 1 : 30 a.m. Herr Sieber reported to me that the telegraphic in-
struction was coming uncoded over the closed circuit teletype. 1 I
thereupon asked Marchese d'Ajeta to tell Count Ciano that I requested
1 Document No, 546.
DECEMBER 1941 961
to be received by him at 2 : 20 a.m. At 2 : 20 a.m. I informed Count
Oiano at his home of the draft text which had been sent to me by wire,
reading to him the German text orally in Italian because in that short
time it had not been possible to make a written Italian translation.
At the same time I pointed out to him that the Reich Foreign Minister
attached great importance to avoiding any delay in issuing the reply
to Tokyo.
When I remarked that I was supposed to pass on the statement of
the Italian position to Berlin during that very night and that there-
fore we would probably have to call on the Duce, too, Count Ciano
stated that he could express full agreement with the draft on behalf
of the Italian Government, as it kept entirely within the limits of
what the Duce thought in regard to the further treatment of the
matter. Paragraph 2 of article 1 even seemed to him a gratifying ex-
tension in our favor. We thereupon agreed that in these circumstances
we would refrain from disturbing the Duce during the night and I
made sure once more that I was authorized through Count Ciano's
statement to inform Berlin of the unqualified assent of the Italian
Government. Count Ciano confirmed this and added that he would
inform the Duce at once in the morning, which would be at about
9 o'clock. 8
In discussing the question when Count Ciano would hand the
analogous statement to the Japanese Ambassador, we agreed that it
would be expedient to do this if possible at the same hour in Berlin
and in Borne. I said I was prepared to inquire once more in Berlin
in that matter in order to set the hour precisely.
Count Ciano added further that in handing the draft to the Japa-
nese Ambassador he would state that as this was a draft from Berlin
the German text was authoritative in all circumstances. He added
that this appeared necessary to him so as to avoid quibbling over
words by the Japanese in case of possible, even innocuous, differences
between the German and Italian texts.
I finally handed Count Ciano the draft text in the form of a carbon
copy of the telegram addressed to me, from which I had cut off the
first and last paragraphs.
I then informed Minister Rintelen from the Embassy at 2 -A5 a.m.
of the outcome of my discussion with Count Ciano ; he thanked me for
the speed with which the instructions had been carried out and stated
that the matter was thus in order for the time being. When I asked
when the Eeich Foreign Minister intended to hand the draft to the
Japanese Ambassador, Herr von Eintelen replied that it would prob-
ably be done right away, that is, still in the course of that very night.
I pointed out to him that the wish had been expressed here that the
* Cf . The Oiano Diaries, entry for Dec. 5, 1941.
682-90B— 64 66
962 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
I
delivery should take place, if possible, at the same hour, and that I
asked him to let me know when the delivery had taken place in Berlin
so that in case it had occurred during the night the Italians could
join in the action in the morning as quickly as possible.
This morning at 9 :30 a.m. Marchess d'Ajeta telephoned me to inform
me by instruction of Count Ciano that the latter had informed the
Duce and had met with his full agreement. He would receive the
Japanese Ambassador immediately to hand him the statement and he
asked me to find out when the delivery had taken place in Berlin.
Count Ciano also -was anxious that the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin
be told that an analogous step would be taken here at the same time
with regard to Mr. Horikiri.
I thereupon telephoned Herr von Rintelen and learned from him
that the statement had already been handed to the Japanese Ambassa-
dor in Berlin at 4 : 00 a.m. this morning 3 and that the Reich Foreign
Minister had expressly pointed out on that occasion that the same step
would be taken here in Rome.
I passed on this information to Marchese d'Ajeta by telephone and
pointed out that it appeared good to me now to receive the Japanese
Ambassador in Rome very soon. D'Ajeta agreed, and stated that the
Japanese Ambassador had been asked to see Count Ciano at 10 : 00 a. m.
I thereupon passed on this last communication to Minister von
Rintelen by telephone.
At 10 : 25 a.m. Marchese d'Ajeta again telephoned and asked whether
and if so what instructions had been sent in this matter to our Am-
bassador in Tokyo. I promised him that I would find out and reply
at once.
Mackensen
Rome, December 5, 1941.
At 10 : 40 a, m. I asked Minister von Rintelen by telephone the ques-
tion of Marchese d'Ajeta's concerning the instructions for Tokyo.
Herr von Rintelen replied that so far no instructions or information of
any sort had been sent to Ambassador Ott and that they would in any
case only be very summary if they were sent at all. I told him that it
was my impression that the Italians considered it best in the interest
of secrecy if the two Ambassadors in Tokyo did not receive any infor-
mation from their Governments in this matter. Herr von Rintelen
indicated understanding for this view, but did not seem to be quite
certain of being able to make it prevail. We arranged in the end that
in case any communication is sent directly to Ambassador Ott in
* Cf . Oshima's account in intercepted telegrams of Dec. 5 to Tokyo the texts
of which are printed in Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 35, pp. 684-685.
DECEMBER 1941 963
this matter I will be immediately informed so that I may let the
Italians know.
Immediately following the telephone conversation I telephoned the
foregoing to Marchese d'Ajeta, who thanked me for this information. 4
Mackensen
* In a subsequent memorandum of Dec. 5 (2281/482765) Maekcnse.n recorded
having received Ribbentrop's instructions, transmitted through RIntelen by
telephone at 3 : 00 p. m., directing him to inform Ciano that ,no instructions or
information in the matter of the agreement would be sent to Ambassador
Ott in Tokyo and that Ciano therefore should likewise abandon such an idea.
Mackensen also recorded that d'Ajeta, whom he informed at 6 : 50 p. m., ex-
pressed the view that Ciano would be very satisfied with this communication.
No. 549
4858/E247807-09
Marshal Antonescu to Adolf Hitler
Telegram
Bucharest, December 5, 1941.
Referring to the request transmitted through M. Mihai Antonescu
concerning an increase in the export of Rumanian fuel oil, 1 1 have the
honor to inform your Excellency of the following :
1. By cutting our internal consumption to the maximum extent,
we can export a total of 25,000 tons of fuel oil to Germany and Italy.
2. If monthly 60,000 tons of coal of at least 7,000 thermal units are
shipped to us, we can make available another amount of 20,000 tons
fuel oil for export, by withdrawing this fuel from the railroads.
But this step cannot be taken without accumulating beforehand a
reserve of 6,000 tons of coal ; at the same time there should be a guar-
antee that in addition to this quantity we shall daily receive five train-
loads of coal.
3. If we should be furnished facilities for piping natural gas to
Bucharest, as I asked of Marshal Goring in Vienna, 2 we could make
another amount of 25,000 tons of fuel oil monthly available for export.
4. In the last 5 months we exported to Germany and Italy amounts
greater than the monthly output of 125,000 tons fuel oil, which ex-
austed our available reserves.
5. I feel once more obligated to stress what I said in the meetings
of Munich 3 and Vienna : Our annual oil production has shrunk from
8,704,000 tons in 1936 to 5,500,000 tons in 1941, although after the
Vienna meeting of March 1941 1 made every effort to increase produc-
tion. The result was an increase of 2,500 tons per day.
6. Despite the drop in oil production, exports to Germany and Italy
have nevertheless risen from 25 percent of total exports in 1936 to 83
percent of total exports in 1941.
1 See documents Nos. 505, 513, and 519.
* See vol. xii of this series, document No 126.
3 See vol. xii of this series, document No, 614.
964 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
I mention this only to prove to Your Excellency that as in the past,
Rumania is today also making effort to aid Germany and Italy in
carrying on with the war.
7. A new mining law which will further exploitation and develop-
ment of Rumanian, mining resources is just about to be enacted.
8. A short time ago, upon requests of the southern front, I have au-
thorized the delivery of 4,000 tons of gasoline over and above the
monthly quota. This contribution represents our war reserve.
9. I take the liberty to emphasize that the substitution of coal for
fuel oil imposes on the Rumanian State Railways an annual additional
expenditure of about 700,000,000 lei and imperils domestic coal pro-
duction, since hitherto inferior coal was mixed with fuel oil.
I merely mention the foregoing facts to enable Your Excellency to
realize the exact state of affairs.
For the same purpose I beg you to order the dispatch of an expert on
this subject to Bucharest, to examine the situation here on the spot,
since the figures received in Berlin regarding Rumanian fuel oil pro-
duction and domestic consumption are not in accord with the facts
in the case. 1
Only in this way can it become evident that we are doing our very
best, even imperiling our economy, to assure the winning of the war. 8
Marshal Antonescu
* There is in the files the draft of a reply telegram from Hitler to Antonescu
dated Dec. 7 (2103/473063-64) acknowledging Antonescu's telegram and promis-
ing that Clodius and the necessary experts would be sent to Bucharest in com-
pliance with Antonescu's request for an examination of the situation on the spot.
The draft telegram was submitted to Hitler on Dec. 7 but there is no record of
the telegram's having been sent.
* Clodius commented on the various points raised In Antonescu's telegram
in a memorandum of Dec. 6 (239/154422-26) as did Neubacher in telegram No.
4186 from Bucharest (239/154440-41).
No. 550
32/25052-53
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Tokyo, December 6, 1941 — 10:00 p.m.
No. 2666 of December 6 Received December 7 — 4 : 10 p. m.
For the Foreign Minister.
"With reference to my telegram No. 2657 of December 5. 1
The Minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed to me today that the
reply to the American note would be sent in the near future. He
could not yet give me any particulars. On December 2, the American
Government had inquired about the purpose of the concentration of
1 Document No. 545.
DECEMBER 1941 965
large Japanese forces in southern Indochina. 2 The American Gov-
ernment saw this as a threat to Thailand, Malaya, and Burma. The
American Government now was told today that the Japanese measures
were within the terms of the agreement concluded with the Govern-
ment at Vichy. 3 The troops in northern China, the Minister added,
had for that matter been reinforced in view of Chinese troop con-
centrations against that area. The Foreign Minister gave me to under-
stand, that troops from southern Indochina had been committed for
that purpose and were in turn reinforced from the outside.
Upon my question whether the Japanese reply would also take a
stand on the allegation of a threat to Thailand, Malaya, and Burma,
the Foreign Minister replied that the answer was implied in the posi-
tion indicated to me. The United States of America, after all, had
no control rights over these territories.
With respect to the American attitude, the Minister explained that
it was difficult to perceive the motives behind it. He doubted that the
United States of America was really desirous of reaching an under-
standing with Japan. The reported movements of American naval
and land forces in the Far East intensified the danger of a clash.
Togo sought to minimize Hull's attack on Japan's policy at the press
conference of December 3.* Ambassador Oshima had meanwhile been
instructed by the Japanese Government to approach the Ftihrer and
the Keich Foreign Minister with a view to the development of closer
German-Japanese relations. A reply had not yet been received. I
expressed to the Minister my best wishes for a successful outcome of
this approach.
In conclusion, the Minister added that the American and English
side was trying to capitalize to the utmost on the evacuation of
Rostov. The Japanese Government, relying on Oshima's detailed
reports, viewed this measure as a temporary episode without any
bearing on the over-all situation, especially if the German offensive
against Moscow, which the Japanese Government was following with
great interest, continued to develop favorably. I made reference to
the very satisfactory reports on hand about the military situation
on all fronts.
The line taken by the Minister in conducting the conversation sug-
gested to me the resistance that has to be overcome while the Japanese
Government is struggling to reach a decision. As has been con-
s See Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941, vol. n, pp. 778-
781.
3 Actually such a statement was presented by Ambassador Nomura, accom-
panied by Kurusu, In a meeting with Secretary of State Hull on Dec. 5. See
Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1981-1941, vol. ati, pp. 781-784.
Cf . document No. 545 and footnote 2.
* For an account of this news conference, see the New York Times of Dec. 4,
1941, p. 1, col. 3.
966 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
firmed to me by friends, attempts by every means are still being
made to halt the development. For that reason I would repeat my
most respectful request for continuing information and instructions.
Ott
No. 551
111/115601
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Telegram
most urgent Berlin, December 6, 1941—11 : 10 p. m.
TOP SECRET
KAM 246 g. Rs.
[No. 2282] 1
For the Ambassador personally.
With reference to your telegram No. 2657 of December 5. 2
With respect to the concluding remarks of your telegram, I want
to say that it would seem inappropriate to me in the present situa-
tion to suggest to the Japanese Government this or that course of
action in the event that a showdown should come about with the
United States. Instead, I want to ask you that if such matters are
discussed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, you state our view in
these terms, that the Axis Powers and Japan find themselves faced
with a struggle upon which hangs their fate, which they must fight
through together, regardless of the form of the tactical moves taken by
one or the other partner in the individual case. If you feel that the
remark which you quote in your telegram might have created at
your post a different impression about our attitude, please correct
it in accordance with the foregoing.
For your strictly confidential and exclusively personal information
I want to add that I am at present engaged in talks with Ambassador
Oshima aiming at a more precise definition of the attitude of the
signatories of the Tripartite Pact with a view to ever closer co-
operation. 3
RlBBENTKOP
The number is supplied from Tokyo telegram 2690 of Dec. 9 (document No.
567) which refers to this document.
* Document No. 545.
* See document No. 546 and document No. 548 and footnote 3. Nothing further
on these discussions prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor has been
found in the German Foreign Ministry files. See, however, the intercepted
telegrams of Dec. 6 and Dec. 7 sent from tire Japanese Foreign Ministry to
Berlin the texts of which are printed in Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 12, Joint
Committee Exhibits Nos. 1 through 6, pp. 245-246 and pt. 35, Proceedings of
Clausen Investigation, p. 686,
DECEMBER 1941 967
No. 552
2281/480956-57
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy
Telegram
most ubgent Behlin, December 7, 1941 — 1 : 10 a. m.
TOP SECRET
No. 3317 of December 6
To be presented immediately to Chief of Mission,
I. Through General von Kintelen the Duce informed the High
Command of the Wehrmacht on December 2 of his intentions with
regard to the port of Bizerte. 1 The OKW thereupon transmitted to
General von Rintelen a directive of the Fuhrer's on December 3. 2 I
assume that you are informed about this through General von
Rintelen. If not, then please have the two teletypes shown you for
your information. The Italian Armistice Commission has likewise
informed the German Armistice Commission about these Italian
intentions and thereby stated that Count Ciano intends to speak to
Admiral Darlan concerning the Bizerte question at the pending
meeting. 3
II. Please make sure that before his departure Count Ciano is
informed about the Fuhrer's view on this question ; ' in particular,
that the French Government can be approached again about Bizerte
only after the mastery of the sea and air in the Central Mediterranean
by the Axis Powers has been established once more through deploy-
ment of the Second Air Force and the German submarines.
III. Colonel Mancinelli, the Italian representative with the Ger-
man Armistice Commission, has stated moreover that the discussion
of the supply question would be handled between Count Ciano and
Darlan in a concrete form in the way in which it was arranged in
Berlin between Ciano and me. 3 Regarding this it is to be noted that
I did not discuss this question here with Count Ciano 5 and accord-
ingly also did not arrange anything concerning it.
Wire your report. 8
Ribbentrof
1 See document No. 532.
! Document No. 532, footnote 5. The copy sent to the Foreign Ministry by
Warllmont (898/292114-15) bears the date Dec. 3. The OKH copy (M341/-
M015344-45) gives the time of dispatch as Dee. 4, 12 : 55 a. m.
* See document No. 532, footnote 4.
1 See document No. 557 and footnote 5.
5 See document No. 501.
' Document No. 557.
968 DOCUMENTS ON GEEMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 553
64/44740-41
The Charge d' 'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most uegent Washington, December 7, 1941 — 8 : 36 p. m.
No. 4293 of December 7 Eeeeived December 9 — 8 : 55 [a. m.]
The Japanese attack on Hawaii and the Philippines struck the
American Government and the American people like a bolt of light-
ning. The first reports came from the White House and were soon
supplemented by the broadcasting companies' own news reports which
immediately interrupted all programs. As we see from the statement
of Hull, which follows verbatim in No. 4292, 1 in which he in an excess
of fury and anger virtually calls Ambassador Nomura a (1 group
apparently missing) and swindler, the Japanese attack came as a com-
plete surprise and caused the greatest consternation among leading
American statesmen. The reaction in London seems to be similar,
according to reports received so far. The measures, reported in detail
by the DNB in New York, which have in the meantime been taken
also reflect ta state of extreme nervousness. They include, for example,
police protection for Japanese Consulates, out of fear of riots, mo-
bilizing the Federal Bureau of Investigation [Bimdes-Geheimpolisei]
for surveillance of Japanese nationals, orders to guard all vital war
plants, apprehension of all Japanese in the Panama Canal Zone, en-
forcement of the Espionage Law of 1917, which is tantamount to insti-
tuting censorship, especially of the isolationist press. These all reflect
extreme nervousness. All the American war plans which, as was
demonstrated by the recent article in the Chicago Tribune? were ori-
ented toward Europe and calculated to gain time for at least another
year or two, have suddenly been scuttled. A war in the Pacific 2 to 3
years before the completion of the two-ocean navies, at a time when
one's own army has not been equipped and the great armament indus-
try has only just been started up, must come at an extremely inoppor-
tune time for the American Government.
They [the Americans] had thought that they themselves could
choose their enemy and the time to begin the war and in the meantime
let other peoples fight for American imperialism. They now see that
they have been terribly deceived in this calculation which had been
based on Japan's willingness to yield, and her fear of America. The
last thing that had been expected .was a Japanese surprise attack which,
as the first reports of heavy losses and great material damage in
1 Not filmed. For text of the several statements by Secretary Hull, released
on Dec. 1 see Department of State, Bulletin, 1941, vol. v, pp. 461-470.
1 See document No. 541.
DECEMBER 1941 969
Hawaii indicate, deprived the Americans of military initiative. It
is significant that the bombastic prophesies that a war against Japan
would he a "promenade" have now been silenced. Senator George, 3
in one of the first statements which we have here from Congress,
speaks of the possibility of a war against Japan lasting 2 to 3 years,
Thomsen
3 Walter F. George, Democrat from Georgia.
No. 554
F3/0517-20
Adolf Hitler to King Gustam V of Sweden
Fuhrer's Headquarters.
December 7, 1941.
Majesty: It is with sincere pleasure that I learned through the
German Legation in Stockholm of the understanding that Your
Majesty shows for the battle that in the truest sense of the word is
being fought today by the German Reich and its allies for the whole
of Europe. 1 It gives me great satisfaction to be able to learn from the
remarks of Your Majesty that as early as 1918, at the end of the last
World "War, you realized the great danger that had arisen through
Bolshevism, not only for Germany, but for all European and particu-
larly for the northern countries. At the same time, however, I may
take the liberty of pointing out that the situation is quite a different
one today.
When the German Reich went down in 1918, vanquished less by the
force of arms of its enemies than by the lack of a superior leadership,
Russia herself was militarily completely crushed. Bolshevism was at
that time the same foe of Europe, nay, of the entire civilized world that
it is today. But its hostility had to be confined more to the internal
work of disintegration in the case of the surrounding nations, because
it did not have at its disposal sufficient resources of military power.
Today, Majesty, the situation is very different. If Germany had suc-
cumbed in this war, Europe would be confronted with the mightiest
military power that had ever threatened this Continent in its entire
history. All nations and states that are today participating in this
fight in the east are therefore protecting with the blood of their
soldiers, not only their own countries, but the entire Continent of
Europe as well. If Finland had collapsed, the Bolshevist tide would
have spread to Norway and finally also have engulfed Sweden. If
1 See document No. 430.
970 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Germany had failed, not only Central Europe, but the whole of West-
ern Europe, would have become a defenseless target of Bolshevist
world destruction. Had Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Italy not
recognized the hour of danger and undertaken the bloody sacrifices of
such a war, the Muscovite-Bolshevist tide would have rolled over the
countries of the Lower Danube and the Balkans all the way to Con-
stantinople. For this is the difference between today and the year
1918: At that time Bolshevism had, indeed, the same impulse of de-
struction, but it lacked the power. Today the same destructive intent
is united with the greatest military machinery of all times. In a
heroic battle of all the allies, which has now lasted over 5 months, it
has been demolished and crushed to such an extent, however, that it
will never rise again. If the operations are for the moment reaching a
sort of standstill, it is not because of Russian resistance as such, but
only because of mud, snow, and frost. Even in the twentieth century
it is impossible to wage war successfully in winter. We have, however,
created the bases for launching the continuation of the attack at the
moment that weather conditions become more favorable for warfare.
This time will come, and it will bring with it the final destruction of
the Bolshevist monster.
I am most sincerely glad that Your Majesty appreciates this unique
historic action that is decisive for the future of the whole of Europe in
the positive sense that has become known to me. I regret, however,
that precisely in Sweden the echo of public opinion is not such as might
have been expected. 2 I acknowledge with thanks all that the Swedish
Government has done in the way of positive contributions in the course
of this struggle. Yet I cannot avoid the feeling that large circles in
Sweden not only do not acknowledge the secular importance of this
historic battle in its bearing also on Sweden, but even try to preserve
their distance from the events. I find this the more incomprehensible
because in the event of a collapse of the German-Finnish battle front
precisely in the north — whether now or in a few years is not of decisive
historical importance—Sweden would be fighting the same life-and-
death battle on her own soil. I must therefore accompany my thanks
for the very comforting personal attitude of Your Majesty with the
sincere wish for success in guiding the interests not only of the
Swedish Government but also of the Swedish public even more
strongly to the realization that this war will decide the fate of Europe,
that is, of all European countries, and that if certain of its peoples
undertake the burden, so heavy in itself, of shedding their blood, the
other countries are obligated to make their contribution at least in
other ways.
' See document No. 364 and footnotes 3 and 4.
DECEMBER 1041 971
Minister Schnurre, who lias the honor of handing this letter to Your
Majesty, will try on the occasion of his visit to Stockholm to strengthen
the interest of the Swedish Government accordingly. 3
Yours, etc. Adolf Hitler
* See document No. 574.
No. 555
498/233941-43
Memorandum by an Official of the Protocol Department
top secret Berlin, December 9, 1941.
zu2647g. x
Subject: Visit of the Spanish General Moscardo with the Fiihrer at
the Fiihrer 's Headquarters on December 7, 1941, at 1 : 00 p.m.
While exchanging greetings General Moscardo said that he conveyed
the most cordial greetings and congratulations from Generalissimo
Franco. General Franco had urged him in particular to tell the
Fiihrer that he believed in the absolute final victory of Germany ; not
because he desired this most strongly, but because he knew that this
victory could not fail, for he was following the victorious campaigns
of the Wehrmacht step by step. General Moscardo took part in the
situation conference in the map room of the OKW bunker. The
Fiihrer explained the situation to him personally. He described, how-
ever, exclusively the position of the Spanish Division and its probable
activity in the immediate future. The Fiihrer did not reveal any
important military information or figures of any sort to the General.
In the discussion of the campaigns in Africa the General came to speak
of Gibraltar. He told the Fiihrer that Spain was very much interested
in the elimination of this English base, for aside from the loss of
prestige which that would mean for the English, Gibraltar in English
hands would always be like a dagger in the heart for the Spaniards.
The Fiihrer said that he was sorry not to be able to undertake any-
thing in this respect at the moment, 2 and he regretted that General
Franco had not seized the opportunity for his part in the spring of
1941. 3
During the dinner attended by a small group in the Fuhrer's bunker,
general matters were discussed without any political importance. The
'2647 g.: Madrid telegram No. 3936 of Nov. 9 (408/233923) in which Stohrer
announced General Moscardo's trip to the Blue Division and his arrival in Berlin.
1 Cf . document No. 467.
' See vol. xi of this series, documents Nos. 323, 420, and 476.
972 DOCUMENTS ON" GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Fuhrer merely asked the General about Spam's relations with Portu-
gal. General Moscardo said that the Portuguese had a childish fear
that Spain might have territorial aspirations against Portugal. The
relations between the two countries were very difficult. Little things
such as a soccer match between Spanish and Portuguese teams often
degenerated into- large-scale quarreling and brawling. That had
gone so far that the Spanish Foreign Ministry had advised him in
his capacity as Spanish sport leader to discontinue sporting events
between Spanish and Portuguese athletes. The Fuhrer expressed his
astonishment that these two countries, which were closely connected
territorially on the Iberian Peninsula, could not get along together.
The General repeated that the Portuguese simply always attributed
hostile intentions to the Spanish. At any rate they acted in a very
reserved way toward Spain and always stressed that they would sell
their independence dearly, no matter to whom. And it was indeed
the case, said the General, that Portugal seemed to be firmly deter-
mined to ward off any aggressive intentions of the U.SA. by force
of arms. This was shown by the continual shifting of troops to the
Azores and the Cape Verde Islands.
The Fuhrer asked the General a few things about the economic
situation in Spain. The General stressed the tremendous difficulties
Spain was having at the moment in obtaining grain and gasoline.
The Fuhrer asked whether Spain did not have enough lignite and
other types of coal available in order perhaps to convert some of the
gasoline engines to gas generators. The General replied that the
necessary factories for carrying out the conversion were lacking in
Spain and that they could only be obtained from Germany with great
difficulty, because Germany's industry was greatly burdened in every
respect. The Fuhrer then treated this question generally without
making special reference to Spain. Following this the cinema "Al-
cazar" and other topics of minor interest were discussed.
In taking leave the Fuhrer asked the General to convey his warmest
wishes to the Caudillo.
Submitted herewith to Minister Schmidt (Foreign Minister's
Secretariat) .
Brandau
DECEMBER 1941 973
No. 556
93/104431-32
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
U.St.S.Pol. 1022 Berlin, December 7, 1941.
The Hungarian Minister, who on instruction of Minister President
de Bardossy had broken off his visit in Vienna yesterday to return to
Berlin, called upon me today and stated the following with the re-
quest that it be transmitted to the Eeich Foreign Minister :
The Regent and the Minister President fully understood the rea-
sons which necessitated postponement of the visit by the Eeich For-
eign Minister to Hungary, thanks to the letters brought by Minister
Freiherr von Dbrnberg. 1 News of a forthcoming visit by the Reich
Foreign Minister to Budapest had spread, however, probably owing
to the hunting preparations by the Regent and the room reservations
made at hotels. Postponement of the visit now might easily be given
a political interpretation by ill-disposed elements. Minister Presi-
dent de Bardossy had accordingly instructed him [the Hungarian
Minister] to inquire about the possibility of putting out an officially
inspired press report indicating that a visit of the Reich Foreign
Minister was planned but had to be postponed for official reasons.
I told M. Sztojay that I would not want to do anything in this
matter in anticipation of the Reich Foreign Minister who, as I had
heard, had already inquired about him as early as yesterday.
The Minister then added that he happened to run into Freiherr von
Dornberg at the railroad station in Vienna yesterday, and that Frei-
herr von Dornberg gave him briefly the reasons for the postponement
of the visit.
Herewith submitted to the Reich Foreign Minister.
Woeemann
1 A memorandum of Bee. 6 by the acting Cbief of Protocol (93A04419) re-
corded that Minister Dornberg, the Chief of Protocol, had left Berlin in order to
deliver to Horthy a personal letter from Ribbentrop. According to DBrnberg
"the Reich Foreign Minister, because of the Far Eastern crisis, has canceled
his acceptance of the hunting visit with his Highness, the Regent of Hungary."
According to an account based on Hungarian documents, the invitation to
Rlbbentrop had been conveyed by Biirdossy during his Berlin visit; see C. A.
Macartney, A History of Hungary, 19S9-1H5, vol. n p. 65. No copy of Ribben-
trop's letter has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.
In Budapest telegram No. 1648 of Dec. 5 (93/104417-18) Minister Jagow re-
ported that in accordance with instructions transmitted through Dornberg he had
asked Minister President Bardossy to convey to the Regent Ribbentrop's com-
munication regarding cancelation of the visit. Bardossy expressed profound
shock at the news and emphasized its unfavorable effects on Hungary's position.
974 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 557
22B1/4809GS-61
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Rome, December 7, 1941.
TOP SECRET
No. 3194 of December 7
For the Foreign Minister personally.
With reference to your telegram No. 3317 of December 6. 1
I have just spoken with Count Ciano regarding the Bizerte ques-
tion, told him of the communications which we have from the Italian
Armistice Commission to the German Armistice Commission and the
statements by Colonel Mancinelli, 2 and asked him whether he had
knowledge of the Duce's inquiry transmitted through General von
Rintelen 3 and the Fuhrer's directive passed on by him to the Comando
Supremo here,* and above all whether he knew that in the Fuhrer's
opinion the French Government could be approached only under the
conditions mentioned in figure II of telegraphic instruction No. 3317.
Count Ciano replied that he could not say what was the basis of the
inaccurate communications of the Italian Armistice Commission and
the statements of Colonel M[ancinelli] . So far the Duce had still not
issued him the instruction for Turin; 5 that would only be done tomor-
row morning. Thus far the Duce had only instructed him quite gen-
erally to "listen" during the conversation and had also mentioned
Bizerte among the subjects that came into question for the conversa-
tion, in the form, that he could point out to the French the great
significance which this question had for Italy. However, he had
not indicated in any way that this theme might be made the subject
of negotiations. He — Ciano — had also not included this theme among
the few points which he intended to propose to the Duce tomorrow as
suitable for discussion in Turin. These points involved a few matters
of an administrative nature such as the establishment of consulates,
etc., such as were inherent in the nature of the relations between two
neighboring states. In the main, however, the meeting had the purpose
of resuming the direct contact between the two governments which
had been broken off for the past year and a half.
Count Ciano added that he would never enter into any sort of
concrete discussion in a matter such as Bizerte without having first
1 Document No. 552.
1 See document No. 532, footnote 4.
1 Document No. 532.
* Document No. 532, footnote 5.
6 This is a reference to the Ciano-Darlan meeting of Dec. 10. See Galeazzo
Ciano, L'Europa verso la catastrofe, pp. 69S-703.
DECEMBER 1941 975
reached full agreement with. us. That was not only a "question of
discipline" for him, but he was also personally of the opinion that
the attempt to push the matter ahead at the present moment could
call up incalculable risks which one should incur all the less since
in his opinion even a successful attempt which would make the port
of Bizerte available to us would not really solve the supply problem,
if only in view of the tremendous distance between Bizerte and the
Libyan front. He had the impression that the Duce was being strongly
pushed by the military in this question, in particular by Cavallero.
I replied to him that the Fiihrer was of exactly the same opinion as
regards the risk that was connected with an action at the present
time.
Since I had the impression from a remark of Count Ciano's that
he had heard something by way of General von Rintelen about the
exchange of ideas between the Duce and the Fiihrer to be sure, but
is not acquainted — at least so far — with the text of the Fiihrer's
opinion, I offered to make available to him a copy of the letter from
General von Kintelen to the High Command here which General von
Rintelen had previously promised to give me for this purpose. Count
Ciano thanked me very much for this offer, since he would then be
fully in the picture for tomorrow's audience with the Duce.
He added that he would of course inform the Duce of my d-marche.
I thanked him for this intention, with the remark that the word de-
marche seemed to me somewhat too solemn for our conversation, which
was meant only for his full orientation, whereupon he replied that
he would then only speak of a conversation. For the rest he believed
he was sure that the Duce, knowing the Fiihrer's opinion, would
not give him instructions that were not in full harmony with this
opinion. Should tomorrow's conversation with the Duce result in
something else, contrary to all expectation, then he would notify me.*
Mackensen
'In telegram No. 3201 of Dec. 8 (2281/480962) Mackensen reported tbat he
had seen Ciano who reverted to the question of Bizerte. Having discussed the
matter with Mussolini, Ciano assured Mackensen tbat toe matter would not
be brought up on the part of the Italians.
Of. The Ciano Diaries, entry for Dec. 7, 1941.
No. 558
124/123235-37
Minister Wied to State Secretory Wetesacker
STRicn* confidential Stockholm, December 7, 1941.
Dear Herr State Secretary : Early in November the Swedish Gov-
ernment rejected the most important points in our latest requests,
976 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
presented in Stockholm by Herr Schnurre, and referred them to the
Government Committee for German-Swedish economic relations for
further study. 1 The Swedish Government had refused in particular
to transport fresh troops through Sweden by leave trains z or to agree
to the export of goods for which raw materials are still imported with
English navicerts via Goteborg with our consent.
Beginning today a state of war exists between Finland and Eng-
land. 3 Although it is as yet impossible to foresee the consequences of
this fact, the Swedish public is naturally talking about the possibility
of intervention by the English as soon as weather conditions in the
far north permit. Under the heading, "Finland's involvement in the
War of the Big Powers," the large Stockholm daily, Stockholma Tid-
ningen, says on December 7 : "The future will reveal what this dec-
laration of war means and what it will entail. It may be only a ges-
ture, but it can also result in military actions and even lead to a serious
threat to the freedom and existence of Finland .... For Sweden,
which considers it her duty, as far as circumstances permit, to main-
tain contact with kindred nations and cultivate Nordic ties in general,
what has now happened cannot in any way alter the general attitude.
We have proclaimed neutrality with the reservation concerning the
aid which in our opinion we can give to Finland. As Prime Minister
Kangell said in his latest speech on Finland's independence day, the
Finnish supply situation is gloomy. Sweden would neglect her duty
'Neither Schnurre's instructions nor a precise list of Germany's wishes has
been found in the flies.
In telegram No. 1829 of Oct 30 (205/143068) Schnurre referred to telegram
No. 2604 (Pol, I M 3156 g. Bs.) and reported that he had taken up the questions
in urgent manner, but that Gtinther was rather negative toward the new German
wishes in the field of transportation.
Stockholm telegram No. 1865 of Nov. 4 (205/143076-79) forwards the text
of a Swedish memorandum which constitutes a reply. It included the follow-
ing items :
Chartering of tankers — a matter for the Swedish-German Government Com-
mittee ;
Delivery of yarn, leather, or furs — not possible in view of the Swedish supply
situation ;
Tents— Sweden had delivered 2,000 a short time back; hospital beds and
surgical equipment could be provided to some extent — the problem should be
referred to the Committees ;
Icebreakers — Sweden would examine the problem ;
Transportation — extension of the courier air traffic had recently been nego-
tiated. Sweden suggested rapid trains rather than the use of planes for express
freight. Further expansion of the military railway traffic could not be conceded ;
as to the desired sea transport from Finnish ports to Germany, Sweden would
assist in the same manner as hitherto.
*Teleeram No. 1966 of Nov. 21 (205/143106-07) reported to a Swedish dis-
inclination to grant Germany the privilege of running furlough trains from
Haparanda to Trelleborg. They suggested that Germany should try to schedule
the furlough traffic over Finland's railways to Abo (Turku) and thence by water
In which case Sweden would assist in the water transport.
Telegram No. 2118 of Dec. 13 (205/143127) reported Sweden's definitive re-
fusal to grant Germany the privilege of a furlough traffic by rail between
Haparanda and Trelleborg.
3 See document No. 540 and footnote 7.
DECEMBER 1941
977
and her own interests with respect to Finland if she did not try to do
what she could, as far as her present admittedly limited potentialities
permit, to help her ancestrally related brother country."
Given this situation, it is almost inevitable that we shall have to
present new requests to the Swedish Government, and I should there-
fore like to point out here that this should be done, if at all possible,
through Finland and through the conventional and always available
channel of the government commissions and the Legation. From
statements made by Swedes I know that the recent practice of dis-
patching a special representative has such an alarming effect on the
party concerned that we might again have to expect unsatisfactory,
negative results. By this I do not mean to say that the negative
responses based on the fundamental attitude of the Swedish Govern-
ment can be avoided entirely ; however, the method of abandoning the
existing channels will not in any circumstances help our case. It is
quite obvious and natural that the alarm button will be pressed as
soon as Herr Schnurre applies at the Swedish Legation in Berlin for
a renewed visa and that the "Swedish hedgehog"— to use the expres-
sion which the leader of the Conservative party and the Minister of
Education and Church affairs, Professor Bagge, once employed in a
public speech— will then immediately roll itself up and present all its
spines ....
From Stockholm it is impossible for me to judge what steps, if any,
are needed and contemplated in the near future in relation to the
Swedish Government. But in such an event I can only give the advice
that all basic requests should first be brought up here through the
Finns and, for the rest, be left as far as possible in the trusty hands
of the chairman of the German Government Committee.* Since,
moreover, the Legation has to perform the auxiliary tasks in the
normal way, it would seem that the maximum influence on the Swedish
Government, obtainable by peaceful means can be achieved in this way.
My wife and I extend to you and the baroness the most cordial
greet! ngs, and I remain, my dear Herr State Secretary, with
Heil Hitler!
Yours, etc. V. Wffl)
P.S. I have just learned that Herr Schnurre will arrive here in the
next few days.
* Ministerialdlrektor Walter of the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture.
For the Committee negotiations, see documents Nos. 347 and 565.
[Editors' Note. Nothing has been found in German Foreign Min-
istry files regarding conversations between Ribbentrop and Oshima
immediately following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. That
,/
682-905—64 67
978 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
such conversations were held is indicated, however, by the following
intercepted telegram dispatched to Tokyo by Oshima on December
8, the text of which is printed in the record of the hearings of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack:
"At 11 p. m. today, the 7th, I received a radio report that hostilities
had broken out between Japan and America, and at once called on
Ribbentrop. He said that from reports which he too had received
he thought this was true> and that therefore, although he had not
yet secured Hitler's sanction, the immediate participation in the war
by Germany and Italy was a matter of course. The secret agreement
had in consequence already become — ? — , and [ % they had decided]
to drop it ... [a portion is lost here] . . . form of German and
Italian participation. Ribbentrop said he would discuss with me
to-morrow, the 8th, about the time of publication of this declaration
and so on.
"Ribbentrop rang up Ciano then and there and notified him of the
foregoing."
{Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 35, Proceedings of Clausen Investiga-
tion, p. 687). See also International Military Tribunal for the Far
East, Proceedings, pp. 34035-34036, and Exhibit No. 3512.]
No. 559
64/44758-59
The Charge cPAjj 'aires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most tjhgent Washington, December 8, 1941 — 10 : 32 a. m.
No. 4301 of December 8 Received December 8, 1941—6 : 40 p. m.
As had been expected Congress, by near-unanimous vote, declared
a state of war to exist with Japan. 1 The only (group missing) was
Congresswoman Rankin, 2 who also voted against war in 1917. Roose-
velt's speech 3 was remarkably short. The fact that he made no men-
tion whatever of Germany or Italy indicates that for the present
he wants to avoid any worsening of the situation in the Atlantic.
Add to this that the initial staggering American losses have focused
all attention on the Pacific and have impressed upon the people
already on the first day of war that the struggle with Japan will
*For text of the Joint Resolution by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives, see Department of State, Bulletin, 1941, vol. v, p. 475.
* Jeannette Rankin, Republican Representative from Montana.
* Message to Congress of Dec. 8 ; for text see Department of State, Bulletin,
1941, vol. v, p. 474.
DECEMBER 1941 979
not be child's play. It is significant that there are reports that re-
inforcements must be immediately obtained for the severely crippled
air forces in Hawaii and that American pilots in London are be-
sieging the embassy there demanding to be sent back because they
want to "fight for their own country P Neither the Government nor
the press are able to conceal behind the mounting wave of patriotism
their disappointment that the cleverly conceived political gamble had
miscarried and that it could have been possible to catch the proud
American military forces in Hawaii napping in such a way. To
soften the initial shock and loss of prestige, attempts are being made
to portray the Japanese attack as an act of desperation. At the same
time the people are being prepared to expect initial reverses and bad
news.
In all other respects the feeling in the country is characterized by
the enthusiastic ovations which the President received in Congress.
There is no such thing as an opposition any more, although some news-
papers are reserving their right to make constructive criticism. For
the first time all segments of political life are joined in eagerness for
war, hatred of Japan, and desire for unity.
The American Government apparently expects Soviet Russia to
enter the war against Japan and start military operations from Si-
beria. Hints to this effect have already appeared in newspapers.
However, Litvinov, asked about this on his arrival yesterday,* an-
swered very cautiously and evasively. The surprisingly high losses
suffered by the American Pacific Fleet in Hawaii pose most difficult
problems for the American conduct of military operations, especially
with regard to whether units of the Atlantic fleet should be ordered
to the Pacific, which would entail substantial reduction of American
cooperation with England in the Atlantic. 5
Thomsen
* Maxim M. Litvinov, newly appointed Soviet Ambassador to the United States,
arrived on Dee. 7 and presented his credentials the following day.
"In telegram No. 4315 of Dee. 9 (64/44773-75) Thomsen stated that there
were increasing reports that American losses at Hawaii were "very much larger
than heretofore admitted officially"; as a result there was much concern and
nervousness about the naval situation in the Pacific.
980 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 560
64/44744-45
The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Washinqton, December 8, 1941 — 9 : 19 p. m.
No. 4294 of December 7 Received December 9 — 3 : 10 p. m.
With reference to my telegram No. 4293 of December 7. 1
In the message to Congress which Roosevelt has just drafted the
President "will ask Congress to declare the existence of a state of war
with Japan and Congress will immediately comply. While the Amer-
ican people were not as yet ripe for war on European soil, Roosevelt
can count on the solid backing of the nation in a war against Japan.
This is also confirmed by statements from the isolationist camp by
such Senators as Wheeler, 2 Taft, 3 and Vandenberg. 1 The nature of
Japan's surprise action which is of course termed here a "brutal
act of aggression against a peace-loving country", will undoubtedly
produce a tremendous upsurge of patriotism and thus render unnec-
essary any further propaganda on the part of Roosevelt to rally the
nation behind him. Roosevelt will utilize this opportunity to obtain
from Congress the full grant of authority he needs for carrying on a
total war and effecting a total mobilization of industry. It may be
expected that all war powers legislation of 1917 and 1918 will again
become effective inasmuch as the conditions for enacting such legis-
lation originally, that is "immediate danger of war" and "state of
war" are present.
Whether Roosevelt will at the same time ask that a state of war
be declared with Germany and Italy is uncertain. From the stand-
point of the American conduct of war against Japan it would seem
logical to avoid a war on two fronts with all the consequences so often
described. However, Roosevelt may attempt at least in this regard
to anticipate the decisions of Germany and Italy, if only to make up
for some of the loss of prestige throughout the whole world and
particularly in South America resulting from the inadequate prepa-
rations against the Japanese operation.
War with Japan means re- direction of all efforts to the country's
own rearmament, a corresponding reduction in lend-lease assistance,
shift of all activity to the Pacific, so far as the garrisoning of Iceland
permits this, organization of convoys in the Pacific, closing of Vladi-
vostok as far as shipments to the Soviets are concerned, jeopardizing
the supply of raw materials, especially rubber.
Thomsen
1 Document No. 553.
* Burton K. Wheeler, Democratic Senator from Montana.
3 Robert A. Taft, Republican Senator from Ohio.
* Arthur H. Vandenberg, Republican Senator from Michigan.
DECEMBER 1941 981
No. 561
205/143123-23
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Stockholm, December 8, 1941 — 9 : 20 p. m.
secret Received December £> — 12 : 10 p. m.
No. 2071 of December 8
For the State Secretary.
Although the consequences of the English declaration of war against
Finland * cannot yet be fully perceived as far as the Swedish sector is
concerned, there are many indications it will not change Sweden's
attitude toward Finland.
I called on the Foreign Minister today and he confirmed to me that
the English declaration of war against Finland had created a gen-
erally unfavorable impression here. Pro-English circles were dis-
turbed. Giinther also told me he had said to the new American Min-
ister 2 on his opening visit that Sweden was highly displeased with
England's action. He would also say this to the British Minister, 3
whom he had not seen since the declaration of war. The Foreign
Minister furthermore stressed that England had not, to be sure, made
any demand as yet that Swedish deliveries to Finland be halted, but
if such a demand should be made, it would be flatly rejected by Sweden.
Quite contrary to his custom, Giinther also attended the reception at
the Legation on December 6 on the occasion of the national holiday.
This step, he told me, was intended as a demonstrative act. The new
situation no doubt entails possibilities of an aggravation of Anglo-
Swedish relations. Such a favorable development for us might
possibly be hampered, however, if we were now to make special de-
mands on Sweden. For the present, therefore, I believe that as far
as possible only the usual economic negotiations, which are difficult
enough as it is, and such others as are of a more or less routine nature,
should be conducted. But if it becomes necessary to make special
demands, the opinion here is that it would be best if they were pre-
sented by Finland. Apart from the fact, that the development indi-
cated above would thereby not be prevented from running its full
course, such a procedure would probably be most likely to succeed,
since, as I have been able to gather from previous statements made
occasionally by the Foreign Minister, there is special sympathy here
for everything which is in the interest of Finland.
WlED
1 See document No. 540 and footnote 7.
a Mr. Herschel V. Johnson, named Minister to Sweden, Oct. 21, 1941.
* Victor Alexander Louis Mallet,
982 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 562
111/115618-18
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Telegram
most decent Berlin, December 8, 1941.
top seceet Sent December 9 — 12 : 15 a. m.
No. 2294
RAM 249
Exclusively for the Ambassador personally.
In the course of the discussions here with Ambassador Oshima * I
have handed him today the enclosed draft of an agreement between
Germany, Italy, and Japan which in essence corresponds to a draft
presented by Oshima. 2 Oshima will for his part transmit this draft
to Tokyo. In order to make sure that it is transmitted, I request that
you, too, give the text to the Japanese Government at once. Further-
more please do everything at your end to see that the assent of the
Japanese Government is communicated to Ambassador Oshima in time
so that the signature can take place here in Berlin on Wednesday 3
morning, our time, at the latest. You may remark casually in this
connection that the Japanese Government itself has an interest in
speeding this up, since the agreement may be announced here in a
special form.
I request an immediate reply if possible.*
The text of the draft follows:
Ribbentrop
1 See Editors' Note, p. 977. For additional information regarding these dis-
cussions which took place on Dec. 8, see the texts of Intercepted telegrams sent
to Tokyo by Oshima on Dec. 8, printed in Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 35, Pro-
ceedings of the Clausen Investigation, pp. 687-688.
' Not found. Osbuna's account In one of the intercepted telegrams (see foot-
note 1) has the following comment regarding the differences between the Japa-
nese draft and the draft printed here:
"From 5 p.m. to-day myself, Bibbentrop, Ease, TJshida, and Gaus put our
heads together on this matter of the declaration on the nonconclusiou of a sepa-
rate peace with a view to imparting to tbis declaration the loftiest possible
significance, and produced the text of the agreement contained In my telegram
under reference. This goes beyond the adoption of our proposal In regard, to
a promise of nonconcluslon of a separate peace (Clause II) to the following
extent :
"») The Three Powers' firm intention to fight together against Anglo-Ameri-
can aggression until final victory is expressed in Clause II.
"6) Cooperation with a view to the establishment of a new order after the
war Is promised in Clause HI.
"Thereby, the significance of the war is elucidated, while atr the same time
Clause III has an advantage from the point of view of obtaining German and
Italian cooperation when the Great Bast Asia co-prosperity sphere is estab-
lished after the war, this, I believe, being in accord with the views of the Japa-
nese Government ..."
See also International Military Tribunal for the Far Bast, exhibit No, 3512.
•Dec 10.
* See document No. 668.
DECEMBER 1941 983
[Enclosure]
In their unshakable determination not to lay down arms until the
joint war against the United States of America and England has
been brought to a successful conclusion, the German Government, the
Italian Government, and the Japanese Government have agreed upon
the following provisions :
Article 1
Germany, Italy, and Japan will jointly wage the war forced upon
them by the United States of America and England until its vic-
torious conclusion with all the powers at their command.
Article 2
Germany, Italy, and Japan undertake not to conclude an armistice
or peace either with the United States of America or with England
except in full mutual agreement.
Article 3
Germany, Italy, and Japan will cooperate very closely after a vic-
torious conclusion of the war for the purpose of bringing about a
just new order.
Article 4
This agreement shall enter into force immediately upon its
signature.
In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized by their Gov-
ernments, have signed this agreement and set their seals to it.
Done in triplicate in the German, Italian, and Japanese languages,
each language being equally authentic, in Berlin on December . . .
1941 — in the XXth year of the Fascist Era — corresponding to the
day of the 12th month of the 16th year of the Syowa Era.
No. 563
2281/482772
Memorandvm by the Ambassador in Italy
Eome, December 8, 1941.
After. having gotten in touch once more with Under State Secre-
tary Gaus and Minister von Eintelen, I called on Count Ciano at
8 : 00 p. m. and gave him the text sent me by telegram. 1 Count Ciano
expressed immediately his agreement with the contents, called up the
Duce in my presence, who for his part had likewise no objections to
1 This refers to the text of the draft for the German-Italian-Japaneae agreement
(document No. 562, enclosure) which was sent to Borne by Rintelen lu telegram
No. 3325 of Dec. 8 (2281/482773-74) .
984 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
make, and then telephoned the Reich Foreign Minister, as arranged,
in order to inform him of Italy's concurrence. In the conversation it
was pointed out that the text, which is to precede the agreement when
it is published by way of a kind of retrospect of the whole develop-
ment, would naturally have to be worded differently on the part of
each of the three participating states according to its different situa-
tion. Our version would be forwarded to the Italians as soon as
possible in order to give them an indication of what our introductory
text would look like.
Because of the direct telephone conversation, Cianc— Ribbentrop, I
have refrained from reporting by telegraph or telephone on the
execution of the instructions and I arranged with Count Ciano that
in case the communication, which was still to come, should arrive after
his departure for Turin 2 at 11 :00 p. m., I should approach the Duce
directly during the two days of his absence. 3
M[ackensen]
1 See document No. 557 and footnote 5.
"The German version of the retrospect which was to precede the published
text of the agreement was forwarded to Rome in Bintelen's telegram No. 3340
of Dee. 9 (2281/482777-78) . According to Maekensen's telegram No. 8210 of Dec.
9 (2281/482779) he handed an Italian translation of this text (2281/482780-81)
to d'Ajeta who had been authorized by Ciano to deal with the matter and who
was to draw up at once a similar Italian statement.
No. 564
8589/E603090-97
Ftihrer's Directive
chefsache Fuheer's Headquarters, December 8, 1941.
TOP SECRET MILITARY
The Fiihrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op) No. 442090/41 g. K. Chefs.
Directive No. 39
The surprisingly early arrival of severe winter weather in the
/ east and the supply difficulties resulting therefrom call for the im-
v mediate cessation of all major offensive operations and a shift to the
defensive.
The conduct of this defensive will be determined by the objective
to which it is directed, namely :
(a) To retain such areas as are of. great importance to the enemy
with respect to his operations and armament production.
(b) To make possible for the Wehrmacht forces committed in the
east the greatest possible measure of recuperation and rehabilitation.
DECEMBER 1941 985
(c) To bring about by the foregoing the prerequisites for resuming
major offensive operations in 1942.
Specifically, I order the following :
I. Army:
1. The bulk of the Army in the east will as soon as possible shift
to the defensive in positions sparing of manpower to be designated
by the Commander in Chief of the Army, and thereupon initiate
rehabilitation of the units, with the armored and motorized divi-
sions in particular to be withdrawn from the front line.
2. Wherever the front is moved back in the absence of enemy pres-
sure, provision must first be made for a rear position affording better
living conditions and better defense facilities to the troops than the
positions previously held.
Abandonment of important lateral communications to the enemy
may put in jeopardy other front sectors not as yet consolidated.
Where this occurs, timing of the withdrawal from particular sectors
must take account of the over-all situation.
3. The course of the front must be calculated to facilitate billeting
of the troops as well as defense and permit organization of a simplified
supply system that would function also during the thaw season.
Switch and rear positions must be laid out and constructed as
speedily as possible as field fortifications, drawing upon manpower
wherever it can be found.
4. Within the framework of the essentially defensive pattern of
operations, the following special missions must be accomplished :
(a) Sevastopol is to be seized as soon as possible; employment of
the bulk of Eleventh Army (less the contingents required for coastal
defense) will be decided after conclusion of fighting in that area.
(b) Army Group, South, notwithstanding all difficulties must en-
deavor to achieve the conditions which, given favorable weather
conditions, would permit it to launch an offensive to seize the lower
Don-Donets line still during the winter. That would provide favor-
able conditions for the spring offensive aimed against the Caucausus.
(c) Army Group, North is to shorten its eastern and southeastern
front north of Lake Ilmen without relinquishing the road and railroad
line from Tikhvin to Volkhov and Kolchenavo [Koltschanccwo] to the
enemy, so as to provide the essential conditions for resolving the
situation south of Lake Ladoga as soon as reinforcements arrive. Only
thus can the final isolation of Leningrad and establishment of contact
with the Finnish Karelian Army be assured.
(d) Should it be found that the enemy has withdrawn the bulk of
his forces from the coastal strip south of Kromtadt Bay and no longer
intends to put up any serious defense there, the shore in that area must
be seized to economize forces.
986 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
II. Luftwaffe:
1. The mission of the Luftwaffe shall be to disrupt rehabilitation
of the Russian armed forces as much as possible by raids against the
armament and training centers, especially Leningrad, Moscow,
Shcherbakov, Gorki, Voronezh, Rostov, Stalingrad, Krasnodar, etc.
Of particular importance is the continuing disruption of the lines of
communication by which the enemy lives, and the utilization of which
imperils our own front sectors. In addition to combating the enemy
air force, all-out support must be given to the Army in the defense
against enemy attacks on the ground and from the air.
2. The organization plan conforming with the Army Group
boundaries submitted to me, and the strength of the Luftwaffe con-
tingents scheduled to remain in the east have my approval. Where
the situation may permit upon conclusion of the Army operations, in-
dividual units may be withdrawn for rehabilitation and training.
3. In order to provide for effective repulse of any winter offensives
and allow for our planned winter operations (see I, 4), a ground
organization shall be maintained to permit prompt shifting of forces
and bringing up reinforcements from units withdrawn. To this end,
the rehabilitation areas shall be organized as close as possible to the
eastern front.
4. Continuous, complete and far-sweeping air reconnaissance is
especially important for early detection and watching of regrouping
movements of the enemy. The Army and the Luftwaffe shall supple-
ment each other in this task through allocation of resources and
missions.
5. I shall continue to reserve the right to authorize withdrawal from
the front near Moscow of contingents still earmarked for commitment
in the area of the Commander in Chief, South. 1
6. Local forces must provide for the air defense of their own billet-
ing and supply areas, and also for securing their important rear com-
munications. In order to take effective countermeasures when con-
centrations of the enemy's attacking air arm have been identified, ar-
rangements shall be made which will permit prompt formation of
concentrations of our own fighter forces for interceptive action.
III. The Navy shall take steps to ensure that the sea route to
Helsinki, which will be less hazardous after the seizure of Hango and
Osmussar [Ostrov], shall be available on a large scale for commercial
navigation and supply movements for our forces in Finland.
The number of small vessels to be constructed at home and in the
allied or occupied countries for supply operations (especially across
the Black Sea and in the Aegean Sea) must still be substantially in-
1 Field Marshal Kesselring. See document No. 535.
DECEMBER 1941 987
creased, setting aside all not absolutely vital demands and security
considerations.
IV. Personnel replacements for the Wehrmacht in 1942 must be
assured even in the event that casualties should run high. Since the
1922 age class alone will be insufficient, drastic measures are called for.
I therefore order :
1. All personnel now on Wehrmacht assignments at home or on
special missions (e.g., Wehrmacht mission in Rumania) that can be
released must be made available for the fighting front through a
sweeping retrenchment program.
Soldiers of younger age classes now in the Zone of the Interior or in
rear services shall in that connection be exchanged for older frontline
soldiers.
2. Regarding the exchanges between the eastern and western
theaters of war, the following rules shall apply :
Fully employable divisions of the second and third wave stationed
in the west shall be exchanged for exceptionally combat-worn divisions
in the east. A temporary weakening in France, during the winter
only, could be afforded in that conjunction.
Combat-experienced officers, non-commissioned officers and men
from eastern divisions slated for disbanding may be assigned to such
western divisions.
Whether additional western divisions which cannot be employed as
units in the east shall he disbanded and used for replenishing tried
eastern divisions shall be decided by me when I have before me the
complete plan of the Army for its reorganization and disposition.
The combat efficiency of the Army in the west must in any event be
kept up to the level of assuring protection of the coasts and execution
of Operation Attila. 2
3. Young workers with service exemptions must to the greatest
possible extent be gradually replaced by prisoners and Russian civilian
workers to be put to work in groups. Special directives to that end
will be issued by the High Command of the Wehrmacht. 3
Adolf Hitler
1 See vol. xi of this series, document No. 488.
*In Hitter's flies on the USSR there is an interesting memorandum (1386/
358843-^16) dated Dec. 8, 1941, and entitled : "How can and will the Soviet Union
continue the war in the Tear 1942." The memorandum excluded either (a) col-
lapse of the government through rebellion of the population and overthrow, or
(6) capitulation and separate peace as long as such a man as Stalin was at the
head of affairs and it forecast a continuation of delaying warfare in 1942. There
is no signature to the document but Hilger's name Is written at the top indi-
cating that he was possibly the author. There is no indication of any circulation
or distribution of the memorandum.
988 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 565
4475/E0S7960/61
CrermaftrSwedisk Agreement Regarding the Delivery of War
Materials
Stockholm, December 8, 1941.
Secret Protocol
[Ha. Pol. 8278 g.] 1
Agreement was reached on the following:
I
Subject to the conclusion of transactions between the German supply
firms and the Swedish import authorities, the delivery of the following
war material to Sweden is promised by Germany : 2
1) Some 15,000 binoculars, 6 x 30, deliverable in 6-8 months after
conclusion of the transaction, in about equal monthly installments;
2) Some 11,000 field telescopes from the firms of Zeiss, Busch, etc.,
deliverable as under 1) ;
3) Two thousand light machine guns with accessories and ammuni-
tion (quantity still to be determined) from the Brno [Brunn] Muni-
tions Works; deliverable in some 6 equal monthly installments after
transaction is concluded;
4) One hundred and ten light field howitzers 10.5 cm. with 300,000
rounds, deliverable at the rate of at least 8 pieces a month, beginning
1 month after the conclusion of the transaction, likewise 30,000 rounds
a month; (Sweden's desire for an increase in the delivery to 140 pieces
and 400,000 rounds is being considered by Germany) ;
5) Three batteries of 3 pieces each of 21-cm. long-barreled Skoda
cannons (with 1350 half -armor shells and 1350 high-explosive shells).
Delivery beginning some 18 months after conclusion of the trans-
action at the rate of two guns a month; corresponding ammunition.
(Sweden's desire to purchase a license for the manufacture of high-
explosive shells instead of the delivery of 1350 units is being considered
by Germany.)
6) Twenty-five million rounds of Pistol Ammunition Parabellum
08, deliverable in monthly installments of about 3 million rounds, be-
ginning one month after conclusion of the transaction. (Sweden's
desire for an increase to 50 million rounds is being studied by
Germany.)
1 The file number is supplied from a copy of the agreement in the flies of
Ministerialdirektor Wiehl (2116/460563-64).
1 Cf . document No. 5&.
DECEMBER 1941 989
7) Up to 340 20- watt ultra shortwave transmitters and up to 940
receivers, as well as up to 50 Telefmiken 15-watt instruments, deliver-
ies to start in the second half of 1942 ;
8) Up to 1,300 Telefunken portable receivers, deliverable in 1943.
(On figures 7 and 8, consideration is being given as to whether, in
view of the long delivery periods, the manufacturing license may not
be acquired instead.)
Ten percent of the purchase price of each German delivery will be
paid by Sweden outside of the German-Swedish Clearing Agreement, 3
in Swedish kronor, converted at the official Berlin medium rate of
exchange. These Swedish kronor may be freely used by Germany for
payment within Sweden, The payment of the remaining 90 percent
of the purchase price is to be made through the medium of the German-
Swedish Clearing Agreement.
Sweden will see to it that the quantities of alloys and other non-
ferrous metals, as well as other raw materials, of which there are
limited stocks in Germany, such as rubber, which are needed for the
manufacture of the equipment purchased, are supplied. Those raw
materials which are supplied will be paid for by Germany through the
medium of the German-Swedish Clearing Agreement.
II
Germany will agree to the sale of the license to manufacture steel
cartridge cases.
Germany will promise to expedite consideration of the possibility
of supplying up to 600 field cars without tires, Type A 330, from the
Klockner-Humboldt-Deutz A.G., the Ulm factory.
Ill
The war material purchased from Germany and the equipment, etc.,
manufactured as a result of the licensing will be used exclusively by
the Swedish Army. The licenses will likewise be exploited only in
Sweden.*
W. Walter
G. Hagglof
* See document No. 347 and footnote 2.
'The German-Swedish general economic agreement signed by Walter and
HagglSf <2116/460572-«33) for the two governmental committees was not con-
cluded until Dec. 19, beyond the scope of this volume.
A general sketch of the agreement was submitted by the Legation In telegram
No. 2125 of 1 )ec. 14 ( 205/143128-30) .
990 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN .POLICY
No. 566
482/231253
Minute by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs
Berlin, December 8, 1941.
D III 664 g.
Minister Benzler, who is currently in Berlin, communicated the
following by telephone :
In the plan for the further treatment of the matter of the Serbian
Jews, a change had occurred since the conference in Belgrade, 1 in
that the Jews now would not be sent to a Serbian island, but rather
to the Zemun camp. The island previously under consideration is
under water. The Croats had agreed to the Jews' being sent to Zemun
as a temporary camp.
Minister Benzler requested on that account that the Jews should
be taken away to the east at the earliest. I replied that this was
completely out of the question before next spring because the deporta-
tion of the Jews from Germany had priority. Even next spring
such a transfer would still be doubtful.
Herewith submitted to Under State Secretary Luther with the
request that the contents be noted.
B.ADEMACHER
1 See document No. 425.
No. 567
32/25088-00
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry .
Telegram
host urgent Tokto, December 9, 1941 — 2:30a.m.
No. 2690 of December 8 Received December 10 — 1 : 40 p. m.
For the Foreign Minister.
The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs received me this after-
noon and told me that he also wanted to inform me personally of
the great decision taken by the Japanese Government to enter the
war, after the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs 1 had already
given me this morning a summary of the development of the Japanese-
American conversations and the memorandum delivered to the Ameri-
can Government. 2 He would ask me to take note of the facts
1 Haruhlko Nishi.
'Eeported by Ott In telegram No. 2676 of Dee. 8 (32/25054). For a pub-
lished text of the Japanese memorandum handed to Secretary Hull on Dec. 7,
see Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941, vol. n, pp. 787-792.
DECEMBER 1941 991
represented in. these papers. Japan had by Imperial Rescript declared
war on America and the British Empire this morning. The Japanese
Government had issued a statement relating thereto, of which I prob-
ably had knowledge also. 8
I told the Japanese Foreign Minister that I felt certain that Japan's
great and momentous decision was attended by the best wishes of the
entire German people. The first reports received about the military
actions indicated that the first Japanese operation had been a great
success.
Togo replied, thanking me from his heart for my wishes in this
fateful hour. This war, as the documents made clear, was a war
forced upon Japan. The Japanese people would carry it through
with the most resolute determination. The Japanese Government
now expected Germany on her part to declare war on America very
soon, and he would ask me to convey this wish of the Japanese Gov-
ernment to Berlin. Ambassador Oshima had received a similar in-
struction. 4 The Minister further stated that Oshima had also been
given the necessary instructions relating to an agreement to act only
jointly in concluding peace or an armistice.
In accordance with telegram No. 2282 of December 6 B I replied
that the Axis Powers and Japan find themselves faced with a struggle
upon which hangs their fate, which they must fight through together
and regardless of the form of the tactical moves taken by one or the
other partner in the individual case. I would not fail to convey
immediately to my Government Japan's wish for a speedy declaration
of war.
*In telegram No. 2684 of Dec. 8 (32/25064-66) Ott had forwarded the
English text of the Imperial Rescript concerning the Japanese declaration of
war on the United States and Great Britain. According to a memorandum
of Dec. 8 by Siegfried (32/25059), the Japanese Embassy informed Weizs&cker
by telephone on Dec. 8 that the Imperial Rescript regarding the declaration
of war had been issued.
* No record of such a demarche carried out by Oshima has been found in the
German Foreign Ministry flies. What appears to be Oshima's account of the
matter is found in the following intercepted telegram sent by him to Tokyo on
Dec. 8 the text of which is printed in Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 12, Joint Com-*
mittee Exhibits Nos. 1-6, p. 253 :
"At 1: 00 p.m. today (8th) I called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and told
him our wish was to have Germany and Italy issue formal declarations of war
on America at once. Ribbentrop replied that Hitler was then in the midst of
a conference at general headquarters discussing how the formalities of declar-
ing war could be carried out so as to make a good impression on the German
people and that he would transmit your wish to him at once and do whatever
he was able to have it carried out promptly. At that time Ribbentrop told me
that on the morning of the 8th Hitler issued orders to the entire German Navy
to attack American ships whenever and wherever they may meet them.
"It goes without saying that this is only for your secret information."
Cf. Ribbentrop's statement after the war regarding Hitler's attitude toward
the question of a German declaration of war on the United States in Trial of
the Major War Criminals, vol. x, pp. 297-298 ; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression,
Supplement B, pp. 1199-1200.
* Document No. 551.
992 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The Foreign Minister also told me that no declaration of war had
as yet been received from the Dutch Government.
With British troops having been the first to cross the southern
border into Thailand, Japanese forces had also been landed in the
south of Thailand. No detailed reports were available as yet about
the attitude of the Thai Government. But Japan had been able to
reach a peaceful agreement with Thailand today.
No change had occurred in the relations between Japan and the
Soviet Union. In reply to my question what the Japanese Govern-
ment intended to do about possible American arms shipments in Rus-
sian ships to Vladivostok, Togo replied that according to the infor-
mation of the Japanese Government, only very minor quantities of
arms had been shipped by this route to date. This issue, which I had
raised with him on several occasions, was rather complex. He would
like to ask me not to require him to go further into it at this time, as
he was still studying it.
The Foreign Minister, who had displayed a very serious manner
throughout the conversation, then stated that the Japanese Govern-
ment was viewing the over-all situation with calm. It was hoped that
the attack on Hawaii would deter the Americans from a thrust into
the western Pacific Ocean. For that reason the Japanese Govern-
ment intended to order no blackout and carry on without declaring
a state of siege. The Japanese Government was well aware that the
war might be very long and hard.
In conclusion I expressed to the Japanese Minister for Foreign
Affairs my wish for closest cooperation and sincerest friendship, and
my hope for an early successful conclusion of the armed conflict in
which we were standing side by side. The Minister assured me that
he, too, was hoping for very close and sincere cooperation.
Ott
No. 568
111/11566T-68
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most urgent Tokto, December 9, 1941 — 8 : 20 a. m., summer time.
No. 2699 Received December 9— 10: 10 p. m.
For the Reich Foreign Minister.
With reference to your telegram No. 2294 of December 8. 1
Immediately after the decoding of the clear text had been finished,
I gave the Foreign Minister the draft agreement and asked for speedy
concurrence in accordance with instructions. The Foreign Minister
1 Document No. 562.
DECEMBER 1941 993
stressed that the Japanese Government attached the greatest import-
ance to having it signed and published as quickly as possible.
He hoped to be able to wire Ambassador Oshima the final text and
full powers in the early afternoon of Wednesday, 2 Japanese time.
In order to secure the prompt assent of the Privy Council and Emperor
he requested our acceptance, by tonight at the latest, of the following
two proposals which he considers indispensable for the Privy Council :
1. In article 3:
a. More precise definition of the term "just new order" possibly by
adding "in accordance with the Tripartite Pact."
&. Obligation of immediate cooperation possibly by inserting "also"
after the words "Japan will."
2. In article 4:
Timing of the agreement in accordance with the Tripartite Pact,
as is said to have been provided for in a supposedly earlier draft.
In order to guarantee the long-range cooperation envisaged in article
3, one could possibly include a supplement to the effect that the con-
tracting parties are to arrange for the continuation of the cooperation
before expiration of the agreement.
The Foreign Minister insisted on the necessity of such additions, in
spite of the fact that I had urgently requested, for the sake of gaining
time, that the German draft be agreed to.
Since the draft and any explanations of the text had not yet been
received from Ambassador Oshima, I agreed to request a speedy state-
ment of the position of the Reich Foreign Minister. The Foreign
Minister asked finally when the German declaration of war on the
U.S.A. was to be expected. I said that I was not informed, but that I
considered it possible that Germany and Italy intended to announce
the actual existence of a state of war with the U.S.A. through the
publication of the agreement now under consideration. The Foreign
Minister stressed in this connection that Japan particularly desired
a formal declaration of war with a subsequent publication of the
agreement. 3
Ott
* Cf Foreign Minister Togo's account of this conversation in his intercepted
telegrams of Dec. 9 to Oshima, the texts of which are printed in Pearl Harbor
Attack, pt. 35, Proceedings of Clausen Investigation, pp. 691-692.
682-90 B — 64 68
994 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 569
F6/0122-29
Memorandum, by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
RAM 64 g. Es. Berlin, December 10, 1941.
Record of a Conversation Between the Foreign Minister and
Ambassador Alfebri in Berlin on December 9, 1941
Ambassador Aliieri explained that be had requested an appointment
with the Foreign Minister pursuant to the telegraphic instruction
received from Count Ciano to ascertain the position taken by Ger-
many on Japan's acts against America and England and to inquire
about the meeting between Reichsmarschall Goring and Petain. 1
The Foreign Minister replied that he himself had received a de-
tailed report on the Goring-Petain meeting only today, after the
Reichsmarschall's return. He had already sent an informatory tele-
gram to Herr von Mackensen so that he could acquaint the Duce
and Count Ciano with the facts." It would also be possible for him to
make that informatory telegram available to Ambassador Alfieri.
Concerning Japan's acts against America and England he had al-
ready talked directly with Count Ciano by telephone, telling him that
these developments were of momentous significance and cause for con-
gratulations on the part of the Axis. 3 He hoped that the Japanese
would be able to deliver a decisive blow, and he had learned with
deep satisfaction from Oshima * that two battleships, among them
the West Virginia had already been sunk by the Japanese.
Japan had launched large-scale operations, attacked Pearl Harbor
in the Hawaiian Islands and Manila in the Philippines, and in addi-
tion had made a landing on the Malay Peninsula as a preliminary to
the assault on Singapore. This was of the highest importance. Also,
Hong Kong had been attacked, and Guam had been seized.
The essential thing was that Japan now was in the fighting on the
side of the Axis. This was a heavy blow for America and worse even
for England. It represented the most important event to develop
since the beginning of the war.
1 See document No. 529.
' Telegram No. 3318 of Dee. 8 (2281/480963-66) in which RIbbentrop directed
Mackensen orally to inform Ciano about the Gbring-Pfitain meeting before
Clano's departure for his meeting at Turin with Darlan.
In telegram No. 3200 of Dec. 8 (1206/331854) Mackensen reported that he
had informed Ciano and in telegram No. 3211 of Dec. 9 (1206/331857-59) that
he had Informed Mussolini.
'The telephone conversation is referred to in document No. 563. Cf. The
Ciano Diaries, entry for Dec. 8, 1941.
* This subject came up in the Ribbentrop-Oshima discussions of Dec. 8, referred
to in document No. 562 and footnote 1.
DECEMBER 1041 995
Concluding, the Foreign Minister noted that certain questions were
still being studied on the German side and that he might possibly
see Alfieri once more later in the day in order to let him have the
picture of things. It concerned an arrangement to be executed, for
which Alfieri would need full powers.
Following this, Alfieri brought up a personal matter. He related,
with some agitation, that on the occasion of the luncheon given by
the Fiihrer for the signers of the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Reichs-
marschall had made a complaint to Count Ciano about the Italian
Embassy. The Eeichsmarschall stated that one of his officers had
been told in Italy by a prominent Italian that rumors were being
spread by the Italian Embassy in Berlin that the Eeichsmarschall no
longer had the confidence of the Fiihrer. The Eeichsmarschall had
shown great indignation to Count Ciano over those rumors. Ciano im-
mediately told him that to his knowledge nothing of such a nature had
ever been mentioned in any report received from Berlin, but promised
that he would institute a thorough investigation of the matter.
Apparently the Eeichsmarschall had also complained to the Fiihrer
about, these rumors for he (Alfieri) attributed to this the exceedingly
warm words which the Fiihrer used when he referred to the Eeichs-
marschall in his talk with Ciano.
Ciano had now written a letter to the Eeichsmarschall regarding the
incident and instructed Alfieri to deliver the letter in person. Because
of the EeichsmarschalPs absence this had not been possible so that he
(Alfieri) had arranged for transmission of Ciano's letter together with
a letter of his own to the Reichsmarschall by other means. Alfieri
added to this report the remark that he felt personally involved by the
action of the Eeichsmarschall because as chief of the Italian Embassy
he naturally bore the responsibility for everything that happened
within his jurisdiction. After the earlier episodes " he would thus
once more become the object of a complaint from the German side.
It appeared most serious to him that the Eeichsmarschall had said
nothing directly to him about the case. He could state categorically
that none of the official reports dispatched from the Embassy in Berlin
had contained anything whatever about a disturbance of the confiden-
tial relationship between the Fiihrer and the Eeichsmarschall. He felt
himself to be unjustly suspected and, considering the other complaints
voiced against him on a previous occasion, found himself so compro-
mised in his position as Ambassador that confronted with these devel-
opments he appealed to the Eeich Minister for protection.
The Reich Minister then raised the question as to what could be the
explanation that rumors of such a nature about the Italian Embassy
kept coming from Eome; whether he (Alfieri) could indeed fully rely
on the staff at his Embassy ; and whether he knew for a certainty that
' See documents Nos. 409, 411, and 446.
996 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
none of the outgoing reports or other written materials had included
any thing of that kind.
Alfieri first asserted with great assurance that it was utterly impos-
sible for Embassy reports to have contained anything of that nature
about the Reichsmarschall, because all outgoing reports were examined
by him.
When the Reich Minister reverted to his earlier suggestion and spe-
cifically recalled an instance in the past which also seemed to have in-
volved a member of the Italian Embassy staff, who must have possessed
accurate information on everything that went on, Alfieri became a
little less sure. He observed that the Italian Embassy comprised a
staff of 100 persons, of whom only 13 or 14, however, were actually
members of the diplomatic corps, and he seemed to concede the possi-
bility that someone was sending reports or writing letters behind his
back of which he was ignorant.
Upon the Foreign Minister's repeatedly reiterated suggestion that it
was strange indeed that such rumors about the Italian Embassy
should keep cropping up in Rome and that there might be someone
there who was ill-disposed toward him, Alfieri finally did admit that
being a former cabinet minister, he naturally had political enemies
and those might be spreading things of that kind.
Finally he presented a carbon copy of the letter to the Reichs-
marschall and of his own covering letter, asking that they be treated
in strict confidence, and in a state of considerable agitation he con-
tinued to complain about the injustice done to him.
In closing the Reich Minister promised that he would straighten
out the matter with the Reichsmarschall.
Schmidt
No. 570
252/164786-88
The Foreign Minister to the Embassies in Argentina, Brazil, and
Chile, and to the Legationin Peru
Telegram
most urgent Berlin, December 10, 1941 — 11 : 50 p. m.
TOP SECRET
RAM 259
To Buenos Aires No. 1469
To Lima No. 370
To Rio de Janeiro No. 2334
To Santiago No. 599
Please call on the Foreign Minister at your post on December 11,
toward noon, and inform him that the policy of the President of the
DECEMBER 1941
997
United States of America has now led to an open state of war between
the United States of America on one side and Japan, the German
Reich, and Italy on the other, after the United States has for some
time already engaged in actual warlike acts against Germany and
Italy, as has been known to the Government there. I request that you
explain once more to the Foreign Minister at your post the political
developments which have led to this situation, stressing the exclusive
responsibility of President Roosevelt and that you refer to the official
German statements which will be made tomorrow in the course of
the day. 1
Following that, please tell the Foreign Minister that we are fully
convinced that the Government will not let itself be dislodged from
its policy of neutrality, which it has followed so far, by the machina-
tions of the policy of the United States which, in many respects, is
contrary to the vital interests and the independence of the Latin
American countries. It would be superfluous to stress that there was
not the slightest cause to institute a change in the hitherto existing
relationship between the Government and ourselves. The Government
at your post was, of course, well enough informed to what extent all
allegations of supposedly hostile intentions by Germany against
Central and South American states were invented and belonged to the
realm of fantasy in order to hide the selfish designs of the United States
for the subjugation of the South American continent. 2
Please report on the reception of your demarche. 3
This instruction goes to Buenos Aires, Lima, Rio de Janeiro, and
Santiago.
RlBBENTROF
1 See documents Nos. 572, 577, and 578 and footnote 9.
* Cf. document No. 158.
* For the reply from Buenos Aires, see document No. 575.
In his reply from Lima, telegram No. 703 of Dec. 11 (229/154290) Noebel, the
German Minister, reported that the question of Peruvian neutrality would be
decided by the Government and that it would most likely consult with other Latin
American countries In this matter.
The reply from Santiago, telegram No. 744 of Dec. 11 (197/88423-24) stressed
the pessimistic mood of the Chilean Foreign Minister and the dependence of Chile
on the United States.
As to Brazil, Priifer, in telegram No. 248 of Dec. 11 (235/157342) mentioned
the Pan-American commitments of the country which, by necessity, had an
adverse influence on German-Brazilian relations in the current crisis. Brazil
would certainly proclaim its solidarity with the United States.
998 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 571
64/44747
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Telegram
priority Berlin, December 10, 1941.
MOST tTRGENT
No. 2307
RAM 253
With reference to your telegram 2699 of December 9. 1
Please inform the Foreign Minister at once that the Reich Govern-
ment agrees to all of the changes in the draft agreement which he
has proposed. 2 Thus the amended articles 3 and 4 would receive the
following wording:
"Article 3.
"Germany, Italy, and Japan will also cooperate very closely after
a victorious conclusion of the war for the purpose of bringing about
a just new order in accordance with the Tripartite Pact concluded by
them on September 27, 1940.
"Article 4.
"This agreement shall enter into force immediately upon its signa-
ture and shall remain valid as long as the Tripartite Pact of Septem-
ber 27, 1940. The High Contracting Parties shall consult with one
another in due time prior to the expiration of this term of validity
concerning the further form of their cooperation provided for in
article 3 of this agreement."
Please insist once more with the utmost vigor that Ambassador
Oshima be issued full powers to sign the agreement in this version
without any further delay and that they arrive here in any case by
Wednesday noon at the latest. 8
RlBBENTROP
1 Document No. 568.
*In telegram No. 3212 of Dec. 10 (1206/331860) Mackensen informed the For-
eign Ministry of Italy's assent to the charges proposed by Japan.
In telegram No. 2308 of Dec. 10 (64/44748) Ribbentrop directed Ott to inform
Togo of the Italian concurrence with the proposed changes.
*In his reply telegTam No. 2712 of Dec. 10 (111/115682) Ott reported that
Togo would make every effort to have the proposed text accepted by the Cabinet,
the Privy Council, and the Emperor by 7 : 00 p. m., Japanese time, of the same
day and to send Oshima full powers by telegraph right away. Copies of
Oshima's full powers in German translation as sent from Tokyo on Dec, 10
are in the flies (2871/564947-48), See Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 35, Proceed-
ings of the Clausen Investigation, pp. 690-691.
DECEMBER 1941 999
No. 572
64/44825-29
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy m the United States 1
Telegram
host urgent Berlin, December 10, 1941.
top secret BAM 257.
Priority Handling
No. 2391
For the Charge d'Affaires personally.
On December 11, at 3 : 30 p.m., German summer time, please deliver
to Mr. Hull or, in case be cannot be reached, to his representative, a ,
copy of the following note which I shall deliver an hour earlier to
the American Charge d'Affaires* here:
"Mr. Charge 1 d'Affaires : The Government of the United States of
America having violated in the most flagrant manner and in ever
increasing measure all rules of neutrality m favor of the adversaries
of Germany and having continually been guilty of the most severe
provocations toward Germany ever since the outbreak of the Euro-
pean War, provoked by the British declaration of war against Ger-
many on September 3, 1939, has finally resorted to open military
acts of aggression.
"On September 11, 1941, s the President of the United States of
America publicly declared that he had ordered the American Navy
and Air Force to shoot on sight at any German war vessel. In his 'S
speech of October 27, 1941, 4 he once more expressly affirmed that this
order was in force.
"Acting under this order, vessels of the American Navy, since early
September 1941, have systematically attacked German naval forces.
Thus, American destroyers, as for instance the Greer, the Kearney
and the Reuben James, have opened fire on German submarines ac-
cording to plan. The Secretary of the American Navy, Mr. Knox,
himself confirmed that American destroyers attacked German sub-
marines.
"Furthermore, the naval forces of the United States of America
under order of their Government and contrary to international law
have treated and seized German merchant vessels on the high seas
as enemy ships.
"The German Government therefore establishes the following facts :
"Although Germany on her part has strictly adhered to the rules
of international law in her relations with the United States of Amer-
1 The text of this instruction was sent by Kintelen to the Embassy in Italy
In telegram No. 3356 of Dee. 10 (64/4481&-24) .
1 Leland B. Morris. See document No. 577.
* See document No. 304, footnote 1.
* See document No. 439, footnote 2.
1000 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
ica during every period of the present war, the Government of the
United States of America from initial violations of neutrality has
finally proceeded to open acts of war against Germany. It has thereby
virtually created a state of war.
"The Government of the Reich consequently discontinues diplo-
matic relations with the United States of America and declares that
in these circumstances brought about by President Roosevelt Germany
too, as from today, considers herself as being in a state of war with
the United States of America.
"Accept Mr. Charge d'Affaires, the expression of my high consid-
eration. Ribbentrop."
Following this, please ask for your passports and request proper
repatriation to Europe for Embassy personnel and include as many
press and other representatives as possible. Please entrust the pro-
tection of German interests to the Swiss Minister in Washington 5
who will receive appropriate instruction from his Government.
Please ensure that, before carrying out the foregoing instruction
there is no contact whatsoever between the Embassy and the State
Department. ; W : e want te avoid absolutely the American Govern -
llnjlllr j irrottTrrtt* tt tttttrt/ii LlfJUIl TtTJ U V UHALlUg w Tjuvjfj ttt uj.iuu nin.^. j. \jl
that reason no official communication from the State Department
must be accepted before your demarche is made.
Immediate acknowledgment of receipt of this order is requested. 7
The secret transmitter is to be destroyed beyond recognition, the entire
cipher material at your post is to be destroyed and its destruction is
to be reported to us.
RlBBENTROP
* Charles Bruggmann.
*The passage scored through was deleted before the telegram was dispatched.
7 Sent by Thomsen in telegram No. 4337 of Dec. 10 (64/44814) . The note was
handed by Thomsen to Bay Atherton, Chief of the European Division of the
Department of State on Dec. 11 at 9:30 a. m. See Department of State,
Bulletin, 1941, vol. v, p. 480.
No. 573
89S/2B2102
Memorandum by an Official of Political Division IM
top secret December 10, 1941.
Pol. IM 3514 g.Rs.
Counselor of Legation von Welck reports as follows :
The Fiihrer has decided that the conversation begun by the Reichs-
marschall with Petain * is to be continued and that the Wehrmacht
Operations Staff is available to the Reichsmarschall for tliis purpose.
1 Document No. 529.
DECEMBER 1941 1001
The French Armistice Commission is to be informed 2 that the Reichs-
marschall would be willing to receive the Colonial Minister, Admiral
Platon, as the representative of the French Government, and the
Commander in Chief in North Africa, General Juin, to discuss the
plan for the defense of Africa. The French are to be asked to submit
Slans, particularly how they visualize a military collaboration in the
ef ense of the African colonial possessions. 8
Kramarz
' Marginal notes : "Through whom ? Wako Wiesbaden ? R[itter] ."
"Yes. Notification was delivered today (Dec. 10). Text is on the way,
Gtrote]."
The text of this note has been filmed on 898/292097.
" Marginal notes : "H. Kramarz. Has Abetz been notified {only for his own
Information ! ) R[itter], Dec. 10."
"Yes, this has been done with Ang. II [Grote]."
The draft of the telegram to Paris has been filmed on 898/292103.
No. 574
205/143125-26
The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
Stockholm, December 11, 1941 — 1 : 20 p. m.
No. 2099 of December 11 Received December 12 — 1 : 45 a. m.
For the Foreign Minister.
Following a long conversation yesterday with Foreign Minister von
Giinther regarding our wishes in the military field * this afternoon
I gave the King, who had come to the city for this reason, the Fiihrer's
letter. 2 Foreign Minister von Giinther and Minister Prinz zu Wied
were present. The King, who at once opened and read the letter, did
not of his own accord, except for comments of general assent, go into
its contents.
The ensuing conversation, which lasted about half an hour, provided
an opportunity, however, for speaking with the King in greater detail
about the role of Sweden in the fight against Bolshevism, and to in-
terest him in this connection in our wishes in the military field. The
most important open question, the transportation of men on leave and
exchange troops from northern Finland through Sweden to Germany
and back was gone into further. The King related how it had been
owing only to his personal intervention that the question of the trans-
portation in the summer of troops through Sweden had been settled in
accordance with our wishes, s and how also in September the 2d divi-
1 No record of this conversation has been found,
'Document No. 554.
* See document No. 10.
1002 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
sion, under convoy by the Swedish Navy, had been transported
through Swedish territorial waters." With respect to our present
wishes, his response, with Giinther's support, was rather negative. 5
The King referred to the English declaration of war on Finland a and
the state of the war between Germany and the United States,' in order
to point up the everincreasing dangers that were threatening Sweden's
neutrality. Giinther objected that England and America would see
in the permission to transport troops from and to northern Finland a
breach of neutrality and a participation in the military operations.
In conclusion the King referred to the difficult internal political situa-
tion. Even if the Swedish Government withdrew its objections, it
would be repudiated by the Riksdag. To my objection that the
Swedish people would certainly understand a fulfillment of the Ger-
man request, just as had been the case in the summer, the King replied
that unfortunately the Riksdag was not the Swedish people.
The King will consider the matter tomorrow in council with the
Cabinet. There is probably not much prospect of a positive decision,
particularly since the Swedish Government a few days ago again took
a negative stand with regard to the Finnish Government, and the ob-
jection is repeatedly made by Sweden that there is no urgent necessity
of routing these transports through Sweden since, with an appropriate
shifting, they could be routed through Finland as well.
Further telegrapliic report will follow.
SCHNURRE
WlED
* See documents Nos. 176 and 178.
* See document No. 558 and footnotes 1 and 2.
" See document No. 540 and footnote 7.
T See document No. 576.
No. 575
233/156848-49
The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
secret Buenos Aires, December 11, 1941 — 5 : 52 p. m.
No. 2092 of December 11 Received December 12 — 3 : 10 a. m.
With reference to your telegram No. 1469 of December 10. 1
I called on the Foreign Minister this morning as instructed and
made the oral statements called for by the above telegraphic instruc-
tion. The Foreign Minister noted with great seriousness the news of
the state of war existing between Germany and the U.S.A. but de-
* Document No. 570.
DECEMBER 1941 1003
clined to take any stand on the German judgment of the policy of the
U.S. A. and of President Roosevelt.
With regard to the future development of German-Argentine rela-
tions the Foreign Minister stated that those principles of solidarity,
mutual assistance, and joint defense which had steadily been devel-
oped in the course of the various Pan-American conferences and had
been adopted by the Argentine Government were decisive for Argen-
tine foreign policy in the present war. For this reason Argentina was
continuing the consultations with the other American Governments
and would participate in the Pan-American conference which would
be held in Rio de Janeiro perhaps before the end of December.
From these statements by the Foreign Minister and other reports
which I have received, I believe I may conclude that the present
Argentine Government will for the time being strive as far as possible
to continue the policy of neutrality within the framework of the Pan-
American agreements, as is also indicated among other things by the
assumption of the protection of British interests in Japan. The actual
course of the American consultations and the impending decision of
the conference in Rio de Janeiro, where Argentina can hardly isolate
herself, cannot yet be foreseen, however.
Same text to Berlin, Lima, Santiago de Chile, Rio de Janeiro.
Theemann
No. 576
1551/377199-200
The Foreign Minister to the Legations in Hungary, Rumania,
Bulgaria, Croatia, and Slovakia 1
Telegram
1. To Budapest No. 2360 Berlin, December 11, 1941.
2. To Bucharest No. 3520
3. To Sofia No. 1992
4. To Zagreb No. 1484
5. To Bratislava No. 1397
Please approach the Government at your post after consultation
with your Italian colleague, who is receiving corresponding instruc-
tions from Rome, and state the following:
In consequence of the generally known aggressive acts of the United
States the Axis Powers have declared themselves to be in a state of war
with that country. Thus the prerequisites exist for the application
of article 3 of the Tripartite Pact. In the opinion of the German and
1 The text of this Instruction was forwarded by Sonnleithner to the Embassy
in Italy in telegram No. 8380 of Dee. 11 (1551/377201).
1004 DOCUMENTS ON GEBMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Italian Governments this establishes the obligation of the Government
concerned for its part, to declare war on the United States at once.
In this connection we do not consider entry into a state of war to be
merely a break in diplomatic relations but the formal declaration that
a state of war exists. Although no military consequences would result
from this for the Government at your post, it is nevertheless of the
greatest importance politically that all of the Powers associated with
the Tripartite Pact should without hesitation give expression to their
solidarity in an unmistakable manner.
Supplement only for Zagreb, Sofia, Bratislava:
At the same time I request you to suggest to the Government at your
post to declare itself to be in a state of war with England, too, since
considering the development of the situation as a whole, a separation
between war against England and war against the United States no
longer appears possible.
For 1 to 5:
Please wire your report at once.
Supplement only for Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia:
We have informed the Japanese Government of our intention to
make this demarche with the Government at your post and have sug-
gested that it instruct its Legation concerned to make the same
demarche. However, please do not delay the execution of your
demarche for this reason.
Ribbentrop
No. 577
F7/0308-06
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministers Secretariat
RAM 65 g. Us. Berlin, December 11, 1941.
Record of thk Delivery by the Foreign Minister to the American
Charge d'affaires Morris of the German Declaration of War
Against the United States
On December 11, 1941, at 2 ; 18 p. m., the Foreign Minister received
the American Charge d'Affaires Morris in his office at Wilhelmstrasse
74 and, standing, read the following statement:
[Here follows the text of the note printed in document No. 572,
p. 999.]
The Foreign Minister added that President Roosevelt had consist-
ently followed a policy aimed at war. Now he had got the war he
desired.
Morris, who had quietly listened to the reading of the statement and
the additional remark by the Foreign Minister, then requested per-
DECEMBER 1941 1005
mission to notify his Government immediately by telegraph. He was
granted this permission by the Foreign Minister and this ended the
visit at 2:21 p. m. 1
Schmidt
1 Cf . Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. I, pp. 588-589.
No. 578
2281/482787-91
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy
Home, December 11, 1941.
At 4 : 30 p. m. yesterday the Reich Foreign Minister telephoned me
personally and asked me to go to the Duce at once and inform him by
order of the Fiihrer that the latter intended to convene the Reichstag
tomorrow at 3 : 00 p, m, and at this occasion to make public the Italo-
German treaty * with Japan and the statements which are to precede
it and which were arranged between us and the Italians." The Foreign
Minister added that the Fiihrer wished thereby to suggest to the Duce
to take similar action here if necessary.
The Reich Foreign Minister stated further that he personally would
summon the American Charge d'Aff aires at 2 : 30 p. m., that is, half
an hour before the meeting of the Reichstag and would make him the
statement that on account of the developments brought about by
President Roosevelt and the resulting situation the Reich considered
itself to be in a state of war with the United States as of December 11.
The Reich Foreign Minister asked me to telephone him again per-
sonally as soon as the instruction had been carried out.
He added further that it would probably also interest the Duce if
I informed him that according to reports received in Berlin not only
the two big English battleships had been sunk, 8 but that in addition
the Japanese fleet had already inflicted large losses on the American
fleet in battle. Two battleships had been sunk and 4 damaged ; 3 Class
A cruisers had been destroyed and also a number of destroyers and
torpedo boats.
1 The signed copies in German, Italian, and Japanese of the "Agreement be-
tween Germany, Italy and Japan regarding joint conduct of the war against the
United States and England until the victorious conclusion, signed in Berlin on
Dee. 11, 1941", together with copies of Oshima's and Alfleri's full powers are
filmed on serial (2871/564945-59).
' See document No. 563 and footnote 3. The Italian version of this statement
in the form approved by Mussolini had been forwarded by Mackensen in telegram
No. 3215 of Dec. 10 (1206/331868-70) .
■ The British battleship Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse were
sunk by Japanese air and naval forces on Dec. 10 east of the Malay coast.
1006 DOCUMENTS ON QEBMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The Reich Foreign Minister then went into considerable detail
concerning the change in the situation brought about by Japan's
action, which he termed extremely fortunate.
I called on the Duce at 5 : 30 p. m. ; he received me at once, inter-
rupting a council of ministers. He received my communication with
the greatest interest and asked me to thank the Fiihrer and the Foreign
Minister sincerely for their special kindness in providing him with
this information, the content of which interested him exceedingly.
He did not plan to have a similar function here on December 11, but
would limit himself to following the Fiihrer's speech on the radio, as
he always did. Here the matter would develop as follows: At
2:30 p. m. Count Ciano would receive the American Charge
d'Aff aires* and deliver to him orally the statement (given me by
Lanza d'Ajeta) E without any further explanation which, after all, was
adequately supplied in the introduction to the German-Italian- Japa-
nese treaty agreed between us. When I asked what arrangements the
Duce expected to make as regards the time of publication by Italy,
he discussed the various possibilities with me and came to the con-
clusion that from the Italian standpoint it. was best to time the an-
nouncement for 3 : 00 o'clock, because the [news of the] reception of
the American by Count Ciano would certainly spread through the city
like wildfire. I pointed out to him that that might possibly anticipate
the announcement by the Fiihrer, a situation which Berlin surely
wanted to avoid in any case. Consequently it appeared better to me
at most to let the press go into action at 3 : 00 o'clock but the radio
only at 3 : 30. Perhaps it would be even more practical considering
the Fiihrer's speech to consider 4: 00 o'clock as the time. The Duce
asked me to find out what Berlin's wishes were in this regard, but
stressed once more than 3 : 00 and 3 : 30 seemed best to him. I promised
to let him know at once as soon as I had an answer from Berlin.
As the Duce explained, the Italian announcement is to occur in this
order :
1. The communique concerning the reception of the American
Charge d'Affaires by Count Ciano. 2. The introductory statements,
and 3. (after a short connecting sentence) the text of the German-
Italian- Japanese treaty.
In concluding the conversation the Duce stressed that he found our
draft for the introductory statements quite excellent.
He received with great interest my communications concerning the
reports about Japanese successes also with respect to the American
fleet and then spoke at considerable length about the different moral
* George Wadswortta.
'Forwarded in Rome telegram No. 3228 of Dec. 10 (64/44807). For the text
or Clano's statement aa delivered to the American Charge d'Affaires, see Foreign
Relations of the United States, 191,1, vol. I, pp. 589-590.
DECEMBER 1941 1007
fighting value of the Japanese and the American nations, as well as
about the person of President Koosevelt, who at the age of 40 years—
a case that occurred only once in 10 million people, as the doctors had
assured him — had contracted infantile paralysis, a fact which had a
decisive effect on his mental condition.
In a short conversation with Lanza d'Ajeta that followed, the latter
asked me the question what time of day we would put in the statement
as determining the start of the state of war. I replied to him that I
would inquire about this in Berlin and inform him at once regarding
this and likewise concerning the question of the exact, hour of the
announcement (whether 3 : 00 or 4 : 00 o'clock) .
In reply to my telephone call to Berlin immediately thereafter, I
was told that the Foreign Minister was resting at the moment and did
not want to be disturbed. He was said to persist in the idea of talking
with me personally about the conversation with the Duce, but to re-
quest for the moment that I report the outcome even at this time. I
briefly sketched the contents of the conversation for Counselor of
Legation Weber, 6 who was at the telephone, so that it could be reported
to the Foreign Minister, and stated in this connection that I could not
be reached by telephone during the next hour because I had to go to
a large reception given by the Japanese Ambassador which had been
arranged some time ago independent of the present events. Counselor
of Legation Weber asked me for the telephone number of the Japa-
nese Embassy in any case, which I gave him, and he promised to in-
form me very soon regarding Lanza d'Aj eta's two questions.
Since no telephone call had come from Berlin even by the evening,
I again called from here at 8 : 30 p.m. and received the information
from Herr Weber that the Foreign Minister had been with the Fuhrer
again for some time and therefore could not be reached at the moment.
As far as the question about the time of the start of the state of war
was concerned, the German statement which was to be handed to the
American Charge d'Affaires contained only the phrase: "as from
today." T They asked me to insist in all circumstances on the hour of
4 : 00 p.m. at the earliest as the time for the announcement. I pointed
out that in the meantime the Duce, of his own accord, would certainly
have set 3 : 00 o'clock for the press and 3 : 30 for the radio, as several
hours had passed since my inquiry, but I would still try to get a change
in accordance with the Berlin wishes.
Immediately after this telephone conversation, Minister Schmidt
(Press) called and insisted for his part, too, on the time of 4: 00 p.m.
I thereupon got in contact with Count Ciano's secretariat, but reached
only Signor de Ferrariis there, who, however, told me that Marchese
" Of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.
7 See documents Nos. 572 and 577.
1008 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
d'Ajeta had received unlimited authorization from the Duce to come
to an agreement with me regarding the time in accordance with our
wishes. We thereupon arranged definitely that the Italian press and
radio would be informed at 4 : 00 p.m. at the earliest. I further in-
formed him that our statement to the American did not contain any
time of day but only the phrase "as from today." That meant that we
considered the state of war as having begun as of December 11, 1941,
at : 00 hours. Signor de Ferrariis confirmed that the Italians would
conform with our statement in theirs.
I then informed Counselor of Legation "Weber accordingly.
This morning at 9 : 10 a.m. at the Termini Station prior to the
arrival of Count Ciano, I gave Marchese d'Ajeta, the draft of our in-
structions to the Charge d'Affaires in Washington, 8 concerning the
delivery of a copy of the Foreign Minister's statement to the Charge
d'Affaires in Berlin, which I had received at 3:15 a.m.; and I made
sure with him once more that now everything had been arranged
between us regarding the course of today's events, 9 and I also told
Count. Ciano this after his arrival.
Marchese d'Ajeta informed me at 10 : 50 a. m. that Count Ciano had
given the Italian Ambassador in Washington in a very urgent priority
telegram the same instructions 10 that had been sent to our Charge
by the Foreign Ministry. ^
Mackensen
8 See document No. 572 and footnote 1.
* In a subsequent memorandum of Dec, 11 (2281/482786) Mackensen recorded
that having been informed at 12 : 30 p.m. that Mussolini would address a crowd
from the balcony of the Palazzo Venezia at 2 : 45 p.m., he took up this matter
with d'Ajeta. D'Ajeta assured Mackensen that Mussolini had already informed
Hitler through Alfleri that he had decided on such an action "in the interest of
a common approach in this matter" but that he would only speak a few words to
the crowd. D'Ajeta confirmed to Mackensen that Mussolini's speech would be
brief and would not conflict with Hitler's address to the Reichstag set for
3: 00 p.m.
For the text of Hitler's speech of Dec. 11 see Dokumente der Deutsohen
Pontile (1044), vol. ix, pt. 2, pp. 499-536; for the text of Mussolini's speech see
the New York Times of Dee. 12, 1941, p. 4, col. 3.
10 Cf. Foreign Relations of the United. States, 1941, vol, i, p. 590, footnote 9.
APPENDICES
6S2-90S — 64 69
Appendix I
ORGANIZATION OP THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY 1
DECEMBER 1941
The Reich Foreign Minister
von Ribbentrop
{a) Secretariat: Minister Dr. Schmidt (Paul Otto)
Senior Counselor Dr. Lohmann
Senior Counselor Dr. von Sonnlelthner
Counselor Dr. Weber
Counselor Dr. Bruns
For special assignments: Minister Bergmami
Counselor of Embassy Dr. Hilger
(6) Personal Staff: Head: Senior Counselor Hewel
i Counselor Dr. Baron Steengracht von Moyland
Staff of the Foreign Minister:
Head: Counselor Braun
Secretary of Legation Gottfriedsen
Secretary of Legation Schwelmer
For special assignments:
Counselor LUcus
Consul General Stahmer
The State Secbetaby of theFobeiqit Ministet
Freiberr von Weizs&cker
Secretariat: Counselor Dr. Siegfried
The Head ov the Auslandsoboanisation
ik the fobeiqh ministet
State Secretary B. W. Bohle
Attached: Secretary of Legation Dr. Gossmann .
State Secbetaby for Special Duties
W. Keppler
Attached: Minister Dr. Grobba
1 This table of organization is based on the German Foreign Ministry plan of
August 1940 (293/183945, 183948-84) as modified by a series of circulars Of De-
cember 1941 (1780/406543-64) which showed the reorganizations effected in Btiro
RAM, Abt. Deutschland, Pers., Pol., Ha, Pol., Recht, Kult., P, and Ru.
For most of the period of this volume, however, the older organization was
In effect, the plan which appears as Appendix I of vol. in of this series (pp.
1087-1091) which is also to be consulted.
1011
1012
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Ambabsadob fob Special Duties
[Activities of the Foreign Ministry relating to economic warfare : general trade
policy, economic warfare against the enemy and defense against economic war-
fare, blockades, contraband, blacklists, economic relations with neutrals,
German property abroad and foreign property in territories controlled by
Germany (1780/406615).]
Dr. Hitter*
Attached :
Minister Eigenlohr
Minister Leitner
Counselor Mackeben
Pbotoool Department
Diplomatic Corps in Berlin, foreign consuls in the German Reich, audiences with
the Ftthrer and Reich Chancellor, ceremonial, state visits, decorations :
Chief of Protocol : Minister Dr. Freiherr von DBrnberg
Deputy : Counselor Dr. von Halem
Depabtment fob German Intebnal Affaies (D)
Director of Department: Under State Secretary Luther
Deputy : Counselor BUttner
Personal Assistant : Secretary of Legation Dr. Neuwirth
Party Section : Business between the Foreign Ministry
and the departments of the NSDAP.
The Party Rally:
D II Matters affecting the Reichsfuhrer SS,
the Reichssicherheitsnauptamt, in-
ternational police cooperation :
D III Information for Foreign Missions about
imporant internal political events.
The Jewish question. Racial policy.
Flags and insignia. National hymn.
Freemasons :
D IV Production and distribution of litera-
ture in and to foreign countries.
Publishers, distributors, and adver-
tising agencies abroad :
D V Approval of all official and private
travel arrangements of officials of
Party and State to foreign countries
with the exception of members of the
Foreign Ministry. Approval of travel
arrangements into the occupied coun-
tries with the exception of Holland
and Norway. National Holidays :
D VI Special constructions : Under State Secretary
Luther
Under State Secretary
Luther
Senior Counselor
Likus
Counselor
Rademacher
Wissenschaftlicher
Hilfsarbeiter Klat-
ten
Counselor Dr. Garben
"By a directive of Oct. 7, 1940, Rlbbentrop further assigned to Ambassador
Ritter the handling in the Foreign Ministry of all military questions affecting
foreign policy, including those previously handled by Pol. I M. At the same time
he was made Immediately subordinate to the Foreign Minister or respectively to
the State Secretary and personally responsible for keeping the Foreign Minister
currently informed on questions of that nature (293/183950).
APPENDIX I
1013
D VII Geographical Service of the Foreign Wissenschaftlicher
Ministry: Hllfsarbeiter Dr.
von Muehlen
D VIII Questions concerning the German com- Referent Triska
munity ; German and foreign national
communities :
D IX Economic questions concerning the na- Minister Grosskopf
tional community:
D IX Resettlement of Volksdeutsche Minister Grosskopf
{ SDGC )
DX Care of foreign laborers: Counselor Dr. Kieser
Special Section : Organizational matters of the Foreign Under State Secretary
Service: Lutner
Pebsonnel and Administbative Department (Pebs.)
Director of Department : Ministerialdirektor Schroeder
Deputy Director : Minister Bergmann
Dlrigent for Administration : Minister Dr. Schwager
Special duties (disciplinary matters, etc.) : Minister Erythropel
Special duties (Party matters) : Counselor Dr. Spelsberg
Political Depabtment (Pol,)
Director of Department : Under State Secretary Dr. Woermann
Deputy Director : Minister von Blntelen
Acting Deputy Director : Minister Dr. von Erdmannsdorff
PoLIM (under Ambassador Ritter) : Military Counselor Kramarz
questions, armaments, national de-
fense :
PoLILuft Aviation questions: Counselor S c h u 1 1 z-
Sponholz
Pol. II Western Europe (Great Britain, Ire- Counselor Dr. Strack
land, British possessions — unless
dealt with elsewhere— France, Al-
geria, French Morocco, Tunisia, Oc-
cupied Belgian territories, Occupied
Netherlands territories, Switzer-
land) :
Pol. Ill Spain, Spanish Morocco, Portugal, Counselor Dr. Haidlen
Vatican :
Pol. IV Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy Minister Dr. Hetnburg
(Ethiopia, Libya), Croatia, Serbia,
Montenegro, Rumania, Slovakia, Hun-
gary:
Pol.V Eastern Europe (Soviet Union, Gov- Senior Counselor Dr.
ernment General) : Schliep'
Pol. VI Scandinavia (Denmark, Greenland, Minister Dr. von
Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Finland) : Grundherr
Pol. VII Near and Middle East (Egypt, Afghan- Counselor Dr.Melchers
istan, Arabia, Ceylon, Cyprus, Pal-
estine, Syria, Turkey, India, Iraq,
Iran, Sudan) :
* Until transferred to Tirana as Consul General in December 1941.
1014
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Pol. VIII Bast Asia and Australia (Japan, Jap-
anese mandated territories, China,
Manchukuo, Mongolia, French In-
dochina, Thailand, Straits Settlement,
Malay States, Netherlands East
Indies, Philippines, Australia, New
Zealand, South Sea territories) :
Pol. IX America (North, Central, and South
America) :
Pol. X Africa (except Algeria, French Mo-
rocco, Tunisia, Italian possessions,
Egypt, Sudan), mandate and colonial
questions :
Pol. XI War guilt questions :
Pol. XII Peace questions, statistics, frontier
treaties and other technical ques-
tions concerning Reich frontiers
which are the subject of negotiations
with foreign governments :
Secretary of Legation
Braun (acting)
Senior Counselor
Freytag
Senior Counselor Dr.
Blelfeld
Senior Counselor Dr.
ron Schmieden
Senior Counselor Dr.
von Schmieden
Economic Policy Depaetmeht (Ha. Pol.)
Director of Department : Mlnisterfaldirektor Wiehl
Deputy Director : Minister Dr. Clodius
Head of Group East, consisting of Divisions V, VI, VII, VIII
Schnurre
Liaison Officer with OKW (War Economy Office) :
Minister Dr,
Ha. Pol. Frio Armistice affairs and the preparation
of the treaties of peace :
Ha. Pol. I General section for questions concern-
ing economics and finance. Commer-
cial and forestry attaches; German
customs law, technical preparation of
commercial treaties :
Economic press and propaganda affairs :
Western Europe:
France, Belgium, Netherlands (includ-
ing colonies, protectorates and man-
dated territories), Switzerland, Lux-
emburg :
Great Britain, Ireland, British Domin-
ions (except Canada), and British
colonies. General questions relating
to trade and economic warfare except
matters dealing with angary, which
are dealt with InRI:
Ha. Pol. Ill Southwest Europe. Spain, Portugal,
including colonies and protectorates :
Ha. Pol. IV Soulli and Southeast Europe
Ha. Pol. II
Ha. Pol. Ha
Ha. Pol. lib
Senior Counselor (un-
assigned) Dr. Du-
mont
Senior Counselor <un-
assigned) Dr. Du-
mont
Consul General Doehle
Keferent Dr. Grunbeck
Senior Counselor
Sabath
Senior
Rttter
Counselor
Senior Counselor
Sabath
APPENDIX I
1015
Ha. Pol. IVa
Ha, Pol. IVb
Ha. Pol. V
Ha. Pol. Va
Ha. Pol. Vb
Ha, Pol. VI
Ha. Pol. VII
Ha. Pol. VIII
Ha. Pol. IX
Ha. Pol. IXa
Ha. Pol. IXb
Ha. Pol. X
Ha, Pol. XI
Ha. Pol. XII
Ha. Pol. XHa
Southeast Europe (except Rumania),
Protectorate, Slovakia, Hungary,
Serbia, Moutenegro, Croatia, Bul-
garia, Greece :
Special Assignment : Legal-financial af-
fairs of the former Yugoslav state :
Italy (Albania, Ethiopia, Libya), Ru-
mania :
Eastern Europe :
Soviet Union :
Liquidation of matters dealing with
Poland and Baltic States:
Northern Europe. Denmark, Sweden,
Norway, Iceland, Finland. Eco-
nomic questions affecting the Ant-
arctic. Whaling :
Near and Middle East. Afghanistan,
Egypt, Arabia, Cyprus, Iraq, Iran,
Palestine, Transjordan, Sudan, Tur-
key, Yemen:
East Asia. Japan, China, Manchukuo,
Mongolia, Thailand, Philippines,
South Sea territories:
Special assignment : Commercial treaty
negotiations :
America :
North America (Canada, United States,
Mexico), Cuba, Dominican Republic,
Haiti, Liberia :
South and Central America (Argen-
tina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guate-
mala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Pan-
ama, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador,
Uruguay, Venezuela) :
Reich Office for Foreign Trade (eco-
nomic news and Information service ;
chambers of commerce abroad) :
Raw materials, war industry, liaison
for control for war economy of Ger-
man ships In neutral ports :
Transportation :
Maritime transportation (including
care of passengers and crews of Ger-
man ships in neutral countries), sale
of ships, fisheries:
Senior Counselor Dr.
Hudeczek
Minister Fabriclus
Counselor Dr. Junker
Consul General Dr. R.
Walter
Counselor Baron von
Behr
Counselor Dr. van
Scherpenberg
Counselor Dr. Ripken
Senior Counselor Dr.
Voss
Consul General Ti-
niann
Senior Counselor Dr-
Davidsen
Minister Moraht
Senior Counselor Dr.
Wingen
Senior Counselor Dr.
Blsae
Minister Dr. Martlus
1016 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICT
11a. Fol.XIIb Other transportation questions (except Minister Dr. Martins
matters relating to deliveries), rail-
roads, world postal and information
associations, post, telegraph, tele-
phone, and radio matters (as far as
they are not being dealt with at the
Press, Personnel, or Kult. R sec-
tions) , automobiles and roads, Inland
navigation, etc.
Legal Department (R.)
Director of Department : Under State Secretary Dr. Gaus
Deputy Director : Senior Counselor Dr. Albrecht
Cultural Policy Depabtment (Kult.)
Director of Department : Minister Dr. von Twardowski
Deputy Director : Consul General Dr. Noldeke
Attached to the Director of the Department
for Special Assignments :
Senior Counselor Plelnert
News Sesvioe and Pbess Department (P)
Director of Department : Minister Dr, Schmidt (Paul K.)
Deputy Director : Minister Braun von Stumm
Information Depabtment
Director of Department : Consul General Wtister (after Aug. 16, 1941)
Deputy Director : Counselor Dr. Kahn
Radio Department (Hu)
Director of Department : Minister RUhle
Deputy Director : Counselor Dr. Schlrmer
Appendix II
LIST OF GERMAN FILES USED
The following table identifies the German file from which each document has
been taken. The documents of the Foreign Ministry were bound into volumes
when they were sent to the flies. As documents in these volumes have been
microfilmed, each film of a file has been identified by a film serial number, while
each page of the documents has been Identified by a frame number stamped on
the original at the time of the filming. (An exception was made with the treaty
files, where the frame numbers were not put on the document pages but were
attached to them at the time of the filming? thus the frame numbers do not
appear on the originals but do, of course, appear on the microfilm.) The docu-
ments published in this collection are identified by the film serial number and
frame numbers in the upper left hand corner of each document.
By reference to the following table of film serial numbers the location in the
National Archives in Washington and in the Public Record Office in London of
the copy of the document used in this publication may be determined. (Locating
the original documents, which are now in the Foreign Ministry's archives in
Bonn, is somewhat complicated by the fact that part of the archives have been
reorganized since their return to the Federal Republic.) In some few cases
separate files, usually on closely related topics, have been filmed consecutively
under a single serial number; these are marked by an asterisk (*). A number
of serials are given as supplementary to earUer ones; these are cases where a
re-examination of the file in question indicated that additional filming might be
useful to scholars or, as is more often the case, where in the process of editing
for publication the editors wished to provide a film record of documents of lesser
importance to which references appeared in the documents selected.
For a complete listing of the files of this period (with their titles in German)
see A Catalog of Files and Microfilms of the German Foreign Ministry Archives
1920-1945 (compiled and edited by George O. Kent) tie .first volume of which
was issued by the Hoover Institution in 1962.
Film Serial
Numbers Title of File
32 Under State Secretary : Japanese-American Relations.
34 State Secretary : Soviet Union.
Under State Secretary: Soviet Union.*
38 Under State Secretary : United States.
41 Reich Foreign Minister : Near Bast and India, 1941-1942.
46 Reich Foreign Minister : Foreign Affairs Surveys ; Rumania
and Rumanian Legionnaires, Horia Sima.*
61 Under State Secretary : Turkey.
62 State Secretary : Denmark.
64 State Secretary : Uruguay, 1939-1942.
65 Reich Foreign Minister : Iran, 1940-1943.
67 Secret Files of Paul Otto Schmidt.
70 State Secretary : Syria.
1017
1018 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Film Serial
Numbers Title of File
71 State Secretary : Arabia, 1940-1942.
77 State Secretary : Morocco, 1940-1943.
82 State Secretary : Japan, July-September 1941.
83 Reich Foreign Minister : Iraq.
91 State Secretary : Ireland.
Under State Secretary: Ireland ( Veesenmayer) .*
93 State Secretary : Hungary.
95 State Secretary: Spain.
98 State Secretary : England, January-September 1941.
100 German Embassy in Italy : Macfcensen's Papers.
105 State Secretary : Russia,
HI State Secretary : The War against North, Central, and South
America, 1941-1942.
116 Eeich Foreign Minister: Africa, Albania, Danzig, Estonia
Croatia* '
124 State Secretary : Political Correspondence of the State Secre-
tary with Officials of the Foreign Service.
129 State Secretary : Portugal.
130 State Secretary : Iceland.
136 State Secretary : German-Spanish Relations.
137 Under State Secretary: Spain, July 1940-July 1942.
138 Dienatstelle Ribbentrop : Confidential Reports.
142 State Secretary : Greece.
173 State Secretary : Netherlands, Netherlands Indies. *
177 State Secretary : Japan, April- June 1941.
191 State Secretary : China, 1939-1942.
195 State Secretary : India, February 1941-March 1942.
197 State Secretary : Chile, 1939-1942.
199 Ketch Foreign Minister : Bolivia, 1936-1942.
201 State Secretary : Rumania.
203 State Secretary : Bolivia, 1939-1942.
205 State Secretary : Sweden, 1939-1940.
216 State Secretary : Indochina, 1940-1943.
217 Reich Foreign Minister : South Africa, 1936-1940.
221 State Secretary : German-French Relations.
222 State Secretary : Rumania.
229 State Secretary : Peru, 1940-1942.
230 State Secretary : Yugoslavia.
233 State Secretary : Argentina, 1938-1941.
235 State Secretary : Brazil.
239 State Secretary : Rumania.
245 State Secretary : Croatia.
251 Under State Secretary : Bolivia, 1941-1942.
252 Reich Foreign Minister : Paraguay, 1939-1942.
253 Under State Secretary : Argentina, July-September 1941.
260 State Secretary : Finland, April-November 1941.
261 State Secretary : Finland, November 1941-June 1942.
265 State Secretary : Turkey.
266 State Secretary : Egypt, 1939-1943.
278 State Secretary : Bulgaria.
281 Under State Secretary : Iran, 1941-1942.
APPENDIX II
1019
Film Serial
Numbers Title of File
293 Tables of Organization of the German Foreign Ministry, 1929-
1940.
318 Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : United States, 1941-
1943.
319 Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Sweden, 1939-1941.
323 State Secretary : Latvia, 1939-1944.
326 Economic Policy Department : Armaments ; Brazil.
329 Under State Secretary : Afghanistan, 1941-1942.
341 Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Argentina, 1939-1942.
343 Pol. XIII: General Files (Grosskopf Papers, previously D
IX).
378 State Secretary : Peace Negotiations with France.
386 State Secretary : German-French Relations.
405 State Secretary : German-French Relations.
462 German Embassy in Spain : Anti-Comintern Pact.
481 German Embassy in Spain: German-Spanish Labor Rela-
tions ; Spanish Workers in Germany.
482 Department for German Internal Affairs : Secret Papers of
Division D III.
492 German Embassy in Spain : Internal Situation in Spain.
496 State Secretary : The War ( July 1941-June 1942) .
498 German Embassy in Spain : Internal Situation in Spain.
502 German Embassy in Spain : The "Blue Division" in Russia.
612 State Secretary : Internal Affairs, July-December 1941.
516 German Legation in Portugal : Wolfram Agreement.
534 State Secretary t Vatican, 1940-1941.
535 State Secretary : Vatican, 1941-1942.
587 Under State Secretary : France.
593 State Secretary : United States, May-June 1941.
610 State Secretary : Slovakia, June-October 1941.
613 State Secretary : Slovakia, November 1941-October 1942.
616 Pol. XIII : Grosskopf : Personal Files.
617 State Secretary : Afghanistan, 1939-1942.
694 Under State Secretary: German Armistice Commission for
France.
765 Pol. I M : North American Trial, 1940-1942.
794 Under State Secretary : Iraq, 1941-1942.
851 Ambassador Eitter : Denmark.
852 Ambassador RItter: France.
898 Ambassador Sitter: France.
911 Ambassador Ritter : OKW.
922 Department for German Internal Affairs [Inland II] : Secret
Papers ; Counterespionage and Agents.
927 Information Department : North America, 1941-1942.
945 Renthe-Fink : Personal Files ; Danish Royal House.
1000 Under State Secretary : Egypt.
1003 Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : German-French
Armistice Commission ; Economic Delegation.
1007 Ambassador Ritter : Japan.
1047 Under State Secretary : Pan-Turanian Movement.
1053 Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Brazil, 1939-1942.
1020 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN" POLICY
Film Serial
Numbers Title of File
1068 Pol. I M ; Japan-Bast Asia.
1084 Pol. I M : Secret Documents.
1099 Ambassador Bitter ; Turkey.
1131 Pol. XIII : Grosskopf Papers.
1200 State Secretary : Political Correspondence.
1206 State Secretary : German-Italian Relations.
1247 Btzdorf Memoranda (origlnallonghand).
1306 Minister Paul K. Schmidt: Memoranda for the Reich For-
eign Minister (April 1941-July 1942).
1386 Ambassador Hitter : Soviet Union.
1459 Ambassador Ritter : Azores.
1517 State Secretary : Italy.
1527 State Secretary : United States.
1531 Reich Chancellery t Ukraine.
1543 State Secretary : United States.
1551 State Secretary : Memoranda on Diplomatic Visits.
1584 Reich Chancellery : Netherlands.
1662 State Secretary : Iran.
1672 German Embassy in Spain : Sea Warfare.
1680 Political Department: The War; East Asia, July-October
1941.
1780 Tables of Organization of the German Foreign Ministry,
1922-1941.
1857 State Secretary : United States.
1901 Supplementary to 1247 (Btzdorf Memoranda : Typescript of
Selected Items) ,
1924 Hewel Papers, 1940-1942.
2033 Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Italy.
2048 State Secretary : Diplomatic Visits, July-December 1941.
2077 Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Italy.
2089 Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Italy.
2109 Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Tnrkey ; Negotiations
with Turkey Concerning Credit Agreement.
2116 Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Sweden, 1941-1943.
2123 Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Iran, 1940-1941.
2148 Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Hungary.
2153 Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Turkey.
2163 Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Yugoslavia.
2165 State Secretary : Correspondence on Political Affairs.
2174 Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Spain.
2193 Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Rumania,
2203 Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Italy.
2233 Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Bulgaria.
2236 Under State Secretary : Greece.
2281 German Embassy In Italy : Secret Papers,
2293 Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Rumania.
2315 Reich Foreign Minister : Croatia.
2361 German Embassy in Turkey: Secret Instructions, Reports,
Telegrams, etc., Armament Industry.
2800 Supplementary to 2168 (Department for German Internal
Affairs [D IX] Top Secret Papers).
APPENDIX II 1021
Film Serial
Numbers Title of File
2871 Political Department : Treaties, 1936-1944.
3068 Pol. Ill: Holy See; Archbishoprics and Bishoprics in Ger-
many, 1936-1939.
3182 Economic Policy Department: Denmark; Currency, Foreign
Exchange, and Foreign Exchange Policy.
3485 German Embassy in Paris : Secret Political Papers.
35T9 Supplementary to 415, 423, 431, 460, 712, 737, 924, 955, 1166,
1167, 1168, 1172, 1176, 1257, 1762, 1894, 1936, 2380, 3196
(Department for German Internal Affairs [Inland II] :
Top Secret Papers) .
3607 Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Sweden, 1941-1943.
3882 Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Spain.
3883 Supplementary to 2361 (German Embassy in Turkey) .
3933 Press Department : Information regarding the Testament of
Peter the Great.
4359 Supplementary to 2205 (Economic Policy Department
[Wiehl] Portugal).
4360 German Legation in Portugal : Secret Papers ; Tungsten, Bor-
ratha Mine.
4475 Economic Policy Department: Treaties.
4601 State Secretary: Memoranda on non-diplomatic visits.
4608 Pol. IX: United States; Jewish Question.
4641 Ambassador Bitter: Volunteers.
4661 German Embassy in France : Secret Files ; Territorial Guards.
4669 "Under State Secretary : Security Zone, 1940-1941.
4672 Department for German Internal Affairs [Inland II] : Top
Secret Papers of Division D Till.
4684 Supplement to 154 (Economic Policy Department [Olodius]
Japan).
4685 German Legation in Rumania: Secret Papers; Telegrams
from Berlin,
4697 Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Greece.
4699 Supplementary to 1979, 3195 (Department for German In-
ternal Affairs [Inland II] : Secret Papers of Division D
VIII).
4703 Supplementary to 2233.
4756 Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Syria, 1927-1941.
4757 Cultural Policy Department: Secret; India.
4803 German Embassy in Paris: Netherlands.
4806 Supplementary to 2380 (Department for German Internal
Affairs [Inland II] : Secret Papers of Division D III).
4826 German Embassy in Paris: Switzerland.
4827 German Legation in Croatia: Political Relations of Croatia
to other Countries ; Border Questions ; Treaties.
4828 German Legation in Croatia: Besettlement of Slovenes,
Hungarians, Croatians, Serbs, Ukrainians.
4832 German Legation in Croatia: Political Relations of Croatia
to other Countries; Border Questions; Treaties.
4839 Reich Chancellery : The War, 1940-1944.
4858 Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Rumania.
4865 German Embassy in Italy: Secret Files.
1022
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
film. Serial
Numbers
4875
4877
4879
4881
4885
4886
4894
4927
4987
4940
4963
4967
4982
4995
5077
5078
5083
5085
5103
5109
5111
5115
5144
5146
6435
6506
8589
9903
B12
B13
Fl-
F20
M178
M180
M209
M341
P3
P6
Title of File
Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Italy.
Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : German-Italian Tele-
graphic Reports from Rome.
Economic Policy Department (Olodius) : Italy.
Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Turkey.
Supplementary to 2124 (Economic Policy Department [Clodius]
German-Turkish Economic Negotiations, September-October
1941).
Supplementary to 2124 (Economic Policy Department [Clodius] :
German-Turkish Economic Negotiations, September-October
1941).
German Embassy in Spain : Army and Police.
German Embassy in Italy: Secret Files; Croatia, Bulgaria,
Slovakia.
German Embassy in Spain : Morocco.
Ambassador Bitter : OKW.
German Legation in Finland : Reports, Instructions,
Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Finland, 1940-1941.
Economic Policy Department: Treaty Files; Switzerland.
Economic Policy Department: Treaty Files; Turkey.
Pol. XIII : Ukraine.
Pol. XIII : Organization.
Reich Chancellery : Reichkommlssariat Ostland.
German Legation in Finland : Instructions, 1940-1941.
Department for German Internal Affairs : Party Section ; Social
Policy.
Luther Files : Correspondence N-Sch, 1941.
Supplementary to 1279 and 4127 (Minister Paul K. Schmidt:
Memoranda, February-December 1941).
Supplementary to 1306 and 4125 (Minister Paul K. Schmidt:
Memoranda for the Reich Foreign Minister, April 1941-July
1942).
Legal Department: Laws of Nations and War; Hague, Peace
Conference.
German Embassy in the Vatican : Baltic States.
German Legation In Finland : Instructions, 1941.
German Legation in Finland : Multex telegrams, 1941-1942.
Navy Archives : OKW Directives.
Supplementary to 4885 (Economic Policy Department [Clodius]
German-Turkish Economic Negotiations) .
State Secretary : German-Italian Relations, May-August 1941.
State Secretary: German-Italian Relations, January-April 1941.
German Foreign Ministry film of flies of the Reich Foreign Min-
ister's Secretariat.
Navy Archives: North Sea/Norway; Baltic Sea, Operations.
Navy Archives: Naval War Staff; Miscellaneous Papers.
Supplementary to 2192 and 4859 (Economic Policy Department
[Wiehl] Rumania).
OKH Attache Department : Secret Papers.
Abetz Personal Archive : Memorandum of July 1, 1943.
Navy Archives : Navy copies of the OKW and other documents of
the second half year 1941.
Appendix III
LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS 1
Abetz, Otto, Ambassador, Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the Ger-
man Military Commander in France.
Aoimovio, Milan, Minister of Interior of a Serbian Government in Belgrade spon-
sored by Germany,
AtBEECHT, Erich, Deputy Director of the Legal Department In the German For-
eign Ministry.
Aletebi, Dino, Italian Ambassador in Germany ; member of the Fascist Grand
Council.
An Foboughx, Iranian Minister President from August 28, 1941.
Ali Man bub, Iranian Minister President to August 27, 1941.
Altenbubq, Felix, Counselor of Embassy and Charge d'Affaires ad interim in the
German Embassy in China to July 1, 1941.
Altehbubq, Gunther, Minister, Reich Plenipotentiary for Greece.
Amau, EiJI, Japanese Ambassador in Italy, September 1939-October 1940 ; Deputy
Foreign Minister, August-October 1941.
Arfuso, Filtppo, Minister, Chef de Cabinet to Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Min
ister ; appointed Minister in Hungary, November 1941.
Antokbsou, Ion, Rumanian General, Leader of the State and Minister President
Marshal of Rumania from August 23, 1941.
Antonebou, Mihai, Rumanian Deputy Minister President and Foreign Minister.
Aran ha, Oswaldo, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Attlee, Clement Richard, Leader of the British Labour Party, Lord Privy Seal,
Attolxco, Bernardo, Italian Ambassador to the Holy See.
Bahdeba, Stepan, Leader of a faction in the Organization of Ukrainian Na-
tionalists (OUN).
Babdoss?, Laszl6 de, Hungarian Minister President and Foreign Minister.
Bargen, Werner von, Counselor of Embassy, Representative of the Foreign
Ministry with the German Military Commander In Belgium and northern
France.
Beckeb, Wilhelm, Colonel of the Luftwaffe ; promoted to Major General in the
summer of 1941 ; in the War Economy and Armaments Office of the OKW.
Beokeble, Adolf Heinz, German Minister in Bulgaria.
Belmonte Pab6n, Ellas, Major, Bolivian Military Attache in Germany to July
1941.
Below, Carl von, Counselor of Legation in the German Legation In Sweden ; ap-
pointed Consul in Goteborg, August 31, 1941.
Behe, Otto, German Consul General at Milan ; Representative of the Reich for
the transfer of the South Tirol population to October 1941 ; Representative
of the Foreign Ministry with the Reich Commissar for the Occupied
Netherlands.
Bbnoist-MSohin, Jacques, State Secretary, attached to the office of the Vice
President of the French Council of Ministers.
1 The biographical details given relate principally to the period and subjects
covered by the documents in this volume.
1023
1024 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICT
Benzlbe, Felix, Minister, Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry with the
German Military Commander in Serbia.
Bismabok, Otto Christian, Prince von, Minister in the German Embassy in Italy.
BLtJCHER, Wipert von, German Minister in Finland.
Bohme, Franz, German General, Commander of the XVIII Mountain Corps;
Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia, September to November
1941.
Botticheb, Friedrich von, German General, Military and Air Attache in the
United States.
Bohbman, Erik, Secretary General in the Swedish Foreign Ministry.
Bohle, Ernst Wilhelm, Gauleiter, Head of the Auslandsorganisation of the Na-
tional Socialist party, State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry.
Boris III, King of Bulgaria.
Bormann, Martin, Reichsletter of the NSDAP, Head of the Party Chancellery.
Bose, Subhas Chandra, Indian nationalist leader, former Secretary General
and President of the Indian Congress party ; leader of the left wing Forward
Bloc.
Bossy, Raonl, Rumanian Minister In Germany.
Bbanbatt, Hans, Official in the Protocol Department in the German Foreign
Ministry.
Brinon, Count Fernand de, Delegate General, with the rank of Ambassador,
of the French Government in the occupied territory.
Brunb, Georg Viktor, Counselor, official in the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.
Buffarini-Guidi, Guido, Under State Secretary in the Italian Ministry of
Interior.
Bullitt, William C, United States Ambassador in France, October 1938-
January 1941.
Cabceller, Demetrio, Spanish Minister of Industry and Commerce.
Catroux, Georges, General, Free French representative in the Middle East;
Free French Delegate General and Plenipotentiary In the Levant, July 1941.
Cavaiaeko, Ugo, Count, Italian General, Chief of the Armed Forces General
Staff.
Chen Chieh, Chinese Ambassador In Germany to July 2, 1941.
Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, leader of the Kuomintang; President of the
Executive Yuan (Premier).
Christian X, King of Denmark.
Churchill, Winston Spencer, British Prime Minister.
Ciano di Cortellazzo, Count Galeazzo, son-in-law of Mussolini ; Italian Foreign
Minister.
Clausen, Frits, leader of the Danish National Socialist party.
Clodius, Carl, Minister, Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department
in the German Foreign Ministry.
Cosmelli, Giuseppe, Counselor of Embassy in the Italian Embassy in Germany,
with the rank of Minister.
d'Ajeta. See Lanza d'Ajeta.
Dankwobt, Werner, Counselor of Legation in the German Legation in Sweden.
Darlan, Jean Francois, Admiral, Vice President of the French Council of Min-
isters and Minister of Foreign Affairs ; Minister of the Navy ; Minister of
Interior to August 194X; Minister of National Defense and Chief of the
French armed forces from August 1941.
be Gaulle, Charles, French General, Head of the French National Committee
and leader of the Free French forces.
Dbntz, Henri, French General ; High Commissioner in Syria and Lebanon and
Commander in Chief of French forces in the Levant to July 1941.
1025
APPENDIX III
DzaoKHO**, Hans Heinrich, J^" ^J^" £ be r 1938, and did not re-
1937; recalled to Berlin for "ltetion, ™J^ Minl8try> 193& _i 9 43.
*J£?£2i.'Z2£ ZS2£ S- - «- - - —
German Foreign Ministry. „, . . „ . HllBMW 1937-July 1941; acting
tember 1941. «„,„«, 1 . rhief Liaison Staff North ; representa-
E „^SrC™»,~-, A T.i« •--, «~» 1— * -
Germany to July 1941.
ECTEt, Erwin, German Minister in Iran.
KSirSSTK^ General, *nder State Secretary for War Production
in the Ministry of War.
Fawm. See Qawuqchi, Vayf ^' . th6 offlce of the Plenipotentiary of
^TES^^H^^ra-ssr * e G °"
territories. united States Supreme Court.
SSTSSt fi?£S£ « -'«— ■«- - - -
German Foreign Ministry. German Embassy in Spain.
ilSS.HS.th e U«.»tU««tSttt.8« t .«t. W .
GATLANI SeeBASHIDAlIAL-GAYLARI.
^'^So^^ in tte Italian Ministry of
Giannini, Amedeo, uirecwr w. y«
Foreign Affairs with rank of Ambassador offl .
Glaise vor HOKSTEBAT7, Edmund, former A ^?^J£ ""
Reappointed "German General I, '^J^SfSd*- President of
Gobing, Hermann Wilhelm Presul «» J^^JK in S Cnief f the Luftwaffe;
ll^X^TZr^'^TZ^ —or to Hilter;
Eeichsmarschall.
!U. M ou* u».w> M. ' *£•"££ STS-m-W » "*■■'
688-906—04- 70
1026 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Gbobskopf, Georg Wilhelm, Senior Counselor, later Minister ; Head of Division
D IX of the Department for German Internal Affairs of the Foreign Ministry.
Geotb, Otto, Secretary of Legation, later Counselor in Political Division I M,
German Foreign Ministry.
Gbundhebb, Werner von. Head of Political Division VI, German Foreign
Ministry.
GtJwtheb, Christian, Swedish Foreign Minister.
Goerabd, Jacques, emissary of Darlan on special mission in Syria, May-June
1941.
Gustav V, King of Sweden.
Hagglof, Gunnar, Head of the Department of Commercial Affairs in the Swedish
Foreign Ministry.
Haldee, Franz, Colonel General, Chief of the German Army General Staff.
Halifax, Viscount, Edward Wood, British Ambassador in the United States.
Hansbon, Per Albin, Swedish Minister President
Hemmen, Hans Richard, Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic
Questions with the German Armistice Commission.
Hempel, Eduard, German Minister in Ireland.
Hehtig, Werner Otto von, Near Eastern specialist, on special assignments In the
German Foreign Ministry; representative of the Foreign Ministry with
Eleventh Army headquarters, August 1941; In charge of Pan-Turanian
questions, October 1941.
Hewel, Walther, Senior Counselor, official of the Personal Staff of the German
Foreign Minister and his personal representative with Hitler.
Heyden-Rynsch, Bernd Otto, Freiherr von der, Counselor of Embassy in the
German Embassy In Spain.
Hetdrioh, Reinhard, SS-Obergruppenfiihrer, Chief of the Security Police and
Security Service.
Hiloeb, Gustav, Counselor of Embassy In the German Embassy in the Soviet
Union to June 1941 ; subsequently on special assignment with the Foreign
Minister's Personal Staff.
Himeb, Kurt, German General with the Hungarian High Command from March
to August 1941.
Himmleb, Helnrich, Reichsf iihrer SS and Chief of the German Police ; Reich
Commissar for the Consolidation of the German National Community.
Hibanuma, Baron Kiichiro, Japanese Minister of Interior to July 16, 1941;
Minister without Portfolio, July 18-October 16, 1941.
Hibohito, Emperor of Japan.
Hitleb, Adolf, Leader of the German National Socialist party, FUhrer and
Chancellor, Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht.
Hoabe, Sir Samuel, British Ambassador in Spain.
Hopkins, Harry L., Special Assistant to president Roosevelt.
Hobieibi, Zenbei, Japanese Ambassador in Italy.
Hobtht de NagybAnya, Mlklos, Admiral, Regent of Hungary.
Hoyningen-Httene, Oswald, Baron von, German Minister in Portugal.
Hubne, See Hoyningen-Huene.
Hull, Cordell, United States Secretary of State.
Huktzioeb, Charles, French General, Minister of War to November 12, 1941.
Husatni, HaJ Amin, al-, Mufti of Jerusalem ; Arab leader.
InBnu, Ismet, General, President of the Turkish Republic.
Jagow, Dietrich von, SA-Obergruppenfuhrer, German Minister in Hungary from
July 24, 1941.
Jodl, Alfred, Lieutenant General, Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff of
theOKW.
APPENDIX III 1027
Juin, Alphonse, General, Commander of French forces In Morocco from August
1941 ; Commander in Chief of French forces in North Africa November 20,
1941.
Kabche, Siegfried, SA-Obergruppenfiihrer, German Minister i,n Croatia.
Keitei^ Wilhelm, Field Marshal, Chief of the OKW.
Kbpplbe, Wilhelm, State Secretary for Special Duties in the German Foreign
Ministry.
Kebbl, Hanns, Reich Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs.
Killingeb, Manfred, Freiherr von, German Minister in Rumania.
Kivimaki, Tolvo Mikael, Finnish Minister in Germany.
Knox, William Franlslin, United States Secretary of the Navy.
Koch, Erich, National Socialist Gauleiter of East Prussia; appointed Reich
Commissar for the Ukraine, August 20, 1941.
Konote, Prince Fumlmaro, Japanese Prime Minister, July 1940-October 16, 1941.
Kotzb, Hans Ulrich von, German Minister in Latvia, 193&-1940; Minister in the
German Legation in Denmark.
Kramaez, Hans, Head of Political Division I M, German Foreign Ministry.
Kketsohmeb, Max, Colonel, German Military Attach^ in Japan.
Kroll, Hans Anton, Minister, Counselor in the German Embassy in Turkey.
Kueusu, Saburo, Japanese Ambassador in Germany, December 1939-February
1941 ; assigned to assist Ambassador Nomura in negotiations with the United
States, November 1941.
Kvatebnix, Slavko, Field Marshal, Deputy Minister President and Minister of
the Armed Forces of the "Independent Croatian State."
Lammers, Hans, Reich Minister, Chief of the Reich Chancellery.
Lanza d'Ajeta, Marchese Blasco, Chief de Cabinet to Count Ciano, Italian For-
eign Minister, from November 1941.
Laval, Pierre, Vice-President of the French Council of Ministers, July 12-
Deeember 13, 1940; Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 28-December 13,
1940.
Leahy, William D., Admiral, United States Ambassador in France.
Leitnek, Rudolf, Minister, attached to the office of Ambassador Ritter in the
German Foreign Ministry,
Ley, Robert, Reichsleiter, leader of the German Labor Front, Director of the
National Socialist party organization.
Likus, Rudolf, Senior Counselor, official of the German Foreign Minister's Per-
sonal Staff and of the Dlenststelle Ribbentrop.
Lindbergh, Charles A., American aviator; Colonel, United States Army Air
Corps Reserve.
List, Wilhelm, German Field Marshal, Commander of the Twelfth Army;
Wehrmacht Commander, Southeast, June-October 1941.
Ljotic, Dmitri je, Leader of the right-wing Zbor Movement in Serbia.
Loesch, Karl von, Secretary of Legation, interpreter, attached to the German
Foreign Minister's Secretariat.
Lohmann, Johann Georg, Senior Counselor, Official of the German Foreign
Minister's Secretariat.
Lobkovio, Mladen, Foreign Minister of the "Independent Croatian State."
Ludin, Hanns, German Minister in Slovakia.
Ludke, Erich, General, Commander of German Troops in Denmark.
Luther, Martin, Director of the Department for German Internal Affairs, Ger-
man Foreign Ministry, with the title of Under State Secretary-
Mackensen, Hans Georg von, German Ambassador in Italy.
Maouone, Lnigi, Cardinal, Papal Secretary of State.
1028 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Manhebhbim, Baron Carl Gustaf Emil, Field Marshal, Commander of the
Finnish Army.
Matsuoka, Yosuke, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 1940 — July 16,
1941.
Mayalde, Count Jose Finat y Escrivft de Komani, Spanish Ambassador in Ger-
many from September 1841.
Mayk-Falkenbebq, Iiudwig, German Consul General at Genoa; High Commis-
sioner of the Reich with rank of Minister for the transfer of the South Tirol
population, October 1941.
Megerle, Karl, German journalist, on special propaganda assignments for the
Foreign Ministry.
Melchess, Wilhelm, Counselor, Head of Political Division VII, German Foreign
Ministry.
Menemenoioolu, Numan, Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry.
Menbhausen, Fritz, Counselor of Embassy in the German Embassy to the Holy
See.
Meyer, Alfred, National Socialist Gauleiter of Westphalia-North, Permanent
Deputy of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
Meyer-Dohnee, Kurt, Commander, German Naval Attache in Spain.
Mihai I, King of Rumania.
Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, Vice Chairman of the Council of People's
Commissars of the Soviet Union ; People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
Mobcabdo, Ituarte Jose, General, Chief of the military cabinet of the Spanish
Chief of State.
Mufti. See Husayni.
Mussert, Anton, Leader of the National Socialist movement in the Netherlands
(NSB).
Mussolini, Benito, founder of the Italian fascist party; Head of the Govern-
ment and Prime Minister ; Commander of the Armed Forces.
Nedic, Milan, General, former Yugoslav Minister of War; Minister President
of a Serbian Government in Belgrade sponsored by Germany, August 29,
1941.
Neubaoher, Hermann, Minister, special representative in charge of economic
Questions at the German Legation in Bucharest.
Nomura, Kichisaburo, Admiral, Japanese Ambassador in the United States.
Numan, See Menemencioguj.
Nubi Pasha, Brother of the Young Turk leader Enver Pasha; active In the
Pan-Turanian movement in Turkey.
Oeasei, Chuichi, Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister to July 1941.
Olivera, Rlcardo, Argentine Ambassador In Germany.
Orsenigo, Cesare, Monslgnor, Apostolic Nuncio in Germany.
Oshima, Hiroshl, General, Japanese Ambassador in Germany.
Ott, Bugen, Major General, German Ambassador in Japan.
Pampebmen, Dr. Rudolf, Secretary of Legation, Head of Division W Vlllb of
the Economic Policy Department In the German Foreign Ministry until its
reorganization in December 1941.
Papen, Franz von, German Ambassador in Turkey.
Paveli6, Ante, Leader of the Croatian nationalist Ustasa movement; Leader
(Poglavnlk) and Minister President of the "Independent Croatian State."
Petaik, Henri Philippe, Marshal of France ; Chief of State,
Peter II, King of Yugoslavia.
Piloer, Hans, German Minister in Afghanistan.
Popov, Ivan Vladimir, Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
APPENDIX III 1029
Post, Eric von, Counselor In the Swedish Legation in Germany.
Pbufer, Curt, German Ambassador in Brazil.
Qatvuqohi, Fawzi al-, Arab nationalist, guerilla leader In insurrections against
the French Mandate in Syria, 1926, and against the British Mandate in
Palestine, 1936-1939.
Rademacheb, Franz, Counselor, Head of Division D III in the Department for
German Internal Affairs, German Foreign Ministry.
Radtke, Herbert Paul Otto, Major, attached to the War Economy and Arma-
ments Office of the OKW.
Raedes, Erieh, Admiral, Commander in Chief of the German Navy.
Rahn, Rudolf, Senior Counselor, attached to the German Embassy in Paris and
in charge of propaganda and information activities; on special mission in
Syria, April-July 1941.
Rashid Am ax-Gaylani, Iraq Minister President, April 8-June 3, 1941 ; subse-
quently in exile in Iran.
Renthe-Fink, Cecil von, Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in
Denmark.
Ribbentrop, Joachim von, German Foreign Minister.
Riccabdi, Arturo, Admiral, Chief of the Italian Naval Staff and Under Secretary
of the Navy.
Riccabdi, Raffaello, Italian Minister of Trade and International Payments.
Rioheet, Arvld, Swedish Minister in Germany.
Rintelbn, Emil von, Minister, Dirigent in the Political Department, German
Foreign Ministry.
Rintsxen, Enno von, General, German Military Attache 1 in Italy ; German Gen-
eral at Headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces.
Ripken, Georg, Counselor, Head of Division W IIIc, which in December 1941
was redsignated Ha. Pol. VII in the Economic Policy Department, German
Foreign Ministry.
Rxttes, Karl, Ambassador on special assignment in the German Foreign Ministry.
Riza Shah Pahlevi, Shah of Iran, 1925-September 16, 1941.
Rommel, Erwin, Lieutenant General, Commander of the German Africa Corps.
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, President of the United States of America.
Rosenberg, Alfred, Reichsleiter, Head of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the
NSDAP ; deputy of the Filhrer for supervision of spiritual and ideological
training of the NSDAP ; charged with "central direction of the questions of
the Eastern European area," April 20, 1941 ; Reich Minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories, July 17, 1941.
Ruiz GuiNAztf, Enrique, Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Rundstedt, Gerd von, German Field Marshal, Commanding Officer, Army Group
South at the Russian front to December 3, 1941.
Rrn, Rlsto, President of Finland.
Sabath, Hermann Friedrich, Senior Counselor, Head of Division W II in the
Economic Policy Department in the German Foreign Ministry until Decem-
ber 1941 ; thereafter Head of Divisions Ha. Pol. Ha and Ha. Pol. III.
Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira, Portuguese Minister President ; also Minister of
War and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Saracoolu, Sukrti, Turkish Foreign Minister.
Soavenius, Erik, Danish Foreign Minister.
Sohebpenbero, Hilger van, Counselor, Head of Division W V in the Economic
Policy Department in the German Foreign Ministry until December 1941 ;
thereafter Head of Division Ha. Pol. VI.
1030 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Sohleieb, Rudolf, Counselor in the German Embassy in Paria with the rank of
Consul General, later with that of Minister.
Schmidt, Paul Karl, Minister, Director of the News Service and Press Depart-
ment, German Foreign Ministry.
Sohmiot, Paul Otto Gustav, Minister, interpreter in the German Foreign Min-
istry ; attached to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat,
Sohhubre, Karl, Minister, Head of Division W IV in the Economic Policy De-
partment, German Foreign Ministry ; with the reorganization of December
1941 he was made Head of Group East (Divisions V, VI, VII, and VIII).
Sohobert, Eugen Bitter von, Colonel General, Commanding General of the
Eleventh German Army and "Commander in Chief of the German troops in
Rumania," May-September 1941.
Sohbobdee, Hans, Director of the Personnel and Administrative Department,
German Foreign Ministry.
Schulenbtjeo, Friedrich Werner, Count von der, German Ambassador in the
Soviet Union to June 22, 1941,
Sohwabzmahn, Hans, Official in the Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister.
Serrano SuSer, Ramon, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Setss-Inqhtabt, Arthur, Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands.
Simovic, Dusan, General, Minister President of the Yugoslav Government in
exile.
Skibpa, Kazys, Lithuanian Minister in Germany, 1939-1940.
Smgtanin, Konstantln, Soviet Ambassador in Japan.
Sodebblom, Staffan John, Head of the Political Department In the Swedish For-
eign Ministry.
Sonni.eithnbb, Franz, Senior Counselor, official in the Secretariat of the German
Foreign Minister.
Stachiw, Wolodymyr, Representative of Stepan Bandera, the leader of a faction
in the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) .
Stahmeb, Heinrich, Far East specialist of the Dienststelle Rlbbentrop, on special
assignment to the Foreign Minister with rank of Ambassador ; appointed
Ambassador to the Nanking government, September 1941.
Stalin, Josef Vissarlonovich, Secretary General of the Central Committee of
the Communist party of the Soviet Union and member of the Politburo;
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.
Staunino, Tnorvald, Danish Minister President.
Steengracht von Moyiand, Adolf, Baron, Counselor in the German Foreign
Ministry ; member of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff.
Stelzer, Gerhard, Counselor of Legation in the German Legation in Rumania,
Stimbon, Henry Lewis, United States Secretary of War.
Stobbeb, Eberhard von, German Ambassador in Spain.
STttoNAGEL, Otto von, General, German Military Commander in France.
Sugitama, Hajime, Japanese General, Chief of the Army General Staff.
Soneb, Bee Serrano Suker.
Szt6jay, Dome, General, Hungarian Minister in Germany.
Tardini, Domenico, Monsignor, Secretary of the Congregation for Extraordinary
Ecclesiastical Affairs.
Taylor, Myron Charles, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope
Pius XII with rank of Ambassador.
Thermann, Edmund, Freiherr von, German Ambassador in Argentina.
Thomas, Georg, General, Head of the War Economy and Armaments Office
( Webrwlrtschaf ts-und Rustungsamt) of the OKW.
APPENDIX in 1031
Thomben, Hans, Counselor of Embassy, OhargS d* Affaires of the German Em-
bassy in the United States.
Two, Joseph, Monsignor, leader of the Slovak People's party; President of
Slovakia.
Tittmann, Harold H., United States Foreign Service Officer, assistant to Myron
O. Taylor.
Toao, Shigenorl, Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union, 1938-1940 ; Foreign
Minister from October 18, 1941.
Tojo, Hideki, General, Japanese Minister of War from July 1940 ; Prime Min-
ister from October 17, 1941.
Tovar, Count de, Portuguese Minister in Germany from September 1941.
Toyoda, Teljiro, Admiral, Japanese Minister for Commerce and Industry to July
16, 1941 ; Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Colonies, July 18-
October 16, 1941.
Tboll-Obebgfell, Heribert von, Counselor of Legation in the German Legation
in Croatia.
TfloiAKOGLOu, George, Minister President of an Axis-sponsored Greek Govern-
ment in Athens.
Tdka, Vojtech, Slovak Minister President
Tueneb, Friedrich, State Councilor, Chief of the Administrative Staff of the
German Military Commander in Serbia.
Uthmakn, Bruno von, General, German Military Attache 1 in Sweden.
Vaboab, Qetulio Dornelles, President of Brazil.
Vkesenmayeb, Edmund, SS-Standartenfuhrer, on the staff of State Secretary
for Special Duties Keppler in the Foreign Ministry; on special assignment
in Belgrade.
Vebekeb, George Gordon Medllcott, British Minister in Finland.
Vool, Oskar, General, Chairman, German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden.
Wahlebt, Paul von, Lieutenant Commander, German Naval Attach^ in Sweden.
Wai-teb, W., Ministerialdirektor in the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture,
in charge of questions of customs, trade and foreign exchange ; Chairman
of the German Committee for economic negotiations with Sweden.
Wang Chiho-wei, Chinese political leader, Head of a Chinese Central Govern-
ment at Nanking sponsored by Japan.
Warlimoht, Walter, German General, Chief of the Department of National
Defense (Abt. L), Wehrmacht Operations Staff.
Weddell, Alexander W., United States Ambassador in Spain.
Weizsackeb, Ernst, Freiherr von, State Secretary of the German Foreign
Ministry.
Wbdck, Wolfgang, Freiherr von, Counselor in the Political Department in the
German Foreign Ministry, assigned to the German Armistice Commission
in Wiesbaden.
Welles, Sumner, United States Under Secretary of State.
Wendler, Ernst, German Minister in Bolivia, November 1937-July 21, 1941.
Webth, Henrlk, General, Chief of the Hungarian General Staff to September
1941.
Wetoakd, Maxime, General, Delegate General of the French Government in
French Africa to November 20, 1941.
Wied, Viktor, Prlnz zu, German Minister in Sweden.
Wiehl, Bmil Karl Josef, Director of the Economic Policy Department, German
Foreign Ministry.
Wilhelmina, Queen of the Netherlands.
1032 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
WnixiE, Wendell, Republican candidate for the Presidency of the United States,
1940.
Witting, Rolf, Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Woeemanw, Ernst, Director of the Political Department in the German Foreign
Ministry with the title of Under State Secretary.
Wohwhat, Helmuth, Prussian State Councilor, Minleterialdirektor for special
assignments In the Four Tear Plan; Head of the delegation for economic
negotiations with Japan from April 1941.
Wusteb, Walther, Consul General, Cultural Affairs specialist In the German
Embassy In Italy ; Director of the Information Department in the Foreign
Ministry, August 15, 1941.
Zbohlin, Erich Wilhelm, German Minister In Lithuania, 1933-1940; assigned
to the Legation in Finland, May 1941.
Zsohmn, Walter, Head of the Press Department in the German Foreign Mfnistry
and Reich Press Chief, 1926-1932 ; assigned to the Embassy in Spain in 1939
where he served aa Press Attache.
Zodlfikab, Tussef, Pasha, Egptian Ambassador In Iran.
Appendix IV
GLOSSARY
OF GERMAN TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 1
AA, Auswartiges Amt, the German
Foreign Ministry
Abt,, Abteilung, department
Abteilung Dcutschland, see D
Abt. L, Abt. Landesverteidigung, the
Department of National Defense in
the Wehrmacht Operations Stan*
Abwehr, counterintelligence, the For-
eign Intelligence Service of the
OKW
ADEuRSt, Amtliche Deutsche Ein-
und Riickwandererstelle, Official
German Agency for Immigrants
and Repatriates
AGK, Ausfuhrgemeinschaft fiir
Kriegsgerat, Export Cartel for war
material
Ang., Angabe, a designation given
when action of more than one sort
was to be taken on a paper. In such
cases the relevant instructions were
usually split up as Ang. I, II, etc.,
which designations followed the file
numbers
AO, Auslandsorganisation, foreign or-
ganization of the National Socialist
party concerned with German na-
tionals living abroad
APA, Aussenpolitisches Amt, foreign
affairs office of the National Social-
ist party
Aus„ Ausl, Ausland, the foreign intel-
ligence department of the OKW
Ausl./Abw., Amt Ausland/Abwehr,
the office of foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence of the OKW
1 Abbreviations are explained by giv-
ing the full German terms. These
terms are explained at their proper
alphabetical listings.
BRAM, Biiro RAM, Secretariat of the
Reich Foreign Minister
Brigadefiihrer, SA and SS rank equiv-
alent to Brigadier General
Chefs., Chefsache, top secret military
D, Abteilung Deutschland, Depart-
ment for German Internal Affairs
in the German Foreign Ministry
Dg„ Dirigent, the deputy head of a
Department of the German Foreign
Ministry
Dienststelle Ribbentrop, office of Rib-
bentrop in his capacity as foreign
affairs adviser to Hitler ; of decreas-
ing importance after his appoint-
ment as Foreign Minister
DNB, Deutsches Nachrichtenbiiro,
German News Agency, owned by the
Ministry of Propaganda
DNSAP, Danmarks National-Social-
istiske Arbejder-Parti, the Danish
National Socialist party
Einsatzgruppc, a special task force
organized by the Security Police and
Security Service
e.o^ ex officio; where this precedes the
file number, It Indicates that there
are no previous papers on the sub-
ject bearing this number
g„ geh, geheim, secret
Gau, the largest territorial adminis-
trative unit of the National Socialist
party
Gauleiter, highest official in a Gau
Gen. Qu, Generalquartiermeister,
general staff officer In charge of
supply and administration
Gen. St. d.H, Generalstab des Heeres,
Army General Staff
g.K, g. Kdos., geheime Kommando-
sache, top secret military
g. Rs, geheime Reichssache, top secret
1033
1034
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOEBIGN POLICY
Ha. Pol., Handelspolitische Abtcilung,
the Economic Policy Department in
the German Foreign Ministry which
again became the official designa-
tion with the reorganization of De-
cember 1941
Kreisleiter, district leader of the Na-
tional Socialist party
Kult, Kulturpolitische Abteilung, the
Cultural Policy Department of the
German Foreign Ministry
Leibstandarte, originally a bodyguard,
later an S3 elite regiment
Luftwaffe, the German Air Force of
the era of World War II
Ministerialdirektor, a grade in the
German Civil Service, usually the
director of a department in a Min-
istry
Ministerialdirigent, a grade in the
German Civil Service, usually dep-
uty director of a department in a
Ministry
Ministerialrat, Ministerial Counselor,
a grade In the German Civil Service
Multex, a circular telegram
NSB, Natiouaal-Socialistische Beweg-
ing, the National Socialist move-
ment in the Netherlands
NSDAP, Nationalsozialistische Deut-
sche Arbeiterpartei, National Social-
ist German Workers party, the full
title of the National Socialist party
NSKK, Nationalsozialistische Kraft-
fahrerkorps, National Socialist Mo-
tor Vehicle Drivers' Corps
NSNAP, Nationaal Social istische
Nederlandsche Arbeiders Partij, the
National Socialist party of the
Netherlands
Ob. d.H., Oberbefehlshaber des
Heeres, Commander in Chief of the
Army
Ob. d.L., Oberbefehlshaber der Luft-
waffe, Commander in Chief of the
Luftwaffe
Ob. d.M, Oberbefehlshaber der
Kriegsmarine, Commander in Chief
of the Navy
Oberdienstleiter, a rank in the Na-
tional Socialist party organization
Obergruppenfiihrer, SA and SS rank
equivalent to Lieutenant General
OKII, Oberkommando des Heeres,
High Command of the Army
OKL, Oberkommando der Luftwaffe,
High Command of the Luftwaffe
OKM, Oberkommando der Kriegsma-
rine, High Command of the Navy
OKW, Oberkommando der Wehr-
macht, High Command of the Wehr-
macht
OUN, Organization of Ukrainian Na-
tionalists
P, Presse, the News Service and
Press Department in the German
Foreign Ministry
Pers„ Personal- und Verwaltungs-
Abteilung, the Personnel and Ad-
ministrative Department of the Ger-
man Foreign Ministry
Pogiavnik, title of Ante Pavelic as
head of the Croatian State
Pol., Politische Abteilung, Political
Department of the Foreign Minis-
try; subdivided according to geo-
graphic areas, Referate, each desig-
nated by a Roman numeral, e.g., Pol.
IV (see Appendix I)
Pol. XIII, a Referat under Ambassa-
dor Schulenburg which was estab-
lished in May 1942. It developed
from the "Russia Committee" and
took over certain files from Referat
D IX
R, Recht, Rechtsabteitung, Legal De-
partment of the German Foreign
Ministry
RAM, Reichsaussenminister, Reich
Foreign Minister
Referat, division within a department
of a German Ministry
Referent, drafting officer, expert, spe-
cialist
Reichsfrauenfiihrung, the higher lead-
ership of the National Socialist
women's organization, and as such
a department of the central leader-
ship of the NSDAP with its seat in
Berlin
Reichsfiihrer SS, Commander in Chief
oftheSS
Reichsgau, administrative division of
territories, formerly part of Austria,
Czechoslovakia, and Poland, which
were incorporated into Germany
APPENDIX IV
1035
Reichslciter, highest rank in the Na-
tional Socialist party organization
Reichsmarschall, Reich Marshal, mili-
tary rank given to Goring
ReichsnHhrstand, the National Social-
ist public corporation for German
agriculture and Its branches, estab-
lished in 1933-1934 by Walter Darre,
Reich Minister for Food and Agri-
culture
Reichsstatthalter, Reich Governor,
representative of the Reich in a
German territory, either a Land or
a Reichsgau, with powers of control
over its entire administration
Rk., Reichskanzlei, Reich Chancellery
RLM, Reichsluftfahrtministerium,
Reich Ministry of Air
RM, Reichsminister, Reich Minister
Ru, Rundfunk, the Radio Department
in the German Foreign Ministry
RWM, Reichswirtschaftsministerium,
Reich Ministry of Economics
SA, Sturmabteilungen der NSDAP,
Storm Troops of the NSDAP
(brown shirts)
SD, Sicherheitsdienst, security serv-
ice; intelligence and counterintelli-
gence agency of the SS and the Se-
curity Police
SKL, Seekriegsleitung, Naval War
Staff
SS, Schutzstaffeln, elite corps of the
National Socialist party, used for
police and military purposes
Stabsleiter, head of the staff of a cen-
tral department In the National
Socialist party
Standarte, SA and SS unit equivalent
to a regiment
Standartenfuhrer, SA and SS rank
equivalent to Colonel
St.S., Staatssekretar, State Secretary
Sturmbannfuhrer, SA and SS rank
equivalent to Major
Ustasa (plural Ustase), Croatian
word meaning rebel or revolt. A
revolutionary, nationalistic, secret
organization founded by Pavelic"
which became a militia in inde-
pendent Croatia
U. St.S, Unterstaatssekreta'r, Under
State Secretary
Volksdeutsche, ethnic Germans, i.e.,
persons belonging to the German
cultural community living outside
the frontiers of the Reich and not
Reich subjects
W, Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung,
the Economic Policy Department in
the German Foreign Ministry
Waffen-SS, SS military units attached
to the Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht; designation of the Ger-
man armed forces after 1935
Westfalen, code name for a special
train used as temporary headquar-
ters by the German Foreign Min-
ister
WFSt, Wehrmachtfiihrungsstab,
Wehrmacht Operations Staff, an of-
fice in the OKW engaged In opera-
tions planning
WHA, Wissenschaftlicher Hilfsarbei-
ter, an auxiliary expert employed
on a consultant's basis, a profes-
sional assistant appointed for spe-
cial tasks
Wi Ru, WirtschafUriistungsamt, War
Economy and Armaments Office of
the OKW
zu, to, in connection with ; where this
precedes the Ale number it Indicates
that the previous papers in the sub-
ject have this number
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